W O R K E R S O F A L L C O U N T R I E S, U N I T E !

From Marx to Mao 
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Page 
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI 
JOINT PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND 
CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION OF THE 
C.P.S.U.(B.), July 29-August 9, 1927 . . . . . . 1 
The International Situation and the Defence of the 
U.S.S.R. Speech Delivered on August 1 . . . . 3 
I. The Attacks of the Opposition on Sections 
of the Comintern . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
II. About China . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
III. The Anglo-Soviet Unity Committee . . . . 39 
IV. The Threat of War and the Defence of the 
U.S.S.R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 
Speech Delivered on August 5 . . . . . . . . 63 
With Reference to the Opposition¹s ³Declaration² of 
August 8, 1927. Speech Delivered on August 9 . . . 90 
INTERVIEW WTTH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR 
DELEGATION, September 9, 1927 . . . . . . . 97 
I. Questions Put by the Delegation and Comrade 
Stalin¹s Answers . . . . . . . . . . . 97 
II. Questions Put by Comrade Stalin and the 
Delegates¹ Replies . . . . . . . . . . 141 
TO COMRADE M. I. ULYANOVA. REPLY TO COMRADE 
L. MIKHELSON . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154

CONTENTS VIII 
THE POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE RUSSIAN 
OPPOSITION. Excerpt from a Speech Delivered at a 
Joint Meeting of the Presidium of the Executive Committee 
of the Comintern and the International Control 
Commission, September 27, 1927. . . . . . . . 158 
SYNOPSIS OF THE ARTICLE ³THE INTERNATIONAL 
CHARACTER OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION² 173 
THE TROTSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW. 
Speech Delivered at a Meeting of the Joint Plenum of 
the Central Committee and Central Control Commission 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.), October 23, 1927 . . . . . . 177 
I. Some Minor Questions . . . . . . . . 177 
II. The Opposition¹s ³Platform² . . . . . . 183 
III. Lenin on Discussions and Oppositions in 
General. . . . . . . . . . . . . 187 
IV. The Opposition and the ³Third Force² . . 188 
V. How the Opposition Is ³Preparing² for the 
Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194 
VI. From Leninism to Trotskyism . . . . . . 198 
VII. Some of the Most Important Results of the 
Party¹s Policy During the Past Few Years 202 
VIII. Back to Axelrod . . . . . . . . . . 207 
INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS¹ DELEGATIONS, 
November 5, 1927 . . . . . . . . . . 212 
THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE OCTOBER 
REVOLUTION. On the Occasion of the Tenth 
Anniversary of the October Revolution . . . . . . 244 
TO THE PARTY CONFERENCE OF THE MOSCOW 
MILITARY AREA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256 
THE PARTY AND THE OPPOSITION. Speech Delivered 
at the Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Party Conference, 
November 23, 1927 . . . . . . . . . . . . 257

CONTENTS IX 
I. Brief Results of the Discussion . . . . . 257 
II. The Working Class and the Peasantry . . . 260 
III. The Party and the Dictatorship of the Proletariat 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . 266 
IV. The Prospects of Our Revolution . . . . . 270 
V. What Next? . . . . . . . . . . . . 272 
THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.), 
December 2-19, 1927. . . . . . . . . . . . 275 
Political Report of the Central Committee, December 3 277 
I. The Growing Crisis of World Capitalism and 
the External Situation of the U.S.S.R. . . . 277 
1. The Economics of World Capitalism and the Intensification 
of the Struggle for Foreign Markets . . . 278 
2. The International Policy of Capitalism and the 
Preparation of New Imperialist Wars . . . . . . 282 
3. The State of the World Revolutionary Movement 
and the Harbingers of a New Revolutionary Upsurge 288 
4. The Capitalist World and the U.S.S.R. . . . . . 291 
5. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297 
II. The Successes of Socialist Construction and the 
Internal Situation in the U.S.S.R. . . . . . 298 
1. The National Economy as a Whole . . . . . 300 
2. The Rate of Development of Our Large-Scale 
Socialist Industry . . . . . . . . . . . 307 
3. The Rate of Development of Our Agriculture . . . 310 
4. Classes, the State Apparatus and the Country¹s 
Cultural Development . . . . . . . . . . 321 
III. The Party and the Opposition . . . . . . 333 
1. The State of the Party . . . . . . . . . 333 
2. The Results of the Discussion . . . . . . . 342 
3. The Fundamental Divergences Between the Party 
and the Opposition. . . . . . . . . . . 346 
4. What Next? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357 
IV. General Summary . . . . . . . . . . . 361

CONTENTS X 
Reply to the Discussion on the Political Report of 
the Central Committee, December 7 . . . . . . 364 
I. Concerning Rakovsky¹s Speech . . . . . . 364 
II. Concerning Kamenev¹s Speech . . . . . . 367 
III. The Summing Up . . . . . . . . . . 379 
STATEMENT TO FOREIGN PRESS CORRESPONDENTS 
CONCERNING THE COUNTERFEIT ³ARTICLES BY 
STALIN² . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 383 
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387 
Biographical Chronicle (August-December 1927) . . . . . 404

PREFACE 
The tenth volume of J. V. Stalin¹s Works contains 
writings and speeches of the period August-December 
1927. 
By the end of 1927 the policy of the socialist industrialisation 
of the country had achieved decisive successes. 
The Bolshevik Party and the Soviet people were 
faced with the urgent task of passing to the collectivisation 
of agriculture. 
In the Political Report of the Central Committee 
to the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin 
analyses the international situation of the Soviet Union, 
the situation in the capitalist countries and the state 
of the revolutionary movement all over the world; shows 
the successes achieved in building socialism in the 
U.S.S.R. in the conditions of capitalist encirclement; 
defines the tasks involved in expanding and consolidating 
the socialist key positions and eliminating 
the capitalist elements from the national economy. 
J. V. Stalin substantiates the course taken towards the

PREFACE XII 
collectivisation of agriculture, which was approved and 
adopted by the congress. 
In the report to the Fifteenth Congress of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) and in his reply to the discussion on this 
report, in his speeches ³The Political Complexion of 
the Russian Opposition,² ³The Trotskyist Opposition 
Before and Now,² ³The Party and the Opposition,² 
and in other works, J. V. Stalin completes the ideological 
rout of Trotskyism, sets the Party the task of completely 
routing the Trotsky-Zinoviev anti-Soviet bloc 
organisationally and eliminating it, and emphasises 
the necessity of fighting tirelessly for unity and iron 
discipline in the ranks of the Bolshevik Party. 
J . V. Stalin¹s works ³The International Character 
of the October Revolution,² ³Interview with Foreign 
Workers¹ Delegations,² and ³The International Situation 
and the Defence of the U.S.S.R.² reveal the historic 
significance of the Great October Socialist Revolution, 
which marked the radical turn in the history of 
mankind from capitalism to communism and the triumph 
of Marxism-Leninism over Social-Democracy. 
J. V. Stalin emphasises the importance of the U.S.S.R. 
as the base of the world revolutionary movement and the 
necessity of defending the Soviet Union from attacks 
by imperialism. 
In his ³Interview with the First American Labour 
Delegation,² J. V. Stalin shows the indissoluble unity 
of Marxism and Leninism and reveals the new contribution 
that Lenin made to the general treasury of Marxism 
by developing the teachings of Marx and Engels 
in conformity with the new era‹the era of imperialism 
and proletarian revolutions.

PREFACE XIII 
In this volume are published for the f i r s t time 
J . V. Stalin¹s letter ³To Comrade M. I . Ulyanova. 
Reply to Comrade L. Mikhelson² and his ³Synopsis of 
the Article ŒThe International Character of the October 
Revolution.¹² 
Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute 
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)


1927 
AUGUST-DECEMBER


JOINT PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE AND CENTRAL CONTROL 
COMMISSION OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)1 
July 29-August 9, 1927 
J. Stalin, On the Opposition, 
Articles and Speeches (1921-27), 
Moscow and Leningrad, 1928


THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND 
THE DEFENCE OF THE U.S.S.R. 
Speech Delivered on August 1 
I 
THE ATTACKS OF THE OPPOSITION 
ON SECTIONS OF THE COMINTERN 
Comrades, I should like, first of all, to deal with 
the attacks of Kamenev, Zinoviev and Trotsky on sections 
of the Comintern, on the Polish section of the Comintern, 
on the Austrian, British and Chinese sections. 
I should like to touch on this question because they, 
the oppositionists, have muddied the waters here and 
have tried to throw dust in our eyes as regards our brother 
parties, whereas what we need here is clarity and 
not opposition twaddle. 
The question of the Polish Party. Zinoviev boldly 
stated here that if there is a Right deviation in the person 
of Warski in the Polish Party, it is the Communist 
International, the present leadership of the Comintern, 
that is to blame. He said that if Warski at one time 
adopted‹and he certainly did adopt‹the standpoint 
of supporting Pilsudski¹s troops, the Comintern is to 
blame for it. 
That is quite wrong. I should like to refer to the 
facts, to passages, well-known to you, of the verbatim 
report of the plenum of the Central Committee and 
Central Control Commission held in July of last year,

J. V. S T A L I N 4
I should like to refer to and cite the testimony of a man 
like Comrade Dzerzhinsky, who stated at the time that 
if there was a Right deviation in the Polish Party, it 
was fostered by none other than Zinoviev. 
That was during the days of the so-called Pilsudski 
rising,2 when we, the members of the Polish Commission 
of the E.C.C.I. and of the Central Committee of our 
Party, which included Dzerzhinsky, Unszlicht, myself, 
Zinoviev and others, were drafting the resolutions for 
the Communist Party of Poland. Zinoviev, as the Chairman 
of the Comintern, submitted his draft proposals, 
in which he said, among other things, that at that moment 
in Poland, when a struggle was flaring up between 
the forces that were behind Pilsudski and the forces 
that were behind the Witos government of Poland, that 
at such a moment, a policy of neutrality on the part of 
the Communist Party was impermissible and that for 
the time being no sharp pronouncements against Pilsudski 
should be made. 
Some of us, including Dzerzhinsky, objected and 
said that that directive was wrong, that it would only 
mislead the Communist Party of Poland. It was necessary 
to say that not only a policy of neutrality, but also 
a policy of supporting Pilsudski was impermissible. 
After some objections, that directive was accepted with 
our amendments. 
By this I want to say that it does not need much 
courage to come out against Warski, who made a mistake 
at that time and was suitably rebuked for it; but to 
blame others for one¹s own sins, to shift the blame for 
fostering the Right deviation in the Polish Party from 
the guilty one, Zinoviev, to the Comintern, to the pres

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 5 
ent leaders of the Comintern, means to commit a crime 
against the Comintern. 
You will say that this is a trifle and that I am wasting 
my time on it. No, comrades, it is not a trifle. The 
struggle against the Right deviation in the Polish Party 
is continuing and will continue. Zinoviev has‹well, 
what is the mildest way I can put it‹the audacity to 
assert that the Right deviation is supported by the present 
leadership of the Comintern. The facts, however, 
show the opposite. They show that Zinoviev is slandering 
the Comintern, that he is blaming others for his own 
sins. That is a habit with Zinoviev, it is nothing new 
for him. It is our duty, however, to expose this slanderous 
habit of his on every occasion. 
About Austria. Zinoviev asserted here that the Austrian 
Communist Party is weak, that it failed to assume 
the leadership of the action that took place recently 
in Vienna.3 That is true and not true. It is true that 
the Austrian Communist Party is weak; but to deny 
that it acted correctly is to slander it. Yes, it is still 
weak, but it is weak because, among other things, there 
is not yet that profound revolutionary crisis of capitalism 
which revolutionises the masses, which disorganises 
Social-Democracy and rapidly increases the chances 
of communism; it is weak because it is young; because 
in Austria there has long been firmly established the 
domination of the Social-Democratic ³Left wing,²4 
which is able, under cover of Left phrases, to 
pursue a Right-wing, opportunist policy; because Social- 
Democracy cannot be shattered at one stroke. But 
what indeed is Zinoviev driving at? He hinted, but 
did not dare to say openly, that if the Austrian Commu

J. V. S T A L I N 6
nist Party is weak, the Comintern is to blame for it. 
Evidently, that is what he wanted to say. But that is 
an impotent accusation. It is a slander. On the contrary, 
it was precisely after Zinoviev ceased to be the Chairman 
of the Comintern that the Austrian Communist 
Party was freed from nagging, from indiscriminate interference 
in its internal life, and thus obtained the opportunity 
to advance, to develop. Is it not a fact that it 
was able to take a most active part in the Vienna events, 
having won for itself the sympathy of the masses of the 
workers? Does not this show that the Austrian Communist 
Party is growing and becoming a mass party? How can 
these obvious facts be denied? 
The attack upon the British Communist Party. Zinoviev 
asserted that the British Communist Party gained 
nothing from the general strike and the coal strike,5 
that it even emerged from the struggle weaker than it 
was before. That is not true. It is not true because the 
importance of the British Communist Party is growing 
from day to day. Only those who are blind can deny 
that. It is obvious if only from the fact that whereas 
previously the British bourgeoisie paid no serious attention 
to the Communist Party, now, on the contrary, 
it is furiously persecuting it; not only the bourgeoisie, 
but also both the General Council and the British Labour 
Party have organised a furious campaign against 
³their² Communists. Why were the British Communists 
more or less tolerated until recently? Because they 
were weak, they had little influence among the masses. 
Why are they no longer tolerated, why are they now being 
fiercely attacked? Because the Communist Party is 
now feared as a force to be reckoned with, because the

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 7 
leaders of the British Labour Party and General Council 
fear it as their grave-digger. Zinoviev forgets this. 
I do not deny that, in general, the Western sections 
of the Comintern are still more or less weak. That cannot 
be denied. But what are the reasons? The chief reasons 
are: 
firstly, the absence of that profound revolutionary 
crisis which revolutionises the masses, brings them to 
their feet and turns them abruptly towards communism; 
secondly, the circumstance that in all the West- 
European countries the Social-Democratic parties are 
still the predominant force among the workers. These 
parties are older than the Communist Parties, which appeared 
only recently and cannot be expected to shatter 
the Social-Democratic parties at one stroke. 
And is it not a fact that, in spite of these circumstances, 
the Communist Parties in the West are growing, 
that their popularity among the masses of the workers 
is rising, that some of them have already become, and 
others are becoming, really mass parties of the proletariat? 
But there is still another reason why the Communist 
Parties in the West are not growing rapidly. That reason 
is the splitting activities of the opposition, of the very 
opposition that is present in this hall. What is required 
to enable the Communist Parties to grow rapidly? Iron 
unity in the Comintern, the absence of splits in its sections. 
But what is the opposition doing? It has created 
a second party in Germany, the party of Maslow and 
Ruth Fischer. It is trying to create similar splitting 
groups in other European countries. Our opposition has 
created a second party in Germany with a central

J. V. S T A L I N 8
committee, a central organ, and a parliamentary group; 
it has organised a split in the Comintern, knowing perfectly 
well that a split at the present time is bound to 
retard the growth of the Communist Parties; and now, 
throwing the blame on the Comintern, it is itself crying 
out about the slow growth of the Communist Parties 
in the West! Now, that is indeed impudence, unlimited 
impudence. . . . 
About the Chinese Communist Party. The oppositionists 
cry out that the Chinese Communist Party, or 
properly speaking, its leadership, has committed Social- 
Democratic, Menshevik mistakes. That is correct. The 
leadership of the Comintern is being blamed for that. 
Now, that is absolutely incorrect. On the contrary, the 
Comintern has systematically rectified the mistakes of 
the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Only 
those who are blind can deny that. You know it from 
the press, from Pravda, from The Communist International6; 
you know it from the decisions of the Comintern. 
The opposition has never named, and will not be able 
to name, a single directive, a single resolution of the 
Comintern capable of giving rise to a Menshevik deviation 
in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist 
Party, because there have been no such directives. 
It is foolish to think that if a Menshevik deviation has 
arisen in some Communist Party, or in its Central Committee, 
the Comintern must necessarily be to blame 
for it. 
Kamenev asks: Where do the Menshevik mistakes 
of the Chinese Communist Party come from? And he 
answers: They can only come about owing to the faulty 
leadership of the Comintern. But I ask: Where did the

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 9 
Menshevik mistakes of the German Communist Party 
during the 1923 revolution come from? Where did Brandlerism7 
come from? Who supported it? Is it not a fact 
that the Menshevik mistakes committed by the Central 
Committee of the German Party were supported by the 
present leader of the opposition, Trotsky? Why did not 
Kamenev say at that time that the appearance of Brandlerism 
was due to the incorrect leadership of the Comintern? 
Kamenev and Trotsky have forgotten the lessons 
of the revolutionary movement of the proletariat. They 
have forgotten that with the upsurge of the revolution 
Right and Left deviations are bound to appear in the 
Communist Parties, the former refusing to break with 
the past and the latter refusing to reckon with the present. 
They have forgotten that no revolution is without 
such deviations. 
And what happened in our Party in October 1917? 
Were there not a Right and a Left deviation in our Party 
at that time? Have Kamenev and Zinoviev forgotten 
that? Do you remember, comrades, the history of the 
Menshevik mistakes that Kamenev and Zinoviev made 
in October? What were those mistakes due to? Who was 
to blame for them? Could Lenin, or the Central Committee 
of Lenin¹s Party, be blamed for them? How could 
the opposition ³forget² these and similar facts? How 
could it ³forget² that with the upsurge of the revolution 
Right and Left deviations from Marxism always make 
their appearance within the parties? And what is the 
task of the Marxists, of the Leninists, under such circumstances? 
It is to fight the Left and Right deviators. 
I am surprised at the arrogance displayed by 
Trotsky who, you see, apparently cannot tolerate the

J. V. S T A L I N 10 
slightest mistake being made by the Communist Parties 
in the West or in the East. He, if you please, is surprised 
that over there, in China, where there is a young 
party, barely two years old, Menshevik mistakes 
could make their appearance. But how many years did 
Trotsky himself stray among the Mensheviks? Has he 
forgotten that? Why, he strayed among the Mensheviks 
for fourteen years‹from 1903 to 1917. Why does 
he excuse his own straying among all sorts of anti- 
Leninist ³trends² for fourteen years before he drew 
near to Bolshevism, but does not grant the young 
Chinese Communists at least four years? Why is he 
so arrogant towards others while forgetting about his 
own strayings? Why? Where is the ³fairness² of it, so 
to speak? 
II 
ABOUT CHINA 
Let us pass to the question of China. 
I shall not dwell on the mistakes of the opposition 
on the question of the character and prospects of the 
Chinese revolution. I shall not do so because enough 
has been said, and said quite convincingly, on this 
subject, and it is not worth while repeating it here. Nor 
shall I dwell on the assertion that in its present phase 
the Chinese revolution is a revolution for customs autonomy 
(Trotsky). Nor is it worth while dwelling on the 
assertion that no feudal survivals exist in China, or that, 
if they do exist, they are of no great importance (Trotsky 
and Radek), in which case the agrarian revolution in 
China would be absolutely incomprehensible. You no

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 11 
doubt already know from our Party press about these 
and similar mistakes of the opposition on the Chinese 
question. 
Let us pass to the question of the basic premises 
of Leninism in deciding the questions of revolution in 
colonial and dependent countries. 
What is the basic premise of the Comintern and the 
Communist Parties generally in their approach to the 
questions of the revolutionary movement in colonial 
and dependent countries? 
It consists in a strict distinction between revolution 
in imperialist countries, in countries that oppress other 
nations, and revolution in colonial and dependent 
countries, in countries that suffer from imperialist oppression 
by other states. Revolution in imperialist countries 
is one thing: there the bourgeoisie is the oppressor 
of other nations; there it is counter-revolutionary 
at all stages of the revolution; there the national factor, 
as a factor in the struggle for emancipation, is absent. 
Revolution in colonial and dependent countries is another 
thing: there the imperialist oppression by other states 
is one of the factors of the revolution; there this oppression 
cannot but affect the national bourgeoisie also; there 
the national bourgeoisie, at a certain stage and for a 
certain period, may support the revolutionary movement 
of its country against imperialism; there the national 
factor, as a factor in the struggle for emancipation, 
is a revolutionary factor. 
To fail to draw this distinction, to fail to understand 
this difference and to identify revolution in imperialist 
countries with revolution in colonial countries, 
is to depart from the path of Marxism, from the path

J. V. S T A L I N 12 
of Leninism, to take the path of the supporters of the 
Second International. 
Here is what Lenin said about this in his report 
on the national and colonial questions at the Second 
Congress of the Comintern: 
³What is the most important, the fundamental idea of our theses? 
The distinction between oppressed nations and oppressing 
nations. We emphasise this distinction‹in contrast to the Second 
International and bourgeois democracy²* (Vol. XXV, 
p. 351).** 
The principal error of the opposition is that it fails 
to understand and does not admit this difference between 
the two types of revolution. 
The principal error of the opposition is that it identifies 
the 1905 Revolution in Russia, an imperialist 
country which oppressed other nations, with the revolution 
in China, an oppressed, semi-colonial country, 
which is compelled to fight imperialist oppression on 
the part of other states. 
Here in Russia, in 1905, the revolution was directed 
against the bourgeoisie, against the liberal bourgeoisie, 
in spite of the fact that it was a bourgeois-democratic 
revolution. Why? Because the liberal bourgeoisie of 
an imperialist country is bound to be counter-revolutionary. 
For that very reason among the Bolsheviks at 
that time there was not, and could not be, any question 
of temporary blocs and agreements with the liberal bourgeoisie. 
On these grounds, the opposition asserts that 
* My italics.‹J. St. 
** References in Roman numerals to Lenin¹s works here and 
elsewhere are to the 3rd Russian edition of the Works.‹Tr.

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 13 
the same attitude should be adopted in China at all stages 
of the revolutionary movement, that temporary agreements 
and blocs with the national bourgeoisie are 
never permissible in China under any conditions. But 
the opposition forgets that only people who do not understand 
and do not admit that there is a difference between 
revolution in oppressed countries and revolution 
in oppressing countries can talk like that, that only 
people who are breaking with Leninism and are sinking 
to the level of supporters of the Second International 
can talk like that. 
Here is what Lenin said about the permissibility of 
entering into temporary agreements and blocs with the 
bourgeois-liberation movement in colonial countries: 
³The Communist International must enter into a temporary 
alliance* with bourgeois democracy in the colonies and backward 
countries, but must not merge with it, and must unfailingly preserve 
the independence of the proletarian movement, even if in 
its most rudimentary form² (see Vol. XXV, p. 290) . . . ³we, as 
Communists, should, and will, support bourgeois-liberation* movements 
in colonial countries only when those movements are 
really revolutionary, when the representatives of those movements 
do not hinder us in training and organising the peasantry 
and the broad masses of the exploited in a revolutionary 
spirit² (Vol. XXV, p. 353). 
How could it ³happen² that Lenin, who fulminated 
against agreements with the bourgeoisie in Russia, 
admitted that such agreements and blocs were permissible 
in China? Perhaps Lenin was mistaken? Perhaps 
he had turned from revolutionary tactics to opportunist 
tactics? Of course not! It ³happened² because Lenin 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 14 
understood the difference between revolution in an oppressed 
country and revolution in an oppressing country. 
It ³happened² because Lenin understood that, at a certain 
stage of its development, the national bourgeoisie 
in the colonial and dependent countries may support 
the revolutionary movement of its own country against 
the oppression of imperialism. That the opposition refuses 
to understand, but it refuses to do so because it 
is breaking with Lenin¹s revolutionary tactics, breaking 
with the revolutionary tactics of Leninism. 
Have you noticed how carefully in their speeches 
the leaders of the opposition evaded these directives 
of Lenin¹s, being afraid to mention them? Why do they 
evade these universally-known tactical directives of 
Lenin¹s for the colonial and dependent countries? Why 
are they afraid of these directives? Because they are 
afraid of the truth. Because Lenin¹s tactical directives 
refute the entire ideological and political line of 
Trotskyism on the questions of the Chinese revolution. 
About the stages of the Chinese revolution. The opposition 
has got so confused that it is now denying that 
there are any stages at all in the development of the 
Chinese revolution. But is there such a thing as a revolution 
that does not go through definite stages of development? 
Did not our revolution have its stages of development? 
Take Lenin¹s April Theses8 and you will 
see that Lenin recognised two stages in our revolution: 
the first stage was the bourgeois-democratic revolution, 
with the agrarian movement as its main axis; the second 
stage was the October Revolution, with the seizure of 
power by the proletariat as its main axis.

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 15 
What are the stages in the Chinese revolution? 
In my opinion there should be three: 
the first stage is the revolution of an all-national 
united front, the Canton period, when the revolution 
was striking chiefly at foreign imperialism, and the 
national bourgeoisie supported the revolutionary movement; 
the second stage is the bourgeois-democratic revolution, 
after the national troops reached the Yangtse 
River, when the national bourgeoisie deserted the revolution 
and the agrarian movement grew into a mighty 
revolution of tens of millions of the peasantry (the Chinese 
revolution is now at the second stage of its development); 
the third stage is the Soviet revolution, which has 
not yet come, but will come. 
Whoever fails to understand that there is no such 
thing as a revolution without definite stages of development, 
whoever fails to understand that there are three 
stages in the development of the Chinese revolution, 
understands nothing about Marxism or about the Chinese 
question. 
What is the characteristic feature of the first stage of 
the Chinese revolution? 
The characteristic feature of the first stage of the 
Chinese revolution is, firstly, that it was the revolution 
of an all-national united front, and secondly, that 
it was directed mainly against foreign imperialist oppression 
(the Hongkong strike,9 etc.). Was Canton then 
the centre, the place d¹armes, of the revolutionary 
movement in China? Of course, it was. Only those who 
are blind can deny that now.

J. V. S T A L I N 16 
Is it true that the first stage of a colonial revolution 
must have just such a character? I think it is true. In 
the ³Supplementary Theses² of the Second Congress of 
the Comintern, which deal with the revolution in China 
and India, it is explicitly stated that in those countries 
³foreign domination is all the time hindering the free 
development of social life,² that ³therefore, the first 
step* of a revolution in the colonies must be to overthrow 
foreign capitalism² (see Verbatim Report of the 
Second Congress of the Comintern, p. 605). 
The characteristic feature of the Chinese revolution 
is that it has taken this ³first step,² has passed through 
the first stage of its development, has passed through 
the period of the revolution of an all-national united 
front and has entered the second stage of its development, 
the period of the agrarian revolution. 
The characteristic feature, for instance, of the Turkish 
revolution (the Kemalists), on the contrary, is 
that it got stuck at the ³first step,² at the first stage 
of its development, at the stage of the bourgeois-liberation 
movement, without even attempting to pass to 
the second stage of its development, the stage of the 
agrarian revolution. 
What were the Kuomintang10 and its government 
at the first stage of the revolution, the Canton period? 
They were a bloc of the workers, the peasants, the bourgeois 
intellectuals and the national bourgeoisie. Was Canton 
at that time the centre of the revolutionary movement, 
the place d¹armes of the revolution? Was it correct 
policy at that time to support the Canton Kuomin- 
* My italics.‹J. St.

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 17 
tang, as the government of the struggle for liberation 
from imperialism? Were we right in giving assistance to 
Canton in China and, say, Ankara in Turkey, when Canton 
and Ankara were fighting imperialism? Yes, we were right. 
We were right, and we were then following in the footsteps 
of Lenin, for the struggle waged by Canton and 
Ankara was dissipating the forces of imperialism, was 
weakening and discrediting imperialism, and was thus 
facilitating the development of the centre of the world 
revolution, the development of the U.S.S.R. Is it true 
that at that time the present leaders of our opposition 
joined with us in supporting both Canton and Ankara, 
giving them certain assistance? Yes, it is true. Let anybody 
try to refute that. 
But what does a united front with the national bourgeoisie 
at the first stage of a colonial revolution mean? 
Does it mean that Communists must not intensify the 
struggle of the workers and peasants against the landlords 
and the national bourgeoisie, that the proletariat ought 
to sacrifice its independence, if only to a very slight 
extent, if only for a very short time? No, it does not 
mean that. A united front can be of revolutionary significance 
only where, and only on condition that, it does 
not prevent the Communist Party from conducting its 
independent political and organisational work, from 
organising the proletariat into an independent political 
force, from rousing the peasantry against the landlords, 
from openly organising a workers¹ and peasants¹ revolution 
and from preparing in this way the conditions for the 
hegemony of the proletariat. I think that the reporter 
fully proved on the basis of universally-known documents 
that it was precisely this conception of the united front

J. V. S T A L I N 18 
that the Comintern impressed upon the Chinese Communist 
Party. 
Kamenev and Zinoviev referred here to a single 
telegram sent to Shanghai in October 1926, stating that 
for the time being, until Shanghai was captured, the 
agrarian movement should not be intensified. I am far 
from admitting that that telegram was right. I have 
never regarded and do not now regard the Comintern 
as being infallible. Mistakes are sometimes made, and 
that telegram was unquestionably a mistake. But, firstly, 
the Comintern itself cancelled that telegram a few 
weeks later (in November 1926), without any promptings 
or signals from the opposition. Secondly, why has 
the opposition kept silent about this until now? Why 
has it recalled that telegram only after nine months? 
And why does it conceal from the Party the fact that 
the Comintern cancelled that telegram nine months ago? 
Hence, it would be malicious slander to assert that that 
telegram defined the line of our leadership. As a matter 
of fact, it was an isolated, episodic telegram, totally 
uncharacteristic of the line of the Comintern, of the line 
of our leadership. That is obvious, I repeat, if only from 
the fact that it was cancelled within a few weeks by a 
number of documents which laid down the line, and 
which were indeed characteristic of our leadership. 
Permit me to refer to these documents. 
Here, for instance, is an excerpt from the resolution 
of the Seventh Plenum of the Comintern, in November 
1926, i.e., a month after the above-mentioned telegram: 
³The peculiar feature of the present situation is its transitional 
character, the fact that the proletariat must choose between 
the prospect of a bloc with considerable sections of the bourgeoisie

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 19 
and the prospect of further consolidating its alliance with the 
peasantry. If the proletariat fails to put forward a radical agrarian 
programme, it will be unable to draw the peasantry into the revolutionary 
struggle and will forfeit its hegemony in the national-liberation 
movement.²* 
And further: 
³The Canton People¹s Government will not be able to retain 
power in the revolution, will not be able to achieve complete victory 
over foreign imperialism and native reaction until the cause 
of national liberation is identified with the agrarian revolution²* 
(see Resolution of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.). 
There you have a document which really does define 
the line of the Comintern leadership. 
It is very strange that the leaders of the opposition 
avoid mention of this universally-known Comintern 
document. 
Perhaps it will not be taken as boastful if I refer 
to the speech I delivered in November of that same year, 
1926, in the Chinese Commission of the Comintern, which, 
not without my participation of course, drafted the 
resolution of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum on the Chinese 
question. That speech was subsequently published 
in pamphlet form under the title The Prospects of the 
Revolution in China. Here are some passages from that 
speech: 
³I know that there are Kuomintangists and even Chinese 
Communists who do not consider it possible to unleash revolution 
in the countryside, since they fear that if the peasantry were drawn 
into the revolution it would disrupt the united anti-imperialist 
front. That is a profound error, comrades. The more quickly and 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 20 
thoroughly the Chinese peasantry is drawn into the revolution, the 
stronger and more powerful the anti-imperialist front in China 
will be.² 
And further: 
³I know that among the Chinese Communists there are comrades 
who do not approve of workers going on strike for an 
improvement of their material conditions and legal status, and 
who try to dissuade the workers from striking. (A voice: ³That 
happened in Canton and Shanghai.²) That is a great mistake, 
comrades. It is a very serious underestimation of the role and 
importance of the Chinese proletariat. This fact should be noted 
in the theses as something decidedly objectionable. It would be 
a great mistake if the Chinese Communists failed to take advantage 
of the present favourable situation to assist the workers to improve 
their material conditions and legal status, even through 
strikes. Otherwise, what purpose does the revolution in China 
serve?² (See Stalin, The Prospects of the Revolution in China.)11 
And here is a third document, of December 1926, 
issued at a time when every city in China was bombarding 
the Comintern with assertions that an extension 
of the struggle of the workers would lead to a crisis, to 
unemployment, to the closing down of mills and factories: 
³A general policy of retreat in the towns and of curtailing 
the workers¹ struggle to improve their conditions would be wrong. 
The struggle in the countryside must be extended, but at the same 
time advantage must be taken of the favourable situation to improve 
the material conditions and legal status of the workers, 
while striving in every way to lend the workers¹ struggle an organised 
character, which precludes excesses or running too far ahead. 
Special efforts must be exerted to direct the struggle in the towns 
against the big bourgeoisie and, above all, against the imperialists, 
so as to keep the Chinese petty bourgeoisie and middle bourgeoisie 
as far as possible within the framework of the united front

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 21 
against the common enemy. We regard the system of conciliation 
boards, arbitration courts, etc., as expedient, provided a correct 
working-class policy is ensured in these institutions. At the same 
time we think i t necessary to utter the warning that decrees 
directed against the right to strike, against workers¹ freedom of 
assembly, etc., are absolutely impermissible.² 
Here is a fourth document, issued six weeks before 
Chiang Kai-shek¹s coup12: 
³The work of the Kuomintang and Communist units in the 
army must be intensified; they must be organised wherever they 
do not now exist and it is possible to organise them; where it is 
not possible to organise Communist units, intensified work must 
be conducted with the help of concealed Communists. 
³It is necessary to adopt the course of arming the workers and 
peasants and converting the peasant committees in the localities 
into actual organs of governmental authority equipped with armed 
self-defence, etc. 
³The Communist Party must everywhere come forward as 
such; a policy of voluntary semi-legality is impermissible; the 
Communist Party must not come forward as a brake on the mass 
movement; the Communist Party should not cover up the treacherous 
and reactionary policy of the Kuomintang Rights, and should 
mobilise the masses around the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist 
Party on the basis of exposing the Rights. 
³The attention of all political workers who are loyal to the 
revolution must be drawn to the fact that at the present time, in 
connection with the regrouping of class forces and concentration 
of the imperialist armies, the Chinese revolution is passing through 
a critical period, and that it can achieve further victories only 
by resolutely adopting the course of developing the mass movement. 
Otherwise a tremendous danger threatens the revolution. 
The fulfilment of directives is therefore more necessary than ever 
before.² 
And even earlier, already in April 1926, a year before 
the coup of the Kuomintang Rights and Chiang Kai

J. V. S T A L I N 
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22 
shek, the Comintern warned the Chinese Communist 
Party, pointing out that it was ³necessary to work for 
the resignation or expulsion of the Rights from the Kuomintang.² 
That is how the Comintern understood, and 
still understands, the tactics of a united front against 
imperialism at the first stage of a colonial revolution. 
Does the opposition know about these guiding documents? 
Of course it does. Why then does it say nothing 
about them? Because its aim is to raise a squabble, not 
to bring out the truth. 
And yet there was a time when the present leaders 
of the opposition, especially Zinoviev and Kamenev, 
did understand something about Leninism and, in the 
main, advocated the same policy for the Chinese revolutionary 
movement as was pursued by the Comintern, 
and which Comrade Lenin out lined for us in his theses.13 
I have in mind the Sixth Plenum of the Communist 
International, held in February-March 1926, when Zinoviev 
was Chairman of the Comintern, when he was 
still a Leninist and had not yet migrated to Trotsky¹s 
camp. I mention the Sixth Plenum of the Communist 
International because there is a resolution of that plenum 
on the Chinese revolution,14 which was adopted 
unanimously in February-March 1926, and which gives 
approximately the same estimate of the first stage 
of the Chinese revolution, of the Canton Kuomintang 
and of the Canton government, as is given by the Comintern 
and by the C.P.S.U.(B.), but which the opposition 
is now repudiating. I mention this resolution because 
Zinoviev voted for it at that time, and not a single mem

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 23 
ber of the Central Committee, not even Trotsky, Kamenev, 
or the other leaders of the present opposition, objected 
to it. 
Permit me to quote a few passages from that resolution. 
Here is what is said in the resolution about the Kuomintang: 
³The Shanghai and Hongkong political strikes of the Chinese 
workers (June-September 1925) marked a turning point in the 
struggle of the Chinese people for liberation from the foreign imperialists. 
. . . The political action of the proletariat gave a powerful 
impetus to the further development and consolidation of 
all the revolutionary-democratic organisations in the country, 
especially of the people¹s revolutionary party, the Kuomintang, 
and the revolutionary government in Canton. The Kuomintang 
party, the main body of which acted in alliance with the Chinese 
Communists, is a revolutionary bloc of workers, peasants, intellectuals, 
and the urban democracy,* based on the common class interests 
of these strata in the struggle against the foreign imperialists 
and against the whole military-feudal way of life, for the independence 
of the country and for a single revolutionary-democratic 
government² (see Resolution of the Sixth Plenum of the E.C.C.I.). 
Thus, the Canton Kuomintang is an alliance of four 
³classes.² As you see, this is almost ³Martynovism²15 
sanctified by none other than the then Chairman of the 
Comintern Zinoviev. 
About the Canton Kuomintang government: 
³The revolutionary government created by the Kuomintang 
party in Canton* has already succeeded in establishing contact 
with the widest masses of the workers, peasants, and urban democracy, 
and, basing i t s e l f on them, has smashed the counter- 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 24 
revolutionary bands supported by the imperialists (and is working 
for the radical democratisation of the whole political life of 
the Kwangtung Province). Thus, being the vanguard in the struggle 
of the Chinese people for independence, the Canton government 
serves as a model for the future revolutionary-democratic development 
of the country²* (ibid.). 
It turns out that the Canton Kuomintang government, 
being a bloc of four ³classes,² was a revolutionary 
government, and not only revolutionary, but even 
a model for the future revolutionary-democratic government 
in China. 
About the united front of workers, peasants and the 
bourgeoisie: 
³In face of the new dangers, the Chinese Communist Party 
and the Kuomintang must develop the most wide-spread political 
activity, organising mass action in support of the struggle 
of the people¹s armies, taking advantage of the contradictions 
within the camp of the imperialists and opposing to them a united 
national revolutionary front of the broadest strata of the population 
(workers, peasants, and the bourgeoisie) under the leadership 
of the revolutionary-democratic organisations²* (ibid.). 
It follows that temporary blocs and agreements with 
the bourgeoisie in colonial countries at a certain stage 
of the colonial revolution are not only permissible, but 
positively essential. 
Is it not true that this is very similar to what Lenin 
tells us in his well-known directives for the tactics of 
Communists in colonial and dependent countries? It 
is a pity, however, that Zinoviev has already managed 
to forget that. 
* My italics.‹J. St.

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 25 
The question of withdrawal from the Kuomintang: 
³Certain sections of the Chinese big bourgeoisie, which had 
temporarily grouped themselves around the Kuomintang Party, 
withdrew from it during the past year, which resulted in the formation 
on the Right wing of the Kuomintang of a small group 
that openly opposed a close alliance between the Kuomintang 
and the masses of the working people, demanded the expulsion 
of the Communists from the Kuomintang and opposed the revolutionary 
policy of the Canton government. The condemnation of 
this Right wing at the Second Congress of the Kuomintang (January 
1926) and the endorsement of the necessity for a militant alliance 
between the Kuomintang and the Communists confirm the revolutionary 
trend of the activities of the Kuomintang and the Canton 
government and ensure for the Kuomintang the revolutionary support 
of the proletariat²* (ibid.). 
It is seen that withdrawal of the Communists from 
the Kuomintang at the first stage of the Chinese revolution 
would have been a serious mistake. It is a pity, however, 
that Zinoviev, who voted for this resolution, 
had already managed to forget it in about a month; 
for it was not later than April 1926 (within a month) 
that Zinoviev demanded the immediate withdrawal of 
the Communists from the Kuomintang. 
About the deviations within the Chinese Communist 
Party and the impermissibility of skipping over the Kuomintang 
phase of the revolution: 
³The political self-determination of the Chinese Communists 
will develop in the struggle against two equally harmful deviations: 
against Right Liquidationism, which ignores the independent 
class tasks of the Chinese proletariat and leads to a formless 
merging with the general democratic national movement; and 
against the extreme Left sentiments in favour of skipping over the 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 26 
revolutionary-democratic stage of the movement to come immediately 
to the tasks of proletarian dictatorship and Soviet power, forgetting 
about the peasantry, that basic and decisive factor in the Chinese 
movement for national emancipation²* (ibid.). 
As you see, here are all the grounds for convicting 
the opposition now of wanting to skip over the Kuomintang 
phase of development in China, of underestimating 
the peasant movement, and of dashing post-haste 
towards Soviets. It hits the nail right on the head. 
Do Zinoviev, Kamenev and Trotsky know about this 
resolution? 
We must assume that they do. At any rate Zinoviev 
must know about it, for it was under his chairmanship 
that this resolution was adopted at the Sixth Plenum 
of the Comintern and he himself voted for it. Why 
are the leaders of the opposition now avoiding this resolution 
of the highest body of the world communist 
movement? Why are they keeping silent about it? Because 
it turns against them on all questions concerning 
the Chinese revolution. Because it refutes the whole of 
the present Trotskyist standpoint of the opposition. 
Because they have deserted the Comintern, deserted 
Leninism, and now, fearing their past, fearing their 
own shadows, are obliged cravenly to avoid the resolution 
of the Sixth Plenum of the Comintern. 
That is how matters stand as regards the first stageof 
the Chinese revolution. 
Let us pass now to the second stage of the Chinese 
revolution. 
While the distinguishing feature of the first stage 
* My italics.‹J. St.

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 27 
was that the spearhead of the revolution was turned 
mainly against foreign imperialism, the characteristic feature 
of the second stage is that the spearhead of the revolution 
is now turned mainly against internal enemies, 
primarily against the feudal landlords, against the feudal 
regime. 
Did the first stage accomplish its task of overthrowing 
foreign imperialism? No, it did not. It bequeathed 
the accomplishment of this task to the second stage of 
the Chinese revolution. It merely gave the revolutionary 
masses the first shaking up that roused them 
against imperialism, only to run its course and hand on 
the task to the future. 
It must be presumed that the second stage of the 
revolution also will not succeed in fully accomplishing 
the task of expelling the imperialists. It will give the 
broad masses of the Chinese workers and peasants a further 
shaking up to rouse them against imperialism, but 
it will do so in order to hand on the completion of this 
task to the next stage of the Chinese revolution, to 
the Soviet stage. 
There is nothing surprising in that. Do we not know 
that analogous facts occurred in the history of our revolution, 
although in a different situation and under different 
circumstances? Do we not know that the first 
stage of our revolution did not fully accomplish its task 
of completing the agrarian revolution, and that it handed 
on that task to the next stage of the revolution, 
to the October Revolution, which wholly and completely 
accomplished the task of eradicating the survivals 
of feudalism? It will therefore not be surprising 
if the second stage of the Chinese revolution does not

J. V. S T A L I N 28 
succeed in fully completing the agrarian revolution, 
and if the second stage of the revolution, after giving 
the vast masses of the peasantry a shaking up and 
rousing them against the survivals of feudalism, hands 
on the completion of this task to the next stage 
of the revolution, to the Soviet stage. That will only 
be a merit of the future Soviet revolution in China. 
What was the task of the Communists at the second 
stage of the revolution in China, when the centre of the 
revolutionary movement had obviously shifted from 
Canton to Wuhan, and when, parallel with the revolutionary 
centre in Wuhan, a counter-revolutionary centre 
was set up in Nanking? 
The task was to utilise to the full the possibility 
of openly organising the Party, the proletariat (trade 
unions), the peasantry (peasant associations), and the 
revolution generally. 
The task was to push the Wuhan Kuomintangists 
to the Left, towards the agrarian revolution. 
The task was to make the Wuhan Kuomintang the 
centre of the fight against counter-revolution and the 
core of a future revolutionary-democratic dictatorship 
of the proletariat and peasantry. 
Was that policy correct? 
The facts have shown that it was the only correct 
policy, the only policy capable of training the masses 
of workers and peasants for the further development 
of the revolution. 
The opposition at that time demanded the immediate 
formation of Soviets of Workers¹ and Peasants¹ 
Deputies. But that was sheer adventurism, an adventurist 
leap ahead, for the immediate formation of

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 29 
Soviets at that time would have meant skipping over 
the Left Kuomintang phase of development. 
Why? 
Because the Kuomintang in Wuhan, which supported 
the alliance with the Communists, had not yet 
discredited and exposed itself in the eyes of the masses 
of workers and peasants, and had not yet exhausted 
itself as a bourgeois revolutionary organisation. 
Because to have issued the slogan of Soviets and of 
the overthrow of the Wuhan government at a time when 
the masses had not yet been convinced through their own 
experience of the worthlessness of that government and 
of the necessity of overthrowing it, would have meant 
leaping ahead, breaking away from the masses, losing 
the support of the masses and thus causing the failure 
of the movement that had already started. 
The opposition thinks that, if it understands that 
the Wuhan Kuomintang was unreliable, unstable and 
insufficiently revolutionary (and it is not difficult for 
any qualified political worker to understand that), that 
is quite enough for the masses also to understand all 
this, that is enough for replacing the Kuomintang by 
Soviets and for securing the following of the masses. 
But that is the usual ³ultra-Left² mistake made by the 
opposition, which takes its own political consciousness 
and understanding for the political consciousness and 
understanding of the vast masses of workers and peasants. 
The opposition is right when it says that the Party 
must go forward. That is an ordinary Marxist precept, 
and there can not be any real Communist Party if it 
is not adhered to. But that is only part of the truth. The

J. V. S T A L I N 30 
whole truth is that the Party must not only go forward, 
but must also secure the following of the vast masses. 
To go forward without securing the following of the vast 
masses means in fact to break away from the movement. 
To go forward, breaking away from the rear-guard, without 
being able to secure the following of the rear-guard, 
means to make a leap ahead that can prevent the advance 
of the masses for some time. The essence of 
Leninist leadership is precisely that the vanguard should 
be able to secure the following of the rear-guard, that 
the vanguard should go forward without breaking away 
from the masses. But in order that the vanguard should 
not break away from the masses, in order that the vanguard 
should really secure the following of the vast 
masses, a decisive condition is needed, namely, that the 
masses themselves should be convinced through their own 
experience that the instructions, directives and slogans 
issued by the vanguard are correct. 
The misfortune of the opposition is that it does not 
accept this simple Leninist rule for leading the vast 
masses, that it does not understand that the Party alone, 
an advanced group alone, without the support of the 
vast masses, cannot make a revolution, that, in the final 
analysis, a revolution ³is made² by the vast masses 
of the working people. 
Why did we Bolsheviks, in April 1917, refrain from 
putting forward the practical slogan for the overthrow 
of the Provisional Government and the establishment 
of Soviet power in Russia, although we were convinced 
that in the very near future we should be faced with 
the necessity of overthrowing the Provisional Government 
and of establishing Soviet power?

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 31 
Because the broad masses of the working people, 
both in the rear and at the front, and, lastly, the Soviets 
themselves, were not yet ready to accept such a slogan, 
they still believed that the Provisional Government was 
revolutionary. 
Because the Provisional Government had not yet 
disgraced and discredited itself by supporting counterrevolution 
in the rear and at the front. 
Why did Lenin, in April 1917, denounce the Bagdatyev 
group in Petrograd which put forward the slogan 
of the immediate overthrow of the Provisional Government 
and the establishment of Soviet power? 
Because Bagdatyev¹s attempt was a dangerous leap 
ahead which created the danger of the Bolshevik Party 
breaking away from the vast masses of the workers 
and peasants. 
Adventurism in politics, Bagdatyevism in matters 
concerning the Chinese revolution‹that is what is now 
killing our Trotskyist opposition. 
Zinoviev asserts that in speaking of Bagdatyevism I 
identify the present Chinese revolution with the October 
Revolution. That, of course, is nonsense. In the first 
place, I myself made the reservation in my article 
³Notes on Contemporary Themes² that ³the analogy 
is a qualified one² and that ³I make it with all the necessary 
reservations, bearing in mind the difference between 
the situation of China in our day and that of Russia 
in 1917.²16 In the second place, it would be foolish to 
assert that one must never draw analogies with revolutions 
in other countries when characterising certain tendencies 
and certain mistakes committed in the revolution 
of a given country. Does not a revolution in one

J. V. S T A L I N 32 
country learn from revolutions in other countries, even 
if those revolutions are not all of the same type? If not, 
what does the science of revolution amount to? 
In essence, Zinoviev denies that there can be a science 
of revolution. Is it not a fact that in the period 
just before the October Revolution Lenin accused 
Chkheidze, Tsereteli, Steklov and others of the ³Louis 
Blancism² of the French Revolution of 1848? Look 
at Lenin¹s article ³Louis Blancism²17 and you will 
realise that Lenin made wide use of analogies from the 
French Revolution of 1848 in characterising the mistakes 
made by various leaders before October, although 
Lenin knew very well that the French Revolution of 
1848 was not of the same type as our October Revolution. 
And if we can speak of the ³Louis Blancism² 
of Chkheidze and Tsereteli in the period before the 
October Revolution, why cannot we speak of the ³Bagdatyevism² 
of Zinoviev and Trotsky in the period of 
the agrarian revolution in China? 
The opposition asserts that Wuhan was not the centre 
of the revolutionary movement. Why then did Zinoviev 
say that ³all round assistance should be rendered² 
the Wuhan Kuomintang, so as to make it the centre 
of the struggle against the Chinese Cavaignacs? Why 
did the Wuhan territory, and no other, become the centre 
of the maximum development of the agrarian movement? 
Is it not a fact that it was precisely the Wuhan 
territory (Hunan, Hupeh) that was the centre of the 
maximum development of the agrarian movement at 
the beginning of this year? Why could Canton, where 
there was no mass agrarian movement, be called ³the 
place d¹armes of the revolution² (Trotsky), whereas

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 33 
Wuhan, in the territory of which the agrarian revolution 
began and developed, must not be regarded as the 
centre, as the ³place d¹armes² of the revolutionary movement? 
How in that case are we to explain the fact 
that the opposition demanded that the Communist Party 
should remain in the Wuhan Kuomintang and the Wuhan 
government? Was the opposition, in April 1927, 
really in favour of a bloc with the ³counter-revolutionary² 
Wuhan Kuomintang? Why this ³forgetfulness² 
and confusion on the part of the opposition? 
The opposition is gloating over the fact that the 
bloc with the Wuhan Kuomintang proved to be shortlived, 
and, moreover, it asserts that the Comintern failed 
to warn the Chinese Communists of the possibility 
of the collapse of the Wuhan Kuomintang. It scarcely 
needs proof that the malicious glee displayed by the 
opposition only testifies to its political bankruptcy. 
The opposition evidently thinks that blocs with the national 
bourgeoisie in colonial countries ought to be of 
long duration; but only people who have lost the last 
remnants of Leninism can think that. Only those who 
are infected with defeatism can gloat over the fact that 
at the present stage the feudal landlords and imperialists 
in China have proved to be stronger than the revolution, 
that the pressure exercised by these hostile forces has 
induced the Wuhan Kuomintang to swing to the Right 
and has led to the temporary defeat of the Chinese revolution. 
As for the opposition¹s assertion that the Comintern 
failed to warn the Communist Party of China of 
the possible collapse of the Wuhan Kuomintang, that 
is one of the usual slanders now so abundant in the 
opposition¹s arsenal.

J. V. S T A L I N 34 
Permit me to quote some documents to refute the 
slanders of the opposition. 
First document, of May 1927: 
³The most important thing now in the internal policy of the 
Kuomintang is to develop the agrarian revolution systematically 
in all provinces, particularly in Kwangtung, under the slogan 
ŒAll power to the peasant associations and committees in the countryside.¹ 
This is the basis for the success of the revolution and of 
the Kuomintang. This is the basis for creating in China a big and 
powerful political and military army against imperialism and its 
agents. Practically, the slogan of confiscating the land is quite 
timely for the provinces in which there is a strong agrarian movement, 
such as Hunan, Kwangtung, etc. Without this the extension 
of the agrarian revolution is impossible*. . . . 
³It is necessary to start at once to organise eight or ten divisions 
of revolutionary peasants and workers with absolutely reliable 
officers. This will be a Wuhan guards force both at the front 
and in the rear for disarming unreliable units. This must not be 
delayed. 
³Disintegrating activities must be intensified in the rear and 
in Chiang Kai-shek¹s units, and assistance must be given to the 
insurgent peasants in Kwangtung, where the rule of the landlords 
is particularly unbearable.² 
The second document, of May 1927: 
³Without an agrarian revolution, victory is impossible. Without 
it the Central Committee of the Kuomintang will be converted 
into a wretched plaything of unreliable generals. Excesses must be 
combated not, however, by means of troops, but through the 
peasant associations. We are decidedly in favour of the actual 
seizure of the land by the masses. Apprehensions concerning Tang 
Ping-shan¹s mission are not devoid of foundation. You must not 
sever yourselves from the working-class and peasant movement, 
but must assist it in every way. Otherwise you will ruin the work. 
* My italics.‹J. St.

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 35 
³Some of the old leaders of the Central Committee of the Kuomintang 
are frightened by events, they are vacillating and compromising. 
An in creased number of new peasant and working-class 
leaders must be drawn from the masses into the Central Committee 
of the Kuomintang. Their bold voices will either stiffen the backs 
of the old leaders or result in their removal. The present structure of 
the Kuomintang must be changed. The top leadership of the Kuomintang 
must certainly be refreshed and reinforced with new 
leaders who have come to the fore in the agrarian revolution, 
while the local organisations must be broadened from the millions 
of members in workers¹ and peasants¹ associations. If this is not 
done the Kuomintang will run the risk of becoming divorced from life 
and of losing all prestige. 
³Dependence upon unreliable generals must be eliminated. Mobilise 
about 20,000 Communists, add about 20,000 revolutionary 
workers and peasants from Hunan and Hupeh, form several 
new army corps, use the students at the officers¹ school as commanders 
and organise your own reliable army before it is too late. If 
this is not done there is no guarantee against failure. It is a difficult 
matter, but there is no alternative. 
³Organise a Revolutionary Military Tribunal headed by 
prominent non-Communist Kuomintangists. Punish officers who 
maintain contact with Chiang Kai-shek or who incite the soldiers 
against the people, the workers and peasants. Persuasion is not 
enough. It is time to act. Scoundrels must he punished. If the Kuomintangists 
do not learn to be revolutionary Jacobins they will 
perish so fat as the people and the revolution ate concerned.²* 
As you see, the Comintern foresaw events, it gave 
timely warning of the dangers and told the Chinese Communists 
that the Wuhan Kuomintang would perish if 
the Kuomintangists failed to become revolutionary 
Jacobins. 
Kamenev said that the defeat of the Chinese revolution 
was due to the policy of the Comintern, and that 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 36 
we ³bred Cavaignacs in China.² Comrades, only one 
who is ready to commit a crime against the Party can 
say that sort of thing about our Party. That is what 
the Mensheviks said about the Bolsheviks during the 
July defeat of 1917, when the Russian Cavaignacs appeared 
on the scene. In his article ³On Slogans,²18 Lenin 
wrote that the July defeat was ³a victory for the Cavaignacs.² 
The Mensheviks at that time gloatingly asserted 
that the appearance of the Russian Cavaignacs was 
due to Lenin¹s policy. Does Kamenev think that the 
appearance of the Russian Cavaignacs during the July 
defeat of 1917 was due to Lenin¹s policy, to the policy 
of our Party, and not to some other cause? Is it becoming 
for Kamenev in this case to imitate the 
Menshevik gentry? (Laughter.) I did not think that the 
comrades of the opposition could sink so low. . . . 
We know that the Revolution of 1905 suffered defeat, 
more over that defeat was more profound than the 
present defeat of the Chinese revolution. The Mensheviks 
at that time said that the defeat of the 1905 Revolution 
was due to the extreme revolutionary tactics of the 
Bolsheviks. Does Kamenev here, too, want to take the 
Menshevik interpretation of the history of our revolution 
as his model and to cast a stone at the Bolsheviks? 
And how are we to explain the defeat of the Bavarian 
Soviet Republic? By Lenin¹s policy, perhaps, and 
not by the correlation of class forces? 
How are we to explain the defeat of the Hungarian 
Soviet Republic? By the policy of the Comintern, perhaps, 
and not by the correlation of class forces? 
How can it be asserted that the tactics of this or 
that party can abolish or reverse the correlation of class

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 37 
forces? Was our policy in 1905 correct, or not? Why 
did we suffer defeat at that time? Do not the facts show 
that if the policy of the opposition had been followed 
the revolution in China would have reached defeat more 
rapidly than was actually the case? What are we to say 
of people who forget about the correlation of class forces 
in time of revolution and who try to explain everything 
solely by the tactics of this or that party? Only one thing 
can be said of such people‹that they have broken with 
Marxism. 
C o n c l u s i o n s. The chief mistakes of the opposition 
are: 
1) The opposition does not understand the character 
and prospects of the Chinese revolution. 
2) The opposition sees no difference between the revolution 
in China and the revolution in Russia, between 
revolution in colonial countries and revolution in imperialist 
countries. 
3) The opposition is departing from Leninist tactics 
on the question of the attitude to the national bourgeoisie 
in colonial countries at the first stage of the revolution. 
4) The opposition does not understand the question 
of the Communists¹ participation in the Kuomintang. 
5) The opposition is violating the principles of 
Leninist tactics on the question of the relations between 
the vanguard (the Party) and the rear-guard (the vast 
masses of the working people). 
6) The opposition is departing from the resolutions 
of the Sixth and Seventh Plenums of the Executive Committee 
of the Communist International.

J. V. S T A L I N 38 
The opposition noisily brags about its policy on the 
Chinese question and asserts that if that policy had been 
adopted the situation in China today would be better 
than it is. It scarcely needs proof that, considering the 
gross mistakes committed by the opposition, the Chinese 
Communist Party would have landed in a complete 
impasse had it adopted the anti-Leninist and adventurist 
policy of the opposition. 
The fact that the Communist Party in China has 
in a short period grown from a small group of five or six 
thousand into a mass party of 60,000 members; the fact 
that the Chinese Communist Party has succeeded in organising 
nearly 3,000,000 proletarians in trade unions 
during this period; the fact that the Chinese Communist 
Party has succeeded in rousing the many millions of 
the peasantry from their torpor and in drawing tens of 
millions of peasants into the revolutionary peasant associations; 
the fact that the Chinese Communist Party 
has succeeded during this period in winning over whole 
regiments and divisions of national troops; the fact 
that the Chinese Communist Party has succeeded during 
this period in converting the idea of the hegemony of 
the proletariat from an aspiration into a reality‹the 
fact that the Chinese Communist Party has succeeded 
in a short period in achieving all these gains is due, 
among other things, to its having followed the path 
outlined by Lenin, the path indicated by the Comintern. 
Needless to say, if the policy of the opposition, with 
its mistakes and its anti-Leninist line on questions 
of colonial revolution, had been followed, these gains 
of the Chinese revolution would either not have been

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 39 
achieved at all, or would have been extremely insignificant. 
Only ³ultra-Left² renegades and adventurers can 
doubt this. 
III 
THE ANGLO-SOVIET UNITY COMMITTEE19 
About the Anglo-Soviet Committee. The opposition 
asserts that we banked, so to speak, on the Anglo-Soviet 
Committee. That is not true, comrades. It is one of 
those slanders that the bankrupt opposition so often 
resorts to. The whole world knows, and, therefore, the 
opposition should know too, that we do not bank on the 
Anglo-Soviet Committee, but on the world revolutionary 
movement and on our successes in building socialism. 
The opposition is deceiving the Party when it 
says that we banked, or are banking, on the Anglo-Soviet 
Committee. 
What, then, is the Anglo-Soviet Committee? The 
Anglo-Soviet Committee is one of the forms of contact 
between our trade unions and the British trade unions, 
reformist trade unions, reactionary trade unions. 
At the present time we are carrying on our work for revolutionising 
the working class in Europe through three 
channels: 
a) through the channel of the Comintern, through 
the Communist sections, the immediate task of which 
is to eliminate reformist political leadership from the 
working-class movement; 
b) through the channel of the Profintern, through 
the revolutionary trade-union minorities, the immediate

J. V. S T A L I N 40 
task of which is to defeat the reactionary labour aristocracy 
in the trade unions; 
c) through the Anglo-Soviet Unity Committee, as 
one of the means of helping the Profintern and its sections 
in their struggle to isolate the labour aristocracy 
in the trade unions. 
The first two channels are the main and permanent 
ones, essential for the Communists as long as classes 
and class society exist. The third is only a temporary, 
auxiliary, episodic channel and, therefore, not durable, 
not always reliable, and some times quite unreliable. 
To put the third channel on a par with the first two 
means running counter to the interests of the working 
class, to communism. That being the case, how can one 
talk about our having banked on the Anglo-Soviet 
Committee? 
Our aim in agreeing to form the Anglo-Soviet 
Committee was to establish open contact with the masses 
of the organised workers of Britain. 
For what purpose? 
Firstly, for the purpose of helping to form a workers¹ 
united front against capital, or, at any rate, of hindering 
the efforts of the reactionary trade-union leaders 
to prevent the formation of such a front. 
Secondly, for the purpose of helping to form a workers¹ 
united front against the danger of imperialist war 
in general and against the danger of intervention in particular, 
or, at any rate, of hindering the efforts of the 
reactionary trade-union leaders to prevent the formation 
of such a front. 
Is it permissible at all for Communists to work in 
reactionary trade unions?

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 41 
It is not only permissible, but sometimes it is positively 
essential to do so, for there are millions of workers 
in the reactionary trade unions, and Communists 
have no right to refuse to join those unions, to find a road 
to the masses and to win them over to communism. 
Look at Lenin¹s book ³Left-Wing² Communism, 
an Infantile Disorder20 and you will see that Lenin¹s tactics 
makes it obligatory for Communists not to refuse 
to work in reactionary trade unions. 
Is it at all permissible to conclude temporary agreements 
with reactionary trade unions, agreements on 
trade-union matters, or on political matters? 
It is not only permissible, but sometimes it is positively 
essential to do so. Everyone knows that the ma 
jority of the trade unions in the West are reactionary, 
but that is not the point at all. The point is that these 
unions are mass unions. The point is that through these 
trade unions it is possible to gain access to the masses. 
Care must be taken, however, that such agreements 
do not restrict, do not limit the freedom of Communists 
to conduct revolutionary agitation and propaganda, 
that such agreements help to disintegrate the 
ranks of the reformists and to revolutionise the masses 
of the workers who still follow the reactionary leaders. 
On these conditions, temporary agreements with mass 
reactionary trade unions are not only permissible but 
sometimes positively essential. 
Here is what Lenin says on this score: 
³Capitalism would not be capitalism if the Œpure¹ proletariat 
were not surrounded by a mass of exceedingly motley intermediate 
types between the proletarian and the semi-proletarian 
(who earns his livelihood in part by the sale of his labour power),

J. V. S T A L I N 42 
between the semi-proletarian and the small peasant (and the petty 
artisan, handicraft worker and small proprietor in general), 
between the small peasant and the middle peasant, and so on, 
and if the proletariat itself were not divided into more developed 
and less developed strata, if it were not divided according to 
place of birth, trade, sometimes according to religion, and so on. 
And from all this follows the necessity, the absolute necessity, for 
the vanguard of the proletariat, for its class-conscious section, for 
the Communist Party, to resort to manoeuvres, arrangements and 
compromises with the various groups of proletarians, with the various 
parties of the workers and small proprietors.* The whole point 
lies in knowing how to apply these tactics in order to raise, and 
not lower, the general level of proletarian political consciousness, 
revolutionary spirit, and ability to fight and win² (Vol. XXV, 
p. 213). 
And further: 
³That the Hendersons, Clyneses, MacDonalds and Snowdens 
are hopelessly reactionary is true. It is equally true that they want 
to take power into their own hands (though, incidentally, they 
prefer a coalition with the bourgeoisie), that they want to Œrule¹ 
on the old bourgeois lines, and that when they do get into 
power they will unfailingly behave like the Scheidemanns and 
Noskes. All that is true. But it by no means follows that to support 
them is treachery to the revolution, but rather that in the interests 
of the revolution the working-class revolutionaries should give these 
gentlemen a certain amount of parliamentary support²* (ibid., 
pp. 218-19). 
The misfortune of the opposition is that it does not 
understand and does not accept these instructions of 
Lenin¹s, and instead of Lenin¹s policy prefers ³ultra-Left² 
noisy talk about the trade unions being reactionary. 
Does the Anglo-Soviet Committee restrict our agitation 
and propaganda, can it restrict it? No, it cannot. 
* My italics.‹J. St.

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 43 
We have always criticised and will criticise the reactionary 
character of the leaders of the British labour movement, 
revealing to the masses of the British working 
class the perfidy and treachery of these leaders. Let the 
opposition try to refute the fact that we have always 
openly and ruthlessly criticised the reactionary activities 
of the General Council. 
We are told that this criticism may cause the British 
to break up the Anglo-Soviet Committee. Well, let them 
do so. The point is not whether there will be a rupture 
or not, but on what question it will take place, what 
idea will be demonstrated by that rupture. At the present 
moment we are faced with the threat of war in general 
and of intervention in particular. If the British break 
away, the working class will know that the reactionary 
leaders of the British labour movement broke away because 
they did not want to counteract the organisation 
of war by their imperialist government. There can scarcely 
be any doubt that a rupture brought about by the 
British under such circumstances will help the Communists 
to discredit the General Council, for the question 
of war is the fundamental question of the present day. 
It is possible that they will not venture to break 
away. But what will that mean? It will mean that we 
have established our freedom to criticise, our freedom 
to continue criticising the reactionary leaders of the 
British labour movement, to expose their treachery 
and social imperialism to the broad masses. Will that 
be good for the labour movement? I think it will not 
be bad. 
Such, comrades, is our attitude towards the question 
of the Anglo-Soviet Committee.

J. V. S T A L I N 44 
IV 
THE THREAT OF WAR AND THE DEFENCE OF THE U.S.S.R. 
The question of war. First of all, I must refute the 
absolutely incorrect and false assertion made by Zinoviev 
and Trotsky that I belonged to the so-called ³Military 
Opposition² at the Eighth Congress of our Party. 
It is absolutely untrue, comrades. It is a fable, invented 
by Zinoviev and Trotsky for want of something 
better to do. I have before me the verbatim report, from 
which it is clear that, together with Lenin, I spoke 
against the so-called ³Military Opposition.² Lastly, there 
are people here who attended the Eighth Party Congress 
and can confirm the fact that I spoke against the ³Military 
Opposition² at the Eighth Congress. I did not oppose 
the ³Military Opposition² as strongly as Trotsky 
would perhaps have liked, because I considered that 
among the Military Opposition there were splendid workers 
who could not be dispensed with at the front; but 
that I certainly did speak against and combat the Military 
Opposition is a fact, which only incorrigible individuals 
like Zinoviev and Trotsky can dispute. 
What was the dispute about at the Eighth Congress? 
About the necessity of putting an end to the voluntary 
principle and the guerilla mentality; about the necessity 
of creating a genuine, regular, workers¹ and peasants¹ 
army bound by iron discipline; about the necessity of 
enlisting the services of military experts for that purpose. 
There was a draft resolution submitted by the advocates 
of a regular army and iron discipline. It was supported 
by Lenin, Sokolnikov, Stalin and others. There 
was another draft, that of V. Smirnov, submitted by

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 45 
those who were in favour of preserving elements of the 
guerilla mentality in the army. It was supported by 
V. Smirnov, Safarov, Voroshilov, Pyatakov and others. 
Here are excerpts from my speech: 
³All the questions touched upon here boil down to one: Is 
Russia to have, or not to have, a strictly disciplined regular army? 
³Six months ago, after the collapse of the old, tsarist army, 
we had a new, a volunteer army, an army which was badly organised, 
which had a collective control, and which did not always 
obey orders. This was at a time when an Entente offensive was 
looming. The army was made up principally, if not exclusively, 
of workers. Because of the lack of discipline in this volunteer 
army, because it did not always obey orders, because of the disorganisation 
in the control of the army, we sustained defeats 
and surrendered Kazan to the enemy, while Krasnov was successfully 
advancing from the South. . . . The facts show that a volunteer 
army cannot stand the test of criticism, that we shall not be 
able to defend our Republic unless we create another army, a 
regular army one infused with the spirit of discipline, possessing 
a competent politicai department and able and ready to rise at 
the first command and march against the enemy. 
³I must say that those non-working-class elements‹the peasants‹
who constitute the majority in our army will not voluntarily 
fight for socialism. A whole number of facts bear this out. 
The series of mutinies in the rear and at the fronts, the series of 
excesses at the fronts show that the non-proletarian elements 
comprising the majority of our army are not disposed to fight 
for communism voluntarily. Hence our task i s to re-educate 
these elements, infusing them with a spirit of iron discipline, to get 
them to follow the lead of the proletariat at the front as well as in 
the rear, to compel them to fight for our common socialist cause, 
and, in the course of the war, to complete the building of a real 
regular army, which is alone capable of defending the country. 
³That is how the question stands. 
³. . . Either we create a real workers¹ and peasants¹ army, a 
strictly disciplined regular army, and defend the Republic, or 
we do not, and in that event our cause will be lost.

J. V. S T A L I N 46 
³ . . . Smirnov¹s project i s unacceptable, because i t can 
only under mine discipline in the army and make it impossible 
to build a regular army.²21 
Such are the facts, comrades. 
As you see, Trotsky and Zinoviev have resorted to 
slander again. 
Further. Kamenev asserted here that during the past 
period, during these two years, we have squandered the 
moral capital that we formerly possessed in the international 
sphere. Is that true? Of course not! It is absolutely 
untrue! 
Kamenev did not say which strata of the population 
he had in mind, among which strata of the population 
of the East and the West we have lost or gained influence. 
For us Marxists, however, it is precisely that question 
that is decisive. Take China, for example. Can it be 
asserted that we have lost the moral capital that we possessed 
among the Chinese workers and peasants? Clearly, 
it cannot. Until lately, the vast masses of workers and 
peasants of China knew little about us. Until lately, 
the prestige of the U.S.S.R. was limited to a narrow 
upper circle of Chinese society, to a narrow circle of liberal 
intellectuals in the Kuomintang, leaders like Feng Yuhsiang, 
the Canton generals, and so forth. The situation 
has now radically changed. At the present time the 
U.S.S.R. enjoys a prestige among the vast masses of 
the workers and peasants of China that may well be envied 
by any force, by any political party in the world. 
On the other hand, the prestige of the U.S.S.R. has fallen 
considerably among the liberal intellectuals in China, 
among the various generals, and so forth; and many 
of the latter are beginning to wage a struggle against

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 47 
the U.S.S.R. But what is there surprising, or bad, about 
that? Can it be required of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Government, 
our Party, that our country should enjoy moral 
prestige among all strata of Chinese society? Who 
but mere liberals can require this of our Party, of the 
Soviet Government? What is better for us: prestige among 
the liberal intellectuals and all sorts of reactionary generals 
in China, or prestige among the vast masses of 
workers and peasants in China? What is decisive from the 
standpoint of our international position, from the standpoint 
of the development of the revolution throughout 
the world: the growth of the U.S.S.R.¹s prestige among 
the vast masses of the working people with an undoubted 
decline of the U.S.S.R.¹s prestige among reactionary liberal 
circles of Chinese society, or prestige among those reactionary 
liberal circles with a decline of moral influence among 
the broad masses of the population? It is enough to put 
this question to realise that Kamenev is wide of the 
mark. . . . 
But what about the West? Can it be said that we 
have squandered the moral capital we possessed among 
the proletarian strata in the West? Obviously not. 
What is shown, for example, by the recent actions of 
the proletariat in Vienna, the general strike and the 
coal strike in Britain, and the demonstrations of 
many thousands of workers in Germany and France in 
defence of the U.S.S.R.? Do they show that the moral 
influence of the proletarian dictatorship is declining 
among the vast working-class masses? Of course not! 
On the contrary, they show that the moral influence 
of the U.S.S.R. is rising and growing stronger among 
the workers in the West; that the workers in the West

J. V. S T A L I N 48 
are beginning to fight their bourgeoisie ³in the Russian 
way.² 
There can be no doubt that hostility against the 
U.S.S.R. is growing among certain strata of the pacifist 
and reactionary liberal bourgeoisie, especially owing to 
the shooting of the twenty ³illustrious² terrorists and 
incendiaries.22 But does Kamenev really prize the good 
opinion of the reactionary liberal pacifist circles of the 
bourgeoisie more than the good opinion of the vast proletarian 
masses in the West? Who would dare deny the 
fact that the shooting of the twenty ³illustrious ones² met 
with a profoundly sympathetic response among the vast 
masses of the workers in the West as well as among us 
in the U.S.S.R.? ³Serves them right, the scoundrels!²‹ 
such was the cry with which the shooting of the twenty 
³illustrious ones² was met in the working-class districts. 
I know that there are people of a certain sort among 
us who assert that the more quietly we behave the better 
it will be for us. These people tell us: ³Things were well 
with the U.S.S.R. when Britain broke off relations with 
it, and they became still better when Voikov was assassinated; 
but things became bad when, in answer to 
the assassination of Voikov, we bared our teeth and 
shot the twenty Œillustrious¹ counter-revolutionaries. 
Before we shot the twenty they were sorry for us in Europe 
and they sympathised with us; after the shooting, 
that sympathy vanished and they began to accuse us 
of not being such good boys as the public opinion of Europe 
would like us to be.² 
What can be said about this reactionary liberal philosophy? 
The only thing that can be said about it is that its

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 49 
authors would like to see the U.S.S.R. toothless, unarmed, 
grovelling at the feet of its enemies and surrendering 
to them. There was a ³bleeding² Belgium, pictures 
of which at one time used to decorate cigarette packets. 
Why should there not be a ³bleeding² U.S.S.R.? Everybody 
would then sympathise with it and be sorry for it. 
But no, comrades ! We do not agree with this. Rather let 
all those liberal pacifist philosophers with their ³sympathy² 
for the U.S.S.R. go to the devil. If only we have 
the sympathy of the vast masses of the working people, 
the rest will follow. And if it is necessary that 
somebody should ³bleed,² we shall make every effort 
to ensure that the one to be bloodily battered and 
³bleeding² shall be some bourgeois country and not the 
U.S.S.R. 
The question whether war is inevitable. Zinoviev 
vehemently asserted here that Bukharin¹s theses say that 
war is ³probable² and ³inevitable,² but not that it is 
absolutely inevitable. He insisted that such a formulation 
is liable to confuse the Party. I picked up Zinoviev¹s 
article ³The Contours of the Future War² and glanced 
through it. And what did I find? I found that in Zinoviev¹s 
article there is not a single word, literally not 
a single word, about war having become inevitable. In 
that article Zinoviev says that a new war is possible. 
A whole chapter in it is devoted to proving that a war 
is possible. That chapter ends with the sentence: ³That 
is why it is legitimate and necessary for Bolshevik- 
Leninists to think now about the possibility of a new 
war.² (General laughter.) Please note, comrades‹²to 
think² about the possibility of a new war. In one passage 
in the article Zinoviev says that war ³is becoming²

J. V. S T A L I N 50 
inevitable, but he does not say a single word, literally 
not a single word, about war already having become inevitable. 
And this man has‹what is the mildest way of 
putting it?‹the audacity to make an accusation against 
Bukharin¹s theses which say that war has become probable 
and inevitable. 
What does it mean to say now that war is ³possible²? 
It means dragging us back at least some seven years, for 
it was as early as some seven years ago that Lenin said 
that war between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist world 
was possible. Was it worth while for Zinoviev to repeat 
what was said long ago and to make out his reversion to 
the past to be a new utterance? 
What does it mean to say now that war is becoming 
inevitable? It means dragging us back at least some 
four years, for it was as early as the period of the Curzon 
ultimatum23 that we said that war was becoming 
inevitable. 
How could it happen that Zinoviev, who only yesterday 
wrote such a confused and quite absurd article about 
war, containing not a single word about war having 
become inevitable, how could it happen that this man 
dared to attack Bukharin¹s clear and definite theses 
about the inevitability of war? It happened because Zinoviev 
forgot what he wrote yesterday. The fact of the 
matter is that Zinoviev is one of those fortunate people 
who write only to forget the very next day what 
they have written. (Laughter.) 
Zinoviev asserted here that Bukharin was ³prompted² 
by Comrade Chicherin to draft his theses on the 
lines that war is probable and inevitable. I ask: Who 
³prompted² Zinoviev to write an article about war

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 51 
being possible now when war has already become inevitable? 
(Laughter.) 
The question of the stabilisation of capitalism. Zinoviev 
here attacked Bukharin¹s theses, asserting that on 
the question of stabilisation they depart from the position 
of the Comintern. That, of course, is nonsense. 
By that Zinoviev only betrayed his ignorance of the 
question of stabilisation, of the question of world capitalism. 
Zinoviev thinks that once there is stabilisation, 
the cause of the revolution is lost. He does not understand 
that the crisis of capitalism and the preparation 
for its doom grow as a result of stabilisation. Is it not 
a fact that capitalism has lately perfected and rationalised 
its technique and has produced a vast mass of 
goods which cannot find a market? Is it not a fact that the 
capitalist governments are more and more assuming 
a fascist character, attacking the working class and temporarily 
strengthening their own positions? Do these 
facts imply that stabilisation has become durable? Of 
course not! On the contrary, it is just these facts that 
tend to aggravate the present crisis of world capitalism, 
which is incomparably deeper than the crisis before the 
last imperialist war. 
The very fact that the capitalist governments are 
assuming a fascist character tends to aggravate the internal 
situation in the capitalist countries and gives rise 
to revolutionary action by the workers (Vienna, Britain). 
The very fact that capitalism is rationalising its 
technique and is producing a vast mass of goods which 
the market cannot absorb, this very fact tends to 
intensify the struggle within the imperialist camp for

J. V. S T A L I N 52 
markets and for fields of capital export and leads to 
the creation of the conditions for a new war, for a new 
redivision of the world. 
Is i t difficult to understand that the excessive 
growth of capitalism¹s productive potentialities, coupled 
with the limited capacity of the world market and the 
stability of ³spheres of influence,² intensifies the struggle 
for markets and deepens the crisis of capitalism? 
Capitalism could solve this crisis if it could increase 
the wages of the workers severalfold, if it could considerably 
improve the material conditions of the peasantry, 
if it could thereby considerably increase the purchasing 
power of the vast masses of the working people and 
enlarge the capacity of the home market. But if it did 
that, capitalism would not be capitalism. Precisely because 
capitalism cannot do that, precisely because capitalism 
uses its ³incomes² not to raise the well-being of 
the majority of the working people, but to intensify 
their exploitation and to export capital to less-developed 
countries in order to obtain still larger ³incomes²‹precisely 
for that reason, the struggle for markets and for 
fields of capital export gives rise to a desperate struggle 
for a new redivision of the world and of spheres of 
influence, a struggle which has already made a new imperialist 
war inevitable. 
Why do certain imperialist circles look askance at 
the U.S.S.R. and organise a united front against it? Because 
the U.S.S.R. is a very valuable market and field 
of capital export. Why are these same imperialist circles 
intervening in China? Because China is a very valuable 
market and field of capital export. And so on and so 
forth.

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 53 
That is the basis and source of the inevitability of 
a new war, irrespective of whether it breaks out between 
separate imperialist coalitions, or against the U.S.S.R. 
The misfortune of the opposition is that it does not 
understand these simple, elementary things. 
The question of the defence of our country. And now 
permit me to deal with the last question, how our opposition 
intends to defend the U.S.S.R. 
Comrades, the revolutionary spirit of a given group, 
of a given trend, of a given party, is not tested by the 
statements or declarations it issues. The revolutionary 
spirit of a given group, of a given trend, of a given party, is 
tested by its deeds, by its practice, by its practical plans. 
Statements and declarations, no matter how striking they 
may be, cannot be believed if they are not backed by 
deeds, if they are not put into effect. 
There is one question which serves as a dividing line 
between all possible groups, trends and parties and 
as a test of whether they are revolutionary or anti-revolutionary. 
Today, that is the question of the defence of 
the U.S.S.R., of unqualified and unreserved defence 
of the U.S.S.R. against attack by imperialism. 
A revolutionary is one who is ready to protect, to 
defend the U.S.S.R. without reservation, without qualification, 
openly and honestly, without secret military 
conferences; for the U.S.S.R. is the first proletarian, revolutionary 
state in the world, a state which is building 
socialism. An internationalist is one who is ready to defend 
the U.S.S.R. without reservation, without wavering, 
unconditionally; for the U.S.S.R. is the base of the 
world revolutionary movement, and this revolutionary 
movement cannot be defended and promoted unless

J. V. S T A L I N 54 
the U.S.S.R. is defended. For whoever thinks of defending 
the world revolutionary movement apart from, or 
against, the U.S.S.R., goes against the revolution and 
must inevitably slide into the camp of the enemies of 
the revolution. 
Two camps have now been formed in face of the threat 
of war, and as a result two positions have arisen: that 
of unqualified defence of the U.S.S.R. and that of fighting 
the U.S.S.R. One has to choose between them, 
for there is not, nor can there be, a third position. Neutrality 
in this matter, waverings, reservations, the 
search for a third position, are attempts to avoid responsibility, 
to wriggle out of the unqualified struggle to 
defend the U.S.S.R., to be missing at the most critical 
moment for the defence of the U.S.S.R. What does avoiding 
responsibility mean? It means imperceptibly slipping 
into the camp of the enemies of the U.S.S.R. 
That is how the question stands now. 
How do matters stand with the opposition from the 
standpoint of the defence, the protection, of the U.S.S.R.? 
Since things have gone so far, l e t me refer to 
Trotsky¹s letter to the Central Control Commission 
in order to demonstrate to you the ³theory² of defence, 
the defence slogan, that Trotsky is holding in reserve in 
the event of war against the U.S.S.R. Comrade Molotov 
has already quoted a passage from this letter in his speech, 
but he did not quote the whole passage. Permit me to 
quote it in full. 
This is how Trotsky understands defeatism and defencism: 
³What is defeatism? A policy which pursues the aim of facilitating 
the defeat of one¹s Œown¹ state which is in the hands of

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 55 
a hostile class. Any other conception and interpretation of defeatism 
will be a falsification. Thus, for example, if someone says 
that the political line of ignorant and dishonest cribbers must be 
swept away like garbage precisely in the interests of the victory 
of the workers¹ state, that does not make him a Œdefeatist.¹ On the 
contrary, under the given concrete conditions, he is thereby giving 
genuine expression to revolutionary defencism: ideological garbage 
does not lead to victory! 
³Examples, and very instructive ones, could be found in the 
history of other classes. We shall quote only one. At the beginning 
of the imperialist war the French bourgeoisie had at its head a 
government without a sail or rudder. The Clemenceau group was 
in opposition to that government. Notwithstanding the war and 
the military censorship, notwithstanding even the fact that the 
Germans were eighty kilometres from Paris (Clemenceau said: 
Œprecisely because of it¹), he conducted a fierce struggle against 
petty-bourgeois flabbiness and irresolution and for imperialist 
ferocity and ruthlessness. Clemenceau was not a traitor to his 
class, the bourgeoisie; on the contrary, he served it more loyally, 
more resolutely and more shrewdly than Viviani, Painlevé and 
Co. The subsequent course of events proved that. The Clemenceau 
group came into power, and its more consistent, more predatory 
imperialist policy ensured victory for the French bourgeoisie. 
Were there any French newspapermen that called the Clemenceau 
group defeatist? There must have been: fools and slanderers follow 
in the train of every class. They do not, however, always have 
the opportunity to play an equally important role² (excerpt from 
Trotsky¹s letter to Comrade Orjonikidze, dated July 11, 1927). 
There you have the ³theory,² save the mark, of the 
defence of the U.S.S.R. proposed by Trotsky. 
³Petty-bourgeois flabbiness and irresolution²‹that, 
it turns out, is the majority in our Party, the majority 
in our Central Committee, the majority in our government. 
Clemenceau‹that is Trotsky and his group. 
(Laughter.) It turns out that if the enemy comes within, 
say, eighty kilometres of the walls of the Kremlin,

J. V. S T A L I N 56 
this new edition of Clemenceau, this comic opera 
Clemenceau will first of all try to overthrow the present 
majority, precisely because the enemy will be eighty kilometres 
from the Kremlin, and only after that will he 
start defending. And it turns out that if our comic-opera 
Clemenceau succeeds in doing that, it will be genuine 
and unqualified defence of the U.S.S.R. 
And in order to do this, he, Trotsky, i.e., Clemenceau, 
is first of all trying to ³sweep away² the ³garbage² 
³in the interests of the victory of the workers¹ state.² 
And what is this ³garbage²? I t turns out that i t is 
the majority in our Party, the majority in the Central 
Committee, the majority in the government. 
It turns out, then, that when the enemy comes within 
eighty kilometres of the Kremlin, this comic-opera 
Clemenceau will be concerned not to defend the U.S.S.R., 
but to overthrow the present majority in the Party. And 
that is what he calls defence! 
Of course, it is rather funny to hear this small quixotic 
group, which in the course of four months barely 
managed to scrape together about a thousand votes, to 
hear this small group threatening a party a million 
strong with the words: ³We shall sweep you away.² You 
can judge from this how deplorable the position of Trotsky¹s 
group must be if, after toiling for four months in 
the sweat of its brow, it barely managed to scrape together 
about a thousand signatures. I think that any opposition 
group could collect several thousand signatures if 
it knew how to set to work. I repeat, it is funny to hear 
a small group in which the leaders outnumber the army 
(laughter), and which after working hard for four whole 
months barely managed to scrape together about a

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 57 
thousand signatures, threatening a party a million strong 
with the words: ³We shall sweep you away.² (Laughter.) 
But how can a small factional group ³sweep away² a 
party a million strong? Do the comrades of the opposition 
think that the present majority in the Party, the 
majority in the Central Committee, is an accidental 
one, that it has no roots in the Party, that it has no 
roots in the working class, that it will voluntarily allow 
itself to be ³swept away² by a comic-opera Clemenceau? 
No, that majority is not an accidental one. It has been 
built up year by year in the course of our Party¹s development; 
it was tested in the fire of struggle during 
October, after October, during the Civil War, and during 
the building of socialism. 
To ³sweep away² such a majority it will be necessary 
to start civil war in the Party. And so, Trotsky is thinking 
of starting civil war in the Party at a time when 
the enemy will be eighty kilometres from the Kremlin. 
It seems that one could hardly go to greater lengths. . . . 
But what about the present leaders of the opposition? 
Have they not been tested? Is it an accident that they, 
who at one time occupied most important posts in our 
Party, later became renegades? Does it still need proof 
that this cannot be regarded as an accident? Well, 
Trotsky wants, with the aid of the small group which 
signed the opposition¹s platform, to turn back the 
wheel of our Party¹s history at a time when the enemy 
will be eighty kilometres from the Kremlin; and it is 
said that some of the comrades who signed the opposition¹s 
platform did so because they thought that if they 
signed they would not be called up for military service. 
(Laughter.)

J. V. S T A L I N 58 
No, my dear Trotsky, it would be better for you not 
to talk about ³sweeping away garbage.² It would be 
better not to talk about it because those words are infectious. 
If the majority becomes ³infected² from you 
by the method of sweeping away garbage, I do not know 
whether that will be good for the opposition. After all, 
it is not impossible that the majority in the Central 
Committee may become ³infected² by this method and 
³sweep away² somebody or other. 
Talk about sweeping away is not always desirable 
or safe, for it may ³infect² the majority in our Central 
Committee and compel it to ³sweep away² somebody 
or other. And if Trotsky is thinking of using the broom 
against the Party and its majority, will it be surprising 
if the Party turns that broom the other way and uses it 
against the opposition? 
Now we know how the opposition intends to defend 
the U.S.S.R. Trotsky¹s essentially defeatist theory 
about Clemenceau, which is supported by the entire opposition, 
is sufficiently striking evidence of this. 
It follows, therefore, that to ensure the defence of the 
U.S.S.R., it is necessary, first of all, to carry out the 
Clemenceau experiment. 
That, so to speak, is the opposition¹s first step towards 
³unqualified² defence of the U.S.S.R. 
The second step towards defence of the U.S.S.R., 
it turns out, is to declare that our Party is a Centrist 
party. The fact that our Party is fighting both the Left 
deviation from communism (Trotsky-Zinoviev) and the 
Right deviation from communism (Smirnov-Sapronov) 
is apparently regarded by our ignorant opposition as 
Centrism.

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 59 
It turns out that these cranks have forgotten that 
in fighting both deviations we are only fulfilling the 
behests of Lenin, who absolutely insisted on a determined 
fight both against ³Left doctrinairism² and against 
³Right opportunism.² 
The leaders of the opposition have broken with 
Leninism and have consigned Lenin¹s behests to oblivion. 
The leaders of the opposition refuse to admit that 
their bloc, the opposition bloc, is a bloc of Right and 
Left deviators from communism. They refuse to admit 
that their present bloc is the re-creation on a new basis of 
Trotsky¹s notorious August bloc of dismal memory. They 
refuse to understand that it is this bloc that harbours the 
danger of degeneration. They refuse to admit that the 
union in one camp of ³ultra-Lefts,² like those scoundrels 
and counter-revolutionaries Maslow and Ruth Fischer, 
and Georgian nationalist deviators is a copy of the Liquidationist 
August bloc of the worst kind. 
And so, it turns out that to arrange for defence it 
is necessary to declare that our Party is a Centrist party 
and to strive to deprive it of its attractiveness in the 
eyes of the workers. 
That, so to speak, is the opposition¹s second step 
towards ³unqualified² defence of the U.S.S.R. 
The third step towards defence of the U.S.S.R., it 
appears, is to declare that our Party is non-existent and 
to depict it as ³Stalin¹s faction.² What do the 
oppositionists mean to say by that? They mean to 
say that there is no Party, there is only ³Stalin¹s faction.² 
They mean to say that the Party¹s decisions are 
not binding upon them and that they have the right 
to violate those decisions at all times and under all

J. V. S T A L I N 60 
circumstances. In that way they want to facilitate their 
fight against our Party. True, they adopted this weapon 
from the arsenal of the Menshevik Sotsialistichesky 
Vestnik24 and of the bourgeois Rul.25 True, it is unworthy 
of Communists to adopt the weapons of Mensheviks 
and bourgeois counter-revolutionaries, but what do they 
care about that? The opposition regards every means as 
justified as long as there is a fight against the Party. 
And so, it turns out that to prepare the defence of the 
U.S.S.R., it is necessary to declare that the Party is nonexistent, 
the very Party without which no defence is 
conceivable. 
That, so to speak, is the opposition¹s third step towards 
³unqualified² defence of the U.S.S.R. 
The fourth step towards defence of the U.S.S.R., it 
appears, is to split the Comintern, to organise a new party 
in Germany headed by those scoundrels and counterrevolutionaries 
Ruth Fischer and Maslow, and thereby 
make it more difficult for the West-European proletariat 
to support the U.S.S.R. 
And so, it turns out that to prepare the defence of 
the U.S.S.R., it is necessary to split the Comintern. 
That, so to speak, is the opposition¹s fourth step towards 
³unqualified² defence of the U.S.S.R. 
The fifth step towards defence of the U.S.S.R., 
it appears, is to ascribe Thermidor tendencies to our 
Party, to split it and begin to build a new party. For 
if we have no party, if there is only ³Stalin¹s faction,² 
whose decisions are not binding upon the members of 
the Party, if that faction is a Thermidor faction‹although 
it is stupid and ignorant to speak of Thermidor 
tendencies in our Party‹what else can be done?

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 61 
And so, it turns out that to arrange for the defence 
of the U.S.S.R., it is necessary to split our Party and to 
set about organising a new party. 
That, so to speak, is the opposition¹s fifth step towards 
³unqualified² defence of the U.S.S.R. 
There you have the five most important measures 
that the opposition proposes for defence of the U.S.S.R. 
Does it still need proof that all these measures proposed 
by the opposition have nothing in common with 
the defence of our country, with the defence of the centre 
of the world revolution? 
And these people want us to publish their defeatist, 
semi-Menshevik articles in our Party press! What 
do they take us for? Have we already ³freedom² 
of the press for all, ³from anarchists to monarchists²? 
No, and we shall not have it. Why do we not publish 
Menshevik articles? Because we have no ³freedom² of 
the press for anti-Leninist, anti-Soviet trends ³from 
anarchists to monarchists.² 
What is the aim of the oppositionists in insisting 
on the publication of their semi-Menshevik, defeatist 
articles? Their aim is to create a loop-hole for 
bourgeois ³freedom² of the press; and they fail to see 
that thereby they are reviving the anti-Soviet elements, 
strengthening their pressure upon the proletarian dictatorship, 
and opening the road for bourgeois ³democracy.² 
They knock at one door, but open another. 
Here is what Mr. Dan writes about the opposition: 
³Russian Social-Democrats would ardently welcome such 
a legalisation of the opposition, although they have nothing in 
common with its positive programme. They would welcome the 
legality of the political struggle, the open self-liquidation of the

J. V. S T A L I N 62 
dictatorship and the transition to new political forms that would 
provide scope for a wide labour movement² (Sotsialistichesky 
Vestnik, No. 13, July 1927). 
³The open self-liquidation of the dictatorship²‹ 
that is what the enemies of the U.S.S.R. expect of you, 
and that is where your policy is leading, comrades of 
the opposition. 
Comrades, we are faced by two dangers: the danger 
of war, which has become the threat of war; and the danger 
of the degeneration of some of the links of our Party. 
In setting out to prepare for defence we must create 
iron discipline in our Party. Without such discipline defence 
is impossible. We must strengthen Party discipline, 
we must curb all those who are disorganising our Party. 
We must curb all those who are splitting our brother parties 
in the West and in the East. (Applause.) We must curb 
all those who are splitting our brother parties in the 
West and are supported in this by those scoundrels Souvarine, 
Ruth Fischer, Maslow and that muddle-head 
Treint. 
Only thus, only in this way shall we be able to meet 
war fully armed, while at the same time striving, at the 
cost of some material sacrifice, to postpone war, to gain 
time, to ransom ourselves from capitalism. 
This we must do, and we shall do it. 
The second danger is the danger of degeneration. 
Where does it come from? From there! (Pointing to 
the opposition.) That danger must be eliminated. (Prolonged 
applause.)

SPEECH DELIVERED ON AUGUST 5 
Comrades, Zinoviev was grossly disloyal to this plenum 
in reverting in his speech to the already settled 
question of the international situation. 
We are now discussing point 4 on the agenda: ³The 
violation of Party discipline by Trotsky and Zinoviev.² 
Zinoviev, however, evading the point under discussion, 
reverted to the question of the international situation 
and tried to resume the discussion of an already settled 
question. Moreover, in his speech he concentrated his 
attack on Stalin, forgetting that we are not discussing 
Stalin, but the violation of Party discipline by Zinoviev 
and Trotsky. 
I am therefore compelled in my speech to revert to 
several aspects of the already settled question in order 
to show that Zinoviev¹s speech was groundless. 
I apologise, comrades, but I shall also have to say 
a few words about Zinoviev¹s thrusts at Stalin. (Voices: 
³Please, do!²) 
First. For some reason, Zinoviev in his speech recalled 
Stalin¹s vacillation in March 1917, and in doing 
so he piled up a heap of fairy-tales. I have never denied 
that I vacillated to some extent in March 1917, but that 
lasted only a week or two; on Lenin¹s arrival in April

J. V. S T A L I N 64 
1917 that vacillation ceased and at the April Conference 
1917, I stood side by side with Comrade Lenin against 
Kamenev and his opposition group. I have mentioned 
this a number of times in our Party press (see On the 
Road to October, Trotskyism or Leninism?, etc.). 
I have never regarded myself as being infallible, 
nor do I do so now. I have never concealed either my mistakes 
or my momentary vacillations. But one must not 
ignore also that I have never persisted in my mistakes, 
and that I have never drawn up a platform, or formed 
a separate group, and so forth, on the basis of my momentary 
vacillations. 
But what has that to do with the question under 
discussion, the violation of Party discipline by Zinoviev 
and Trotsky? Why does Zinoviev, evading the question 
under discussion, revert to reminiscences of March 1917? 
Has he really forgotten his own mistakes, his struggle 
against Lenin, his separate platform in opposition to 
Lenin¹s Party in August, September, October and November 
1917? Perhaps Zinoviev by his reminiscences 
of the past hopes to push into the background the question, 
now under discussion, of the violation of Party 
discipline by Zinoviev and Trotsky? No, that trick of 
Zinoviev¹s will not succeed. 
Second. Zinoviev, further, quoted a passage from a 
letter I wrote to him in the summer of 1923, some months 
before the German revolution of 1923. I do not remember 
the history of that letter, I have no copy of it, and I 
am therefore unable to say with certainty whether Zinoviev 
quoted it correctly. I wrote it, I think, at the 
end of July or beginning of August 1923. I must say, 
however, that that letter is absolutely correct from be

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
65 
ginning to end. By referring to that letter Zinoviev evidently 
wants to imply that I was in general sceptical 
about the German revolution of 1923. That, of course, 
is nonsense. 
The letter touched first of all on the question whether 
the Communists should take power immediately. In 
July or the beginning of August 1923 there was not yet 
in Germany that profound revolutionary crisis which 
brings the vast masses to their feet, exposes the compromising 
policy of Social-Democracy, utterly disorganises 
the bourgeoisie and raises the question of the immediate 
seizure of power by the Communists. Naturally, 
under the circumstances prevailing in July-August, 
there could be no question of the immediate seizure of 
power by the Communists in Germany, who moreover 
were a minority in the ranks of the working class. 
Was that position correct? I think it was. And that 
was the position held at that time by the Political 
Bureau. 
The second question touched on in that letter relates 
to a demonstration of communist workers at a 
time when armed fascists were trying to provoke the 
Communists to premature action. The stand I took at 
that time was that the Communists should not allow 
themselves to be provoked. I was not the only one to 
take that stand; it was the stand of the whole Political 
Bureau. 
Two months later, however, a radical change took 
place in the situation in Germany; the revolutionary 
crisis became more acute; Poincare began a military 
offensive against Germany; the financial crisis in Germany 
became catastrophic; the German government 
JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

J. V. S T A L I N 66 
began to collapse and a ministerial reshuffle began; the 
evolutionary tide rose, threatening to overwhelm the 
Social-Democrats; the workers began en masse to desert 
Social-Democracy and to go over to the Communists; 
the question of the seizure of power by the Communists 
came on the order of the day. Under these circumstances 
I, like the other members of the Comintern Commission, 
was resolutely and definitely in favour of the immediate 
seizure of power by the Communists. 
As is known, the German Commission of the Comintern 
that was set up at that time, consisting of Zinoviev, 
Bukharin, Stalin, Trotsky, Radek and a number of German 
comrades, adopted a series of concrete decisions 
concerning direct assistance to the German comrades 
in the matter of seizing power. 
Were the members of that commission unanimous 
on all points at that time? No, they were not. There was 
disagreement at that time on the question whether Soviets 
should be set up in Germany. Bukharin and I argued 
that the factory committees could not serve as substitutes 
for Soviets and proposed that proletarian Soviets 
be immediately organised in Germany. Trotsky and 
Radek, as also some of the German comrades, opposed 
the organisation of Soviets and argued that the factory 
committees would be enough for seizure of power. 
Zinoviev wavered between these two groups. 
Please note, comrades, that it was not a question 
of China, where there are only a few million proletarians, 
but of Germany, a highly industrialised country, where 
there were then about fifteen million proletarians. 
What was the upshot of these disagreements? It 
was that Zinoviev deserted to the side of Trotsky and

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 67 
Radek and the question of Soviets was settled in the 
negative. 
True, later on, Zinoviev repented of his sins, but 
that does not do away with the fact that at that time 
Zinoviev was on the Right, opportunist flank on one of 
the fundamental questions of the German revolution, 
whereas Bukharin and Stalin were on the revolutionary, 
communist flank. 
Here is what Zinoviev said about this later: 
³On the question of Soviets (in Germany‹J. St .) we made 
a mistake in yielding to Trotsky and Radek. Every time a concession 
is made on these questions, one becomes convinced that 
one is making a mistake. It was impossible to set up workers¹ 
Soviets at the time, but that was a touchstone for revealing whether 
the line was Social-Democratic or Communist. We should not 
have yielded on this question. To yield was a mistake on our part. 
That is how the matter stands, comrades² (Verbatim Report of 
the Fifth Meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. with Represent 
tives of the Communist Party of Germany, January 19, 1924, 
p. 70). 
In this passage Zinoviev says ³we made a mistake.² 
Who are ³we²? There was not, and could not have been, 
any ³we.² It was Zinoviev who made a mistake in deserting 
to the side of Trotsky and Radek and in adopting 
their erroneous position. 
Such are the facts. 
Zinoviev would have done better not to recall the 
German revolution of 1923 and disgrace himself in the 
eyes of the plenum; the more so because, as you see, 
the question of the German revolution which he raised 
has nothing to do with point 4 of the plenum agenda 
which we are now discussing.

J. V. S T A L I N 68 
The question of China. According to Zinoviev it appears 
that Stalin, in his report at the Fourteenth Party 
Congress, identified China with America. That, of course, 
is nonsense. There was no question of any identification 
of China with America in my report, nor could 
there have been. Actually, in my report I merely dealt 
with the right of the Chinese people to national unity 
and to national liberation from the foreign yoke. Concentrating 
my criticism on the imperialist press, I said: 
If you, Messieurs the imperialists, justify, at any rate 
in words, the national war in Italy, the national war 
in America, and the national war in Germany for unity 
and liberation from a foreign yoke, in what way is China 
inferior to these countries, and why should not the Chinese 
people have the right to national unity and liberation? 
That is what I said in my report, without in any 
way touching upon the question of the prospects and 
tasks of the Chinese revolution from the standpoint 
of communism. 
Was that presentation of the question legitimate in 
controversy with the bourgeois press? Obviously, it was. 
Zinoviev does not understand a simple thing like that, 
but for that his own obtuseness is to blame and nothing 
else. 
Zinoviev, it appears, considers that the policy of 
transforming the Wuhan Kuomintang, when it was revolutionary, 
into the core of a future revolutionarydemocratic 
dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry 
was wrong. The question arises: What was wrong about 
it? Is it not a fact that the Wuhan Kuomintang was revolutionary 
at the beginning of this year? Why did Zinoviev 
shout for ³all-round assistance² for the Wuhan

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 69 
Kuomintang if the Wuhan Kuomintang was not revolutionary? 
Why did the opposition swear that it was 
in favour of the Communist Party remaining in the 
Wuhan Kuomintang if the latter was not revolutionary 
at that time? What would Communists be worth who, 
belonging to the Wuhan Kuomintang and enjoying influence 
in it, did not attempt to get the Kuomintang 
fellow-travellers to follow them and did not attempt 
to transform the Wuhan Kuomintang into the core of 
a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship? I would say that 
such Communists would not be worth a farthing. 
True, that attempt failed, because at that stage the 
imperialists and the feudal landlords in China proved 
to be stronger than the revolution and, as a consequence, 
the Chinese revolution suffered temporary defeat. But 
does it follow from that that the Communist Party¹s 
policy was wrong? 
In 1905 the Russian Communists also attempted to 
transform the Soviets which existed at that time into 
the core of a future revolutionary-democratic dictatorship 
of the proletariat and peasantry; but that attempt 
also failed at that time owing to the unfavourable correlation 
of class forces, owing to the fact that tsarism 
and the feudal landlords proved to be stronger than 
the revolution. Does it follow from this that the Bolsheviks¹ 
policy was wrong? Obviously, it does not. 
Zinoviev asserts, further, that Lenin was in favour 
of the immediate organisation of Soviets of workers¹ 
deputies in China, and he referred to Lenin¹s theses on 
the colonial question that were adopted at the Second 
Congress of the Comintern. But here Zinoviev is simply 
misleading the Party.

J. V. S T A L I N 70 
It has been stated in the press several times, and it 
must be repeated here, that in Lenin¹s theses there is not 
a single word about Soviets of workers¹ deputies in China. 
It has been stated in the press several times, and 
it must be repeated here, that in his theses Lenin had 
in mind not Soviets of workers¹ deputies, but ³peasant 
Soviets,² ³people¹s Soviets,² ³toilers¹ Soviets,² and 
he made the special reservation that this applied to 
countries ³where there is no industrial proletariat, or 
practically none.² 
Can China be included in the category of countries 
where ³there is no industrial proletariat, or practically 
none²? Obviously not. Is it possible in China to form 
peasant Soviets, toilers¹ Soviets, or people¹s Soviets, 
without first forming class Soviets of the working class? 
Obviously not. Why, then, is the opposition deceiving 
the Party by referring to Lenin¹s theses? 
The question of the respite. In 1921, on the termination 
of the Civil War, Lenin said that we now had some 
respite from war and that we ought to take advantage 
of that respite to build socialism. Zinoviev is now finding 
fault with Stalin, asserting that Stalin converted 
that respite into a period of respite, which, he alleges, 
contradicts the thesis on the threat of war between the 
U.S.S.R. and the imperialists. 
Needless to say, this fault-finding of Zinoviev¹s 
is stupid and ridiculous. Is it not a fact that there has 
been no military conflict between the imperialists and 
the U.S.S.R. for the past seven years? Can this period 
of seven years be called a period of respite? Obviously, 
it can and should be so called. Lenin more than once 
spoke of the period of the Brest Peace, but everybody

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 71 
knows that that period did not last more than a year. 
Why can the one-year period of the Brest Peace be called 
a period and the seven-year period of respite not be called 
a period of respite? How is it possible to take up the 
time of the joint plenum of the Central Committee and 
Central Control Commission with such ridiculous and 
stupid fault-finding? 
About the dictatorship of the Party. It has been stated 
several times in our Party press that Zinoviev distorts 
Lenin¹s conception of the ³dictatorship² of the Party 
by identifying the dictatorship of the proletariat with 
the dictatorship of the Party. It has been stated several 
times in our Party press that by ³dictatorship² of the 
Party Lenin understood the Party¹s leadership of the 
working class, that is to say, not the Party¹s use of force 
against the working class, but leadership by means of 
persuasion, by means of the political education of the 
working class, to be precise, leadership by one party, 
which does not share, and does not desire to share, that 
leadership with other parties. 
Zinoviev does not understand this and distorts 
Lenin¹s conception. However, by distorting Lenin¹s conception 
of the ³dictatorship² of the Party, Zinoviev is, 
perhaps without realising it, making way for the penetration 
of ³Arakcheyev² methods into the Party, for 
justifying Kautsky¹s slanderous allegation that Lenin 
was effecting ³the dictatorship of the Party over the working 
class.² Is that a decent thing to do? Obviously 
not. But who is to blame if Zinoviev fails to understand 
such simple things? 
About national culture. The nonsense Zinoviev talked 
here about national culture ought to be perpetuated

J. V. S T A L I N 72 
in some way, so that the Party may know that Zinoviev 
is opposed to the development of the national culture 
of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. on a Soviet basis, that he 
is, in fact, an advocate of colonisation. 
We used to regard, and still regard, the slogan of 
national culture in the epoch of the domination of the 
bourgeoisie in a multi-national state as a bourgeois 
slogan. Why? Because, in the period of the domination 
of the bourgeoisie in such a state, that slogan signifies 
the spiritual subordination of the masses of the working 
people of all nationalities to the leadership, the domination, 
the dictatorship, of the bourgeoisie. 
After the proletariat seized power we proclaimed 
the slogan of the development of the national culture 
of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. on the basis of the Soviets. 
What does that mean? It means that we adapt the development 
of national culture among the peoples of the 
U.S.S.R. to the interests and requirements of socialism, 
to the interests and requirements of the proletarian dictatorship, 
to the interests and requirements of the working 
people of all the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. 
Does that mean that we are now opposed to national 
culture in general? No, it does not. It merely means 
that we are now in favour of developing the national 
culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., their national 
languages, schools, press, and so forth, on the basis of 
the Soviets. And what does the reservation ³on the basis 
of the Soviets² mean? It means that in its content the 
culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. which the Soviet 
Government is developing must be a culture common 
to all the working people, a socialist culture; in its form, 
however, it is and will be different for all the peoples

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 73 
of the U.S.S.R.; it is and will be a national culture, 
different for the various peoples of the U.S.S.R. in conformity 
with the differences in language and specific 
national features. I spoke about this in the speech I 
delivered at the Communist University of the Toilers 
of the East about three years ago.26 It is on these lines 
that our Party has been operating all the time, encouraging 
the development of national Soviet schools, of 
a national Soviet press, and other cultural institutions; 
encouraging the ³nationalisation² of the Party apparatus, 
the ³nationalisation² of the Soviet apparatus, 
and so on and so forth. 
It is precisely for this reason that Lenin, in his letters 
to comrades working in the national regions and 
republics, called for the development of the national 
culture of these regions and republics on the basis of 
the Soviets. 
It is precisely because we have pursued this line 
ever since the proletariat seized power that we have 
succeeded in erecting an international edifice never 
before seen in the world, the edifice known as the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics. 
Zinoviev, however, now wants to overturn all this, 
to obliterate, to bury all this by declaring war on national 
culture. And this colonialist twaddle on the national 
question he calls Leninism! Is that not ridiculous, comrades? 
The building of socialism in one country. Notwithstanding 
the series of severe defeats they have sustained 
on this question, Zinoviev and the opposition in 
general (Trotsky, Kamenev) clutch at it again and again 
and waste the time of the plenum. They try to make it

J. V. S T A L I N 74 
appear that the thesis that the victory of socialism is 
possible in the U.S.S.R. is not Lenin¹s theory, but 
Stalin¹s ³theory.² 
It scarcely needs proof that this assertion by the 
opposition is an attempt to deceive the Party. Is it not 
a fact that it was none other than Lenin who, as far back 
as 1915, stated that the victory of socialism is possible 
in one country?27 Is it not a fact that it was none other 
than Trotsky who, at that very time, opposed Lenin on 
this question and described Lenin¹s thesis as ³national 
narrow-mindedness²? What has Stalin¹s ³theory² to do 
with it? 
Is it not a fact that it was none other than Kamenev 
and Zinoviev who dragged in the wake of Trotsky in 
1925 and declared that Lenin¹s teaching that the victory 
of socialism is possible in one country was ³national 
narrow-mindedness²? Is it not a fact that our Party, 
as represented by its Fourteenth Conference, adopted 
a special resolution declaring that the victorious building 
of socialism in the U.S.S.R. is possible,28 in spite 
of Trotsky¹s semi-Menshevik theory? 
Why do Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev evade this 
resolution of the Fourteenth Conference? 
Is it not a fact that our Party, as represented by 
its Fourteenth Congress, endorsed the resolution of the 
Fourteenth Conference and spearheaded its decision 
against Kamenev and Zinoviev29? 
Is it not a fact that the Fifteenth Conference of our 
Party adopted a decision substantiated in detail declaring 
that the victory of socialism is possible in the 
U.S.S.R.,30 and that it spearheaded that decision against 
the opposition bloc and its head, Trotsky?

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 75 
Is it not a fact that the Seventh Enlarged Plenum 
of the E.C.C.I. endorsed that resolution of the Fifteenth 
Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and found Trotsky, 
Zinoviev and Kamenev guilty of a Social-Democratic 
deviation 31 ? 
The question is: What has Stalin¹s ³theory² to do 
with it? 
Did Stalin ever demand of the opposition anything 
else than that it should admit the correctness of these 
decisions of the highest bodies of our Party and of the 
Comintern? 
Why do the leaders of the opposition evade all these 
facts if their consciences are clear? What are they counting 
on? On deceiving the Party? But is it difficult to 
understand that nobody will succeed in deceiving our 
Bolshevik Party? 
Such, comrades, are the questions which, properly 
speaking, have nothing to do with the point under discussion 
about the breach of Party discipline by Trotsky 
and Zinoviev, but which nevertheless Zinoviev has 
dragged in for the purpose of throwing dust in our 
eyes and of slurring over the question under discussion. 
I again ask you to excuse me for taking up your 
time by examining these questions, but I could not do 
otherwise, for there was no other way of killing the 
desire of our oppositionists to deceive the Party. 
And now, comrades, permit me to pass from ³defence² 
to attack. 
The chief misfortune of the opposition is that it 
still fails to understand why it has been ³reduced to 
this kind of life.²

J. V. S T A L I N 76 
In point of fact, why did its leaders, who only yesterday 
were among the leaders of the Party, ³suddenly² 
become renegades? How is this to be explained? The 
opposition itself is inclined to attribute it to causes of 
a personal character: Stalin ³did not help,² Bukharin 
³let us down,² Rykov ³did not support,² Trotsky 
³missed the opportunity,² Zinoviev ³overlooked,² and so 
forth. But this cheap ³explanation² is not even the shadow 
of an explanation. The fact that the present leaders 
of the opposition are isolated from the Party is a fact 
of no little significance. And it certainly cannot be 
called an accident. The fact that the present leaders of 
the opposition fell away from the Party has deep-seated 
causes. Evidently, Zinoviev, Trotsky and Kamenev went 
astray on some question, they must have committed 
some grave offence‹otherwise the Party would not have 
turned away from them, as from renegades. And so the 
question is: On what did the leaders of the present opposition 
go astray, what did they do to deserve being 
³reduced to this kind of life²? 
The first fundamental question on which they went 
astray was the question of Leninism, the question of 
the Leninist ideology of our Party. They went astray in 
trying, and they are still trying, to supplement Leninism 
with Trotskyism, in fact, to substitute Trotskyism for 
Leninism. But, comrades, by doing so the leaders of the 
opposition committed a very grave offence for which the 
Party could not, and cannot, forgive them. Obviously, 
the Party could not follow them in their attempt to turn 
from Leninism to Trotskyism, and owing to this the 
leaders of the opposition found themselves isolated 
from the Party.

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 77 
What is the present bloc of the Trotskyists with 
the former Leninists in the opposition? Their present 
bloc is the material expression of the attempt to supplement 
Leninism with Trotskyism. It was not I who 
invented the term ³Trotskyism.² It was first used by 
Comrade Lenin to denote something that is the opposite 
of Leninism. 
What is the principal sin of Trotskyism? The principal 
sin of Trotskyism is disbelief in the strength 
and capacity of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. to lead 
the peasantry, the main mass of the peasantry, both in 
the struggle to consolidate the rule of the proletariat 
and, particularly, in the struggle for victory in building 
socialism in our country. 
The principal sin of Trotskyism is that it does not 
understand and, in essence, refuses to accept the Leninist 
idea of the hegemony of the proletariat (in relation to 
the peasantry) in the matter of winning and consolidating 
the proletarian dictatorship, in the matter of building 
socialism in separate countries. 
Were the former Leninists‹Zinoviev and Kamenev‹ 
aware of these organic defects of Trotskyism? Yes, they 
were. Only yesterday they were shouting from the housetops 
that Leninism is one thing and Trotskyism is another. 
Only yesterday they were shouting that Trotskyism 
is incompatible with Leninism. But it was enough for 
them to come into conflict with the Party and to find 
themselves in the minority to forget all this and to turn to 
Trotskyism in order to wage a joint struggle against the 
Leninist Party, against its ideology, against Leninism. 
You, no doubt, remember our disputes at the Fourteenth 
Congress. What was our dispute at that time with

J. V. S T A L I N 78 
the so-called ³New Opposition²? It was about the role 
and significance of the middle peasant, about the role 
and significance of the main mass of the peasantry, about 
the possibility of the proletariat leading the main mass 
of the peasantry in the matter of building socialism in 
spite of the technical backwardness of our country. 
In other words, our dispute with the opposition was 
on the same subject as that on which our Party has long 
been in dispute with Trotskyism. You know that the result 
of the disputes at the Fourteenth Congress was deplorable 
for the ³New Opposition.² You know that as a 
result of the disputes the ³New Opposition² migrated 
to the camp of Trotskyism on the fundamental question 
of the Leninist idea of the hegemony of the proletariat 
in the era of proletarian revolution. It was on this basis 
that the so-called opposition bloc of the Trotskyists 
and the former Leninists in the opposition arose. 
Did the ³New Opposition² know that the Fifth Congress 
of the Comintern had defined Trotskyism as a 
petty-bourgeois deviation 32 ? Of course, it did. More than 
that, it itself helped to carry the corresponding resolution 
at the Fifth Congress. Was the ³New Opposition² 
aware that Leninism and a petty-bourgeois deviation 
are incompatible? Of course, it was. More than that, it 
shouted i t from the house-tops for the entire Party 
to hear. 
Now judge for yourselves: Could the Party refrain 
from turning away from leaders who burn today what 
they worshipped yesterday, who deny today what they 
loudly preached to the Party yesterday, who try to supplement 
Leninism with Trotskyism in spite of the fact 
that only yesterday they denounced such an attempt

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 79 
as a betrayal of Leninism? Obviously, the Party had 
to turn away from such leaders. 
In its zeal to turn everything upside down, the opposition 
even went so far as to deny that Trotsky 
belonged to the Mensheviks in the period before the 
October Revolution. Don¹t let that surprise you, comrades. 
The opposition bluntly says that Trotsky has never 
been a Menshevik since 1904. Is that a fact? Let us turn 
to Lenin. 
Here is what Lenin said about Trotsky in 1914, 
three and a half years before the October Revolution. 
³The old participants in the Marxist movement in Russia 
know the figure of Trotsky very well and there is no need to discuss 
him for their benefit. But the younger generation of workers 
does not know him, and it is therefore necessary to discuss him, for 
he is typical of all the five coteries abroad, which, in fact, also 
vacillate between the Liquidators and the Party. 
³In the period of the old Iskra (1901-03), these waverers, who 
flitted from the ŒEconomists¹ to the ŒIskra-ists¹ and back again, 
were dubbed ŒTushino deserters¹ (the name given in the Turbulent 
Times in Russia to soldiers who deserted from one camp to 
another). . . . 
³The only ground the ŒTushino deserters¹ have for claiming 
that they stand above factions is that they Œborrow¹ their ideas 
from one faction one day and from another faction the next day. 
Trotsky was an ardent ŒIskra-ist¹ in 1901-03, and Ryazanov described 
his role at the Congress of 1903 as that of ŒLenin¹s cudgel.¹ 
At the end of 1903, Trotsky was an ardent Menshevik,* i.e., he had 
gone over from the Iskra-ists to the ŒEconomists.¹ He proclaimed 
that Œthere is a gulf between the old and the new Iskra.¹ In 1904-05, 
he deserted the Mensheviks and began to oscillate, co-operating 
with Martynov (an ŒEconomist¹) at one moment and proclaiming 
his absurdly Left Œpermanent revolution¹ theory the next. 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 80 
In 1906-07, he approached the Bolsheviks, and in the spring of 
1907 he declared that he was in agreement with Rosa Luxemburg. 
³In the period of disintegration, after long Œnon-factional¹ 
vacillation, he again went to the Right, and in August 1912 he 
entered into a bloc with the Liquidators. Now he has deserted them 
again, although, i n s u b s t a n c e, he repeats their paltry ideas.* 
³Such types are characteristic as the wreckage of past historical 
formations, of the time when the mass working-class movement 
in Russia was still dormant, and when every coterie had 
Œspace¹ in which to pose as a trend, group or faction, in short, as 
a Œpower,¹ negotiating amalgamation with others. 
³The younger generation of workers need to know thoroughly 
whom they are dealing with when people come before them making 
incredibly pretentious claims, but absolutely refusing to reckon 
with either the Party decisions that since 1908 have defined and 
established our attitude towards Liquidationism, or the experience 
of the present-day working-class movement in Russia, 
which has actually brought about the unity of the majority on the 
basis of full recognition of the above-mentioned decisions² (see 
Vol. XVII, pp. 393-94). 
It turns out therefore that throughout the period 
after 1903 Trotsky was outside the Bolshevik camp, 
now flitting to the Menshevik camp, now deserting it, 
but never joining the Bolsheviks; and in 1912 he organised 
a bloc with the Menshevik-Liquidators against 
Lenin and his Party, while remaining in the same camp 
as the Mensheviks. 
Is it surprising that such a ³figure² is distrusted 
by our Bolshevik Party? 
Is it surprising that the opposition bloc headed by 
this ³figure² finds itself isolated from and rejected 
by the Party? 
* My italics.‹J. St.

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 81 
The second fundamental question on which the leaders 
of the opposition went astray was that of whether 
the victory of socialism in one country is possible in the 
period of imperialism. The opposition¹s mistake is that 
it tried imperceptibly to liquidate Lenin¹s teaching on 
the possibility of the victory of socialism in one country. 
It is now no secret to anyone that as far back as 
1915, two years before the October Revolution, Lenin 
proclaimed the thesis, on the basis of the law of uneven 
economic and political development in the conditions 
of imperialism, that ³the victory of socialism is possible 
first in several or even in one capitalist country taken 
separately² (Lenin, Vol. XVIII, p. 232). 
It is now no secret to anyone that it was none other 
than Trotsky who, in that same year 1915, opposed 
Lenin¹s thesis in the press and declared that to admit 
the possibility of the victory of socialism in separate 
countries ³is to fall a prey to that very national narrowmindedness* 
which constitutes the essence of socialpatriotism² 
(Trotsky, The Year 1917, Vol. III, Part 1, 
pp. 89-90). 
Nor is it a secret, but a universally-known fact, 
that this controversy between Lenin and Trotsky continued, 
in fact, right up to the appearance in 1923 of 
Lenin¹s last pamphlet On Co-operation,33 in which he 
again and again proclaimed that it is possible to build 
³a complete socialist society² in our country. 
What changes in connection with this question occurred 
in the history of our Party after Lenin¹s death? 
In 1925, at the Fourteenth Conference of our Party, 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 82 
Kamenev and Zinoviev, after a number of vacillations, 
accepted Lenin¹s teaching on the possibility of the victory 
of socialism in one country and, with the Party, 
dissociated themselves from Trotskyism on this question. 
Several months later, however, before the Fourteenth 
Congress, when they found themselves in the minority 
in the struggle against the Party and were compelled 
to enter into a bloc with Trotsky, they ³suddenly² 
turned towards Trotskyism, repudiating the resolution 
of the Fourteenth Conference of our Party and abandoning 
Lenin¹s teaching on the possibility of the victory 
of socialism in one country. As a result, Trotsky¹s semi- 
Menshevik twaddle about the national narrow-mindedness 
of Lenin¹s theory has served the opposition as 
a screen by means of which it attempts to cover up its 
activities aimed at liquidating Leninism on the question 
of building socialism. 
The question is: What is there surprising in the fact 
that the Party, educated and trained in the spirit of 
Leninism, considered it necessary, after all that, to 
turn away from these Liquidators, and that the leaders 
of the opposition found themselves isolated from the 
Party? 
The third fundamental question on which the 
leaders of the opposition went astray was the question of 
our Party, of its monolithic character, of its iron unity. 
Leninism teaches that the proletarian Party must 
be united and monolithic, that it must not have any 
factions or factional centres, that it must have a single 
Party centre and a single will. Leninism teaches that 
the interests of the proletarian party require enlightened 
discussion of questions of Party policy, an enlight- 
* My italics.‹J. St.

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 83 
ened attitude of the mass of the Party membership towards 
the Party¹s leadership, criticism of the Party¹s 
defects, criticism of its mistakes. At the same time, however 
Leninism requires that the decisions of the Party 
should be unquestioningly carried out by all members 
of the Party, once these decisions have been adopted 
and approved by the leading Party bodies. 
Trotskyism looks at the matter differently. According 
to Trotskyism, the Party is something in the nature 
of a federation of factional groups, with separate factional 
centres. According to Trotskyism, the Party¹s 
proletarian discipline is unbearable. Trotskyism cannot 
tolerate the proletarian regime in the Party. Trotskyism 
does not understand that it is impossible to carry out 
the dictatorship of the proletariat unless there is iron 
discipline in the Party. 
Were the former Leninists in the opposition aware 
of these organic defects in Trotskyism? Of course, they 
were. More than that, they shouted from the house-tops 
that the ³organisational schemes² of Trotskyism were 
incompatible with the organisational principles of 
Leninism. The fact that in its statement of October 16, 
1926, the opposition repudiated the conception of the 
Party as a federation of groups is only additional confirmation 
of the fact that the opposition had not, and 
has not, a leg to stand on in this matter. This repudiation, 
however, was only verbal, it was insincere. Actually, 
the Trotskyists have never abandoned their efforts to foist 
the Trotskyist organisational line upon our Party, and 
Zinoviev and Kamenev are helping them in that disgraceful 
work. It was enough for Zinoviev and Kamenev 
to find themselves in the minority in their struggle

J. V. S T A L I N 84 
against the Party for them to turn to the Trotskyist, 
semi-Menshevik organisational plan and, jointly with 
the Trotskyists, to proclaim war on the proletarian 
regime in the Party as the slogan of the day. 
What is there surprising in the fact that our Party 
did not consider it possible to bury the organisational 
principles of Leninism and that it cast aside the present 
leaders of the opposition? 
Such, comrades, are the three fundamental questions 
on which the present leaders of the opposition went 
astray and broke with Leninism. 
After that, can one be surprised that Lenin¹s Party 
in its turn broke with those leaders? 
Unfortunately, however, the degradation of the opposition 
did not end there. It sank still lower, to limits 
beyond which it is impossible to go without running the 
risk of landing outside the Party. 
Judge for yourselves. 
Until now it was difficult to suppose that, low as 
it had sunk, the opposition would waver on the question 
of the unqualified defence of our country. Now, 
however, we must not only assume, but assert, that the 
attitude of the present leaders of the opposition is a 
defeatist one. How else is one to interpret Trotsky¹s 
stupid and absurd thesis about a Clemenceau experiment 
in the event of a new war against the U.S.S.R.? 
Can there be any doubt that this is a sign that the opposition 
has sunk still lower? 
Until now it was difficult to suppose that the opposition 
would ever hurl against our Party the stupid 
and incongruous accusation of being a Thermidor party. 
In 1925, when Zalutsky first talked about Thermidor

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 85 
tendencies in our Party, the present leaders of the opposition 
emphatically dissociated themselves from him. 
Now, however, the opposition has sunk so low that it 
goes farther than Zalutsky and accuses the Party of being 
a Thermidor party. What I cannot understand is how 
people who assert that our Party has become a Thermidor 
party can remain in its ranks. 
Until now the opposition tried ³merely² to organise 
separate factional groups in the sections of the Comintern. 
Now, however, it has gone to the length of openly 
organising a new party in Germany, the party of those 
counter-revolutionary scoundrels Maslow and Ruth 
Fischer, in opposition to the existing Communist Party 
in Germany. That stand is one of directly splitting the 
Comintern. From the formation of factional groups in 
the sections of the Comintern to splitting the Comintern‹
such is the road of degradation that the leaders 
of the opposition have travelled. 
It is characteristic that in his speech Zinoviev did 
not deny that there is a split in Germany. That this 
anti-communist party was organised by our opposition 
is evident if only from the fact that the anti-Party articles 
and speeches of the leaders of our opposition are 
being printed and distributed in pamphlet form by Maslow 
and Ruth Fischer. (A voice: ³Shame!²) 
And what is the significance of the fact that the opposition 
bloc put up Vuiovich to undertake in our press 
the political defence of this second, Maslow-Ruth Fischer, 
party in Germany? It shows that our opposition 
is supporting Maslow and Ruth Fischer openly, is supporting 
them against the Comintern, against its proletarian 
sections. That is no longer merely factionalism,

J. V. S T A L I N 86 
comrades. It is a policy of openly splitting the Comintern. 
(Voices: ³Quite right!²) 
Formerly, the opposition strove to secure freedom 
for factional groups within our Party. Now, that is not 
enough for it. Now, it is taking the path of an outright 
split, creating a new party in the U.S.S.R., with its 
own Central Committee and its own local organisations. 
From the policy of factionalism to the policy of an outright 
split, to the policy of creating a new party, to 
the policy of ³Ossovskyism²34‹such are the depths to 
which the leaders of our opposition have sunk. 
Such are the principal landmarks on the road of the 
opposition¹s further degradation in departing from the 
Party and the Comintern, in pursuing the policy of splitting 
the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
Can such a situation be tolerated any longer? Obviously 
not. The splitting policy cannot be permitted 
either in the Comintern or in the C.P.S.U.(B.). That evil 
must be eradicated immediately if we value the interests 
of the Party and the Comintern, the interests of their 
unity. 
Such are the circumstances that compelled the Central 
Committee to raise the question of expelling Trotsky 
and Zinoviev from the Central Committee. 
What is the way out?‹you will ask. 
The opposition has landed in an impasse. The task 
is to make a last attempt to help the opposition to extricate 
itself from that impasse. What Comrade Orjonikidze 
proposed here on behalf of the Central Control 
Commission is the method and the maximum of concession 
to which the Party could agree in order to promote 
peace in the Party.

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 87 
Firstly, the opposition must emphatically and irrevocably 
abandon its ³Thermidor² twaddle and its 
foolish slogan of a Clemenceau experiment. The opposition 
must understand that people with such views 
and such tendencies cannot defend our country in 
face of the threat of war that hangs over it. The opposition 
must understand that people with such views and 
such tendencies cannot continue to be members of 
the Central Committee of our Party. (Voices: ³Quite 
right!²) 
Secondly, the opposition must openly and definitely 
condemn the splitting, anti-Leninist Maslow-Ruth 
Fischer group in Germany and break off all connection 
with it. Support of the policy of splitting the Comintern 
cannot be tolerated any longer. (Voices: ³Quite 
right!²) 
The U.S.S.R. cannot be defended if support is given 
to the splitting of the Comintern and to the disorganisation 
of the sections of the Comintern. 
Thirdly, the opposition must emphatically and irrevocably 
abandon a l l factionalism and a l l the paths 
that lead to the creation of a new party within the 
C.P.S.U.(B.). The splitting policy must not be permitted 
in our Party either two months or even two hours 
before our Party congress. (Voices: ³Quite right!²) 
Such, comrades, are the three chief conditions which 
must be accepted if we are to allow Trotsky and Zinoviev 
to remain members of the Central Committee of 
our Party. 
It will be said that this is repression. Yes, it is repression. 
We have never regarded the weapon of repression 
as excluded from our Party¹s arsenal. We are acting

J. V. S T A L I N 88 
here in conformity with the well-known resolution of 
the Tenth Congress of our Party, in conformity with the 
resolution that was drafted and carried through at the 
Tenth Congress by Comrade Lenin.35 Here are points 
6 and 7 of this resolution: 
Point 6: ³The congress orders the immediate dissolution of 
all groups without exception that have been formed on the basis 
of one platform or another and instructs all organisations strictly 
to see to it that there shall be no factional pronouncements of any 
kind. Non-observance of this decision of the congress shall involve 
certain and immediate expulsion from the Party.² 
Point 7: ³In order to ensure strict discipline within the Party 
and in all Soviet work and to secure the maximum unanimity, 
doing away with all factionalism, the congress authorises the Central 
Committee, in case (cases) of breach of discipline or of a revival 
or toleration of factionalism, to apply all Party penalties, 
up to and including expulsion from the Party and, in regard to 
members of the Central Committee, to reduce them to the status 
of candidate members and even, as an extreme measure, to expel 
them from the Party. A condition for the application of such an 
extreme measure (to members and candidate members of the C.C. 
and members of the Control Commission) must be the convocation 
of a plenum of the Central Committee, to which all candidate members 
of the Central Committee and all members of the Control 
Commission shall be invited. If such a general assembly of the most 
responsible leaders of the Party, by a two-thirds majority, considers 
it necessary to reduce a member of the Central Committee 
to the status of a candidate member, or to expel him from the Party, 
this measure shall be put into effect immediately.² 
Voices: This should be put into effect at once. 
Stalin: Wait, comrades, don¹t be in a hurry. This 
was written and bequeathed to us by Lenin, for he knew 
what iron Party discipline is, what the proletarian dictatorship 
is. For he knew that the dictatorship of the

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 89 
proletariat is exercised through the Party, that without 
the Party, a united and monolithic party, the dictatorship 
of the proletariat is impossible. 
Such are the conditions which must be accepted if 
Trotsky and Zinoviev are to remain members of the Central 
Committee of our Party. If the opposition accepts 
these conditions, well and good. If it does not, so much 
the worse for it. (Applause.)

WITH REFERENCE TO 
THE OPPOSITION¹S ³DECLARATION² 
OF AUGUST 8, 1927 
Speech Delivered on August 9 
Comrades, what the opposition is offering us cannot 
be regarded as peace in the Party. We must not harbour 
any illusions. What the opposition is offering us is a 
temporary armistice. (A voice: ³Not even temporary!²) 
It is a temporary armistice, which may be something 
of a step forward under certain circumstances, but on 
the other hand it may not. That must be borne in mind 
once and for all. That must be borne in mind, whether 
or not the opposition agrees to yield further. 
It is a step forward for the Party that the opposition 
has retreated to some extent on all the three questions 
we put to it. It has retreated to some extent, but 
with such reservations as may create grounds for an even 
sharper struggle in the future. (Voices: ³Quite right!² 
³Quite right, that¹s true!²) 
The question of the defence of the U.S.S.R. is a fundamental 
one for us in view of the threat of war that has 
arisen. In its declaration the opposition states in a 
positive form that it stands for the unqualified and 
unreserved defence of the U.S.S.R., but it refuses to condemn 
Trotsky¹s well-known formula, his well-known 
slogan about Clemenceau. Trotsky must have the courage 
to admit facts.

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 91 
I think that the entire plenum of the Central Committee 
and Central Control Commission is unanimously of the 
opinion that a man who in his heart, who in deed and 
not only in word, stands for the unqualified defence of 
our country would not write what Trotsky wrote in his 
letter to the Central Control Commission addressed to 
Comrade Orjonikidze. 
I think that the entire plenum of the C.C. and 
C.C.C. is convinced that this slogan, this formula, of 
Trotsky¹s about Clemenceau can only raise doubts of 
Trotsky¹s sincerity in regard to the defence of the U.S.S.R. 
More than that, it creates the impression that Trotsky 
adopts a negative attitude towards the questions of the 
unqualified defence of our country. (Voices: ³Quite right, 
absolutely right!²) 
I think that the entire plenum of the C.C. and 
C.C.C. is profoundly convinced that in issuing this slogan, 
this formula, about Clemenceau, Trotsky made 
the defence of the U.S.S.R. depend on the condition 
contained in the point about changing the leadership 
of our Party and the leadership of the Soviet 
Government. Only those who are blind can fail to see 
that. I f Trotsky lacks the courage, the elementary 
courage, to admit his mistake, he himself will be to 
blame. 
Since the opposition in its document does not condemn 
this mistake of Trotsky¹s, it means that the opposition 
wants to keep a weapon in reserve for future attacks 
on the Party in regard to the defence of the country, 
in regard to the line that the Party is pursuing. It 
means that the opposition is keeping a weapon in reserve 
with the intention of using it.

J. V. S T A L I N 92 
Hence, on this fundamental question, the opposition 
seeks not peace, but a temporary armistice, with 
a reservation that may still further intensify the struggle 
in the future. (A voice: ³We don¹t need an armistice, 
we need peace.²) 
No, comrades, you are mistaken, we do need an armistice. 
If we were to take an example, it would be best 
to take that of Gogol¹s Ossip, who said: ³A piece of 
string? Give it here, even a piece of string will come in 
handy.² It will indeed be best to act like Gogol¹s Ossip. 
We are not so rich in resources and so strong that we 
can afford to reject a piece of string. We must not 
reject even a piece of string. Think well and you will 
understand that our arsenal must include even a piece 
of string. 
On the second question, the question of Thermidor, 
the opposition has undoubtedly retreated; on this score 
it has retreated to some extent from its previous stand, 
for after such a retreat there cannot (to be logical, of 
course) be any more of that stupid agitation about a 
³Thermidor degeneration² of the Party which has 
been conducted by certain members of the opposition, 
particularly by some of its semi-Menshevik members. 
The opposition, however, has accompanied this concession 
with a reservation that may, in future, remove 
all possibility of an armistice and peace. They say that 
there are certain elements in the country who betray 
tendencies towards a restoration, towards a Thermidor. 
But nobody has ever denied that. Since antagonistic 
classes exist, since classes have not been abolished, attempts 
will always, of course, be made to restore the 
old order. But that was not the point of our dispute.

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 93 
The point of the dispute is that in its documents the 
opposition makes thrusts at the Central Committee, 
and hence at the Party, concerning Thermidor tendencies. 
The Central Committee cannot be separated from 
the Party. It cannot. That is nonsense. Only anti-Party 
people who fail to understand the basic elementary premises 
of Lenin¹s organisational structure can assume 
that the Central Committee, particularly our Central 
Committee, can be separated from the Party. 
The opposition, however, accompanies its concessions 
with the reservations I have mentioned. But such 
reservations provide the opposition with a weapon in 
reserve with which to attack the Party again when the 
opportunity occurs. 
Of course, it is ludicrous to speak of Thermidor 
tendencies of the Central Committee. I will say more: 
it is nonsense. I don¹t think that the opposition itself 
believes that nonsense, but it needs it as a bogey. For 
if the opposition really believed that, then, of course, 
it should have declared open war on our Party and on 
our Central Committee; but it assures us that it wants 
peace in the Party. 
And so, on the second point also, the opposition is 
keeping a weapon in reserve with which to attack the 
Central Committee again later on. That, too, must be 
borne in mind comrades, under all circumstances. 
Whether we remove the leaders of the opposition from 
the Central Committee or not on the fundamental 
question of Thermidor they will have a weapon in reserve, 
and the Party must take now all measures so as to 
eliminate the opposition if it takes up this anti-Party 
weapon again.

J. V. S T A L I N 94 
The third question is that of the split in the Communist 
Party of Germany, of the anti-Leninist and splitting 
group of Ruth Fischer and Maslow. 
We had a strange talk in the commission yesterday. 
With great, very great, difficulty, after a number of 
speeches, the oppositionists found the courage to say 
that, in obedience to the decision of the Comintern‹ 
not because they were convinced, but in obedience to the 
decision of the Comintern‹they agreed to admit that 
organisational contact with this anti-Party group is impermissible. 
I proposed: ³organisational contact with and 
support of this group.² Trotsky said: ³No, that is not 
necessary, we cannot accept that. The Comintern¹s 
decision to expel them was wrong. I shall try to get those 
people‹Ruth Fischer and Maslow‹reinstated.² 
What does that show? Judge for yourselves. How 
completely the elementary notion of the Party principle 
has disappeared from the minds of these people! 
Let us suppose that, today, the C.P.S.U.(B.) expels 
Myasnikov, about whose anti-Party activities you all 
know. Tomorrow, Trotsky will come along and say: 
³I cannot refrain from supporting Myasnikov, because 
the Central Committee¹s decision was wrong, but I am 
willing to break off organisational contact with him in 
obedience to your orders.² 
Tomorrow we expel the ³Workers¹ Truth² group,36 
about whose anti-Party activities you also know. Trotsky 
will come forward and say: ³I cannot refrain from 
supporting this anti-Party group, because you were 
wrong in expelling it.² 
The day after tomorrow the Central Committee expels 
Ossovsky, because he is an enemy of the Party, as

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 95 
you know very well. Trotsky will tell us that it was 
wrong to expel Ossovsky, and that he cannot refrain from 
supporting him. 
But if the Party, if the Comintern, after a detailed 
discussion of the conduct of certain people, including 
that of Ruth Fischer and Maslow, if these high proletarian 
bodies decide that such people must be expelled, 
and if, in spite of that, Trotsky persists in supporting 
these expelled people, what is the position then? What 
becomes of our Party, of the Comintern? Do they exist 
for us? It turns out that for Trotsky neither the Party 
nor the Comintern exists, there exists only Trotsky¹s 
personal opinion. 
But what if not only Trotsky but also other members 
of the Party want to behave as Trotsky does? Obviously, 
this guerrilla mentality, this hetman mentality, 
can only lead to the destruction of the Party principle. 
There will no longer be a party; instead there will be 
the personal opinion of each hetman. That is what 
Trotsky refuses to understand. 
Why did the opposition refuse to refrain from 
supporting the anti-communist Maslow-Ruth Fischer 
group? Why did the leaders of the opposition refuse to 
accept our amendment on that point? Because they want 
to keep a third weapon in reserve with which to attack 
the Comintern. That must also be borne in mind. 
Whether we reach agreement with them or not, whether 
they are removed from the Central Committee or 
not, they will have this weapon in reserve for a future 
attack on the Comintern. 
The fourth question is that of the dissolution of 
factions. We propose that i t be said honestly and

J. V. S T A L I N 96 
straightforwardly: ³The faction must be dissolved without 
fail.² The leaders of the opposition refuse to say 
that. Instead, they say: ³The elements of factionalism 
must be eliminated²; but they add: ³the elements of 
factionalism engendered by the inner-Party regime.² 
Here you have the fourth little reservation. That 
is also a weapon held in reserve against our Party and 
its unity. 
What was the intention of the oppositionists in refusing 
to accept the formulation proposing the immediate 
dissolution of the faction, which they have, and which 
intends to hold an illegal conference here in Moscow in 
a day or two? It means that they want to retain the right 
to go on organising demonstrations at railway stations, 
as much as to say: the regime is to blame, we were compelled 
to organise yet another demonstration. It means 
that they want to retain the right to go on attacking 
the Party, as much as to say: the regime compels us 
to attack. Here you have yet another weapon which 
they are keeping in reserve. 
The joint plenum of the Central Committee and 
Central Control Commission should know and remember 
all this.

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN 
LABOUR DELEGATION 
September 9, 1927 
I 
QUESTIONS PUT BY THE DELEGATION AND 
COMRADE STALIN¹S ANSWERS 
FIRST QUESTION. What new principles have 
Lenin and the Communist Party added in practice to Marxism? 
Would it be correct to say that Lenin believed in 
³creative revolution² whereas Marx was more inclined 
to wait for the culmination of the development of economic 
forces? 
ANSWER: I think that Lenin ³added² no ³new 
principles² to Marxism, nor did he abolish any of the 
³old² principles of Marxism. Lenin was, and remains, 
the most loyal and consistent pupil of Marx and Engels, 
and he wholly and completely based himself on the 
principles of Marxism. 
But Lenin did not merely carry out the teaching 
of Marx and Engels. He was at the same time the 
continuer of that teaching. 
What does that mean? 
It means that he developed further the teaching 
of Marx and Engels in conformity with the new conditions 
of development, with the new phase of capitalism,

J. V. S T A L I N 98 
with imperialism. It means that in developing further 
the teaching of Marx in the new conditions of the class 
struggle, Lenin contributed something new to the general 
treasury of Marxism as compared with what was 
created by Marx and Engels, with what could be created 
in the pre-imperialist period of capitalism; at the same 
time Lenin¹s new contribution to the treasury of Marxism 
is wholly and completely based on the principles 
laid down by Marx and Engels. 
It is in this sense that we speak of Leninism as Marxism 
of the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. 
Here are a few questions to which Lenin contributed 
something new, developing further the teaching of 
Marx. 
Firstly, the question of monopoly capitalism, of 
imperialism as the new phase of capitalism. 
In Capital, Marx and Engels analysed the foundations 
of capitalism. But Marx and Engels lived in the 
period of the domination of pre-monopoly capitalism, 
in the period of the smooth evolution of capitalism and 
its ³peaceful² expansion over the whole world. 
That old phase of capitalism came to a close towards 
the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth 
century, when Marx and Engels were already dead. 
It is understandable that Marx and Engels could only 
guess at the new conditions for the development of capitalism 
that arose as a result of the new phase of capitalism 
which succeeded the old phase, as a result of the 
imperialist, monopoly phase of development, when the 
smooth evolution of capitalism was succeeded by spasmodic, 
cataclysmic development of capitalism, when

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 99 
the unevenness of development and the contradictions 
of capitalism became particularly pronounced, and when 
the struggle for markets and fields of capital export, 
in the circumstances of the extreme unevenness of development, 
made periodical imperialist wars for periodic 
redivisions of the world and of spheres of influence 
inevitable. 
The service Lenin rendered here, and consequently, 
his new contribution, was that, on the basis of the fundamental 
principles in Capital, he made a substantiated 
Marxist analysis of imperialism as the last phase 
of capitalism, and exposed its ulcers and the conditions 
of its inevitable doom. That analysis formed the basis 
for Lenin¹s thesis that under the conditions of imperialism 
the victory of socialism is possible in individual 
capitalist countries, taken separately. 
Secondly, the question of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. 
The fundamental idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
as the political rule of the proletariat and as 
a method of overthrowing the power of capital by the 
use of force was advanced by Marx and Engels. 
Lenin¹s new contribution in this field was that: 
a) he discovered the Soviet system as the best state 
form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, utilising for 
this the experience of the Paris Commune and the 
Russian revolution; 
b) he elucidated the formula of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat from the angle of the problem of the allies 
of the proletariat, defining the dictatorship of the pro 
letariat as a special form of class alliance between the 
proletariat, as the leader, and the exploited masses of

J. V. S T A L I N 100 
the non-proletarian classes (the peasantry, etc.), as 
the led; 
c) he laid particular emphasis on the fact that the 
dictatorship of the proletariat is the highest type of 
democracy in class society, the form of proletarian democracy, 
which expresses the interests of the majority 
(the exploited), in contrast to capitalist democracy, 
which expresses the interests of the minority (the exploiters). 
Thirdly, the question of the forms and methods of 
successfully building socialism in the period of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, in the period of transition 
from capitalism to socialism, in a country surrounded 
by capitalist states. 
Marx and Engels regarded the period of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat as a more or less prolonged 
one, full of revolutionary clashes and civil wars, in the 
course of which the proletariat, being in power, would 
take the economic, political, cultural and organisational 
measures necessary for creating, in the place of the 
old, capitalist society, a new, socialist society, a society 
without classes and without a state. Lenin wholly 
and completely based himself on these fundamental 
principles of Marx and Engels. 
Lenin¹s new contribution in this field was that: 
a) he proved that a complete socialist society can 
be built in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
surrounded by imperialist states, provided the country 
is not strangled by the military intervention of the surrounding 
capitalist states; 
b) he traced the concrete lines of economic policy 
(the ³New Economic Policy²) by which the proletariat,

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 101 
having possession of the economic key positions (industry, 
land, transport, banks, etc.), links up socialised 
industry with agriculture (³the link between industry 
and peasant economy²) and thus leads the whole national 
economy towards socialism; 
c) he traced the concrete ways of gradually guiding 
and drawing the main mass of the peasantry into the 
channel of socialist construction through the co-operatives, 
which in the hands of the proletarian dictatorship 
are a most powerful instrument for the transformation 
of small peasant economy and for the re-education of 
the main mass of the peasantry in the spirit of socialism. 
Fourthly, the question of the hegemony of the proletariat 
in the revolution, in every popular revolution, 
both in the revolution against tsarism and in the revolution 
against capitalism. 
Marx and Engels provided the main outlines of the 
idea of the hegemony of the proletariat. Lenin¹s new 
contribution in this field was that he further developed 
and expanded those outlines into a harmonious system 
of the hegemony of the proletariat, into a harmonious 
system of leadership of the working masses in town and 
country by the proletariat not only in the overthrow 
of tsarism and capitalism, but also in the building of 
socialism under the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
We know that, thanks to Lenin and his Party, the 
idea of the hegemony of the proletariat was applied 
in a masterly way in Russia. This, incidentally, explains 
why the revolution in Russia brought the 
proletariat into power. 
In the past, things usually took the following 
course: during the revolution the workers fought at the

J. V. S T A L I N 102 
barricades, it was they who shed their blood and overthrew 
the old order, but power fell into the hands of the 
bourgeois, who then oppressed and exploited the workers. 
That was the case in England and France. That was 
the case in Germany. Here, in Russia, however, things 
took a different turn. In Russia the workers were not 
merely the shock force of the revolution. While being 
the shock force of the revolution, the Russian proletariat 
at the same time strove for hegemony, for political 
leadership of all the exploited masses of town and 
country, rallying them around itself, wresting them from 
the bourgeoisie and politically isolating the bourgeoisie. 
And while being the leader of the exploited masses, the 
Russian proletariat fought to take power into its own 
hands and to utilise it in its own interests, against the 
bourgeoisie, against capitalism. This, in fact, explains 
why each powerful outbreak of the revolution in Russia, 
in October 1905 as well as in February 1917, brought on 
to the scene Soviets of Workers¹ Deputies as the embryo 
of the new apparatus of power whose function is to suppress 
the bourgeoisie‹as against the bourgeois parliament, 
the old apparatus of power, whose function is 
to suppress the proletariat. 
Twice the bourgeoisie in Russia tried to restore the 
bourgeois parliament and put an end to the Soviets: 
in September 1917, at the time of the Pre-parliament, 
before the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, and in 
January 1918, at the time of the Constituent Assembly, 
after the seizure of power by the proletariat; and on both 
occasions it suffered defeat. Why? Because the bourgeoisie 
was already politically isolated, because the vast 
masses of the working people regarded the proletariat

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 103 
as the sole leader of the revolution, and because the Soviets 
had already been tried and tested by the masses 
as their own workers¹ government, to exchange which 
for a bourgeois parliament would have meant suicide 
for the proletariat. It is not surprising, therefore, that 
bourgeois parliamentarism did not take root in Russia. 
That is why the revolution in Russia led to the rule 
of the proletariat. 
Such were the results of the application of Lenin¹s 
system of the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution. 
Fifthly, the national and colonial question. 
Analysing in their time the events in Ireland, India, 
China, the Central European countries, Poland and 
Hungary, Marx and Engels provided the basic, initial 
ideas on the national and colonial question. Lenin in 
his works based himself on those ideas. 
Lenin¹s new contribution in this field was: 
a) he unified those ideas in one harmonious system 
of views on national and colonial revolutions in the era 
of imperialism; 
b) he linked the national and colonial question with 
the question of overthrowing imperialism; 
c) he declared the national and colonial question 
to be a component part of the general question of international 
proletarian revolution. 
Lastly, the question of the party of the proletariat. 
Marx and Engels provided the main outlines on the 
party as the advanced detachment of the proletariat, 
without which (the party) the proletariat cannot achieve 
its emancipation, either in the sense of capturing

J. V. S T A L I N 104 
power, or in the sense of transforming capitalist society. 
Lenin¹s new contribution in this field was that he 
developed those outlines further in conformity with the 
new conditions of the struggle of the proletariat in the 
period of imperialism and showed that: 
a) the party is the highest form of class organisation 
of the proletariat as compared with other forms of 
proletarian organisation (trade unions, co-operatives, 
state organisation) whose work it is the Party¹s function 
to generalise and direct; 
b) the dictatorship of the proletariat can be implemented 
only through the party, as the guiding force 
of the dictatorship; 
c) the dictatorship of the proletariat can be complete 
only if it is led by one party, the Communist Party, 
which does not and must not share the leadership 
with other parties; 
d) unless there is iron discipline in the party, the 
tasks of the dictatorship of the proletariat in regard to 
suppressing the exploiters and transforming class society 
into socialist society cannot be accomplished. 
That, in the main, is the new contribution made by 
Lenin in his works, giving concrete form to Marx¹s 
teaching and developing it further in conformity with 
the new conditions of the struggle of the proletariat in 
the period of imperialism. 
That is why we say that Leninism is Marxism of 
the era of imperialism and proletarian revolutions. 
It is clear from this that Leninism cannot be separated 
from Marxism; still less can it be counterposed to 
Marxism.

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 105 
The question submitted by the delegation goes on 
to say: 
³Would it be correct to say that Lenin believed in 
Œcreative revolution¹ whereas Marx was more inclined 
to wait for the culmination of the development of economic 
forces?² 
I think it would be quite incorrect to say that. I 
think that every popular revolution, if it really is a 
popular revolution, is a creative revolution, for i t 
breaks up the old order and creates a new one. 
Of course, there is nothing creative in the ³revolutions²‹
if they may be so called‹that sometimes take 
place in certain backward countries, in the form of toylike 
³risings² of one tribe against another. But Marxists 
never regarded such toy-like ³risings² as revolutions. 
It is obviously not a question of such ³risings,² 
but of a mass, popular revolution in which the oppressed 
classes rise up against the oppressing classes. Such 
a revolution cannot but be creative. Marx and Lenin 
upheld precisely such a revolution, and only such a revolution. 
It goes without saying that such a revolution 
cannot arise under all conditions, that it can take place 
only under definite favourable conditions of an economic 
and political nature. 
SECOND QUESTION. Can it be said that the Communist 
Party controls the government? 
ANSWER: It all depends upon what is meant by 
control. In capitalist countries they have a rather peculiar 
conception of control. I know that a number of 
capitalist governments are controlled by big banks, notwithstanding 
the existence of ³democratic² parliaments.

J. V. S T A L I N 106 
The parliaments claim that they control the government. 
In fact, however, the composition of the governments 
is predetermined, and their actions are controlled by 
big financial consortiums. Who does not know that there 
is not a single capitalist ³power² where the cabinet can 
be formed against the will of the big financial magnates? 
It is enough for financial pressure to be exerted to 
cause Cabinet Ministers to go flying from their posts, 
as if bewitched. That is actually control of governments 
by the banks, in spite of the seeming control by parliament. 
If such control is meant, then I must declare that 
control of the government by money-bags is inconceivable 
and absolutely out of the question in our country, 
if only for the reason that the banks in our country have 
long been nationalised and the money-bags have been 
kicked out of the U.S.S.R. 
Perhaps the delegation wanted to ask not about control, 
but about the guidance of the government by the 
Party? If that is what the delegation wanted to ask, 
my answer is: Yes, in our country the Party guides the 
government. And the Party is able to do so because it 
enjoys the confidence of the majority of the workers 
and working people generally and has a right to guide 
the organs of government in the name of that majority. 
How does the guidance of the government by the 
workers¹ party in the U.S.S.R., by the Communist Party 
of the U.S.S.R., manifest itself? 
First of all by the Communist Party striving, through 
the Soviets and their congresses, to secure the election 
of i t s candidates to the principal government 
posts, the election of its best workers, who are devoted

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 107 
to the cause of the proletariat and are ready loyally 
and faithfully to serve the proletariat. It succeeds in 
doing this in the vast majority of cases because the workers 
and peasants have confidence in the Party. It is 
no accident that the leaders of the organs of government 
in our country are Communists and that those leaders 
enjoy enormous prestige in the country. 
Secondly, by the Party checking the work of the organs 
of administration, the work of the organs of government, 
rectifying mistakes and defects, which are unavoidable, 
helping these organs to carry out the government¹s 
decisions and striving to secure for them the support 
of the masses; moreover not a single important decision 
is taken by them without appropriate instructions 
from the Party. 
Thirdly, by the fact that when the plan of work of 
the various organs of government in the sphere of industry 
or agriculture, or in the sphere of trade or cultural 
development, is drawn up, the Party gives general 
guiding instructions defining the character and direction 
of the work of these organs during the period these 
plans are in operation. 
The bourgeois press usually expresses ³surprise² at 
the Party¹s ³interference² in state affairs. But this 
³surprise² is thouroughly false. It is well known that 
in capitalist countries the bourgeois parties equally ³interfere² 
in state affairs and guide the government, and 
in those countries that guidance is concentrated in the 
hands of a narrow circle of persons who in one way or 
another are connected with the big banks and who, because 
of that, strive to conceal the role they play from 
the people.

J. V. S T A L I N 108 
Who does not know that every bourgeois party in 
Britain, or in other capitalist countries, has its secret 
cabinet consisting of a narrow circle of persons in whose 
hands the exercise of this guidance is concentrated? 
Recall, for example, Lloyd George¹s reference to the 
³shadow² cabinet in the Liberal Party. The difference 
in this respect between the Land of Soviets and the 
capitalist countries is: 
a) in capitalist countries the bourgeois parties guide 
the state in the interests of the bourgeoisie and against 
the proletariat, whereas in the U.S.S.R. the Communist 
Party guides the state in the interests of the proletariat 
and against the bourgeoisie; 
b) the bourgeois parties conceal their guiding role 
from the people by resorting to suspicious, secret cabinets, 
whereas the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. does 
not need any secret cabinets; it condemns the policy 
and practice of secret cabinets and openly declares to 
the whole country that it takes responsibility for the 
guidance of the state. 
A delegate: Does the Party guide the trade unions 
on the same principles? 
Stalin: In the main, yes. Formally, the Party cannot 
give the trade unions any directives; but the Party 
gives directives to the Communists who work in the 
trade unions. It is known that in the trade unions there 
are communist groups, just as there are in the Soviets, 
co-operatives, and so forth. It is the duty of these communist 
groups to try to secure by persuasion that the 
trade-union, Soviet, co-operative, and other bodies adopt 
decisions which correspond to the Party¹s directives. 
And they succeed in this in the vast majority of cases

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 109 
because the Party exercises enormous influence among 
the masses and enjoys their great confidence. In this 
way unity of action is secured among the extremely diverse 
proletarian organisations. Without it, there would 
be confusion and disharmony in the work of these working-
class organisations. 
THIRD QUESTION. Since only one party enjoys 
legality in Russia, how do you know that the masses sympathise 
with communism? 
ANSWER: It is true that in the U.S.S.R. there are 
no legal bourgeois parties; that only one party, the party 
of the workers, the Communist Party, enjoys legality. 
Have we, however, ways and means of convincing 
ourselves that the majority of the workers, the majority 
of the labouring masses, sympathise with the Communists? 
It is a question, of course, of the masses of the 
workers and peasants and not of the new bourgeoisie, nor 
of the fragments of the old exploiting classes, which have 
already been smashed by the proletariat. Yes, we have 
the possibility, we have ways and means of ascertaining 
whether the masses of the workers and peasants sympathise 
with the Communists or not. 
Let us take the most important periods in the life 
of our country and see whether there are grounds for 
asserting that the masses really sympathise with the 
Communists. 
Let us take, first of all, so important a period as that 
of the October Revolution in 1917, when the Communist 
Party, precisely as a party, openly called upon the 
workers and peasants to overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie, 
and when this Party obtained the support of

J. V. S T A L I N 110 
the overwhelming majority of the workers, soldiers 
and peasants. 
What was the situation at that time? The Socialist-
Revolutionaries (S.-R.¹s) and the Social-Democrats 
(Mensheviks), who had formed a bloc with the bourgeoisie, 
were then in power. The state apparatus, central and 
local, as well as the apparatus of command of the twelvemillion-
strong army, was in the hands of those parties, 
in the hands of the government. The Communist 
Party was in a state of semi-legality. The bourgeois in 
all countries prophesied the inevitable collapse of the 
Bolshevik Party. The Entente wholly and completely 
supported the Kerensky Government. Nevertheless, the 
Communist Party, the Bolshevik Party, never ceased 
to call upon the proletariat to overthrow that government 
and to establish the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Well, what happened? The overwhelming majority of 
the labouring masses, in the rear and at the front, most 
emphatically supported the Bolshevik Party‹the Kerensky 
Government was overthrown and the rule of the 
proletariat was established. 
How could it happen that the Bolsheviks proved 
victorious at that time in spite of the hostile prophecies 
made by the bourgeois of all countries about the doom 
of the Bolshevik Party? Does this not prove that the 
broad masses of the working people sympathise with 
the Bolshevik Party? I think it does. 
There you have the first test of the prestige and influence 
of the Communist Party among the broad masses 
of the population. 
Let us take the next period, the period of intervention, 
the period of civil war, when the British capital

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 111 
ists occupied the north of Russia, the area of Archangel 
and Murmansk, when the American, British, Japanese 
and French capitalists occupied Siberia and pushed Kolchak 
into the forefront, when the French and British 
capitalists took steps to occupy ³South Russia² and 
championed Denikin and Wrangel. 
That was a war conducted by the Entente and the 
Russian counter-revolutionary generals against the communist 
government in Moscow, against the October 
gains of our revolution. It was the period when the 
strength and stability of the Communist Party was 
put to the severest test among the broad masses of the 
workers and peasants. 
But what happened? Is it not known that the outcome 
of the Civil War was that the armies of occupation were 
driven from Russia and the counter-revolutionary generals 
were wiped out by the Red Army? 
It turned out that the fate of a war is decided in 
the last analysis, not by technical equipment, with which 
Kolchak and Denikin were plentifully supplied by the 
enemies of the U.S.S.R., but by a correct policy, by the 
sympathy and support of the vast masses of the population. 
Was it an accident that the Bolshevik Party 
proved victorious then? Of course not. Does not this 
fact prove that the Communist Party in our country 
enjoys the sympathy of the broad masses of the working 
people? I think it does. 
There you have the second test of the strength and 
stability of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. 
Let us pass to the present period, the post-war period, 
when questions of peaceful construction are on

J. V. S T A L I N 112 
the order of the day, when the period of economic 
disruption has been superseded by the period of the 
restoration of industry, and finally, by the period of 
the reconstruction of the whole of our national economy 
on a new technical basis. Have we now ways and means 
of testing the strength and stability of the Communist 
Party, of ascertaining the extent of the sympathy enjoyed 
by that Party among the broad masses of the working 
people? I think we have. 
Let us take, first of all, the trade unions in the Soviet 
Union, which embrace about ten million proletarians; 
let us examine the composition of the leading 
bodies of our trade unions. Is it an accident that Communists 
are at the head of these bodies? Of course not. 
It would be absurd to think that the composition of the 
leading bodies of the trade unions is a matter of indifference 
to the workers of the U.S.S.R. The workers 
of the U.S.S.R. grew up and were trained in the storms 
of three revolutions. They learned, as no one else learned, 
to test their leaders and to kick them out if they do not 
serve the interests of the proletariat. At one time Plekhanov 
was the most popular man in our Party. The workers, 
however, did not hesitate to isolate him completely 
when they became convinced that he had departed from 
the proletarian line. And if such workers express their 
complete confidence in the Communists, elect them to 
responsible posts in the trade unions, this fact cannot 
but serve as direct evidence that the strength and stability 
of the Communist Party among the workers in 
the U.S.S.R. is enormous. 
There you have proof that the broad masses of the 
workers certainly sympathise with the Communist Party.

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 113 
Let us take the last elections to the Soviets. In the 
U.S.S.R. the right to vote in the election of Soviets 
is enjoyed by the whole adult population from the age 
of eighteen, irrespective of sex or nationality‹except 
for the bourgeois elements who exploit the labour of 
others and have been deprived of electoral rights. This 
makes a total of about sixty million voters. The overwhelming 
majority of these, of course, are peasants. 
Of these sixty million, about 51 per cent, that is, over 
thirty million, exercised their right to vote. Now examine 
the composition of the leading bodies of our Soviets, 
central and local. Can it be called an accident that the 
overwhelming majority of the elected leading elements 
are Communists? Obviously, it cannot. Does not this fact 
show that the Communist Party enjoys the confidence 
of the vast masses of the peasantry? I think it does. 
There you have yet another test of the strength and 
stability of the Communist Party. 
Let us take the Komsomol (Young Communist 
League) which unites about two million young workers 
and peasants. Can it be called an accident that the overwhelming 
majority of the elected leading elements in 
the Young Communist League are Communists? I do not 
think so. 
There you have yet another test of the strength and 
prestige of the Communist Party. 
Finally, let us take the innumerable assemblies, 
conferences, delegate meetings, and so forth, which 
embrace vast masses of the working people, workers 
and peasants, both men and women, of all the nationalities 
included in the U.S.S.R. In Western countries, 
people sometimes wax ironical over these conferences

J. V. S T A L I N 114 
and assemblies and assert that the Russians in general 
like to talk a lot. For us, however, these conferences 
and assemblies are of enormous importance, both as 
a means of testing the mood of the masses and as a means 
of exposing our mistakes and indicating the methods 
by which they can be rectified; for we make not a few 
mistakes and we do not conceal them, because we think 
that exposing mistakes and honestly correcting them 
is the best way to improve the administration of the 
country. Read the speeches delivered at these assemblies 
and conferences, read the practical and straightforward 
remarks uttered by these ³common people,² 
workers and peasants, read the decisions they adopt 
and you will see how enormous is the influence and 
prestige enjoyed by the Communist Party, you will see 
that it is an influence and prestige that any party in the 
world might envy. 
There you have yet another test of the stability of 
the Communist Party. 
Such are the ways and means by which we can test 
the strength and influence of the Communist Party 
among the masses of the people. 
That is how I know that the broad masses of the workers 
and peasants in the U.S.S.R. sympathise with the 
Communist Party. 
FOURTH QUESTION. If non-Party people were to 
form a group and nominate their candidates at the elections 
on a platform supporting the Soviet Government, but at the 
same time were to demand the abolition of the monopoly 
of foreign trade, could they have their own funds and conduct 
an active political campaign?

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 115 
ANSWER: I think that there is an irreconcilable 
contradiction in this question. We cannot conceive of a 
group basing itself on a platform of support for the 
Soviet Government and at the same time demanding the 
abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade. Why? Because 
the monopoly of foreign trade is one of the unshakable 
foundations of the platform of the Soviet Government; 
because a group that demanded the abolition of 
the monopoly of foreign trade could not support the 
Soviet Government; because such a group could only be 
one that was profoundly hostile to the whole Soviet 
system. 
There are, of course, elements in the U.S.S.R. who 
demand the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade. 
They are the Nepmen, the kulaks, and the fragments of 
the already routed exploiting classes, and so forth. But 
those elements constitute an insignificant minority of the 
population. I do not think that the delegation is speaking 
of those elements in its question. If, however, the 
delegation has in mind the workers and the labouring 
masses of the peasantry, then I must say that among 
them a demand for the abolition of the monopoly of 
foreign trade would only evoke jeers and hostility. 
In point of fact, what would the abolition of the monopoly 
of foreign trade mean for the workers? For them 
it would mean abandoning the industrialisation of the 
country, stopping the construction of new mills and factories 
and the expansion of the old ones. For them it 
would mean flooding the U.S.S.R. with goods from capitalist 
countries, winding up our industry because of 
its relative weakness, an increase in unemployment, a 
worsening of the material conditions of the working

J. V. S T A L I N 116 
class, and the weakening of its economic and political 
positions. In the final analysis it would mean strengthening 
the Nepmen and the new bourgeoisie in general. Can 
the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. agree to commit suicide 
like that? Obviously, it cannot. 
And what would the abolition of the monopoly of 
foreign trade mean for the labouring masses of the peasantry? 
It would mean transforming our country from 
an independent country into a semi-colonial one and impoverishing 
the peasant masses. It would mean reverting 
to the ³free-trade² regime which prevailed under 
Kolchak and Denikin, when the combined forces of the 
counter-revolutionary generals and the ³Allies² were free 
to rob and fleece the vast masses of the peasantry. In 
the final analysis it would mean strengthening the kulaks 
and other exploiting elements in the countryside. 
The peasants have sufficiently experienced the charms 
of that regime in the Ukraine, in the North Caucasus, 
on the Volga, and in Siberia. What grounds are there for 
supposing that they will want to put that noose round 
their necks again? Is it not obvious that the labouring 
masses of the peasantry cannot be in favour of abolishing 
the monopoly of foreign trade? 
A delegate: The delegation raised the point about 
the monopoly of foreign trade, about its abolition, 
as one around which a whole group of the population 
might organise if it were not for the fact that one party 
enjoys a monopoly in the U.S.S.R., the monopoly of 
legality. 
Stalin: The delegation is consequently reverting to 
the question of the monopoly enjoyed by the Communist 
Party as the only legal party in the U.S.S.R. I replied

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 117 
briefly to this question when I spoke about the ways 
and means of testing the sympathy of the vast masses of 
the workers and peasants towards the Communist Party. 
As for the other strata of the population, the kulaks, 
the Nepmen, the remnants of the old, routed, exploiting 
classes, they have been deprived of the right to have their 
own political organisations, just as they have been deprived 
of electoral rights. The proletariat took away from 
the bourgeoisie not only the factories and mills, the banks 
and railways, the land and mines; it also took away from 
them the right to have their own political organisations, 
because the proletariat does not want to have the rule 
of the bourgeoisie restored. Apparently, the delegation 
does not object to the fact that the proletariat of the 
U.S.S.R. has deprived the bourgeoisie and the landlords 
of the factories and mills, the land and railways, the 
banks and mines. (Laughter.) 
I t seems to me, however, that the delegation is 
somewhat surprised that the proletariat did not confine 
itself to this, but went further and deprived the 
bourgeoisie of political rights. That, to my mind, is 
not quite logical, or more correctly, it is quite illogical. 
Why should the proletariat be required to show magnanimity 
towards the bourgeoisie? Does the bourgeoisie 
in the West, where it is in power, show the slightest 
magnanimity towards the working class? Does it not 
drive genuine revolutionary working-class parties underground? 
Why should the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. be 
required to show magnanimity towards its class 
enemy? I think that one should be logical. Those who 
think that political rights can be restored to the 
bourgeoisie must, to be logical, go further and raise the

J. V. S T A L I N 118 
question of restoring to the bourgeoisie the factories and 
mills, railways and banks. 
A delegate: The aim of the delegation was to find 
out how opinions among the working class and the peasantry 
other than the opinions of the Communist Party 
can find legal expression. It would be wrong to take 
that as meaning that the delegation is interested in the 
question of granting political rights to the bourgeoisie, 
that it is interested in the question how the bourgeoisie 
might find legal means of expressing its opinions. What 
we are referring to is how opinions among the working 
class and the peasantry other than the opinions of the 
Communist Party can find legal expression. 
Another delegate: These different opinions could find 
expression in the mass working-class organisations, in 
the trade unions, and so forth. 
Stalin: Very well. Consequently, it is not a question 
of restoring the political rights of the bourgeoisie, but 
of conflict of opinion within the working class and 
among the peasantry. 
Is there any conflict of opinion among the workers 
and the labouring masses of the peasantry in the Soviet 
Union at the present time? Undoubtedly there is. It is 
impossible that millions of workers and peasants should 
think alike on all practical questions and on all details. 
That never happens. First of all, there is a great difference 
between the workers and the peasants both as regards 
their economic position and as regards their views on 
various questions. Secondly, there is some difference 
of views within the working class itself, difference in 
training, difference in age and temperament, difference 
between workers of long standing and those who

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 119 
have recently come from the countryside, and so forth. 
All this leads to a conflict of opinion among the workers 
and among the labouring masses of the peasantry, and 
this finds legal expression at meetings, in trade unions, 
in co-operatives, during elections to the Soviets, etc. 
But there is a radical difference between the conflict 
of opinion now, under the conditions of the proletarian 
dictatorship, and the conflict of opinion that existed 
in the past, before the October Revolution. In the 
past, the conflict of opinion among the workers and among 
the labouring masses of the peasantry was concentrated 
mainly on questions of the overthrow of the landlords, 
of tsarism, of the bourgeoisie, and on the smashing of 
the bourgeois order. Now, under the conditions of the 
proletarian dictatorship, the conflict of opinion does not 
revolve around questions of the overthrow of Soviet 
power, of the smashing of the Soviet system, but around 
questions of the improvement of the Soviet bodies, of 
the improvement of their work. There is a radical difference 
here. 
There is nothing surprising in the fact that the conflict 
of opinion in the past around the question of the revolutionary 
break-up of the existing order provided the 
basis for the appearance of several rival parties within the 
working class and the labouring masses of the peasantry. 
Those parties were: the Bolshevik Party, the Menshevik 
Party, the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. On the other 
hand, it is not at all difficult to understand that 
now, under the proletarian dictatorship, conflict of 
opinion, the aim of which is not to break up the 
existing Soviet system, but to improve and consolidate 
it, provides no basis for the existence of several parties

J. V. S T A L I N 120 
among the workers and the labouring masses in the 
countryside. 
That is why the legality of one party alone, the Communist 
Party, the monopoly enjoyed by that Party, not 
only meets with no objection among the workers and 
labouring peasants, but, on the contrary, is accepted 
as something necessary and desirable. 
Our Party¹s position as the only legal party in the 
country (the Communist Party¹s monopoly) is not something 
artificial and deliberately invented. Such a position 
cannot be created artificially by administrative 
machinations, and so forth. Our Party¹s monopoly grew 
out of life, it developed historically as a result of the 
utter bankruptcy of the Socialist-Revolutionary and 
Menshevik parties, and their departure from the stage 
under the conditions prevailing in our country. 
What were the Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik 
parties in the past? They were channels of bourgeois 
influence among the proletariat. What fostered and 
sustained those parties before October 1917? The existence 
of the bourgeois class and, in the final analysis, the 
existence of bourgeois rule. Is it not clear that when the 
bourgeoisie was overthrown the basis for the existence 
of those parties was bound to disappear? 
What became of those parties after October 1917? 
They became parties advocating the restoration of capitalism 
and the overthrow of the rule of the proletariat. 
Is it not obvious that those parties were bound to lose 
all ground and all influence among the workers and the 
labouring strata of the peasantry? 
The fight between the Communist Party and the 
Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik parties for in

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 121 
fluence over the working class did not begin yesterday. It 
began when the first signs of a mass revolutionary movement 
manifested themselves in Russia, even before 
1905. The period from 1903 to October 1917 was a period 
of a fierce conflict of opinion within the working class 
of our country, a period of struggle between the Bolsheviks, 
the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries for 
influence within the working class. During that period 
the working class of the U.S.S.R. went through three 
revolutions. In the crucible of those revolutions it tried 
and tested these parties, tested their fitness for 
the cause of the proletarian revolution, tested their 
proletarian revolutionary character. And so, just before 
the October days of 1917, when history had summed 
up the entire past revolutionary struggle, when history 
had weighed in the balance the various parties fighting 
within the working class‹the working class of the 
U.S.S.R. at last made its definitive choice and accepted 
the Communist Party as the only proletarian party. 
How are we to explain the fact that the working 
class chose the Communist Party? Is it not a fact that 
the Bolsheviks in the Petrograd Soviet, for example, 
were an insignificant minority in April 1917? Is it 
not a fact that the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks 
had an overwhelming majority in the Soviets at 
that time? Is it not a fact that just before the October 
days the whole apparatus of government and all means 
of coercion were in the hands of the Socialist-Revolutionary 
and Menshevik parties, which had formed a 
bloc with the bourgeoisie? 
The explanation is that the Communist Party stood 
for the cessation of the war, for an immediate democratic

J. V. S T A L I N 122 
peace, whereas the parties of the Socialist-Revolutionaries 
and Mensheviks advocated ³war to a victorious 
finish,² the continuation of the imperialist war. 
The explanation is that the Communist Party stood 
for the overthrow of the Kerensky Government, for the 
overthrow of bourgeois rule, for the nationalisation of 
the factories and mills, the banks and railways, whereas 
the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties 
fought in defence of the Kerensky Government and defended 
the right of the bourgeoisie to the factories and 
mills, the banks and railways. 
The explanation is that the Communist Party stood 
for the immediate confiscation of the landlords¹ land 
for the benefit of the peasantry, whereas the Socialist- 
Revolutionary and Menshevik parties put off this question 
until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, 
which, in its turn, they postponed indefinitely. 
Is it surprising, then, that the workers and poor 
peasants finally made their choice in favour of the Communist 
Party? 
Is i t surprising, then, that the Socialist-Revolutionary 
and Menshevik parties went to the bottom so 
quickly? 
That is where the monopoly of.the Communist Party 
comes from, and that is why the Communist Party came 
into power. 
The next period, the period after October 1917, the 
period of civil war, was the period of the final doom of 
the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties, the 
period of the final triumph of the Bolshevik Party. In 
that period the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries 
themselves facilitated the triumph of the Commu

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 123 
nist Party. The fragments of the Menshevik and Socialist-
Revolutionary parties, which were wrecked and 
sunk during the October Revolution, began to link up 
with counter-revolutionary kulak revolts, formed a bloc 
with the Kolchakites and Denikinites, entered the service 
of the Entente and utterly discredited themselves 
in the eyes of the workers and peasants. The situation 
then created was that the Socialist-Revolutionaries 
and Mensheviks, having turned from bourgeois revolutionaries 
into bourgeois counter-revolutionaries, helped 
the Entente in its efforts to strangle the new, 
Soviet Russia, whereas the Bolshevik Party, rallying 
around itself all that was vital and revolutionary, roused 
more and more new detachments of workers and peasants 
for the fight for the socialist Motherland, for the fight 
against the Entente. 
Quite naturally, the victory of the Communists 
in that period was bound to lead, and in fact did lead, to 
the utter defeat of the Socialist-Revolutionaries and 
Mensheviks. Is it then surprising that, after all this, 
the Communist Party became the only party of the 
working class and the poor peasantry? 
That is how the monopoly of the Communist Party 
as the only legal party in the country arose. 
You speak of a conflict of opinion among the workers 
and peasants at the present time, under the conditions 
of the proletarian dictatorship. I have said already that 
there is and will be a conflict of opinion, that no progress 
is possible without it. But the conflict of opinion among 
the workers under present conditions does not revolve 
around the fundamental question of overthrowing the Soviet 
system, but around practical questions of improving

J. V. S T A L I N 124 
the Soviets, of rectifying mistakes committed by 
Soviet bodies, and, consequently, of consolidating the 
Soviet regime. It is quite understandable that such a 
conflict of opinion can only strengthen and perfect the 
Communist Party. It is quite understandable that such 
a conflict of opinion can only strengthen the monopoly 
of the Communist Party. It is quite understandable that 
such a conflict of opinion cannot provide a basis for the 
formation of other parties within the working class and 
labouring peasantry. 
FIFTH QUESTION. Could you briefly tell us what 
are the main disagreements between yourself and Trotsky? 
ANSWER: I must say first of all that the disagreements 
with Trotsky are not personal disagreements. If 
they were personal disagreements the Party would not 
bother with them for a single hour, for it does not like 
individuals to thrust themselves forward. 
Evidently, you refer to the disagreements in the 
Party. That is how I understand the question. Yes, there 
are such disagreements in the Party. The character of 
these disagreements was described in considerable detail 
in the reports recently delivered by Rykov in Moscow and 
by Bukharin in Leningrad. These reports have been published. 
I have nothing to add to what is stated in them 
about those disagreements. If you do not have these 
documents I can get them for you. (The delegation states 
that it is in possession of the documents.) 
A delegate: On our return we shall be asked about 
these disagreements, but we do not have all the documents. 
For example, we do not have the ³platform of 
the 83.²

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 125 
Stalin: I did not sign that ³platform.² I have no right 
to dispose of other people¹s documents. (Laughter.) 
SIXTH QUESTION. In capitalist countries the chief 
incentive for the development of production is the hope 
of obtaining profit. This incentive is, of course, relatively 
absent in the U.S.S.R. What serves in place of it, and how 
effective is this substitute, in your opinion? Can it be 
permanent? 
ANSWER: It is true that the principal motive force 
of capitalist economy is profit. It is also true that profit 
is neither the aim nor the motive force of our socialist 
industry. What, then, is the motive force of our industry? 
First of all, the fact that the factories and mills in 
our country belong to the entire people and not to 
capitalists, that the factories and mills are managed 
not by agents of the capitalists, but by representatives 
of the working class. The consciousness that the workers 
work not for capitalists, but for their own state, for their 
own class, is a tremendous motive force in the development 
and perfection of our industry. 
It should be noted that the overwhelming majority 
of the factory and mill managers in our country are 
working men appointed by the Supreme Council of National 
Economy in agreement with the trade unions, and that 
not a single factory manager can remain at his post 
against the will of the workers or of the trade union 
concerned. 
It should also be noted that in every factory and 
works there is a factory or works committee, which is

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DISTRIBUTION 
126 
elected by the workers and which controls the activities 
of the management. 
Finally, it should be noted that in every industrial 
enterprise workers¹ production conferences are held, which 
all the workers in the given enterprise attend and at 
which they check the entire work of the manager, discuss 
the factory management¹s plan of work, point out mistakes 
and shortcomings, and have an opportunity of 
getting those shortcomings put right through their trade 
unions, through the Party and through the Soviet government 
bodies. 
It is not difficult to understand that all this radically 
changes both the status of the workers and the order 
of things at the various enterprises. Whereas under capitalism 
the worker regards the factory as something alien 
to him, as someone else¹s property, and even as a 
prison, under the Soviet system the worker no longer 
regards the factory as a prison, but as something near 
and dear to him, in the development and improvement 
of which he is vitally interested. 
It scarcely needs proof that this new attitude of the 
workers towards the factory, towards the enterprise, this 
feeling that the factory is something near and dear to 
them, serves as a tremendous motive force for the whole 
of our industry. 
This explains the fact that the number of workerinventors 
in the field of the technique of production, 
and of worker-organisers of industry is growing day by 
day.
Secondly, the fact that the income derived from industry 
in our country does not serve to enrich individuals, 
but is used to expand industry further, to improve

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 127 
the material and cultural conditions of the working 
class, and to reduce the price of the manufactured goods 
needed by the workers and the peasants, that is, once 
again to improve the material conditions of the labouring 
masses. 
The capitalist cannot devote his income to improving 
the well-being of the working class. He is out to make 
profit; otherwise he would not be a capitalist. He makes 
profit in order to convert it into extra capital and to 
export it to less developed countries in order to gain 
additional, still greater profit. That is how capital flows 
from North America to China, to Indonesia, to South 
America and Europe, from France to the French colonies, 
and from Britain to the British colonies. 
In our country things are different, for we neither 
conduct nor recognise colonial policy. In our country, 
the income derived from industry remains here and is 
used to expand industry further, to improve the conditions 
of the workers, and to enlarge the capacity of the 
home market, including the peasant market, by reducing 
the price of manufactured goods. In our country, about ten 
percent of the profits obtained from industry is used to 
improve the conditions of the working class. A sum equal 
to thirteen per cent of total wage payments is assigned 
for the insurance of the working class at state expense. A 
certain part of the income (I cannot say just now exactly 
how much) is used for cultural services, vocational training 
and annual holidays for the workers. A fairly considerable 
part of the income (again I cannot now say 
exactly how much) is used for raising the workers¹ money 
wages. The rest of the income from industry is used 
for the further expansion of industry, for repairing old

J. V. S T A L I N 128 
and building new factories and, lastly, for reducing the 
price of manufactured goods. 
The enormous significance of these facts for our industry 
is that: 
a) they help to draw agriculture closer to industry 
and to smooth out the antithesis between town and 
country; 
b) they help to enlarge the capacity of the home market‹
urban and rural‹and thereby create a constantly expanding 
base for the further development of industry. 
Thirdly, the fact that the nationalisation of industry 
facilitates the planned management of industry as a 
whole. 
Are these stimuli and motive forces of our industry 
permanent factors? Can they be permanently operating 
factors? Yes, they are undoubtedly permanently operating 
stimuli and motive forces. And the more our industry 
develops, the more will the potency and significance 
of these factors increase. 
SEVENTH QUESTION. How far can the U.S.S.R. 
co-operate with the capitalist industry of other countries? 
Is there a definite limit to such co-operation, or is it simply 
an experiment to ascertain in what field co-operation 
is possible and in what field it is not? 
ANSWER: Evidently, this refers to temporary 
agreements with capitalist states in the field of industry, 
in the field of commerce and, perhaps, in the field 
of diplomatic relations. 
I think that the existence of two opposite systems, 
the capitalist system and the socialist system, does not 
preclude the possibility of such agreements. I think that

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 129 
such agreements are possible and expedient under conditions 
of peaceful development. 
Exports and imports are the most suitable ground for 
such agreements. We need: equipment, raw materials 
(raw cotton for example), semi-manufactures (from metals, 
etc.), while the capitalists need a market for those 
goods. There you have a basis for agreements. The capitalists 
need: oil, timber, grain products; we need a market 
for those goods. There you have a basis for agreements. 
We need credits; the capitalists need good interest for 
their credits. There you have still further basis for agreements, 
namely, in the field of credit; moreover, it is 
well known that the Soviet bodies are the most scrupulous 
of all in their payments on credits. 
The same can be said about the diplomatic field. We 
are pursuing a policy of peace and we are ready to sign 
pacts of mutual non-aggression with bourgeois states. 
We are pursuing a policy of peace and we are ready to 
come to an agreement on disarmament, even including 
the complete abolition of standing armies; we already 
declared this to the whole world at the Genoa Conference.
37 There you have a basis for agreements in the diplomatic 
field. 
The limits to these agreements? The limits are set 
by the opposite natures of the two systems, between 
which there is rivalry, struggle. Within the limits permitted 
by these two systems, but only within these limits, 
agreements are quite possible. The experience of 
the agreements with Germany, Italy, Japan, etc., shows 
this. 
Are these agreements merely an experiment, or can 
they be of a more or less prolonged character? That does

J. V. S T A L I N 130 
not depend upon us alone; it also depends upon the other 
parties. It depends on the general situation. A war 
may upset all agreements. Finally, it depends on the 
terms of the agreement. We cannot accept enslaving 
terms. We have an agreement with Harriman, who is 
exploiting the manganese mines in Georgia. That agreement 
was concluded for twenty years. As you see, 
not a short period by any means. We also have an agreement 
with the Lena Gold-Fields Company, which is 
engaged in gold mining in Siberia. That agreement has 
been concluded for thirty years‹a still longer period. 
Finally, we have an agreement with Japan, for the exploitation 
of the oil and coal fields in Sakhalin. 
We should like these agreements to be of a more or 
less lasting character. But that, of course, does not depend 
upon us alone, it also depends upon the other parties.
EIGHTH QUESTION. what are the chief distinctions 
between Russia and the capitalist states as regards 
policy towards national minorities? 
ANSWER: Evidently, this refers to the nationalities 
in the U.S.S.R. which were formerly oppressed by 
tsarism and the Russian exploiting classes and which 
did not possess their own statehood. 
The chief distinction is that in capitalist states there 
is national oppression and national enslavement,whereas 
here in the U.S.S.R. both have been completely eradicated. 
In capitalist states, besides first-rank, privileged, 
³state² nations, there are second-rank, ³non-state,² unequal 
nations, deprived of various rights, and above all

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 131 
of rights of statehood. In our country, in the U.S.S.R., 
however, all the attributes of national inequality and 
national oppression have been abolished. In our country, 
all nations have equal rights and are sovereign, for the 
national and state privileges formerly enjoyed by the 
dominant, Great-Russian nation have been abolished. 
It is not, of course, a question of declarations about 
equal rights of nationalities. All kinds of bourgeois and 
Social-Democratic parties have made numerous declarations 
about national equality of rights. But what are 
declarations worth if they are not put into effect? It is 
a question of abolishing those classes which are the vehicles, 
the authors and operators of national oppression. 
In our country those classes were the landlords and capitalists. 
We overthrew those classes and thereby did 
away with the possibility of national oppression. And 
precisely because we overthrew those classes, genuine 
national equality of rights became possible in our country. 
That is what we in our country call the realisation 
of the idea of self-determination of nations, including 
the right of secession. Precisely because we realised the 
self-determination of nations, we have succeeded in 
abolishing mutual distrust between the labouring masses 
of the various nations in the U.S.S.R. and in uniting 
those nations on a voluntary basis into one union state. 
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as it exists 
today is the result of our national policy and the expression 
of the voluntary federation of the nations in the 
U.S.S.R. into one union state. 
It scarcely needs proof that such a policy in the national 
question is inconceivable in capitalist countries, 
for there the capitalists, who are the authors and opera

J. V. S T A L I N 132 
tors of the policy of national oppression, are still in 
power. 
One cannot fail to note, for example, the fact that 
the supreme organ of power in the U.S.S.R., the Central 
Executive Committee of the Soviets, is not necessarily 
headed by a Russian chairman., but by six chairmen, 
corresponding to the number of Union Republics 
which are united in the U.S.S.R. Of these chairmen, one 
is a Russian (Kalinin), the second a Ukrainian (Petrovsky), 
the third a Byelorussian (Chervyakov), the fourth 
an Azerbaijanian (Musabekov), the fifth a Turkmenian 
(Aitakov), and the sixth an Uzbek (Faizulla Khojayev). 
That fact is a striking illustration of our national policy. 
Needless to say, not a single bourgeois republic, no 
matter how democratic, could take such a step. In our 
country, however, it is taken for granted as logically 
following from our policy of national equality of rights. 
NINTH QUESTION. American labour leaders justify 
their struggle against the Communists on two grounds: 
1) the Communists are disrupting the labour movement 
by their factional fight inside the unions and by their 
attacks on union officials who are not radicals; 
2) American Communists take their orders from Moscow 
and therefore cannot be good trade unionists, since they 
place their loyalty to a foreign organisation above their 
loyalty to their union. 
How can this difficulty be removed so that American 
Communists may be able to work jointly with other units 
of the American labour movement? 
ANSWER: I think that the attempts of the American 
labour leaders to justify their struggle against the

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 133 
Communists cannot withstand the slightest criticism. 
No one has yet proved, or will be able to prove, that the 
Communists disrupt the labour movement. On the 
other hand, however, it can be taken as fully proved that 
the Communists are the most devoted and courageous 
fighters of the labour movement all over the world, 
including America. 
Is it not a fact that during workers¹ strikes and demonstrations 
the Communists march in the front ranks of 
the working class and take the first blows of the capitalists, 
whereas at such a time the reformist labour leaders 
take shelter in the capitalists¹ backyards? How can 
Communists refrain from criticising the cowardice 
and reactionary character of the reformist labour leaders? 
Is i t not obvious that such criticism can only 
serve to stimulate and strengthen the labour movement? 
True, such criticism wrecks the prestige of the 
reactionary labour leaders. But what of it? Let the 
reactionary labour leaders answer with countercriticism, 
but not by expelling the Communists from 
the unions. 
I think that if the American labour movement wants 
to live and develop it cannot do without a conflict of 
opinion and of trends within the trade unions. I think 
that the conflict of opinion and of trends within the 
trade unions, criticism of the reactionary leaders, and 
so forth, will develop more and more in spite of the 
resistance to it on the part of the reformist labour leaders. 
Such a conflict of opinion and such criticism are absolutely 
essential for the American working class so that it 
can choose between the various trends and finally take

J. V. S T A L I N 134 
its stand as an independent organised force within 
American society. 
The complaints of the American reformist leaders 
against the Communists only show that they are not 
sure that they are right and feel that their position is 
shaky. For that very reason they fear criticism like the 
plague. It is worth noting that the American labour 
leaders are apparently more determined opponents of elementary 
democracy than many of the bourgeois in 
America. 
The assertion that the American Communists work 
under ³orders from Moscow² is absolutely false. No Communist 
in the world would agree to work ³under orders² 
from outside against his own convictions, against his 
will, and contrary to the requirements of the situation. 
And even if there were such Communists they would 
not be worth a farthing. 
The Communists are the boldest and bravest of people, 
and they are fighting a host of enemies. The merit 
of the Communists is, among other things, that they 
are able to stand up for their convictions. It is, therefore, 
strange to speak of American Communists as having 
no convictions of their own and capable only of working 
³under orders² from outside. 
The only thing that is correct in the labour leaders¹ 
assertion is that the American Communists are affiliated 
to the international communist organisation and consult 
the central body of this organisation on various questions 
from time to time. But is there anything bad in 
that? Are the American labour leaders opposed to the 
organisation of an international workers¹ centre? True, 
they are not affiliated to Amsterdam,38 but that is not

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 135 
because they are opposed to an international workers¹ 
centre as such, but because they think that Amsterdam 
is too radical. (Laughter.) 
Why may the capitalists organise internationally 
and the working class, or part of it, not have its international 
organisation? 
Is it not obvious that Green and his friends in the 
American Federation of Labour39 slander the American 
Communists in slavishly repeating the capitalist legends 
about ³orders from Moscow²? 
Some people think that the members of the Communist 
International in Moscow do nothing but sit and write 
instructions to all countries. More than sixty countries 
are affiliated to the Comintern, so you can picture to 
yourselves the position of the members of the Comintern, 
who neither sleep nor eat, but sit day and night writing 
instructions to all those countries. (Laughter.) And the 
American labour leaders think that with this amusing 
legend they can cover up their fear of the Communists and 
gloss over the fact that Communists are the most 
courageous and devoted cadres of the American working 
class! 
The delegation wants to know whether there is a 
way out of this situation. I think there is only one way 
out: permit a conflict of opinion and of trends within 
the American trade unions; drop the reactionary policy 
of expelling the Communists from the trade unions, and 
give the working class of America an opportunity to 
choose freely between those trends; for America has not 
yet had her October Revolution, and the workers there 
have not yet had the opportunity to make their final 
choice between the various trends in the trade unions.

J. V. S T A L I N 136 
TENTH QUESTION. Is money now being sent to 
America to assist the American Communist Party or the 
Communist paper, the ³Daily Worker²? 
If not, how much do the American Communists contribute 
to the Third International in annual affiliation fees? 
ANSWER: If this refers to the relations between the 
Communist Party of America and the Third International, 
I must say that the Communist Party of America, 
as part of the Communist International, no doubt pays 
affiliation fees to the Comintern, just as, it must be supposed, 
the Comintern, as the central body of the inter 
national communist movement, renders the Communist 
Party of America what assistance it can whenever it 
considers it necessary. I do not think there is anything 
surprising or extraordinary in that. 
If, however, the question refers to the relations between 
the Communist Party of America and the Communist 
Party of the U.S.S.R., then I must say that I do 
not know of a single occasion on which the representatives 
of the American Communist Party appealed for 
assistance to the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. You 
may think this strange, but it is a fact that shows the 
extreme scrupulousness of the American Communists. 
But what would happen if the Communist Party of 
America did appeal to the Communist Party of the 
U.S.S.R. for assistance? I think that the Communist 
Party of the U.S.S.R. would render it what assistance it 
could. Indeed, what would be the worth of the Communist 
Party, particular]y as it is in power, if it refused to 
do what i t could to assist the Communist Party of 
another country living under the yoke of capitalism? I

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 137 
should say that such a Communist Party would not be 
worth a farthing. 
Let us assume that the American working class had 
come into power after overthrowing its bourgeoisie; let 
us assume that the working class of America, which had 
emerged victorious from the great struggle against capitalism, 
was appealed to by the working class of another 
country to render what material assistance it could, would 
the American working class refuse such assistance? I 
think it would cover itself with disgrace if it hesitated 
to render assistance. 
ELEVENTH QUESTION. We know that some 
good Communists do not altogether agree with the Communist 
Party¹s demand that all new members must be atheists, 
because the reactionary clergy are now suppressed. Could the 
Communist Party in the future take a neutral attitude towards 
a religion which supported all the teachings of science and 
did not oppose communism? 
Could you in the future permit Party members to hold 
religious convictions if the latter did not conflict with 
Party loyalty? 
ANSWER: There are several inexactitudes in this 
question. 
Firstly, I do not know of any ³good Communists² 
such as the delegation mentions here. It is doubtful 
whether any such Communists exist at all. 
Secondly, I must state that, speaking formally, we 
have no conditions for accepting members into the 
Party that require that an applicant for Party membership 
must necessarily be an atheist. The conditions of 
entry into our Party are: acceptance of the Party

J. V. S T A L I N 138 
programme and rules; unqualified submission to the 
decisions of the Party and of its bodies; payment of 
membership dues; membership of one of the organisations 
of the Party. 
A delegate: Very often I read that members are expelled 
from the Party for believing in God. 
Stalin: I can only repeat what I have already said 
about the conditions of membership of our Party. We 
have no other conditions. 
Does that mean that the Party is neutral towards 
religion? No, it does not. We conduct, and will continue 
to conduct, propaganda against religious prejudices. The 
laws of our country recognise the right of every citizen 
to profess any religion. That is a matter for the conscience 
of each individual. That is precisely why we separated 
the church from the state. But in separating the 
church from the state and proclaiming freedom of conscience 
we at the same time preserved the right of every 
citizen to combat religion, all religion, by argument, 
by propaganda and agitation. The Party cannot be 
neutral towards religion, and it conducts anti-religious 
propaganda against all religious prejudices because it 
stands for science, whereas religious prejudices run 
counter to science, because all religion is the antithesis 
of science. Cases such as occur in America, where Darwinists 
were prosecuted recently, 40 cannot occur here 
because the Party pursues a policy of defending science 
in every way. 
The Party cannot be neutral towards religious prejudices, 
and i t will continue to conduct propaganda 
against those prejudices, because that is one of the best 
means of undermining the influence of the reactionary

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 139 
clergy, who support the exploiting classes and who 
preach submission to those classes. 
The Party cannot be neutral towards the disseminators 
of religious prejudices, towards the reactionary 
clergy, who poison the minds of the labouring masses. 
Have we repressed the reactionary clergy? Yes, we 
have. The only unfortunate thing is that they have not 
yet been completely eliminated. Anti-religious propaganda 
is the means by which the elimination of the reactionary 
clergy will be completely carried through. Cases 
occur sometimes when certain members of the Party 
hinder the full development of anti-religious propaganda. 
If such members are expelled it is a very good thing, 
because there is no room for such ³Communists² in the 
ranks of our Party. 
TWELFTH QUESTION. Can you briefly give us 
the characteristics of the future society that communism is 
trying to create? 
ANSWER: The general characteristics of communist 
society are given in the works of Marx, Engels and Lenin. 
Briefly, the anatomy of communist society may be 
described as follows: It is a society in which: a) there 
will be no private ownership of the instruments and 
means of production, but social, collective ownership; 
b) there will be no classes or state power, but there will 
be working people in industry and agriculture who manage 
economic affairs as a free association of working people; 
c) the national economy, organised according to plan, will 
be based on the highest level of technique, both in industry 
and agriculture; d) there will be no antithesis between 
town and country, between industry and agricul

J. V. S T A L I N 140 
ture; e) products will be distributed according to the 
principle of the old French Communists: ³from each 
according to his ability, to each according to his needs²; 
f) science and art will enjoy conditions sufficiently favourable 
for them to attain full flowering; g) the individual, 
freed from concern about his daily bread and from 
the necessity of adapting himself to the ³powers that 
be,² will become really free. 
And so on and so forth. 
Clearly, we are still a long way from such a society. 
As to the international conditions necessary for the 
complete triumph of communist society, these will 
take shape and grow in proportion to the growth of revolutionary 
crises and revolutionary actions of the working 
class in capitalist countries. 
It must not be imagined that the working class in 
one country, or in several countries, will march towards 
socialism, and still more to communism, and that the 
capitalists of other countries will sit still with folded arms 
and look on this with indifference. Still less must it be 
imagined that the working class in capitalist countries 
will agree to be mere spectators of the victorious development 
of socialism in one or another country. In 
point of fact, the capitalists will do all in their power to 
crush such countries. In point of fact, every important 
step taken towards socialism, and still more towards 
communism, in any country will inevitably be accompanied 
by the irresistible efforts of the working class in 
capitalist countries to achieve power and socialism in 
those countries. 
Thus, in the further course of development of the 
international revolution and of international reaction,

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 141 
two world centres will be formed: the socialist centre, attracting 
to itself the countries gravitating towards socialism, 
and the capitalist centre, attracting to itself the 
countries gravitating towards capitalism. The struggle 
between these two camps will decide the fate of capitalism 
and socialism throughout the world. 
II 
QUESTIONS PUT BY COMRADE STALIN AND 
THE DELEGATES¹ REPLIES 
Stalin: If the delegation is not very tired, I would 
ask it to permit me, in my turn, to put a few questions. 
(The delegation agrees.) 
FIRST QUESTION. How do you account for the 
small percentage of workers organised in trade unions in 
America? 
I think you have about seventeen million industrial 
workers in America. (The delegates state that there are 
from eighteen to nineteen million industrial workers.) Of 
these, I think, about three million are organised. (The 
delegates state that the American Federation of Labour has a 
membership of approximately three million and that, in 
addition, half a million workers are organised in other 
unions, so that, all together, there are three and a half million 
organised workers.) Personally I think that that is a 
very small percentage of workers organised in trade 
unions. Here, in the U.S.S.R., 90 percent of the proletarians 
in the country are organised in trade unions. I 
would like to ask the delegation whether it regards the fact 
of such a relatively small percentage of workers being

J. V. S T A L I N 142 
organised in trade unions as a good thing. Does not the 
delegation think that it is a sign of the weakness of the 
American proletariat, and of the weakness of its weapons 
of struggle against the capitalists in the economic field? 
Brophy: The small trade-union membership is not 
due to wrong tactics in the labour organisations, but 
to the general economic conditions in the country, 
which do not stimulate the entire mass of workers 
to organise, and which, thanks to their favourable character, 
lessen the need for the working class to fight the 
capitalists. Of course, these conditions will change, and 
as they change the trade unions will grow and the 
whole trade-union movement will take a different path. 
Douglas: I agree with the explanation given by the 
previous speaker. I would add, firstly, that it must be 
borne in mind that in recent times in the United States 
the capitalists themselves have been raising wages very 
considerably. This process of raising wages was seen in 
1917, in 1919, and later. If present-day real wages are 
compared with those of 1911 they will be found to be 
much higher. 
In the process of its development the trade-union 
movement was built, as it is built today, on the craft principle, 
according to trade, and the trade unions were 
formed mainly for skilled workers. At the head of these 
unions there were certain leaders who constituted a 
close organisation and strove to obtain good conditions 
for their members. They had no incentive to widen the 
trade unions or to organise the unskilled workers. 
Moreover, the American trade unions come up 
against well-organised capitalism, which has at its command 
every means of preventing the organisation of all

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 143 
the workers in trade unions. If, for example, a trust finds 
that trade-union resistance in one of its plants is becoming 
too strong, it will go so far as to close that plant and 
transfer production to another plant. In this way the 
resistance of the trade union is broken. 
American capitalism itself raises the workers¹ wages, 
but it does not give them any economic power or the 
opportunity to fight for an improvement in their economic 
conditions. 
Another very important fact in America is that the 
capitalists sow strife among the workers of various nationalities. 
In the majority of cases the unskilled work 
ers are immigrants from Europe or, as has recently become 
the case, Negroes. The capitalists try to sow 
strife among workers of different nationalities. This national 
division is found among the skilled and among the 
unskilled workers. The capitalists systematically sow 
antagonism among the workers of various nationalities 
irrespective of their degree of skill. 
During the past ten years the American capitalists 
have been conducting a more enlightened policy, in that 
they have been forming their own trade unions, the socalled 
company unions. They strive to give the workers 
an incentive in the work of their plant, an interest in 
its profits, and so forth. American capitalism shows a 
tendency to substitute vertical division for horizontal 
division, that is, to split up the working class, giving it 
an incentive and interest in capitalism. 
Coyle: I approach the question not from the theoretical, 
but from the practical point of view. It is true 
that it is easier to organise the workers in good times, 
but the statistics of the membership of the American

J. V. S T A L I N 144 
Federation of Labour show that the A. F. of L. is gradually 
losing the unskilled workers and is increasing its skilled 
worker membership. Thus, the American Federation of 
Labour wants to become, and is gradually becoming, 
an organisation mainly of skilled workers. 
The trade-union movement in America barely touches 
the unskilled workers. The big branches of industry 
are not covered by the trade unions. Of these big branches 
of industry, only in the coal and the railroad industries are 
the workers organised to any extent, and even in the coal 
industry 65 per cent of the workers are unorganised. The 
workers in such industries as steel, rubber and automobiles 
are almost completely unorganised. It may be said 
that the trade unions do not touch the unskilled workers. 
There are a number of trade unions outside the American 
Federation of Labour which strive to organise the 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers. As for the stand taken 
by the leaders of the American Federation of Labour, 
one of them, for example the President of the Machinists 
Union, quite frankly stated that he does not want to 
attract the unskilled workers to his union. The position 
in regard to the trade-union leaders is that a leader caste 
has grown up consisting of a few score of individuals who 
receive enormous salaries, $10,000 per annum and over, 
and it is extremely difficult to get into this caste. 
Dunn: The question put by Comrade Stalin is not 
put fairly, because if 90 per cent of the workers in his 
country are organised, it must be borne in mind that 
here the working class is in power, whereas in capitalist 
countries the workers are an oppressed class and the 
bourgeoisie does everything to prevent the workers from 
organising in trade unions.

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 145 
Moreover, in those countries there are reactionary 
trade unions led by reactionary leaders. Under the conditions 
prevailing in America it is very difficult to 
get the very idea of trade unionism into the heads of the 
workers. This explains why trade unionism is so limited 
in America. 
Stalin: Does the last speaker agree with the previous 
speaker that some of the leaders of the labour movement 
in America deliberately strive to restrict the tradeunion 
movement? 
Dunn: I agree. 
Stalin: I did not wish to offend anybody. I merely 
wanted to clear up for myself the difference between 
the situation in America and that in the U.S.S.R. If I 
have offended anybody, I apologise. (Laughter of the 
delegates.) 
Dunn: I am not offended in the least. 
Stalin: Is there a system of state insurance of workers 
in America? 
A delegate: There is no system of state insurance of 
workers in America. 
Coyle: In most states, compensation is paid for accidents 
at work amounting to a maximum of 30 per cent 
of the loss of earning capacity. This is in most of the 
states. The compensation is paid by the private firms in 
whose enterprises the earning capacity is lost, but the 
law requires such payment. 
Stalin: Is there state insurance against unemployment 
in America? 
A delegate: No. The unemployment insurance fund 
that exists can satisfy from eighty to one hundred thousand 
unemployed in all states.

J. V. S T A L I N 146 
Coyle: There i s insurance (not state insurance) 
against industrial accidents, that is, accidents at work, 
but there is no insurance against incapacity to work due 
to sickness or old age. The insurance fund is made up of 
contributions from the workers. As a matter of fact the 
whole fund is provided by the workers themselves, for if 
the workers did not organise these funds they would 
receive a bigger wage increase, and as these funds are 
established in agreement with the employers the workers 
receive a smaller increase. Almost the whole fund is made 
up by the workers. Actually, the employers contribute 
only a very small proportion, about 10 per cent. 
Stalin: I think the comrades will be interested to 
learn that here, in the U.S.S.R., the state spends more 
than 800,000,000 rubles per annum on workers¹ insurance. 
It will also not be superfluous to add that our workers 
in all branches of industry, in addition to their ordinary 
wages, receive a sum equal to about one-third of the 
total pay-roll in the shape of insurance, welfare improvements, 
cultural services, and so forth. 
SECOND QUESTION. How do you explain the 
absence of a special mass workers¹ party in the United 
States? 
The bourgeoisie in America have two parties, the 
Republican Party and the Democratic Party, but the 
American workers have no mass political party of their 
own. Do not the comrades think that the absence of such 
a mass workers¹ party, even one like that in Britain (the 
Labour Party), weakens the working class in its political 
fight against the capitalists?

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 147 
Then another question: Why do the leaders of the American 
labour movement, Green and the others, so strongly 
oppose the formation of an independent workers¹ party 
in America? 
Brophy: Yes, the leaders did decide that there was 
no need to form such a party. There is a minority, however, 
which considers that such a party is needed. Objective 
conditions in America at the present time are such 
that, as has been pointed out already, the trade-union 
movement in the United States is very weak, and the weakness 
of the trade-union movement is, in its turn, due to 
the fact that the working class at present does not have to 
organise and fight the capitalists because the capitalists 
themselves raise wages and provide satisfactory material 
conditions for the workers. 
Stalin: But if such provision is made at all, it is 
mainly the skilled workers who benefit. There is a contradiction 
here. On the one hand it would appear that 
there is no need to organise because the workers are provided 
for. On the other hand you say that it is precisely 
those workers who are best provided for, i.e., the skilled 
workers, who are organised in trade unions. Thirdly, it 
would appear that the unorganised are just those workers 
who are least provided for, i.e., the unskilled workers, 
who most of all stand in need of organisation. I cannot 
understand this at all. 
Brophy: Yes, there is a contradiction here, but American 
political and economic conditions are likewise 
contradictory. 
Brebner: Although the unskilled workers are not organised, 
they have the political right to vote, so that if 
there is any discontent the unskilled workers can express

J. V. S T A L I N 148 
this discontent by exercising their political right to vote. 
On the other hand, when the organised workers meet 
with particularly hard times they do not turn to their 
union, but exercise their political right to vote. Thus, 
the political right to vote compensates for the absence of 
trade-union organisation. 
Israels: One of the chief difficulties is the system 
itself, the election system in the United States. It is not 
the man who polls a majority of votes in the whole 
country, or even the majority of the votes of any one 
class, who is elected President. In every state there 
is an electoral college; every state elects a certain 
number of electors who take part in the election of the 
President. To be elected President, the candidate must 
obtain 51 per cent of the votes. If there were three or 
four parties no candidate would be elected, and the election 
of the President would have to be transferred to 
Congress. This is an argument against forming a third 
party. Those who oppose the formation of a third party 
argue in this way: Don¹t put up a third candidate because 
you will split the liberal vote and you will prevent the 
liberal candidate from being elected. 
Stalin: But Senator La Follette at one time was creating 
a third bourgeois party. It follows then that a third 
party cannot split the vote if it is a bourgeois party, but 
that it can split the vote if it is a workers¹ party. 
Davis: I do not regard the fact mentioned by the previous 
speaker as a fundamental one. I think the most 
important fact is the following. I will quote the example 
of the city where I live. During the election campaign 
the representative of a certain party comes along and 
gives the trade-union leader an important job, and in

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 149 
connection with the campaign places certain funds at his 
disposal, which he puts to his own use. This gives him 
a certain prestige connected with the job he has received. 
It turns out, therefore, that the trade-union leaders 
support one or the other of the bourgeois parties. Naturally, 
when there is any talk of forming a third party, 
a workers¹ party, these labour leaders refuse to do anything 
in the matter. They argue that if a third party were 
formed there would be a split in the trade-union movement. 
Douglas: The chief reason why only skilled workers 
are organised is that to be able to join a union a man 
must have money and be well off, because the entrance 
fees and dues are very high and unskilled workers cannot 
afford to pay. 
Moreover, the unskilled workers are in constant danger 
of being thrown out of work by the employers if they 
attempt to organise. The unskilled workers can be organised 
only with the active support of the skilled workers. In 
most cases they do not get this support, and this is one 
of the chief obstacles to the organisation of the unskilled 
workers. 
The principal means by which the workers can defend 
their rights are political means. That, in my opinion, 
is the chief reason why the unskilled workers are 
unorganised. 
I must point to a special feature of the American 
electoral system, the primary elections, in which 
any man can go to a primary, declare himself a 
Democrat or a Republican and cast his vote. I am convinced 
that Gompers could not have kept the workers 
on a non-political programme if he did not have this

J. V. S T A L I N 150 
argument about the primary voting. He always told the 
workers that if they wanted political action they could 
join either of the two existing political parties, capture 
the responsible positions in them and win influence. 
With this argument Gompers managed to keep the workers 
away from the idea of organising the working class 
and of forming a workers¹ party. 
THIRD QUESTION. How do you explain the fact 
that on the question of recognising the U.S.S.R. the leaders 
of the American Federation of Labour are more reactionary 
than many bourgeois? 
How do you explain the fact that a bourgeois like 
Mr. Borah, and others, declare in favour of recognising 
the U.S.S.R., whereas the American labour leaders, 
from Gompers to Green, have been and still are conducting 
very reactionary propaganda against recognition 
of the first workers¹ republic, against recognition of the 
U.S.S.R.? 
How do you explain the fact that even a reactionary 
like the late President Woodrow Wilson was able to 
³greet² Soviet Russia, whereas Green and the other 
leaders of the American Federation of Labour want to be 
more reactionary than the capitalists? 
Here is the text of the ³greeting² Woodrow Wilson 
sent to the Congress of Soviets of Russia in March 1918, 
at the time when the troops of the German Kaiser were 
marching against Soviet Petrograd: 
³May I not take advantage of the meeting of the Congress 
of the Soviets to express the sincere sympathy which the people 
of the United States feel for the Russian people at this moment 
when the German power has been thrust in to interrupt and turn

J. V. S T A L I N 151 
back the whole struggle for freedom and substitute the wishes of 
Germany for the purpose of the people of Russia? Although the government 
of the United States is unhappily not now in a position 
to render the direct and effective aid it would wish to render, I 
beg to assure the people of Russia through the Congress that it 
will avail itself of every opportunity to secure for Russia once 
more complete sovereignty and independence in her own affairs 
and full restoration to her great role in the life of Europe and the 
modern world. The whole heart of the people of the United States 
is with the people of Russia in the attempt to free themselves 
forever from autocratic government and become masters of their 
own life² (see Pravda, No. 50, March 16, 1918). 
Can we regard it as normal that the leaders of the American 
Federation of Labour want to be more reactionary than 
reactionary Wilson? 
Brophy: I cannot give an exact explanation, but I 
think that the leaders of the American Federation of Labour 
are opposed to the recognition of Soviet Russia for 
the very same reason that the American Federation of 
Labour is not affiliated to the Amsterdam International. 
I think it is due to the peculiar philosophy of the 
American workers and to the economic difference between 
them and the European workers. 
Stalin: But, as far as I know the leaders of the 
American Federation of Labour do not object to the 
recognition of Italy or Poland, where the fascists are 
ruling. 
Brophy: By quoting the example of Poland and Italy 
where there are fascist governments you explain why 
America does not recognise the U.S.S.R. This hostility 
towards the U.S.S.R. is due to the unpleasantness which 
the Communists at home cause the American labour 
leaders.

J. V. S T A L I N 152 
Dunn: The argument used by the last speaker‹that 
the labour leaders cannot recognise the U.S.S.R. because 
they cannot get on with the Communists at home‹is not 
convincing, because they preached non-recognition of 
the U.S.S.R. before the American Communist Party was 
organised. 
The chief reason is that the leaders of the American 
Federation of Labour are opposed to everything that 
smacks of socialism. They are put up to this by the capitalists 
who have an organisation called the National 
Civic Federation, which does its utmost to rouse the 
American public against socialism in any form. This organisation 
opposed the stand taken by Ivy Lee, who advocated 
the development of commercial relations between 
America and the U.S.S.R. The leaders of this organisation 
said: How can we maintain order among our 
own working class when liberals begin to talk like that? 
The National Civic Federation is an organisation of a 
group of capitalists who have invested a large sum of 
money in it and control it. It should be mentioned that 
the vice-president of this reactionary organisation is Matthew 
Woll, the vice-president of the American Federation 
of Labour. 
Brophy: The reasons given for the reactionary character 
of the trade-union leaders are not the chief ones. 
This question must be gone into more deeply. The presence 
of the American delegation in the U.S.S.R. is the 
best answer and shows that a section of the American 
workers is sympathetic towards the Soviet Union. I 
think that the opinion of the leaders of the American 
Federation of Labour about the U.S.S.R. does not differ 
from the opinion held by the majority of the work

INTERVIEW WITH THE FIRST AMERICAN LABOUR DELEGATION 153 
ers of America. The attitude of the majority of the 
workers towards the U.S.S.R. is due to the remoteness 
of the U.S.S.R. The working class of America is not interested 
in international affairs and the influence that 
the bourgeoisie exercises on the working class of America 
is felt very strongly in its attitude towards the U.S.S.R. 
Pravda, No. 210, 
September 15, 1927

TO COMRADE M. I. ULYANOVA 
REPLY TO COMRADE L. MIKHELSON 
The other day I received from you a copy of Comrade 
Mikhelson¹s letter on the national question. Here is my 
answer in a few words. 
1) The Buryat comrades asked me: ³How is one to 
conceive the transition to a single universal culture 
through the national cultures which are developing within 
the limits of our individual autonomous republics?² 
(See Stalin, Problems of Leninism, p. 259.41) I answered 
that this transition is conceived not as a transition 
through a ³single universal language and the dying away 
of all other languages in the period of socialism,²42 but 
through the assimilation by the nationalities of a universal 
culture that will be proletarian in content, but in 
forms corresponding to the languages and manner of life 
of these nationalities (see Problems of Leninism). To 
explain this I quoted a number of facts about the development 
of our revolution, which led to the awakening 
and strengthening of the nationalities formerly pushed 
into the background, and of their cultures. That is what 
the controversy was about. 
Comrade Mikhelson has failed to understand the 
essence of the controversy.

TO COMRADE M. I. ULYANOVA 155 
2) Comrade Mikhelson, cavilling at my words ³in the 
period of socialism² (see above), and at my statement 
that the process of assimilation of some nationalities 
does not imply the disappearance of nations in general, 
asserts that some of Stalin¹s formulations can give grounds 
for interpreting them as ³a revision of Leninism² on 
the national question. Moreover, he quotes Lenin¹s 
statement that ³the aim of socialism is not only to abolish 
the division of mankind into small states and all 
isolation of nations, not only to draw the nations together, 
but to merge them.²43 
I think, firstly, that Comrade Mikhelson is diverging 
from the presentation of the question given by the Buryat 
comrades in their letter and from which Stalin 
could not possibly diverge in his speech at the Communist 
University of the Toilers of the East. The Buryats had 
in mind precisely a transition through national cultures 
to a universal culture, moreover the Buryat comrades 
evidently thought that first there will be national cultures 
and later a universal culture. In his answer, 
Stalin objected to this and said that this transition will 
not take place in the way the Buryats imagine, but 
that among the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. there will 
be a simultaneous development both of national culture (in 
form) and of a universal culture (in content), and that 
only with such a way of this transition can the assimilation 
of the universal culture by the nationalities take 
place (see Problems of Leninism). 
I think, further, that Comrade Mikhelson has failed 
to grasp the meaning of my answer. When speaking 
of the ³period of socialism² in our country, I had in 
mind not the ³final² victory of socialism, a victory which

J. V. S T A L I N 156 
can be achieved only on an international scale, when socialism 
is victorious in all or in a number of the major 
countries, but the period of the building of socialism in 
our country. That is obvious from the entire presentation 
of the question in my speech at the Communist 
University of the Toilers of the East. Can it be asserted 
that during the period of the building of socialism in 
our country (the ³period of socialism²), i.e., before the 
victory of socialism in other countries, the nations 
in our country will unfailingly disappear, that they 
will merge into one common nation with one common 
language? I think that i t cannot be asserted. More 
than that. Even after the victory of the proletarian 
dictatorship on a world scale, even after that, for a 
long time national and state differences will s t i l l 
exist. 
Lenin was quite right when he said that ³national 
and state differences among peoples and countries. . . 
will continue to exist for a very, very long time even 
after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established 
on a world scale² (see Vol. XXV, p. 227). 
How, then, are we to understand the passage from 
Lenin quoted by Comrade Mikhelson, which states that 
the aim of socialism is, in the long run, the merging of 
nations? I think we should understand it differently from 
the way Comrade Mikhelson does, for it is obvious from 
what has been said above that in this passage Lenin had 
in mind the merging of nations as the ultimate aim of 
socialism, to be achieved as a result of the victory of 
socialism in all countries ³a very, very long time . . . 
after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established 
on a world scale.²

TO COMRADE M. I. ULYANOVA 157 
It follows, therefore, that Comrade Mikhelson does 
not understand Lenin. 
3) I think that there is no need to make Stalin¹s 
³formulations² ³more precise.² I am waiting impatiently 
for the opposition to dare to touch upon the principle 
of the national question in an open controversy at the 
Party congress. I am afraid it will not dare to do that, 
for after Zinoviev¹s unsuccessful speech at the plenum 
of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, 
the opposition preferred to say absolutely nothing 
about the question of national culture in its recent 
³platform.² If, however, the oppositionists do pluck 
up courage and raise the question, all the better for the 
Party, for the Party will only gain by it. 
J. Stalin 
September 16, 1927 
Published for the first time

THE POLITICAL COMPLEXION 
OF THE RUSSIAN OPPOSITION 
Excerpt from a Speech Delivered 
at a Joint Meeting of the Presidium 
of the Executive Committee of the Comintern 
and the International Control Commission 
September 27, 1927 
Comrades, the speakers here have spoken so well and 
they have discussed the subject so thoroughly that there 
is little left for me to say. 
I did not hear Vuiovich¹s speech as I was not in the 
hall; I caught only the end of his speech. From that end 
I gathered that he accuses the C.P.S.U.(B.) of opportunism, 
that he regards himself as a Bolshevik and undertakes 
to teach the C.P.S.U.(B.) Leninism. 
What can one say to that? Unfortunately, we have 
a certain number of people in our Party who call themselves 
Bolsheviks but actually have nothing in common 
with Leninism. I think that Vuiovich is one of their 
number. When people like that undertake to teach the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) Leninism it is easy to understand that 
nothing can come of it. I think that Vuiovich¹s criticism 
is not worth answering. 
I recall an anecdote about the German poet Heine. 
Permit me to tell it to you. Among the various critics who 
opposed Heine in the press was a most unfortunate and 
rather untalented literary critic named Auffenberg. The 
chief characteristic of this writer was that he tirelessly

THE POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE RUSSIAN OPPOSITION 159 
kept on ³criticising² and impertinently attacking Heine 
in the press. Evidently, Heine did not think it worth while 
reacting to this ³criticism² and maintained a stubborn 
silence. This surprised Heine¹s friends and so they 
wrote to him asking how it was that the writer Auffenberg 
had written a heap of critical articles against him 
and that he did not think it worth while replying. Heine 
was obliged to answer his friends. What did he say? 
He answered in the press in these few words: ³Auffenberg 
the writer I do not know; I believe he is something 
like Arlincourt, whom I do not know either.² 
Paraphrasing Heine, the Russian Bolsheviks could 
say about Vuiovich¹s exercises in criticism: ³Vuiovich the 
Bolshevik we do not know; we believe he is something 
like Ali Baba, whom we do not know either.² 
About Trotsky and the opposition. The opposition¹s 
chief misfortune is that it does not know what it is talking 
about. In his speech Trotsky spoke of policy in China; 
but he refuses to admit that the opposition has never had 
any line, any policy in relation to China. The opposition 
has wobbled, has marked time, has swung to and fro, 
but it has never had a line. The controversy between us 
revolved around three questions relating to China: 
the question of the Communists¹ participation in the Kuomintang, 
the question of Soviets, and the question of the 
character of the Chinese revolution. On all three questions 
the opposition proved to be bankrupt because it 
had no line. 
The question of taking part in the Kuomintang. In 
April 1926, that is, a month after the Sixth Plenum of 
the E.C.C.I., at which a decision was taken in favour of 
Communists belonging to the Kuomintang, the opposi

J. V. S T A L I N 160 
tion demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Communists 
from the Kuomintang. Why? Because, frightened 
by Chiang Kai-shek¹s first onslaught (March 1926), the 
opposition in effect demanded submission to Chiang 
Kai-shek, it wanted to withdraw the Communists from 
the play of revolutionary forces in China. 
The formal grounds, however, on which the opposition 
based its demand for withdrawal from the Kuomintang 
were that Communists cannot take part in bourgeois-
revolutionary organisations, and the Kuomintang 
was certainly such an organisation. A year later, in 
April 1927, the opposition demanded that the Communists 
should take part in the Wuhan Kuomintang. Why? 
On what grounds? Had the Kuomintang ceased to be a 
bourgeois organisation in 1927? Is there a line here, even 
the shadow of a line? 
The question of Soviets. Here, too, the opposition 
had no definite line. In April 1927, one part of the opposition 
demanded immediate organisation of Soviets 
in China for the purpose of overthrowing the Kuomintang 
in Wuhan (Trotsky). At the same time the other part of 
the opposition also demanded immediate organisation of 
Soviets, but for the purpose of supporting the Kuomintang 
in Wuhan, and not of overthrowing it (Zinoviev). And 
that is what they call a line! Moreover, both parts of 
the opposition, both Trotsky and Zinoviev, while demanding 
the organisation of Soviets, at the same time demanded 
participation of the Communists in the Kuomintang, 
participation of the Communists in the ruling party. 
Make head or tail of that, if you can! Organise Soviets 
and at the same time demand participation of the Communists 
in the ruling party, that is, in the Kuomintang‹not

THE POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE RUSSIAN OPPOSITION 161 
everybody is capable of such a stupidity. And that is 
called a line! 
The question of the character of the Chinese revolution. 
The Comintern was and still is of the opinion that 
the basis of the revolution in China in the present period 
is the agrarian peasant revolution. What is the 
opposition¹s opinion on this subject? It never has had 
any definite opinion on it. At one time it asserted that 
there cannot be an agrarian revolution in China since 
there is no feudalism there. At another time it declared 
that an agrarian revolution is possible and necessary in 
China, although it did not attach serious significance to 
the survivals of feudalism there, which made it difficult 
to understand what could give rise to an agrarian 
revolution. At yet another time i t asserted that the 
chief thing in the Chinese revolution is not an agrarian 
revolution, but a revolution for customs autonomy. Make 
head or tail of that, if you can! 
Such is the opposition¹s so-called ³line² on the 
controversial questions of the Chinese revolution. 
That is not a line, but marking time, confusion, 
complete absence of a line. 
And these people undertake to criticise the Leninist 
position of the Comintern! Is that not ridiculous, comrades? 
Trotsky spoke here about the revolutionary movement 
in Kwangtung, about the troops of Ho Lung and 
Yeh Ting, and he accused us of creating a new Kuomintang 
here to head this movement. I shall not attempt to 
refute this story, which Trotsky has simply invented. All 
I want to say is that the whole business of the southern 
revolutionary movement, the departure of the troops of

J. V. S T A L I N 162 
Yeh Ting and Ho Lung from Wuhan, their march into 
Kwangtung, their joining the peasant revolutionary 
movement and so forth‹I want to say that all this was 
undertaken on the initiative of the Chinese Communist 
Party. Does Trotsky know that? He ought to, if he 
knows anything at all. 
Who will head this movement if it gains successes, 
if there is a new upsurge of the revolution in China? Soviets, 
of course. Before, in the hey-day of the Kuomintang, 
conditions were unfavourable for the immediate 
organisation of Soviets. Now, however, that the Kuomintangists 
have disgraced and discredited themselves 
by their connection with the counter-revolution, now, 
if the movement gains success, Soviets can become and 
actually will become, the main force that will rally 
around itself the workers and peasants of China. And who 
will be at the head of the Soviets? The Communists, of 
course. But the Communists will no longer take part 
in the Kuomintang i f a revolutionary Kuomintang 
appears upon the scene again. Only ignoramuses can 
combine the existence of Soviets with the possibility 
of Communists belonging to the Kuomintang party. 
To combine these two incompatible things means 
failure to understand the nature and purpose of 
Soviets. 
The same must be said about the Anglo-Russian Committee. 
Here we have the same wobbling and absence of 
a line on the part of the opposition. At first the opposition 
was enchanted by the Anglo-Russian Committee. 
It even asserted that the Anglo-Russian Committee 
was a means of ³making reformism in Europe harmless² 
(Zinoviev), evidently forgetting that the British half of

THE POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE RUSSIAN OPPOSITION 163 
the Anglo-Russian Committee consisted precisely of 
reformists. 
Later, when the opposition realised at last that Purcell 
and his friends are reformists, its enchantment 
gave way to disenchantment, more than that, to desperation, 
and it demanded an immediate rupture as a means 
of overthrowing the General Council, failing to understand 
that the General Council cannot be overthrown 
from Moscow. Swinging from one piece of stupidity 
to another‹such was the opposition¹s so-called ³line² 
on the question of the Anglo-Russian Committee. 
Trotsky is incapable of understanding that when 
things are ripe for a rupture, the main thing is not the 
rupture as such, but the question on which the rupture 
takes place, the idea that is demonstrated by the rupture. 
What idea is demonstrated by the rupture that has 
already taken place? The idea of the threat of war, the 
idea of the need to combat the war danger. Who can 
deny that it is precisely this idea that is now the main 
question of the day all over Europe? From this it follows, 
however, that it was precisely on this major question 
that we had to bring the masses of the workers up against 
the treachery of the General Council, and that is what 
we did. The fact that the General Council found itself 
compelled to take the initiative in the rupture and 
bear the odium of it at a time of the threat of a new war 
‹this fact is the best possible exposure in the eyes of the 
masses of the workers of the General Council¹s treacherous 
and social-imperialist ³nature² on the basic question 
of war. But the opposition asserts that it would have 
been better had we taken the initiative in the rupture and 
borne the odium of it!

J. V. S T A L I N 164 
And that is what they call a line! And these muddleheads 
undertake to criticise the Leninist position of the 
Comintern! Is that not ridiculous, comrades? 
The opposition is in an even worse plight on the question 
of our Party, on the question of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
Trotsky does not understand our Party. He has a wrong 
conception of our Party. He regards our Party in the same 
way as an aristocrat regards the ³rabble,² or a bureaucrat 
his subordinates. If that were not so, he would not 
assert that it is possible in a party a million strong, in 
the C.P.S.U.(B.), for individuals, for individual leaders, 
to ³seize,² to ³usurp² power. To talk about ³seizing² 
power in a party a million strong, a party that has made 
three revolutions and is now shaking the foundations of 
world imperialism‹such is the depth of stupidity to 
which Trotsky has sunk! 
Is it at all possible to ³seize² power in a party a million 
strong, a party rich in revolutionary traditions? If 
it is, why has Trotsky failed to ³seize² power in the 
Party, to force his way to leadership of the Party? How 
is that to be explained? Does Trotsky lack the will and 
the desire to lead? Is it not a fact that for more than two 
decades already Trotsky has been fighting the Bolsheviks 
for leadership in the Party? Why has he failed to 
³seize² power in the Party? Is he a less powerful orator 
than the present leaders of our Party? Would it not 
be truer to say that as an orator Trotsky is superior to 
many of the present leaders of our Party? How, then, 
are we to explain the fact that notwithstanding his oratorical 
skill, notwithstanding his will to lead, notwithstanding 
his abilities, Trotsky was thrown out of the 
leadership of the great party which is called the

THE POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE RUSSIAN OPPOSITION 165 
C.P.S.U.(B.)? The explanation that Trotsky is inclined 
to offer is that our Party, in his opinion, is a voting herd, 
which blindly follows the Central Committee of the Party. 
But only people who despise the Party and regard it as 
rabble can speak of it in that way. Only a down-at-heel 
party aristocrat can regard the Party as a voting herd. 
It is a sign that Trotsky has lost the sense of Party principle, 
has lost the ability to discern the real reasons why 
the Party distrusts the opposition. 
Indeed, why does the C.P.S.U.(B.) express utter 
distrust of the opposition? The reason is that the opposition 
intended to replace Leninism by Trotskyism, to 
supplement Leninism with Trotskyism, to ³improve² 
Leninism by means of Trotskyism. But the Party wants 
to remain faithful to Leninism in spite of all the various 
artifices of the down-at-heel aristocrats in the Party. 
That is the root cause why the Party, which has made 
three revolutions, found it necessary to turn its back on 
Trotsky and on the opposition as a whole. 
And the Party will behave in a similar way towards 
all ³leaders² and ³guides² who intend to embellish 
Leninism with Trotskyism or any other variety of opportunism. 
By depicting our Party as a voting herd, Trotsky expresses 
contempt for the mass of the C.P.S.U.(B.) membership. 
Is it surprising that the Party reciprocates this 
contempt and expresses utter distrust of Trotsky? 
The opposition is in the same plight on the question 
of the regime in our Party. Trotsky tries to make it appear 
that the present regime in the Party, which is opposed 
by the entire opposition, is something fundamentally 
different from the regime that was established in

J. V. S T A L I N 166 
the Party in Lenin¹s time. He wants to make it appear 
that he has no objection to the regime established by 
Lenin after the Tenth Congress, but that, strictly speaking, 
he is fighting the present regime in the Party, which, 
he claims, has nothing in common with the regime established 
by Lenin. 
I assert that here Trotsky is uttering a plain untruth. 
I assert that the present regime in the Party is an 
exact expression of the regime that was established in 
the Party in Lenin¹s time, at the Tenth and Eleventh 
Congresses of our Party. 
I assert that Trotsky is fighting the Leninist regime 
in the Party, the regime that was established in Lenin¹s 
time, and under Lenin¹s guidance. 
I assert that the Trotskyists had already started their 
fight against the Leninist regime in the Party in Lenin¹s 
time, and that the fight the Trotskyists are now waging 
is a continuation of the fight against the regime in the 
Party which they were already waging in Lenin¹s time. 
What are the underlying principles of that regime? 
They are that while inner-Party democracy is operated 
and business like criticism of the Party¹s defects and 
mistakes is permitted, no factionalism whatsoever can 
be permitted, and all factionalism must be abandoned on 
pain of expulsion from the Party. 
When was this regime established in the Party? At 
the Tenth and Eleventh Congresses of our Party, that is, 
in Lenin¹s time. 
I assert that Trotsky and the opposition are fighting 
this very same regime in the Party. 
We have a document like the ³Declaration of the 
Forty Six,² signed by Trotskyists like Pyatakov, Preo

THE POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE RUSSIAN OPPOSITION 167 
brazhensky, Serebryakov, Alsky, and others, which 
definitely said that the regime established in the Party 
after the Tenth Congress was now obsolete and had 
become intolerable for the Party. 
What did those people demand? They demanded that 
factional groups be permitted in the Party and that the 
corresponding decision of the Tenth Congress be rescinded. 
That was in 1923. I declare that Trotsky has wholly 
and entirely identified himself with the stand of the 
³Forty-Six² and is waging a fight against the regime that 
was established in the Party after the Tenth Congress. 
There you have the beginning of the Trotskyists¹ fight 
against the Leninist regime in the Party. (Trotsky: ³I 
did not speak about the Tenth Congress. You are inventing.²) 
Trotsky must surely know that I can bring documentary 
proof. The documents have remained in tact; I 
shall distribute them among the comrades and it will 
then be clear which of us is speaking the truth.* 
* Note of the Editorial Board of ³The Communist International²: 
On October 3, Comrade Stalin submitted to the Political 
Secretariat of the E.C.C.I., as an appendix to the minutes of the 
joint meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. and the International 
Control Commission, the documentary proofs he had referred to 
in his speech, namely: 
1) An excerpt from the ³Declaration of the Forty-Six² (October 
15, 1923), signed by Pyatakov, Preobrazhensky, Serebryakov, 
Alsky, and others, which states: 
³The regime which has been established in the Party is absolutely 
intolerable. I t kills the Party¹s independent activity 
and substitutes for the Party a picked, bureaucratic apparatus, 
which operates without a hitch in normal times, but which inevitably 
misfires in moments of crisis, and which is in danger of proving 
utterly bankrupt in face of impending grave events. The

J. V. S T A L I N 168 
I assert that the Trotskyists who signed the ³Declaration 
of the Forty-Six² were already waging a fight 
against the Leninist regime in the Party in Lenin¹s time. 
I assert that Trotsky supported this fight against 
the Leninist regime all the time, inspiring the opposition 
and egging it on. 
I assert that Trotsky¹s present fight against the regime 
in our Party is a continuation of the anti-Leninist 
fight I have just spoken about. 
The question of the Trotskyists¹ illegal, anti-Party 
printing press. Trotsky constructed his written speech 
in such a way that he barely mentioned the illegal printing 
press, evidently considering that he was not obliged 
to deal with such a ³trifle² as the Trotskyists¹ illegal, 
anti-Party printing press. It was not the speech 
of an accused person, but a declaration of the opposition 
present situation is due to the fact that the regime of factional dictatorship 
within the Party that objectively arose after the Tenth Congress 
is now obsolete.² 
2) An excerpt from Trotsky¹s statement to the Central Committee 
and the Central Control Commission (October 8, 1923), 
which states: 
³The regime which, in the main, had already arisen 
before the Twelfth Congress and was definitely established and 
given shape after it, is far more remote from workers¹ democracy 
than the regime that existed in the severest periods of war communism.² 
In explanation of these excerpts it must be said that before 
the Twelfth Congress we had the Eleventh Congress (in the spring 
of 1922) and the Tenth Congress (in the spring of 1921), the proceedings 
of which were directed by Lenin, and the resolutions of which 
gave definite shape to the very regime in the Party which is attacked 
in the ³Declaration of the Forty-Six² (Trotskyists) and 
in the above-mentioned statement by Trotsky.

THE POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE RUSSIAN OPPOSITION 169 
levelling charges against the Comintern and the 
C.P.S.U.(B.). It is obvious, however, that the question of 
the Trotskyists¹ illegal, anti-Party printing press wholly 
and completely exposes both Trotsky and his supporters 
in the opposition as enemies of the Party principle, as 
splitters and disrupters of the proletarian cause. 
Indeed, Trotsky thinks that the opposition is right 
‹and therefore it has a right to set up its illegal printing 
press. 
In addition to Trotsky¹s group, however, there are 
other opposition groups in the C.P.S.U.(B.): the ³Workers¹ 
Opposition,² the Sapronovites, and so forth. Each 
of these small groups believes it is right. If we follow in 
Trotsky¹s footsteps we must grant that each of these 
groups has a right to set up its illegal printing press. 
Let us suppose that they do set up their illegal printing 
presses and that the Party takes no steps to combat this 
evil‹what will then be left of the Party? 
What would it mean to permit all the various groups 
in the Party to have their illegal printing presses? It 
would mean permitting the existence of a number of 
centres in the Party, each having its ³programme,² its 
³platform,² its ³line.² What will then be left of the 
iron discipline in our Party, the discipline which Lenin 
regarded as the foundation of the proletarian dictatorship? 
Is such discipline possible unless there is a single, 
united leading centre? Does Trotsky realise what a quagmire 
he is slipping into by advocating the right of 
opposition groups to have illegal, anti-Party printing 
presses? 
The question of Bonapartism. On this question the 
opposition betrays utter ignorance. By accusing the

J. V. S T A L I N 170 
overwhelming majority in our Party of making attempts 
at Bonapartism, Trotsky demonstrates his utter ignorance 
and failure to understand the roots of Bonapartism. 
What is Bonapartism? Bonapartism is an attempt 
to impose the will of the minority upon the majority 
by the use of force. Bonapartism is the forcible seizure 
of power in a party, or in a country, by the minority 
in opposition to the majority. But since the supporters 
of the line of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
constitute the overwhelming majority both in the Party 
and in the Soviets, how can any body be so silly as to say 
that the majority is trying to impose its own will upon 
itself by the use of force? Has there ever been a case in 
history when the majority has imposed its own will 
upon itself by the use of force? Who but lunatics would 
believe that such an inconceivable thing is possible? 
Is it not a fact that the supporters of the line of the 
Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) constitute the 
overwhelming majority in the Party and in the country? 
Is it not a fact that the opposition is merely a tiny handful? 
One can conceive of the majority in our Party imposing 
its will upon the minority, i.e., the opposition; 
and that is quite lawful in the Party sense of the term. 
But how can one conceive of the majority imposing 
its will upon itself, and by the use of force at that? How 
can there be any question of Bonapartism here? Would it 
not be truer to say that a tendency may arise among the 
minority, that is, among the opposition, to impose its will 
upon the majority? It would not be surprising if such a 
tendency did arise, for the minority, that is, the Trotskyist 
opposition, has now no other means of capturing the

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
171 
leadership except by resorting to force against the majority. 
So that, if we are to speak of Bonapartism, let Trotsky 
look for Bonaparte candidates in his group. 
A few words about degeneration and Thermidor tendencies. 
I shall not analyse here the foolish and ignorant 
charges about degeneration and Thermidor tendencies 
which the oppositionists sometimes advance against the 
Party. I shall not deal with them because they are not 
worth analysing. I should like to present the question 
from the purely practical point of view. 
Let us assume for a moment that the Trotskyist opposition 
is pursuing a genuinely revolutionary policy and 
not a Social Democratic deviation‹if that is the case, 
how are we to explain the fact that all the degenerate 
opportunist elements who have been expelled from 
the Party and from the Comintern gather around the 
Trotskyist opposition, find shelter and protection there? 
How are we to explain the fact that Ruth Fischer 
and Maslow, Scholem and Urbahns, who have been expelled 
from the Comintern and from the Communist 
Party of Germany as degenerate and renegade elements, 
find protection and a hearty welcome precisely 
in the Trotskyist opposition? 
How are we to account for the fact that opportunists 
and real degenerates like Souvarine and Rosmer in 
France, and Ossovsky and Dashkovsky in the U.S.S.R., 
find shelter precisely in the Trotskyist opposition? 
Can it be called an accident that the Comintern and 
the C.P.S.U.(B.) expel these degenerates and really Thermidor 
minded people from their ranks, whereas Trotsky 
and Zinoviev welcome them with open arms and afford 
them shelter and protection? 
THE POLITICAL COMPLEXION OF THE RUSSIAN OPPOSITION

J. V. S T A L I N 172 
Do not these facts show that the ³revolutionary² 
phrases of the Trotskyist opposition remain mere 
phrases, while, in actual fact, the opposition is the rallying 
centre of the degenerate elements? 
Does not all this show that the Trotskyist opposition 
is a hotbed and nursery of degeneration and Thermidor 
tendencies? 
At any rate among us in the C.P.S.U.(B.), there is 
one and only one group that rallies around itself all 
sorts of scoundrels, such as Maslow and Ruth Fischer, 
Souvarine and Ossovsky. That group is the Trotsky 
group. 
Such, in general, comrades, is the political complexion 
of the opposition. 
You will ask: What conclusion is to be drawn? 
There is only one conclusion. The opposition has got 
itself into such a muddle, it has so agilely landed in 
an impasse from which there is no escape, that it is 
faced with the alternative: either the Comintern and the 
C.P.S.U.(B.), or Maslow, Ruth Fischer, and the renegades 
of the illegal, anti-Party press. 
It cannot go on swinging between these two camps 
forever. The time has come to choose. Either with the 
Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.), and then‹war against 
Maslow and Ruth Fischer, against all the renegades. 
Or against the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the Comintern, and 
then‹a good riddance of them to the Maslow and Ruth 
Fischer group, to all the renegades and degenerates, to 
all the Shcherbakovs and other scum. (Applause.) 
Published in the magazine 
Kommunistichesky Internatsional, 
No. 41, October 14, 1927

SYNOPSIS OF THE ARTICLE 
³THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER 
OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION² 
The October Revolution is not merely a revolution 
³within national bounds,² but, primarily, a revolution of 
an international, world order; for it signifies a radical 
turn in the world history of mankind from the old to 
the new. 
Revolutions in the past usually ended by one group 
of exploiters at the helm of government being replaced 
by another group of exploiters. The exploiters changed, 
exploitation remained. Such was the case during the revolutions 
of the slaves, the revolutions of the serfs, 
the revolutions of the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie. 
The October Revolution differs from these revolutions 
in principle. Its aim is not to replace one form 
of exploitation by another form of exploitation, one 
group of exploiters by another group of exploiters, but to 
abolish all exploitation of man by man, to overthrow 
all groups of exploiters. 
The establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
the most revolutionary and most organised of 
all exploited classes. 
Precisely for this reason the victory of the October 
Revolution signifies a radical turn in economics and 
politics, in the manner of life, customs, habits and

J. V. S T A L I N 174 
traditions, in the culture and in the whole spiritual complexion 
of the exploited masses throughout the world. 
That is the basic reason why the oppressed classes 
in all countries entertain the greatest sympathy for the 
October Revolution, which they regard as the pledge of 
their own emancipation. 
Four main features. 
1) The centres of imperialism (the ³metropolises²). 
October as the turn from the rule of capitalism 
in the advanced countries to communism. We 
often say that the October Revolution is a breach of 
the world imperialist front. But what does that mean? 
It means that it ushered in the era of proletarian revolutions 
and the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Formerly, the point of departure was the French Revolution 
of the eighteenth century; its traditions were 
utilised and its order was implanted. 
Now the October Revolution is the point of departure. 
Formerly, France. 
Now, the U.S.S. R. 
Formerly, the ³Jacobin² was the bogy of the entire 
bourgeoisie. 
Now, the Bolshevik is the bogy of the bourgeoisie. 
The era of ³ordinary² bourgeois revolutions, when 
the proletariat was merely the shock force, while the 
exploiters reaped the fruits of revolution, has passed 
away. 
The era of proletarian revolutions in the capitalist 
countries has begun. 
2) The periphery of imperialism. October ushered in 
the era of liberating revolutions in the colonial and dependent 
countries.

SYNOPSIS OF THE ARTICLE 175 
The proletariat cannot emancipate itself unless it 
emancipates the peoples oppressed by imperialism. The 
united front of proletarian revolutions in the metropolises 
and colonial revolutions in the dependent countries. 
The era of tranquil exploitation of the colonies and 
dependent countries has passed away. 
The era of liberating revolutions in the colonies, 
the era of the awakening of the proletariat in those countries, 
the era of its hegemony, has begun. 
3) The centres and periphery‹together. Thereby, October 
struck world imperialism a mortal blow from which 
it will never recover. 
Imperialism will never recover the ³equilibrium² 
and ³stability² that it possessed before October. 
The era of the ³stability² of capitalism has passed 
away. 
The era of the decline of capitalism has begun. 
4) October signifies the ideological victory of communism 
over Social-Democratism, of Marxism over reformism. 
Formerly, before the victory of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat in the U.S.S. R., the Social-Democrats and reformists 
could flaunt the banner of Marxism, could coquet 
with Marx and Engels, etc., for that was not dangerous 
for the bourgeoisie, and people did not yet know 
what the victory of Marxism could lead to. 
Now, after the victory of the proletarian dictatorship 
in the U.S.S.R., when everybody realises what 
Marxism leads to and what its victory may signify, the 
Social-Democrats and reformists, sensing the danger to 
the bourgeoisie of such flaunting and coquetting with

J. V. S T A L I N 176 
Marxism, have preferred to dissociate themselves from 
Marxism. 
Henceforth, communism is the only shelter and bulwark 
of Marxism. 
Henceforth, the spirit of Marxism is abandoning 
Social-Democracy, just as Social-Democracy earlier 
abandoned Marxism. 
Now, after the victory of the October Revolution, 
only those can be Marxists who resolutely and devotedly 
support the first proletarian dictatorship in the world. 
What does supporting the first proletarian dictatorship 
in the world mean? It means taking the stand of 
direct struggle against one¹s own bourgeoisie. As, however, 
the Social-Democrats do not want to fight their own 
bourgeoisie but prefer to adapt themselves to it, they, 
naturally, take the stand of fighting the first proletarian 
dictatorship in the world, the stand of restoring capitalism 
in the U.S.S.R. That is the twilight of Social-Democracy. 
October ushered in the era of the triumph of world 
communism, which is the era of the twilight of Social- 
Democracy, of its final desertion to the camp of the 
bourgeoisie. 
October is the victory of Marxism in ideology. 
October 1927 
Published for the first time

THE TROTSKYIST 
OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW 
Speech Delivered at a Meeting of the Joint Plenum 
of the Central Committee and the Central Control 
Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.)44 
October 23, 1927 
I 
SOME MINOR QUESTIONS 
Comrades, I have not much time; I shall therefore 
deal with separate questions. 
First of all about the personal factor. You have 
heard here how assiduously the oppositionists hurl abuse 
at Stalin, abuse him with all their might. That does 
not surprise me, comrades. The reason why the main attacks 
were directed against Stalin is because Stalin 
knows all the opposition¹s tricks better, perhaps, than 
some of our comrades do, and i t is not so easy, I 
dare say, to fool him. So they strike their blows primarily 
at Stalin. Well, let them hurl abuse to their heart¹s 
content. 
And what is Stalin? Stalin is only a minor figure. 
Take Lenin. Who does not know that at the time of the 
August bloc the opposition, headed by Trotsky, waged 
an even more scurrilous campaign of slander against 
Lenin? Listen to Trotsky, for example: 
³The wretched squabbling systematically provoked by Lenin, 
that old hand at the game, that professional exploiter of all that 
is backward in the Russian labour movement, seems like a senseless 
obsession² (see ³Trotsky¹s Letter to Chkheidze,² April 1913).

J. V. S T A L I N 178 
Note the language, comrades! Note the language! 
It is Trotsky writing. And writing about Lenin. 
Is it surprising, then, that Trotsky, who wrote in 
such an ill-mannered way about the great Lenin, whose 
shoe-laces he was not worthy of tying, should now hurl 
abuse at one of Lenin¹s numerous pupils‹Comrade 
Stalin? 
More than that. I think the opposition does me honour 
by venting all its hatred against Stalin. That is as it 
should be. I think it would be strange and offensive if 
the opposition, which is trying to wreck the Party, 
were to praise Stalin, who is defending the fundamentals 
of the Leninist Party principle. 
Now about Lenin¹s ³will.² The oppositionists 
shouted here‹you heard them‹that the Central Committee 
of the Party ³concealed² Lenin¹s ³will.² We have 
discussed this question several times at the plenum 
of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, 
you know that. (A voice: ³Scores of times.²) 
It has been proved and proved again that nobody has 
concealed anything, that Lenin¹s ³will² was addressed 
to the Thirteenth Party Congress, that this ³will² was 
read out at the congress (Voices: ³That¹s right!²), that 
the congress unanimously decided not to publish it because, 
among other things, Lenin himself did not want it 
to be published and did not ask that it should be published. 
The opposition knows all this just as well as we do. 
Nevertheless, it has the audacity to declare that the Central 
Committee is ³concealing² the ³will.² 
The question of Lenin¹s ³will² was brought up, 
if I am not mistaken, as far back as 1924. There is a 
certain Eastman, a former American Communist who

THE TROSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW 179 
was later expelled from the Party. This gentleman, who 
mixed with the Trotskyists in Moscow, picked up some 
rumours and gossip about Lenin¹s ³will,² went abroad 
and published a book entitled After Lenin¹s Death, in 
which he did his best to blacken the Party, the Central 
Committee and the Soviet regime, and the gist of which 
was that the Central Committee of our Party was ³concealing² 
Lenin¹s ³will.² In view of the fact that this 
Eastman had at one time been connected with Trotsky, 
we, the members of the Political Bureau, called upon 
Trotsky to dissociate himself from Eastman who, clutching 
at Trotsky and referring to the opposition, had 
made Trotsky responsible for the slanderous statements 
against our Party about the ³will.² Since the question 
was so obvious, Trotsky did, indeed, publicly dissociate 
himself from Eastman in a statement he made in the 
press. It was published in September 1925 in Bolshevik, 
No. 16. 
Permit me to read the passage in Trotsky¹s article 
in which he deals with the question whether the Party and 
its Central Committee was concealing Lenin¹s ³will² 
or not. I quote Trotsky¹s article: 
³In several parts of his book Eastman says that the Central 
Committee Œconcealed¹ from the Party a number of exceptionally 
important documents written by Lenin in the last period of his life 
(it is a matter of letters on the national question, the so-called Œwill,¹ 
and others); there can be no other name for this than slander against 
the Central Committee of our Party.* From what Eastman says 
it may be inferred that Vladimir Ilyich intended those letters, 
which bore the character of advice on internal organisation, for 
the press. In point of fact, that is absolutely untrue. During his 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 180 
illness Vladimir Ilyich often sent proposals, letters, and so forth, 
to the Party¹s leading institutions and to its congress. It goes 
without saying that all those letters and proposals were always 
delivered to those for whom they were intended, were brought 
to the knowledge of the delegates at the Twelfth and Thirteenth 
Congresses, and always, of course, exercised due influence upon 
the Party¹s decisions; and if not all of those letters were published, 
i t was because the author did not intend them for the press. 
Vladimir Ilyich did not leave any Œwill,¹ and the very character 
of his attitude towards the Party, as well as the character of the 
Party itself, precluded the possibility of such a Œwill.¹ What is 
usually referred to as a Œwill¹ in the émigré and foreign bourgeois 
and Menshevik press (in a manner garbled beyond recognition) 
is one of Vladimir Ilyich¹s letters containing advice on organisational 
matters. The Thirteenth Congress of the Party paid the closest 
attention to that letter, as to all of the others, and drew from 
it conclusions appropriate to the conditions and circumstances 
of the time. All talk about concealing or violating a Œwill¹ is a malicious 
invention and is entirely directed against Vladimir Ilyich¹s 
real will,* and against the interests of the Party he created² (see 
Trotsky¹s article ³Concerning Eastman¹s Book After Lenin¹s 
Death,² Bolshevik, No. 16, September 1, 1925, p. 68). 
Clear, one would think. That was written by none 
other than Trotsky. On what grounds, then, are Trotsky, 
Zinoviev and Kamenev now spinning a yarn about the 
Party and its Central Committee ³concealing² Lenin¹s 
³will²? It is ³permissible² to spin yarns, but one should 
know where to stop. 
It is said that in that ³will² Comrade Lenin suggested 
to the congress that in view of Stalin¹s ³rudeness² 
it should consider the question of putting another comrade 
in Stalin¹s place as General Secretary. That is quite 
true. Yes, comrades, I am rude to those who grossly 
* My italics.‹J. St.

THE TROSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW 181 
and perfidiously wreck and split the Party. I have never 
concealed this and do not conceal it now. Perhaps 
some mildness is needed in the treatment of splitters, 
but I am a bad hand at that. At the very first meeting 
of the plenum of the Central Committee after the Thirteenth 
Congress I asked the plenum of the Central Committee 
to release me from my duties as General Secretary. 
The congress itself discussed this question. It was 
discussed by each delegation separately, and all the 
delegations unanimously, including Trotsky, Kamenev 
and Zinoviev, obliged Stalin to remain at his post. 
What could I do? Desert my post? That is not in 
my nature; I have never deserted any post, and I have 
no right to do so, for that would be desertion. As I have 
already said before, I am not a free agent, and when 
the Party imposes an obligation upon me, I must obey. 
A year later I again put in a request to the plenum 
to release me, but I was again obliged to remain at 
my post. 
What else could I do? 
As regards publishing the ³will,² the congress decided 
not to publish it, since it was addressed to the 
congress and was not intended for publication. 
We have the decision of a plenum of the Central 
Committee and Central Control Commission in 1926 to ask 
the Fifteenth Congress for permission to publish this 
document. We have the decision of the same plenum 
of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission 
to publish other letters of Lenin¹s, in which he 
pointed out the mistakes of Kamenev and Zinoviev 
just before the October uprising and demanded their 
expulsion from the Party.45

J. V. S T A L I N 182 
Obviously, talk about the Party concealing these 
documents is infamous slander. Among these documents 
are letters from Lenin urging the necessity of expelling 
Zinoviev and Kamenev from the Party. The Bolshevik 
Party, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik 
Party, have never feared the truth. The strength of the 
Bolshevik Party lies precisely in the fact that it does 
not fear the truth and looks the truth straight in the face. 
The opposition is trying to use Lenin¹s ³will² as a 
trump card; but it is enough to read this ³will² to see 
that it is not a trump card for them at all. On the contrary, 
Lenin¹s ³will² is fatal to the present leaders of 
the opposition. 
Indeed, it is a fact that in his ³will² Lenin accuses 
Trotsky of being guilty of ³non-Bolshevism² and, as 
regards the mistake Kamenev and Zinoviev made during 
October, he says that that mistake was not ³accidental.² 
What does that mean? It means that Trotsky, 
who suffers from ³non-Bolshevism,² and Kamenev and Zinoviev, 
whose mistakes are not ³accidental² and can and 
certainly will be repeated, cannot be politically trusted. 
It is characteristic that there is not a word, not a 
hint in the ³will² about Stalin having made mistakes. 
It refers only to Stalin¹s rudeness. But rudeness is not 
and cannot be counted as a defect in Stalin¹s political 
line or position. 
Here is the relevant passage in the ³will²: 
³I shall not go on to characterise the personal qualities of the 
other members of the Central Committee. I shall merely remind you 
that the October episode with Zinoviev and Kamenev was, of 
course, not accidental, but that they can be blamed for it personally 
as little as Trotsky can be blamed for his non-Bolshevism.² 
Clear, one would think.

THE TROSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW 183 
II 
THE OPPOSITION¹S ³PLATFORM² 
Next question. Why did not the Central Committee 
publish the opposition¹s ³platform²? Zinoviev and Trotsky 
say that it was because the Central Committee and 
the Party ³fear² the truth. Is that true? Of course not. 
More than that. It is absurd to say that the Party or the 
Central Committee fear the truth. We have the verbatim 
reports of the plenums of the Central Committee 
and Central Control Commission. Those reports have 
been printed in several thousand copies and distributed 
among the members of the Party. They contain the 
speeches of the oppositionists as well as of the representatives 
of the Party line. They are being read by tens and 
hundreds of thousands of Party members. (Voices: ³That¹s 
true!²) If we feared the truth we would not have circulated 
those documents. The good thing about those 
documents is precisely that they enable the members 
of the Party to compare the Central Committee¹s position 
with the views of the opposition and to make their 
decision. Is that fear of the truth? 
In October 1926, the leaders of the opposition strutted 
about and asserted, as they are asserting now, that 
the Central Committee feared the truth, that it was 
hiding their ³platform,² concealing it from the Party, 
and so forth. That is why they went snooping among 
the Party units in Moscow (recall the Aviapribor Factory), 
in Leningrad (recall the Putilov Works), and other 
places. Well, what happened? The communist workers 
gave our oppositionists a good drubbing, such a drubbing 
indeed that the leaders of the opposition were

J. V. S T A L I N 184 
compelled to flee from the battlefield. Why did they not 
at that time dare to go farther, to all the Party units, to 
ascertain which of us fears the truth‹the opposition or 
the Central Committee? It was because they got cold feet, 
being frightened by the real (and not imaginary) truth. 
And now? Speaking honestly, is not a discussion 
going on now in the Party units? Point to at least one 
unit, containing at least one oppositionist and where 
at least one meeting has been held during the past 
three or four months, in which representatives of the 
opposition have not spoken, in which there has been 
no discussion. Is it not a fact that during the past three 
or four months the opposition has been coming forward 
whenever it could in the Party units with its counterresolutions? 
(Voices: ³Quite true!²) Why, then, do not 
Trotsky and Zinoviev try to go to the Party units and 
expound their views? 
A characteristic fact. In August this year, after 
the plenum of the Central Committee and Central 
Control Commission, Trotsky and Zinoviev sent in a 
statement that they wanted to speak at a meeting of 
the Moscow active if the Central Committee had no objection. 
To this the Central Committee replied (and the 
reply was circulated among the local organisations) 
that it had no objection to Trotsky and Zinoviev speaking 
at such a meeting, provided, however, that they, as 
members of the Central Committee, did not speak 
against the decisions of the Central Committee. What happened? 
They dropped their request. (General laughter.) 
Yes, comrades, somebody among us does fear the 
truth, but it is not the Central Committee, and still 
less the Party; it is the leaders of our opposition.

THE TROSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW 185 
That being the case, why did not the Central Committee 
publish the opposition¹s ³platform²? 
Firstly, because the Central Committee did not want 
and had no right to legalise Trotsky¹s faction, or any 
factional group. In the Tenth Congress resolution ³On 
Unity,² Lenin said that the existence of a ³platform² 
is one of the principal signs of factionalism. In spite of 
that, the opposition drew up a ³platform² and demanded 
that it be published, thereby violating the decision of 
the Tenth Congress. Supposing the Central Committee 
had published the opposition¹s ³platform,² what would 
it have meant? It would have meant that the Central 
Committee was willing to participate in the opposition¹s 
factional efforts to violate the decisions of the Tenth 
Congress. Could the Central Committee and the Central 
Control Commission agree to do that? Obviously, no selfrespecting 
Central Committee could take that factional 
step. (Voices: ³Quite true!²) 
Further. In this same Tenth Congress resolution 
³On Unity,² written by Lenin, it is said: ³The congress 
orders the immediate dissolution of all groups without 
exception that have been formed on the basis of 
one platform or another,² that ³non-observance of this 
decision of the congress shall involve certain and immediate 
expulsion from the Party.² The directive is clear 
and definite. Supposing the Central Committee and the 
Central Control Commission had published the opposition¹s 
³platform,² could that have been called the dissolution 
of all groups without exception formed on one ³platform² 
or another? Obviously not. On the contrary, 
it would have meant that the Central Committee and the 
Central Control Commission themselves were intending

J. V. S T A L I N 186 
not to dissolve, but to help to organise groups and 
factions on the basis of the opposition¹s ³platform.² 
Could the Central Committee and the Central Control 
Commission take that step towards splitting the Party? 
Obviously, they could not. 
Finally, the opposition¹s ³platform² contains slanders 
against the Party which, if published, would do 
the Party and our state irreparable harm. 
In fact, it is stated in the opposition¹s ³platform² 
that our Party is willing to abolish the monopoly of 
foreign trade and make payment on all debts, hence, 
also on the war debts. Everybody knows that this is 
a disgusting slander against our Party, against our working 
class, against our state. Supposing we had published 
the ³platform² containing this slander against the 
Party and the state, what would have happened? The 
only result would have been that the international 
bourgeoisie would have begun to exert greater pressure 
upon us, it would have demanded concessions to which 
we could not agree at all (for example, the abolition of 
the monopoly of foreign trade, payments on the war 
debts, and so forth) and would have threatened us 
with war. 
When members of the Central Committee like Trotsky 
and Zinoviev supply false reports about our Party 
to the imperialists of all countries, assuring them that 
we are ready to make the utmost concessions, including 
the abolition of the monopoly of foreign trade, it can 
have only one meaning: Messieurs the bourgeois, press 
harder on the Bolshevik Party, threaten to go to war 
against them; the Bolsheviks will agree to every concession 
if you press hard enough.

THE TROSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW 187 
False reports about our Party lodged with Messieurs 
the imperialists by Zinoviev and Trotsky in 
order to aggravate our difficulties in the sphere of foreign 
policy‹that is what the opposition¹s ³platform² 
amounts to. 
Whom does this harm? Obviously, it harms the proletariat 
of the U.S.S.R., the Communist Party of the 
U.S.S.R., our whole state. 
Whom does it benefit? It benefits the imperialists 
of all countries. 
Now I ask you: could the Central Committee agree to 
publish such filth in our press? Obviously, it could not. 
Such are the considerations that compelled the Central 
Committee to refuse to publish the opposition¹s 
³platform.² 
III 
LENIN ON DISCUSSIONS AND OPPOSITIONS 
IN GENERAL 
The next question. Zinoviev vehemently tried 
to prove that Lenin was in favour of discussion always 
and at all times. He referred to the discussion 
of various platforms that took place before the Tenth 
Congress and at the congress itself, but he ³forgot² 
to mention that Lenin regarded the discussion that 
took place before the Tenth Congress as a mistake. He 
³forgot² to say that the Tenth Congress resolution 
³On Party Unity,² which was written by Lenin and was 
a directive for the development of our Party, ordered 
not the discussion of ³platforms,² but the dissolution 
of all groups whatsoever formed on the basis of one 
³platform² or another. He ³forgot² that at the Tenth

J. V. S T A L I N 188 
Congress Lenin spoke in favour of the ³prohibition² 
in future of all oppositions in the Party. He ³forgot² 
to say that Lenin regarded the conversion of our Party 
into a ³debating society² as absolutely impermissible. 
Here, for example, is Lenin¹s appraisal of the discussion 
that took place prior to the Tenth Congress: 
³I have already had occasion to speak about this today and, 
of course, I could only cautiously observe that there can hardly 
be many among you who do not regard this discussion as an excessive 
luxury. I cannot refrain from adding that, speaking for myself, 
I think that this luxury was indeed absolutely impermissible, 
and that in permitting such a discussion we undoubtedly made 
a mistake² (see Minutes of the Tenth Congress, p. 1646). 
And here is what Lenin said at the Tenth Congress 
about any possible opposition after the Tenth Congress: 
³Consolidation of the Party, prohibition of an opposition 
in the Party‹such is the political conclusion to be drawn from 
the present situation. . . .² ³We do not want an opposition now, 
comrades. And I think that the Party congress will have to draw 
this conclusion, to draw the conclusion that we must now put an end 
to the opposition, finish with it, we have had enough of oppositions 
now!² (Ibid., pp. 61 and 63.47) 
That is how Lenin regarded the question of discussion 
and of opposition in general. 
IV 
THE OPPOSITION AND THE ³THIRD FORCE² 
The next question. What was the need for Comrade 
Menzhinsky¹s statement about the whiteguards with 
whom some of the ³workers² at the Trotskyists¹ illegal, 
anti-Party printing press are connected?

THE TROSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW 189 
Firstly, in order to dispel the lie and slander that 
the opposition is spreading in connection with this question 
in its anti-Party sheets. The opposition assures 
everyone that the report about whiteguards who are con 
nected in one way or another with allies of the opposition 
like Shcherbakov, Tverskoy, and others, is fiction, 
an invention, put into circulation for the purpose of 
discrediting the opposition. Comrade Menzhinsky¹s statement, 
with the depositions made by the people under 
arrest, leaves no doubt whatever that a section of the 
³workers² at the Trotskyists¹ illegal, anti-Party printing 
press are connected, indubitably connected, with whiteguard 
counter-revolutionary elements. Let the opposition 
try to refute those facts and documents. 
Secondly, in order to expose the lies now being 
spread by Maslow¹s organ in Berlin (Die Fahne des Kommunismus, 
that is, The Banner of Communism). We have 
just received the last issue of this filthy rag, published 
by this renegade Maslow, who is occupied in slandering 
the U.S.S.R. and betraying state secrets of the U.S.S.R. 
to the bourgeoisie. This organ of the press prints for 
public information, in a garbled form, of course, the 
depositions made by the arrested whiteguards and their 
allies at the illegal, anti-Party printing press. (Voices: 
³Scandalous!²) Where could Maslow get this information 
from? This information is secret, for not all the 
members of the whiteguard band that is involved in 
the business of organising a conspiracy on the lines of 
the Pilsudski conspiracy have as yet been traced and arrested. 
This information was made known in the Central 
Control Commission to Trotsky, Zinoviev, Smilga and 
other members of the opposition. They were forbidden

J. V. S T A L I N 190 
to make a copy of those depositions for the time being. 
But evidently, they did make a copy and hastened 
to send it to Maslow. But what does sending that information 
to Maslow for publication mean? It means warning 
the whiteguards who have not yet been traced and 
arrested, warning them that the Bolsheviks intend to 
arrest them. 
Is it proper, is it permissible for Communists to do 
a thing like that? Obviously not. 
The article in Maslow¹s organ bears a piquant heading: 
³Stalin Is Splitting the C.P.S.U.(B.). A Whiteguard 
Conspiracy. A Letter from the U.S.S.R.² (Voices: ³Scoundrels!²) 
Could we, after all this, after Maslow, with the 
aid of Trotsky and Zinoviev, had printed for public 
information garbled depositions of people under arrest, 
could we, after all this, refrain from making a report to 
the plenum of the Central Committee and Central 
Control Commission and from contrasting the lying stories 
with the actual facts and the actual depositions? 
That is why the Central Committee and the Central 
Control Commission considered it necessary to ask 
Comrade Menzhinsky to make a statement about the 
facts. 
What follows from these depositions, from Comrade 
Menzhinsky¹s statement? Have we ever accused or are 
we now accusing the opposition of organising a military 
conspiracy? Of course, not. Have we ever accused or 
are we now accusing the opposition of taking part in 
this conspiracy? Of course, not. (Muralov: ³You did 
make the accusation at the last plenum.²) That is not 
true, Muralov. We have two statements by the Central 
Committee and the Central Control Commission about

THE TROSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW 191 
the illegal, anti-Party printing press and about the non- 
Party intellectuals connected with that printing press. 
You will not find a single sentence, not a single word, 
in those documents to show that we are accusing the opposition 
of participating in a military conspiracy. In 
those documents the Central Committee and the Central 
Control Commission merely assert that, when organising 
its illegal printing press, the opposition got into contact 
with bourgeois intellectuals, and that some of these intellectuals 
were, in their turn, found to be in contact with 
whiteguards who were hatching a military conspiracy. 
I would ask Muralov to point out the relevant passage 
in the documents published by the Political Bureau of 
the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central 
Control Commission in connection with this question. 
Muralov cannot point out such a passage because it does 
not exist. 
That being the case, what are the charges we have 
made and still make against the opposition? 
Firstly, that the opposition, in pursuing a splitting 
policy, organised an anti-Party, illegal printing press. 
Secondly, that the opposition, for the purpose of organising 
this printing press, entered into a bloc with 
bourgeois intellectuals, part of whom turned out to be 
in direct contact with counter-revolutionary conspirators. 
Thirdly, that, by enlisting the services of bourgeois 
intellectuals and conspiring with them against the Party, 
the opposition, independently of its will or desire, found 
itself encircled by the so-called ³third force.² 
The opposition proved to have much more confidence 
in those bourgeois intellectuals than in its own Party.

J. V. S T A L I N 192 
Otherwise it would not have demanded the release of 
³all those arrested² in connection with the illegal printing 
press, including Shcherbakov, Tverskoy, Bolshakov 
and others, who were found to be in contact with counterrevolutionary 
elements. 
The opposition wanted to have an anti-Party, illegal 
printing press; for that purpose it had recourse to the 
aid of bourgeois intellectuals, but some of those intellectuals 
proved to be in contact with downright counterrevolutionaries‹
such is the chain that resulted, comrades. 
Independently of the opposition¹s will or desire, 
anti-Soviet elements flocked round it and strove to utilise 
its splitting activities for their own ends. 
Thus, what Lenin predicted as far back as the Tenth 
Congress of our Party (see the Tenth Congress resolution 
³On Party Unity²), where he said that the ³third force,² 
that is the bourgeoisie, would certainly try to hitch 
on to the conflict within our Party in order to utilise 
the opposition¹s activities for its own class ends, has 
come true. 
It is said that counter-revolutionary elements sometimes 
penetrate our Soviet bodies also, at the fronts for 
example without having any connection with the opposition. 
That is true. In such cases, however, the Soviet 
authorities arrest those elements and shoot them. But 
what did the opposition do? It demanded the release 
of the bourgeois intellectuals who were arrested in connection 
with the illegal printing press and were found to be 
in contact with counter-revolutionary elements. That is 
the trouble, comrades. That is what the opposition¹s 
splitting activities lead to. Instead of thinking of all 
these dangers, instead of thinking of the pit that is yawn

THE TROSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW 193 
ing in front of them, our oppositionists heap slander on 
the Party and try with all their might to disorganise, 
to split our Party. 
There is talk about a former Wrangel officer who is 
helping the OGPU to unmask counter-revolutionary organisations. 
The opposition leaps and dances and makes 
a great fuss about the fact that the former Wrangel officer 
to whom the opposition¹s allies, all these Shcherbakovs 
and Tverskoys, applied for assistance, proved 
to be an agent of the OGPU. But is there anything wrong 
in this former Wrangel officer helping the Soviet authorities 
to unmask counter-revolutionary conspiracies? Who 
can deny the right of the Soviet authorities to win former 
officers to their side in order to employ them for the 
purpose of unmasking counter-revolutionary organisations? 
Shcherbakov and Tverskoy addressed themselves to 
this former Wrangel officer not because he was an agent 
of the OGPU, but because he was a former Wrangel officer, 
and they did so in order to employ him against 
the Party and against the Soviet Government. That is 
the point, and that is the misfortune of our opposition. 
And when, following up these clues, the OGPU quite 
unexpectedly came across the Trotskyists¹ illegal, anti- 
Party printing press, it found that, while arranging a 
bloc with the opposition, Messieurs the Shcherbakovs, 
Tverskoys and Bolshakovs were already in a bloc with 
counter-revolutionaries, with former Kolchak officers 
like Kostrov and Novikov, as Comrade Menzhinsky 
reported to you today. 
That is the point, comrades, and that is the trouble 
with our opposition.

J. V. S T A L I N 194 
The opposition¹s splitting activities lead it to linking 
up with bourgeois intellectuals, and the link with 
bourgeois intellectuals makes it easy for all sorts of 
counter-revolutionary elements to envelop it‹that is the 
bitter truth. 
V 
HOW THE OPPOSITION IS ³PREPARING² 
FOR THE CONGRESS 
The next question: about the preparations for the 
congress. Zinoviev and Trotsky vehemently asserted here 
that we are preparing for the congress by means of repression. 
It is strange that they see nothing but ³repression.² 
But what about the decision to open a discussion 
taken by a plenum of the Central Committee and 
Central Control Commission more than a month before 
the congress‹is that in your opinion preparation 
for the congress, or is it not? And what about the discussion 
in the Party units and other Party organisations 
that has been going on incessantly for three or four 
months already? And the discussion of the verbatim 
reports and decisions of the plenum that has been going 
on for the past six months, particularly the past three 
or four months, on all questions concerning home and 
foreign policy? What else can all this be called if not 
stimulating the activity of the Party membership drawing 
it into the discussion of the major questions of our 
policy, preparing the Party membership for the congress? 
Who is to blame if, in all this, the Party organisations 
do not support the opposition? Obviously, the 
opposition is to blame, for its line is one of utter bank

THE TROSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW 195 
ruptcy, its policy is that of a bloc with all the anti- 
Party elements, including the renegades Maslow and 
Souvarine, against the Party and the Comintern. 
Evidently, Zinoviev and Trotsky think that preparations 
for the congress ought to be made by organising 
illegal, anti-Party printing presses, by organising illegal, 
anti-Party meetings, by supplying false reports 
about our Party to the imperialists of all countries, by 
disorganising and splitting our Party. You will agree 
that this is a rather strange idea of what preparations 
for the Party congress mean. And when the Party takes 
resolute measures, including expulsion, against the disorganisers 
and splitters, the opposition raises a howl 
about repression. 
Yes, the Party resorts and will resort to repression 
against disorganisers and splitters, for the Party 
must not be split under any circumstances, either before 
the congress or during the congress. It would be suicidal 
for the Party to allow out-and-out splitters, the 
allies of all sorts of Shcherbakovs, to wreck the Party 
just because only a month remains before the congress. 
Comrade Lenin saw things in a different light. You 
know that in 1921 Lenin proposed that Shlyapnikov be 
expelled from the Central Committee and from the Party 
not for organising an anti-Party printing press, and 
not for allying himself with bourgeois intellectuals, but 
merely because, at a meeting of a Party unit, Shlyapnikov 
dared to criticise the decisions of the Supreme Council 
of National Economy. If you compare this attitude of 
Lenin¹s with what the Party is now doing to the opposition, 
you will realise what licence we have allowed the 
disorganisers and splitters.

J. V. S T A L I N 196
You surely must know that in 1917, just before the 
October uprising, Lenin several times proposed that 
Kamenev and Zinoviev be expelled from the Party merely 
because they had criticised unpublished Party decisions 
in the semi-socialist, in the semi-bourgeois newspaper 
Novaya Zhinn.48 But how many secret decisions of the 
Central Committee and the Central Control Commission 
are now being published by our opposition in the columns 
of Maslow¹s newspaper in Berlin, which is a bourgeois, 
anti-Soviet, counter-revolutionary newspaper! Yet we 
tolerate all this, tolerate it without end, and thereby give 
the splitters in the opposition the opportunity to wreck 
our Party. Such is the disgrace to which the opposition 
has brought us! But we cannot tolerate it forever, comrades. 
(Voices: ³Quite right!² Applause.) 
It is said that disorganisers who have been expelled 
from the Party and conduct anti-Soviet activities are 
being arrested. Yes, we arrest them, and we shall do so 
in future if they do not stop undermining the Party 
and the Soviet regime. (Voices: ³Quite right! Quite 
right!²) 
It is said that such things are unprecedented in the 
history of our Party. That is not true. What about the 
Myasnikov group?49 What about the ³Workers¹ Truth² 
group? Who does not know that the members of those 
groups were arrested with the full consent of Zinoviev, 
Trotsky and Kamenev? Why was it permissible three 
or four years ago to arrest disorganisers who had been expelled 
from the Party, but is impermissible now, when 
some of the former members of the Trotskyist opposition 
go to the length of directly linking up with counterrevolutionaries?

THE TROSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW 197 
You heard Comrade Menzhinsky¹s statement. In that 
statement it is said that a certain Stepanov (an armyman), 
a member of the Party, a supporter of the opposition, 
is in direct contact with counter-revolutionaries, 
with Novikov, Kostrov and others, which Stepanov 
himself does not deny in his depositions. What do you 
want us to do with this fellow, who is in the opposition 
to this day? Kiss him, or arrest him? Is it surprising 
that the OGPU arrests such fellows? (Voices from the 
audience: ³Quite right! Absolutely right!² Applause.) 
Lenin said that the Party can be completely wrecked 
if indulgence is shown to disorganisers and splitters. 
That is quite true. That is precisely why I think that 
it is high time to stop showing indulgence to the leaders 
of the opposition and to come to the conclusion that 
Trotsky and Zinoviev must be expelled from the Central 
Committee of our Party. (Voices: ³Quite right!²) 
That is the elementary conclusion and the elementary, 
minimum measure that must be taken in order to protect 
the Party from the disorganisers¹ splitting activities. 
At the last plenum of the Central Committee and 
Central Control Commission, held in August this year, 
some members of the plenum rebuked me for being too 
mild with Trotsky and Zinoviev, for advising the plenum 
against the immediate expulsion of Trotsky and 
Zinoviev from the Central Committee. (Voices from the 
audience: ³That¹s right, and we rebuke you now.²) Perhaps 
I was too kind then and made a mistake in proposing 
that a milder line be adopted towards Trotsky and 
Zinoviev. (Voices: ³Quite right!² Comrade Petrovsky: 
³Quite right. We shall always rebuke you for a rotten

J. V. S T A L I N 198 
Œpiece of string¹!²) But now, comrades, after what we 
have gone through during these three months, after the 
opposition has broken the promise to dissolve its faction 
that it made in its special ³declaration² of August 8, 
thereby deceiving the Party once again, after all this, 
there can be no more room at all for mildness. We must 
now step into the front rank with those comrades who 
are demanding that Trotsky and Zinoviev be expelled 
from the Central Committee. (Stormy applause. Voices: 
³Quite right! Quite right!² A voice from the audience: 
³Trotsky should be expelled from the Party.²) Let the 
congress decide that, comrades. 
In expelling Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Central 
Committee we must submit for the consideration of the 
Fifteenth Congress all the documents which have accumulated 
concerning the opposition¹s splitting activities, 
and on the basis of those documents the congress will be 
able to adopt an appropriate decision. 
VI 
FROM LENINISM TO TROTSKYISM 
The next question. In his speech Zinoviev touched 
upon the interesting question of ³mistakes² in the Party¹s 
line during the past two years and of the ³correctness² 
of the opposition¹s line. I should like to answer this 
briefly by clearing up the question of the bankruptcy 
of the opposition¹s line and the correctness of our Party¹s 
line during the past two years. But I am taking up too 
much of your attention, comrades. (Voices: ³Please go 
on!² The chairman: ³Anyone against?² Voices: ³Please 
go on!²)

THE TROSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW 199 
What is the main sin of the opposition, which determined 
the bankruptcy of its policy? Its main sin is 
that it tried, is trying, and will go on trying to embellish 
Leninism with Trotskyism and to replace Leninism 
by Trotskyism. There was a time when Kamenev and 
Zinoviev defended Leninism from Trotsky¹s attacks. At 
that time Trotsky himself was not so bold. That was 
one line. Later, however, Zinoviev and Kamenev, frightened 
by new difficulties, deserted to Trotsky¹s side, 
formed something in the nature of an inferior August 
bloc with him and thus became captives of Trotskyism. 
That was further confirmation of Lenin¹s earlier statement 
that the mistake Zinoviev and Kamenev made in 
October was not ³accidental.² From fighting for Leninism, 
Zinoviev and Kamenev went over to the line of fighting 
for Trotskyism. That is an entirely different line. And 
that indeed explains why Trotsky has now become bolder. 
What is the chief aim of the present united bloc 
headed by Trotsky? It is little by little to switch the 
Party from the Leninist course to that of Trotskyism. 
That is the opposition¹s main sin. But the Party wants 
to remain a Leninist party. Naturally, the Party turned 
its back on the opposition and raised the banner of Leninism 
ever higher and higher. That is why yesterday¹s 
leaders of the Party have now become renegades. 
The opposition thinks that its defeat can be ³explained² 
by the personal factor, by Stalin¹s rudeness, 
by the obstinacy of Bukharin and Rykov, and so forth. 
That is too cheap an explanation! It is an incantation, 
not an explanation. Trotsky has been fighting Leninism 
since 1904. From 1904 until the February Revolution in 
1917 he hung around the Mensheviks, desperately fighting

J. V. S T A L I N 200 
Lenin¹s Party all the time. During that period Trotsky 
suffered a number of defeats at the hand of Lenin¹s 
Party. Why? Perhaps Stalin¹s rudeness was to blame? 
But Stalin was not yet the secretary of the Central Committee 
at that time; he was not abroad, but in Russia, 
fighting tsarism underground, whereas the struggle between 
Trotsky and Lenin raged abroad. So what has 
Stalin¹s rudeness got to do with it? 
During the period from the October Revolution to 
1922, Trotsky, already a member of the Bolshevik Party, 
managed to make two ³grand² sorties against Lenin and 
his Party: in 1918‹on the question of the Brest Peace; 
and in 1921‹on the trade-union question. Both those 
sorties ended in Trotsky being defeated. Why? Perhaps 
Stalin¹s rudeness was to blame here? But at that time 
Stalin was not yet the secretary of the Central Committee. 
The secretarial posts were then occupied by notorious 
Trotskyists. So what has Stalin¹s rudeness got to do 
with it? 
Later, Trotsky made a number of fresh sorties against 
the Party (1923, 1924, 1926, 1927) and each sortie ended 
in Trotsky suffering a fresh defeat. 
Is it not obvious from all this that Trotsky¹s fight 
against the Leninist Party has deep, far-reaching historical 
roots? Is it not obvious from this that the struggle 
the Party is now waging against Trotskyism is a continuation 
of the struggle that the Party, headed by Lenin, 
waged from 1904 onwards? 
Is i t not obvious from all this that the attempts 
of the Trotskyists to replace Leninism by Trotskyism 
are the chief cause of the failure and bankruptcy of the 
entire line of the opposition?

THE TROSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW 201 
Our Party was born and grew up in the storm of revolutionary 
battles. It is not a party that grew up in a 
period of peaceful development. For that very reason it 
is rich in revolutionary traditions and does not make a 
fetish of its leaders. At one time Plekhanov was the 
most popular man in the Party. More than that, he was 
the founder of the Party, and his popularity was incomparably 
greater than that of Trotsky or Zinoviev. Nevertheless, 
in spite of that, the Party turned away from Plekhanov 
as soon as he began to depart from Marxism and 
go over to opportunism. Is it surprising, then, that people 
who are not so ³great,² people like Trotsky and Zinoviev, 
found themselves at the tail of the Party after they began 
to depart from Leninism? 
But the most striking indication of the opposition¹s 
opportunist degeneration, the most striking sign of the 
opposition¹s bankruptcy and fall, was its vote against 
the Manifesto of the Central Executive Committee of the 
U.S.S.R. The opposition is against the introduction of 
a seven-hour working day! The opposition is against 
the Manifesto of the Central Executive Committee of 
the U.S.S.R.! The entire working class of the U.S.S.R., 
the entire advanced section of the proletarians in all 
countries, enthusiastically welcome the Manifesto, unanimously 
applaud the idea of introducing a seven-hour 
working day‹but the opposition votes against the Manifesto 
and adds its voice to the general chorus of bourgeois 
and Menshevik ³critics,² it adds its voice to those of the 
slanderers on the staff of Vorwärts.50 
I did not think that the opposition could sink to 
such a disgrace.

J. V. S T A L I N 202 
VII 
SOME OF THE MOST IMPORTANT RESULTS 
OF THE PARTY¹S POLICY DURING THE 
PAST FEW YEARS 
Let us pass now to the question of our Party¹s line 
during the past two years; let us examine and appraise it. 
Zinoviev and Trotsky said that our Party¹s line 
has proved to be unsound. Let us turn to the facts. Let 
us take four principal questions of our policy and examine 
our Party¹s line during the past two years from 
the standpoint of these questions. I have in mind such 
decisive questions as that of the peasantry, that of 
industry and its re-equipment, that of peace, and, lastly, 
that of the growth of the communist elements throughout 
the world. 
The question of the peasantry. What was the situation 
in our country two or three years ago? You know 
that the situation in the countryside was a serious one. 
Our Volost Executive Committee chairmen, and officials 
in the countryside generally, were not always recognised 
and were often the victims of terrorism. Village correspondents 
were met with sawn-off rifles. Here and 
there, especially in the border regions, there were bandit 
activities; and in a country like Georgia there were 
even revolts.51 Naturally, in such a situation the kulaks 
gained strength, the middle peasants rallied round the 
kulaks, and the poor peasants became disunited. The situation 
in the country was aggravated particularly by the fact 
that the productive forces in the countryside grew very 
slowly, part of the arable land remained quite untilled, 
and the crop area was about 70 to 75 per cent of the pre

THE TROSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW 203 
war area. This was in the period before the Fourteenth 
Conference of our Party. 
At the Fourteenth Conference the Party adopted a 
number of measures in the shape of certain concessions 
to the middle peasants designed to accelerate the progress 
of peasant economy, increase the output of agricultural 
produce‹food and raw materials, establish a stable alliance 
with the middle peasants, and hasten the isolation 
of the kulaks. At the Fourteenth Congress of our Party, 
the opposition, headed by Zinoviev and Kamenev, tried 
to disrupt this policy of the Party and proposed that we 
adopt instead what was, in essence, the policy of dekulakisation, 
a policy of restoring the Poor Peasants¹ 
Committees. In essence, that was a policy of reverting 
to civil war in the countryside. The Party repulsed this 
attack of the opposition; it endorsed the decisions of 
the Fourteenth Conference, approved the policy of revitalising 
the Soviets in the countryside and advanced 
the slogan of industrialisation as the main slogan of socialist 
construction. The Party steadfastly kept to the 
line of establishing a stable alliance with the middle 
peasants and of isolating the kulaks. 
What did the Party achieve by this? 
What it achieved was that peace was established in 
the countryside, relations with the main mass of the 
peasantry were improved, conditions were created for 
organising the poor peasants into an independent political 
force, the kulaks were still further isolated and the 
state and co-operative bodies gradually extended their activities 
to the individual farms of millions of peasants. 
What does peace in the countryside mean? It is 
one of the fundamental conditions for the building of

J. V. S T A L I N 204 
socialism. We cannot build socialism if we have bandit 
activities and peasant revolts. The crop area has now 
been brought up to pre-war dimensions (95 per cent), 
we have peace in the countryside, an alliance with the 
middle peasants, a more or less organised poor peasantry, 
strengthened rural Soviets and the enhanced prestige of 
the proletariat and its Party in the countryside. 
We have thus created the conditions that enable us 
to push forward the offensive against the capitalist elements 
in the countryside and to ensure further success 
in the building of socialism in our country. 
Such are the results of our Party¹s policy in the 
countryside during the two years. 
Thus, i t follows that our Party¹s policy on the 
major question of the relations between the proletariat 
and the peasantry has proved to be correct. 
The question of industry. History tells us that so 
far not a single young state in the world has developed 
its industry, and its heavy industry in particular, without 
outside assistance, without foreign loans, or without 
plundering other countries, colonies, and so forth. 
That is the ordinary path of capitalist industrialisation. 
Britain developed her industry in the past by draining 
the vital sap from all countries, from all colonies, for 
hundreds of years and investing the loot in her industry. 
Germany has begun to rise lately because she has received 
loans from America amounting to several thousand 
million rubles. 
We, however, cannot proceed by any of these paths. 
Colonial plunder is precluded by our entire policy. 
And we are not granted loans. Only one path is left to us, 
the path indicated by Lenin, namely: to raise our indus

THE TROSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW 205 
try, to re-equip our industry on the basis of internal 
accumulations. The opposition has been croaking all the 
time about internal accumulations not being sufficient 
for the re-equipment of our industry. As far back as 
April 1926, the opposition asserted at a plenum of the 
Central Committee that our internal accumulations 
would not suffice for making headway with the reequipment 
of our industry. At that time the opposition 
predicted that we would suffer failure after failure. 
Nevertheless, on making a check it has turned out 
that we have succeeded in making headway with the reequipment 
of our industry during these two years. It 
is a fact that during the two years we have managed to 
invest over two thousand million rubles in our industry. 
It is a fact that these investments have proved to be 
sufficient to make further headway with the re-equipment 
of our industry and the industrialisation of the 
country. We have achieved what no other state in the 
world has yet achieved: we have raised our industry, 
we have begun to re-equip it, we have made headway in 
this matter on the basis of our own accumulations. 
There you have the results of our policy on the question 
of the re-equipment of our industry. 
Only the blind can deny the fact that our Party¹s 
policy in this matter has proved to be correct. 
The question of foreign policy. The aim of our foreign 
policy, if one has in mind diplomatic relations with 
bourgeois states, is to maintain peace. What have we 
achieved in this sphere? What we have achieved is that 
we have upheld‹well or ill, nevertheless we have upheld‹
peace. What we have achieved is that, in spite 
of the capitalist encirclement, in spite of the hostile

J. V. S T A L I N 206 
activities of the capitalist governments, in spite of 
the provocative sorties in Peking,52 London53 and 
Paris54‹in spite of all this, we have not allowed ourselves 
to be provoked and have succeeded in defending 
the cause of peace. 
We are not at war in spite of the repeated prophecies 
of Zinoviev and others‹that is the fundamental fact 
in face of which all the hysterics of our opposition are 
of no avail. And this is important for us, because only 
under peace conditions can we promote the building 
of socialism in our country at the rate that we desire. 
Yet how many prophecies of war there have been! Zinoviev 
prophesied that we should be at war in the spring 
of this year. Later he prophesied that in all probability 
war would break out in the autumn of this year. Nevertheless, 
we are already facing the winter, but still there 
is no war. 
Such are the results of our peace policy. 
Only the blind can fail to see these results. 
Lastly, the fourth question‹that of the state of 
the communist forces throughout the world. Only the 
blind can deny that the Communist Parties are growing 
throughout the world, from China to America, from Britain 
to Germany. Only the blind can deny that the elements 
of the crisis of capitalism are growing and not 
diminishing. Only the blind can deny that the progress 
in the building of socialism in our country, the successes 
of our policy within the country, are one of the chief 
reasons for the growth of the communist movement 
throughout the world. Only the blind can deny the progressive 
increase in influence and prestige of the Communist 
International in all countries of the world.

THE TROSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW 207 
Such are the results of our Party¹s line on the four 
principal questions of home and foreign policy during 
the past two years. 
What does the correctness of our Party¹s policy signify? 
Apart from everything else, it can signify only 
one thing: the utter bankruptcy of the policy of our 
opposition. 
VIII 
BACK TO AXELROD 
That is all very well, we may be told. The opposition¹s 
line is wrong, it is an anti-Party line. Its tactics 
cannot be called anything else than splitting tactics. 
The expulsion of Zinoviev and Trotsky is therefore the 
natural way out of the situation that has arisen. All that 
is true. 
But there was a time when we all said that the leaders 
of the opposition must be kept in the Central Committee, 
that they should not be expelled. Why this change 
now? How is this turn to be explained? And is there 
a turn at all? 
Yes, there is. How is it to be explained? It is due to 
the radical change that has taken place in the fundamental 
policy and organisational ³scheme² of the leaders 
of the opposition. The leaders of the opposition, and 
primarily Trotsky, have changed for the worse. Naturally, 
this was bound to cause a change in the Party¹s policy 
towards these oppositionists. 
Let us take, for example, such an important question 
of principle as that of the degeneration of our Party. 
What is meant by the degeneration of our Party? It

J. V. S T A L I N 208 
means denying the existence of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat in the U.S.S.R. What was Trotsky¹s position 
in this matter, say, about three years ago? You know that 
at that time the liberals and Mensheviks, the Smena- 
Vekhists55 and a l l kinds of renegades kept on reiterating 
that the degeneration of our Party was inevitable. 
You know that at that time they quoted examples 
from the French revolution and asserted that the Bolsheviks 
were bound to suffer the same collapse as the Jacobins 
in their day suffered in France. You know that historical 
analogies with the French revolution (the downfall 
of the Jacobins) were then and are today the chief 
argument advanced by all the various Mensheviks and 
Smena-Vekhists against the maintenance of the proletarian 
dictatorship and the possibility of building socialism 
in our country. 
What was Trotsky¹s attitude towards this three 
years ago? He was certainly opposed to the drawing of such 
analogies. Here is what he wrote at that time in his 
pamphlet The New Course (1924): 
³The historical analogies with the Great French Revolution 
(the downfall of the Jacobins!) which liberalism and Menshevism 
utilise and console themselves with are superficial and unsound²* 
(see The New Course, p. 33) 
Clear and definite! It would be difficult, I think, 
to express oneself more emphatically and definitely. 
Was Trotsky right in what he then said about the historical 
analogies with the French revolution that were 
being zealously advanced by all sorts of Smena-Vekhists 
and Mensheviks? Absolutely right. 
* My italics.‹J. St.

THE TROSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW 209 
But now? Does Trotsky still adopt that position? 
Unfortunately, he does not. On the contrary even. During 
these three years Trotsky has managed to evolve in 
the direction of ³Menshevism² and ³liberalism.² Now 
he himself asserts that drawing historical analogies with 
the French revolution is a sign not of Menshevism, but 
of ³real,² ³genuine² ³Leninism.² Have you read the 
verbatim report of the meeting of the Presidium of the 
Central Control Commission held in July this year? 
If you have, you will easily understand that in his struggle 
against the Party Trotsky is now basing himself on 
the Menshevik theories about the degeneration of our 
Party on the lines of the downfall of the Jacobins in 
the period of the French revolution. Today, Trotsky 
thinks that twaddle about ³Thermidor² is a sign of 
good taste. 
From Trotskyism to ³Menshevism² and ³liberalism² 
in the fundamental question of degeneration‹such is 
the path that the Trotskyists have travelled during the 
past three years. 
The Trotskyists have changed. The Party¹s policy 
towards the Trotskyists has also had to change. 
Let us now take a no less important question, such 
as that of organisation, of Party discipline, of the submission 
of the minority to the majority, of the role 
played by iron Party discipline in strengthening 
the dictatorship of the proletariat. Everybody knows 
that iron discipline in our Party is one of the fundamental 
conditions for maintaining the dictatorship of 
the proletariat and for success in building socialism in 
our country. Everybody knows that the first thing the 
Mensheviks in all countries try to do is to undermine the

J. V. S T A L I N 210 
iron discipline in our Party. There was a time when 
Trotsky understood and appreciated the importance of 
iron discipline in our Party. Properly speaking, the disagreements 
between our Party and Trotsky never ceased, 
but Trotsky and the Trotskyists were clever enough to 
submit to the decisions of our Party. Everybody is aware 
of Trotsky¹s repeated statement that, no matter what our 
Party might be, he was ready to ³stand to attention² 
whenever the Party ordered. And it must be said that 
often the Trotskyists succeeded in remaining loyal to 
the Party and to its leading bodies. 
But now? Can it be said that the Trotskyists, the 
present opposition, are ready to submit to the Party¹s 
decisions, to stand to attention, and so forth? No. That 
cannot be said any longer. After they have twice broken 
their promise to submit to the Party¹s decisions, after 
they have twice deceived the Party, after they have 
organised illegal printing presses in conjunction with 
bourgeois intellectuals, after the repeated statements of 
Zinoviev and Trotsky made from this very rostrum that 
they were violating the discipline of our Party and would 
continue to do so‹after all that it is doubtful whether 
a single person will be found in our Party who would 
dare to believe that the leaders of the opposition are ready 
to stand to attention before the Party. The opposition 
has now shifted to a new line, the line of splitting the 
Party, the line of creating a new party. The most 
popular pamphlet among the oppositionists at the 
present time is not Lenin¹s Bolshevik pamphlet One 
Step Forward, Two Steps Back, 56 but Trotsky¹s old 
Menshevik pamphlet Our Political Tasks (published in 
1904), written in opposition to the organisational prin

THE TROSKYIST OPPOSITION BEFORE AND NOW 211 
ciples of Leninism, in opposition to Lenin¹s pamphlet 
One Step Forward, Two Steps Back. 
You know that the essence of that old pamphlet of 
Trotsky¹s is repudiation of the Leninist conception of the 
Party and of Party discipline. In that pamphlet Trotsky 
never calls Lenin anything but ³Maximilien Lenin,² 
hinting that Lenin was another Maximilien Robespierre, 
striving, like the latter, for personal dictatorship. In that 
pamphlet Trotsky plainly says that Party discipline need 
be submitted to only to the degree that Party decisions 
do not contradict the wishes and views of those who are 
called upon to submit to the Party. That is a purely 
Menshevik principle of organisation. Incidentally that 
pamphlet is interesting because Trotsky dedicates it to 
the Menshevik P. Axelrod. That is what he says: ³To 
my dear teacher Pavel Borisovich Axelrod.² (Laughter. 
Voices: ³An out-and-out Menshevik!²) 
From loyalty to the Party to the policy of splitting 
the Party, from Lenin¹s pamphlet One Step Forward, 
Two Steps Back to Trotsky¹s pamphlet Our Political 
Tasks, from Lenin to Axelrod‹such is the organisational 
path that our opposition has travelled. 
The Trotskyists have changed. The Party¹s organisational 
policy towards the Trotskyist opposition has also 
had to change. 
Well, a good riddance! Go to your ³dear teacher Pavel 
Borisovich Axelrod²! A good riddance! Only make haste, 
most worthy Trotsky, for, in view of his senility, ³Pavel 
Borisovich² may die soon, and you may not reach your 
³teacher² in time. (Prolonged applause.) 
Pravda, No. 251, 
November 2, 1927

INTERVIEW 
WITH FOREIGN WORKERS¹ DELEGTIONS 
November 5, 1927 
Stalin: Comrades, yesterday I received an unsigned 
list of questions in German. This morning I received 
two other lists, one from the French delegation and another 
from the Danish delegation. Let us begin with the 
first list of questions, although I do not know which delegation 
it comes from. Then we can take the other two 
lists. If you have no objection, let us begin. (The delegates 
agree.) 
FIRST QUESTION. Why does the U.S.S.R. not 
take part in the League of Nations? 
ANSWER: The reasons why the Soviet Union does 
not take part in the League of Nations have been repeatedly 
given in our press. I can point out some of these 
reasons. 
The Soviet Union is not a member of the League of 
Nations and does not take part in the League of Nations, 
firstly, because it does not want to take responsibility 
for the imperialist policy of the League of Nations, for 
Eighty delegates were present from Germany 
France, Austria, Czechoslovakia, South 
America, China, Belgium, Finland, Denmark 
and Estonia. The interview lasted six hours.

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS¹ DELEGATIONS 213 
the ³mandates² which are handed out by the League of 
Nations for the exploitation and oppression of colonial 
countries. The Soviet Union does not take part in the 
League of Nations because it is opposed to imperialism, 
opposed to the oppression of the colonies and dependent 
countries. 
The Soviet Union does not take part in the League 
of Nations, secondly, because it does not want to take 
responsibility for the war preparations, for the growth 
of armaments, for the new military alliances, and so 
forth, which the League of Nations screens and sanctifies, 
and which are bound to lead to new imperialist 
wars. The Soviet Union does not take part in the League 
of Nations because it is wholly and completely opposed 
to imperialist wars. 
Finally, the Soviet Union does not take part in the 
League of Nations because it does not want to be a component 
part of the screen, in the shape of the League of 
Nations, for imperialist machinations, which the League 
covers up by the unctuous speeches of its members. 
Under present conditions the League of Nations is 
a ³house of assignation² for the imperialist bosses who 
transact their nefarious business behind the scenes. 
What is said officially in the League of Nations is mere 
talk, designed to deceive the people. But what is done 
unofficially by the imperialist bosses behind the scenes 
in the League of Nations is real imperialist action, hypocritically 
covered up by the grandiloquent orators of 
the League of Nations. 
Is it surprising, then, that the Soviet Union does 
not want to be a member of, and participant in, this 
anti-popular farce?

J. V. S T A L I N 214 
SECOND QUESTION. Why is a Social-Democratic 
party not allowed in the Soviet Union? 
ANSWER: A Social-Democratic party (that i s , a 
Menshevik party) is not allowed in the Soviet Union 
for the same reason that counter-revolutionaries are not 
allowed here. Perhaps this may surprise you, but there 
is nothing surprising about it. 
The conditions under which our country developed, 
the history of its development, are such that, whereas 
under the tsarist regime Social-Democracy was a more or 
less revolutionary party, after the overthrow of tsarism, 
under Kerensky, it became a government party, a bourgeois 
party, a party standing for imperialist war, and 
after the October Revolution it became a party of open 
counter-revolution, a party standing for the restoration 
of capitalism. 
You must surely be aware that the Social-Democrats 
in our country took part in the Civil War on the side 
of Kolchak and Denikin, against Soviet power. At 
the present time that party stands for the restoration 
of capitalism, the liquidation of the Soviet system. 
I think that this evolution of Social-Democracy is 
typical of it not only in the U.S.S.R., but also in other 
countries. In our country Social-Democracy was more or 
less revolutionary so long as the tsarist regime existed. 
That, in fact, explains why we Bolsheviks, together with 
the Mensheviks, that is, the Social-Democrats, formed one 
party. Social-Democracy becomes a bourgeois party, of 
the opposition or of the government, when the so-called 
democratic bourgeoisie comes into power. Social-Democ

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS¹ DELEGATIONS 215 
racy turns into a party of open counter-revolution when 
the revolutionary proletariat comes into power. 
A delegate: Does that mean that Social-Democracy is 
a counter-revolutionary force only here, in the Soviet 
Union, or can it be described as a counter-revolutionary 
force in other countries too? 
Stalin: I have already said that there is some difference 
here. 
In the land of the proletarian dictatorship, Social- 
Democracy is a counter-revolutionary force striving for 
the restoration of capitalism and for the liquidation of 
the proletarian dictatorship in the name of bourgeois 
³democracy.² 
In the capitalist countries, where the proletariat 
is not yet in power, Social-Democracy is either an opposition 
party in relation to capitalist rule, or a semigovernment 
party in alliance with the liberal bourgeoisie 
against the most reactionary forces of capitalism and 
also against the revolutionary working-class movement, 
or else an out-and-out government party directly and 
openly defending capitalism and bourgeois ³democracy² 
against the revolutionary proletarian movement. 
It becomes out-and-out counter-revolutionary, and 
its counter-revolutionary activities are directed against 
the proletarian regime, only when the latter has become 
a reality. 
THIRD QUESTION. Why is there no freedom of the 
press in the U.S.S.R.? 
ANSWER: What freedom of the press do you mean? 
Freedom of the press for which class‹the bourgeoisie or 
the proletariat? If you mean freedom of the press for the

J. V. S T A L I N 216 
bourgeoisie, then it does not and will not exist here 
while the proletarian dictatorship exists. But if you 
mean freedom for the proletariat, then I must say that 
you will not find another country in the world where 
freedom of the press for the proletariat is as wide and 
complete as it is in the U.S.S.R. 
Freedom of the press for the proletariat is not a 
mere phrase. If the best printing plants and the best 
press clubs are not available, if there are no openlyfunctioning 
working-class organisations, ranging from 
the narrowest to the widest, that embrace millions of 
workers, if there is not the widest freedom of assembly, 
there can be no freedom of the press. 
Examine the conditions of life in the U.S.S.R., go 
into the workers¹ districts; you will find that the best 
printing plants, the best press clubs, entire paper mills, 
entire ink and colour factories needed by the press, palatial 
meeting halls, all these and many other things 
that are needed for working-class freedom of the press 
are wholly and completely at the disposal of the working 
class and the masses of the working people. That is what 
we call freedom of the press for the working class. We 
have no freedom of the press for the bourgeoisie. 
We have no freedom of the press for the Mensheviks 
and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who in our country stand 
for the interests of the defeated and overthrown bourgeoisie. 
But is that surprising? We never pledged ourselves 
to grant freedom of the press to all classes, to make 
all classes happy. When taking power in October 1917, 
the Bolsheviks openly declared that this meant the 
power of one class, the power of the proletariat, which 
would suppress the bourgeoisie in the interests of the

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS¹ DELEGATIONS 217 
labouring masses of town and country, who form the overwhelming 
majority of the population of the U.S.S.R. 
How, after this, can the proletarian dictatorship 
be required to grant freedom of the press to the bourgeoisie? 
FOURTH QUESTION. Why are the imprisoned 
Mensheviks not released? 
ANSWER: Evidently this refers to the active Mensheviks. 
Yes, it is true, the active Mensheviks in our 
country are not released from prison until their sentences 
expire. But is that surprising? 
Why were not the Bolsheviks, for example, released 
from prison in July, August, September and October 
1917, when the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries 
were in power? 
Why was Lenin compelled to hide underground from 
July to October 1917, when the Mensheviks and Socialist- 
Revolutionaries were in power? How can you explain the 
fact that the great Lenin, whose name is the banner 
of the proletarians of all countries, was compelled to go 
into hiding from July to October 1917, in Finland, far 
away from the ³democratic republic² of Kerensky and 
Tsereteli, Chernov and Dan, and that Pravda, the organ 
of Lenin¹s Party, was wrecked by the bourgeois authorities 
in spite of the fact that prominent Mensheviks, 
active leaders of the Second International, were then at 
the head of the government? 
Obviously, all this is to be explained by the fact 
that the struggle between bourgeois counter-revolution 
and proletarian revolution is bound to lead to a certain 
amount of repression. I have already said that in our

J. V. S T A L I N 218 
country Social-Democracy is a counter-revolutionary 
party. But from this it follows that the proletarian revolution 
cannot avoid arresting the leaders of that counter-
revolutionary party. 
But this is not all. From this it follows also that 
the arrest of Mensheviks in our country is a continuation 
of the policy of the October Revolution. In point of 
fact, what is the October Revolution? The October 
Revolution is primarily the overthrow of the rule of 
the bourgeoisie. All more or less class-conscious workers 
of all countries now admit that the Bolsheviks were 
right in overthrowing bourgeois rule in October 1917. 
I have no doubt that you are of the same opinion. But 
the question is: whom did the proletariat actually overthrow 
in 1917? History tells us, the facts tell us, that in 
October 1917 the proletariat overthrew the Mensheviks 
and Socialist-Revolutionaries, for it was the Mensheviks 
and Socialist-Revolutionaries, Kerensky and Chernov, 
Gotz and Lieber, Dan and Tsereteli, Abramovich and 
Avksentiev, who were in power at that time. And what 
are the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary parties? 
They are parties of the Second International. 
I t follows, therefore, that in accomplishing the 
October Revolution the proletariat of the U.S.S.R. overthrew 
parties of the Second International. This may 
be unpleasant for some Social-Democrats, but it is an 
undeniable fact, comrades, and it would be absurd to 
dispute it. 
Hence, it follows that in a proletarian revolution 
it is possible and necessary to overthrow the rule of the 
Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries so that the 
rule of the proletariat may triumph.

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS¹ DELEGATIONS 219 
But if they may be overthrown, why cannot they be 
arrested when they openly and definitely go over to the 
camp of bourgeois counter-revolution? Do you think that 
overthrowing the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries 
is a milder measure than arresting them? 
The policy of the October Revolution cannot be regarded 
as correct without also regarding the inevitable 
results of that policy as correct. One thing or the other: 
either the October Revolution was a mistake‹in 
which case the arrest of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries 
is also a mistake; 
or the October Revolution was not a mistake‹in 
which case the arrest of Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries 
who have taken the path of counter-revolution 
cannot be regarded as a mistake. 
Logic demands this. 
FIFTH QUESTION. Why was the correspondent of 
the Social-Democratic Press Bureau refused permission 
to enter the U.S.S.R.? 
ANSWER: Because the Social-Democratic press 
abroad, and Vorwärts in particular, has outdone even a 
number of bourgeois newspapers in its monstrous slandering 
of the U.S.S.R. and its representatives. 
Because a number of bourgeois newspapers, like 
Vossische Zeitung,57 behave far more ³impartially² and 
³decently² than Vorwärts in their struggle against the 
U.S.S.R. This may seem ³strange,² but i t is a fact 
that cannot be ignored. If Vorwärts could behave not 
worse than some bourgeois newspapers, its representatives 
would most likely have a place in the U.S.S.R. 
among the representatives of other bourgeois newspapers.

J. V. S T A L I N 220
A few days ago a Vorwärts representative asked a 
member of our Embassy staff in Berlin what conditions 
had to be complied with to enable a Vorwärts representative 
to receive the right to enter the U.S.S.R. In reply, 
he was told: ³When Vorwärts proves by deeds that it is 
prepared to behave towards the U.S.S.R. and its representatives 
not worse than a Œrespectable¹ liberal newspaper 
like Vossische Zeitung, the Soviet Government will 
have no objection to permitting a Vorwärts correspondent 
to enter the U.S.S.R.² 
I think that the answer is quite understandable. 
SIXTH QUESTION. Is it possible to unite the Second 
and Third Internationals? 
ANSWER: I think it is impossible. 
It is impossible because the Second and Third Internationals 
have two entirely different lines of policy and 
look in different directions. Whereas the Third International 
looks in the direction of the overthrow of capitalism 
and the establishment of the proletarian dictatorship, 
the Second International, on the contrary, looks in the 
direction of the preservation of capitalism and of the 
destruction of everything that is needed for the establishment 
of the proletarian dictatorship. 
The struggle between the two Internationals is the 
ideological reflection of the struggle between the supporters 
of capitalism and the supporters of socialism. 
In this struggle, either the Second or the Third International 
must be victorious. There are no reasons for doubting 
that the Third International will be victorious in 
the working-class movement.

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS¹ DELEGATIONS 221 
I think that it is impossible to unite them at the 
present time. 
SEVENTH QUESTION. How do you estimate the 
situation in Western Europe? Are revolutionary events 
to be expected within the next few years? 
ANSWER: I think that elements of a profound crisis 
of capitalism are growing and will continue to grow in 
Europe. Capitalism may become partly stabilised, it may 
rationalise its production, it may temporarily hold down 
the working class‹capitalism is still able to do all 
that, but it will never recover the ³stability² and ³equilibrium² 
that it possessed before the world war and the 
October Revolution. It will never recover that ³stability² 
and ³equilibrium.² 
That this is true is evident if only from the fact that 
every now and again the flames of revolution break 
out in the European countries and also in the colonies, 
which are the source of life of European capitalism. 
One day the flames of revolution break out in Austria, 
next day in Britain, the day after that somewhere in 
France or Germany, and then in China, Indonesia, 
India, and so forth. 
But what are Europe and the colonies? They are the 
centre and periphery of capitalism. There is ³unrest² 
in the centres of European capitalism. There is still 
greater ³unrest² in its periphery. The conditions for 
new revolutionary events are maturing. I think that the 
clearest indication of the growing crisis of capitalism, 
and the clearest manifestation of the mounting discontent 
and anger of the working class, are the events connected 
with the murder of Sacco and Vanzetti.58

J. V. S T A L I N 222 
What is the murder of two working men for the capitalist 
mincing-machine? Have not scores and hundreds 
of workers been killed up till now every week, every day? 
But the murder of two workers, Sacco and Vanzetti, was 
enough to set the working class all over the world 
in motion. What does that show? It shows that things 
are getting hotter and hotter for capitalism. It shows 
that the conditions for new revolutionary events are maturing. 
The fact that the capitalists may succeed in sweeping 
back the first wave of the revolutionary outbreak 
cannot by any means serve as a consolation for capitalism. 
The revolution against capitalism cannot advance in one 
solid and unbroken wave. It always grows in the course 
of flows and ebbs. It was so in Russia. It will be so in 
Europe. We are on the threshold of new revolutionary 
events. 
EIGHTH QUESTION. Is the opposition in the Russian 
Party strong? On what circles does it rely? 
ANSWER: I think that it is very weak. More than 
that, its forces are almost insignificant in our Party. 
Here I have today¹s newspaper. It contains a survey of 
the last few days¹ discussions. The figures show that 
over 135,000 members of the Party voted for the Central 
Committee and its theses, and 1,200 voted for the opposition. 
That is even less than one per cent. 
I think that further voting will show even more 
ignominious results for the opposition. Our discussion will 
continue right up to the congress. During this period we 
shall, if possible, canvass the opinion of the whole Party. 
I do not know how discussions are conducted in the

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS¹ DELEGATIONS 223 
Social-Democratic parties in your countries. I do not 
know whether discussions are conducted at all in the 
Social-Democratic parties. We consider that a discussion 
is a serious matter. We shall canvass the opinion of 
the whole Party and you will see that the relative importance 
of the opposition in our Party will prove to be 
even more insignificant than is shown by the figures I 
have just read out. It is quite likely that at the Fifteenth 
Congress of our Party the opposition will not have a single 
representative, not a single delegate. 
Let us take, for example, such huge plants as the 
Treugolnik Factory, or the Putilov Works in Leningrad. 
The number of workers at the Treugolnik Factory is 
about 15,000. The number of Party members is 2,122. 
The opposition received thirty-nine votes. The number 
of workers at the Putilov Works is about 11,000. The 
number of Party members is 1,718. The opposition received 
twenty-nine votes. 
On what circles does the opposition rely? I think 
that the opposition relies primarily on non-proletarian 
circles. If you were to ask the non-proletarian strata of 
the population, those who are dissatisfied with the 
regime of the proletarian dictatorship, whom they sympathise 
with, they would unhesitatingly answer that they 
sympathise with the opposition. Why? Because, in essence, 
the struggle that the opposition is waging is a 
struggle against the Party, a struggle against the regime 
of the proletarian dictatorship, with which certain nonproletarian 
sections cannot help being dissatisfied. The 
opposition reflects the discontent of the non-proletarian 
sections of the population, it reflects their pressure upon 
the proletarian dictatorship.

J. V. S T A L I N 224 
NINTH QUESTION. Is there any truth in the assertion, 
circulated in Germany by Ruth Fischer and Maslow, 
that the present leaders of the Comintern and of the Russian 
Party are betraying the workers to the counter-revolution? 
ANSWER: We must assume that it is true. We must 
assume that the Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.) are 
betraying the working class of the U.S.S.R. wholesale 
to the counter-revolutionaries of all countries. 
More than that. I can inform you that the Comintern 
and the C.P.S.U.(B.) recently decided to bring 
back to the U.S.S.R. all the landlords and capitalists 
who have been driven out of the country and to restore 
their factories to them. 
Nor is that all. The Comintern and the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
have gone even further and have decided that the time 
has come for the Bolsheviks to become cannibals. 
Finally, we have decided to nationalise all women 
and to make it a practice to violate our own sisters. 
(General laughter. Several delegates: ³Who could have 
asked such a question?²) 
I see that you are laughing. Perhaps some of you 
will think that I am not treating the question seriously. 
Of course, comrades, such questions cannot be treated 
seriously. I think that such questions can be answered 
only by ridicule. (Stormy applause.) 
TENTH QUESTION. What is your attitude towards 
the opposition and to the Ruth Fischer-Maslow trend in 
Germany? 
ANSWER: My attitude towards the opposition and 
its agency in Germany is the same as the attitude of the

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS¹ DELEGATIONS 225 
well-known French novelist, Alphonse Daudet, towards 
Tartarin of Tarascon. (Signs of lively amusement among 
the delegates.) 
You have no doubt read Alphonse Daudet¹s famous 
novel about Tartarin of Tarascon. Tartarin, the hero 
of the book, was just an ordinary ³good² petty bourgeois. 
But he had such a wild imagination and such a capacity 
for ³good-natured lying² that in the end he fell victim 
to these extraordinary abilities. 
Tartarin boasted to everybody that he had killed 
an incalculable number of lions and tigers in the Atlas 
Mountains. His credulous friends therefore hailed him 
as the greatest lion-hunter in the world. But Alphonse 
Daudet certainly knew, as Tartarin himself certainly 
knew, that Tartarin had never seen a lion or a tiger in 
his life. 
Tartarin boasted to everybody that he had climbed 
Mont Blanc. His credulous friends therefore hailed him 
as the greatest mountain-climber in the world. But Alphonse 
Daudet certainly knew that Tartarin had never 
seen the top of Mont Blanc, for he had only roamed about 
the foot of it. 
Tartarin boasted to everybody that he had founded 
a great colony in a country remote from France. His 
credulous friends therefore hailed him as the greatest 
coloniser in the world. But Alphonse Daudet certainly 
knew, as Tartarin himself had to admit, that the figments 
of Tartarin¹s imagination could only lead to his discomfiture. 
You know what discomfiture and disgrace for the 
Tartarinites resulted from Tartarin¹s fantastic boasting.

J. V. S T A L I N 226 
I think that the boastful clamour that the leaders 
of the opposition have raised in Moscow and Berlin will 
end in similar discomfiture and disgrace for the opposition. 
(General laughter.) 
Thus, we have exhausted the first list of questions. 
Let us now pass on to the questions of the French 
delegation. 
FIRST QUESTION. How does the Government of 
the U.S.S.R. propose to combat the foreign oil firms? 
ANSWER: I think that the question is wrongly put. 
As it stands, one might think that the Soviet oil industry 
has set out to attack the oil firms of other countries 
and is seeking to knock them out and liquidate them. 
Is that how matters actually stand? No, it is not. 
In actual fact, the situation is that certain oil firms 
in capitalist countries are striving to strangle the Soviet 
oil industry, and so the latter is compelled to defend 
itself in order to be able to exist and develop. 
The fact of the matter is that the Soviet oil industry 
is weaker than the oil industry of the capitalist countries 
both as regards output‹our output is less than theirs 
‹and as regards connections with the market‹they have 
better connection with the world market than we have. 
How does the Soviet oil industry defend itself? 
It defends itself by improving the quality of its products 
and, above all, by reducing the price of oil, by 
putting cheap oil on the market, cheaper than the oil of 
the capitalist firms. 
It may be asked: Are the Soviets so well off that 
they can afford to sell cheaper than the extremely rich 
capitalist firms? Of course, Soviet industry is not richer

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS¹ DELEGATIONS 227 
than the capitalist firms. On the contrary, the capitalist 
firms are much richer than Soviet industry. But it is 
not a matter of being rich. The point is that the Soviet 
oil industry is not a capitalist industry and, therefore, 
does not need enormous super-profits, whereas capitalist 
oil firms cannot do without colossal super-profits. 
And precisely because the Soviet oil industry does not 
need super-profits, it can sell its products cheaper than 
the capitalist firms. 
The same can be said about Soviet grain, Soviet 
timber, and so forth. 
In general, it must be said that Soviet commodities, 
and especially Soviet oil, are a price-reducing 
factor in the international market and, therefore, one 
that helps to improve the conditions of the mass of consumers. 
Herein lies the strength of the Soviet oil industry 
and its means of defence against the attacks of the capitalist 
oil firms. It also explains why the oil owners of 
all countries, and Deterding in particular, are howling 
at the top of their voices against the Soviets and the 
Soviet oil industry, covering up their policy of high oil 
prices and of robbing the mass of consumers with fashionable 
talk about ³communist propaganda.² 
SECOND QUESTION. How do you intend to achieve 
collectivism in the peasant question? 
ANSWER: We intend to achieve collectivism in 
agriculture gradually, by economic, financial, and educational 
and political measures. 
I think that the most interesting question is that of 
economic measures. The measures we are taking in 
this sphere run along three lines:

J. V. S T A L I N 228 
the line of organising the individual peasant farms 
on a co-operative basis; 
the line of organising peasant farms, mainly the 
farms of poor peasants, in producers¹ co-operatives, and 
finally, 
the line of bringing the peasant farms within the 
sphere of operation of the planning and regulating bodies 
of the state both as regards the marketing of peasant 
produce and as regards supplying the peasants with 
necessary articles produced by our industry. 
A few years ago the situation was that between 
industry and peasant economy there were numerous 
middlemen, private traders, who supplied the peasants 
with urban manufactures and sold the peasants¹ grain 
to the workers. Naturally, these middlemen did not 
³work² for nothing; they squeezed tens of millions of 
rubles both out of the peasants and out of the urban population. 
That was the period when the link between town 
and country, between socialist industry and the individual 
peasant farms, had not yet been firmly established. 
At that time the role played by the co-operatives and the 
state distributive bodies was relatively insignificant. 
A radical change has taken place since then. At 
present, the role played by the co-operatives and state 
trading bodies in trade between town and country, between 
industry and peasant economy, may be regarded 
not merely as a predominant, but as a supreme, if not 
monopolistic, one. The co-operatives and state bodies 
handle over 70 per cent of the textiles supplied to the 
countryside. As for agricultural machinery, the co-operatives 
and state bodies supply nearly 100 per cent. 
The share of the co-operatives and state bodies in pur

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS¹ DELEGATIONS 229 
chasing grain from the peasants is over 80 per cent, and 
in purchasing raw materials for industry, such as cotton, 
sugar-beet, etc., the share of the co-operatives and state 
bodies is almost 100 per cent. 
What does that mean? 
I t means, firstly, that the capitalists are being 
ousted from the sphere of trade; industry is being directly 
linked with peasant economy; the profits formerly 
obtained by profiteers and middlemen now remain in 
industry and agriculture; the peasants are able to buy 
urban manufactured goods more cheaply, and the workers, 
in their turn, are able to buy agricultural produce 
more cheaply. 
It means, secondly, that by ousting the middlemen 
and capitalists from the sphere of trade, industry is 
able to take the lead of peasant economy, to influence 
it and raise its efficiency to a higher level, to rationalise 
and industrialise it. 
It means, thirdly, that by linking agriculture with 
industry the state is able to introduce the principle 
of planning in the development of agriculture, to supply 
it with improved seed and fertilisers, to determine the 
extent of its production, to influence it as regards price 
policy, and so forth. 
It means, finally, that favourable conditions are 
being created in the countryside for eliminating the 
capitalist elements, for further restricting and ousting 
the kulaks, for organising the working peasants¹ farms 
in producers¹ co-operatives, for financing the latter out 
of state funds. 
Let us take, for example, the production of sugarbeet 
for the sugar industry, and the production of cotton

J. V. S T A L I N 230 
for the textile industry. The volume of production 
of these kinds of raw materials, as well as their prices 
and quality, are now not determined haphazardly, not by 
the play of forces in an unorganised market through 
middlemen and profiteers, the bourse, various capitalist 
agencies, and so forth, but according to a definite plan, 
by definite agreements concluded in advance between the 
sugar and textile syndicates on the one hand, and tens 
of thousands of peasant farms represented by beet and 
cotton growing co-operatives, on the other hand. 
Here we no longer have the bourse, agencies, speculation 
on prices, and so forth. In our country, in this 
sphere all these instruments of capitalist economy no 
longer exist. Here, only two parties meet, without any 
bourse or middlemen‹the state syndicates on the one 
hand, and peasant co-operators on the other. The state 
syndicates sign contracts with the corresponding co-operative 
organisations for the production of a particular 
quantity of sugar-beet or cotton, for the supply of seed, 
loans, etc., to the peasantry. At the end of the financial 
year the entire output is taken by the syndicates, 
and the peasants receive for it the amounts agreed upon 
in the contracts. That is what we call the contract 
system. 
The advantage of this system is that it is profitable 
for both sides and links peasant economy directly 
with industry without any middlemen. This system is the 
surest path to the collectivisation of peasant economy. 
It cannot be said that other branches of agriculture 
have already reached this stage of development; but it 
can confidently be said that all branches of agriculture, 
not excluding grain production, will gradually take this

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS¹ DELEGATIONS 231 
path of development. And that is the direct path to the 
collectivisation of agriculture. 
All-embracing collectivisation will come when the 
peasant farms are reorganised on a new technical basis, 
through mechanisation and electrification, when the majority 
of the working peasants are organised in co-operative 
organisations, and when the majority of villages 
are covered by a network of agricultural co-operatives 
of a collectivist type. 
We are moving towards this goal, but have not yet 
reached it and are not likely to reach it soon. Why? 
Because, among other things, it requires large sums of 
money, which our state does not yet possess, but which 
will undoubtedly be accumulated in the course of time. 
Marx said that not a single new social system in history 
established itself without being abundantly financed, 
without hundreds and hundreds of millions being spent 
on it. I think that we are already entering the stage in 
the development of agriculture when the state is beginning 
to be able abundantly to finance the new social, 
collectivist system. The fact that socialist industry has 
already achieved the role of the leading element in our 
national economy and that it is taking the lead of agriculture 
is the surest guarantee that peasant economy will 
take the path of further collectivisation. 
THIRD QUESTION. What were the main difficulties 
under war communism, when attempts were made 
to abolish money? 
ANSWER: There were many difficulties, both in 
the sphere of internal development and in the sphere of 
foreign relations.

J. V. S T A L I N 232
Taking internal relations of an economic character, 
three main difficulties could be noted. 
Firstly, the difficulty was that our industry was 
ruined and paralysed, except for the war industry, which 
supplied our civil war fronts with munitions during the 
period of intervention. Two-thirds of our mills and factories 
were at a standstill, transport was disorganised, 
there were no manufactured goods, or hardly any. 
Secondly, agriculture was in a bad way; the ablebodied 
men from the peasant farms had been sent to the 
fronts. There was a shortage of raw materials, a shortage 
of bread for the urban population, particularly for 
the workers. In those days the workers¹ daily bread ration 
was half a pound and sometimes only an eighth 
of a pound. 
Thirdly, there was little or no smooth-running, intermediary, 
Soviet trade apparatus between town and 
country capable of supplying the countryside with 
manufactured goods and the towns with agricultural produce. 
The co-operatives and the state trading bodies 
existed only in embryo. 
However, when the Civil War ended and the ³New 
Economic Policy² was introduced, the economic situation 
in the country underwent a radical change. 
Industry developed, gained strength and occupied a 
commanding position throughout the national economy. 
The most characteristic fact in this respect is that during 
the past two years we have been able to invest in industry 
over two thousand million rubles from our own accumulations, 
without assistance from abroad, without any foreign 
loans whatever. It can no longer be said that there are 
no goods whatever for the peasantry.

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS¹ DELEGATIONS 233 
Agriculture has developed, its output has reached 
the pre-war level. It can now no longer be said that there 
is in general no grain or other agricultural produce for 
the workers. 
The co-operatives and state trading bodies have developed 
to such an extent that they occupy a commanding 
position in the trade of the country. It can now no 
longer be said that we have no intermediary distributive 
apparatus between town and country, between industry 
and peasant economy. 
Of course, all this is not enough to build a socialist 
economy at once; but it is quite enough to enable us 
to proceed further along the path of successful socialist 
construction. 
We must now re-equip our industry and build new 
factories on a new technical basis. 
We must raise the level of efficiency in agriculture, 
supply the peasantry with the largest possible number 
of agricultural machines; we must organise the majority 
of the working peasants in co-operatives and reorganise 
the individual peasant farms in a wide network of agricultural 
collective associations. 
We must set up an intermediary distributive apparatus 
between town and country that will be capable of 
calculating and satisfying the requirements of the towns 
and villages throughout the country, in the same way that 
every individual calculates his personal budget of income 
and expenditure. 
When we have achieved all this, it can be presumed 
that the time will have come when money is no longer 
needed. 
But that is still a long way off.

J. V. S T A L I N 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
234
FOURTH QUESTION. What about the ³scissors²? 
ANSWER: If by the ³scissors² is meant the divergence 
between the prices of agricultural produce and the 
prices of manufactured goods from the standpoint of 
cost of production, the situation as regards the ³scissors² 
is as follows: 
Undoubtedly, our manufactured goods are still sold at 
a somewhat higher price than they could be sold under other 
circumstances. That is because our industry is young, 
because it has to be protected from outside competition, 
because conditions must be created which can accelerate 
its development. And its rapid development is essential 
for both town and country, for otherwise we shall be 
unable in proper time to provide the peasant farmers 
with an adequate supply of textiles and agricultural machines. 
This creates a divergence between the prices of manufactured 
goods and the prices of agricultural produce, 
which is somewhat to the detriment of peasant economy. 
In order to relieve peasant economy of this handicap, 
the government and the Party have decided to pursue a 
policy of gradually but steadily reducing the prices of 
manufactured goods. Can this be called a feasible policy? 
I think that it is absolutely feasible. It is known, for 
example, that during the past year we have been able to 
reduce the retail prices of manufactured goods by about 
8-10 per cent. It is also known that our industrial organisations 
are systematically reducing the cost of production 
and the wholesale prices of manufactured goods. There is 
no reason to doubt that this policy will be continued. 
More than that. I must say that the policy of steadily 
reducing the prices of manufactured goods is the corner

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS¹ DELEGATIONS 235 
stone of our economic policy, without which neither the 
improvement and rationalisation of our industry nor 
the strengthening of the alliance between the working 
class and the peasantry is conceivable. 
In bourgeois countries a different policy is adhered to 
in this respect. There, enterprises are usually organised 
into trusts and syndicates for the purpose of raising the 
prices of manufactured goods in the home market, of 
converting them into monopoly prices in order thereby to 
squeeze out as much profit as possible and to create a fund 
for the export of goods abroad, where they are sold by the 
capitalists at low prices with a view to capturing new 
markets. 
The same policy was pursued here in Russia under the 
bourgeois regime, when sugar, for example, was sold at 
exorbitant prices in the home market, while abroad, 
in Britain, for example, this same sugar was sold so 
cheaply that it was used for feeding pigs. 
The Soviet Government pursues a diametrically opposite 
policy. It holds that industry must serve the population 
and not the other way round. It holds that a steady 
reduction of the prices of manufactured goods is a basic 
means for ensuring the normal growth of industry. That 
is apart from the fact that the policy of reducing the 
prices of manufactured goods helps to increase the demand 
of the population, increases the capacity of the home market, 
urban and rural, and thus creates an ever-growing 
source for the further expansion of industry. 
FIFTH QUESTION. What proposals does the Soviet 
Government offer the small French bondholders? How are 
they to be brought to the knowledge of the French rentiers?

J. V. S T A L I N 236
ANSWER: Our proposals on the pre-war debts were 
published in the well-known interview with Rakovsky. 
I think you must be familiar with them. They are made 
conditional on simultaneous receipt of credits by the 
U.S.S.R. In this we adhere to the principle of give and 
take. If you give us credits you will get something from 
us in the way of payments on the pre-war debts. If you 
give nothing you will get nothing. 
Does that mean that thereby we have in principle 
recognised the pre-war debts? No, it does not. It merely 
means that while leaving in force the well-known decree 
annulling the tsarist debts,59 we are nevertheless willing 
to conclude a working agreement to pay some part of 
the pre-war debts, provided we are granted the credits 
which we need and which will also benefit French 
industry. We regard payments on the debts as extra 
interest on the credits received by us for the development 
of our industry. 
Some talk about tsarist Russia¹s war debts. Some 
talk about all sorts of claims on the U.S.S.R. owing to the 
results of the October Revolution. They forget, however, 
that our revolution is the repudiation on principle of 
imperialist wars and the tsarist debts connected with 
them. They forget that the U.S.S.R. cannot and will not 
pay the war debts. 
They also forget that the U.S.S.R. cannot wipe off 
the books the plunder and violence to which the country 
was subjected for several years, during the armed intervention 
of foreign states, and in connection with which 
the U.S.S.R. is making certain counter-claims. 
Who is answerable for that plunder and violence? 
Who must be called to account for it? Who must pay for

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS¹ DELEGATIONS 237 
that plunder and violence? The imperialist bosses are inclined 
to forget these unpleasant things; but they must 
know that such things are not forgotten. 
SIXTH QUESTION. How do you reconcile the vodka 
monopoly with the fight against drunkenness? 
ANSWER: I think that it is in general difficult to 
reconcile them. There is undoubtedly a contradiction 
here. The Party is aware of this contradiction, but it 
deliberately invited it, knowing that at the present time 
such a contradiction is the lesser evil. 
When we introduced the vodka monopoly we were 
confronted with the alternatives: 
either to go into bondage to the capitalists by ceding 
to them a number of our most important mills and factories 
and receiving in return the funds necessary to enable 
us to carry on, 
or to introduce the vodka monopoly in order to obtain 
the necessary working capital for developing our 
industry with our own resources and thus avoid going 
into foreign bondage. 
Members of the Central Committee, including myself, 
had a talk with Lenin at the time, and he admitted 
that if we failed to obtain the necessary loans from 
abroad we should have to agree openly and straightforwardly 
to adopt the vodka monopoly as an extraordinary 
temporary measure. 
That is how matters stood when we introduced the 
vodka monopoly. 
Of course, generally speaking, it would be better to 
do without vodka, for vodka is an evil. But that would 
mean going into temporary bondage to the capitalists,

J. V. S T A L I N 238 
which is a still greater evil. We, therefore, preferred the 
lesser evil. At present the revenue from vodka is over 
500 million rubles. To give up vodka now would mean 
giving up that revenue; moreover there are no grounds 
for asserting that this would reduce drunkenness, for 
the peasants would begin to distil their own vodka and 
to poison themselves with illicit spirits. 
Evidently, the serious shortcomings as regards the 
cultural development of the countryside play a certain 
role here. This is apart from the fact that the immediate 
abandonment of the vodka monopoly would deprive 
our industry of over 500 million rubles, which could not 
be replaced from any other source. 
Does that mean that the vodka monopoly must remain 
indefinitely? No, it does not. We introduced it as 
a temporary measure. Hence, it must be abolished as soon 
as we find in our national economy new sources of revenue 
for the further development of our industry. That such 
sources will be found there can be no doubt. 
Were we right in transferring the manufacture of 
vodka to the state? I think we were. If vodka were transferred 
to private hands it would: 
firstly, strengthen private capital, 
secondly, deprive the government of the opportunity 
to regulate properly the production and consumption 
of vodka, and 
thirdly, make it more difficult for the government 
to abolish the production and consumption of vodka 
in the future. 
At present our policy is gradually to reduce the production 
of vodka. I think that in the future we shall 
be able to abolish the vodka monopoly altogether, re

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS¹ DELEGATIONS 239 
duce the output of alcohol to the minimum required 
for technical purposes, and later on end the sale of vodka 
altogether. 
I think that we should, perhaps, not have to deal 
with vodka, or with many other unpleasant things, if 
the West-European proletarians took power into their 
hands and gave us the necessary assistance. But what 
is to be done? Our West-European brothers do not want 
to take power yet, and we are compelled to do the best 
we can with our own resources. But that is not our 
fault, it is‹fate. 
As you see, our West-European friends also bear 
a share of the responsibility for the vodka monopoly. 
(Laughter and applause.) 
SEVENTH QUESTION, The judicial powers of the 
GPU, trial without witnesses, without counsel for the defence, 
secret arrests. Considering that French public opinion 
finds it hard to approve of these measures, it would 
be interesting to hear on what grounds they are justified. 
Is it intended to modify or abolish them? 
ANSWER: The GPU, or Cheka, is a punitive organ 
of the Soviet state. It is an organ more or less 
analogous to the Committee of Public Safety which was 
set up during the Great French Revolution. It punishes 
primarily spies, plotters, terrorists, bandits, profiteers 
and counterfeiters. It is something in the nature of a 
military-political tribunal set up for the purpose of protecting 
the interests of the revolution from the counterrevolutionary 
bourgeoisie and their agents. 
This organ was created on the morrow of the 
October Revolution, after the discovery of all kinds of

J. V. S T A L I N 240 
conspiratorial, terrorist and espionage organisations 
financed by Russian and foreign capitalists. 
This organ developed and gained strength after a 
series of terrorist acts had been perpetrated against 
leaders of the Soviet Government, after the murder 
of Comrade Uritsky, a member of the Revolutionary 
Committee, in Petrograd (he was killed by a Socialist-Revolutionary), 
after the murder of Comrade Volodarsky, a 
member of the Revolutionary Committee, in Petrograd 
(he was also killed by a Socialist-Revolutionary), after 
the attempt on the life of Lenin (he was wounded by 
a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party). 
It must be admitted that the GPU at that time 
struck unerring and telling blows at the enemies of the 
revolution. Not only that, it has retained that ability 
to this day. From that time on, the GPU has been the 
terror of the bourgeoisie, the vigilant guardian of the 
revolution, the naked sword of the proletariat. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the bourgeois 
of all countries mortally hate the GPU. There is no 
limit to the legends that have been invented about the 
GPU. There is no limit to the slanders that have been 
circulated about the GPU. What does that mean? It 
means that the GPU is effectively guarding the interests 
of the revolution. The sworn enemies of the revolution 
curse the GPU. It follows, therefore, that the GPU 
is doing the right thing. 
The attitude of the workers towards the GPU is different. 
Go to the workers¹ districts and ask the workers 
what they think of the GPU. You will find that they 
respect i t . Why? Because they regard i t as a loyal 
defender of the revolution.

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS¹ DELEGATIONS 241 
I can understand why the bourgeois hate and distrust 
the GPU. I can understand why the first thing 
various bourgeois tourists enquire about on arriving in 
the U.S.S.R. is whether the GPU still exists, and whether 
it is not high time to abolish it. All this is comprehensible 
and not surprising. 
But I cannot understand why some workers¹ delegates, 
on arriving in the U.S.S.R., anxiously enquire 
whether many counter-revolutionaries have been punished 
by the GPU, whether terrorists and plotters against 
the proletarian government will s t i l l be punished, 
and whether it is not high time to abolish the GPU. 
Why do some workers¹ delegates show such concern 
for the enemies of the proletarian revolution? How can 
it be explained? How can it be justified? 
Maximum leniency is advocated, we are advised 
to abolish the GPU. . . . But is there any guarantee 
that if the GPU is abolished the capitalists of all countries 
will give up organising and financing counterrevolutionary 
groups of plotters, terrorists, wreckers, 
incendiaries and dynamiters? To disarm the revolution 
without any guarantees that the enemies of 
the revolution will be disarmed‹would that not be 
folly, would that not be a crime against the working 
class? 
No, comrades, we do not want to repeat the mistakes 
of the Paris Communards. The Paris Communards 
were too lenient in dealing with the Versaillese, for 
which Marx rightly reproved them at the time. They 
had to pay for their leniency by tens of thousands of 
workers being shot by the Versaillese when Thiers entered 
Paris.

J. V. S T A L I N 242 
Do the comrades think that the Russian bourgeois 
and landlords are less bloodthirsty than the Versaillese 
were in France? At all events, we know how savagely 
they dealt with the workers when they occupied Siberia, 
the Ukraine and the North Caucasus in alliance 
with the French and British, the Japanese and American 
interventionists. 
I do not mean to say that it is the internal situation 
of the country that obliges us to have punitive 
organs of the revolution. From the standpoint of the 
internal situation, the revolution is so firm and unshakable 
that we could manage without the GPU. But 
the point is that our enemies at home are not isolated 
individuals. The point is that they are connected by 
a thousand threads with the capitalists of all countries, 
who support them with all their might and all their 
means. We are a country surrounded by capitalist states. 
The internal enemies of our revolution are agents 
of the capitalists of all countries. The capitalist states 
are a base and rear for the internal enemies of our revolution. 
Hence, in fighting the enemies at home we 
are fighting the counter-revolutionary elements of all 
countries. Now judge for yourselves whether, under 
these circumstances, we can manage without punitive 
organs like the GPU. 
No, comrades, we do not want to repeat the mistakes 
of the Paris Communards. The revolution needs the 
GPU; and the GPU will continue to exist to the 
terror of the enemies of the proletariat. (Stormy applause.) 
A delegate: Allow me, Comrade Stalin, to thank you 
on behalf of the delegates present for your explanations 
and for refuting the lies about the U.S.S.R. that are

INTERVIEW WITH FOREIGN WORKERS¹ DELEGATIONS 243 
spread abroad. You need have no doubts that we shall 
be able to tell our workers at home the truth about the 
U.S.S.R. 
Stalin: There is no need to thank me, comrades. I 
consider it my duty to answer your questions and to 
report to you. We Soviet leaders regard it as our duty 
to report to our class brothers on all questions on which 
they wish to hear reports. Our state is the offspring of 
the world proletariat. The leaders of our state merely 
do their duty to the international proletariat when 
they report to its representatives. (Applause.) 
Pravda, Nos. 260 and 261, 
November 13 and 15, 1927

THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER 
OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION 
On the Occasion of the Tenth Anniversary 
of the October Revolution 
The October Revolution cannot be regarded merely 
as a revolution ³within national bounds.² It is, primarily, 
a revolution of an international, world order, for 
it signifies a radical turn in the world history of mankind, 
a turn from the old, capitalist world to the new, socialist 
world. 
Revolutions in the past usually ended by one group 
of exploiters at the helm of government being replaced 
by another group of exploiters. The exploiters changed, 
exploitation remained. Such was the case during the liberation 
movements of the slaves. Such was the case 
during the period of the uprisings of the serfs. Such was 
the case during the period of the well-known ³great² 
revolutions in England, France and Germany. I am not 
speaking of the Paris Commune, which was the first 
glorious, heroic, yet unsuccessful attempt on the part 
of the proletariat to turn history against capitalism. 
The October Revolution differs from these revolutions 
in principle. Its aim is not to replace one form of 
exploitation by another form of exploitation, one group 
of exploiters by another group of exploiters, but to abolish 
all exploitation of man by man, to abolish all groups 
of exploiters, to establish the dictatorship of the pro

THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION 245 
letariat, to establish the power of the most revolutionary 
class of all the oppressed classes that have ever 
existed, to organise a new, classless, socialist society. 
It is precisely for this reason that the victory of the 
October Revolution signifies a radical change in the 
history of mankind, a radical change in the historical 
destiny of world capitalism, a radical change in the liberation 
movement of the world proletariat, a radical 
change in the methods of struggle and the forms of organisation, 
in the manner of life and traditions, in the 
culture and ideology of the exploited masses throughout 
the world. 
That is the basic reason why the October Revolution 
is a revolution of an international, world order. 
That also is the source of the profound sympathy 
which the oppressed classes in all countries entertain 
for the October Revolution, which they regard as a 
pledge of their own emancipation. 
A number of fundamental issues could be noted on 
which the October Revolution influences the development 
of the revolutionary movement throughout the 
world. 
1. The October Revolution is noteworthy primarily 
for having breached the front of world imperialism, for 
having overthrown the imperialist bourgeoisie in one 
of the biggest capitalist countries and put the socialist 
proletariat in power. 
The class of wage-workers, the class of the persecuted, 
the class of the oppressed and exploited has for 
the first time in the history of mankind risen to the position 
of the ruling class, setting a contagious example 
to the proletarians of all countries.

J. V. S T A L I N 246 
This means that the October Revolution has ushered 
in a new era, the era of proletarian revolutions in the 
countries of imperialism. 
It took the instruments and means of production from 
the landlords and capitalists and converted them into 
public property, thus counterposing socialist property to 
bourgeois property. It thereby exposed the lie of the capitalists 
that bourgeois property is inviolable, sacred, 
eternal. 
It wrested power from the bourgeoisie, deprived the 
bourgeoisie of political rights, destroyed the bourgeois 
state apparatus and transferred power to the Soviets, 
thus counter-posing the socialist rule of the Soviets, as 
proletarian democracy, to bourgeois parliamentarism, as 
capitalist democracy. Lafargue was right when he said, 
as far back as 1887, that on the morrow of the revolution 
³all former capitalists will be disfranchised.²60 
The October Revolution thereby exposed the lie of 
the Social-Democrats that at the present time a peaceful 
transition to socialism is possible through bourgeois 
parliamentarism. 
But the October Revolution did not and could not 
stop there. Having destroyed the old, bourgeois order, 
it began to build the new, socialist order. The 10 years of 
the October Revolution have been 10 years of building 
the Party, trade unions, Soviets, co-operatives, cultural 
organisations, transport, industry, the Red Army. 
The indubitable successes of socialism in the U.S.S.R. 
on the front of construction have clearly shown that the 
proletariat can successfully govern the country without 
the bourgeoisie and against the bourgeoisie, that it can 
successfully build industry without the bourgeoisie and

THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION 247 
against the bourgeoisie, that it can successfully direct 
the whole of the national economy without the bourgeoisie 
and against the bourgeoisie, that it can successfully 
build socialism in spite of the capitalist encirclement. 
Menenius Agrippa, the famous Roman senator of 
ancient times, was not the only one to uphold the old ³theory² 
that the exploited cannot do without the exploiters 
any more than the head and other parts of the body 
can do without the stomach. This ³theory² is now the 
corner-stone of the political ³philosophy² of Social-Democracy 
in general, and of the Social-Democratic policy 
of coalition with the imperialist bourgeoisie in particular. 
This ³theory,² which has acquired the character of a 
prejudice, is now one of the most serious obstacles in the 
path towards the revolutionisation of the proletariat 
in the capitalist countries. One of the most important 
results of the October Revolution is that it dealt this 
false ³theory² a mortal blow. 
Is there any further need to prove that these and 
similar results of the October Revolution could not and 
cannot fail to exert an important influence on the revolutionary 
movement of the working class in the capitalist 
countries? 
Such generally known facts as the progressive growth 
of communism in the capitalist countries, the growing 
sympathy of the proletarians of all countries for the working 
class of the U.S.S.R. and, finally, the many workers¹ 
delegations that come to the Land of Soviets, prove 
beyond doubt that the seeds sown by the October Revolution 
are already beginning to bear fruit. 
2. The October Revolution has shaken imperialism 
not only in the centres of its domination, not only in

J. V. S T A L I N 248 
the ³metropolises.² It has also struck at the rear of 
imperialism, its periphery, having undermined the rule 
of imperialism in the colonial and dependent countries. 
Having overthrown the landlords and the capitalists, 
the October Revolution broke the chains of national 
and colonial oppression and freed from it, without 
exception, all the oppressed peoples of a vast state. The 
proletariat cannot emancipate itself unless it emancipates 
the oppressed peoples. It is a characteristic feature 
of the October Revolution that it accomplished 
these national-colonial revolutions in the U.S.S.R. not 
under the flag of national enmity and conflicts among 
nations, but under the flag of mutual confidence and 
fraternal rapprochement of the workers and peasants 
of the various peoples in the U.S.S.R., not in the name 
of nationalism, but in the name of internationalism. 
It is precisely because the national-colonial revolutions 
took place in our country under the leadership 
of the proletariat and under the banner of internationalism 
that pariah peoples, slave peoples, have for 
the first time in the history of mankind risen to the position 
of peoples that are really free and really equal, 
thereby setting a contagious example to the oppressed 
nations of the whole world. 
This means that the October Revolution has ushered 
in new era, the era of colonial revolutions which 
are being carried out in the oppressed countries of the 
world in alliance with the proletariat and under the 
leadership of the proletariat. 
It was formerly the ³accepted² idea that the world 
has been divided from time immemorial into inferior 
and superior races, into blacks and whites, of whom the

THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION 249 
former are unfit for civilisation and are doomed to be 
objects of exploitation, while the latter are the only 
bearers of civilisation, whose mission it is to exploit 
the former. 
That legend must now be regarded as shattered and 
discarded. One of the most important results of the October 
Revolution is that it dealt that legend a mortal 
blow, by demonstrating in practice that the liberated 
non-European peoples, drawn into the channel of Soviet 
development, are not one whit less capable of promoting 
a really progressive culture and a really progressive 
civilisation than are the European peoples. 
It was formerly the ³accepted² idea that the only 
method of liberating the oppressed peoples is the method 
of bourgeois nationalism, the method of nations drawing 
apart from one another, the method of disuniting nations, 
the method of intensifying national enmity among 
the labouring masses of the various nations. 
That legend must now be regarded as refuted. One 
of the most important results of the October Revolution 
is that it dealt that legend a mortal blow, by demonstrating 
in practice the possibility and expediency of 
the proletarian, internationalist method of liberating the 
oppressed peoples, as the only correct method; by demonstrating 
in practice the possibility and expediency 
of a fraternal union of the workers and peasants of the 
most diverse nations based on the principles of voluntariness 
and internationalism. The existence of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, which is the prototype 
of the future integration of the working people of all 
countries into a single world economic system, cannot 
but serve as direct proof of this.

J. V. S T A L I N 250 
It need hardly be said that these and similar results 
of the October Revolution could not and cannot fail 
to exert an important influence on the revolutionary 
movement in the colonial and dependent countries. Such 
facts as the growth of the revolutionary movement of 
the oppressed peoples in China, Indonesia, India, etc., 
and the growing sympathy of these peoples for the 
U.S.S.R., unquestionably bear this out. 
The era of tranquil exploitation and oppression of 
the colonies and dependent countries has passed away. 
The era of liberating revolutions in the colonies and 
dependent countries, the era of the awakening of the 
proletariat in those countries, the era of its hegemony 
in the revolution, has begun. 
3. Having sown the seeds of revolution both in the 
centres of imperialism and in its rear, having weakened 
the might of imperialism in the ³metropolises² and having 
shaken its domination in the colonies, the October 
Revolution has thereby put in jeopardy the very existence 
of world capitalism as a whole. 
While the spontaneous development of capitalism 
in the conditions of imperialism has passed‹owing 
to its unevenness, owing to the inevitability of conflicts 
and armed collisions, owing, finally, to the unprecedented 
imperialist slaughter‹into the process of the 
decay and the dying of capitalism, the October Revolution 
and the resultant dropping out of a vast country 
from the world system of capitalism could not but accelerate 
this process, undermining, bit by bit, the very 
foundations of world imperialism. 
More than that. While shaking imperialism, the 
October Revolution has at the same time created‹in

THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION 251 
the shape of the first proletarian dictatorship‹a powerful 
and open base for the world revolutionary movement, 
a base such as the latter never possessed before and on 
which it now can rely for support. It has created a powerful 
and open centre of the world revolutionary movement, 
such as the latter never possessed before and around 
which it can now rally, organising a united revolutionary 
front of the proletarians and of the oppressed peoples 
of all countries against imperialism. 
This means, firstly, that the October Revolution 
inflicted a mortal wound on world capitalism from 
which the latter will never recover. For that very reason 
capitalism will never recover the ³equilibrium² and 
³stability² that it possessed before October. 
Capitalism may become partly stabilised, it may 
rationalise its production, turn over the administration 
of the country to fascism, temporarily hold down the 
working class; but it will never recover the ³tranquillity,² 
the ³assurance,² the ³equilibrium² and the ³stability² 
that it flaunted before; for the crisis of world 
capitalism has reached the stage of development when 
the flames of revolution must inevitably break out, now 
in the centres of imperialism, now in the periphery, 
reducing to naught the capitalist patch-work and daily 
bringing nearer the fall of capitalism. Exactly as in the 
well-known fable, ³when it pulled its tail out of the mud, 
its beak got stuck; when it pulled its beak out, its tail 
got stuck.² 
This means, secondly, that the October Revolution 
has raised to such a height the strength and importance, 
the courage and the fighting preparedness of the oppressed 
classes of the whole world as to compel the ruling

J. V. S T A L I N 252 
classes to reckon with them as a new, important factor. 
Now the labouring masses of the world can no longer 
be regarded as a ³blind mob,² groping in the dark 
and devoid of prospects; for the October Revolution has 
created a beacon which illumines their path and opens 
up prospects for them. Whereas formerly there was 
no world-wide open forum from which the aspirations and 
strivings of the oppressed classes could be expounded 
and formulated, now such a forum exists in the shape 
of the first proletarian dictatorship. 
There is hardly room for doubt that the destruction 
of this forum would for a long time cast the gloom 
of unbridled, black reaction over the social and political 
life of the ³advanced countries.² I t cannot be 
denied that the very existence of a ³Bolshevik state² 
puts a curb upon the dark forces of reaction, thus helping 
the oppressed classes in their struggle for liberation. 
It is this that explains the savage hatred which 
the exploiters of all countries entertain for the Bolsheviks. 
History repeats itself, though on a new basis. Just 
as formerly, during the period of the downfall of feudalism, 
the word ³Jacobin² evoked dread and abhorrence 
among the aristocrats of all countries, so now, in the period 
of the down fall of capitalism, the word ³Bolshevik² 
evokes dread and abhorrence among the bourgeois in 
all countries. And conversely, just as formerly Paris was 
the refuge and school for the revolutionary representatives 
of the rising bourgeoisie, so now Moscow is the 
refuge and school for the revolutionary representatives 
of the rising proletariat. Hatred of the Jacobins did not 
save feudalism from collapse. Can there be any doubt

THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION 253 
that hatred of the Bolsheviks will not save capitalism 
from its inevitable downfall? 
The era of the ³stability² of capitalism has passed 
away, carrying away with it the legend of the indestructibility 
of the bourgeois order. 
The era of the collapse of capitalism has begun. 
4. The October Revolution cannot be regarded merely 
as a revolution in the sphere of economic and socialpolitical 
relations. It is at the same time a revolution 
in the minds, a revolution in the ideology, of the working 
class. The October Revolution was born and gained 
strength under the banner of Marxism, under the banner 
of the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, under 
the banner of Leninism, which is Marxism of the era of 
imperialism and proletarian revolutions. Hence i t 
marks the victory of Marxism over reformism, the victory 
of Leninism over Social-Democratism, the victory 
of the Third International over the Second International. 
The October Revolution has brought into being an 
impassable chasm between Marxism and Social-Democratism, 
between the policy of Leninism and the policy 
of Social-Democratism. 
Formerly, before the victory of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, Social-Democracy, while refraining from 
openly repudiating the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
but doing nothing, absolutely nothing, to bring 
nearer the realisation of this idea, could flaunt the banner 
of Marxism, and it is obvious that this behaviour 
of Social-Democracy created no danger whatever for 
capitalism. Then, in that period, Social-Democracy was 
formally identified, or almost completely identified, 
with Marxism.

J. V. S T A L I N 254
Now, after the victory of the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
when everybody has seen for himself to what 
Marxism leads and what its victory may signify, Social- 
Democracy is no longer able to flaunt the banner of 
Marxism, can no longer coquet with the idea of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat without creating a certain 
danger for capitalism. Having long ago broken with 
the spirit of Marxism, it has found itself compelled to 
discard also the banner of Marxism; it has openly and 
unambiguously taken a stand against the offspring of 
Marxism, against the October Revolution, against the 
first dictatorship of the proletariat in the world. 
Now it has had to dissociate itself from Marxism, 
and has actually done so; for under present conditions 
one cannot call oneself a Marxist unless one openly 
and devotedly supports the first proletarian dictatorship 
in the world, unless one wages a revolutionary struggle 
against one¹s own bourgeoisie, unless one creates 
the conditions for the victory of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat in one¹s own country. 
A chasm has opened between Social-Democracy and 
Marxism. Henceforth, the only bearer and bulwark 
of Marxism is Leninism, communism. 
But matters did not end there. The October Revolution 
went further than drawing a demarcation line 
between Social Democracy and Marxism; it relegated 
Social-Democracy to the camp of the direct defenders of 
capitalism against the first proletarian dictatorship 
in the world. When Messieurs the Adlers and Bauers, 
the Welses and Levis, the Longuets and Blums abuse the 
³Soviet regime² and extol parliamentary ³democracy,² 
these gentlemen mean that they are fighting and will

THE INTERNATIONAL CHARACTER OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION 255 
continue to fight for the restoration of the capitalist 
order in the U.S.S.R., for the preservation of capitalist 
slavery in the ³civilised² states. 
Present-day Social-Democratism is an ideological support 
of capitalism. Lenin was a thousand times right when 
he said that the present-day Social-Democratic politicians 
are ³real agents of the bourgeoisie in the working-class 
movement, the labour lieutenants of the capitalist class,² 
that in the ³civil war between the proletariat and the 
bourgeoisie² they would inevitably range themselves 
³on the side of the ŒVersaillese¹ against the ŒCommunards.¹²
61 
It is impossible to put an end to capitalism without 
putting an end to Social-Democratism in the labour movement. 
That is why the era of dying capitalism is also 
the era of dying Social-Democratism in the labour 
movement. 
The great significance of the October Revolution 
consists, among other things, in the fact that it marks 
the inevitable victory of Leninism over Social-Democratism 
in the world labour movement. 
The era of the domination of the Second International 
and of Social-Democratism in the labour movement 
has ended. 
The era of the domination of Leninism and of the 
Third International has begun. 
Pravda, No. 255, 
November 6-7, 1927 
Signed: J. Stalin

TO THE PARTY CONFERENCE 
OF THE MOSCOW MILITARY AREA62 
Fraternal greetings to you, comrades! I wish you 
every success in your work. Long live our glorious Red 
Army! 
J. Stalin 
Published in the newspaper 
Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 263, 
November 18, 1927

THE PARTY AND THE OPPOSITION 
Speech Delivered at the Sixteenth Moscow 
Gubernia Party Conference63 
November 23, 1927 
Comrades, permit me briefly to sum up the struggle 
between the Party and the opposition, to sum up the 
discussion that has developed during the past three 
or four weeks within the Party and‹it must be frankly 
stated‹outside it. 
I 
BRIEF RESULTS OF THE DISCUSSION 
The following statistical results are available: up 
to the present, something over 572,000 comrades have 
declared for the Party, for its Central Committee; for 
the opposition‹something over 3,000. 
The opposition is usually fond of flaunting figures, 
percentages, claiming that it has the support of 99 per 
cent, and so forth. Everybody sees now that over 99 per 
cent have declared against the opposition and for the 
Central Committee of the Party. 
Who is to ³blame² for that? The opposition itself! 
Every now and again the opposition has tried to push 
us into a discussion. For two years a]ready, hardly

J. V. S T A L I N 258 
a day passed without it making a new demand for a 
discussion. We resisted that pressure; we members 
of the Central Committee resisted that pressure, knowing 
that our Party is not a debating society, as Lenin 
quite rightly said, knowing that our Party is the militant 
party of the proletariat, surrounded by enemies, 
engaged in building socialism, faced with an enormous 
number of practical tasks of creative activity and, 
therefore, unable to concentrate all its attention ever 
so often on the disagreements within the Party. 
But time moved on towards a discussion, and a 
month, more than a month, before the Fifteenth Congress, 
the Party, in conformity with the Party Rules, 
said: Very well, you want a discussion, you want a 
fight‹let¹s have it, then! And here is the result: over 99 
per cent for the Party, for its Central Committee; less 
than one per cent for the opposition. 
The opposition¹s bluff has been called 100 per cent, 
so to speak. 
It may be said that this result is not decisive. It 
may be said that besides the Party there is also the 
working class and the masses of the labouring peasantry. 
It may be said that here, in this sphere, the results have 
not yet been summed up. That is not true, comrades! 
The results have been summed up in this sphere too. 
What were the November Seventh demonstrations in 
all the cities and villages throughout our vast country? 
Were they not all a tremendous demonstration of the 
working class, of the labouring sections of the peasantry, 
of the Red Army and the Red Navy, for our Party, for 
the government, and against the opposition, against 
Trotskyism?

THE PARTY AND THE OPPOSITION 259 
Is not the ignominy that the opposition called 
down upon its own head on the Tenth Anniversary of 
October, is not the unanimity with which the millions 
of working people greeted the Party and the government 
on that day, proof that not only the Party, but 
also the working class, not only the working class, 
but also the labouring sections of the peasantry, not 
only the labouring sections of the peasantry, but also 
the entire Army and the entire Navy, stand like a 
rock for the Party, for the government and against 
the opposition, against the disorganisers? (Prolonged 
applause.) 
What more results do you need? 
There you have, comrades, a brief summing up of 
the struggle between the Party and the opposition, 
between the Bolsheviks and the opposition, the struggle 
that developed within the Party and later, through 
the opposition¹s own fault, went beyond the borders 
of the Party. 
How is this ignominious defeat of the opposition 
to be explained? I t is a fact that no other opposition 
in the history of our Party since the Bolsheviks 
took power has ever suffered such an ignominious 
defeat. 
We know about the opposition of the Trotskyists 
in the period of the Brest Peace. At that time it had the 
support of about a quarter of the Party. 
We know about the opposition of the Trotskyists 
in 1921, during the trade-union discussion. At that 
time it had the support of about one-eighth of the Party. 
We know about the so-called ³New Opposition,² 
the Zinoviev-Kamenev opposition, at the Fourteenth

J. V. S T A L I N 260 
Congress. It then had the support of the entire Leningrad 
delegation. 
But now? Now the opposition is more isolated than 
ever before. It is doubtful now whether it will have 
even one delegate at the Fifteenth Congress. (Prolonged 
applause.) 
The failure of the opposition is due to its being 
completely divorced from the Party, from the working 
class, from the revolution. The opposition has turned 
out to be a handful of intellectuals divorced from life, 
divorced from the revolution. Therein lies the root of 
the opposition¹s ignominious failure. 
Let us, by way of a test, take two or three of the 
questions which separate the opposition from the Party. 
II 
THE WORKING CLASS 
AND THE PEASANTRY 
The question of the relations between the working 
class and the peasantry. 
Lenin said that the question of the relations between 
the working class and the peasantry in our country is 
a fundamental question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
the fundamental question of our revolution. 
He said: 
³Ten or twenty years of correct relations with the peasantry, 
and victory on a world scale is assured (even if the proletarian 
revolutions, which are growing, are delayed).²64 
What are correct relations with the peasantry? By 
correct relations with the peasantry Lenin meant the

THE PARTY AND THE OPPOSITION 261 
establishment of a ³stable alliance² with the middle 
peasants, while relying on the poor peasants. 
But what is the opposition¹s view on this question? 
It not only attaches no value to the alliance between 
the working class and the peasantry, it not only fails 
to appreciate the immense importance of such an alliance 
for the development of our revolution, but it 
goes ³further² and proposes a policy that would inevitably 
lead to the break-up of the alliance between the 
working class and the peasantry, to the rupture of the 
bond between the working class and the peasantry. 
Not to go far for proof of this, I could refer to Preobrazhensky, 
the opposition¹s chief economist, who 
regards the peasantry as a ³colony² for our industry, 
as an object to be exploited to the utmost. 
I could also refer to a number of the opposition¹s 
documents in favour of raising the prices of manufactured 
goods, which would inevitably cause our industry 
to wilt, would strengthen the kulaks, ruin the middle 
peasants and force the poor peasants into bondage to 
the kulaks. 
All these and similar opposition documents are part 
and parcel of the opposition¹s policy calculated to cause 
a rupture with the peasantry, a rupture with the masses 
of the middle peasantry. 
Is anything said plainly and openly about this in 
the opposition¹s ³platform² or in its counter-theses? 
No. In the opposition¹s ³platform² and counter-theses 
all this is carefully hidden and veiled. On the contrary, 
in the opposition¹s ³platform² and counter-theses you 
can find scores of compliments addressed to the middle 
peasants and to the poor peasants. They also contain

J. V. S T A L I N 262 
thrusts at the Party¹s alleged kulak deviation. But they 
say nothing, absolutely nothing, plainly and openly 
about the opposition¹s fatal line, which leads and is 
bound to lead to a rupture between the working class 
and the peasantry. 
But what the leaders of the opposition are hiding 
so carefully from the workers and peasants I shall now 
try to bring into the light of day and lay on the table 
in order to teach the opposition not to deceive the Party 
in future. I have in mind the speech recently delivered by 
Ivan Nikitich Smirnov at the Rogozhsko-Simonovsky 
District Party Conference. Smirnov, one of the leaders of 
the opposition, proved to be one of the few honest men 
among them who had the courage to tell the truth about 
the opposition¹s line. Do you want to know what the 
opposition¹s real ³platform² is on the question of the 
relations between the proletariat and the peasantry? 
Read Smirnov¹s speech and study i t , for i t i s one 
of those rare opposition documents which tell the 
whole truth about the stand actually taken by our oppositionists. 
Here is what Smirnov said in his speech: 
³We say that our state budget must be revised in such a way 
that the greater part of this five thousand million budget should 
flow into industry, for it would be better for us to put up with discord 
with the middle peasants than to invite certain doom.² 
That is the fundamental thing of all that the leaders 
of the opposition have been concealing in their ³platform² 
and counter-theses, and what Smirnov, also 
a leader of the opposition, conscientiously dragged 
into the light of day.

THE PARTY AND THE OPPOSITION 263 
Hence, not a stable alliance with the middle peasants, 
but discord with the middle peasants‹that, it appears, 
is the means of ³saving² the revolution. 
Lenin said that ³the supreme principle of the dictatorship 
is the maintenance of the alliance of the proletariat 
and the peasantry in order that the proletariat 
may retain its leading role and state power.²65 
But the opposition disagrees with that and asserts 
that the important thing for the dictatorship of the proletariat 
is not an alliance with the peasantry, with the 
main mass of the peasantry, but discord with it. 
Lenin said, and not only said but constantly reiterated, 
from the Eighth Party Congress onwards, that it 
will be impossible to build socialism successfully in 
our country unless we have ³a stable alliance with the 
middle peasants.²66 
But the opposition disagrees with that and asserts 
that the policy of a stable alliance with the middle 
peasants can be replaced by a policy of discord with 
them. 
Lenin said that in building socialism we must move 
forward together with the main mass of the peasantry. 
But the opposition disagrees with that and asserts 
that we must move forward not together with the peasantry, 
but in discord with them. 
That i s the principal disagreement between the 
Party and the opposition on the cardinal question of 
the relations between the working class and the peasantry. 
In its ³platform² the opposition tried to hide its 
true countenance by addressing compliments to the 
peasantry and making hypocritical thrusts at the Party¹s

J. V. S T A L I N 264 
alleged kulak deviation. But Smirnov introduced a 
radical amendment to the opposition¹s ³platform² by 
tearing the mask from the leaders of the opposition and 
telling the Party the truth about the opposition, the 
truth about the opposition¹s actual platform. 
What follows from this? It follows from this that 
the opposition¹s ³platform² and counter-theses are 
mere scraps of paper, calculated to deceive the Party 
and the working class. 
What does a policy of discord with the middle peasants 
mean? The policy of discord with the middle peasants 
is a policy of discord with the majority of the 
peasants, for the middle peasants constitute not less 
than 60 per cent of the entire peasantry. That is precisely 
why the policy of discord with the middle peasants 
leads to the majority of the peasants being driven into 
the arms of the kulaks. And a policy of driving 
the majority of the peasants into the arms of the 
kulaks means strengthening the kulaks, isolating the 
poor peasants, weakening Soviet rule in the countryside 
and helping the kulaks to throttle the poor peasants. 
But the matter does not end here. To pursue a policy 
of discord with the majority of the peasantry means 
starting civil war in the countryside, making it difficult 
for our industry to be supplied with the raw materials 
produced by the peasants (cotton, sugar-beet, flax, 
hides, wool, etc.), disorganising the supply of agricultural 
produce for the working class, shattering the very 
foundations of our light industry, disrupting our entire 
work of construction, disrupting our whole plan of industrialising 
the country.

THE PARTY AND THE OPPOSITION 265 
That is the turn the matter takes, comrades, if we bear 
in mind not the bare statements the opposition makes 
in its ³platform² and counter-theses, but the opposition¹s 
actual policy as authoritatively explained to us by 
Smirnov. 
I am far from accusing the opposition of deliberately 
striving for all these misfortunes. It is not, however, 
a matter of what the opposition desires and is 
striving for, but of the results that must inevitably 
follow from the opposition¹s policy of discord with 
the middle peasantry. 
The same thing is happening to the opposition here 
as happened with the bear in Krylov¹s fable ³The Hermit 
and the Bear.² (Laughter.) It goes without saying that 
the bear¹s intention in smashing the head of his friend 
the hermit with a lump of rock was to deliver him from 
the importunate fly. The bear was prompted by the 
friendliest motives. Nevertheless, the bear¹s friendly 
motives led to an action that was far from friendly, 
and for which the hermit paid with his life. Of course, 
the opposition wishes the revolution nothing but good. 
But to achieve this it proposes such means as would 
result in the utter defeat of the revolution, in the utter 
defeat of the working class and the peasantry, in the 
disruption of all our work of construction. 
The opposition¹s ³platform² is a platform for the 
rupture of the alliance between the working class and 
the peasantry, a platform for the disruption of all our 
work of construction, a platform for the disruption of 
the work of industrialisation.

J. V. S T A L I N 266 
III 
THE PARTY AND THE DICTATORSHIP 
OF THE PROLETARIAT 
The question of the Party. 
Lenin says that the unity and iron discipline of the 
Party are the basis of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
The opposition in actual fact holds the opposite view. 
It thinks that for the proletarian dictatorship we need 
not the unity and iron discipline of the Party, but the 
destruction of the Party¹s unity and discipline, the splitting 
of the Party and the formation of a second party. 
True, the opposition talks and writes, writes and talks, 
and not so much talks as howls about Party unity. 
But the opposition¹s talk about Party unity is hypocritical 
chatter calculated to deceive the Party. (Applause.) 
For, while talking and shouting about unity, the 
opposition is building a new, anti-Leninist party. And 
it is not only engaged in building it, it has already 
built it, as is shown by authentic documents, such as 
the speeches of Kuzovnikov, Zof and Reno, former 
oppositionists. 
We are now in possession of exhaustive documentary 
evidence that for over a year already the opposition has 
had its own anti-Leninist party, with its Central Committee, 
regional bureaux, gubernia bureaux, and so forth. 
What can the opposition oppose to these facts except 
hypocritical chatter about unity? 
The opposition is shouting that the Central Committee 
of the Party will not succeed in pushing it into 
the position of a second party. Strange! Has the Cen

THE PARTY AND THE OPPOSITION 267 
tral Committee ever tried to push the opposition into 
such a position? Is it not a fact that the Central Committee 
has all along been restraining the opposition 
from slipping into the line of organising a second 
party? 
The entire history of our disagreements during 
the past two years is a history of the efforts of the Central 
Committee of our Party to restrain the opposition from 
taking steps towards a split and to keep the opposition 
people within the Party. 
Take the case of the opposition¹s well-known ³declaration² 
of October 16, 1926. Was that not an 
attempt of the Central Committee to keep the opposition 
within the ranks of the Party? 
Take the opposition¹s second ³declaration² of August 
8, 1927. What does that show if not that the Central 
Committee of the Party has been anxious all along 
to keep the opposition within the ranks of a single 
party? 
But what happened? The opposition made declarations 
about unity, made promises to maintain unity, 
gave assurances that it would abandon factionalism; 
but actually it continued to build a second party. 
What does all that show? It shows that we cannot 
take the opposition at its word; that the opposition 
must be tested not by its ³platforms² and countertheses, 
but by its deeds. 
Lenin said: learn to test groups, trends and parties 
not by their promises and ³platforms,² but by their 
deeds. We regard it as our duty to follow in Lenin¹s 
footsteps and to test the opposition not by the papers 
and ³platforms² it concocts, but by its deeds.

J. V. S T A L I N 268 
When the opposition writes ³platforms² and counter-
theses and raises a howl about Party unity, it is 
deceiving the Party, it is hypocrisy, mere words. But 
when the opposition builds a new party, sets up its own 
central committee, organises regional bureaux, and so 
forth, thereby disrupting the unity and proletarian 
discipline of our Party, those are the opposition¹s deeds, 
its nefarious deeds. 
That does not mean, of course, that the opposition 
has already succeeded in creating anything like a real 
party. No. It has not succeeded in that, and it never 
will. It will not succeed, because the working class is 
against the opposition. In trying to create a new party, 
a second party, the opposition is in reality engaged in 
a childish game, playing at being a party, a central 
committee, regional bureaux, and so forth. Routed and 
disgraced, they find consolation in amusing themselves 
by playing at being a party, a central committee, regional 
bureaux, and so forth. (Laughter. Applause.) 
But, comrades, there are games and games. When 
the opposition plays at being a party it can only arouse 
laughter, because, for the Party, that playing is nothing 
more than an amusing fancy. 
We have, however, not only the Party to consider. 
We still have classes, we still have anti-Soviet elements 
in our country. And those anti-Soviet elements are 
watching the opposition¹s game, learning from it how 
to fight the Party, how to fight the Soviet regime, 
how to fight our revolution. For those elements, the 
opposition¹s game of being a party, the opposition¹s 
thrusts at the Party, the opposition¹s anti-Soviet sorties, 
serve as a sort of school, a sort of preparatory school for

THE PARTY AND THE OPPOSITION 269 
learning how to fight the Soviet regime, how to unleash 
the forces of counter-revolution. 
It is not surprising that all sorts of anti-Soviet elements 
flock around the opposition. Herein lies the danger 
of the opposition¹s game of being a party. And 
precisely because a grave danger lurks here, the Party cannot 
look on indifferently at the opposition¹s anti-Soviet 
exercises; precisely for this reason it must put a 
stop to them altogether. 
As for the working class, it cannot fail to see how 
dangerous is the anti-Party game the opposition is 
playing. For the opposition, the Party is a chess-board. 
In fighting the Party, it makes various chess moves. 
One day it submits a declaration promising to end factionalism. 
Next day it repudiates its own declaration. 
A day later it submits a new declaration, only to repudiate 
its own declaration again a few days after. These 
are chess moves for the opposition. They are players 
and nothing more. 
But that is not the way the working class looks 
upon its Party. For the working class the Party is not 
a chess-board, but the instrument of its emancipation. 
For the working class the Party is not a chess-board, 
but a vital means of overcoming its enemies, of organising 
new victories, of achieving the final victory of socialism. 
Hence the working class can only despise those 
who turn its Party, its holy of holies, into a chess-board 
for the dishonest games of the oppositionist players. 
For the working class cannot but know that the opposition¹s 
efforts to disrupt our Party¹s iron discipline, its 
efforts to split our Party, are, in essence, efforts to disrupt 
the dictatorship of the proletariat in our country.

J. V. S T A L I N 270 
The opposition¹s ³platform² is a platform for wrecking 
our Party, a platform for disarming the working 
class, a platform for unleashing the anti-Soviet forces, 
a platform for disrupting the dictatorship of the proletariat 
. 
IV 
THE PROSPECTS OF OUR REVOLUTION 
Let us pass to the third question, the question of 
the prospects of our revolution. 
The characteristic feature of the whole line of the 
opposition is disbelief in the strength of our revolution, 
disbelief in the proletariat¹s strength and capacity to lead 
the peasantry, disbelief in the strength and capacity 
of the working class to build socialism. 
I have already quoted the passage from Smirnov¹s 
speech about the inevitable ³doom² of our revolution 
if we do not establish discord with the middle peasantry. 
This is not the first time that we have heard the songs of 
the opposition about the ³doom² of the revolution. This 
is not the first time that in the opposition¹s declarations 
we have encountered continual whining and consternation 
in face of difficulties, predictions of the twilight 
and collapse of our revolution. From the time that 
the opposition¹s factional policy began to suffer defeat 
after defeat the opposition has not ceased shouting about 
the ³doom² of our revolution, making out the doom of 
its own group to be the ³doom² of the revolution. The 
opposition has only to find itself in the minority, to 
get a drubbing from the Party, for it to rush into the 
street and start shouting about the ³doom² of the revo

THE PARTY AND THE OPPOSITION 271 
lution and to utilise all possible difficulties against the 
Party. 
As early as in the period of the Brest Peace, in 1918, 
when the revolution was experiencing certain difficulties, 
Trotsky, after being defeated by the Party at 
the Seventh Congress, began to shout about the ³doom² 
of our revolution. But the revolution did not perish, 
and Trotsky¹s prophecies remained empty prophecies. 
In 1921, in the period of the trade-union discussion, 
when we were faced with new difficulties arising from 
the abolition of the surplus appropriation system, and 
Trotsky suffered another defeat, at the Tenth Party 
Congress, he again began to shout about the ³doom² of 
the revolution. I well remember Trotsky asserting at 
a meeting of the Political Bureau, in Lenin¹s presence, 
that the Soviet regime had ³sung its swan-song,² that 
its days and hours were numbered. (Laughter.) But 
the revolution did not perish, the difficulties were overcome, 
and the hysterical fuss about the ³doom² of the 
revolution remained mere fuss. 
I don¹t know whether the days and hours were numbered 
at that time or not; but if they were, all I can 
say is, they were numbered incorrectly. (Applause, 
laughter.) 
In 1923, in a period of new difficulties, this time 
arising out of NEP, in the period of the market crisis, 
Trotsky again began a swan-song about the ³doom² 
of the revolution, making out the defeat of his own 
group at the Thirteenth Conference of our Party to be 
the defeat of the revolution. The revolution, however, 
ignored this swan-song and overcame the difficulties 
facing it at that time.

J. V. S T A L I N 272 
In 1925-26, in a period of new difficulties arising 
from the progress of our industry, Trotsky, this time in 
chorus with Kamenev and Zinoviev, again began a 
swan-song about the ³doom² of the revolution, making 
out the defeat of his own group at the Fourteenth Congress 
and after the Fourteenth Congress to be the defeat 
of the revolution. The revolution, however, had no intention 
of dying, the self-styled prophets were pushed 
into the background and the difficulties were overcome, 
as always, as in the past, for Bolsheviks look upon difficulties 
not as something to wail and whine over, but 
as something to overcome. (Loud applause.) 
Now, at the end of 1927, owing to the new difficulties 
in the period of the reconstruction of our whole 
economy on a new technical basis, they have again 
begun a swan-song about the ³doom² of the revolution, 
trying, in this way, to cover up the actual doom of their 
own group. But, comrades, you all see that the revolution 
is alive and thriving, while it is others who are 
perishing. 
And so they sang and sang their swan-song until at 
last they found themselves in a hopeless position. 
(Laughter.) 
The opposition¹s ³platform² is a platform for the 
³doom² of our revolution. 
V 
WHAT NEXT? 
Such is the opposition¹s actual platform on the 
three principal questions on which we disagree: the 
question of the working class and the peasantry, the question 
of the Party and the dictatorship of the proletariat,

THE PARTY AND THE OPPOSITION 273 
and finally, the question of the prospects of our revolution. 
You see that this queer platform testifies to the 
opposition¹s complete divorce from the Party, from the 
working class, from our revolution. It is the platform 
of intellectuals who have broken with Leninism and are 
divorced from life. 
Is it surprising, after all this, that the Party and 
the working class have completely turned away from 
the opposition? 
That is why the opposition suffered ignominious 
defeat in its struggle against the Party during the last 
discussion. 
What next?‹we are asked. 
The opposition complains that the other day it submitted 
a declaration on unity, signed by thirty-one 
Trotskyists, but has not yet received a satisfactory 
answer. But indeed what answer can be given to the 
hypocritical declaration of the thirty-one Trotskyists 
when the opposition¹s false declarations are refuted 
again and again by its splitting activities? The history 
of our Party records a similar declaration made, I think 
in 1907, by thirty-one Mensheviks. (Voices from the 
audience: ³That¹s right!²) Lenin at the time called that 
declaration ³the hypocrisy of the thirty-one Mensheviks.²
67 (Laughter.) I think that the hypocrisy of the 
thirty-one Trotskyists is quite analogous to the hypocrisy 
of the thirty-one Mensheviks. (Voices from the audience: 
³Quite true!²) The opposition has twice deceived 
the Party. Now it wants to deceive the Party a third 
time. No, comrades, we have had enough of deception, 
enough of games. (Applause.)

J. V. S T A L I N 274 
What next? 
The limit has been reached, comrades, for the opposition 
has exceeded all bounds of what is permissible 
in the Party. It cannot go on swinging from side to side 
in two parties at once, in the old, Leninist Party, the 
one and only Party, and in the new, Trotskyist party. 
It must choose between these two parties. 
Either the opposition itself does away with this 
second, Trotskyist party, abandoning its anti-Leninist 
views and frankly condemning its own mistakes before 
the whole Party; 
or the opposition fails to do that‹in which case 
we ourselves will do away with the Trotskyist party 
altogether. (Applause.) 
One thing or the other. 
Either the oppositionists take this necessary step, 
or they do not do so, and in that case they will be 
sent flying out of the Party. (Stormy and prolonged 
applause. An ovation from the entire hall. The ³Internationale² 
is sung.) 
Pravda, No. 269, 
November 24, 1927

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS 
OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)68 
December 2-19, 1927 
Pravda, Nos. 279, 282 
December 6 and 9, 1927


POLITICAL REPORT 
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
December 3 
I 
THE GROWING CRISIS OF WORLD 
CAPITALISM AND THE EXTERNAL SITUATION 
OF THE U.S.S.R. 
Our country, comrades, is living and developing 
in the conditions of capitalist encirclement. Its external 
position depends not only on its internal forces, but 
also on the state of that capitalist encirclement, on the 
situation in the capitalist countries which surround 
our country, on their strength and weakness, on the 
strength and weakness of the oppressed classes throughout 
the world, on the strength and weakness of the 
revolutionary movement of those classes. That is apart 
from the fact that our revolution is a part of the international 
revolutionary movement of the oppressed 
classes. 
That is why I think that the Central Committee¹s 
report must start with a sketch of our country¹s international 
position, with a sketch of the situation in the 
capitalist countries and of the state of the revolutionary 
movement in all countries.

J. V. S T A L I N 278 
1. The Economics of World Capitalism 
and the Intensification of the Struggle 
for Foreign Markets 
a) The first question is that of the state of production 
and trade in the major capitalist countries. 
The basic fact in this sphere, comrades, is that during 
the past two years, during the period under review, 
production in the capitalist countries has transcended 
the pre-war level, has gone beyond the pre-war level. 
Here are some figures relating to this. 
Index of world output of pig iron: in 1925‹97.6 per 
cent of pre-war; in 1926‹already 100.5 per cent of prewar; 
for 1927 no complete figures are available; figures 
are available for the first half year, showing a further 
increase in the output of pig iron. 
Index of world output of steel: in 1925‹118.5 per 
cent; in 1926‹122.6 per cent of pre-war. 
Index of world output of coal: in 1925‹97.9 per 
cent; in 1926‹a slight drop‹96.8 per cent. This evidently 
reflects the effect of the British strike. 
World consumption of cotton: in 1925-26‹108.3 per 
cent of pre-war; in 1926-27‹112.5 per cent of pre-war. 
World crop of five cereals69: in 1925‹107.2 per 
cent of pre-war; in 1926‹110.5 per cent; in 1927‹ 
112.3 per cent. 
Thus, slowly, in short steps, the general index of 
world production is moving forward and has exceeded 
the pre-war level. 
On the other hand, however, some capitalist countries 
are not merely going forward, but leaping forward, 
leaving behind the pre-war level; for example, the

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 279 
United States of America, and in some respects, Japan. 
Figures for the United States: growth of manufacturing 
industry in 1925‹148 per cent of pre-war; 1926‹152 per 
cent of pre-war; growth of mining industry in 1925‹ 
143 per cent of pre-war; 1926‹154 per cent. 
Growth of world trade. World trade is not advancing 
as rapidly as production, it usually lags behind 
production, but for all that it has approached the prewar 
level. Index of foreign trade all over the world 
and in the chief countries in 1925‹98.1 per cent of prewar; 
in 1926‹97.1 per cent. For individual countries: 
United States of America in 1925‹134.3 per cent of 
pre-war; in 1926‹143 per cent; France‹98.2 per cent 
and 99.2 per cent; Germany‹74.8 per cent and 73.6 
per cent; Japan‹176.9 and 170.1 per cent. 
Taken as a whole, world trade has already approached 
the pre-war level, and in some countries, the United 
States and Japan, for example, it has already exceeded 
the pre-war level. 
Lastly, a third series of facts testifying to technical 
progress, rationalisation of capitalist industry, creation 
of new industries, increasing trustification, increasing 
cartellisation of industry on an international scale. These 
facts, I think, are known to everybody. Therefore, 
I shall not dwell on them. I shall merely observe that 
capital has prospered not only as regards the growth of 
production and as regards trade as well, but also in the 
field of improving methods of production, in the field 
of technical progress and the rationalisation of production; 
moreover all this has led to the further strengthening 
of the largest trusts and to the organisation of new, 
powerful, monopolist cartels.

J. V. S T A L I N 280 
Such are the facts, comrades, that should be noted, 
and that should serve as our starting-point. 
Does all this mean that, thereby, the stabilisation 
of capitalism has become firm and lasting? Of course 
not! It was already stated in the report to the Fourteenth 
Congress70 that capitalism might reach the prewar 
level, might exceed that pre-war level, might rationalise 
its production, but that this did not mean‹did 
not by a long way mean‹that the stabilisation of capitalism 
could as a result become firm, that capitalism 
could recover its former, pre-war stability. On the contrary, 
this very stabilisation, the fact that production 
is growing, that trade is growing, that technical progress 
and production potentialities are increasing, 
whereas the world market, the limits of that market, and 
the spheres of influence of the individual imperialist 
groups, remain more or less stable‹precisely this is giving 
rise to a most profound and acute crisis of world 
capitalism, a crisis which is fraught with new wars 
and which threatens the existence of any stabilisation 
at all. 
Partial stabilisation is giving rise to an intensification 
of the crisis of capitalism, and the growing crisis 
is upsetting stabilisation‹such are the dialectics of 
the development of capitalism in the present period of 
history. 
b) The most characteristic feature of this growth 
of production and trade of world capitalism is that the 
development proceeds unevenly. Development is not 
taking place in such a way that the capitalist countries 
are moving forward one behind the other, smoothly 
and evenly, without hindering one another and without

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 281 
upsetting each other, but, on the contrary, in such a way 
that some countries are being ousted and are declining, 
while others are pushing forward and moving upward; 
it is proceeding in the form of a mortal struggle of continents 
and countries for supremacy in the market. 
The economic centre is shifting from Europe to 
America, from the Atlantic to the Pacific. The share 
of world trade of America and Asia is thereby growing 
at the expense of Europe. 
A few figures: in 1913, Europe¹s share of world 
foreign trade was 58.5 per cent, America Œs‹21.2 per 
cent and Asia¹s‹12.3 per cent; in 1925, however, 
Europe¹s share dropped to 50 per cent, America¹s share 
rose to 26.6 per cent and Asia¹s share rose to 16 per cent. 
Parallel with countries in which capitalism is tearing 
ahead (the U.S.A. and partly Japan), we have other 
countries which are in a state of economic decline (Britain). 
Parallel with growing capitalist Germany and 
rising countries which have been coming to the front 
in recent years (Canada, Australia, Argentina, China, 
India), we have countries in which capitalism is 
becoming stabilised (France, Italy). The number of 
claimants to markets is growing, production potentialities 
are growing, and supply is growing, but the 
dimensions of markets and the borders of spheres of 
influence remain more or less stable. 
Such is the basis of the growing irreconcilable contradictions 
of present-day capitalism. 
c) This contradiction between the growth of the production 
potentialities and the relative stability of markets 
lies at the root of the fact that the problem of markets 
is today the fundamental problem of capitalism.

J. V. S T A L I N 282 
An aggravation of the problem of markets in general, 
especially an aggravation of the problem of foreign 
markets, and an aggravation of the problem of markets 
for capital exports in particular‹such is the present 
state of capitalism. 
This, indeed, explains why it is becoming a common 
thing for mills and factories to work below capacity. 
Raising tariff barriers only adds fuel to the flames. Capitalism 
is becoming cramped in the framework of the 
present markets and spheres of influence. Peaceful 
attempts to solve the problem of markets have not produced 
results, nor could they do so. As everybody knows, 
the bankers¹ declaration in 1926 about free trade ended 
in a fiasco.71 The Economic Conference of the League 
of Nations in 1927, the object of which was to ³unite 
the economic interests² of the capitalist countries, also 
ended in a fiasco. The peaceful road to the solution of 
the problem of markets remains closed to capitalism. 
The only ³way out² left open for capitalism is a new 
redivision of colonies and of spheres of influence by 
force, by means of armed collisions, by means of new 
imperialist wars. 
Stabilisation is intensifying the crisis of capitalism. 
2. The International 
Policy of Capitalism and the Preparation 
of New Imperialist Wars 
a) In this connection, the question of redividing 
the world and spheres of influence, which constitute the 
basis of foreign markets, is today the principal question 
in the policy of world capitalism. I have already said

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
283 
that the existing distribution of colonies and spheres of 
influence brought about as a result of the last imperialist 
war has already become obsolete. It now fails to satisfy 
either the United States, which, not being content 
with South America, is trying to penetrate Asia (primarily 
China); or Britain, whose dominions and a number 
of whose most important Eastern markets are slipping 
from her hands; or Japan, which every now and 
again is ³obstructed² in China by Britain and America; 
or Italy and France, which have an incalculable number 
of ³points of dispute² in the Danubian countries and 
in the Mediterranean; and least of all does it satisfy 
Germany, which is still bereft of colonies. 
Hence the ³general² striving for a new redivision 
of markets and sources of raw materials. That the Asiatic 
markets and the routes to them are the chief arena 
of the struggle needs no proof. Hence a series of key 
problems, which are veritable hotbeds of new conflicts. 
Hence the so-called Pacific problem (the America- 
Japan-Britain antagonism) as the origin of the struggle 
for supremacy in Asia and on the routes to it. Hence 
the Mediterranean problem (the Britain-France-Italy 
antagonism) as the origin of the struggle for supremacy 
on the shores of the Mediterranean, as the origin of the 
struggle for the shortest routes to the East. Hence the 
aggravation of the oil problem (antagonism between 
Britain and America), for without oil it is impossible 
to wage war, and whoever has the advantage as regards 
oil has a chance of victory in the coming war. 
Recently, the-British press published Chamberlain¹s 
³latest² plan for ³settling² the Mediterranean problem. 
I cannot guarantee the authenticity of this plan; but 
THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

J. V. S T A L I N 284 
there can be no doubt that the appearance of Chamberlain¹s 
plan in the press is symptomatic. According to 
this plan, the ³mandate² for Syria is to be transferred 
from France to Italy, Tangiers is to be transferred to 
France on the payment of financial compensation to 
Spain, the Cameroons are to be restored to Germany, 
Italy is to pledge herself to stop ³making trouble² in 
the Balkans, etc. 
All this is on the pretext of fighting the Soviets. 
It is well known that no dirty work is undertaken nowadays 
without dragging in the Soviets. 
But what is the real intention of this plan? Its intention 
is to oust the French bourgeoisie from Syria. Since 
ancient times Syria has been the gate to the East, to 
Mesopotamia, Egypt, etc. From Syria it is possible 
to do harm to Britain both in the area of the Suez Canal 
and in the area of Mesopotamia. And so, apparently, 
Chamberlain wants to put a stop to this unpleasant 
state of affairs. Needless to say, the appearance of this 
plan in the press cannot be called an accident. The 
value of this fact is that it presents a vivid picture 
of the squabbles, conflicts and military collisions which 
can arise from the present relations between the socalled 
³great powers.² 
As regards the present state of the oil problem and 
the struggle around it, this is spoken of rather eloquently 
in the October issue of the well-known American magazine 
The World¹s Work72: 
³Herein lies a very real danger to peace and understanding between 
the Anglo-Saxon peoples. . . . The support of American businessmen 
by the State Department will inevitably become stronger 
as the need for it increases. If the British Government becomes iden

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 285 
tified with the British oil industry, sooner or later the American 
Government will become identified with the American oil industry. 
The struggle cannot be transferred to the governments without 
vastly increasing the danger of war.² 
This leaves no room for doubt: things are moving 
towards the organisation of new coalitions of powers 
in order to prepare new wars for foreign markets, 
for sources of raw materials, and for the routes to 
them. 
b) Have attempts been made during the period 
under review to bring about a ³peaceful settlement² 
of the maturing military conflicts? Yes, there have been 
more of them than might have been expected; but they 
have led to nothing, absolutely nothing. Not only that; 
those attempts have turned out to be merely a screen 
for the preparations that the ³powers² are making for 
new wars, a screen intended to deceive the people, to 
deceive ³public opinion.² 
Take the League of Nations, which, according to 
the mendacious bourgeois press, and the no less mendacious 
Social-Democratic press, is an instrument of 
peace. What has all the League of Nations¹ talk about 
peace, disarmament, reduction of armaments led to? 
To nothing, except the deception of the masses, except 
new spurts in armaments, except a further aggravation 
of the maturing conflicts. Can it be regarded as accidental 
that although the League of Nations has been talking 
about peace and disarmament for three years, and 
although the so-called Second International has been 
giving its support to this mendacious talk for three 
years, the ³nations² are continuing to arm more and 
more, expanding the old conflicts among the ³powers,²

J. V. S T A L I N 286 
piling up new conflicts, and thus undermining the cause 
of peace? 
What does the failure of the tripartite conference 
for the reduction of naval armaments (Britain, America 
and Japan)73 indicate, if not that the Pacific problem 
is the source of new imperialist wars, that the ³powers² 
do not want either to disarm or to reduce armaments? 
What has the League of Nations done to avert this 
danger? 
Or take, for example, the recent declarations of the 
Soviet delegation in Geneva on the question of genuine 
disarmament (and not window-dressing).74 What is the 
explanation of the fact that Comrade Litvinov¹s straightforward 
and honest declaration in favour of complete 
disarmament struck the League of Nations with paralysis 
and came as a ³complete surprise² to it? Does not 
this fact show that the League of Nations is not an instrument 
of peace and disarmament, but an instrument 
for covering up new armaments and the preparation 
of new wars? 
The venal bourgeois press of all countries, from 
Japan to Britain, from France to America, is shouting 
at the top of its voice that the Soviet disarmament proposals 
are ³insincere.² In that case, why not test the 
sincerity of the Soviet proposals and proceed at once, 
in practice, to disarm, or at least considerably to reduce 
armaments? What prevents this? 
Or, for example, the present system of ³friendship 
pacts² between capitalist states: the pact between 
France and Yugoslavia, the pact between Italy and 
Albania, the ³pact of friendship² between Poland and 
Lithuania that Pilsudski is preparing, the ³Locarno

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 287 
system,²75 the ³spirit of Locarno,² etc.‹what is this 
if not a system of preparation of new wars and of alignment 
of forces for future military collisions? 
Or take, for example, the following facts: from 
1913 to 1927 the numerical strength of the armies of 
France, Britain, Italy, the United States and Japan 
increased from 1,888,000 to 2,262,000 men; in the same 
period the military budgets of the same countries grew 
from 2,345 million gold rubles to 3,948 million; in the 
period from 1923 to 1927, the number of aircraft in 
commission in these five countries rose from 2,655 to 
4,340; the cruiser tonnage of these five powers rose from 
724,000 tons in 1922 to 864,000 tons in 1926; the position 
as regards war chemicals is illustrated by the wellknown 
statement of General Fries, Chief of the United 
States Chemical Warfare Service: ³One chemical airbomb 
of 450 kilograms charged with Lewisite can make 
ten blocks of New York uninhabitable, and 100 tons of 
Lewisite dropped from 50 aeroplanes can make the whole 
of New York uninhabitable, at least for a week.² 
What do these facts show if not that the preparation 
of a new war is in full swing? 
Such are the results of the ³peace policy² and of 
the ³disarmament² policy of the bourgeois states in 
general, of the League of Nations especially, and of 
Social-Democratic servility to capital in particular. 
Formerly, the justification put forward for the 
growth of armaments was that Germany was armed 
from head to foot. Today this ³justification² falls to 
the ground because Germany has been disarmed. 
Is it not obvious that the growth of armaments is 
dictated by the inevitability of new imperialist wars

J. V. S T A L I N 288 
between the ³powers,² that the ³spirit of war² is the 
principal content of the ³spirit of Locarno²? 
I think that the present ³peaceful relations² could 
be likened to an old, worn-out shirt consisting of patches 
held together by a thin thread. It is enough to pull 
this thread fairly hard, to break it in some place or 
other, for the whole shirt to fall to pieces, leaving nothing 
but patches. It is enough to shake the present ³peaceful 
relations² somewhere in Albania or Lithuania, in 
China or North Africa, for the whole ³edifice of peaceful 
relations² to collapse. 
That is how things were before the last imperialist 
war, when the assassination in Sarajevo76 led to war. 
That is how things are now. 
Stabilisation is inevitably giving rise to new imperialist 
wars. 
3. The State of the World 
Revolutionary Movement and the Harbingers 
of a New Revolutionary Upsurge 
a) For waging war, increased armaments are not 
enough, the organisation of new coalitions is not enough. 
For this it is necessary in addition to strengthen the 
rear in the capitalist countries. Not a single capitalist 
country can wage an important war unless i t first 
strengthens its own rear, unless it curbs ³its² workers, 
unless it curbs ³its² colonies. Hence the gradual fascisation 
of the policy of the bourgeois governments. 
The fact that the Right bloc now rules in France, 
the Hicks-Deterding-Urquhart bloc in Britain, the bourgeois 
bloc in Germany, the war party in Japan,

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 289 
and fascist governments in Italy and Poland, cannot 
be called accidental. 
Hence the pressure that is being brought to bear 
upon the working class: the Trade-Union Act in 
Britain,77 the law on ³arming the nation² in France,78 
the abolition of the eight-hour day in a number of countries, 
and the offensive of the bourgeoisie against the 
proletariat everywhere. 
Hence the increased pressure that is being brought 
to bear upon the colonies and dependent countries, the 
reinforcement there of imperialist troops, whose number 
has now reached a million, of which over 700,000 are 
quartered in the British ³spheres of influence² and 
³possessions.² 
b) It is not difficult to understand that this brutal 
pressure of the fascisised governments was bound to 
meet with a counter-movement on the part of the oppressed 
peoples in the colonies and of the working class 
in the metropolises. Facts like the growth of the revolutionary 
movement in China, Indonesia, India, etc., 
cannot fail to have a decisive significance for the fate 
of world imperialism. 
Judge for yourselves. Of the 1,905 million inhabitants 
of the entire globe, 1,134 million live in the colonies 
and dependent countries, 143,000,000 live in the 
U.S.S.R., 264,000,000 live in the intermediate countries, 
and only 363,000,000 live in the big imperialist 
countries, which oppress the colonies and dependent 
countries. 
Clearly, the revolutionary awakening of the colonial 
and dependent countries presages the end of world imperialism. 
The fact that the Chinese revolution has not

J. V. S T A L I N 290 
yet led to direct victory over imperialism cannot be of 
decisive significance for the prospects of the revolution. 
Great popular revolutions never achieve final victory 
in the first round of their battles. They grow and gain 
strength in the course of flows and ebbs. That has been 
so everywhere, including Russia. So it will be in China. 
The most important result of the Chinese revolution 
is the fact that it has awakened from age-long 
slumber and has set in motion hundreds of millions of 
exploited and oppressed people, has utterly exposed the 
counter-revolutionary character of the cliques of generals, 
has torn the mask from the faces of the Kuomintang 
servitors of counter-revolution, has raised the prestige 
of the Communist Party among the masses of the 
common people, has raised the movement as a whole 
to a higher stage and has roused new hope in the hearts 
of the millions of the oppressed classes in India, Indonesia, 
etc. Only the blind and the faint-hearted can doubt 
that the Chinese workers and peasants are moving towards 
a new revolutionary upsurge. 
As regards the revolutionary working-class move 
ent in Europe, here in this sphere, too, we have obvious 
signs of a swing to the Left on the part of the rank-andfile 
workers and of a revolutionary revival. Facts like 
the British general strike and coal strike, the revolutionary 
action of the workers in Vienna, the revolutionary 
demonstrations in France and Germany in connection 
with the murder of Sacco and Vanzetti, the 
election successes achieved by the German and Polish 
Communist Parties, the obvious differentiation that 
is taking place in the British working-class movement, 
whereby the workers are moving to the Left while the

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 291 
leaders are moving to the Right, into the camp of avowed 
social-imperialism, the degeneration of the Second 
International into a direct appendage of the imperialist 
League of Nations, the decline of the prestige of 
the Social-Democratic parties among the broad masses 
of the working class, the universal growth of the influence 
and prestige of the Comintern and its sections 
among the proletarians in all countries, the growth of 
the prestige of the U.S.S.R. among the oppressed classes 
all over the world, the ³Congress of the Friends of 
the U.S.S.R.,²79 etc.‹all these facts undoubtedly 
indicate that Europe is entering a new period of revolutionary 
upsurge. 
If a fact like the murder of Sacco and Vanzetti could 
give rise to working-class demonstrations, it undoubtedly 
indicates that revolutionary energy has accumulated 
in the depths of the working class and is seeking, 
and will continue to seek, a cause, an occasion, sometimes 
seemingly most insignificant, to break to the surface 
and hurl itself upon the capitalist regime. 
We are living on the eve of a new revolutionary upsurge 
both in the colonies and in the metropolises. 
Stabilisation is giving rise to a new revolutionary 
upsurge. 
4. The Capitalist World and the U.S.S.R. 
a) Thus, we have all the symptoms of a most profound 
crisis and of the growing instability of world 
capitalism. 
Whereas the temporary post-war economic crisis of 
1920-21, with the chaos within the capitalist countries,

J. V. S T A L I N 292 
and the breakdown of their external ties, may be regarded 
as having been overcome, as a result of which a period 
of partial stabilisation has begun, the general and 
fundamental crisis of capitalism ushered in as a result 
of the victory of the October Revolution and the dropping 
out of the U.S.S.R. from the world capitalist system, 
far from being overcome is, on the contrary, becoming 
deeper and deeper, and is shaking the very foundations 
of the existence of world capitalism. 
Far from hindering the development of this general 
and fundamental crisis, stabilisation, on the contrary, 
has provided the basis and source for its further development. 
The growing struggle for markets, the necessity 
of a new redivision of the world and of spheres of influence, 
the bankruptcy of bourgeois pacifism and of 
the League of Nations, the feverish efforts to form new 
coalitions and to align forces in view of the possibility 
of a new war, the furious growth of armaments, the savage 
pressure upon the working class and the colonial 
countries, the growth of the revolutionary movement 
in the colonies and in Europe, the growth of the prestige 
of the Comintern throughout the world, and lastly, the 
consolidation of the might of the Soviet Union and its 
enhanced prestige among the workers of Europe and the 
labouring masses in the colonies‹all these are facts 
which cannot but shake the very foundations of world 
capitalism. 
The stabilisation of capitalism is becoming more and 
more putrid and unstable. 
Whereas a couple of years ago it was possible and 
necessary to speak of the ebb of the revolutionary tide 
in Europe, today we have every ground for asserting

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 293 
that Europe is obviously entering a period of new revolutionary 
upsurge; to say nothing of the colonies and dependent 
countries, where the position of the imperialists 
is becoming more and more catastrophic. 
b) The capitalists¹ hopes of taming the U.S.S.R., 
of its capitalistic degeneration, of the decline of its 
prestige among the workers of Europe and the labouring 
masses of the colonies, have collapsed. The U.S.S.R. 
is growing and developing precisely as a country which 
is building socialism. Its influence among the workers 
and peasants all over the world is growing and gaining 
strength. The very existence of the U.S.S.R. as a country 
which is building socialism is one of the greatest 
factors in the disintegration of world imperialism and 
in the undermining of its stability both in Europe and 
in the colonies. The U.S.S.R. is obviously becoming 
the banner of the working class of Europe and of the 
oppressed peoples of the colonies. 
Therefore, to clear the ground for future imperialist 
wars, to secure a tighter grip on ³their² working 
class and to curb ³their² colonies with the object of 
strengthening the capitalist rear, it is necessary, the bourgeois 
bosses think, first of all to curb the U.S.S.R., that 
seat and hotbed of revolution, which, moreover, could 
be one of the biggest markets for the capitalist countries. 
Hence the revival of interventionist tendencies 
among the imperialists, the policy of isolating the 
U.S.S.R., the policy of encircling the U.S.S.R., the 
policy of preparing the conditions for war against 
the U.S.S.R. 
The strengthening of interventionist tendencies in 
the camp of the imperialists and the threat of war (against

J. V. S T A L I N 294 
the U.S.S.R.) is one of the basic factors in the present 
situation. 
I t is considered that the most ³threatened² and 
³injured² party under the conditions of the developing 
crisis of capitalism is the British bourgeoisie. And it 
is the British bourgeoisie that has taken the initiative 
in strengthening interventionist tendencies. Obviously, 
the assistance that the Soviet workers rendered the British 
coal miners, and the sympathy of the working class 
of the U.S.S.R. for the revolutionary movement in 
China, could not but add fuel to the flames. All these 
circumstances determined Britain¹s rupture with the 
U.S.S.R. and the worsening of relations with a number 
of other states. 
c) The struggle between two tendencies in the relations 
between the capitalist world and the U.S.S.R., 
the tendency towards military aggression (primarily 
Britain) and the tendency to continue peaceful relations 
(a number of other capitalist countries), is, in view of 
this, the basic fact in our foreign relations at the present 
time. 
Facts which denote the tendency towards peaceful 
relations during the period under review are: the Non- 
Aggression Pact with Turkey; the Guarantee Pact with 
Germany; the Tariff Agreement with Greece; the agreement 
with Germany on credits; the Guarantee Pact 
with Afghanistan; the Guarantee Pact with Lithuania; 
the initialling of a Guarantee Pact with Latvia; the 
Trade Agreement with Turkey; the settlement of the 
conflict with Switzerland; the Treaty of Neutrality with 
Persia; improvement in relations with Japan; growth 
of commercial intercourse with America and Italy.

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 295 
Facts which denote the tendency towards military 
aggression during the period under review are: the 
British Note in connection with financial assistance to 
the striking coal miners; the raid on the Soviet diplomatic 
representatives in Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai; 
the raid on Arcos; Britain¹s rupture with the 
U.S.S.R.; the assassination of Voikov; terroristic acts 
by British hirelings in the U.S.S.R.; strained relations 
with France on the question of the recall of Rakovsky. 
Whereas a year or two ago it was possible and necessary 
to speak of a period of a certain equilibrium and 
³peaceful co-existence² between the U.S.S.R. and the 
capitalist countries, today we have every ground for 
asserting that the period of ³peaceful co-existence² is 
receding into the past, giving place to a period of imperialist 
assaults and preparation for intervention against 
the U.S.S.R. 
True, Britain¹s attempts to form a united front 
against the U.S.S.R. have failed so far. The reasons 
for this failure are: the contradiction of interests in 
the camp of the imperialists; the fact that some countries 
are interested in economic relations with the 
U.S.S.R.; the peace policy of the U.S.S.R.; the counter-
action of the working class of Europe; the imperialists¹ 
fear of unleashing revolution in their own countries 
in the event of war against the U.S.S.R. But this 
does not mean that Britain will abandon her efforts 
to organise a united front against the U.S.S.R., that 
she will fail to organise such a front. The threat of 
war remains in force, despite Britain¹s temporary 
setbacks.

J. V. S T A L I N 296 
Hence the task is to take into account the contradictions 
in the camp of the imperialists, to postpone 
war by ³buying off² the capitalists and to take all 
measures to maintain peaceful relations. 
We must not forget Lenin¹s statement that as regards 
our work of construction very much depends upon 
whether we succeed in postponing war with the capitalist 
world, which is inevitable, but which can be postponed 
either until the moment when the proletarian 
revolution in Europe matures, or until the moment 
when the colonial revolutions have fully matured, or, 
lastly, until the moment when the capitalists come to 
blows over the division of the colonies. 
Therefore, the maintenance of peaceful relations 
with the capitalist countries is an obligatory task for us. 
Our relations with the capitalist countries are based 
on the assumption that the co-existence of two opposite 
systems is possible. Practice has fully confirmed 
this. Sometimes the question of debts and credits is a 
stumbling-block. In this our policy is clear. It is based 
on the formula: ³give and take.² If you give us credits 
with which to fertilise our industry, you will get some 
part of the pre-war debts, which we regard as extra 
interest on the credits. If you give nothing, you will 
get nothing. Facts show that we have some achievements 
to record as regards receiving industrial credits. 
I have in mind just now not only Germany, but also 
America and Britain. Wherein lies the secret? In the 
fact that our country could be a vast market for imports 
of equipment, while the capitalist countries need markets 
for precisely that kind of goods.

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 297 
5. Conclusions 
To sum up, we have: 
Firstly, the growth of the contradictions within the 
capitalist encirclement; the necessity for capitalism 
of a new redivision of the world by means of war; the 
interventionist tendencies of one part of the capitalist 
world headed by Britain; the reluctance of the other 
part of the capitalist world to become involved in war 
against the U.S.S.R., preferring to establish economic 
relations with it; a conflict between these two tendencies 
and a certain possibility for the U.S.S.R. to turn these 
contradictions to account for the purpose of maintaining 
peace. 
Secondly, we have the collapsing stabilisation; the 
growth of the colonial-revolutionary movement; the 
signs of a new revolutionary upsurge in Europe; 
the growth of the prestige of the Comintern and its 
sections throughout the world; the obvious growth 
of the sympathy of the working class of Europe for 
the U.S.S.R.; the growing might of the U.S.S.R. 
and the growing prestige of the working class of our 
country among the oppressed classes throughout the 
world. 
Hence the Party¹s tasks: 
1) In the sphere of the international revolutionary 
movement: 
a) to strive to develop the Communist Parties throughout 
the world; 
b) to strive to strengthen the revolutionary trade unions 
and the workers¹ united front against the capitalist offensive;

J. V. S T A L I N 298 
c) to strive to strengthen the friendship between the 
working class of the U.S.S.R. and the working class in 
the capitalist countries; 
d) to strive to strengthen the link between the working 
class of the U.S.S.R. and the liberation movement in the 
colonies and dependent countries. 
2) In the sphere of the U.S.S.R.¹s foreign policy: 
a) to combat the preparations for new imperialist 
wars; 
b) to combat Britain¹s interventionist tendencies and 
to strive to strengthen the U.S.S.R.¹s defensive capacity; 
c) to pursue a policy of peace and to maintain peaceful 
relations with the capitalist countries; 
d) to expand our trade with the outside world on the 
basis of strengthening the monopoly of foreign trade; 
e) rapprochement with the so-called ³weak² and ³unequal² 
states, which are suffering from oppression and 
exploitation by the ruling imperialist powers. 
II 
THE SUCCESSES OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 
AND THE INTERNAL SITUATION 
IN THE U.S.S.R. 
Permit me, comrades, to pass to the internal situation 
in our country, to the successes of our socialist 
construction, to the question of the fate of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, of its development, of its consolidation. 
The Fourteenth Congress of our Party instructed the 
Central Committee to direct the development of our 
national economy from the standpoint of the following 
principal tasks:

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 299 
firstly, that our policy should promote the progressive 
growth of production in the national economy as 
a whole; 
secondly, that the Party¹s policy should promote 
the acceleration of the rate of development of industry 
and ensure for industry the leading role in the whole 
of the national economy; 
thirdly, that in the course of development of the 
national economy, the socialist sector of the national 
economy, the socialist forms of economy, should be 
ensured ever-increasing relative importance at the expense 
of the private-commodity and capitalist sectors; 
fourthly, that our economic development as a whole, 
the organisation of new branches of industry, the 
development of certain branches for raw materials, etc., 
should be conducted along such lines that the general 
development should ensure the economic independence 
of our country, that our country should not become 
an appendage of the capitalist system of world 
economy; 
fifthly, that the dictatorship of the proletariat, the 
bloc of the working class and the peasant masses, and 
the leadership by the working class in this bloc, should 
be strengthened, and 
sixthly, that the material and cultural conditions 
of the working class and of the rural poor should be 
steadily improved. 
What has our Party, the Central Committee of our 
Party, done in regard to carrying out these tasks during 
the period under review?

J. V. S T A L I N 300 
1. The National Economy as a Whole 
First question‹development of the national economy 
as a whole. I shall quote here some of the principal 
figures showing the growth of the national economy as 
a whole, and of industry and agriculture in particular, 
during the period under review. I take these figures 
from the estimates of the State Planning Commission. I 
have in mind the State Planning Commission¹s control figures 
for 1927-28 and the rough draft of the five-year plan. 
a) Growth of production in the whole of the national 
economy of the U.S.S.R. during the two years. Whereas 
in 1924-25, according to the State Planning Commission¹s 
new calculations, the gross output of agriculture 
amounted to 87.3 per cent of the pre-war level and the 
output of industry as a whole amounted to 63.7 per cent 
of the pre-war level, now, two years later, in 1926-27, 
agricultural output already amounts to 108.3 per cent, 
and industrial output to 100.9 per cent. According to 
the State Planning Commission¹s control figures for 
1927-28, a further increase in agricultural output to 
111.8 per cent of pre-war and of industrial output to 
114.4 per cent of pre-war is anticipated. 
The growth of trade turn-over (wholesale and retail) in 
the country during the two years. Taking the volume of 
trade in 1924-25 at 100 (14,613 million chervonets rubles), 
we have an increase in 1926-27 by 97 per cent (28,775 million 
rubles), and in 1927-28 a further growth to over 116 
per cent of the previous year (33,440 million rubles) is 
anticipated. 
The development of our credit system during the 
two years. Taking the combined balance-sheets of all

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 301 
our credit institutions on October 1, 1925, at 100 
(5,343 million chervonets rubles), we have an increase 
on July 1, 1927 by 53 per cent (8,175 million rubles). 
There are no grounds for doubting that 1927-28 will 
show a further growth of our nationalised credit system. 
The development of railway transport during the 
two years. Whereas the freight turn-over of the whole 
of our railway system in 1924-25 amounted to 63.1 per 
cent of pre-war, now, in 1926-27, it amounts to 99.1 per 
cent, and in 1927-28 it will amount to 111.6 per cent. 
That is apart from the fact that during these two years 
the total length of our railways increased from 74,400 
kilometres to 76,200 kilometres, which is an increase 
of 30.3 per cent above the pre-war level and of 8.9 per 
cent above the level of 1917. 
The growth of the state budget during the two years. 
Whereas our combined budget (the single state budget 
plus the local budgets) in 1925-26 amounted to 72.4 per 
cent of pre-war (5,024 million rubles), at the present 
time, i.e., 1927-28, the combined budget should amount 
to 110-112 per cent of pre-war (over 7,000 million rubles). 
The increase during the two years is 41.5 per cent. 
The growth of foreign trade during the two years. 
Whereas our total foreign trade turn-over in 1924-25 
amounted to 1,282 million rubles, i.e., about 27 per 
cent of pre-war, now, in 1926-27, we have a turn-over 
of 1,483 million rubles, i.e., 35.6 per cent of pre-war, 
and it is anticipated that in 1927-28 we shall have a 
turn-over of 1,626 million rubles, i.e., 37.9 per cent 
of pre-war. 
The causes of the slow rate of development of foreign 
trade:

J. V. S T A L I N 302 
firstly, the fact that the bourgeois states often place 
obstacles in the way of our foreign trade which sometimes 
amount to a secret blockade; 
secondly, the fact that we cannot trade according 
to the bourgeois formula: ³we shall export, even if we 
go short of food.² 
A good feature is the favourable balance of the People¹s 
Commissariat of Foreign Trade in 1926-27, amounting 
to 57 million rubles. This is the first year since 
1923-24 that we have had a favourable balance of foreign 
trade. 
Summing up, we have the following picture of the 
general growth of the total national income during the 
two years: whereas the national income of the U.S.S.R. 
in 1924-25 amounted to 15,589 million chervonets rubles, 
in 1925-26 we had 20,252 million rubles, i.e., an 
increase for the year of 29.9 per cent; and in 1926-27 we 
had 22,560 million rubles, i.e., an increase of 11.4 per 
cent for the year. According to the State Planning Commission¹s 
control figures, in 1927-28 we shall have 
24,208 million rubles, i.e., an increase of 7.3 per cent. 
Bearing in mind that the average annual increase 
in the national income of the United States does not 
exceed 3-4 per cent (only once, in the eighties of the last 
century, did the United States have an increase in national 
income of about 7 per cent), and that the annual 
increase in the national income of other countries, Britain 
and Germany, for example, does not exceed 1-3 per 
cent, it must be admitted that the rate of growth of the 
national income of the U.S.S.R. during the last few years 
is a record one compared with that of the major capitalist 
countries of Europe and America.

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 303 
Conclusion: the national economy of our country is 
growing at a rapid rate. 
The Party¹s task: further to promote the development 
of our country¹s national economy in all branches of production. 
b) The growth of our national economy is proceeding 
not blindly, not along the line of a simple quantitative 
increase in production, but in a known, strictly 
defined direction. The decisive factors in the development 
of the national economy during the past two 
years have been the following two principal circumstances: 
Firstly, the key-note of the development of our national 
economy is the industrialisation of the country, 
the increasingly important role of industry in relation 
to agriculture. 
Secondly, the development of the national economy, 
the industrialisation of the country, is proceeding in 
the direction of an increase in the relative importance and 
commanding role of the socialist forms of economy, in both 
production and trade, at the expense of the privatecommodity 
and capitalist sectors. 
Figures showing the increase of the relative importance 
of industry in the national economy (exclusive 
of transport and electrification). Whereas in 1924-25, 
industry¹s share of the gross output of the national 
economy, calculated at pre-war prices, amounted to 
32.4 per cent, and the share of agriculture to 67.6 per 
cent, in 1926-27 industry¹s share rose to 38 per cent 
while the share of agriculture dropped to 62 per cent. 
In 1927-28, industry¹s share should rise to 40.2 and 
that of agriculture should drop to 59.8 per cent.

J. V. S T A L I N 304 
Figures showing the increase in the relative importance 
of the production of instruments and means of 
production‹which is the chief core of industry, as compared 
with the whole of industry during the two years: 
in 1924-25 the share of production of means of production‹
34.1 per cent; in 1926-27‹37.6 per cent; 
in 1927-28 it is proposed to bring it up to 38.6 per 
cent. 
Figures showing the increase of the relative importance 
of the production of means of production in state 
large-scale industry during the two years: in 1924-25‹ 
42.0 per cent; in 1926-27‹44.0 per cent; in 1927-28 it 
is proposed to bring it up to 44.9 per cent. 
As regards industry¹s output of commodities and 
the relative importance of this output in the total volume 
of commodities, industry¹s share in the two years 
rose from 53.1 per cent in 1924-25 to 59.5 per cent in 
1926-27, and in 1927-28 it should reach 60.7 per cent, 
whereas agriculture¹s share of the output of commodities 
amounted to 46.9 per cent in 1924-25, dropped to 40.5 per 
cent in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 should drop further to 
39.3 per cent. 
Conclusion: our country is becoming an industrial 
country. 
The Party¹s task: to take all measures further to promote 
the industrialisation of our country. 
Figures showing the growth of the relative importance 
and commanding role of the socialist forms of 
economy at the expense of the private-commodity and 
capitalist sectors during the two years. Whereas capital 
investments in the socialised sector of the national economy 
(state and co-operative industry, transport, elec

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 305 
trification, etc.) increased from 1,231 million rubles 
in 1924-25 to 2,683 million rubles in 1926-27, and in 
1927-28 should rise to 3,456 million rubles, which amounts 
to an increase from 43.8 per cent of total investments in 
1924-25 to 65.3 per cent in 1927-28‹investments in 
the non-socialised sector of the national economy have 
been relatively decreasing all the time, and in absolute 
figures have increased only slightly from 1,577 million 
rubles in 1924-25 to 1,717 million rubles in 1926-27, 
and in 1927-28 should reach the figure of 1,836 million 
rubles, which will be a fall in the relative importance 
of investments in the non-socialised sector from 56.2 per 
cent in 1924-25 to 34.7 per cent in 1927-28. 
Whereas the gross output of the socialised sector of 
industry rose from 81 per cent in 1924-25 to 86 per cent 
of the total industrial output in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 
should rise to 86.9 per cent, the share of the non-socialised 
sector of industry has been falling year by year: 
from 19 per cent of the total industrial output in 1924-25 
to 14 per cent in 1926-27, and in 1927-28 it should fall 
still further to 13.1 per cent. 
As regards the part played by private capital in 
large-scale (statistically registered) industry, it is falling 
not only relatively (3.9 per cent in 1924-25 and 
2.4 per cent in 1926-27), but also absolutely (169 million 
pre-war rubles in 1924-25 and 165 million pre-war 
rubles in 1926-27). 
The same ousting of private capitalist elements is 
seen in the sphere of home trade. Whereas in 1924-25 
the socialised sector¹s share of the total trade turn-over 
(wholesale and retail) amounted to 72.6 per cent‹ 
wholesale 90.6 per cent and retail 57.3 per cent, in

J. V. S T A L I N 306 
1926-27 the socialised sector ¹s share of total trade 
rose to 81.9 per cent‹wholesale to 94.9 per cent and 
retail to 67.4 per cent. On the other hand, the private 
sector¹s share dropped in this period from 27.4 per cent 
of total trade to 18.1 per cent‹wholesale from 9.4 per 
cent to 5.1 per cent and retail from 42.7 per cent to 
32.6 per cent, and in 1927-28 a further drop in the private 
sector¹s share in all branches of trade is anticipated. 
Conclusion: our country is confidently and rapidly 
proceeding towards socialism, pushing the capitalist elements 
into the background and step by step ousting them 
from the national economy. 
This fact reveals to us the basis of the question: ³Who 
will beat whom?² This question was raised by Lenin 
in 1921, after the New Economic Policy was introduced. 
Shall we succeed in linking our socialised industry 
with peasant economy, ousting the private trader, the 
private capitalist, and learning to trade; or will private 
capital beat us by causing a split between the proletariat 
and the peasantry?‹that is how the question stood 
at that time. Now we can say that, in the main, we have 
already achieved decisive successes in this sphere. Only 
the blind or the imbecile can deny that. 
Now, however, the question: ³Who will beat whom?² 
assumes a different character. This question is now 
shifting from the sphere of trade to the sphere of production, 
to the sphere of handicraft production, to the 
sphere of agricultural production, where private capital 
is of a certain importance, and from which it must be 
systematically eliminated. 
The Party¹s task: to extend and consolidate our socialist 
key positions in all branches of the nation

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 307 
al economy, both in town and country, pursuing a course 
towards the elimination of the capitalist elements from the 
national economy. 
2. The Rate of Development of Our 
Large-Scale Socialist Industry 
a) The growth of the output of large-scale nationalised 
industry, which constitutes over 77 per cent of all 
industry in the country. Whereas in 1925-26 the increase 
in output (calculated in pre-war rubles) of large-scale 
nationalised industry over that of the preceding year 
amounted to 42.2 per cent, in 1926-27 to 18.2 per cent, 
and in 1927-28 will amount to 15.8 per cent, the State 
Planning Commission¹s rough and very conservative 
five-year estimates provide for an increase in output 
during five years of 76.7 per cent, with an average arithmetical 
annual increase of 15 per cent and an increase 
in industrial output in 1931-32 to double the pre-war 
output. 
If we take the gross output of all industry in the 
country, both large-scale (state and private) and small 
industry, then the annual, average arithmetical increase 
in output, according to the State Planning Commission¹s 
five-year estimates, will be about 12 per cent, 
which will be an increase in total industrial output in 
1931-32 of nearly 70 per cent compared with the prewar 
level. 
In America, the annual increase in total industrial 
output for the five years 1890-95 was 8.2 per cent, for 
the five years 1895-1900‹5.2 per cent, for the five years 
1900-05‹2.6 per cent, for the five years 1905-10‹3.6

J. V. S T A L I N 308 
per cent. In Russia, for the ten years 1895-1905, the average 
annual increase was 10.7 per cent, for the eight years 
1905-13‹8.1 per cent. 
The percentage of annual increase in the output of our 
socialist industry, and also in the output of all industry, 
is a record one, such as not a single big capitalist country 
in the world can show. 
And that is in spite of the fact that American industry, 
and especially Russian pre-war industry, were 
abundantly fertilised by a powerful flow of foreign capital, 
whereas our nationalised industry is compelled to 
base itself on its own accumulations. 
And that is in spite of the fact that our nationalised 
industry has already entered the period of reconstruction, 
when the re-equipment of old factories and the erection 
of new ones has acquired decisive importance for increasing 
industrial output. 
In the rate of its development, our industry in general, 
and our socialist industry in particular, is overtaking 
and outstripping the development of industry in the 
capitalist countries. 
b) How is this unprecedented rate of development of 
our large-scale industry to be explained? 
Firstly, by the fact that it is nationalised industry, 
thanks to which it is free from the selfish and anti-social 
interests of private capitalist groups and is able to develop 
in conformity with the interests of society 
as a whole. 
Secondly, by the fact that it is conducted on a larger 
scale and is more concentrated than industry anywhere 
else in the world, thanks to which it has every possibility 
of beating private capitalist industry.

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 309 
Thirdly, by the fact that the state, controlling nationalised 
transport, nationalised credit, nationalised 
foreign trade and the general state budget, has every 
possibility of directing nationalised industry in a planned 
way, as a single industrial enterprise, which gives 
it enormous advantages over all other industry and 
accelerates its rate of development many times over. 
Fourthly, by the fact that nationalised industry, 
being industry of the biggest and most powerful kind, 
has every possibility of pursuing a policy of steadily 
reducing production costs, of reducing wholesale 
prices and cheapening its products, thereby expanding 
the market for its products, increasing the capacity 
of the home market and creating for itself a continuously 
increasing source for the further expansion of production. 
Fifthly, by the fact that nationalised industry is 
able for many reasons, one of them being that it pursues 
the policy of reducing prices, to develop under conditions 
of gradual rapprochement between town and country, 
between the proletariat and the peasantry, in contrast 
with capitalist industry, which develops under 
conditions of increasing enmity between the bourgeois 
town, which bleeds the peasantry white, and the decaying 
countryside. 
Lastly, by the fact that nationalised industry is 
based on the working class, which is the leader in all 
our development, thanks to which it is able more easily 
to develop technology in general, and the productivity 
of labour in particular, and to apply rationalisation to 
production and management, with the support of the 
broad masses of the working class, which is not and cannot 
be the case under the capitalist system of industry.

J. V. S T A L I N 310 
All this is proved beyond doubt by the rapid growth 
of our technology during the past two years and the rapid 
development of new branches of industry (machines, 
machine-tools, turbines, automobiles and aircraft, 
chemicals, etc.). 
It is also proved by the rationalisation of production 
that we are carrying out, along with a shorter working 
day (a 7-hour day) and along with a steady improvement 
in the material and cultural conditions of the 
working class, which is not and cannot be the case under 
the capitalist system of economy. 
The unprecedented rate of development of our socialist 
industry is direct and indubitable proof of the superiority 
of the Soviet system of production over the capitalist system. 
Lenin was right in saying, as far back as September 
1917, before the Bolsheviks had captured power, that 
after establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat 
we can and must ³overtake and outstrip the advanced 
countries economically as well² (Vol. XXI, p. 191). 
The Party¹s task: to maintain the achieved rate of 
development of socialist industry and to increase it in 
the near future with the object of creating the favourable 
conditions necessary for overtaking and outstripping the 
advanced capitalist countries. 
3. The Rate of Development of Our Agriculture 
a) In the countryside, on the other hand, we have 
a relatively slow growth of output. Whereas in 1925-26 
the increase in gross output (calculated in pre-war rubles) 
compared with the preceding year amounted to 19.2 per 
cent, in 1926-27 to 4.1 per cent, and in 1927-28 will

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 311 
amount to 3.2 per cent, the State Planning Commission¹s 
rough and very conservative five-year estimates provide 
for an increase in output during five years of 24 per cent, 
with an average arithmetical annual increase in output 
of 4.8 per cent, and with an increase in agricultural 
output in 1931-32 of 28-30 per cent compared with prewar 
output. 
This is a more or less tolerable annual increase in 
agricultural output. But it cannot possibly be called 
either a record one compared with the capitalist countries, 
or an adequate one for maintaining in the future the 
necessary equilibrium between agriculture and our nationalised 
industry. 
In the U.S.A., the annual increase in the gross output 
of agriculture was 9.3 per cent in the decade 1890- 
1900, 3.1 per cent in the decade 1900-10, and 1.4 per cent 
in the decade 1910-20. In pre-war Russia the annual 
increase in agricultural output in the decade 1900-11 was 
3.2-3.5 per cent. 
True, the annual increase in the output of our agriculture 
in the five-year period 1926-27‹1931-32 will 
amount to 4.8 per cent; moreover, as is seen, the percentage 
increase in agricultural output under Soviet conditions 
has grown compared with that in the period of 
capitalist Russia. But i t must not be forgotten that 
whereas the gross output of nationalised industry in 
1931-32 will be double that of pre-war industry and the 
output of all industry in 1931-32 will show an increase 
of about 70 per cent above the pre-war level, the output 
of agriculture by that time will exceed the pre-war 
agricultural output only by 28-30 per cent., i.e., by less 
than a third.

J. V. S T A L I N 312 
In view of this, the rate of development of our agriculture 
cannot be regarded as quite satisfactory. 
b) How is this relatively slow rate of development 
of agriculture compared with the rate of development 
of our nationalised industry to be explained? 
It is due to the extreme backwardness of our agricultural 
technique and the exceedingly low cultural 
level in the countryside, and particularly to the fact 
that our scattered agricultural production does not have 
the advantages that our large-scale, united, nationalised 
industry has. First of all, agricultural production 
is not nationalised and not united, but broken up and 
scattered. It is not carried on in a planned way, and 
for the time being an enormous part of it is subjected 
to the anarchy of small production. It is not united and 
organised in large units on the lines of collective farming 
and for that reason still provides a convenient field for 
exploitation by kulak elements. These circumstances 
deprive scattered agriculture of the colossal advantages 
of large-scale, united and planned production which 
our nationalised industry possesses. 
What is the way out for agriculture? Perhaps the 
slowing down of the rate of development of our industry 
in general and of our nationalised industry in particular? 
Under no circumstances! That would be most reactionary, 
anti-proletarian utopianism. (Voices: ³Quite 
right!²) Nationalised industry must and will develop 
at an accelerated rate. That is the guarantee of our 
advance to socialism. That is the guarantee that, finally, 
agriculture itself will be industrialised. 
What is the way out? The way out is to turn the 
small and scattered peasant farms into large united

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 313 
farms based on cultivation of the land in common, to 
go over to collective cultivation of the land on the basis 
of a new and higher technique. 
The way out is to unite the small and dwarf peasant 
farms gradually but surely, not by pressure, but by example 
and persuasion, into large farms based on common, 
co-operative, collective cultivation of the land with 
the use of agricultural machines and tractors and scientific 
methods of intensive agriculture. 
There is no other way out. 
Unless this is done, our agriculture will be unable 
either to overtake or to outstrip the capitalist countries 
with the most developed agriculture (Canada, etc.). 
All the measures we have taken to restrict the capitalist 
elements in agriculture, to develop the socialist 
elements in the countryside, to draw the peasant farms 
into the channel of co-operative development, to exercise 
planned influence by the state on the countryside 
by embracing peasant economy both as regards supplies 
and marketing, and as regards production‹all these 
measures are decisive, it is true, but for all that they 
are only preparatory to putting agriculture on to a collectivist 
basis. 
c) What has the Party done in this direction during 
the two years? Not a little has been done, but it is far 
from all that could have been done. 
As regards embracing agriculture from outside, so 
to speak, along the line of supplying agriculture with 
the manufactured goods it needs and the marketing of 
agricultural produce, we have the following achievements: 
the agricultural co-operatives now unite about 
a third of all peasant households; the consumers

J. V. S T A L I N 314 
co-operatives have increased their share of supplies to 
the countryside from 25.6 per cent in 1924-25 to 50.8 
per cent in 1926-27; the co-operative and state bodies 
have increased their share of the marketing of agricultural 
produce from 55.7 per cent in 1924-25 to 63 per 
cent in 1926-27. 
As regards embracing agriculture from inside, so to 
speak, along the line of agricultural production, terribly 
little has been done. Suffice it to say that at the 
present time the collective farms and state farms provide 
only a little over 2 per cent of the total agricultural 
produce and a little over 7 per cent of the total marketed 
produce. 
There are quite a few reasons for this, of course, 
both objective and subjective. Unskilful approach to 
the matter, insufficient attention to it on the part of 
our officials, the conservatism and backwardness of the 
peasants, the shortage of funds necessary for financing 
the passing over of the peasants to the common cultivation 
of the land, etc. And quite large funds are needed 
for this purpose. 
Lenin said at the Tenth Congress that we still lacked 
the funds necessary for making agriculture subject to 
the state or collective principle. I think that now we 
shall have those funds, and they ought to increase in 
the course of time. But, meanwhile, things are taking 
such a turn that unless the scattered peasant farms are 
united, unless they go over to cultivation of the land 
in common, it will be impossible to make serious progress 
either in the intensification or in the mechanisation 
of agriculture, it will be impossible to arrange 
things in such a way that the rate of development of

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 315 
our agriculture can exceed that of capitalist countries, 
such as Canada, for example. 
Therefore, the task is to concentrate the attention 
of our officials in the countryside on this important 
matter. 
I think that in this matter the machine-hiring stations 
under the People¹s Commissariats of Agriculture and 
of the agricultural co-operatives must play an exceedingly 
important role. 
Here is an example how the state farms sometimes 
help the peasants to go over to collective cultivation of 
the land with enormous benefit to the peasants. I have 
in mind the assistance in the way of tractors which the 
Association of Ukrainian State Farms rendered the peasants 
in the Odessa District, and the letter from those 
peasants, recently published in Izvestia, expressing 
thanks for this assistance. Permit me to read this letter. 
(Voices: ³Please do!²) 
³We settlers in the hamlets of Shevchenko, Krasin, Kalinin, 
Red Dawn and Rising Sun express our profound gratitude to the 
Soviet Government for the enormous assistance afforded us in restoring 
our farms. The majority of us‹being poor, possessing neither 
horses nor implements‹were unable to cultivate the land allotted 
to us and were obliged to lease it to the long-resident kulaks, receiving 
part of the crop in return. The crop was a bad one because, naturally, 
a tenant will not trouble to cultivate properly other people¹s 
land. The small credits we received from the state we used up for 
food and we sank into deeper poverty every year. 
³This year a representative of the Association of Ukrainian State 
Farms visited us and proposed to us that instead of taking financial 
credits we should allow our land to be ploughed with tractors. 
All the settlers, except for a few kulaks, agreed to this, although we 
had little confidence that the work would be done efficiently. To 
our great joy, and to the chagrin of the kulaks, the tractors ploughed

J. V. S T A L I N 316 
up all the virgin land and fallow land; they ploughed and harrowed 
5-6 times to clear the land of weeds and finally sowed all the fields 
with high-grade wheat. The kulaks are not jeering at the work of the 
tractor team now. This year, owing to the absence of rain, the peasants 
in our district planted hardly any winter wheat, and where it 
was planted it has not come up yet. But our, settlers¹, fields, stretching 
for hundreds of dessiatins, are green with splendid fallow-sown 
wheat such as cannot be seen even in the richest German settlements. 
³In addition to sowing winter wheat, the tractors ploughed up 
the whole of the winter fallow for the spring crops. Now, not a dessiatin 
of our land has been left unploughed, or leased out. There is not a 
single poor peasant among us who has not several dessiatins of winter 
wheat. 
³After we have seen the way the tractors work we do not want 
to carry on poor, small farming any more, and we have decided to 
organise common tractor farming in which there will be no separate 
peasant plots. The organisation of tractor farming for us has already 
been undertaken by the Taras Shevchenko State Farm, with which 
we have signed a contract² (Izvestia, No. 267, November 22, 1927). 
That is what the peasants write. 
If we had more examples like this, comrades, it 
would be possible to make great progress in the collectivisation 
of the countryside. 
The Party¹s task: to enlarge the extent of peasant economy 
embraced by the co-operatives and state bodies in 
the matter of marketing and supplies, and to make it the 
immediate practical task of our work in the countryside 
gradually to transform the scattered peasant farms into 
united, big farms, to introduce collective cultivation of the 
land on the basis of the intensification and mechanisation 
of agriculture, calculating that such a path of development 
is a most important means of accelerating the rate of 
development of agriculture and of defeating the capitalist 
elements in the countryside.

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 317 
* 
* 
* 
Such, on the whole, are the results and achievements 
in the sphere of the work of economic construction. 
This does not mean that all is well with us in this 
sphere. No, comrades, by no means everything is well 
with us. 
For example, we have elements of a goods shortage. 
That is an unfavourable feature in our economy, but, 
unfortunately, for the time being an inevitable one. 
For the fact that we are developing the production of 
instruments and means of production at a faster rate 
than light industry, this fact in itself predetermines 
that there will still be elements of a goods shortage in 
the country during the next few years. But we cannot 
act otherwise if we want to push forward the industrialisation 
of the country to the utmost. 
There are people, our opposition for example, who 
draw material for their ideology in profiteers¹ queues 
and shout about the goods shortage, and at the same 
time demand a policy of ³super-industrialisation.² But 
that, of course, is stupid, comrades. Only ignoramuses 
can talk like that. We cannot, we must not, cut down 
our heavy industry for the sake of developing light 
industry to the utmost. And, besides, it is impossible 
to develop light industry to a sufficient extent unless 
the development of heavy industry is accelerated. 
We could have increased imports of finished goods 
and thus have mitigated the goods shortage, and that 
is what the opposition insisted on at one time. But that 
proposal was so silly that the opposition had to drop it. 
Whether we are working efficiently enough to mitigate

J. V. S T A L I N 318 
the elements of the goods shortage, which it is quite 
possible to do under our conditions and on which our 
Party has always insisted, is another question. I think 
that it is precisely in this sphere that not all is well 
with us. 
Further, we have a fact like the relatively large 
number of capitalists both in the sphere of industry and 
in the sphere of trade. The relative importance of these 
elements is really not quite so small as some of our 
comrades sometimes depict it. That, too, is a liability 
in the balance-sheet of our economy. 
Recently I read what is in every respect an interesting 
book by Comrade Larin: Private Capital in the 
U.S.S.R. I would advise you to read this book, comrades. 
In it you will see how adroitly and skilfully the 
capitalist hides himself behind the flag of producers¹ 
co-operation, behind the flag of agricultural co-operation, 
behind the flag of state trading bodies of one kind 
or other. Is everything being done to restrict, reduce 
and, finally, to oust the capitalist elements from the 
sphere of our national economy? I do not think that 
everything is being done. I know, for example, that 
in handicraft industry in general, and in the leather 
and textile industries in particular, there are quite a 
number of new millionaires, who are enslaving the handicraft 
workers and small producers generally. Is everything 
being done economically to surround and oust 
these exploiting elements by linking the handicraft 
workers with the co-operatives or with state bodies? 
There can scarcely be any doubt that far from everything 
is being done in this sphere. And yet this question 
is of extreme importance for us.

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 319 
Further, there has been a certain increase in the 
number of kulaks in the countryside. That is a liability 
in the balance-sheet of our economy. Is everything 
being done economically to restrict and isolate the 
kulaks? I do not think that everything is being done. 
Those comrades are wrong who think that it is possible 
and necessary to put an end to the kulaks by means of 
administrative measures, through the GPU: give an 
order, affix a seal, and that settles it. That is an easy 
way, but it is far from being effective. The kulak must 
be defeated by means of economic measures and in conformity 
with Soviet law. Soviet law, however, is not 
a mere phrase. This does not, of course, preclude the 
taking of certain necessary administrative measures 
against the kulaks. But administrative measures must 
not take the place of economic measures. Serious attention 
must be paid to the fact that the Party¹s line in 
the fight against the kulaks is being distorted in the 
practice of our co-operative bodies, especially in the 
matter of agricultural credits. 
Further, we have a fact like the extremely slow rate 
of reduction of production costs in industry, of reduction 
of wholesale prices of manufactured goods, 
and especially of retail prices of urban goods. This, too, 
is a liability in the balance-sheet of our work of economic 
construction. We cannot but observe that in this we encounter 
the tremendous resistance of the apparatus‹ 
state, co-operative and Party. Evidently, our comrades 
fail to understand that the policy of reducing the prices 
of manufactured goods is one of the principal levers 
for improving our industry, expanding the market 
and strengthening the very basis on which alone our

J. V. S T A L I N 320 
industry can expand. There can scarcely be any doubt 
that only by ruthlessly combating this inertia of the 
apparatus, this resistance of the apparatus to the policy 
of reducing prices, will it be possible to wipe out this 
liability. 
Lastly, we have liabilities like vodka in the budget, 
the extremely slow rate of development of foreign trade 
and the shortage of reserves. I think that it would be 
possible to start gradually to reduce the output of vodka 
and, instead of vodka, to resort to sources of revenue 
such as the radio and the cinema. Indeed, why not take 
these extremely important means in hand and put on 
this job real Bolsheviks, shock workers, who could 
successfully expand the business and make it possible, 
at last, to reduce the output of vodka? 
As regards foreign trade, it seems to me that a number 
of the economic difficulties we are encountering are 
due to the insufficiency of exports. Can we push exports 
forward? I think we can. Is everything being done to 
increase exports to the utmost? I do not think that everything 
is being done. 
The same must be said about reserves. Those comrades 
are wrong who say, sometimes thoughtlessly 
and sometimes because of their ignorance of the matter, 
that we have no reserves. No, comrades, we have some 
kind of reserves. All the organs of our state, from uyezd 
and gubernia to regional and central, try to put something 
in reserve for a rainy day. But these reserves are 
small. That must be admitted. Therefore, the task is 
to increase reserves as much as possible, even if that 
sometimes entails cutting down some current requirements.

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 321 
Such, comrades,, are the darker sides of our work 
of economic construction, to which attention must be 
paid, and which must be eliminated at all costs in order 
to be able to move forward at a faster rate. 
4. Classes, the State Apparatus and 
the Country¹s Cultural Development 
From questions of the country¹s economic situation 
let us pass to questions of the political situation. 
a) The working class. Figures showing the numerical 
growth of the working class and of wage-workers generally. 
In 1924-25 there were 8,215,000 wage-workers 
(not including unemployed); in 1926-27 there were 
10,346,000. An increase of 25 per cent. Of these, manual 
workers, including agricultural and seasonal, numbered 
5,448,000 in 1924-25, and in 1926-27‹7,060,000. An 
increase of 29.6 per cent. Of these, workers in largescale 
industry numbered 1,794,000 in 1924-25, and in 
1926-27‹2,388,000. An increase of 33 per cent. 
The material conditions of the working class. In 
1924-25 the wage-workers¹ share of the national income 
amounted to 24.1 per cent, and in 1926-27 it grew to 
29.4 per cent, which is 30 per cent above the wage-workers¹ 
share of the national income before the war, whereas 
the share of the national income received by other 
social groups, including the bourgeoisie, diminished 
during this period (for example, the share of the bourgeoisie 
dropped from 5.5 per cent to 4.8 per cent). In 
1924-25 real wages (exclusive of social services) 
of the workers in state industry as a whole amounted 
to 25.18 Moscow computed rubles per month; in 1926-27

J. V. S T A L I N 322 
they amounted to 32.14 rubles, which is an increase of 
27.6 per cent for the two years and is 5.4 per cent above 
the pre-war level. If we add social insurance and cultural, 
municipal and other services, wages in 1924-25 
were 101.5 per cent of pre-war and in 1926-27‹128.4 
per cent of pre-war. The social insurance funds increased 
from 461 million rubles in 1924-25 to 852 million 
rubles in 1926-27, i.e., by 85 per cent, which made it 
possible to send 513,000 persons to rest homes and sanatoriums, 
to provide allowances for 460,000 unemployed 
and 700,000 pensioners (disabled workers and disabled 
civil war veterans) and to pay workers full wages during 
sickness. 
Two years ago, in 1924-25, expenditure on workers¹ 
housing amounted to something over 132,000,000 
rubles; in 1925-26‹to something over 230,000,000 
rubles; in 1926-27‹282,000,000 rubles, and in 
1927-28 it will amount to something over 391,000,000 
rubles, including 50,000,000 rubles provided for in 
the Manifesto of the Central Executive Committee. 
The total expenditure on workers¹ housing in the past 
three years by industry, transport, local Executive 
Committees and co-operatives (not including individual 
construction) was 644,700,000 rubles, and including 
the assignments for 1927-28‹1,036 million rubles. 
These assignments for the three years made it possible 
to build housing accommodation with a floor space of 
4,594,000 sq. metres and to provide accommodation 
for 257,000 workers, and, counting their families, 
for about 900,000 persons. 
The question of unemployment. I must say that 
there is a discrepancy here between the figures of the

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 323 
All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and those 
of the People¹s Commissariat of Labour. I take the 
figures of the People¹s Commissariat of Labour because 
they cover the truly unemployed element connected 
with the labour exchanges. According to the returns 
of the People¹s Commissariat of Labour, the number 
of unemployed during the two years increased from 
950,000 to 1,048,000. Of these, industrial workers constitute 
16.5 per cent and brain workers and unskilled 
labourers 74 per cent. Thus, the chief source of unemployment 
in our country is the over-population in the 
countryside; the fact that our industry has to some extent 
failed to absorb a certain minimum of industrial workers 
is only a subsidiary source. 
To sum up: there is an undoubted rise in the standard 
of living of the working class as a whole. 
The Party¹s task: to continue along the line of further 
improving the material and cultural conditions of 
the working class, of further raising the wages of the working 
class. 
b) The peasantry. I do not think it is worth while 
quoting figures on differentiation among the peasantry 
because my report is already too long, and everybody 
is familiar with the figures. There can be no doubt that 
differentiation under the dictatorship of the proletariat 
cannot be identified with differentiation under the capitalist 
system. Under capitalism the extremes grow, 
the poor peasants and the kulaks, while the middle 
peasants melt away. In our country the opposite is the 
case; the number of middle peasants is growing, because 
a certain part of the poor peasants rise to the position 
of middle peasants; the number of kulaks is growing;

J. V. S T A L I N 324 
the number of poor peasants is diminishing. This fact 
shows that the central figure in agriculture is, as previously, 
the middle peasant. The bloc with the middle 
peasants, while relying on the poor peasants, is of decisive 
importance for the fate of our entire work of construction, 
for the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
The general improvement of material conditions in 
the countryside. We have figures on the increase in the 
incomes of the peasant population. Two years ago, 
in 1924-25, the income of the peasant population amounted 
to 3,548 million rubles, in 1926-27 this income grew 
to 4,792 million rubles, i.e., it increased 35.1 per cent, 
whereas the peasant population during this period increased 
only 2.38 per cent. This is an indubitable indication 
that material conditions in the countryside are 
improving. 
This does not mean that the material conditions 
of the peasantry have improved in all districts of the 
country. It is well known that in some places the harvest 
was uneven during these two years, and the effects 
of the crop failure of 1924 have not yet been fully overcome. 
Hence the assistance the state renders the working 
peasantry in general and the poor peasants in particular. 
In 1925-26 state assistance to the working peasantry 
amounted to 373,000,000 rubles and in 1926-27 
to 427,000,000 rubles. Special assistance to the rural 
poor in 1925-26 in the shape of grants to the poorest 
farms amounted to 38,000,000 rubles, tax exemptions 
for poor farms amounted to 44,000,000 rubles and insurance 
exemptions for poor peasants to 9,000,000 
rubles, making a total of 91,000,000 rubles. Special 
assistance to the rural poor in 1926-27 under the same

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 325 
heads: 39,000,000 rubles, 52,000,000 rubles and 9,000,000 
rubles, making a total of about 100,000,000 rubles. 
To sum up: there is an improvement in the material 
conditions of the main mass of the peasantry. 
The Party¹s task: to continue along the line of further 
improving the material and cultural conditions of the 
main mass of the peasantry, primarily of the poor peasants, 
to strengthen the alliance between the working class and 
the peasantry, to raise the prestige of the working class 
and of its Party in the countryside. 
c) The new bourgeoisie. The intelligentsia. A characteristic 
feature of the new bourgeoisie is that, unlike the 
working class and the peasantry, it has no reason to be 
satisfied with the Soviet regime. Its dissatisfaction is 
not accidental. It has its roots in life. 
I have spoken about the growth of our national economy, 
I have spoken about the growth of our industry, 
about the growth of the socialist elements of our national 
economy, about the decline in the relative importance 
of the private owners, about the elimination of 
the small traders. But what does that mean? It means 
that while our industry and our trading bodies are growing, 
tens of thousands of small and medium capitalists 
are being ruined. How many small and medium 
shops have been closed during these years? Thousands. 
And how many small manufacturers have been proletarianised? 
Thousands. And how many civil servants 
have been discharged in connection with the reduction 
of staffs in our state apparatus? Hundreds and thousands. 
The progress of our industry, the progress of our 
trading and co-operative bodies, the improvement of 
our state apparatus, is progress and improvement of

J. V. S T A L I N 326 
benefit to the working class, of benefit to the main mass 
of the peasantry, but of disadvantage to the new bourgeoisie, 
of disadvantage to the middle strata generally 
and to the urban middle strata in particular. Is it to 
be wondered at that discontent with the Soviet regime 
is growing among those strata? Hence the counter-revolutionary 
moods in those circles. Hence the Smena-Vekhist 
ideology, as a fashionable commodity on the political 
market of the new bourgeoisie. 
But it would be a mistake to think that the whole 
of the civil service element, the whole of the intelligentsia 
is in a state of discontent, in a state of grumbling or 
unrest against the Soviet regime. Parallel with the 
growth of discontent in the depths of the new bourgeoisie 
we have the fact of a differentiation among the 
intelligentsia, a desertion from Smena-Vekhism, the 
passing of hundreds and thousands of working intellectuals 
to the side of the Soviet regime. This fact, comrades, 
is undoubtedly a favourable fact, which must 
be noted. 
The pioneers in this are the technical intelligentsia, 
because, being closely connected with the process of 
production, they cannot but see that the Bolsheviks 
are leading the country forward, to a better future. 
Such gigantic works of construction as the Volkhov 
Power Plant, the Dnieper Power Plant, the Svir Power 
Plant, the Turkestan Railway, the Volga-Don project 
and a whole series of new gigantic industrial plants 
with which the fate of whole strata of the technical 
intelligentsia is bound up, cannot but exercise some 
beneficial influence upon these strata. It is not only 
a bread and butter question for them, it is also a matter

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 327 
of honour, a matter of creative effort, which naturally 
draws them to the working class, to the Soviet regime. 
That is apart from the rural working intelligentsia, 
especially village school-teachers, who began to support 
the Soviet regime long ago, and who cannot help welcoming 
the development of education in the countryside. 
Therefore, parallel with the growth of dissatisfaction 
among certain strata of the intelligentsia, we have the 
bond between the working intelligentsia and the working 
class. 
The Party¹s task is to continue along the line of isolating 
the new bourgeoisie and to strengthen the bond 
between the working class and the working Soviet intelligentsia 
in town and country. 
d) The state apparatus and the struggle against bureaucracy. 
So much is being said about bureaucracy 
that there is no need to dilate on i t . That elements 
of bureaucracy exist in our state, co-operative and Party 
apparatus, there can be no doubt. That it is necessary 
to combat the elements of bureaucracy, and that this task 
will confront us all the time, as long as we have state 
power, as long as the state exists, is also a fact. 
But one must know how far one can go. To carry the 
struggle against bureaucracy in the state apparatus to 
the point of destroying the state apparatus, of discrediting 
the state apparatus, of attempts to break it up‹ 
that means going against Leninism, means forgetting 
that our apparatus is a Soviet apparatus, which is a state 
apparatus of a higher type than any other state apparatus 
in the world. 
Wherein lies the strength of our state apparatus? 
In that it links the state power with the millions of

J. V. S T A L I N 328 
workers and peasants through the Soviets. In that the 
Soviets are schools of administration for tens and hundreds 
of thousands of workers and peasants. In that the 
state apparatus does not fence itself off from the vast 
masses of the people, but merges with them through an 
incalculable number of mass organisations, all sorts 
of commissions, committees, conferences, delegate meetings, 
etc., which encompass the Soviets and in this 
way buttress the organs of government. 
Wherein lies the weakness of our state apparatus? 
In the existence within it of elements of bureaucracy, 
which spoil and distort its work. In order to eliminate 
bureaucracy from it‹and this cannot be done in one 
or two years‹we must systematically improve the state 
apparatus, bring it closer to the masses, reinvigorate it 
by bringing in new people loyal to the cause of the working 
class, remodel it in the spirit of communism, but 
not break it up or discredit it. Lenin was a thousand 
times right when he said: ³Without an Œapparatus¹ we 
would have perished long ago. If we do not wage a systematic 
and stubborn struggle to improve the apparatus 
we shall perish before we have created the base for socialism.²
80 
I shall not dilate on those defects in our state apparatus 
that are glaring enough as it is. I have in mind, 
primarily, ³Mother Red Tape.² I have at hand a heap 
of materials on the matter of red tape, exposing the 
criminal negligence of a number of judicial, administrative, 
insurance, co-operative and other organisations. 
Here is a peasant who went to a certain insurance 
office twenty-one times to get some matter put right, 
and even then failed to get any result.

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 329 
Here is another peasant, an old man of sixty-six, 
who walked 600 versts to get his case cleared up at an 
Uyezd Social Maintenance Office, and even then failed 
to get any result. 
Here is an old peasant woman, fifty-six years old, 
who, in response to a summons by a people¹s court, 
walked 500 versts and travelled over 600 versts by horse 
and cart, and even then failed to get justice done. 
A multitude of such facts could be quoted. It is not 
worth while enumerating them. But this is a disgrace 
to us, comrades! How can such outrageous things be 
tolerated? 
Lastly, facts about ³demoting.² It appears, that in 
addition to workers who are promoted, there are also 
such as are ³demoted,² who are pushed into the background 
by their own comrades, not because they are 
incapable or inefficient, but because they are conscientious 
and honest in their work. 
Here is a worker, a tool-maker, who was promoted 
to a managerial post at his plant because he was a capable 
and incorruptible man. He worked for a couple 
of years, worked honestly, introduced order, put a stop 
to inefficiency and waste. But, working in this way, 
he trod on the toes of a gang of so-called ³Communists,² 
he disturbed their peace and quiet. And what happened? 
This gang of ³Communists² put a spoke in his wheel 
and thus compelled him to ³demote himself,² as much 
as to say: ³You wanted to be smarter than us, you won¹t 
let us live and make a bit in quiet‹so take a back seat, 
brother.² 
Here is another worker, also a tool-maker, an adjuster 
of bolt-cutting machines, who was promoted to a

J. V. S T A L I N 330 
managerial post at his factory. He worked zealously 
and honestly. But, working in this way, he disturbed 
somebody¹s peace and quiet. And what happened? A 
pretext was found and they got rid of this ³troublesome² 
comrade. How did this promoted comrade leave, what 
were his feelings? Like this: ³In whatever post I was 
appointed to I tried to justify the confidence that was 
placed in me. But this promotion played a dirty trick 
on me and I shall never forget it. They threw mud at me. 
My wish to bring everything into the light of day remained 
a mere wish. Neither the works committee, nor 
the management, nor the Party unit would listen to me. 
I am finished with promotion, I would not take another 
managerial post even if offered my weight in gold² 
(Trud,81 No. 128, June 9, 1927). 
But this is a disgrace to us, comrades! How can such 
outrageous things be tolerated? 
The Party¹s task is, in fighting against bureaucracy 
and for the improvement of the state apparatus, to extirpate 
with a red-hot iron such outrageous things in our practical 
work as those I have just spoken about. 
e) Concerning Lenin¹s slogan about the cultural revolution. 
The surest remedy for bureaucracy is raising 
the cultural level of the workers and peasants. One can 
curse and denounce bureaucracy in the state apparatus, 
one can stigmatise and pillory bureaucracy in our 
practical work, but unless the masses of the workers 
reach a certain level of culture, which will create the 
possibility, the desire, the ability to control the state 
apparatus from below, by the masses of the workers 
themselves, bureaucracy will continue to exist in spite of 
everything. Therefore, the cultural development of the

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 331 
working class and of the masses of the working peasantry, 
not only the development of literacy, although literacy 
is the basis of all culture, but primarily the cultivation 
of the ability to take part in the administration of the 
country, is the chief lever for improving the state and 
every other apparatus. This is the sense and significance 
of Lenin¹s slogan about the cultural revolution. 
Here is what Lenin said about this in March 1922, 
before the opening of the Eleventh Congress of our Party, 
in his letter to the Central Committee addressed to Comrade 
Molotov: 
³The chief thing we lack is culture, ability to administer. . . . 
Economically and politically NEP fully ensures us the possibility 
of laying the foundation of socialist economy.* It is Œonly¹ a matter 
of the cultural forces of the proletariat and of its vanguard.²82 
These words of Lenin¹s must not be forgotten, comrades. 
(Voices: ³Quite right!²) 
Hence the Party¹s task: to exert greater efforts to raise 
the cultural level of the working class and of the working 
strata of the peasantry. 
* 
* 
* 
How can the internal political situation in our 
country be summed up? 
It can be summed up in this way: The Soviet regime 
is the most stable regime in the world. (Stormy applause.) 
But while the Soviet regime is stronger than all 
the other regimes existing in the world, a regime that 
any bourgeois government may envy, that does not mean 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 332 
that all is well with us in this sphere. No, comrades, 
we have shortcomings in this sphere too, which we, 
as Bolsheviks, cannot and must not conceal. 
Firstly, we have unemployment. This is a serious 
shortcoming, which we must overcome, or at least 
reduce to a minimum at all costs. 
Secondly, we have grave defects in housing construction 
for the workers, a housing crisis, which we must 
also overcome, or at least reduce to a minimum within 
the next few years. 
We have some manifestations of anti-Semitism, not 
only among certain circles of the middle strata of the population, 
but also among a certain section of the workers, 
and even in some quarters in our Party. This evil 
must be combated, comrades, with all ruthlessness. 
We also have a shortcoming like the slackening in 
the struggle against religion. 
And lastly, we have a terrible cultural backwardness, 
not only in the broad sense of the term, but also in its 
narrow sense, in the sense of elementary literacy, for 
the percentage of illiteracy in the U.S.S.R. is still not 
inconsiderable. 
All these and similar shortcomings must be eliminated, 
comrades, if we want to advance at a more or less 
rapid rate. 
To finish with this section of my report, permit me 
to say a few words about the most characteristic appointments 
during the period under review. I shall not 
touch on the appointment of the Vice-Chairmen of the 
Council of People¹s Commissars of the U.S.S.R. Nor 
shall I touch on the appointment of the People¹s Commissars 
of the Supreme Council of National Economy,

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 333 
of the People¹s Commissariat of Trade, and of the Joint 
State Political Administration of the U.S.S.R. I would 
like to deal with three appointments that are significant. 
You know that Lobov has been appointed Chairman 
of the Supreme Council of National Economy of the 
R.S.F.S.R. He is a metalworker. You know that Ukhanov, 
a metalworker, has been elected Chairman of the 
Moscow Soviet in place of Kamenev. You know also 
that Komarov, also a metalworker, has been elected 
Chairman of the Leningrad Soviet in place of Zinoviev. 
Thus the ³Lord Mayors² of our two capitals are metalworkers. 
(Applause.) It is true that they are not of 
the nobility, but they are managing the affairs of our 
capitals better than any member of the nobility. (Applause.) 
You may say that this is a tendency towards 
metallisation, but I don¹t think there is anything 
bad about that. (Voices: ³On the contrary, it is very 
good.²) 
Let us wish the capitalist countries, let us wish 
London, let us wish Paris, success in catching up with 
us at last and in putting up their own metalworkers 
as ³Lord Mayors.² (Applause.) 
III 
THE PARTY AND THE OPPOSITION 
1. The State of the Party 
Comrades, I shall not deal at length with the numerical 
and ideological growth of our Party, I shall not 
quote figures, because Kosior will report to you on this 
in detail.

J. V. S T A L I N 334 
Nor shall I speak about the social composition of 
our Party, or about the figures relating to this, because 
Kosior will give you exhaustive data on it in his report. 
I should like to say a few words about the higher 
level, the qualitative improvement, in our Party¹s work 
of leadership both in the sphere of economics and in 
the sphere of politics. There was a time, comrades, two 
or three years ago, when a section of our comrades, headed 
by Trotsky, I think (laughter, voices: ³Think?²), 
rebuked our Gubernia Committees,our Regional Committees 
and our Central Committee, asserting that the Party 
organisations were not competent to interfere in the 
country¹s economic affairs and had no business to do so. 
Yes, there was such a time. Today, however, it is doubtful 
whether anybody would dare to cast such accusations 
at the Party organisations. That the Gubernia and Regional 
Committees have mastered the art of economic 
leadership, that the Party organisations are leading the 
work of economic construction and not trailing in its 
rear, is such a glaring fact that only the blind or imbecile 
would dare to deny it. The very fact that we have 
decided to put on the agenda of this congress the question 
of a five-year plan of development of the national 
economy, this very fact alone shows that the Party has 
made immense progress in the planned leadership of 
our work of economic construction both in the districts 
and at the centre. 
Some people think that there is nothing special about 
this. No, comrades, there is something special and important 
about this, which must be noted. Reference is 
sometimes made to American and German economic

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 335 
bodies which, it is alleged, also direct their national 
economy in a planned way. No, comrades, those countries 
have not yet achieved this, and never will achieve it, 
as long as the capitalist system exists there. To be able 
to lead in a planned way it is necessary to have a different 
system of industry, a socialist and not a capitalist 
system; it is necessary to have at least a nationalised 
industry, a nationalised credit system, nationalised 
land, a socialist bond with the countryside, workingclass 
rule in the country, etc. 
True, they also have something in the nature of 
plans; but these are forecast plans, guess-work plans, 
not binding on anybody, and they cannot serve as a 
basis for directing the country¹s economy. Things are 
different in our country. Our plans are not forecast plans, 
not guess-work plans, but directive plans, which are 
binding upon our leading bodies, and which determine 
the trend of our future economic development on a 
country-wide scale. 
You see, we have a fundamental difference here. 
That is why I say that even the mere fact that the 
question of a five-year plan of development of the national 
economy has been put on the congress agenda, 
even this fact is a sign of the qualitatively higher level 
of our leadership in planning. 
Nor shall I deal at length with the growth of inner- 
Party democracy in our Party. Only the blind fail to 
see that inner-Party democracy, genuine inner-Party 
democracy, an actual upsurge of activity on the part of 
the mass of the Party membership, is growing and developing 
in our Party. There is talk about democracy. 
But what is democracy in the Party? Democracy for

J. V. S T A L I N 336 
whom? If by democracy is meant freedom for a couple 
or so of intellectuals divorced from the revolution to 
engage in endless chatter, to have their own press organ, 
etc., then we have no use for such ³democracy,² 
because it is democracy for an insignificant minority 
that sets at naught the will of the overwhelming majority. 
If, however, by democracy is meant freedom for 
the mass of the Party membership to decide questions 
connected with our work of construction, an upsurge 
of activity of the Party membership, drawing them into 
the work of Party leadership, developing in them the feeling 
that they are the masters in the Party, then we have 
such democracy, that is the democracy we need, and we 
shall steadily develop it in spite of everything. (Applause.) 
Nor shall I, comrades, deal at length with the fact 
that, parallel with inner-Party democracy, collective 
leadership is growing, step by step, in our Party. Take 
our Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. 
Together they constitute a leading centre of 
200-250 comrades, which meets regularly and decides 
highly important questions connected with our work of 
construction. It is one of the most democratic and collectively 
functioning centres our Party has ever had. 
Well? Is it not a fact that the settlement of highly important 
questions concerning our work is passing more 
and more from the hands of a narrow upper group into 
the hands of this broad centre, which is most closely 
connected with all branches of our work of construction 
and with all the districts of our vast country? 
Nor shall I dilate on the growth of our Party cadres. 
It is indisputable that during the past few years the

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 337 
old cadres of our Party have been permeated with new, 
rising cadres, consisting mainly of workers. Formerly, 
we counted our cadres in hundreds and thousands, but 
now we have to count them in tens of thousands. I think 
that if we begin from the lowest organisations, the shop 
and team organisations, and proceed to the top, all over 
the Union, we shall find that our Party cadres, the 
overwhelming majority of whom are workers, now 
number not less than 100,000. This indicates the immense 
growth of our Party. It indicates the immense 
growth of our cadres, the growth of their ideological 
and organisational experience, the growth of their communist 
culture. 
Lastly, there is one further question, which there 
is no need to deal with at length but which ought to be 
mentioned. That is the question of the growth of the 
Party¹s prestige among the non-Party workers and the 
masses of the working people in general of our country, 
among the workers and the oppressed classes in general 
all over the world. There can scarcely be any doubt 
now that our Party is becoming the banner of liberation 
for the masses of the working people all over the world, 
and that the title of Bolshevik is becoming a title of 
honour for the best members of the working class. 
Such, in general, comrades, is the picture of our 
achievements in the sphere of Party affairs. 
This does not mean, comrades, that there are no 
shortcomings in our Party. No, there are shortcomings, 
and grave ones at that. Permit me to say a few words 
about them. 
Let us take, for example, the guidance of economic 
and other organisations by our Party organisations. Is

J. V. S T A L I N 338 
all well with us in this respect? No, not all. Often we 
settle questions, not only in the districts, but also at 
the centre, by the family, domestic-circle method, so 
to speak. Ivan Ivanovich, a member of the top leadership 
of such and such an organisation, has, say, made 
a gross mistake and has messed things up. But Ivan 
Fyodorovich is reluctant to criticise him, to expose his 
mistakes and to correct them. He is reluctant to do so 
because he does not want to ³make enemies.² He has 
made a mistake, he has messed things up‹what of it? 
Who of us does not make mistakes? Today I shall let 
him, Ivan Fyodorovich, off; tomorrow he will let me, 
Ivan Ivanovich, off; for what guarantee is there that I, 
too, shall not make a mistake? Everything in order and 
satisfactory. Peace and good will. They say that a mistake 
neglected is detrimental to our great cause? Never 
mind! We¹ll muddle through somehow. 
Such, comrades, is the way some of our responsible 
workers usually argue. 
But what does that mean? If we Bolsheviks, who 
criticise the whole world, who, in the words of Marx, 
are storming heaven, if we, for the sake of this or that 
comrade¹s peace of mind, abandon self-criticism, is it 
not obvious that that can lead only to the doom of our 
great cause? (Voices: ³Quite right!² Applause.) 
Marx said that what, among other things, distinguishes 
the proletarian revolution from every other revolution 
is that it criticises itself and, in criticising itself, 
strengthens itself.83 That is an extremely important 
point of Marx¹s. If we, the representatives of the 
proletarian revolution, shut our eyes to our defects, 
settle questions by the family-circle method, hush up

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 339 
each other¹s mistakes and drive the ulcers inwards into 
the organism of the Party, who will correct these mistakes, 
these defects? 
Is it not obvious that we shall cease to be proletarian 
revolutionaries, and that we shall certainly perish 
if we fail to eradicate from our midst this philistinism, 
this family-circle method of settling highly important 
questions of our work of construction? 
Is it not obvious that by refraining from honest and 
straightforward self-criticism, by refraining from honest 
and open correction of our mistakes, we close our road 
to progress, to the improvement of our work, to new successes 
in our work? 
After all, our development does not proceed in the 
form of a smooth, all-round ascent. No, comrades, we 
have classes, we have contradictions within the country, 
we have a past, we have a present and a future, we have 
contradictions between them, and our onward progress 
cannot take the form of a smooth rocking on the waves of 
life. Our advance takes place in the process of struggle, 
in the process of the development of contradictions, in 
the process of overcoming these contradictions, in the 
process of bringing these contradictions to light and 
eliminating them. 
As long as classes exist we shall never be in a position 
to say: Well, thank God, everything is all right 
now. We shall never be in such a position, comrades. 
Something in life is always dying. But that which 
is dying refuses to die quietly; it fights for its existence, 
defends its moribund cause. 
Something new in life is always being born. But that 
which is being born does not come into the world quiet

J. V. S T A L I N 340 
ly; it comes in squealing and screaming, defending its 
right to existence. (Voices: ³Quite right!² Applause.) 
The struggle between the old and the new, between 
the dying and the nascent‹there you have the basis 
of our development. By failing to note and bring to light 
openly and honestly, as befits Bolsheviks, the defects 
and mistakes in our work, we close our road to progress. 
But we want to go forward. And precisely because we 
want to go forward we must make honest and revolutionary 
self-criticism one of our most important tasks. 
Without this there is no progress. Without this there is 
no development. 
But it is precisely along this line that things with 
us are still in a bad way. More than that, it is enough 
for us to achieve a few successes to forget about the 
shortcomings, to take it easy and get conceited. Two 
or three big successes‹and already we become reckless. 
Another two or three big successes‹and already we 
become conceited, we expect a ³walk-over²! But the mistakes 
remain, the defects continue to exist, the ulcers 
are driven inwards into the organism of the Party and 
the Party begins to sicken. 
A second shortcoming. It consists in introducing 
administrative methods in the Party, in replacing the 
method of persuasion, which is of decisive importance 
for the Party, by the method of administration. This 
shortcoming is a danger no less serious than the first one. 
Why? Because it creates the danger of our Party organisations, 
which are independently acting organisations, 
being converted into mere bureaucratic institutions. 
If we take into account that we have not less than 60,000 
of the most active officials distributed among all sorts

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 341 
of economic, co-operative and state institutions, where 
they are fighting bureaucracy, it must be admitted that 
some of them, while fighting bureaucracy in those 
institutions, sometimes become infected with bureaucracy 
themselves and carry that infection into the Party 
organisation. And this is not our fault, comrades, but 
our misfortune, for that process will continue to a greater 
or lesser degree as long as the state exists. And precisely 
because that process has some roots in life, we must 
arm ourselves for the struggle against this shortcoming, 
we must raise the activity of the mass of the Party membership, 
draw them into the decision of questions concerning 
our Party leadership, systematically implant 
inner-Party democracy and prevent the method of persuasion 
in our Party practice being replaced by the 
method of administration. 
A third shortcoming. This consists in the desire 
of a number of our comrades to swim with the stream, 
smoothly and calmly, without perspective, without looking 
into the future, in such a way that a festive and 
holiday atmosphere should be felt all around, that we 
should have celebration meetings every day, with applause 
everywhere, and that all of us should be elected 
in turn as honorary members of all sorts of presidiums. 
(Laughter, applause.) 
Now it is this irresistible desire to see a festive 
atmosphere everywhere, this longing for decoration, for 
all sorts of anniversaries, necessary and unnecessary, 
this desire to swim with the stream without noticing 
where it is taking us (laughter, applause)‹it is all this 
that forms the substance of the third shortcoming in our 
Party practice, the basis of the defects in our Party life.

J. V. S T A L I N 342 
Have you seen boatmen, rowing conscientiously, 
in the sweat of their brows, but not seeing where the current 
is carrying them? I have seen such boatmen on the 
Yenisei. They are honest and tireless boatmen. But the 
trouble is that they do not see, and refuse to see, that 
the current may carry them against the rocks, where 
doom awaits them. 
The same thing happens to some of our comrades. 
They row conscientious]y, without stopping, their boat 
floats smoothly with the stream, only they do not know 
where it is taking them, and they do not even want to 
know. Working without perspective, floating without 
sail or rudder‹that is what the desire to swim with the 
stream necessarily leads to. 
And the results? The results are obvious: first they 
become coated with mould, then they become drab, 
after that they sink into the quagmire of philistinism 
and subsequently turn into regular philistines. That is 
the path of real degeneration. 
There you have, comrades, some of the shortcomings 
in our Party practice and in our Party life, about which 
I wanted to say a few bitter words to you. 
And now permit me to pass to questions connected 
with the discussion and our so-called opposition. 
2. The Results of the Discussion 
Is there any sense, any value in a Party discussion? 
Sometimes people say: Why on earth was this discussion 
started, what good is it to anyone, would it not 
have been better to settle the disputed questions privately, 
without washing dirty linen in public? That is

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 343 
wrong, comrades. Sometimes a discussion is absolutely 
necessary, and indubitably useful. The whole point 
is‹what kind of discussion? If the discussion is conducted 
within comradely limits, within Party limits, if 
its object is honest self-criticism, criticism of shortcomings 
in the Party, if, therefore, it improves our work 
and arms the working class, then such a discussion is 
necessary and useful. 
But there is another kind of discussion, the object 
of which is not to improve our common work but to 
worsen it; not to strengthen the Party, but to disintegrate 
and discredit it. Such a discussion usually leads not to 
the arming, but to the disarming of the proletariat. Such 
a discussion we do not need. (Voices: ³Quite right!² 
Applause.) 
When the opposition demanded an all-Union discussion 
about three months before the congress, before 
the Central Committee¹s theses had been drawn up, before 
the publication of those theses, it tried to thrust upon 
us the kind of discussion that would inevitably have facilitated 
the task of our enemies, the task of the enemies 
of the working class, the task of the enemies of our Party. 
That was precisely the reason why the Central Committee 
opposed the opposition¹s plans. And it is precisely because 
it opposed the opposition¹s plans that we succeeded 
in placing the discussion on the right lines by giving 
it a basis in the shape of the Central Committee¹s theses 
for the congress. Now we can say without hesitation that, 
on the whole, the discussion has been a gain. 
As regards washing dirty linen in public, that is 
nonsense, comrades. We have never been, and never 
will be, afraid of openly criticising ourselves and our

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FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
344 
mistakes before the whole Party. The strength of Bolshevism 
is precisely that it is not afraid of criticism and 
that, in criticising its defects, it acquires the energy 
for making further progress. Thus, the present discussion 
is a sign of our Party¹s strength, a sign of its 
might. 
It must not be forgotten that in every big party, 
especially a party like ours, which is in power, and which 
contains a certain proportion of peasants and civil 
servants, there accumulate in the course of a certain 
time some elements who are indifferent to questions 
of Party practice, who vote blindly and swim with 
the stream. The presence of a large number of these elements 
is an evil which must be combated. These elements 
constitute the marsh in our Party. 
A discussion is an appeal to this marsh. The oppositionists 
appeal to it in order to win over some part 
of it. And they do indeed win over its worst part. The 
Party appeals to it in order to win over its best part 
to draw it into active Party life. As a result, the marsh 
is compelled to exercise self-determination in spite of 
all its inertia. And it does indeed exercise self-determination 
as a result of these appeals, by giving up one section 
of its ranks to the opposition and another to the 
Party, thus ceasing to exist as a marsh. In the general 
balance-sheet of our Party development this is an asset. 
As a result of our present discussion, the marsh has diminished; 
it has wholly ceased, or is ceasing, to exist. 
Herein lies the advantage of the discussion. 
The results of the discussion? The results are known. 
Up to yesterday, it turns out, 724,000 comrades voted 
for the Party and a little over 4,000 voted for the oppo

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 345 
sition. Such are the results. Our oppositionists thundered 
that the Central Committee had become divorced 
from the Party, that the Party had become divorced 
from the class, that if ³ifs² and ³ans² were pots and 
pans they, the oppositionists, would certainly have had 
99 per cent on their side. But since ³ifs² and ³ans² are 
not pots and pans, it turns out that the opposition has 
not even one per cent. Such are the results. 
How could it happen that the Party as a whole, and 
after it the working class as well, so thoroughly isolated 
the opposition? After all, the opposition is headed by 
well-known people with well-known names, people who 
know how to advertise themselves (voices: ³Quite right!²), 
people who are not afflicted with modesty (applause) 
and who are able to blow their own trumpets, to make 
the most of their wares. 
It happened because the leading group of the opposition 
proved to be a group of petty-bourgeois intellectuals 
divorced from life, divorced irom the revolution, 
divorced from the Party, from the working class. 
(Voices: ³Quite right!² Applause.) 
A little while ago I spoke about the successes we 
have achieved in our work, about our achievements in 
the sphere of industry, in the sphere of trade, in the sphere 
of our economy as a whole, and in the sphere of foreign 
policy. But the opposition is not concerned with those 
achievements. It does not see, or does not wish to see 
them. It does not wish to see them partly because of its 
ignorance and partly because of the obstinacy characteristic 
of intellectuals who are divorced from life.

J. V. S T A L I N 346 
3. The Fundamental Divergences Between 
the Party and the Opposition 
You will ask, what then, after all, are the disagreements 
between the Party and the opposition, on what 
questions do they disagree? 
On all questions, comrades. (Voices: ³Quite right!²) 
Recently I read a statement made by a non-Party 
worker in Moscow, who is joining the Party, or has 
already joined. Here is how he formulates the disagreements 
between the Party and the opposition: 
³Formerly we tried to find out what the Party and the opposition 
disagreed about. Now we cannot find out on what the opposition 
agrees with the Party. (Laughter, applause.) The opposition 
is against the Party on all questions, therefore if I sided with the 
opposition I would not join the Party.² (Laughter, applause.) (See 
Izvestia, No. 264.) 
You see how aptly and at the same time concisely 
workers are sometimes able to express themselves. I 
think that this is the aptest and truest characterisation 
of the opposition¹s attitude to the Party, to its ideology, 
its programme and its tactics. 
It is precisely the fact that the opposition disagrees 
with the Party on all questions that makes it a group 
with its own ideology, its own programme, its own tactics 
and its own organisational principles. 
The opposition possesses everything that is needed 
to form a new party, everything except a ³trifle²‹the 
strength to do so. (Laughter, applause.) 
I could mention seven main questions on which there 
is disagreement between the Party and the opposition.

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 347 
F i r s t. The question of the possibility of the victorious 
building of socialism in our country. I shall not 
refer to the opposition¹s documents and declarations 
on this question. Everybody is familiar with them and 
there is no point in repeating them. It is clear to everybody 
that the opposition denies the possibility of the 
victorious building of socialism in our country. In denying 
that possibility, however, it is directly and openly 
slipping into the position of the Mensheviks. 
The opposition¹s line on this question is not a new 
one for its present leaders. It was the line taken by Kamenev 
and Zinoviev when they refused to go towards 
the October uprising. They stated plainly at the time 
that by making an uprising we were heading for destruction, 
that we must wait for the Constituent Assembly, 
that the conditions for socialism had not matured and 
would not mature soon. 
Trotsky took the very same line when he went towards 
the uprising; for he said plainly that if a victorious 
proletarian revolution in the West did not bring 
timely assistance in the more or less near future, it 
would be foolish to think that a revolutionary Russia 
could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe. 
Indeed, how did Kamenev and Zinoviev on the one 
side, Trotsky on the other, and Lenin and the Party on 
the third, go towards the uprising? That is a very interesting 
question, about which it is worth while saying 
a few words, comrades. 
You know that Kamenev and Zinoviev were driven 
towards the uprising with a stick. Lenin drove 
them with a stick, threatening them with expulsion 
from the Party (laughter, applause), and they were

J. V. S T A L I N 348 
compelled to drag themselves to the uprising. (Laughter, 
applause.) 
Trotsky went towards the uprising voluntarily. He 
did not go whole-heartedly, however, but with a slight 
reservation, which already at that time brought him 
close to Kamenev and Zinoviev. It is an interesting fact 
that it was precisely before the October Revolution, in 
June 1917, that Trotsky deemed it appropriate to publish 
in Petrograd a new edition of his old pamphlet A 
Peace Programme, as if wishing to show thereby that he 
was going towards the uprising under his own flag. What 
does he speak about in that pamphlet? In it he polemises 
with Lenin on the question of the possibility of the 
victory of socialism in one country, considers this idea 
of Lenin¹s incorrect and asserts that we shall have to 
take power, but that if timely aid does not come from the 
victorious West-European workers it is hopeless to think 
that a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face 
of a conservative Europe, and whoever does not agree 
with Trotsky¹s criticism suffers from national narrowmindedness. 
Here is an excerpt from Trotsky¹s pamphlet of that 
time: 
³Without waiting for the others, we begin and continue the 
struggle nationally, in the full confidence that our initiative will 
give an impetus to the struggle in other countries, but if this should 
not occur, it would be hopeless to think‹as historical experience 
and theoretical considerations testify‹that, for example, a revolutionary 
Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative 
Europe². . . . ³To accept the perspective of a social revolution 
within national bounds is to fall a prey to that very national narrowmindedness 
which constitutes the essence of social-patriotism.² 
(Trotsky, The Year 1917, Vol. III, Part 1, p. 90.)

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 349 
Such, comrades, was Trotsky¹s slight reservation, 
which goes far to explain to us the roots and the 
subsoil of his present bloc with Kamenev and Zinoviev. 
But how did Lenin, how did the Party, go towards 
the uprising? Also with a slight reservation? No, Lenin 
and his Party went towards the uprising without any 
reservations. Here is an excerpt from one of Lenin¹s 
splendid articles ³The Military Programme of the Proletarian 
Revolution,² published abroad in September 
1917: 
³The victory of socialism in one country does not at one stroke 
altogether eliminate all war. On the contrary, it presupposes wars. 
The development of capitalism proceeds extremely unevenly in the 
various countries. It cannot be otherwise under commodity production. 
From this it follows irrefutably that socialism cannot achieve 
victory simultaneously in all countries. It will achieve victory first 
in one or several countries, while the others will remain bourgeois 
or pre-bourgeois for some time. This is bound to create not only 
friction, but a direct striving on the part of the bourgeoisie of the 
other countries to crush the victorious proletariat of the socialist 
state. In such cases a war on our part would be a legitimate and 
just war. It would be a war for socialism, for the liberation of other 
peoples from the bourgeoisie.² (Lenin, ³The Military Programme 
of the Proletarian Revolution,² Notes of the Lenin Institute, 
Part II, p. 7.84) 
You see that we have a totally different line here. 
Whereas Trotsky went towards the uprising with a slight 
reservation that brought him close to Kamenev and Zinoviev, 
asserting that, taken by itself, proletarian power 
cannot amount to anything much if timely aid does 
not come from outside, Lenin, on the contrary, went 
to the uprising without reservations, asserting that proletarian 
power in our country must serve as a base for

J. V. S T A L I N 350 
assisting the proletarians of other countries to emancipate 
themselves from the yoke of the bourgeoisie. 
That is how the Bolsheviks went towards the October 
uprising, and that is why Trotsky, and Kamenev and 
Zinoviev found common ground in the tenth year of 
the October Revolution. 
One could depict in the form of a dialogue the conversation 
between Trotsky on the one hand, and Kamenev 
and Zinoviev on the other, when the opposition bloc 
was being formed. 
Kamenev and Zinoviev to Trotsky: ³So you see, dear 
comrade, in the end we proved to be right when we said 
that we ought not to go towards the October uprising, 
that we ought to wait for the Constituent Assembly, 
and so forth. Now, everybody sees that the country is 
degenerating, the government is degenerating, we are 
heading for destruction and there won¹t be any socialism 
in our country. We ought not to have gone towards 
the uprising. But you went to the uprising voluntarily. 
You made a big mistake.² 
Trotsky replies to them: ³No, dear colleagues, you 
are unjust towards me. True, I went towards the uprising, 
but you forgot to say how I went. After all, 
I did not go to the uprising whole-heartedly, but with 
a reservation. (General laughter.) And since it is evident 
now that aid cannot be expected from anywhere outside, 
it is clear that we are heading for destruction, as I foretold 
at the time in A Peace Programme.² 
Zinoviev and Kamenev: ³Yes, you may be right. 
We forgot about your slight reservation. It is clear now 
that our bloc has an ideological foundation.² (General 
laughter. Applause.)

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 351 
That is how the opposition¹s line of denying the possibility 
of victoriously building socialism in our country 
came into being. 
What does that line signify? It signifies surrender. 
To whom? Obviously to the capitalist elements in our 
country. To whom else? To the world bourgeoisie. But 
the Left phrases, the revolutionary gestures‹what has 
become of them? They have vanished. Give our opposition 
a good shaking, cast aside the revolutionary phraseology, 
and at bottom you will find that they are defeatists. 
(Applause.) 
S e c o n d. The question of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. Have we the dictatorship of the proletariat 
or not? Rather a strange question. (Laughter.) Nevertheless, 
the opposition raises it in every one of its declarations. 
The opposition says that we are in a state of 
Thermidor degeneration. What does that mean? It means 
that we have not got the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
that both our economics and our politics are a failure 
and are going backwards, that we are not moving towards 
socialism, but towards capitalism. That, of course, 
is strange and foolish. But the opposition insists 
on it. 
There you have, comrades, yet another divergence. 
It is on this that Trotsky¹s well-known thesis about 
Clemenceau is based. If the government has degenerated, 
or is degenerating, is it worth while sparing, defending, 
upholding it? Clearly, it is not worth while. If a situation 
arises favourable to the ³removal² of such a 
government, if, say, the enemy comes within 80 kilometres 
of Moscow, is it not obvious that advantage should 
be taken of that situation to sweep this government

J. V. S T A L I N 352 
away and to set up a new, Clemenceau, i.e., Trotskyist, 
government? 
Clearly, there is nothing Leninist in this ³line.² 
It is Menshevism of the purest water. The opposition 
has slipped into Menshevism. 
T h i r d. The question of the bloc between the working 
class and the middle peasants. The opposition has all 
along concealed its hostility to the idea of such a bloc. 
Its platform, its counter-theses, are remarkable not so 
much for what they say as for what the opposition has 
tried to conceal from the working class. But a man was 
found, I. N. Smirnov, also one of the leaders of the opposition, 
who had the courage to tell the truth about the 
opposition, to drag it into the light of day. And what do 
we find? We find that we ³are heading for destruction,² 
and if we want to ³save ourselves,² we must go in for 
discord with the middle peasants. Not very clever, but 
clear. 
Here, too, the opposition¹s Menshevik ears have at 
last become exposed for everybody to see. 
F o u r t h. The question of the character of our revolution. 
If the possibility of victoriously building socialism 
in our country is denied, if the existence of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat is denied, if the necessity 
of a bloc between the working class and the peasantry 
is denied, what then remains of our revolution, of its 
socialist character? Obviously, nothing, absolutely 
nothing. The proletariat came to power, it carried the 
bourgeois revolution to completion, the peasantry now has 
nothing to do with the revolution since it has already 
received land, so the proletariat can now retire and 
make room for other classes.

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 353 
There you have the opposition¹s line, if we delve 
down to the roots of the oppositionist views. 
There you have all the roots of the defeatism of our 
opposition. No wonder the Bundist defeatist Abramovich 
praises it. 
F i f t h. The question of Lenin¹s line on the leadership 
of colonial revolutions. Lenin took as his startingpoint 
the difference between imperialist countries and 
oppressed countries, between communist policy in imperialist 
countries and communist policy in colonial count 
r i e s . Taking this difference as his starting-point, 
he said, already during the war, that the idea of defending 
the fatherland, which is inacceptable and counterrevolutionary 
for communism in imperialist countries, 
is quite acceptable and legitimate in oppressed countries 
that are waging a war of liberation against imperialism.
That is why Lenin conceded the possibility, at a 
certain stage and for a certain period, of a bloc and even 
of an alliance with the national bourgeoisie in colonial 
countries, if this bourgeoisie is waging war against 
imperialism, and if it is not hindering the Communists 
from training the workers and poor peasants in the spirit 
of communism. 
The sin of the opposition here is that it has completely 
abandoned this line of Lenin¹s and has slipped 
into that of the Second International, which denies the 
expediency of supporting revolutionary wars waged 
by colonial countries against imperialism. And it is 
this that explains all the misfortunes that have befallen 
our opposition on the question of the Chinese revolution.

J. V. S T A L I N 354 
There you have yet another divergence. 
S i x t h. The question of united front tactics in the 
world working-class movement. The sin of the opposition 
here is that it has abandoned the Leninist tactics on the 
question of gradually winning the vast masses of the working 
class to the side of communism. The vast masses of 
the working class are not won over to the side of communism 
merely by the Party pursuing a correct policy. The 
Party¹s correct policy is a big thing, but it is by no 
means everything. In order that the vast masses of the 
working class should come over to communism, the 
masses themselves should become convinced through their 
own experience that the communist policy is correct. And 
for the masses to become convinced requires time, requires 
that the Party should work skilfully and ably 
in leading the masses to its positions, that the Party 
should work skilfully and ably to convince the vast masses 
that its policy is correct. 
We were absolutely right in April 1917, for we knew 
that things were moving towards the overthrow of the 
bourgeoisie and to the establishment of Soviet power. 
But we did not yet call upon the broad masses 
of the working class to rise in revolt against the power 
of the bourgeoisie. Why? Because the masses had 
not yet had the opportunity to become convinced that 
our absolutely correct policy was correct. Only when 
the petty-bourgeois Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik 
parties had utterly discredited themselves on 
the fundamental questions of the revolution, only when 
the masses began to be convinced that our policy was 
correct, only then did we lead the masses to the uprising. 
And it is precisely because we led the masses to

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 355 
the uprising at the proper time that we achieved victory 
then. 
There you have the roots of the united front idea. 
Lenin put the united front tactics into operation precisely 
for the purpose of helping the vast masses of the 
working class in the capitalist countries, who are infected 
with the prejudices of the Social-Democratic policy 
of compromise, to learn from their own experience that 
the Communists¹ policy is correct, and to pass to the 
side of communism. 
The sin of the opposition is that it utterly repudiates 
these tactics. At one time it was infatuated, stupidly 
and unwisely infatuated, with the tactics of the united 
front, and it enthusiastically welcomed the conclusion 
of an agreement with the General Council in Britain, 
believing that that agreement was ³one of the surest guarantees 
of peace,² ³one of the surest guarantees against 
intervention,² one of the surest means of ³rendering 
reformism in Europe harmless² (see Zinoviev¹s report 
to the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.)). But 
when its hopes of rendering reformism ³harmless² 
through the aid of the Purcells and Hickses were cruelly 
dashed to the ground, it rushed to the other extreme 
and utterly repudiated the idea of united front 
tactics. 
There you have, comrades, yet another divergence 
demonstrating the opposition¹s complete abandonment 
of the Leninist united front tactics. 
S e v e n t h. The question of the Leninist Party principle, 
of Leninist unity in the C.P.S.U.(B.) and in the 
Comintern. Here, the opposition utterly abandons the 
Leninist organisational line and takes the path of

J. V. S T A L I N 356 
organising a second party, the path of organising a new 
International. 
There you have seven main questions, showing that 
on all of them the opposition has slipped into Menshevism. 
Can these Menshevik views of the opposition be regarded 
as compatible with our Party¹s ideology, with 
our Party¹s programme, with its tactics, with the tactics 
of the Comintern, with the organisational line of 
Leninism? 
Under no circumstances; not for a single moment! 
You will ask: how could such an opposition come 
into being among us, where are its social roots? I think 
that the social roots of the opposition lie in the fact of 
the ruin of the urban petty-bourgeois strata in the circumstances 
of our development, in the fact that these 
strata are discontented with the regime of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, in the striving of these strata 
to change that regime, to ³improve² it in the direction 
of establishing bourgeois democracy. 
I have already said that as a result of our progress, 
as a result of the growth of our industry, as a result of the 
growth of the relative importance of the socialist forms 
of economy, a section of the petty bourgeoisie, particularly 
of the urban bourgeoisie, is being ruined and is 
going under. The opposition reflects the grumbling of 
these strata and their discontent with the regime of the 
proletarian revolution. 
Such are the social roots of the opposition.

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 357 
4. What Next? 
What is to be done now with the opposition? 
Before passing to this question I should like to tell 
you the story of an experiment in joint work with Trotsky 
that Kamenev made in 1910. This is a very interesting 
question, the more so as it could give us some clue 
to the proper approach to the question raised. In 1910 
a plenum of our Central Committee was held abroad. 
It discussed the question of the relations between the 
Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, and Trotsky in particular 
(we were then a part of one party that included 
the Mensheviks, and we called ourselves a group). The 
plenum decided in favour of conciliation with the Mensheviks 
and, consequently, with Trotsky, in spite of 
Lenin, in opposition to Lenin. Lenin was left in the minority. 
But what about Kamenev? Kamenev undertook 
to co-operate with Trotsky. His co-operation was with 
Lenin¹s knowledge and consent, because Lenin wanted 
to prove to Kamenev by experience that it was harmful 
and impermissible to co-operate with Trotsky against 
Bolshevism. 
Listen to what Kamenev relates about this: 
³In 1910, the majority of our group made an attempt at conciliation 
and agreement with Comrade Trotsky. Vladimir Ilyich was 
strongly opposed to this attempt and, Œas a punishment,¹ as it were, 
for my persistence in the attempt to reach agreement with Trotsky, 
insisted that I should be the one sent by the Central Committee 
as its representative on the editorial board of Comrade Trotsky¹s 
newspaper. By the autumn of 1910‹having worked on this editorial 
board for several months‹I was convinced that Vladimir 
Ilyich was right in his opposition to my Œconciliatory¹ line, and with 
his consent I resigned from the editorial board of Comrade Trotsky¹s

J. V. S T A L I N 358 
organ. Our rupture with Comrade Trotsky at that time was marked 
by a series of sharply-worded articles in the Central Organ of the 
Party. It was at that time that Vladimir Ilyich suggested to me that 
I should write a pamphlet summing up our disagreements with the 
Menshevik-Liquidators and with Comrade Trotsky. ³You have made 
an experiment at agreement with the extreme Left (Trotskyist) 
wing of the anti-Bolshevik groups, you have become convinced that 
agreement is impossible, and so you must write a summarising pamphlet,¹ 
Vladimir Ilyich said to me. Naturally, Vladimir Ilyich particularly 
insisted that precisely on the subject of the relations between 
Bolshevism and what we then called Trotskyism everything 
should be told . . . to the very end.² (L. Kamenev¹s preface to his 
pamphlet Two Parties.) 
What were the results of this? Listen further: 
³The experiment in joint work with Trotsky‹which, I make 
bold to say, I performed with sincerity, as is proved precisely by 
the way Trotsky is now exploiting my letters and private conversations‹
showed that conciliation irresistibly slips into defence of Liquidationism 
and definitely takes the side of the latter.² (L. Kamenev, 
Two Parties.) 
And further: 
³Oh, had ŒTrotskyism¹ been victorious as a mood in the Party, 
what a clear field there would have been for Liquidationism, for Otzovism, 
and for all the trends that were fighting the Party² (ibid.). 
There, comrades, you have an experiment in joint 
work with Trotsky. (A voice: ³An instructive experiment.²) 
Kamenev, at the time, described the results 
of that experiment in a special pamphlet that was published 
in 1911 under the title Two Parties. I have no 
doubt that this pamphlet was very useful to all those comrades 
who still harboured illusions about co-operation 
with Trotsky.

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 359 
And now I would ask: would not Kamenev try to 
write another pamphlet, also bearing the title Two Parties, 
about his present experiment in co-operating with 
Trotsky? (General laughter. Applause.) Perhaps there 
would be some use in his doing so. Of course, I can give 
Kamenev no guarantee that Trotsky will not now use 
his letters and intimate conversations against him as 
he did then. (General laughter.) But it is scarcely worth 
while being afraid of that. At all events, a choice has 
to be made: either to be afraid that Trotsky will use 
Kamenev¹s letters and divulge his secret conversations 
with Trotsky, in which case the danger arises of being 
outside the Party; or to cast off all fear and remain in 
the Party. 
That is how the question stands now, comrades: one 
thing or the other. 
It is said that the opposition intends to present to 
the congress some kind of a declaration to the effect 
that it, the opposition, submits and will in future submit 
to all Party decisions (a voice: ³Just as it did in 
October 1926?²), dissolve its faction (a voice: ³We have 
heard that twice!²) and defend its views, which i t 
does not renounce (voices: ³Oh!² ³No, we had better 
dissolve it ourselves!²), within the framework of the 
Party Rules. (Voices: ³With slight reservations.² ³Our 
framework is not made of rubber.²) 
I think, comrades, that nothing will come of this. 
(Voices: ³Quite right!² Prolonged applause.) We too, 
comrades, have made some experiment with declarations 
(applause), we made an experiment with two declarations 
(voices: ³Quite right!²), that of October 16, 1926 
and that of August 8, 1927. What did that experiment

J. V. S T A L I N 360 
lead to? Although I do not intend to write a pamphlet 
Two Parties, I make bold to say that that experiment 
led to the most negative results (voices: ³Quite right!²), 
to the deception of the Party on two occasions, to the 
slackening of Party discipline. What grounds has the 
opposition now for demanding that we, the congress of 
a great Party, the congress of Lenin¹s Party, should take 
its word after such an experiment? (Voices: ³It would 
be foolishness.² ³Whoever does so will get into trouble.²) 
It is said that they are also raising the question 
of the reinstatement in the Party of those who have been 
expelled. (Voices: ³That won¹t come off.² ³Let them 
go into the Menshevik marsh.²) I think, comrades, 
that that, too, will not come off. (Prolonged applause.) 
Why did the Party expel Trotsky and Zinoviev? 
Because they are the organisers of the entire work of 
the anti-Party opposition (voices: ³Quite right!), 
because they set out to break the laws of the Party, because 
they thought that nobody would dare to touch 
them, because they wanted to create for themselves the 
position of a nobility in the Party. 
But do we want to have a privileged nobility and an 
unprivileged peasantry in the Party? Shall we Bolsheviks, 
who uprooted the nobility, restore them now in 
our Party? (Applause.) 
You ask: why did we expel Trotsky and Zinoviev 
from the Party? Because we do not want a nobility in the 
Party. Because there is a single law in our Party, and 
all members of the Party have equal rights. (Voices: 
³Quite right!² Prolonged applause.) 
If the opposition wants to be in the Party let it submit 
to the will of the Party, to its laws, to its instruc

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 361 
tions, without reservations, without equivocation. If 
it does not want to do that‹let it go where it will find 
more freedom. (Voices: ³Quite right!² Applause.) We 
do not want new laws providing privileges for the opposition, 
and we will not create them. (Applause.) 
The question is raised about conditions. We make 
only one condition: the opposition must disarm wholly 
and entirely, both ideologically and organisationally. 
(Voices: ³Quite right!² Prolonged applause.) 
It must renounce its anti-Bolshevik views openly 
and honestly, before the whole world. (Voices: ³Quite 
right!² Prolonged applause.) 
It must brand the mistakes it has committed, mistakes 
which have grown into crimes against the Party, 
openly and honestly, before the whole world. 
It must surrender its units to us in order that the 
Party may be able to dissolve them so that nothing is 
left. (Voices: ³Quite right!² Prolonged applause.) 
Either that, or let them go out of the Party. And if 
they do not go out, we shall throw them out. (Voices: 
³Quite right!² Prolonged applause.) 
That is how the matter stands with the opposition, 
comrades. 
IV 
GENERAL SUMMARY 
I am concluding, comrades. 
What is the general summary for the period under 
review? It is as follows: 
1) we have maintained peace with the surrounding 
states, in spite of enormous difficulties, in spite of the 
provocative attacks of the bourgeoisie of the ³great powers²;

J. V. S T A L I N 362 
2) we have strengthened the link between the working 
class of the U.S.S.R. and the workers in the imperialist 
countries and in the colonies, in spite of a multitude of 
obstacles, in spite of the ocean of slander poured out 
against us by the venal, hundred-mouthed bourgeois press; 
3) we have raised the prestige of the proletarian dictatorship 
among the vast masses of the working people 
in all parts of the world; 
4) we, as a party, have helped the Comintern and its 
sections to increase their influence in all countries in the 
world; 
5) we have done everything one party can do to develop 
and accelerate the world revolutionary movement; 
6) we have raised further our socialist industry, establishing 
for it a record rate of development and consolidating 
its hegemony in the entire national economy; 
7) we have established a bond between socialist industry 
and peasant economy; 
8) we have strengthened the alliance between the working 
class and the middle peasants, while relying on the peasant 
poor; 
9) we have strengthened the dictatorship of the proletariat 
in our country, in spite of the hostile international 
encirclement, and have shown the workers of all countries 
that the proletariat is able not only to destroy capitalism, 
but also to build socialism; 
10) we have strengthened the Party, upheld Leninism 
and utterly routed the opposition. 
Such is the general summary. 
What is the conclusion? Only one conclusion can be 
drawn: we are on the right road; our Party¹s policy is 
correct. (Voices: ³Quite right!² Applause.)

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 363 
And from this it follows that, continuing along this 
road, we shall certainly achieve the victory of socialism 
in our country, the victory of socialism in all countries. 
(Prolonged applause.) 
But that does not mean that we shall not encounter 
difficulties on our road. There will be difficulties. But 
difficulties do not daunt us, for we are Bolsheviks who 
have been steeled in the fire of revolution. 
There will be difficulties. But we shall surmount 
them, as we have surmounted them up to now, for we 
are Bolsheviks, who have been wrought by Lenin¹s 
iron Party in order to combat difficulties and surmount 
them, and not to whine and moan. 
And precisely because we are Bolsheviks we shall 
certainly be victorious. 
Comrades! Forward to the victory of communism 
in our country, to the victory of communism all over the 
world! (Stormy and prolonged applause. All rise and give 
Comrade Stalin an ovation. The ³Internationale² is sung.)

REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION ON THE POLITICAL 
REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
December 7 
Comrades, after the speeches delivered by a whole 
series of delegates, there is little left for me to say. 
Concerning the speeches of Yevdokimov and Muralov I 
cannot say anything of their substance, for they provide 
no material for that. Only one thing could be said about 
them: Allah, forgive them their trespasses, for they know 
not what they are talking about. (Laughter, applause.) 
I should like to deal with the speeches delivered by 
Rakovsky and, particularly, Kamenev, whose speech was 
the most hypocritical and lying of all the speeches of the 
oppositionists. (Voices: ³Quite right!²) 
I 
CONCERNING RAKOVSKY¹S SPEECH 
a) Concerning foreign policy. I think that it was to 
no purpose that Rakovsky touched upon the question 
of war and foreign policy here. Everybody knows that at 
the Moscow conference Rakovsky made a fool of himself 
on the question of war. Evidently, he came here and 
took the floor in order to correct that stupidity, but he 
made an even bigger fool of himself. (Laughter.) I think it 
would have been better for Rakovsky not to say anything 
about foreign policy.

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 365 
b) Concerning Left and Right. Rakovsky asserts that 
the opposition is the Left sector of our Party. That is 
enough to make a cat laugh, comrades. Obviously, such 
statements are made for political bankrupts to console 
themselves with. It has been proved that the opposition 
is the Menshevik wing of our Party, that the opposition 
has slipped into Menshevism, that, objectively, the opposition 
has become a tool of the bourgeois elements. All 
this has been proved over and over again. How then can 
there be any talk here about the opposition¹s Leftism? 
How can a Menshevik group which, objectively, has become 
a tool of the ³third force,² of the bourgeois elements, 
how can such a group be more Left than the Bolsheviks? 
Is it not obvious that the opposition is the Right, Menshevik 
wing of the C.P.S.U.(B.)? 
Evidently, Rakovsky has got himself thoroughly 
mixed up and has confused the right with the left. 
Do you remember Gogol¹s Selifan?‹²Oh you, dirty 
legs. . . . You don¹t know which is right and which is 
left!² 
c) Concerning the opposition¹s assistance. Rakovsky 
says that the opposition is prepared to support the Party 
if the imperialists attack us. How generous, to be sure! 
They, a tiny group, scarcely half of one per cent of our 
Party, graciously promise to assist us if the imperialists 
attack our country. We have no faith in your assistance, 
and we don¹t need it! We ask only one thing of you: 
Don¹t hinder us, stop hindering us! All the rest we shall 
do ourselves, you can be sure of that. (Voices: ³Quite 
right!² Applause.) 
d) Concerning ³signalmen.² Rakovsky states further 
that the opposition is signalling to us about the dangers,

J. V. S T A L I N 366 
the difficulties, the ³destruction² facing our country. 
Fine ³signalmen,² indeed, who want to save the Party 
from ³destruction² when they themselves are rushing to 
their doom and really need saving! They can barely keep 
on their feet themselves and yet want to save others! 
Isn¹t it ridiculous, comrades? (Laughter.) 
Picture to yourselves a tiny boat at sea, barely 
able to keep afloat, ready to founder at any moment, and 
picture to yourselves a magnificent steamship powerfully 
cutting the waves and confidently making headway. 
What would you say if this tiny boat thrust itself forward 
to save the huge steamship? (Laughter.) It would be 
more than ridiculous, would it not? That is exactly the 
position the ³signalmen² of our opposition are in now. 
They are signalling to us about dangers, difficulties, 
³destruction,² and what not, but they themselves are 
sinking, they do not realise that they have already gone 
to the bottom. 
Speaking of themselves as ³signalmen,² the oppositionists 
thereby lay claim to the leadership of the Party, 
of the working class, of the country. The question is‹ 
on what grounds? Have they, the oppositionists, given 
any practical proof that they are capable of leading anything, 
let alone the Party, the class, the country? Is it 
not a fact that the opposition, headed by people like 
Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev, has been leading its 
group for two years already and that, by their leadership, 
the leaders of the opposition have brought it to complete 
bankruptcy? Is it not a fact that during these two years 
the opposition has led its group from defeat to defeat? 
What does this show if not that the leaders of the opposition 
are bankrupt, that their leadership has proved to

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 367 
be leadership to defeat, not to victory? But since the 
leaders of the opposition failed in a small matter, what 
grounds are there for thinking that they will be successful 
in a big one? Is it not obvious that people who have 
gone bankrupt in leading a small group cannot possibly 
be entrusted with the leadership of such a big thing as 
the Party, the working class, the country? 
That is what our ³signalmen² refuse to understand. 
II 
CONCERNING KAMENEV¹S SPEECH 
I pass on to Kamenev¹s speech. That speech was the 
most lying, hypocritical, fraudulent and scoundrelly of 
all the opposition speeches delivered here, from this 
rostrum. (Voices: ³Quite right!² Applause.) 
a) Two faces in one person. The first thing Kamenev 
tried to do in his speech was to cover up his tracks. The 
representatives of the Party spoke here about our Party¹s 
achievements, about our successes in construction, about 
the improvement in our work, etc. Further, they spoke 
of the Menshevik sins of the oppositionists, of their having 
slipped into Menshevism by denying the possibility of 
successfully building socialism in our country, denying 
the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat in 
the U.S.S.R., denying the expediency of the policy of 
alliance between the working class and the middle peasants, 
spreading slanders about a Thermidor, etc. Lastly, 
they said that these views of the opposition are incompatible 
with membership of our Party, that the opposition 
must abandon these Menshevik views if it wants to remain 
in the Party.

J. V. S T A L I N 368
Well? Kamenev could think of nothing better than 
to evade these questions, to cover up his tracks and 
pass on. He was asked about vital questions of our 
programme, our policy, our work of construction; but 
he evaded them, as if they did not concern him. Can this 
behaviour of Kamenev¹s be called a serious attitude towards 
the matter? How is this behaviour of the opposi 
tion to be explained? It can be explained only by one 
thing: the desire to deceive the Party, to lull its vigilance, 
to fool the Party once again. 
The opposition has two faces: a hypocritically genial 
one, and a Menshevik anti-revolutionary one. It shows 
the Party its hypocritically genial face when the Party 
puts pressure on it and demands that it should abandon 
its factionalism, its splitting policy. It shows its Menshevik 
anti-revolutionary face when it sets out to appeal to 
the non-proletarian forces, when it sets out to appeal 
to the ³street² against the Party, against the Soviet 
regime. Just now, as you see, it has turned its hypocritically 
genial face to us in the endeavour to 
deceive the Party once again. That is why Kamenev 
tried to cover up his tracks by evading the highly 
important questions on which we disagree. Can this duplicity, 
this double-facedness, be tolerated any longer? 
One thing or the other: either the opposition wants 
to talk seriously to the Party, in which case it must 
throw off its mask; or it intends to keep its two faces, 
in which case i t will find itself outside the Party. 
(Voices: ³Quite right!²) 
b) Concerning the traditions of Bolshevism. Kamenev 
asserts that there is nothing in the traditions of our 
Party, in the traditions of Bolshevism, that justifies

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 369 
the demand that a member of the Party should give up 
certain views that are incompatible with our Party¹s 
ideology, with our programme. Is that correct? Of course 
not. More than that, it is a lie, comrades! 
Is it not a fact that all of us, including Kamenev, 
expelled Myasnikov and the Myasnikovites from the 
Party? Why did we expel them? Because their Menshevik 
views were incompatible with the Party¹s 
views. 
Is it not a fact that all of us, including Kamenev, 
expelled part of the ³Workers¹ Opposition² from the 
Party? Why did we expel it? Because its Menshevik views 
were incompatible with our Party¹s views. 
Why were Ossovsky and Dashkovsky expelled from 
the Party? Why were Maslow, Ruth Fischer, Katz and 
others expelled from the Comintern? Because their views 
were incompatible with the ideology of the Comintern, 
with the ideology of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
Our Party would not be a Leninist Party if it permitted 
the existence of anti-Leninist elements within our 
organisations. If this were permitted, then why not 
bring the Mensheviks into our Party? What is to be done 
with people who, while in the ranks of our Party, have 
slipped into Menshevism and propagate their anti-Leninist 
views? What can there be in common between the 
Leninist Party and such people? Kamenev slanders our 
Party, abandons the traditions of our Party, abandons 
the traditions of Bolshevism by asserting that we can 
tolerate within our Party people who profess and preach 
Menshevik views. And it is precisely because Kamenev, 
and the entire opposition with him, trample upon the 
revolutionary traditions of our Party that the Party

J. V. S T A L I N 370 
demands that the opposition should abandon its anti- 
Leninist views. 
c) The opposition¹s pretended devotion to principle. 
Kamenev asserts that it is difficult for him and the other 
oppositionists to abandon their views because they are accustomed 
to defend their views in the Bolshevik manner. 
He says that it would be unprincipled on the part of the 
opposition to abandon its views. It appears, then, that 
the leaders of the opposition are men of high principle. 
Is that true, comrades? Do the leaders of the opposition 
really value their principles, their views, their convictions 
so highly? It does not seem like it, comrades. It 
does not seem like it, bearing in mind the history of the 
formation of the opposition bloc. (Laughter.) The very 
opposite is the case. History shows, facts show, that 
nobody has jumped so easily from one set of principles 
to another, nobody has changed his views so easily and 
freely as the leaders of our opposition have done. Why, 
then, should they not give up their views now, too, if 
the interests of the Party demand it? 
Here are some examples from the history of Trotskyism. 
It is well known that Lenin, mustering the Party, 
convened a conference of Bolsheviks in Prague in 1912. 
It is well known that that conference was of very great 
importance in the history of our Party, for it drew a 
dividing line between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks 
and united the Bolshevik organisations all over 
the country into a single Bolshevik Party. 
It is well known that in that same year, 1912, a Menshevik 
conference of the August bloc, headed by Trotsky, 
took place. Further, it is well known that that confer

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 371 
ence proclaimed war on the Bolshevik conference and 
called upon the workers¹ organisations to liquidate 
Lenin¹s Party. What did the conference of Trotsky¹s 
August bloc accuse the Prague Bolshevik conference of 
at that time? Of all the mortal sins. It accused it of usurpation, 
sectarianism, of organising a ³coup d¹état² in the 
Party, and the devil knows what else. 
Here is what the conference of the August bloc said 
at that time about the Bolshevik conference in Prague 
in its statement to the Second International: 
³The conference declares that that conference (the Bolshevik 
conference in Prague in 1912‹J. St.) is an open attempt of a group 
of persons, who have quite deliberately led the Party to a split, 
to usurp the Party¹s flag, and it expresses its profound regret that 
several Party organisations and comrades have fallen victims to this 
deception and have thereby facilitated the splitting and usurpatory 
policy of Lenin¹s sect. The conference expresses its conviction 
that all the Party organisations in Russia and abroad will protest 
against the coup d¹état that has been brought about, will refuse to 
recognise the central bodies elected at that conference, and will by 
every means help to restore the unity of the Party by the convocation 
of a genuine all-Party conference.² (From the statement of the 
August bloc to the Second International, published in Vorwärts, 
March 26, 1912.) 
As you see, everything is here: Lenin¹s sect, usurpation, 
and a ³coup d¹état² in the Party. 
And what happened? A few years passed‹and Trotsky 
abandoned those views of his about the Bolshevik 
Party. He not only abandoned his views, but crawled 
on his belly to the Bolshevik Party, joining it as one 
of its active members. (Laughter.) 
What grounds are there for assuming, after all this, 
that Trotsky and the Trotskyists will not be able once

J. V. S T A L I N 372 
again to abandon their views about Thermidor tendencies 
in our Party, about usurpation, etc.? 
Another example from the same sphere. 
It is known that at the end of 1924, Trotsky published 
a pamphlet entitled The Lessons of October. It is 
known that in this pamphlet Trotsky described Kamenev 
and Zinoviev as the Right, semi-Menshevik wing of 
our Party. It is known that Trotsky¹s pamphlet was the 
cause of a whole discussion in our Party. And what happened? 
Only about a year passed‹and Trotsky abandoned 
his views and proclaimed that Zinoviev and 
Kamenev were not the Right wing of our Party but its 
Left, revolutionary wing. 
Another example, this time from the history of the 
Zinoviev group. It is known that Zinoviev and Kamenev 
have written a whole pile of pamphlets against Trotskyism. 
It is known that as far back as 1925 Zinoviev and 
Kamenev declared, together with the whole Party, that 
Trotskyism is incompatible with Leninism. It is known 
that both Zinoviev and Kamenev, together with the 
whole Party, carried resolutions, both at the congresses 
of our Party and at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, 
about Trotskyism being a petty-bourgeois deviation. And 
what happened? Less than a year passed after that before 
they renounced their views and proclaimed that 
Trotsky¹s group was a genuinely Leninist and revolutionary 
group within our Party. (A voice: ³A mutual 
amnesty!²) 
Such, comrades, are the facts, many more of which 
could be quoted if desired. 
Is it not obvious from this that the high devotion to 
principle of the leaders of the opposition that Kamenev

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 373 
tells us about here is a fairy-tale that has nothing in 
common with reality? 
Is it not obvious that nobody in our Party has managed 
to renounce his principles so easily and freely as 
Trotsky, Zinoviev and Kamenev? (Laughter.) 
The question arises: what grounds are there for 
assuming that the leaders of the opposition, who have 
abandoned their principles and their views several times 
already, will not be able to abandon them once again? 
Is it not obvious that our demand that the opposition 
should abandon its Menshevik views is not as harsh 
for the leaders of the opposition as Kamenev tries to 
make out? (Laughter.) This is not the first time they 
have had to abandon their views, so why should they not 
abandon them just once again? (Laughter.) 
d) Either the Party, or the opposition. Kamenev asserts 
that it is wrong to require the oppositionists to 
abandon certain views of theirs which have become incompatible 
with the Party¹s ideology and programme. I have 
already shown how foolish this assertion of Kamenev¹s 
i s , bearing in mind the opposition bloc¹s past and 
present. But let us assume for a moment that Kamenev 
is right. What will the position be then? Can the Party, 
our Party, abandon its views, convictions, principles? 
Can our Party be required to abandon its views, its principles? 
The Party has arrived at the definite conviction 
that the opposition must abandon i t s anti-Leninist 
views, that if it does not do so it will be sent flying 
out of the Party. If it is wrong to require the opposition 
to abandon its convictions, why is it right to require 
the Party to abandon its views and convictions 
about the opposition? According to Kamenev, however,

J. V. S T A L I N 374 
the opposition cannot abandon its anti-Leninist views, 
but the Party must abandon its view that the opposition 
cannot be allowed to remain in our Party unless the opposition 
abandons its anti-Leninist views. Where is 
the logic in this? (Laughter, applause.) 
Kamenev asserts that the oppositionists are courageous 
men who stand up for their convictions to the last. I 
have little belief in the courage and devotion to principle 
of the leaders of the opposition. I have especially 
little belief in the courage, for example, of Zinoviev 
or Kamenev (laughter), who abuse Trotsky one day and 
embrace him the next. (A voice: ³They are accustomed to 
play leap-frog.²) But let us assume for a moment that 
the leaders of our opposition have retained some modicum 
of courage and devotion to principle. What grounds 
are there for assuming that the Party is less courageous 
and devoted to principle than, say, Zinoviev, Kamenev or 
Trotsky? What grounds are there for assuming that the 
Party will more easily abandon its convictions about 
the opposition, its conviction that the latter¹s Menshevik 
views are incompatible with the Party¹s ideology and 
programme, than that the leaders of the opposition will 
abandon their views, which they change every now and 
again like gloves? (Laughter.) 
Is it not clear from this that Kamenev is requiring 
the Party to abandon its views about the opposition and 
the latter ¹s Menshevik mistakes? Is not Kamenev going 
too far? Will he not agree that it is dangerous to go 
so far? 
The question is this: either the Party, or the opposition. 
Either the opposition abandons its anti-Leninist 
views; or it does not do so‹in which case not even the

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 375 
memory of it will remain in the Party. (Voices: ³Quite 
right!² Applause.) 
e) The opposition has broken away from the traditions 
of Bolshevism. Kamenev asserts that there is nothing in 
Bolshevik traditions that justifies the demand that members 
of the Party should abandon their views. Speakers 
here have fully proved that is not correct. Facts 
confirm that Kamenev is telling a downright untruth. 
But the question is: is there in Bolshevik traditions 
any instance of what the opposition permits itself 
to do and continues doing? The opposition organised a 
faction and converted it into a party within our Bolshevik 
Party. But who has ever heard that Bolshevik traditions 
permitted anybody to commit such an outrageous 
act? How can one talk about Bolshevik traditions while 
at the same time bringing about a split in the Party and 
the formation of a new, anti-Bolshevik party within it? 
Further. The opposition organised an illegal printing 
press, entering into a bloc with bourgeois intellectuals, 
who, in their turn, were found to be in a bloc with 
avowed whiteguards. The question arises: how can one 
talk about the traditions of Bolshevism when one permits 
such an outrageous act, which borders on downright 
treachery to the Party and the Soviet regime? 
Lastly, the opposition organised an anti-Party, anti- 
Soviet demonstration, appealing to the ³street,² appealing 
to non-proletarian elements. But how can one talk 
about Bolshevik traditions when one appeals to the 
³street² against one¹s own Party, against one¹s own Soviet 
regime? Who has ever heard that Bolshevik traditions 
permitted such an outrageous act, which 
borders on downright counter-revolution?

J. V. S T A L I N 376 
Is it not obvious that Kamenev speaks of the traditions 
of Bolshevism in order to screen his rupture with 
those traditions in the interests of his anti-Bolshevik 
group? 
The opposition gained nothing from its appeal to 
the ³street² because the opposition proved to be an insignificant 
coterie. That was not its fault but its misfortune. 
And what i f the opposition had a little more 
strength behind it? Is it not obvious that its appeal to the 
³street² would have turned into an open putsch against 
the Soviet regime? Is it difficult to understand that, 
in essence, this attempt of the opposition¹s differed in 
no way from the well-known attempt of the Left Socialist- 
Revolutionaries in 1918? (Voices: ³Quite right!²) By 
rights, for those attempts we ought to have arrested all 
the active members of the opposition on November 7. 
(Voices: ³Quite right!² Prolonged applause.) We did not 
do so only because we took pity on them, we displayed 
magnanimity and wanted to give them an opportunity 
to come to their senses. But they interpreted our magnanimity 
as weakness. 
Is it not obvious that Kamenev¹s talk about Bolshevik 
traditions is empty and deceitful talk intended to 
screen the opposition¹s rupture with the traditions of 
Bolshevism? 
f) Concerning sham unity and genuine unity. Kamenev 
gave us a song here about unity. He positively warbled, 
begging the Party to come to the rescue and establish 
unity ³at all costs.² They, the leaders of the opposition, 
don¹t you see, are opposed to the two-party policy. They, 
don¹t you see, are in favour of Party unity ³at all costs.² 
And yet, we know for certain that at the very moment

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 377 
that Kamenev was singing about Party unity here, his 
supporters were passing resolutions at their secret meetings 
to the effect that the opposition¹s declaration on 
unity was a manoeuvre designed to preserve its forces 
and enable its splitting policy to be continued. On the 
one hand, the opposition sings about Party unity at the 
congress of the Leninist Party. On the other hand, the 
opposition works underground to split the Party, to 
organise a second party, to undermine Party unity. That 
is what they call unity ³at all costs.² Is it not time 
to stop this criminal, swindling game? 
Kamenev talked about unity. Unity with whom? 
Unity with the Party, or with Shcherbakov? Is it not 
time to understand that Leninists and Messieurs the 
Shcherbakovs cannot be united in one Party? 
Kamenev talked about unity. Unity with whom? 
With Maslow and Souvarine, or with the Comintern and 
the C.P.S.U.(B.)? Is i t not time to understand that 
one cannot speak of unity with the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the 
Comintern while persisting in unity with the Maslows 
and Souvarines? Is it not time to understand that it is 
impossible to unite Leninist views with the opposition¹s 
Menshevik views? 
Unite Lenin and Abramovich? No thank you, comrades! 
It is time to stop this swindling game. 
That is why I think that Kamenev¹s talk about unity 
³at all costs² is a hypocritical game intended to deceive 
the Party. 
We need genuine unity and not playing at unity. 
Have we genuine, Leninist unity in our Party? Yes, we 
have. When 99 per cent of our Party vote for the Party 
and against the opposition, that is real, genuine,

J. V. S T A L I N 378 
proletarian unity such as we have not had in our Party 
before. Here you have the Party Congress, at which there 
is not a single opposition delegate. (Applause.) What is 
that if not the unity of our Leninist Party? That is what 
we call the Leninist unity of the Bolshevik Party. 
g) ³Finish with the opposition!² The Party has done 
all that could possibly be done to put the opposition on 
the Leninist road. The Party has displayed the utmost 
leniency and magnanimity to enable the opposition to 
come to its senses and rectify its mistakes. The Party has 
called upon the opposition to renounce its anti-Leninist 
views openly and honestly, before the whole Party. The 
Party has called upon the opposition to admit its mistakes 
and denounce them in order to free itself of them 
once and for all. The Party has called upon the opposition 
completely to disarm, both ideologically and organisationally. 
What is the Party¹s object in doing so? Its object 
is to finish with the opposition and to pass on to positive 
work. Its object is to liquidate the opposition at 
last and obtain the opportunity to get right down to 
our great work of construction. 
Lenin said at the Tenth Congress: ³We do not want an 
opposition now . . . we must now put an end to the 
opposition, finish with it, we have had enough of oppositions 
now!²85 
The Party wants this slogan of Lenin¹s to be put 
into effect at last in the ranks of our Party. (Prolonged 
applause.) 
If the opposition disarms‹well and good. If i t 
refuses to disarm‹we shall disarm it ourselves. (Voices: 
³Quite right!² Applause.)

THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 379 
III 
THE SUMMING UP 
From Kamenev¹s speech it is evident that the opposition 
does not intend to disarm completely. The opposition¹s 
declaration of December 3 indicates the same thing. 
Evidently, the opposition prefers to be outside the Party. 
Well, let it be outside the Party. There is nothing terrible, 
or exceptional, or surprising, in the fact that they 
prefer to be outside the Party, that they are cutting themselves 
off from the Party. If you study the history of 
our Party you will find that always, at certain serious 
turns taken by our Party, a certain section of the old 
leaders fell out of the cart of the Bolshevik Party and 
made room for new people. A turn is a serious thing, 
comrades. A turn is dangerous for those who do not sit 
firmly in the Party cart. Not everybody can keep his 
balance when a turn is made. You turn the cart‹and on 
looking round you find that somebody has fallen out. 
(Applause.) 
Let us take 1903, the period of the Second Congress 
of our Party. That was the period of the Party¹s turn 
from agreement with the liberals to a mortal struggle 
against the liberal bourgeoisie, from preparing for the 
struggle against tsarism to open struggle against it for 
completely routing tsarism and feudalism. At that time 
the Party was headed by the six: Plekhanov, Zasulich, 
Martov, Lenin, Axelrod and Potresov. The turn proved 
fatal to five out of the six. They fell out of the cart. 
Lenin alone remained. (Applause.) It turned out that the 
old leaders of the Party, the founders of the Party (Plekhanov, 
Zasulich and Axelrod) plus two young ones

J. V. S T A L I N 380 
(Martov and Potresov) were against one, also a young 
one, Lenin. If only you knew how much howling, weeping 
and wailing there was then that the Party was doomed, 
that the Party would not hold out, that nothing could 
be done without the old leaders. The howling and wailing 
subsided, however, but the facts remained. And the facts 
were that precisely thanks to the departure of the five 
the Party succeeded in getting on to the right road. It 
is now clear to every Bolshevik that if Lenin had not 
waged a resolute struggle against the five, if the five 
had not been pushed aside, our Party could not have rallied 
as a Bolshevik Party capable of leading the proletarians 
to the revolution against the bourgeoisie. (Voices: 
³That¹s true!²) 
Let us take the next period, the period 1907-08. 
That was the period of our Party¹s turn from open revolutionary 
struggle against tsarism to flanking methods 
of struggle, to the use of all kinds of legal possibilities 
‹from insurance funds to the floor of the Duma. It 
was the period of retreat after we had been defeated in 
the 1905 Revolution. This turn required of us that we 
should master new methods of struggle in order, after 
mustering our forces, to resume the open revolutionary 
struggle against tsarism. But this turn proved fatal to 
a number of old Bolsheviks. Alexinsky fell out of the 
cart. At one time he was quite a good Bolshevik. Bogdanov 
fell out. He was one of the most prominent leaders of 
our Party. Rozhkov‹a former member of the Central 
Committee of our Party‹fell out. And so forth. There 
was, perhaps, at that time no less howling and wailing 
that the Party would perish than in 1903. The howling, 
however, subsided but the facts remained.

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
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381 
And the facts showed that the Party would not 
have been able to get on to the right road under the 
new conditions of struggle had it not purged itself of 
the people who were wavering and hindering the cause 
of the revolution. What was Lenin¹s object at that time? 
He had only one object: to rid the Party of the unstable 
and whining elements as quickly as possible, so that they 
should not get in our way. (Applause.) 
That is how our Party grew, comrades. 
Our Party is a living organism like every organism, 
it undergoes a process of metabolism: the old and obsolete 
passes away (applause), the new and growing lives 
and develops. (Applause.) Some go away, both at the 
top and at the bottom. New ones grow, both at the top 
and at the bottom, and lead the cause forward. That 
is how our Party grew. That is how it will continue 
to grow. 
The same must be said about the present period of 
our revolution. We are in the period of a turn from the 
restoration of industry and agriculture to the reconstruction 
of the entire national economy, to its reconstruction 
on a new technical basis, when the building of socialism 
is no longer merely in prospect, but a living, 
practical matter, which calls for the surmounting of 
extremely great difficulties of an internal and external 
character. 
You know that this turn has proved fatal to the 
leaders of our opposition, who were scared by the new 
difficulties and intended to turn the Party in the direction 
of surrender. And if certain leaders, who do not want 
to sit firmly in the cart, now fall out, it is nothing to 
be surprised at. It will merely rid the Party of people 
THE FIFTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

J. V. S T A L I N 382 
who are getting in its way and hindering its progress. 
Evidently, they seriously want to free themselves from 
our Party cart. Well, if some of the old leaders who 
are turning into trash intend to fall out of the cart‹ 
a good riddance to them! (Stormy and prolonged applause. 
The whole congress rises and gives Comrade Stalin an 
ovation.)

STATEMENT 
TO FOREIGN PRESS CORRESPONDENTS 
CONCERNING THE COUNTERFEIT 
³ARTICLES BY STALIN² 
In answer to the enquiry made by foreign press correspondents 
in Moscow (Associated Press, Wolff Bureau, 
Neue Freie Presse,86 etc.) in connection with the counterfeit 
³articles by Stalin,² I consider it necessary to state 
the following: 
It is scarcely necessary now to refute the falsifiers 
from the New York American,87 the Wide World News 
Agency, or the Anglo-American Newspaper Service, who 
are circulating all sorts of fables in the shape of nonexistent 
³articles by Stalin² on the ³air force² of the 
U.S.S.R., on ³conciliation² between the Soviet Government 
and the ³Orthodox Church,² on the ³restoration² 
to the capitalists of ³oil properties² in the U.S.S.R., 
and so forth. There is no need to refute them because 
those gentlemen expose themselves in the press precisely 
as professional falsifiers who live by trading in forgeries. 
It is sufficient to read the ³explanations² that those 
gentlemen gave in the press the other day in the attempt 
to ³justify² their knavish tricks, to realise that we are 
dealing here not with press correspondents, but with pen 
pirates. 
Nevertheless, in answer to the enquiry made by the 
press correspondents, I am willing to say that:

J. V. S T A L I N 384 
a) I have never set eyes upon ³Hermann Gottfrei² or 
any other of the foreign press correspondents alleged to 
have interviewed me; 
b) I have given no interview, either to those gentlemen 
or any other foreign press correspondent, during the 
past year; 
c) I have delivered no speeches, whether in the ³Presidium 
of the Moscow Soviet² or in the ³Moscow Committee² 
of the Party, either on the ³restoration² to the 
capitalists of ³oil properties² in the U.S.S.R., or 
on the ³Orthodox Church,² or on the ³air force² of the 
U.S.S.R.; 
d) I have given the press no ³articles² or ³notes² 
of that nature. 
The gentlemen of the New York American, the Wide 
World News Agency and the Anglo-American Newspaper 
Service are deceiving their readers in asserting that the 
counterfeit ³articles by Stalin² were not repudiated in 
Moscow at the time. The counterfeit ³articles² on the 
³air force² of the U.S.S.R. and on ³conciliation² with the 
³Orthodox Church² became known in Moscow at the 
end of November 1927. They were at once exposed by 
the People¹s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs as forgeries, 
and this was communicated to the Associated Press correspondent 
in Moscow, Mr. Reswick. On these grounds 
Mr. Reswick at once sent the following telegram, dated 
December 1, to the Associated Press: 
³I was informed in the People¹s Commissariat of Foreign Affairs 
today that they are here seriously considering the question 
of taking legal proceedings in New York against the New York American 
and the Hearst press in general with a view to putting a stop 
to the circulation of the articles bearing Stalin¹s signature. The au

STATEMENT TO FOREIGN PRESS CORRESPONDENTS 385 
thorities here object particularly to the item in the New York American 
of November 6 under the heading ³Using the Church to Support 
the Soviets,² alleged to be a secret report by Stalin at a meeting 
of the Moscow Presidium. According to the People¹s Commissariat 
of Foreign Affairs, the articles are pure inventions. Reswick, 
December 1, 1927.² 
Was this telegram published in the United States? 
And if not, why not? Was it not because the publication 
of Mr. Reswick¹s cable would have deprived that American-
Hungarian, or Hungarian-American, Mr. Korda, of a 
source of income? 
This is not the first time the New York American has 
tried to make capital out of forged non-existent Stalin 
³interviews² and ³articles.² I know, for example, that 
in June 1927 the New York American published a counterfeit 
³interview with Stalin,² alleged to have been 
given to a certain Cecil Winchester, about a ³rupture 
with Britain,² abandonment of ³world revolution,² the 
Arcos raid, and so forth. In connection with this, the 
Argus Clipping Bureau wrote to me at the time asking 
me to confirm the genuineness of that ³interview² and 
inviting me to become its client. Having no doubt that 
this was a piece of trickery, I at once sent the following 
refutation to the New York Daily Worker88: 
³Dear comrades, the Argus Clipping Bureau has sent 
me a cutting from the New York American (of June 12, 
1927), containing an interview which I am supposed to have 
given to a certain Cecil Winchester. I hereby declare that 
I have never seen any Cecil Winchester and never gave 
him or anyone else any interview, and I have had absolutely 
nothing to do with the New York American. If the 
Argus Clipping Bureau is not a bureau of swindlers it

J. V. S T A L I N 386 
must be surmised that it was misled by swindlers and 
blackmailers connected with the New York American. 
J. Stalin. July 11, 1927.² 
Nevertheless, the falsifiers in Mr. Korda¹s organisation 
are continuing their knavish tricks. . . . 
What is the object of those tricks? What do Korda 
and Co. want to achieve by their tricks? Sensation, perhaps? 
No, not only sensation. Their aim is to counteract 
the effect produced by the U.S.S.R. delegation at Geneva 
by its declaration on complete disarmament. 
Will they achieve their object? Of course not! The 
forgery will be exposed (it has already been exposed), 
but the facts will remain. The facts are that the U.S.S.R. 
is the only country in the world which is pursuing a genuine 
peace policy, that the U.S.S.R. is the only country 
in the world which has honestly raised the question of 
real disarmament. 
The fact that in their struggle against the peace 
policy of the U.S.S.R. the agents of capital are compelled 
to resort to the assistance of all sorts of shady individuals 
and pen pirates is the best demonstration of the moral 
strength and soundness of principle of the stand taken 
on the question of disarmament by the U.S.S.R. delegation 
at Geneva. 
J. Stalin 
December 16, 1927 
Pravda, No. 200 
December 18, 1927

N O T E S 
1 The joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control 
Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was held from July 29 to 
August 9, 1927. The plenum discussed the following questions: 
the international situation; economic directives for 1927-28; the 
work of the Central Control Commission and Workers¹ and Peasants¹ 
Inspection; the Fifteenth Party Congress; breach of Party 
discipline by Zinoviev and Trotsky. At the meeting of the plenum 
on August 1, J. V. Stalin delivered a speech on ³The International 
Situation and the Defence of the U.S.S.R.² On August 2, 
the plenum elected J. V. Stalin to the commission for drafting 
the resolution on the international situation. Noting the growing 
threat of a new armed attack upon the Soviet Union, the 
plenum condemned the defeatist stand of the Trotsky-Zinoviev 
bloc and set the task of strengthening the defence capacity of 
the Soviet Union to the utmost. The plenum issued economic 
directives for 1927-28 and noted the utter bankruptcy of the 
opposition¹s defeatist line in the sphere of economic policy. 
In its resolution on the work of the Central Control Commission 
and Workers¹ and Peasants¹ Inspection, the plenum outlined a 
programme for the further improvement of the work of the state 
apparatus. At the meeting of the plenum on August 5, J. V. Stalin 
delivered a speech during the discussion of G. K. Orjonikidze¹s 
report on the breach of Party discipline by Zinoviev and Trotsky. 
On August 6, the plenum elected J. V. Stalin to the commission 
for drafting the resolution on G. K. Orjonikidze¹s report. The 
plenum exposed the criminal activities of the leaders of the

NOTES 388 
Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc and raised the question of expelling Trotsky 
and Zinoviev from the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
Only after this, on August 8, did the leaders of the opposition 
submit to the plenum a ³declaration² in which they hypocritically 
condemned their own behaviour and promised to abandon 
factional activities. On August 9, J. V. Stalin delivered a speech 
at the plenum on the opposition¹s ³declaration.² The plenum 
gave Trotsky and Zinoviev a severe reprimand and warning, 
demanded that the leaders of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc dissolve 
their faction forthwith, and called upon all the organisations and 
members of the Party to defend unity and iron discipline in the 
Party. (For the resolutions of the plenum of the Central Committee 
and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), see 
Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp 239-74.)
p. 1 
2 This refers to the armed coup d¹état effected in Poland by Pilsudski 
in May 1926, as a result of which Pilsudski and his clique 
established their dictatorship and carried out the fascisation 
of the country. (On the Pilsudski coup d¹état, see J. V. Stalin, 
Works, Vol. 8, pp. 177-81.) p. 4 
3 This refers to the revolutionary action of the proletariat in Vienna 
on July 15-18, 1927. The action was provoked by the acquittal 
by a bourgeois court in Vienna of a group of fascists who had 
killed a number of workers. The action, which arose spontaneously, 
developed into an uprising with street fighting against 
the police and troops. The uprising was suppressed as a result 
of the treachery of the leaders of Austrian Social-Democracy. 
p. 5 
4 This refers to the ³Left² wing of the Austrian Social-Democratic 
Party. It arose in 1916 and was headed by F. Adler and O. Bauer. 
Under cover of revolutionary phrases this Social-Democratic 
³Left² wing in fact acted against the interests of the workers, and 
was therefore the most dangerous section of Social-Democracy. 
p. 5

NOTES 389 
5 The general strike and coal miners¹ strike in Britain were provoked 
by the employers¹ offensive against the standard of living 
of the working class. On the refusal of the coal miners to accept 
a reduction of wages and increased hours, the coal owners declared 
a lock-out. The miners answered this by declaring a strike on 
May 1, 1926. On May 3, a general strike was proclaimed in solidarity 
with the miners. Several million organised workers in 
the most important branches of industry and transport took part 
in the strike. On May 12, when the workers¹ struggle was at 
its height, the leaders of the General Council of the Trades Union 
Congress betrayed the strikers by calling off the general strike. 
The miners, however, continued the struggle. It was only due 
to the repressive measures taken by the government and employers 
and the extreme distress among the miners that the latter 
were compelled in November 1926 to go back to work on the coal 
owners¹ terms. (On the British general strike, see J. V. Stalin, 
Works, Vol. 8, pp. 164-77.) p. 6 
6 Communist International‹a magazine, organ of the Executive 
Committee of the Communist International, published from May 
1919 to June 1943 in Russian, French, German, English and other 
languages. It ceased publication in connection with the decision 
taken on May 15, 1943 by the Presidium of the Executive Committee 
of the Comintern to dissolve the Communist International. 
p. 8 
7 Brandlerism‹a Right-opportunist trend in the Communist Party 
of Germany, so named after Brandler, who belonged to the leadership 
of the Communist Party of Germany in 1922-23 and was 
leader of the Right-wing group. The defeatist policy of the 
Brandlerites and their collaboration with the Social-Democratic 
top leadership led to the defeat of the German working class in 
the 1923 revolution. In 1929, Brandler was expelled from the 
Communist Party for his factional, anti-Party activities. p. 9 
8 V. I. Lenin, The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution 
(see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, pp. 1-7). p. 14

NOTES 390 
9 The Hongkong strike of the Chinese workers began on June 19, 
1925, and lasted sixteen months. The strike bore a political character 
and was directed against foreign imperialist oppression. 
p. 15 
10 The Kuomintang‹a political party in China, founded in 1912 
by Sun Yat-sen for the purpose of fighting for a republic and for 
the national independence of the country. In 1924 the Communist 
Party of China joined the Kuomintang and thus helped to 
convert the latter into a mass people¹s revolutionary party. 
In the first stage of development of the Chinese revolution of 
1925-27, when the latter was an anti-imperialist revolution of a 
united all-national front, the Kuomintang was the party of the 
bloc of the proletariat, the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie and 
a section of the big national bourgeoisie. In the second stage, 
in the period of the agrarian, bourgeois-democratic revolution, 
after the national bourgeoisie had passed into the camp of the 
counter-revolution, the Kuomintang was a bloc of the proletariat, 
the peasantry and urban petty bourgeoisie, and pursued an antiimperialist 
revolutionary policy. The expansion of the agrarian 
revolution and the pressure exerted by the feudal landlords on the 
Kuomintang on the one hand, and on the other hand the pressure 
brought to bear by the imperialists, who demanded that the Kuomintang 
should break with the Communists, frightened the 
petty-bourgeois intelligentsia (the Lefts in the Kuomintang), 
who turned to the side of the counter-revolution. When the Left 
Kuomintangists began to desert the revolution (in the summer 
of 1927), the Communists withdrew from the Kuomintang and 
the latter became the centre of the struggle against the revolution. 
(On the Kuomintang, see J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 9, pp. 246-55 
and 346-55.) p. 16 
11 See J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 8, pp. 385, 389. p. 20 
12 This refers to the counter-revolutionary coup in China carried out 
on April 12, 1927, by the Right-wing Kuomintangists headed by 
Chiang Kai-shek, as a result of which a counter-revolutionary 
government was set up in Nanking. (On Chiang Kai-shek¹s coup, 
see J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 9, pp. 229-31.) p. 21

NOTES 391 
13 V. I. Lenin, ³Preliminary Draft of Theses on the National and 
Colonial Questions² (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 122-28). 
p. 22 
14 The resolution on the Chinese question drafted by the Eastern 
Commission of the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive 
Committee of the Comintern was adopted at a plenary meeting 
on March 13, 1926 (see The Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive 
Committee of the Comintern. Theses and Resolutions, Moscow- 
Leningrad, 1926, pp. 131-36). p. 22 
15 In an article on the development of the Chinese revolution of 
1925-27, A. Martynov (a former Menshevik who was admitted 
to membership of the R.C.P.(B.) by the Twelfth Party Congress) 
advanced the thesis that the revolution in China could peacefully 
evolve from a bourgeois-democratic revolution into a proletarian 
revolution. The Trotsky-Zinoviev anti-Soviet bloc tried to thrust 
responsibility for Martynov¹s mistaken thesis upon the leadership 
of the Comintern and of the C.P.S.U.(B.). p. 23 
16 See J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 9, p. 366. p. 31 
17 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, pp. 15-18.
p. 32 
18 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 25, pp. 164-70. p. 36 
19 The Anglo-Soviet, or Anglo-Russian, Unity Committee (the 
Joint Consultative Committee of the trade-union movements 
of Great Britain and the U.S.S.R.) was set up on the initiative 
of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions at an Anglo- 
Russian trade-union conference in London, April 6-8, 1925. 
The committee consisted of representatives of the A.U.C.C.T.U. 
and of the General Council of the British Trades Union Congress. 
The committee ceased to exist in the autumn of 1927 owing to 
the treacherous policy of the reactionary leaders of the British 
trade unions. (On the Anglo-Russian Committee, see J. V. Stalin, 
Works, Vol. 8, pp. 193-202, 205-14.) p. 39

NOTES 392 
20 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 1-97. p. 41 
21 See J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 4, pp. 258-59. p. 46 
22 This refers to the shooting, in accordance with the sentence pronounced 
on June 9, 1927, by the Collegium of the OGPU of the 
U.S.S.R., of twenty monarchist whiteguards for conducting 
terrorist, sabotage and espionage activities. These whiteguards 
had been sent to the U.S.S.R. by the intelligence services of 
foreign countries; among them were former Russian princes and 
members of the nobility, big landlords, industrialists, merchants 
and guards officers of the tsarist army. p. 48 
23 The Curzon ultimatum‹the Note dated May 8, 1923, sent by 
Lord Curzon, the British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
threatening a new intervention against the U.S.S.R. p. 50 
24 Sotsialistichesky Vestnik (Socialist Herald)‹a magazine published 
by Menshevik whiteguard émigrés. From February 1921 to 
March 1933 it was published in Germany, and later in France 
and the U.S.A. The magazine is the mouthpiece of the reactionary 
whiteguard émigrés. p. 60 
25 Rul (Helm)‹a Cadet, whiteguard émigré newspaper, published 
in Berlin from November 1920 to October 1931. p. 60 
26 J. V. Stalin, ³The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples 
of the East² (see Works, Vol 7, pp. 135-54). p. 73 
27 V. I. Lenin, ³The United States of Europe Slogan² (see Works, 
4th Russ. ed., Vol. 21, p. 311). p. 74 
28 This refers to the resolution ³The Tasks of the Comintern and 
the R.C.P.(B.) in Connection with the Enlarged Plenum of the 
E.C.C.I.² adopted by the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) 
held April 27-29, 1925 (see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. 
Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 
1953, pp. 43-52). p. 74

NOTES 393 
29 This refers to the resolution on the report of the Central Committee 
adopted by the Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) held 
December 18-31, 1925 (see Resolutions and Decisions of 
C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee 
Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 73-82). p. 74 
30 This refers to the resolution on ³The Opposition Bloc in the 
C.P.S.U.(B.)² adopted by the Fifteenth Conference of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) held October 26 to November 3, 1926 (see Resolutions 
and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and 
Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 209-20). p. 74 
31 This refers to the resolution on the Russian question adopted by 
the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the 
Comintern held November 22 to December 16, 1926 (see Theses 
and Resolutions of the Seventh Enlarged Plenum of the Executive 
Committee of the Comintern, Moscow-Leningrad, 1927, pp. 60-70). 
p. 75 
32 This refers to the resolution on the Russian question adopted 
at the Fifth Congress of the Communist International held June 
17 to July 8, 1924 (see The Fifth World Congress of the Communist 
International Theses, Resolutions and Decisions, Moscow 1924, 
pp. 175-86). p. 78 
33 V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 427-35. p. 81 
34 ³Ossovskyism²‹a counter-revolutionary ³theory² that tried 
to justify the formation of a Trotskyist party in the U.S.S.R. 
This ³theory² was propounded by the Trotskyist Ossovsky, 
who was expelled from the C.P.S.U.(B.) in August 1926. p. 86 
35 This refers to the resolution ³On Party Unity² adopted by the 
Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) held March 8-16, 1921 (see 
Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part I, 1953, pp. 527-30). p. 88

NOTES 394 
36 The ³Workers¹ Truth² group‹a counter-revolutionary underground 
group formed in 1921. The members of this group were 
expelled from the R.C.P.(B.). p. 94 
37 The Genoa Conference‹an international economic conference 
held in Genoa (Italy) from April 10 to May 19, 1922. There took 
part in it, on the one hand, Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan 
and other capitalist states, and, on the other hand, Soviet Russia. 
At the opening of the conference the Soviet delegation submitted 
an extensive programme for the rehabilitation of Europe and 
also a scheme for universal disarmament. The Soviet delegation¹s 
proposals were rejected. The representatives of the capitalist 
countries presented to the Soviet delegation demands which, if 
conceded, would have meant transforming the land of Soviets 
into a colony of West-European capital (payment of all war and 
pre-war debts, restitution of nationalised foreign property to the 
former foreign owners, and so forth). The Soviet delegation rejected 
the claims of the foreign capitalists. p. 129 
38 This refers to the international federation of reformist trade 
unions formed at a congress held in Amsterdam in July 1919. The 
Amsterdam International pursued a reformist policy, openly 
collaborated with the bourgeoisie, fought the revolutionary 
working-class movement, and was hostile to the Soviet Union. 
During the Second World War the Amsterdam International 
practically ceased to function. It was officially dissolved on 
December 14, 1945, owing to the formation of the World Federation 
of Trade Unions. p. 134 
39 American Federation of Labour‹a federation embracing a part 
of the trade unions in the United States, formed in 1881. The 
leaders of this federation are agents of American imperialism 
in the United States trade-union movement and conduct splitting 
activities in the world labour movement. p. 135 
40 In 1925 (July 10 to 21), a trial took place in the state of Tennessee, 
U.S.A., which attracted world-wide attention. A college teacher, 
named John Scopes was tried for teaching Darwin¹s theory of

NOTES 395 
evolution. The American reactionary obscurantists found him 
guilty of violating the laws of the state and fined him. p. 138 
41 J. V. Stalin, ³The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples 
of the East² (see Works, Vol. 7, p. 142). p. 154 
42 J. V. Stalin, ³The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples 
of the East² (see Works, Vol. 7, p. 141). p. 154 
43 V. I. Lenin, The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations 
to Self-Determination (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, p. 135). 
p. 155 
44 The joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central 
Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was held October 21-23, 
1927. It discussed and approved the draft theses submitted by 
the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
on the questions of the agenda of the Fifteenth Congress of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.), namely: directives for drawing up a five-year 
plan for the national economy; work in the countryside. The 
plenum approved the appointment of reporters, resolved to open 
a discussion in the Party, and decided to publish the theses for 
the Fifteenth Congress for discussion at Party meetings and in 
the press. In view of the attack of the leaders of the Trotsky- 
Zinoviev opposition against the Manifesto issued by the Central 
Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. in commemoration of the 
tenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist Revolution, particularly 
against the point about going over to a seven-hour working 
day, the plenum discussed this question and in a special 
decision declared that the Political Bureau of the Central 
Committee had acted rightly in its initiative in the publication 
of the Manifesto of the Central Executive Committee of 
the U.S.S.R. and approved the Manifesto itself. The plenum 
heard a report of the Presidium of the Central Control 
Commission on the factional activities of Trotsky and Zinoviev 
after the August (1927) plenum of the Central Committee 
and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.). During 
the discussion of this matter at the meeting of the plenum held 
on October 23, J. V. Stalin delivered the speech: ³The Trotskyist

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NOTES 396 
Opposition Before and Now.² For deceiving the Party and waging 
a factional struggle against it, the plenum expelled Trotsky 
and Zinoviev from the Central Committee and decided to submit 
to the Fifteenth Party Congress all the documents relating to the 
splitting activities of the leaders of the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition. 
For the resolutions and decisions of the plenum, see Resolutions 
and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and 
Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 275-311.) p. 177 
45 V. I. Lenin, ³A Letter to the Members of the Bolshevik Party² 
and ³A Letter to the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P.² 
(see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 26, pp. 185-88 and 192-96). p. 181 
46 V. I. Lenin, Report on the Political Activities of the Central 
Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), March 8, 1921 (see Works, 4th 
Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 152). p. 188 
47 V. I. Lenin, Reply to the Discussion on the Report of the Central 
Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), March 9, 1921 (see Works, 4th 
Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 170, 177). p. 188 
48 Novaya Zhizn (New Life)‹a Menshevik newspaper published 
in Petrograd from April 1917; closed down in July 1918. 
p. 196 
49 Myasnikov group‹a counter-revolutionary underground group 
which called itself the ³workers¹ group.² It was formed in Moscow 
in 1923 by G. Myasnikov and others who had been expelled from 
the R.C.P.(B.) and had very few members. It was dissolved in 
the same year. p. 196 
50 Vorwärts (Forward)‹a newspaper, central organ of the Social- 
Democratic Party of Germany, published from 1876 to 1933. 
After the Great October Socialist Revolution i t became a 
centre of anti-Soviet propaganda. p. 201 
51 This refers to the counter-revolutionary revolts that broke out 
in Georgia on August 28, 1924. They were organised by the rem

NOTES 397 
nants of the defeated bourgeois-nationalist parties and by the 
émigré Menshevik ³government² of N. Jordania on the instructions, 
and with the financial assistance, of the imperialist states 
and the leaders of the Second International. The revolts were 
quelled on August 29, the day after they broke out, with the active 
assistance of the Georgian workers and labouring peasantry. 
p. 202 
52 This refers to the armed attack by a detachment of Chinese soldiers 
and police upon the Soviet Embassy in Peking (Peiping) 
on April 6, 1927. The attack was instigated by the foreign imperialists 
with the object of provoking an armed conflict between 
China and the U.S.S.R. p. 206 
53 This refers to the police raid on the Soviet Trade Delegation and 
on Arcos (the Anglo-Russian-Co-operative Society) in London, 
carried out on May 12, 1927, on the order of the British Conservative 
Government. p. 206 
54 This refers to the anti-Soviet campaign in France in the autumn 
of 1927. It was inspired by the French Government, which supported 
all kinds of anti-Soviet activities, conducted a campaign 
of slander against the official Soviet representatives and institutions 
in Paris, and viewed with favour Britain¹s rupture of diplomatic 
relations with the U.S.S.R. p. 206 
55 Smena-Vekhists‹the representatives of a bourgeois political 
trend which arose in 1921 among the Russian whiteguard intelligentsia 
living abroad. It was headed by a group consisting of 
N. Ustryalov, Y. Kluchnikov, and others, who published the 
magazine Smena Vekh (Change of Landmarks). The Smena-Vekhists 
expressed the views of the new bourgeoisie and bourgeois intelligentsia 
in Soviet Russia who believed that, owing to the introduction 
of the New Economic Policy, the Soviet system would 
gradually degenerate into bourgeois democracy. (On the Smena- 
Vekhists, see V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol . 33, 
pp. 256-57, and J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 7, pp. 350-51 and 
Vol. 9, pp. 73-74.) p. 208

NOTES 398 
56 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 7, pp. 185-392. 
p. 210 
57 Vossische Zeitung‹a German bourgeois newspaper published in 
Berlin from 1704 until April 1934. p. 219 
58 Sacco and Vanzetti‹Italian workers, immigrants in the United 
States, were arrested on May 5, 1920, in Brockton, Massachusetts, 
on a framed-up charge of murder and robbery and in 1921 were 
sentenced to death by an American reactionary court. Mass demonstrations, 
meetings and strikes in which millions of working people 
took part, were held all over the world in protest against this 
sentence. On August 23, 1927, Sacco and Vanzetti were executed. 
p. 221 
59 The decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee 
of the Soviets of Workers¹, Soldiers¹ and Peasants¹ Deputies 
annulling the tsarist government¹s state debts was adopted on 
January 21, 1918. p. 236 
60 Paul Lafargue, On the Morrow of the Revolution (see Works, Russ. 
ed., Vol. I, 1925, pp. 329-30). p. 246 
61 V. I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (see 
Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, p. 182). p. 255 
62 The Seventh Party Conference of the Moscow Military Area was 
held November 15-17, 1927. J. V. Stalin¹s greetings were read 
on November 17 at the morning session. p. 256 
63 The Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
was held November 20-28, 1927. The conference heard reports 
of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.), discussed the prospects of the work of economic 
construction in the Moscow Gubernia in connection with 
the general plan for the development of the national economy of 
the U.S.S.R., reports of the Moscow Committee and Moscow 
Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), a report on work in

NOTES 399 
the countryside, and other questions. J. V. Stalin delivered a 
speech on November 23, at the morning session of the conference. 
In its resolution on the report of the Central Committee of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.), the conference approved the Central Committee¹s 
political and organisational activities and also its decisions on 
the Trotskyist opposition. The conference elected J. V. Stalin 
as a delegate to the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
p. 257 
64 V. I. Lenin, ³Outline of the Pamphlet The Tax in Kind² (see 
Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 302-03). p. 260 
65 V. I. Lenin, Report on the Tactics of the R.C.P.(B.), delivered 
at the Third Congress of the Communist International, July 5, 
1921 (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 466). p. 263 
66 V. I. Lenin, Opening Speech at the Eighth Congress of the 
R.C.P.(B.), March 18, 1919 (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, 
p. 125). p. 263 
67 V. I. Lenin ³The Elections in St. Petersburg and the Hypocrisy 
of the Thirty-One Mensheviks² (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., 
Vol. 12, pp. 17-27). p. 273 
68 The Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) took place in Moscow, 
December 2-19, 1927. The congress discussed the political and 
organisational reports of the Central Committee, the reports of the 
Central Auditing Commission, of the Central Control Commission 
and Workers¹ and Peasants¹ Inspection, and of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern; it 
also discussed the directives for the drawing up of a five-year 
plan for the development of the national economy and a report 
on work in the countryside; it heard the report of the congress 
commission on the question of the opposition and elected the central 
bodies of the Party. On December 3, J. V. Stalin delivered 
the political report of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
and on December 7 he replied to the discussion. On December

NOTES 400 
12, the congress elected J. V. Stalin a member of the commission 
for drafting the resolution on the report about the work of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern. 
The congress approved the political and organisational line 
of the Party¹s Central Committee and instructed it to continue 
to pursue a policy of peace and of strengthening the defence capacity 
of the U.S.S.R., to continue with unrelaxing tempo the 
socialist industrialisation of the country, to extend and strengthen 
the socialist sector in town and countryside and to steer a course 
towards eliminating the capitalist elements from the national 
economy. The congress passed a resolution calling for the fullest 
development of the collectivisation of agriculture, outlined a 
plan for the extension of collective farms and state farms and 
indicated the methods of fighting for the collectivisation of agriculture. 
The Fifteenth Congress has gone into the history of the 
Party as the Collectivisation of Agriculture Congress. It gave instructions 
for the drawing up of the First Five-Year Plan for 
the Development of the National Economy of the U.S.S.R. 
In its decisions on the opposition directed towards the liquidation 
of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc, the congress noted that the 
disagreements between the Party and the opposition had developed 
into programmatic disagreements, that the Trotskyist opposition 
had taken the path of anti-Soviet struggle, and declared 
that adherence to the Trotskyist opposition and the propagation 
of its views were incompatible with membership of the Bolshevik 
Party. The congress approved the decision of the joint meeting 
of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.) of November 1927 to expel Trotsky and 
Zinoviev from the Party and decided to expel from the Party 
all active members of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc. (On the Fifteenth 
Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), see History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), 
Short Course, Moscow 1954, pp. 447-49. For the resolutions and 
decisions of the congress, see Resolutions and Decisions of 
C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee 
Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 313-71.) p. 275 
69 This refers to the grain crops: wheat, rye, barley, oats and maize. 
p. 278

NOTES 401 
70 J. V. Stalin, Political Report of the Central Committee to the 
Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), December 18, 1925 
(see Works, Vol. 7, pp. 267-361). p. 280 
71 This refers to the declaration of bankers, industrialists and merchants 
of the United States, Britain and other countries, published 
in October 1926, calling for the removal of the tariff barriers 
set up by the European states. Actually, it was an attempt on the 
part of Anglo-American finance capital to establish its hegemony 
in Europe. p. 282 
72 The World¹s Work‹a magazine that expressed the views of the 
ruling circles of the big bourgeoisie of the United States, published 
in Garden City, New York State, from 1899 to 1932. p. 284 
73 The tripartite conference on the reduction of naval armaments 
took place in Geneva, from June 20 to August 4, 1927. p. 286 
74 On November 30, 1927, the fourth session was opened in Geneva 
of the League of Nations Preparatory Commission for the 
forthcoming conference on disarmament. The Soviet delegation 
made a declaration at the session proposing a programme of universal 
and total disarmament. The Soviet disarmament project 
was rejected. p. 286 
75 The ³Locarno system²‹a system of treaties and agreements 
concluded by the imperialist states at a conference held in Locarno, 
Switzerland, October 5-16, 1925, for the purpose of consolidating 
the post-war order in Europe created by the Versailles 
Peace Treaty and of utilising Germany against the Soviet Union. 
(On the Locarno Conference, see J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 7, 
pp. 277-78, 279-80.) p. 287 
76 This refers to the assassination by a Serbian nationalist of the 
Austrian Crown Prince, Francis-Ferdinand, in Sarajevo, Bosnia, 
on June 28, 1914, which served as the ostensible reason for unleashing 
the world imperialist war of 1914-18. p. 288 
77 The Trade-Union Act passed by the Conservative Government 
of Britain in 1927 encouraged strike-breaking, restricted the

NOTES 402 
right of the trade unions to collect dues for political purposes, 
and prohibited civil servants from belonging to trade unions 
affiliated to the Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party. 
The Act authorised the government to ban any strike. p. 289 
78 The law on ³arming the nation,² passed by the French Chamber 
of Deputies in March 1927, was part of a general plan for the 
reorganisation of the war machine of French imperialism and for 
the preparation of a new war. It provided for the militarisation 
of the political and economic life of the country, the mobilisation 
of the entire population of the metropolis and the colonies in 
the event of war, the militarisation of the trade unions and other 
workers¹ organisations, the abolition of the right to strike, the 
increase of the standing army and the employment of the armed 
forces to suppress revolutionary actions by the proletariat of 
France and the oppressed peoples of the colonies. p. 289 
79 The World Congress of the Friends of the U.S.S.R. was held in 
Moscow, November 10-12, 1927. It was convened on the initiative 
of the foreign workers¹ delegations that had come to the Soviet 
Union for the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Great 
October Socialist Revolution. The congress was attended by 947 
delegates from 43 countries. The delegates heard reports on the 
progress of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. during the ten 
years and on the protection of the first proletarian state in the 
world from the danger of war. The congress adopted an appeal 
to the working people of all countries ending with the words 
³Make use of all means and all methods to fight for, defend and protect 
the U.S.S.R., the motherland of the working people, the bulwark 
of peace, the centre of liberation, the fortress of socialism!² 
p. 291 
80 V. I. Lenin, ³Outline of the Pamphlet The Tax in Kind² (see 
Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 301). p. 328 
81 Trud (Labour)‹a daily newspaper, organ of the All-Union Central 
Council of Trade Unions, issued in Moscow since February 19, 
1921. p. 330

NOTES 403 
82 V. I. Lenin, Letter to V. M. Molotov on a Plan of the Political 
Report for the Eleventh Congress of the Party (see Works, 4th 
Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 223-24). p. 331 
83 Karl Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (see 
K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, 
p. 228). p. 338 
84 V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 23, p. 67. p. 349 
85 V. I. Lenin, Reply to the Discussion on the Report of the 
Central Committee to the Tenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), 
March 9, 1921 (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 177). 
p. 378 
86 Neue Freie Presse‹a bourgeois-liberal newspaper published 
in Vienna from 1864 until January 1939. p. 383 
87 New York American‹a reactionary Hearst newspaper published 
in New York from 1882 until 1937. During the last years 
of its existence it took a pro-fascist line. p. 383 
88 Daily Worker‹a newspaper, central organ of the Workers 
(Communist) Party of America. From 1922 until 1924 it was 
published as a weekly in Chicago under the title of The Worker. 
In 1924 it was transformed into a daily under the title of the 
Daily Worker. Since 1927 it has been published in New York. 
p. 385

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 
(August-December 1927) 
July 29-August 
9 
August 1 
August 2 
August 5 
August 6-9 
August 9 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of the joint plenum of 
the Central Committee and Central Control Commission 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
At a meeting of the joint plenum of the Central 
Committee and Central Control Commission of 
the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech 
on ³The International Situation and the Defence 
of the U.S.S.R.² 
At a meeting of the joint plenum of the Central 
Committee and Central Control Commission of 
the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin is elected to the 
commission for editing the draft resolution on the 
international situation. 
At a meeting of the joint plenum of the Central 
Committee and Central Control Commission of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech in 
connection with G. K. Orjonikidze¹s report on the 
breach of Party discipline by Zinoviev and Trotsky. 
J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the commission 
of the joint plenum of the Central Committee 
and Central Control Commission of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) for drafting the resolution on the 
breach of Party discipline by Zinoviev and Trotsky. 
At a meeting of the joint plenum of the Central 
Committee and Central Control Commission of

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 405 
August 11 
September 4 
September 9 
September 16 
September 27 
September 30 
October 21-23 
October 23 
the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech 
³With Reference to the Opposition¹s ŒDeclaration¹ of 
August 8, 1927.² 
J. V. Stalin is present at a meeting of the active of 
the Moscow organisation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) during 
the discussion of a report on the decisions of the 
August joint plenum of the Central Committee and 
Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin is present at a youth demonstration 
held in the Red Square, Moscow, to celebrate the 
thirteenth anniversary of International Youth Day. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with the first American 
labour delegation. 
J. V. Stalin writes a letter to M. I. Ulyanova. 
J. V. Stalin has a talk with the French writer 
Henri Barbusse. 
At a joint meeting of the Presidium of the Executive 
Committee of the Communist International 
and the International Control Commission, 
J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on ³The Political 
Complexion of the Russian Opposition.² 
J. V. Stalin has a talk with a group of members 
of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and 
with E. Thälmann, the chairman of the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of Germany. 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of the joint plenum 
of the Central Committee and Central Control 
Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
At a meeting of the joint plenum of the Central 
Committee and Central Control Commission of 
the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on 
³The Trotskyist Opposition Before and Now.²

FROM MARX 
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406 BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 
October 26 
October 
November 3 
November 5 
November 6 
November 6-7 
November 7 
November 9 
The joint plenum of the Central Committee and 
Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
appoints J. V. Stalin to make the Central Committee¹s 
political report at the Fifteenth Congress 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin has a talk with a delegation of workers 
from the Moscow State Aircraft Factory. 
J. V. Stalin writes the synopsis of the article 
³The International Character of the October 
Revolution.² 
The Eighth Krasnaya Presnya District Conference 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J . V. Stalin as a 
delegate to the Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Conference 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin gives an interview to foreign workers¹ 
delegations who have arrived in the U.S.S.R. to 
take part in the celebration of the tenth anniversary 
of the Great October Socialist Revolution. 
J. V. Stalin delivers a speech of greetings at a 
meeting of the Moscow Soviet held to celebrate the 
tenth anniversary of the Great October Socialist 
Revolution. 
J. V. Stalin¹s article ³The International Character 
of the October Revolution. On the Occasion of the 
Tenth Anniversary of the October Revolution² is 
published in Pravda, No. 255. 
J. V. Stalin is present at the military parade of the 
Moscow garrison and the demonstration of the working 
people in the Red Square, Moscow, held in 
honour of the tenth anniversary of the Great 
October Socialist Revolution. 
J. V. Stalin delivers a speech of greetings at a 
meeting in the Bolshoi Theatre, Moscow, called by

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 407 
November 10 
November 16 
November 18 
November 19 
November 23 
November 28 
December 2-19 
December 3 
December 7 
the Central Council of the Society for the Promotion 
of Air and Chemical Defence of the U.S.S.R. 
in honour of the tenth anniversary of the Great 
October Socialist Revolution and the progress of 
aircraft construction in the U.S.S.R. 
J. V. Stalin attends the first session of the World 
Congress of the Friends of the U.S.S.R. held in the 
Hall of Columns of the House of Trade Unions. 
J. V. Stalin has a talk with a group of army 
personnel‹delegates to the Seventh Party Conference 
of the Moscow Military Area. 
J. V. Stalin¹s greetings to the Seventh Party 
Conference of the Moscow Military Area are published 
in Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 263. 
The First Leningrad Regional Conference of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to the Leningrad 
Regional Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
At the Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Conference of 
the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivers a speech 
on ³The Party and the Opposition.² 
The Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Conference of 
the C.P.S.U.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin as a delegate to 
the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Fifteenth 
Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin delivers the political report of the 
Central Committee to the Fifteenth Congress of 
the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin replies to the discussion on the Central 
Committee¹s political report to the Fifteenth Congress 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 
Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
408 
December 12 
December 16 
December 17 
December 19 
The Fifteenth Party Congress elects J. V. Stalin 
to the commission for drafting the resolution on 
the report of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the 
Executive Committee of the Comintern. 
J. V. Stalin writes an answer to the enquiry 
made by foreign press correspondents in Moscow 
concerning the counterfeit ³articles by Stalin.² 
J. V. Stalin takes part in the meeting of the 
commission set up by the Fifteenth Congress of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) to draft the resolution on the report 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the Executive 
Committee of the Comintern. 
The Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) elects 
J. V. Stalin to the Central Committee of the 
Party. 
J . V. Stalin takes part in the work of the plenum of 
the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) that 
was elected by the Fifteenth Congress. 
The plenum of the Central Committee of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.), with the participation of members of 
the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, 
elects J. V. Stalin to the Political Bureau, Organising 
Bureau and Secretariat of the Central Committee, 
and appoints him General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.).