W O R K E R S O F A L L C O U N T R I E S, U N I T E !

From Marx to Mao 
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C O N T E N T S 
Page 
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIII 
GRAIN PROCUREMENTS AND THE PROSPECTS FOR 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGRICULTURE. From 
Statements Made in Various Parts of Siberia in January 
1928. (Brief Record) . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
FIRST RESULTS OF THE PROCUREMENT CAMPAIGN 
AND THE FURTHER TASKS OF THE PARTY. To 
All Organisations of the C.P.S.U.(B.) . . . . . . 12 
GREETINGS TO THE RED ARMY ON ITS TENTH ANNIVERSARY. 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
THREE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE RED ARMY. 
Speech Delivered at a Plenum of the Moscow Soviet Held 
in Honour of the Tenth Anniversary of the Red Army, 
February 25, 1928 . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
THE WORK OF THE APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF THE 
CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND CENTRAL CONTROL 
COMMISSION. Report Delivered at a Meeting of the 
Active of the Moscow Organisation of the C.P.S.U.(B.), 
April 13, 1928. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
I. Self-Criticism . . . . . . . . . . . . 31 
II. The Question of Grain Procurement . . . . 42 
III. The Shakhty Affair . . . . . . . . . . 57 
IV. General Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . 67

CONTENTS VIII 
GREETINGS TO THE WORKERS OF KOSTROMA 69 
SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF 
THE ALL-UNION LENINIST YOUNG COMMUNIST 
LEAGUE, May 16, 1928 . . . . . . . . . . 70 
I. Strengthen the Readiness for Action of the 
Working Class . . . . . . . . . . . 71 
II. Organise Mass Criticism from Below . . . 75 
III. The Youth Must Master Science. . . . . 79 
TO KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA. On Its Third Anniversary 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83 
TO THE SVERDLOV UNIVERSITY. On Its Tenth Anniversary 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 
ON THE GRAIN FRONT. From a Talk to Students of the 
Institute of Red Professors, the Communist Academy 
and the Sverdlov University, May 28, 1928 . . . . . 85 
LETTER TO THE MEMBERS OF THE PARTY AFFAIRS 
STUDY CIRCLE AT THE COMMUNIST ACADEMY 102 
LENIN AND THE QUESTION OF THE ALLIANCE 
WITH THE MIDDLE PEASANT. Reply to Comrade S. 105 
TO THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF 
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. Reply to Frumkin. 
(With Reference to Frumkin¹s Letter of June 15, 1928) 121 
AGAINST VULGARISING THE SLOGAN OF SELFCRITICISM 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 
PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). July 4-12, 1928 . 145 
The Programme of the Comintern. Speech Delivered 
on July 5, 1928 . . . . . . . . . . . 147 
Industrialisation and the Grain Problem. Speech 
Delivered on July 9, 1928. . . . . . . . . 165 
On the Bond between the Workers and Peasants 
and On State Farms. From a Speech Delivered 
on July 11, 1928 . . . . . . . . . . . 197

CONTENTS IX 
RESULTS OF THE JULY PLENUM OF THE C.C., 
C.P.S.U.(B.). Report to a Meeting of the Active of the 
Leningrad Organisation of the C.P.S.U.(B.), July 13, 
1928 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6 
I. The Comintern . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 
1. Major Problems of the Sixth Congress of the 
Comintern . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 6 
2. The Programme of the Comintern . . . . . 211 
II. Questions of Socialist Construction in the 
U.S.S.R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 213 
1. Grain Procurement Policy. . . . . . . . . 213 
2. Training of Cadres for the Work of Industrial 
construction . . . . . . . . . . . . 224 
III. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226 
TO THE LENINGRAD OSOAVIAKHIM . . . . . . 228 
LETTER TO COMRADE KUIBYSHEV. . . . . . . 229 
TO THE MEMORY OF COMRADE I. I. SKVORTSOVSTEPANOV 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230 
THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.). Speech 
Delivered at the Plenum of the Moscow Committee and 
Moscow Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), 
October 19, 1928 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 
REPLY TO COMRADE SH.. . . . . . . . . . . 249 
TO THE LENINIST YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE. 
Greetings on the Day of the Tenth Anniversary of the All- 
Union Leninist Young Communist League . . . . . 252 
ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FIRST CONGRESS 
OF WORKING WOMEN AND PEASANT 
WOMEN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 254 
INDUSTRIALISATION OF THE COUNTRY AND THE 
RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.). Speech 
Delivered at the Plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), 
November 19, 1928 . . . . . . . . . . . . 255

CONTENTS X 
I. The Rate of Development of Industry . . . 256 
II. The Grain Problem . . . . . . . . . 267 
III. Combating Deviations and Conciliation 
towards Them . . . . . . . . . . . . 280 
TO THE WORKERS OF THE ³KATUSHKA² FACTORY, 
TO THE WORKERS OF THE YARTSEVO FACTORY, 
SMOLENSK GUBERNIA . . . . . . . 30 3 
TO THE WORKERS OF THE KRASNY PROFINTERN 
FACTORY, BEZHITSA . . . . . . . . . . . 305 
ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FRUNZE 
MILITARY ACADEMY OF THE WORKERS¹ AND 
PEASANTS¹ RED ARMY . . . . . . . . . . 306 
THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE GERMAN COMMUNIST 
PARTY. Speech Delivered at a Meeting of the Presidium 
of the E.C.C.I., December 19, 1928 . . . . . . . 30 7 
I. The Problem of the Capitalist Stabilisation . . 308 
II. The Problem of the Class Battles of the Proletariat 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 311 
III. The Problem of the German Communist Party 315 
IV. The Rights in the C.P.G. and in the C.P.S.U.(B.) 320 
V. The Drafts for the Open and Closed Letters . . 323 
REPLY TO KUSHTYSEV . . . . . . . . . . . 325 
THEY HAVE SUNK TO THE DEPTHS . . . . . . 327 
BUKHARIN¹S GROUP AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 
IN OUR PARTY. From Speeches Delivered at 
a Joint Meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.C. and 
the Presidium of the C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) at the End of 
January and the Beginning of February 1929. (Brief 
Record). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332 
REPLY TO BILL-BELOTSERKOVSKY . . . . . . . 341 
TO THE WORKING MEN AND WOMEN OF THE 
KRASNY TREUGOLNIK FACTORY . . . . . . 345

CONTENTS XI 
TELEGRAM TO THE RED ARMY MEN, COMMANDERS 
AND POLITICAL OFFICERS OF THE FIRST RED 
COSSACK REGIMENT, PROSKUROV . . . . . . 346 
GREETINGS TO SELSKOKHOZYAISTVENNAYA 
GAZETA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 347 
THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND LENINISM. Reply to 
Comrades Meshkov, Kovalchuk, and Others . . . . . 348 
1. The Concept ³Nation² . . . . . . . . . 348 
2. The Rise and Development of Nations . . . 350 
3. The Future of Nations and of National Languages 356 
4. The Policy of the Party on the National Question 365 
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 373 
Biographical Chronicle . . . . . . . . . . . . 389


PREFACE 
The Eleventh Volume of the Works of J. V. Stalin 
contains writings and speeches of the period January 
1928 to March 1929. 
In this period, on the basis of the successes achieved 
in the socialist industrialisation of the country, the 
Bolshevik Party worked intensively to prepare the way 
for the transition of the labouring masses of the peasantry 
from individual economy to collective-farm socialist 
economy. Consistently steering a course towards the collectivisation 
of agriculture, as decided at the Fifteenth 
Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), the Party worked to create 
all the necessary conditions for a mass influx of the 
peasants into the collective farms. 
When the Party passed over to the offensive against 
the kulaks, the hostile Bukharin-Rykov group of Right 
capitulators threw off the mask and came out openly 
against the Party¹s policy. 
In the letter ³To the Members of the Political Bureau 
of the Central Committee,² in the speeches on ³The 
Right Danger in the C.P.S.U.(B.),² Industrialisation 
of the Country and the Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
and ³Bukharin¹s Group and the Right Deviation

PREFACE XIV 
in Our Party,² in the article ³They Have Sunk to the 
Depths² and in other works, J. V. Stalin reveals the 
counter-revolutionary kulak nature of the Right deviation, 
exposes the subversive activities of the Right capitulators 
and of the Trotskyist underground anti-Soviet 
organisation, and points to the necessity of waging 
a relentless fight on two fronts, while concentrating fire 
on the Right deviation. 
In the reports on The Work of the April Joint Plenum 
of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission 
and Results of the July Plenum of the C.C., 
C.P.S.U.(B.), in the talk ³On the Grain Front,² the 
speeches on ³Industrialisation and the Grain Problem² 
and ³On the Bond between the Workers and Peasants 
and on State Farms,² the speech at the Eighth 
Congress of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist 
League and the speech on ³Grain Procurements and 
the Prospects for the Development of Agriculture,² 
in the article ³Lenin and the Question of the Alliance 
with the Middle Peasant² and in other works, 
J. V. Stalin defines the principal ways and means 
of solving the grain problem, building collective farms 
and state farms and strengthening the bond between 
town and country. In these works he demonstrates the 
necessity for a rapid rate of development of industry, 
as the basis for socialism and the defence of the country 
and sets the task of training new cadres from the ranks 
of the working class capable of mastering science and 
technology. J. V. Stalin stresses the vital necessity for 
the utmost development of criticism and self-criticism 
as the Bolshevik method of educating cadres, as the 
motive force of the development of Soviet society.

PREFACE XV 
J . V. Stalin¹s work The National Question and 
Leninism published here for the first time, is devoted 
to further development of Marxist-Leninist theory and 
substantiation of the Bolshevik Party¹s policy on the 
national question. In this work J. V. Stalin advances 
the thesis of new, socialist nations, which have been 
formed first of all in the Soviet Union, brings out the 
fundamental difference between bourgeois nations and 
socialist nations, and stresses the solidarity and viability 
of the socialist nations. 
This volume contains J. V. Stalin¹s well-known 
speech on Three Distinctive Features of the Red Army, 
which reveals the sources of the Red Army¹s strength 
and might and outlines the ways and means of further 
strengthening it. 
Questions of the international revolutionary movement 
and the tasks of the fraternal Communist 
Parties are dealt with in the report on Results of the 
July Plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and in 
the speeches on ³The Programme of the Comintern² 
and The Right Danger in the German Communist Party. 
J. V. Stalin stresses the international significance of 
the Great October Socialist Revolution and of socialist 
construction in the U.S.S.R. He explains that the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) of the Soviet state is 
an inevitable phase of the socialist revolution in all 
countries. 
In this volume the following fourteen works of 
J. V. Stalin are published for the first time: ³Grain 
Procurements and the Prospects for the Development 
of Agriculture²; ³First Results of the Procurement Campaign 
and the Further Tasks of the Party²; ³To the

PREFACE XVI 
Members of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee²; 
³The Programme of the Comintern²; ³Industrialisation 
and the Grain Problem²; ³On the Bond between 
the Workers and Peasants and on State Farms²; 
³Letter to Comrade Kuibyshev²; ³Reply to Comrade 
Sh.²; ³Reply to Kushtysev²; ³They Have Sunk to the 
Depths²; ³Bukharin¹s Group and the Right Deviation 
in Our Party²; ³Reply to Bill-Belotserkovsky²; ³Telegram 
to . . . Proskurov²; The National Question and 
Leninism. 
Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute 
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

!(@*_MARCH !(@(


GRAIN PROCUREMENTS AND 
THE PROSPECTS FOR THE DEVELOPMENT 
OF AGRICULTURE 
From Statements Made in Various Parts 
of Siberia in January 19281 
(Brief Record) 
I have been sent to you here in Siberia for a short 
visit. I have been instructed to help you to fulfil the 
plan for grain procurements. I have also been instructed 
to discuss with you the prospects for the development of 
agriculture, the plan for developing the formation of collective 
farms and state farms in your territory. 
You are no doubt aware that this year our country¹s 
grain accounts show a shortage, a deficit, of more than 
100,000,000 poods. Because of this the Government and 
the Central Committee have had to tighten up grain procurements 
in all regions and territories so as to cover 
this deficit in our grain accounts. The deficit will have 
to be met primarily by the regions and territories with 
good harvests, which will have not only to fulfil, but 
to overfulfil the plan for grain procurements. 
You know, of course, what the effect of the deficit 
may be if it is not made good. The effect will be that 
our towns and industrial centres, as well as our Red 
Army, will be in grave difficulties; they will be poorly 
supplied and will be threatened with hunger. Obviously, 
we cannot allow that. 
What do you think about it? What measures are 
you thinking of taking in order to perform your duty

J. V. S T A L I N 4
to the country? I have made a tour of the districts of 
your territory and have had the opportunity to see 
for myself that your people are not seriously concerned 
to help our country to emerge from the grain crisis. 
You have had a bumper harvest, one might say a record 
one. Your grain surpluses this year are bigger than ever 
before. Yet the plan for grain procurements is not being 
fulfilled. Why? What is the reason? 
You say that the plan for grain procurements is a 
heavy one, and that it cannot be fulfilled. Why cannot 
it be fulfilled? Where did you get that idea from? Is 
it not a fact that your harvest this year really is a record 
one? Is it not a fact that Siberia¹s grain procurement 
plan this year is almost the same as it was last year? 
Why, then, do you consider that the plan cannot be 
fulfilled? Look at the kulak farms: their barns and 
sheds are crammed with grain; grain is lying in the 
open under pent roofs for lack of storage space; the 
kulaks have 50,000-60,000 poods of surplus grain per 
farm, not counting seed, food and fodder stocks. Yet 
you say that the grain procurement plan cannot be 
fulfilled. Why are you so pessimistic? 
You say that the kulaks are unwilling to deliver 
grain, that they are waiting for prices to rise, and prefer 
to engage in unbridled speculation. That is true. But 
the kulaks are not simply waiting for prices to rise; 
they are demanding an increase in prices to three times 
those fixed by the government. Do you think it permissible 
to satisfy the kulaks? The poor peasants and a 
considerable section of the middle peasants have already 
delivered their grain to the state at government prices. 
Is it permissible for the government to pay the kulaks

GRAIN PROCUREMENTS AND THE PROSPECTS OF AGRICULTURE 5 
three times as much for grain as it pays the poor and 
middle peasants? One has only to ask this question 
to realise how impermissible it would be to satisfy the 
kulaks¹ demands. 
If the kulaks are engaging in unbridled speculation 
on grain prices, why do you not prosecute them for 
speculation? Don¹t you know that there is a law against 
speculation‹Article 107 of the Criminal Code of the 
R.S.F.S.R., under which persons guilty of speculation 
are liable to prosecution, and their goods to confiscation 
in favour of the state? Why don¹t you enforce this 
law against the grain speculators? Can it be that you are 
afraid to disturb the tranquillity of the kulak gentry?! 
You say that enforcement of Article 107 against 
the kulaks would be an emergency measure, that it would 
not be productive of good results, that it would worsen 
the situation in the countryside. Comrade Zagumenny 
is especially insistent about this. Supposing it would 
be an emergency measure‹what of it? Why is it that 
in other territories and regions enforcement of Article 
107 has yielded splendid results, has rallied the labouring 
peasantry around the Soviet Government and improved 
the situation in the countryside, while among 
you, in Siberia, it is held that it is bound to produce 
bad results and worsen the situation? Why, on what 
grounds? 
You say that your prosecuting and judicial authorities 
are not prepared for such a step. But why is it that 
in other territories and regions the prosecuting and 
judicial authorities were prepared for it and are acting 
quite effectively, yet here they are not prepared to enforce 
Article 107 against speculators? Who is to blame

J. V. S T A L I N 6
for that? Obviously, it is your Party organisations that 
are to blame; they are evidently working badly and are 
not seeing to it that the laws of our country are conscientiously 
observed. I have seen several dozen of your 
prosecuting and judicial officials. Nearly all of them 
live in the homes of kulaks, board and lodge with them, 
and, of course, they are anxious to live in peace with 
the kulaks. In reply to my question, they said that the 
kulaks¹ homes are cleaner, and the food there is better. 
Clearly, nothing effective or useful for the Soviet state 
is to be expected from such prosecuting and judicial 
officials. The only thing that is not clear is why these 
gentry have not yet been cleared out and replaced by 
other, honest officials. 
I propose: 
a) that the kulaks be ordered to deliver all their 
grain surpluses immediately at government prices; 
b) that if the kulaks refuse to obey the law they 
should be prosecuted under Article 107 of the Criminal 
Code of the R.S.F.S.R., and their grain surpluses confiscated 
in favour of the state, 25 per cent of the confiscated 
grain to be distributed among the poor peasants and 
economically weaker middle peasants at low government 
prices or in the form of long-term loans. 
As for your prosecuting and judicial officials, all 
who are unfit for their posts should be dismissed and 
replaced by honest, conscientious Soviet-minded people. 
You will soon see that these measures yield splendid 
results, and you will be able not only to fulfil, but even 
overfulfil the plan for grain procurements. 
But this does not exhaust the problem. These measures 
will be sufficient to correct the situation this year.

GRAIN PROCUREMENTS AND THE PROSPECTS OF AGRICULTURE 7 
But there is no guarantee that the kulaks will not again 
sabotage the grain procurements next year. More, it 
may be said with certainty that so long as there are 
kulaks, so long will there be sabotage of the grain procurements. 
In order to put the grain procurements on 
a more or less satisfactory basis, other measures are 
required. What measures exactly? I have in mind developing 
the formation of collective farms and state farms. 
Collective and state farms are, as you know, largescale 
farms capable of employing tractors and machines. 
They produce larger marketable surpluses than the 
landlord or kulak farms. It should be borne in mind that 
our towns and our industry are growing and will continue 
to grow from year to year. That is necessary for 
the industrialisation of the country. Consequently, 
the demand for grain will increase from year to year, 
and this means that the grain procurement plans 
will also increase. We cannot allow our industry to be 
dependent on the caprice of the kulaks. We must therefore 
see to it that in the course of the next three or four 
years the collective farms and state farms, as deliverers 
of grain, are in a position to supply the state with at 
least one-third of the grain required. This would relegate 
the kulaks to the background and lay the foundation 
for the more or less proper supply of grain to the 
workers and the Red Army. But in order to achieve this, 
we must develop the formation of collective and state 
farms to the utmost, sparing neither energy nor resources. 
It can be done, and we must do it. 
But even that is not all. Our country cannot live 
with an eye only to today¹s needs. We must also give 
thought to the morrow, to the prospects for the develop

J. V. S T A L I N 8
ment of our agriculture and, lastly, to the fate of socialism 
in our country. The grain problem is part of the 
agricultural problem, and the agricultural problem is 
an integral part of the problem of building socialism 
in our country. The partial collectivisation of agriculture 
of which I have just spoken will be sufficient to keep 
the working class and the Red Army more or less tolerably 
supplied with grain, but it will be altogether insufficient 
for: 
a) providing a firm basis for a fully adequate supply 
of food to the whole country while ensuring the necessary 
food reserves in the hands of the state, and 
b) securing the victory of socialist construction in 
the countryside, in agriculture. 
Today the Soviet system rests upon two heterogeneous 
foundations: upon united socialised industry and 
upon individual small-peasant economy based on private 
ownership of the means of production. Can the Soviet 
system persist for long on these heterogeneous foundations? 
No, it cannot. 
Lenin says that so long as individual peasant economy, 
which engenders capitalists and capitalism, predominates 
in the country, the danger of a restoration 
of capitalism will exist. Clearly, so long as this danger 
exists there can be no serious talk of the victory of socialist 
construction in our country. 
Hence, for the consolidation of the Soviet system 
and for the victory of socialist construction in our country, 
the socialisation of industry alone is quite insufficient. 
What is required for that is to pass from the socialisation 
of industry to the socialisation of the whole of 
agriculture.

GRAIN PROCUREMENTS AND THE PROSPECTS OF AGRICULTURE 9 
And what does that imply? 
It implies, firstly, that we must gradually, but unswervingly, 
unite the individual peasant farms, which 
produce the smallest marketable surpluses, into collective 
farms, kolkhozes, which produce the largest marketable 
surpluses. 
It implies, secondly, that all areas of our country, 
without exception, must be covered with collective farms 
(and state farms) capable of replacing not only the 
kulaks, but the individual peasants as well, as suppliers 
of grain to the state. 
It implies, thirdly, doing away with all sources that 
engender capitalists and capitalism, and putting an end 
to the possibility of the restoration of capitalism. 
It implies, fourthly, creating a firm basis for the 
systematic and abundant supply of the whole country 
not only with grain, but also with other foodstuffs, while 
ensuring the necessary reserves for the state. 
It implies, fifthly, creating a single and firm socialist 
basis for the Soviet system, for Soviet power. 
It implies, lastly, ensuring the victory of socialist 
construction in our country. 
Such are the prospects for the development of our 
agriculture. 
Such is the task of victoriously building socialism 
in our country. 
It is a complex and difficult task, but one that is 
quite possible to fulfil; for difficulties exist in order 
to be surmounted and vanquished. 
We must realise that we can no longer make progress 
on the basis of small individual peasant economy, that 
what we need in agriculture is large farms capable of

J. V. S T A L I N 10 
employing machines and producing the maximum marketable 
surpluses. There are two ways of creating large 
farms in agriculture: the capitalist way‹through the 
wholesale ruin of the peasants and the organisation 
of big capitalist estates exploiting labour; and the socialist 
way‹through the union of the small peasant 
farms into large collective farms, without ruining the 
peasants and without exploitation of labour. Our Party 
has chosen the socialist way of creating large farms in 
agriculture. 
Even before the victory of the October Revolution, 
and then, immediately after that victory, Lenin set 
the Party the task of uniting the small peasant farms 
into large collective farms as the prospect for the development 
of our agriculture, and as the decisive means 
of securing the victory of socialism in the countryside, 
in agriculture. 
Lenin pointed out that: 
a) ³The small-farming system under commodity production 
cannot save mankind from the poverty and oppression of the 
masses² (Vol. XX, p. 1222); 
b) ³If we continue as of old on our small farms, even as free 
citizens on free land, we shall still be faced with inevitable ruin² 
(Vol. XX, p. 4173); 
c) ³Only with the help of common, artel, co-operative labour 
can we escape from the impasse into which the imperialist war 
has landed us² (Vol. XXIV, p. 537). 
Lenin further points out: 
³Only if we succeed in practice in showing the peasants the 
advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation 
of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of 
co-operative, artel farming, will the working class, which 
holds state power in its hands, actually prove to the peasant

GRAIN PROCUREMENTS AND THE PROSPECTS OF AGRICULTURE 11 
the correctness of its policy and actually secure the real and 
durable following of the vast masses of the peasantry. Hence the 
importance of every kind of measure to promote co-operative, 
artel agriculture can hardly be overestimated. We have millions 
of individual farms in our country, scattered and dispersed in the 
depths of the countryside. . . . Only when it is proved in practice, 
by experience easily understood by the peasants, that the transition 
to the co-operative, artel form of agriculture is essential and 
possible, only then shall we be entitled to say that in this vast 
peasant country, Russia, an important step towards socialist agriculture 
has been taken²* (Vol. XXIV, pp. 579-80). 
Such are Lenin¹s directives. 
In pursuance of these directives, the Fifteenth Congress 
of our Party4 stated in its resolution on ³Work 
in the Countryside²: 
³In the present period, the task of uniting and transforming 
the small individual peasant farms into large collective farms 
must be made the Party¹s principal task in the countryside.²5 
That, comrades, is how matters stand in regard to 
the socialisation of agriculture in our country. 
Our duty is to carry out these directives. 
Published for the first time 
* My italics.‹J. St.

FIRST RESULTS 
OF THE PROCUREMENT CAMPAIGN 
AND THE FURTHER TASKS OF THE PARTY 
To All Organisations of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
About a month and a half ago, in January 1928, 
we experienced a very grave crisis in regard to grain 
procurements. Whereas by January 1927 we had managed 
to procure 428,000,000 poods of cereals, by January 1928 
procurements of cereals scarcely totalled 300,000,000 
poods. Hence, by January 1928, as compared with January 
1927, we had a deficit, a shortage, of 128,000,000 
poods. That shortage is an approximate statistical expression 
of the grain procurement crisis. 
What does the grain procurement crisis imply? What 
is its significance? What are its probable consequences? 
It implies, above all, a crisis in the supply of the 
working class areas, high bread prices in these areas, 
and a fall in the real wages of the workers. 
It implies, secondly, a crisis in the supply of the Red 
Army, and dissatisfaction among the Red Army men. 
It implies, thirdly, a crisis in the supply of the flaxgrowing 
and cotton-growing areas, profiteering prices 
for grain in these areas, abandonment of the growing 
of flax and cotton for the growing of grain‹and hence curtailment 
of cotton and flax output, leading to curtailed 
output of the corresponding branches of the textile industry.

FIRST RESULTS OF THE PROCUREMENT CAMPAIGN 13 
It implies, fourthly, the absence of grain reserves 
in the hands of the state, both for needs at home (in the 
event of crop failure) and for the needs of export, which 
is necessary for the import of equipment and agricultural 
machines. 
It implies, lastly, a break-down of our entire price 
policy, a break-down of the policy of stabilising prices 
of grain products, a break-down of the policy of systematically 
lowering prices of manufactured goods. 
In order to cope with these difficulties, it was necessary 
to make up for lost time and to cover the procurement 
deficit of 128,000,000 poods. And in order to cover 
this deficit, it was necessary to bring into action all 
the levers of the Party and government, to shake our 
organisations out of their lethargy, to throw the best 
forces of the Party, from top to bottom, on to the procurement 
front and increase the procurements at all 
costs, taking the utmost advantage of the short period 
still remaining before the spring thaws rendered the 
roads impassable. 
It was with these objects in view that the C.C., 
C.P.S.U.(B.) issued its first two grain procurement 
directives (the first of December 14, 1927, and the second 
of December 24, 1927). Since these directives, however, 
did not have the desired effect, the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 
found it necessary to issue on January 6, 1928, a third 
directive, one quite exceptional both as to its tone and 
as to its demands. This directive concluded with a threat 
to leaders of Party organisations in the event of their 
failing to secure a decisive improvement in grain procurements 
within a very short time. Naturally, such a 
threat can be resorted to only in exceptional cases, the

J. V. S T A L I N 14 
more so as secretaries of Party organisations work not 
for the sake of their jobs, but for the sake of the revolution. 
Nevertheless, the C.C. thought it proper to resort 
to such a step because of the above-mentioned exceptional 
circumstances. 
Of the various causes that determined the grain 
procurement crisis, the following should be noted. 
Firstly. The countryside is growing stronger and 
richer. Above all, it is the kulak that has grown stronger 
and richer. Three years of good harvest have not 
been without their effect. Grain surpluses this year 
are not less than last year, just as this year there are 
not fewer, but more manufactured goods in the country 
than last year. But the well-to-do sections of the rural 
population were able this year to get a living from 
industrial crops, meat products, etc., and held back 
their grain products in order to force up prices of them. 
True, the kulak cannot be considered the principal holder 
of grain products, but he enjoys prestige in economic 
matters in the countryside, he works hand in glove with 
the urban speculator, who pays him more for his grain, 
and he is able to get the middle peasant to follow him 
in raising grain prices, in sabotaging the Soviet price 
policy, because he meets with no resistance from our 
procurement organisations. 
Secondly. Our procurement organisations proved 
unequal to their task. Abusing the system of bonuses 
and all the various ³lawful² additions to prices, our 
procurement organisations, instead of curbing speculation, 
frantically competed with one another, undermined 
the united front of the procurement officials, inflated 
grain prices and involuntarily helped the specula

FIRST RESULTS OF THE PROCUREMENT CAMPAIGN 15 
tors and kulaks to sabotage the Soviet price policy, spoil 
the market, and reduce the volume of procurements. 
True, if the Party had interfered, it could have put a 
stop to these shortcomings. But, intoxicated by last 
year¹s procurement successes and absorbed by the discussion,
6 it disregarded the shortcomings in the belief 
that everything would come right of its own accord. 
More, a number of Party organisations adopted a perfunctory 
attitude towards the procurements, as of no 
concern of theirs, forgetting that it is primarily the 
Party that is answerable to the working class for shortcomings 
in procurement, just as it is for shortcomings 
in the work of all economic and co-operative organisations. 
Thirdly. The line of our work in the countryside 
was distorted in a whole number of areas. The Party¹s 
basic slogan ³rely on the poor peasant, build a stable 
alliance with the middle peasant, never for a moment 
cease fighting against the kulaks² was often applied incorrectly. 
While our Party organisations have learned 
to build an alliance with the middle peasant‹which 
is a tremendous achievement for the Party‹not everywhere 
by far are they yet working properly with the 
poor peasants. As to the fight against the kulaks and the 
kulak danger, here our Party organisations are still 
far from having done all they should have done. This, 
incidently, explains why elements alien to the Party 
have of late developed both in our Party and in our 
other organisations, elements who fail to see that there 
are classes in the countryside, do not understand the 
principles of our class policy, and try to work in such 
a way as not to offend anybody in the countryside, to

J. V. S T A L I N 16 
live in peace with the kulak, and generally to preserve 
their popularity among ³all strata² of the rural population. 
Naturally, the presence of such ³Communists² 
in the countryside could not serve to improve our work 
there, to restrict the exploiting proclivities of the kulaks, 
and to rally the poor peasants around the Party. 
Further. Up to January, owing to the peasants¹ 
greater returns from non-cereal crops, animal husbandry 
and seasonal occupations, their effective demand was 
much greater than last year. Moreover, despite the greater 
volume of manufactured goods sent to the rural 
areas, in terms of value there was a certain falling off 
in the supply of goods, that is to say, the supply lagged 
behind the growth of effective demand. 
All this, coupled with such blunders in our work 
as belated delivery of manufactured goods to the countryside, 
an inadequate agricultural tax, inability to extract 
cash surpluses from the countryside, etc., brought 
about the conditions which led to the grain procurement 
crisis. 
It goes without saying that the responsibility for 
these blunders rests primarily on the Central Committee, 
and not only on the local Party organisations. 
In order to put an end to the crisis, it was necessary, 
first of all, to rouse the Party organisations and 
make them understand that grain procurement was a 
matter for the whole Party. 
It was necessary, secondly, to curb speculation and 
rehabilitate the market by striking at the speculators 
and the kulaks who engaged in speculation, by setting 
in motion the Soviet laws against speculation in articles 
of mass consumption.

FIRST RESULTS OF THE PROCUREMENT CAMPAIGN 17 
It was necessary, thirdly, to extract the cash surpluses 
from the countryside by setting in motion the 
laws on self-taxation, on the peasant loan, and on illicit 
distilling. 
It was necessary, fourthly, to put our procurement 
organisations under the control of the Party organisations, 
compelling them to cease competing among themselves 
and to observe the Soviet price policy. 
It was necessary, lastly, to put an end to distortions 
of the Party line in the practical work in the countryside, 
by laying stress on the necessity of combating 
the kulak danger, and by making it obligatory for our 
Party organisations ³to develop further the offensive 
against the kulaks² (see the Fifteenth Party Congress 
resolution on ³Work in the Countryside²).7 
We know from the Central Committee¹s directives 
that the Party resorted precisely to these measures in 
its fight for increased procurements, and launched a 
campaign along these lines throughout the country. 
Under different conditions and in other circumstances, 
the Party might have put into operation other forms 
of struggle as well, such as, for example, throwing tens 
of millions of poods of grain on to the market and thus 
wearing down the well-to-do sections of the rural population 
who were withholding their grain from the market. 
But for that the state needed to have either sufficient 
grain reserves, or substantial foreign currency reserves 
for importing tens of millions of poods of grain from 
abroad. But, as we know, the state did not possess such 
reserves. And just because such reserves were not available, 
the Party had to resort to those emergency measures 
which are reflected in the Central Committee¹s

J. V. S T A L I N 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
18 
directives, which have found expression in the procurement 
campaign that has developed, and the majority 
of which can remain in force only in the current procurement 
year. 
The talk to the effect that we are abolishing NEP, 
that we are introducing the surplus-appropriation system, 
dekulakisation, etc., is counter-revolutionary chatter 
that must be most vigorously combated. NEP is 
the basis of our economic policy, and will remain so 
for a long historical period. NEP means trade and tolerating 
capitalism, on condition that the state retains 
the right and the possibility of regulating trade in the 
interest of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Without 
this, the New Economic Policy would simply mean the 
restoration of capitalism, which is what the counterrevolutionary 
chatterers who are talking about the 
abolition of NEP refuse to understand. 
Now we have every ground for affirming that the 
measures adopted and the grain procurement campaign 
that has developed have already been crowned with the 
first decisive victory for the Party. The rate of procurement 
has substantially increased everywhere. Twice as 
much was procured in January as in December. In 
February the rate of procurement has shown a further increase. 
The procurement campaign has been a test for 
all our organisations, Party as well as Soviet and cooperative; 
it has helped them to rid themselves of degenerate 
elements and has brought to the fore new, revolutionary 
personnel. Shortcomings in the work of the 
procurement organisations are being brought to light, and 
ways of correcting them are being outlined in the course 
of the procurement campaign. Party work in the coun

FIRST RESULTS OF THE PROCUREMENT CAMPAIGN 19 
tryside is improving and acquiring a fresh spirit, 
and distortions of the Party line are being eliminated. 
The influence of the kulak in the countryside is becoming 
weaker, work among the poor peasants is being 
livened up, Soviet public life in the countryside is being 
put on a firmer footing, and the prestige of the Soviet 
Government among the main mass of the peasantry, 
including the middle peasants, is rising. 
We are obviously emerging from the grain procurement 
crisis. 
However, side by side with these achievements in 
the practical implementation of the Party¹s directives, 
there are a number of distortions and excesses which, 
if not eliminated, may create new difficulties. Instances 
of such distortions and excesses are the attempts in 
certain individual districts to pass to methods of direct 
barter, compulsory subscription to the agricultural loan, 
organisation of substitutes for the old interception 
squads, and, lastly, abuse of powers of arrest, unlawful 
confiscation of grain surpluses, etc. 
A definite stop must be put to all such practices. 
The Central Committee instructs all local Party 
and Soviet organisations, besides intensifying the efforts 
of all bodies to secure the complete fulfilment of 
the grain procurement plan, to proceed at once to prepare 
for the spring sowing campaign in such a way as 
to ensure an enlargement of the spring crop area. 
The agitation carried on by individual kulak-speculator 
elements for a decrease of the sown area must 
be countered by a solid, concerted and organised campaign 
for an extension of the sown area by the poorer 
sections of the rural population and the middle peasants,

J. V. S T A L I N 20 
particular support being rendered to the collective 
farms. 
In view of the above, the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) recommends 
that: 
1. The campaign for increasing the grain procurements 
should be continued unflaggingly, and the fulfilment 
of the year¹s grain procurement plan should 
be secured at all costs. 
2. The fight against all direct and indirect raising 
of the contractual prices should be intensified. 
3. Competition among state and co-operative procurement 
agencies should be completely eliminated, 
ensuring a real united front of them against the private 
traders and kulaks who are speculating on a rise 
in prices. 
4. Pressure on the kulaks‹the real holders of 
big marketable grain surpluses‹should be continued, 
this pressure to be exerted exclusively on the basis of 
Soviet law (in particular, by enforcing Article 107 of 
the Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. and the corresponding 
article of the Ukrainian Code against particularly 
malicious elements who hold surpluses of two thousand 
poods of marketable grain and over); but in no circumstances 
must these or similar measures be applied to the 
middle peasantry. 
5. Twenty-five per cent of the grain surpluses confiscated 
by law from speculators and kulak speculating elements 
should be turned over to the poor peasants in the 
form of long-term loans to satisfy their need of grain for 
seed and, if necessary, for food. 
6. Excesses and distortions in carrying out the 
campaign for increasing grain procurements, which

FIRST RESULTS OF THE PROCUREMENT CAMPAIGN 21 
in some cases have assumed the form of applying the 
methods of the surplus-appropriation system, such as allocation 
of grain delivery quotas to the separate farms, 
the posting of interception squads on district boundaries, 
etc., should be resolutely eliminated. 
7. When exacting from peasants repayment of 
debts to the state (arrears in agricultural tax, insurance, 
loans, etc.), while pressure should continue to be 
exerted on the wealthier, especially the kulak, sections of 
the rural population, rebates and preferential treatment 
should be accorded to the poor peasants and, where 
necessary, to the economically weaker middle peasants. 
8. In cases of self-taxation, higher progressive 
rates than those of the agricultural tax should be applied 
to the kulaks and the well-to-do sections of the 
rural population. Exemption from self-taxation should 
be ensured for the poorer sections, and reduced rates for the 
economically weaker middle peasants and families of Red 
Army men. In developing the self-taxation campaign 
everywhere, public initiative should be stimulated and 
the co-operation of the poor peasants, Young Communist 
League, women delegates and rural intellectuals extensively 
enlisted. The proceeds from self-taxation should 
be used strictly for the purposes laid down and not allowed 
to be spent on maintaining the apparatus, the 
specific objects of investments, estimates of expenditure, 
etc., being discussed and endorsed by the peasant assemblies, 
and the use of the sums made subject to wide 
public control. 
9. Administrative methods of placing the peasant 
loan (payment in loan certificates for grain delivered 
by peasants, compulsory allocation of loan

J. V. S T A L I N 22 
subscription quotas to the farms, etc.) should be categorically 
prohibited; attention should be focused on 
explaining to the peasants all the benefits the peasant 
loan offers them, and the influence and forces of the 
rural public organisations should be used to place the 
loan also among the wealthy sections of the rural population. 
10. There should be no relaxation of attention 
to satisfying the demand for manufactured goods in the 
grain procurement areas. While putting a stop to all 
direct and indirect forms of bartering grain for manufactured 
goods, with regard to goods in very short supply 
the privileges enjoyed by members of co-operatives may 
in exceptional cases be extended to peasant sellers of 
grain who are not members of co-operatives. 
11. While continuing verification and determined 
purging of Party, Soviet and co-operative organisations 
in the course of the procurement campaign, 
all alien and adventitious elements should be expelled 
from these organisations and replaced by staunch 
Party people or tested non-Party people. 
On the instructions of the C.C., C.P.B.U.(B.) 
J. Stalin 
February 13, 1928 
Published for the first time

GREETINGS TO THE RED ARMY 
ON ITS TENTH ANNIVERSARY 
Greetings to the Red Army, which upheld the achievements 
of the October Revolution in great battles! 
Glory to the soldiers who fell in the proletarian 
cause! 
Glory to the soldiers who stand guard over the 
great cause of socialist construction! 
J. Stalin 
Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 46, 
February 23, 1928

THREE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES 
OF THE RED ARMY 
Speech Delivered at a Plenum of the Moscow Soviet 
Held in Honour of the Tenth Anniversary 
of the Red Army 
February 25, 1928 
Comrades, permit me to convey the greetings of the 
Central Committee of our Party to the men of our Red 
Army, the men of our Red Navy, the men of our Red 
Air Force, and, lastly, to our potential servicemen, the 
armed workers of the U.S.S.R. 
The Party is proud that, with the assistance of the 
workers and peasants, it has succeeded in creating the 
first Red Army in the world, which in great battles 
fought for and upheld the liberty of the workers and 
peasants. 
The Party is proud that the Red Army has acquitted 
itself with honour in travelling the hard route of fierce 
battles against internal and external enemies of the 
working class and peasantry of our country, that it 
has succeeded in taking shape as a mighty militant revolutionary 
force, to the terror of the enemies of the working 
class and the joy of all the oppressed and enslaved. 
The Party is proud that the Red Army, having travelled 
the long route of the liberation of the workers and 
peasants from the yoke of the landlords and capitalists, 
has at last won the right to celebrate its jubilee, marking 
the completion of the tenth year since its birth.

THREE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE RED ARMY 25 
Comrades, wherein lies the strength, what is the 
source of the strength of our Red Army? 
What are the features which radically distinguish 
our Red Army from all armies that have ever existed in 
the world? 
What are the distinctive features which constitute 
the source of the strength and might of our Red Army? 
The first fundamental distinctive feature of our Red 
Army is that it is the army of the liberated workers and 
peasants, it is the army of the October Revolution, the 
army of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
All armies that have ever existed under capitalism, 
no matter what their composition, have been armies for the 
furtherance of the power of capital. They were, and are, 
armies of capitalist rule. The bourgeois of all countries 
lie when they say that the army is politically neutral. 
That is not true. In bourgeois countries, the army 
is deprived of political rights, it is not allowed into the 
political arena. That is true. But that by no means implies 
that it is politically neutral. On the contrary, always 
and everywhere, in all capitalist countries, the army 
was, and is, drawn into the political struggle as an 
instrument for the suppression of the working people. 
Is it not true that the army in those countries suppresses 
the workers and serves as a buttress of the masters? 
In contrast to such armies, our Red Army is distinguished 
by the fact that it is an instrument for the 
furtherance of the power of the workers and peasants, 
an instrument for the furtherance of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, an instrument for the liberation of 
the workers and peasants from the yoke of the landlords 
and capitalists.

J. V. S T A L I N 26 
Our army is an army of liberation of the working 
people. 
Have you considered the fact, comrades, that in 
the old days the people feared the army, as indeed they 
fear it now in the capitalist countries; that between 
the people and the army is a barrier separating the one 
from the other? And how is it with us? With us, on the 
contrary, people and army constitute a single whole, a 
single family. Nowhere in the world is there such an attitude 
of love and solicitude on the part of the people 
for the army as in our country. In our country the army 
is loved and respected, it is the object of general solicitude. 
Why? Because for the first time in the history 
of the world the workers and peasants have created their 
own army, which serves not the masters, but the former 
slaves, the now emancipated workers and peasants. 
There you have a source of the strength of our 
Red Army. 
And what does the people¹s love for their army mean? 
It means that such an army will have the firmest of rears, 
that such an army is invincible. 
What is an army without a firm rear? Nothing at all. 
The biggest armies, the best-equipped armies collapsed 
and fell to pieces when they did not have a firm rear, 
when they did not have the support and sympathy of 
the rear, of the labouring population. Ours is the only 
army in the world that has the sympathy and support 
of the workers and peasants. Therein lies its strength, 
therein lies its might. 
That, above all, is what distinguishes our Red Army 
from all other armies that ever existed or exist today.

THREE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE RED ARMY 27 
The desire of the Party, its task, is to see to 
it that this distinctive feature of the Red Army, its 
closeness to and fraternal connection with the workers 
and peasants, is preserved and made permanent. 
A second distinctive feature of our Red Army is 
that it is an army of brotherhood among the nations 
of our country, an army of liberation of the oppressed 
nations of our country, an army of defence of the liberty 
and independence of the nations of our country. 
In the old days, armies were usually trained in the 
spirit of dominant-nation chauvinism, in the spirit of conquest, 
in the belief of the need to subjugate weaker nations. 
That, indeed, explains why armies of the old type, 
capitalist armies, were at the same time armies of national, 
colonial oppression. Therein lay one of the fundamental 
weaknesses of the old armies. Our army radically 
differs from the armies of colonial oppression. Its 
whole nature, its whole structure, is based on strengthening 
the ties of friendship among the nations of our country, 
on the idea of liberating the oppressed peoples, on 
the idea of defending the liberty and independence 
of the socialist republics that go to make up the Soviet 
Union. 
That is a second and fundamental source of the 
strength and might of our Red Army. Therein lies the 
pledge that at a critical moment our army will have the 
fullest support of the vast masses of all the nations and 
nationalities inhabiting our boundless land. 
The desire of the Party, its task, is to see to i t 
that this distinctive feature of our Red Army is likewise 
preserved and made permanent.

J. V. S T A L I N 28 
And, lastly, a third distinctive feature of the Red 
Army. It is that the spirit of internationalism is trained 
and fostered in our army, that the spirit of internationalism 
imbues our Red Army through and through. 
In the capitalist countries, armies are usually trained 
to hate the peoples of other countries, to hate other 
states, to hate the workers and peasants of other countries. 
Why is this done? In order to turn the army into 
an obedient herd in the event of armed clashes between 
states, between powers, between countries. That is a 
source of weakness of all capitalist armies. 
Our army is built on entirely different principles. 
The strength of our Red Army lies in the fact that from 
the day of its birth it has been trained in a spirit of internationalism, 
that it has been trained to respect the peoples 
of other countries, to love and respect the workers 
of all countries, to preserve and promote peace among 
countries. And precisely because our army is trained 
in the spirit of internationalism, trained to understand 
that the interests of the workers of all countries are one, 
precisely for this reason our army is an army of the workers 
of all countries. 
And that this is a source of our army¹s strength and 
might, the bourgeois of all countries will learn if they 
should venture to attack our country, for they will then 
see that our Red Army, trained as it is in the spirit of 
internationalism, has countless friends and allies in all 
parts of the world, from Shanghai to New York and from 
London to Calcutta. 
That, comrades, is a third and fundamental distinctive 
feature which imbues the spirit of our army and constitutes 
a source of its strength and might.

THREE DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE RED ARMY 29 
The desire of the Party, its task, is to see to it that 
this distinctive feature of our army is likewise preserved 
and made permanent. 
It is to these three distinctive features that our army 
owes its strength and might. 
This, too, explains the fact that our army knows 
where it is heading for, because it consists not of tin 
soldiers, but of enlightened people who understand 
where to head for and what to fight for. 
But an army that knows what it is fighting for is 
invincible, comrades. 
That is why our Red Army has every ground for 
being the best army in the world. 
Long live our Red Army! 
Long live its soldiers! 
Long live its leaders! 
Long live the dictatorship of the proletariat which 
created the Red Army, gave it victory and crowned 
it with glory! (Stormy and prolonged applause.) 
Pravda, No. 50, 
February 28, 1928

THE WORK OF THE APRIL JOINT 
PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
AND CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION 
Report Delivered at a Meeting of the Active 
of the Moscow Organisation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
April 13, 1928* 
Comrades, the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C.8 
that has just concluded has one feature which distinguishes 
it from the series of plenary meetings held in 
the past two years. This feature is that it was a plenum 
of a purely business-like character, a plenum where there 
were no inner-Party conflicts, a plenum where there 
were no inner-Party dissensions. 
Its agenda consisted of the most burning questions 
of the day: the grain procurements, the Shakhty affair,9 
and, lastly, the plan of work of the Political Bureau and 
plenum of the Central Committee. These, as you see, 
are quite serious questions. Nevertheless, the debates 
at the plenum were of a purely business-like character, 
and the resolutions were adopted unanimously. 
The reason is that there was no opposition at the 
plenum. The reason is that the questions were approached 
in a strictly business-like manner, without factional 
attacks, without factional demagogy. The reason is 
that only after the Fifteenth Congress, only after the 
liquidation of the opposition, did it become possible 
* Several paragraphs of this report which at the time were 
not published in the press are here restored.‹Ed.

WORK OF APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. 31 
for the Party to tackle practical problems seriously and 
thoroughly. 
That is the good aspect and, if you like, the inestimable 
advantage of that phase of development which 
we have entered since the Fifteenth Congress of our Party, 
since the liquidation of the opposition. 
I 
SELF-CRITICISM 
A characteristic feature of the work of this plenum, 
of its debates and its resolutions, is that from beginning 
to end, its key-note was the sternest self-criticism. More, 
there was not a single question, not a single speech, at 
the plenum which was not accompanied by criticism of 
shortcomings in our work, by self-criticism of our organisations. 
Criticism of our shortcomings, honest and 
Bolshevik self-criticism of Party, Soviet and economic 
organisations‹that was the general tone of the plenum. 
I know that there are people in the ranks of the Party 
who have no fondness for criticism in general, and for 
self-criticism in particular. Those people, whom I might 
call ³skin-deep² Communists (laughter), every now and 
then grumble and shrug their shoulders at self-criticism, 
as much as to say: Again this accursed self-criticism, 
again this raking out of our shortcomings‹ 
can¹t we be allowed to live in peace? Obviously, those 
³skin-deep² Communists are complete strangers to 
the spirit of our Party, to the spirit of Bolshevism. 
Well, in view of the existence of such sentiments among 
those people who greet self-criticism with anything 
but enthusiasm, it is permissible to ask: Do we need

J. V. S T A L I N 32 
self-criticism; where does it derive from, and what is 
its value? 
I think, comrades, that self-criticism is as necessary 
to us as air or water. I think that without it, without 
self-criticism, our Party could not make any headway, 
could not disclose our ulcers, could not eliminate our 
shortcomings. And shortcomings we have in plenty. 
That must be admitted frankly and honestly. 
The slogan of self-criticism cannot be regarded as 
a new one. It lies at the very foundation of the Bolshevik 
Party. It lies at the foundation of the regime of 
the dictatorship of the proletariat. Since our country 
is a country with a dictatorship of the proletariat, 
and since the dictatorship is directed by one party, the 
Communist Party, which does not, and cannot, share 
power with other parties, is it not clear that, if we want 
to make headway, we ourselves must disclose and correct 
our errors‹is it not clear that there is no one else to 
disclose and correct them for us? Is it not clear, comrades, 
that self-criticism must be one of the most important 
motive forces of our development? 
The slogan of self-criticism has developed especially 
powerfully since the Fifteenth Congress of our Party. 
Why? Because after the Fifteenth Congress, which put 
an end to the opposition, a new situation arose in the Party, 
one that we have to reckon with. 
In what does the novelty of this situation consist? 
In the fact that now we have no opposition, or next 
to none; in the fact that, because of the easy victory 
over the opposition‹a victory which in itself is a most 
important gain for the Party‹there may be a danger of 
the Party resting on its laurels, beginning to take things

WORK OF APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. 33 
easy and closing its eyes to the shortcomings in our 
work. 
The easy victory over the opposition is a most important 
gain for our Party. But concealed within it is a certain 
drawback, which is that the Party may be a prey to selfsatisfaction, 
to self-admiration, and begin to rest on 
its laurels. And what does resting on our laurels mean? 
It means putting an end to our forward movement. And 
in order that this may not occur, we need self-criticism‹ 
not that malevolent and actually counter-revolutionary 
criticism which the opposition indulged in‹but honest, 
frank, Bolshevik self-criticism. 
The Fifteenth Congress of our Party was alive to 
this, and it issued the slogan of self-criticism. Since 
then the tide of self-criticism has been mounting, and 
it laid its imprint also on the work of the April plenum 
of the C.C. and C.C.C. 
It would be strange to fear that our enemies, our 
internal and external enemies, might exploit the criticism 
of our shortcomings and raise the shout: Oho! All 
is not well with those Bolsheviks! It would be strange 
if we Bolsheviks were to fear that. The strength of 
Bolshevism lies precisely in the fact that it is not afraid 
to admit its mistakes. Let the Party, let the Bolsheviks, 
let all the upright workers and labouring elements 
in our country bring to light the shortcomings in our 
work, the shortcomings in our constructive effort, 
and let them indicate ways of eliminating our shortcomings, 
so that there may be no stagnation, vegetation, 
decay in our work and our construction, so that all 
our work and all our constructive measures may improve 
from day to day and go from success to success. That is

J. V. S T A L I N 34 
the chief thing just now. As for our enemies, let them 
rant about our shortcomings‹such trifles cannot and 
should not disconcert Bolsheviks. 
Lastly, there is-yet another circumstance that impels 
us to self-criticism. I am referring to the question 
of the masses and the leaders. A peculiar sort of relation 
has lately begun to arise between the leaders and the 
masses. On the one hand there was formed, there came 
into being historically, a group of leaders among us 
whose prestige is rising and rising, and who are 
becoming almost unapproachable for the masses. On the 
other hand the working-class masses in the first place, 
and the mass of the working people in general are rising 
extremely slowly, are beginning to look up at the 
leaders from below with blinking eyes, and not infrequently 
are afraid to criticise them. 
Of course, the fact that we have a group of leaders 
who have risen excessively high and enjoy great prestige 
is in itself a great achievement for our Party. Obviously, 
the direction of a big country would be unthinkable 
without such an authoritative group of leaders. 
But the fact that as these leaders rise they get further 
away from the masses, and the masses begin to look up 
at them from below and do not venture to criticise them, 
cannot but give rise to a certain danger of the leaders 
losing contact with the masses and the masses getting 
out of touch with the leaders. 
This danger may result in the leaders becoming conceited 
and regarding themselves as infallible. And what 
good can be expected when the top leaders become selfconceited 
and begin to look down on the masses? Clearly, 
nothing can come of this but the ruin of the Party.

WORK OF APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. 35 
But what we want is not to ruin the Party, but to move 
forward and improve our work. And precisely in order 
that we may move forward and improve the relations 
between the masses and the leaders, we must keep the 
valve of self-criticism open all the time, we must make 
it possible for Soviet people to ³go for² their leaders, 
to criticise their mistakes, so that the leaders may not 
grow conceited, and the masses may not get out of touch 
with the leaders. 
The question of the masses and the leaders is sometimes 
identified with the question of promotion. That 
is wrong, comrades. It is not a question of bringing 
new leaders to the fore, although this deserves the 
Party¹s most serious attention. It is a question of preserving 
the leaders who have already come to the fore 
and possess the greatest prestige by organising permanent 
and indissoluble contact between them and the 
masses. It is a question of organising, along the lines 
of self-criticism and criticism of our shortcomings, the 
broad public opinion of the Party, the broad public 
opinion of the working class, as an instrument of keen 
and vigilant moral control, to which the most authoritative 
leaders must lend an attentive ear if they want 
to retain the confidence of the Party and the confidence 
of the working class. 
From this standpoint, the value of the press, of 
our Party and Soviet press, is truly inestimable. From 
this standpoint, we cannot but welcome the initiative 
shown by Pravda in publishing the Bulletin of the Workers¹ 
and Peasants¹ Inspection,10 which conducts systematic 
criticism of shortcomings in our work. Only we must 
see to it that the criticism is serious and penetrating,

J. V. S T A L I N 36 
and does not just skate on the surface. From this standpoint, 
too, we have to welcome the initiative shown by 
Komsomolskaya Pravda11 in vigorously and spiritedly 
attacking shortcomings in our work. 
Critics are sometimes abused because of imperfections 
in their criticism, because their criticism is not 
always 100 per cent correct. The demand is often made 
that criticism should be correct on all accounts, and if 
it is not correct on every point, they begin to decry and 
disparage it. 
That is wrong, comrades. It is a dangerous misconception. 
Only try to put forward such a demand, and you 
will gag hundreds and thousands of workers, worker 
correspondents and village correspondents who desire 
to correct our shortcomings but who sometimes are 
unable to formulate their ideas correctly. We would 
get not self-criticism, but the silence of the tomb. 
You must know that workers are sometimes afraid 
to tell the truth about shortcomings in our work. They 
are afraid not only because they might get into ³hot 
water² for it, but also because they might be made into 
a ³laughing-stock² on account of their imperfect criticism. 
How can you expect an ordinary worker or an 
ordinary peasant, with his own painful experience of 
shortcomings in our work and in our planning, to frame 
his criticism according to all the rules of the art? If you 
demand that their criticism should be 100 per cent correct, 
you will be killing all possibility of criticism from 
below, all possibility of self-criticism. That is why I 
think that if criticism is even only 5 or 10 per cent true, 
such criticism should be welcomed, should be listened 
to attentively, and the sound core in it taken into ac

WORK OF APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. 37 
count. Otherwise, I repeat, you would be gagging all 
those hundreds and thousands of people who are devoted 
to the cause of the Soviets, who are not yet skilled 
enough in the art of criticism, but through whose lips 
speaks truth itself. 
Precisely in order to develop self-criticism and not 
extinguish it, we must listen attentively to all criticism 
coming from Soviet people, even if sometimes it 
may not be correct to the full and in all details. Only 
then can the masses have the assurance that they will 
not get into ³hot water² if their criticism is not perfect, 
that they will not be made a ³laughing-stock² if 
there should be errors in their criticism. Only then can 
self-criticism acquire a truly mass character and meet 
with a truly mass response. 
It goes without saying that what we have in mind 
is not just ³any sort² of criticism. Criticism by a counterrevolutionary 
is also criticism. But its object is to 
discredit the Soviet regime, to undermine our industry, 
to disrupt our Party work. Obviously, i t is not 
such criticism we have in mind. It is not of such criticism 
I am speaking, but of criticism that comes from 
Soviet people, and which has the aim of improving the 
organs of Soviet rule, of improving our industry, of 
improving our Party and trade-union work. We need criticism 
in order to strengthen the Soviet regime, not to 
weaken it. And it is precisely with a view to strengthening 
and improving our work that the Party proclaims the 
slogan of criticism and self-criticism. 
What do we expect primarily from the slogan of 
self-criticism, what results can it yield if it is carried 
out properly and honestly? It should yield at least two

J. V. S T A L I N 38 
results. It should, in the first place, sharpen the vigilance 
of the working class, make it pay more attention 
to our shortcomings, facilitate their correction, 
and render impossible any kind of ³surprises² in our 
constructive work. I t should, in the second place, 
improve the political culture of the working class, develop 
in it the feeling that it is the master of the country, 
and facilitate the training of the working class in the 
work of administering the country. 
Have you considered the fact that not only the Shakhty 
affair, but also the procurement crisis of January 
1928 came as a ³surprise² to many of us? The Shakhty 
affair was particularly noteworthy in this respect. This 
counter-revolutionary group of bourgeois experts carried 
on their work for five years, receiving instructions 
from the anti-Soviet organisations of international 
capital. For five years our organisations were writing 
and circulating all sorts of resolutions and decisions. 
Our coal industry, of course, was making headway 
all the same, because our Soviet economic system is 
so virile and powerful that it got the upper hand in spite 
of our blockheadedness and our blunders, and in spite 
of the subversive activities of the experts. For five years 
this counter-revolutionary group of experts was engaged 
in sabotaging our industry, causing boiler explosions, 
wrecking turbines, and so on. And all this time 
we were oblivious to everything. Then ³suddenly,² like 
a bolt from the blue, came the Shakhty affair. 
Is this normal, comrades? I think it is very far from 
normal. To stand at the helm and peer ahead, yet 
see nothing until circumstances bring us face to face 
with some calamity‹that is not leadership. That is not

WORK OF APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. 39 
the way Bolshevism understands leadership. In order 
to lead, one must foresee. And foreseeing is not always 
easy, comrades. 
It is one thing when a dozen or so leading comrades 
are on the watch for and detect shortcomings in our 
work, while the working masses are unwilling or unable either 
to watch for or to detect shortcomings. Here all 
the chances are that you will be sure to overlook something, 
will not detect everything. It is another thing 
when, together with the dozen or so leading comrades, 
hundreds of thousands and millions of workers are on 
the watch to detect shortcomings in our work, disclosing 
our errors, throwing themselves into the general 
work of construction and indicating ways of improving 
it. Here there is a greater guarantee that there will be 
no surprises, that objectionable features will be noted 
promptly and prompt measures taken to eliminate 
them. 
We must see to it that the vigilance of the working 
class is not damped down, but stimulated, that hundreds 
of thousands and millions of workers are drawn into 
the general work of socialist construction, that hundreds 
of thousands and millions of workers and peasants, and 
not merely a dozen leaders, keep vigilant watch over the 
progress of our construction work, notice our errors and 
bring them into the light of day. Only then shall we have 
no ³surprises.² But to bring this about, we must develop 
criticism of our shortcomings from below, we must 
make criticism the affair of the masses, we must assimilate 
and carry out the slogan of self-criticism. 
Lastly, as regards promoting the cultural powers 
of the working class, developing in it the faculty of

J. V. S T A L I N 40 
administering the country in connection with the carrying 
out of the slogan of self-criticism. Lenin said: 
³The chief thing we lack is culture, ability to administer. . . . 
Economically and politically, N E P fully ensures us the possibility 
of laying the foundation of a socialist economy. It is Œonly¹ 
a matter of the cultural forces of the proletariat and of i t s 
vanguard.²12 
What does this mean? It means that one of the main 
tasks of our constructive work is to develop in the working 
class the faculty and ability to administer the country, 
to administer economy, to administer industry. 
Can we develop this faculty and ability in the working 
class without giving full play to the powers and 
capacities of the workers, the powers and capacities 
of the finest elements of the working class, for criticising 
our errors, for detecting our shortcomings and 
for advancing our work? Obviously, we cannot. 
And what is required in order to give full play to 
the powers and capacities of the working class and the 
working people generally, and to enable them to acquire 
the faculty of administering the country? It requires, 
above all, honest and Bolshevik observance of the slogan 
of self-criticism, honest and Bolshevik observance of the 
slogan of criticism from below of shortcomings and 
errors in our work. I f the workers take advantage 
of the opportunity to criticise shortcomings in our work 
frankly and bluntly, to improve and advance our work, 
what does that mean? It means that the workers are becoming 
active participants in the work of directing the 
country, economy, industry. And this cannot but enhance 
in the workers the feeling that they are the mas

WORK OF APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. 41 
ters of the country, cannot but enhance their activity, 
their vigilance, their culture. 
This question of the cultural powers of the working 
class is a decisive one. Why? Because, of all the ruling 
classes that have hitherto existed, the working class, 
as a ruling class, occupies a somewhat special and 
not altogether favourable position in history. All ruling 
classes until now‹the slave-owners, the landlords, the 
capitalists‹were also wealthy classes. They were in a 
position to train in their sons the knowledge and faculties 
needed for government. The working class differs 
from them, among other things, in that it is not a wealthy 
class, that i t was not able formerly to train in its 
sons the knowledge and faculty of government, and has 
become able to do so only now, after coming to power. 
That, incidently, is the reason why the question of 
a cultural revolution is so acute with us. True, in the 
ten years of its rule the working class of the U.S.S.R. has 
accomplished far more in this respect than the landlords 
and capitalists did in hundreds of years. But the international 
and internal situation is such that the results 
achieved are far from sufficient. Therefore, every 
means capable of promoting the development of the 
cultural powers of the working class, every means capable 
of facilitating the development in the working class 
of the faculty and ability to administer the country and 
industry‹every such means must be utilised by us to 
the full. 
But it follows from what has been said that the slogan 
of self-criticism is one of the most important means 
of developing the cultural powers of the proletariat, of 
developing the faculty of government in the working

J. V. S T A L I N 42 
class. From this follows yet another reason why the carrying 
out of the slogan of self-criticism is a vital task 
for us. 
Such, in general, are the reasons which make the 
slogan of self-criticism imperative for us as a slogan 
of the day. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the key-note of 
the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. was self-criticism. 
Let us pass now to the question of grain procurements. 
II 
THE QUESTION OF GRAIN PROCUREMENTS 
First of all, a few words about the nature of the 
grain procurement crisis that developed here in January 
of this year. The essence of the matter is that in October 
of last year our procurements began to decline, reached 
a very low point in December, and by January of this 
year we had a deficit of 130,000,000 poods of grain. 
This year¹s harvest was, perhaps, no worse than last 
year¹s; it may have been a little less. The carry-over 
from previous harvests was bigger than it was last year, 
and it was generally considered that the marketable 
surplus of grain in our country this year was not smaller, 
but larger than in the previous year. 
It was with this consideration in mind that the procurement 
plan for the year was fixed at slightly above 
last year¹s plan. But in spite of this, the procurements 
declined, and by January 1928 we had a deficit of 
130,000,000 poods. It was an ³odd² situation: there was 
plenty of grain in the country, yet the procurements

WORK OF APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. 43 
were falling and creating the threat of hunger in the 
towns and in the Red Army. 
How is this ³oddity² to be explained? Was it not 
due to some chance factor? The explanation many are 
inclined to give is that we had been caught napping, 
had been too busy with the opposition and had let our 
attention slip. That we really had been caught napping 
is, of course, true. But to put it all down to an 
oversight would be the grossest error. Still less can the 
procurement crisis be attributed to some chance factor. 
Such things do not happen by chance. That would be 
too cheap an explanation. 
What, then, were the factors that led up to the procurement 
crisis? 
I think there were at least three such factors. 
Firstly. The difficulties of our socialist construction 
in the conditions of our international and internal 
situation. I am referring primarily to the difficulties 
of developing urban industry. It is necessary to pour 
goods of every kind into the countryside in order to be 
able to draw out of it the maximum quantity of agricultural 
produce. This requires a faster rate of development 
of our industry than is the case now. But in order 
to develop industry more swiftly, we need a faster rate 
of socialist accumulation. And to attain such a rate of 
accumulation is not so easy, comrades. The result is a 
shortage of goods in the countryside. 
I am referring, further, to the difficulties of our 
constructive work in the countryside. Agriculture is 
developing slowly, comrades. It should be developing 
with gigantic strides, grain should become cheaper 
and harvests bigger, fertilisers should be applied to

J. V. S T A L I N 44 
the utmost and mechanised production of grain should 
be developed at high speed. But that is not the case, 
comrades, and will not come about quickly. 
Why? 
Because our agriculture is a small-peasant economy, 
which does not readily lend itself to substantial improvement. 
Statistics tell us that before the war there 
were about 16,000,000 individual peasant farms in our 
country. Now we have about 25,000,000 individual 
peasant farms. This means that ours is essentially 
a land of small-peasant economy. And what is smallpeasant 
economy? It is the most insecure, the most primitive, 
the most underdeveloped form of economy, producing 
the smallest marketable surpluses. That is the 
whole crux of the matter, comrades. Fertilisers, machines, 
scientific agriculture and other improvements‹these 
are things which can be effectively applied on large 
farms, but which are inapplicable or practically inapplicable 
in small-peasant economy. That is the weakness 
of small-scale economy, and that is why it cannot compete 
with the large kulak farms. 
Have we any large farms at all in the countryside, 
employing machines, fertilisers, scientific agriculture 
and so on? Yes, we have. Firstly, there are 
the collective farms and state farms. But we have few 
of them, comrades. Secondly, there are the large kulak 
(capitalist) farms. Such farms are by no means few in 
our country, and they are still a big factor in agriculture. 
Can we adopt the course of encouraging privately 
owned, large capitalist farms in the countryside? Obviously, 
we cannot. It follows then that we must do our ut

WORK OF APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. 45 
most to develop in the countryside large farms of the 
type of the collective farms and state farms and 
try to convert them into grain factories for the country 
organised on a modern scientific basis. That, in fact, 
explains why the Fifteenth Congress of our Party issued 
the slogan of the maximum development in forming 
collective and state farms. 
It would be a mistake to think that the collective 
farms must only be formed from the poorer strata of the 
peasantry. That would be wrong, comrades. Our collective 
farms must comprise both poor and middle peasants, 
and embrace not only individual groups or clusters, but 
entire villages. The middle peasant must be given a 
prospect, he must be shown that he can develop his husbandry 
best and most rapidly through the collective 
farm. Since the middle peasant cannot rise into the 
kulak group, and it would be unwise for him to sink, 
he must be given the prospect of being able to improve 
his husbandry through the formation of collective 
farms. 
But our collective farms and state farms are still 
all too few, scandalously few. Hence the difficulties 
of our constructive work in the countryside. Hence our 
inadequate grain output. 
Secondly. It follows from this that the difficulties 
of our constructive work in town and country are a 
basis on which a procurement crisis can develop. But 
this does not mean that a procurement crisis was bound 
to develop precisely this year. We know that these difficulties 
existed not only this year, but also last year. 
Why, then, did a procurement crisis develop precisely 
this year? What is the secret?

J. V. S T A L I N 46 
The secret is that this year the kulak was able to take 
advantage of these difficulties to force up grain prices, 
launch an attack on the Soviet price policy and thus 
slow up our procurement operations. And he was able 
to take advantage of these difficulties for at least two 
reasons: 
firstly, because three years of good harvests had 
not been without their effect. The kulak grew strong in 
that period, grain stocks in the countryside in general, 
and among the kulaks in particular, accumulated during 
that time, and it became possible for the kulak to attempt 
to dictate prices; 
secondly, because the kulak had support from the 
urban speculators, who speculate on a rise of grain prices 
and thus force up prices. 
This does not mean, of course, that the kulak is the 
principal holder of grain. By and large, it is the middle 
peasant who holds most of the grain. But the kulak 
has a certain economic prestige in the countryside, 
and in the matter of prices he is sometimes able to get 
the middle peasant to follow his lead. The kulak elements 
in the countryside are thus in a position to take 
advantage of the difficulties of our constructive work 
for forcing up grain prices for purposes of speculation. 
But what is the consequence of forcing up grain 
prices by, say, 40-50 per cent, as the kulak speculating 
elements did? The first consequence is to undermine 
the real wages of the workers. Let us suppose that we 
had raised workers¹ wages at the time. But in that case 
we should have had to raise prices of manufactured 
goods, and that would have hit at the living standards

WORK OF APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. 47 
both of the working class and of the poor and middle 
peasants. And what would have been the effect of this? 
The effect would undoubtedly have been directly to 
undermine our whole economic policy. 
But that is not all. Let us suppose that we had raised 
grain prices 40-50 per cent in January or in the spring 
of this year, just before the preparations for the sowing. 
What would have been the result? We should have disorganised 
the raw materials base of our industry. The 
cotton-growers would have abandoned the growing of 
cotton and started growing grain, as a more profitable 
business. The flax-growers would have abandoned flax 
and also started growing grain. The beet-growers would 
have done the same. And so on and so forth. In short, we 
should have undermined the raw materials base of our industry 
because of the profiteering appetites of the capitalist 
elements in the countryside. 
But that is not all either. If we had forced up grain 
prices this spring, say, we should certainly have brought 
misery on the poor peasant, who in the spring buys 
grain for food as well as for sowing his fields. The poor 
peasants and the lower-middle peasants would have 
had every right to say to us: ³You have deceived us, 
because last autumn we sold grain to you at low prices, 
and now you are compelling us to buy grain at high 
prices. Whom are you protecting, gentlemen of the Soviets, 
the poor peasants or the kulaks?² 
That is why the Party had to retaliate to the blow 
of the kulak speculators, aimed at forcing up grain 
prices, with a counter-blow that would knock out of 
the kulaks and speculators all inclination to menace 
the working class and our Red Army with hunger.

J. V. S T A L I N 48 
Thirdly. I t i s unquestionable that the capitalist 
elements in the countryside could not have taken advantage 
of the difficulties of our constructive work to the 
degree they actually did, and the procurement crisis 
would not have assumed such a menacing character, 
if they had not been assisted in this matter by one other 
circumstance. What is that circumstance? 
It is the slackness of our procurement bodies, 
the absence of a united front between them, their competition 
with one another, and their reluctance to wage 
a determined struggle against speculating on higher 
grain prices. 
It is, lastly, the inertia of our Party organisations 
in the grain procurement areas, their reluctance to intervene 
as they should have done in the grain procurement 
campaign, their reluctance to intervene and 
put an end to the general slackness on the procurement 
front. 
Intoxicated by the successes of last year¹s procurement 
campaign, and believing that this year the procurements 
would come in automatically, our procurement 
and Party organisations left it all to the ³will of God,² 
and left a clear field to the kulak speculating elements. 
And that was just what the kulaks were waiting for. 
It is scarcely to be doubted that, had it not been for this 
circumstance, the procurement crisis could not have 
assumed such a menacing character. 
It should not be forgotten that we, that is to say 
our organisations, both procurement and other, control 
nearly 80 per cent of the supply of manufactured goods 
to the countryside, and nearly 90 per cent of all the procurements 
there. It need scarcely be said that this cir

WORK OF APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. 49 
cumstance makes it possible for us to dictate to the kulak 
in the countryside, provided that our organisations 
know how to utilise this favourable position. But we, 
instead of utilising this favourable position, allowed 
everything to go on automatically and thereby facilitated‹
against our own will, of course‹the fight of the 
capitalist elements of the countryside against the Soviet 
Government. 
Such, comrades, were the conditions which determined 
the procurement crisis at the end of last year. 
You see, therefore, that the procurement crisis cannot 
be considered a matter of chance. 
You see that the procurement crisis is the expression 
of the first serious action, under the conditions of NEP, 
undertaken by the capitalist elements of the countryside 
against the Soviet Government in connection with one 
of the most important questions of our constructive work, 
that of grain procurements. 
That, comrades, is the class background of the grain 
procurement crisis. 
You know that, in order to end the procurement 
crisis and curb the kulaks¹ appetite for speculation, the 
Party and the Soviet Government were obliged to adopt a 
number of practical measures. Quite a lot has been said 
about these measures in our press. They have been dealt 
with in fairly great detail in the resolution of the joint 
plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. Hence I think that there 
is no need to repeat that here. 
I only want to say something about certain emergency 
measures which were taken because of the emergency 
circumstances, and which, of course, will lapse 
when these emergency circumstances cease to exist.

J. V. S T A L I N 50 
I am referring to the enforcement of Article 107 of the 
law against speculation. This article was adopted by the 
Central Executive Committee in 1926. It was not applied 
last year. Why? Because the grain procurements proceeded, 
as i t i s said, normally, and there were no 
grounds for applying this article. It was called to mind 
only this year, at the beginning of 1928. And it was recalled 
because we had a number of emergency circumstances 
which resulted from the speculating machinations 
of the kulaks and which held out the threat of hunger. 
It is clear that if there are no emergency circumstances 
in the next procurement year and the procurements 
proceed normally, Article 107 will not be applied. And, 
on the contrary, if emergency circumstances arise and 
the capitalist elements start their ³tricks² again, 
Article 107 will again appear on the scene. 
It would be stupid on these grounds to say that NEP 
is being ³abolished,² that there is a ³reversion² to the 
surplus-appropriation system, and so on. Only enemies 
of the Soviet regime can now think of abolishing NEP. 
Nobody benefits more from the New Economic Policy 
now than the Soviet Government. But there are people 
who think that NEP means not intensifying the struggle 
against capitalist elements, including the kulaks, with 
a view to overcoming them, but ceasing the struggle 
against the kulaks and other capitalist elements. It 
need scarcely be said that such people have nothing in 
common with Leninism, for there is not, and cannot 
be, any place for them in our Party. 
The results of the measures taken by the Party and 
the Soviet Government to put an end to the food crisis 
are also known to you. Briefly, they are as follows.

WORK OF APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. 51 
Firstly, we made up for lost time and procured grain 
at a tempo which equalled, and in places surpassed, 
that of last year. You know that in the three months 
January-March we succeeded in procuring more than 
270,000,000 poods of grain. That, of course, is not all 
we need. We shall still have to procure upwards of 
100,000,000 poods. Nevertheless, it constituted that 
necessary achievement which enabled us to put an end 
to the procurement crisis. We are now fully justified in 
saying that the Party and the Soviet Government have 
scored a signal victory on this front. 
Secondly, we have put our procurement and Party 
organisations in the localities on a sound, or more or 
less sound, footing, having tested their combat readiness 
in practice and purged them of blatantly corrupt elements 
who refuse to recognise the existence of classes in 
the countryside and are reluctant to ³quarrel² with the 
kulaks. 
Thirdly, we have improved our work in the countryside, 
we have brought the poor peasants closer to us and 
won the allegiance of the overwhelming majority of the 
middle peasants, we have isolated the kulaks and have 
somewhat offended the well-to-do top stratum of the 
middle peasants. In doing so, we have put into effect 
our old Bolshevik slogan, proclaimed by Lenin as far 
back as the Eighth Congress of our Party13: Rely on the 
poor peasant, build a stable alliance with the middle 
peasant, never for a moment cease fighting against the 
kulaks. 
I know that some comrades do not accept this slogan 
very willingly. It would be strange to think that 
now, when the dictatorship of the proletariat is firmly

J. V. S T A L I N 52 
established, the alliance of the workers and the peasants 
means an alliance of the workers with the entire peasantry, 
including the kulaks. No, comrades, such an alliance 
we do not advocate, and cannot advocate. Under the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, when the power of the working 
class is firmly established, the alliance of the working class 
with the peasantry means reliance on the poor peasants, 
alliance with the middle peasants, and a fight against 
the kulaks. Whoever thinks that under our conditions 
alliance with the peasantry means alliance with the 
kulaks has nothing in common with Leninism. Whoever 
thinks of conducting a policy in the countryside 
that will please everyone, rich and poor alike, is not a 
Marxist, but a fool, because such a policy does not exist 
in nature, comrades. (Laughter and applause.) Our policy 
is a class policy. 
Such, in the main, are the results of the measures 
we took to increase the grain procurements. 
Undoubtedly, in the practical work of carrying out 
these measures there were a number of excesses and 
distortions of the Party line. A number of cases of distortion 
of our policy which, because of our blockheadedness, 
hit primarily at the poor and middle peasant‹cases of 
incorrect application of Article 107, etc.‹are familiar 
to all. We punish, and shall punish, people guilty of 
such distortions with the utmost severity. But it would 
be strange, because of these distortions, not to see the 
beneficial and truly valuable results of the Party¹s meaures, 
without which we could not have emerged from 
the procurement crisis. To do so would be closing one¹s 
eyes to the chief thing and giving prominence to that 
which is minor and incidental. It would be overlooking

WORK OF APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. 53 
the very substantial achievements of the procurement 
campaign because of a handful of individual instances 
of distortion of our line, distortions which have absolutely 
no warrant in the measures adopted by the 
Party. 
Were there any circumstances which facilitated our 
procurement achievements and our fight against the attack 
of the capitalist elements in the countryside? 
Yes, there were. One might mention at least two 
such circumstances. 
Firstly, there is the fact that we secured the intervention 
of the Party in the procurement campaign and the 
blow at the kulak speculating elements after the Fifteenth 
Congress of our Party, after the liquidation of the 
opposition, after the Party had attained the maximum 
unity by routing its Party enemies. The fight against 
the kulaks must not be regarded as a trifling matter. In 
order to defeat the machinations of the kulak speculators 
without causing any complications in the country, 
we need an absolutely united party, an absolutely firm 
rear and an absolutely firm government. It can scarcely 
be doubted that the existence of these factors was in 
a large degree instrumental in forcing the kulaks to 
beat an instantaneous retreat. 
Secondly, there is the fact that we succeeded in linking 
our practical measures for curbing the kulak speculating 
elements with the vital interests of the working 
class, the Red Army and the majority of the poorer 
sections of the rural population. The fact that the kulak 
speculating elements were menacing the labouring 
masses of town and country with the spectre of famine, 
and in addition were violating the laws of the Soviet

J. V. S T A L I N 54 
Government (Article 107), could not but result in the 
majority of the rural population siding with us in our 
fight against the capitalist elements in the countryside. 
The kulak was scandalously speculating in grain, thereby 
creating the gravest difficulties both in town and 
country; in addition he was violating Soviet laws, 
that is, the will of the Central Executive Committee of 
Soviets of Workers¹, Peasants¹ and Red Army Men¹s 
Deputies‹is it not obvious that this circumstance was 
bound to facilitate the work of isolating the kulaks? 
The pattern was in a way similar (with the appropriate 
reservations, of course) to the one we had in 1921, 
when, because of the famine in the country, the Party, 
headed by Lenin, raised the question of confiscating valuables 
from the churches with a view to acquiring food 
for the famine-stricken regions, and made this the basis 
of an extensive anti-religious campaign, and when 
the priests, by clinging to their valuables, were in fact 
opposing the starving masses and thereby evoked the 
resentment of the masses against the Church in general 
and against religious prejudices in particular, and especially 
against the priests and their leaders. There were 
some queer people at that time in our Party who thought 
that Lenin had come to realise the necessity of combating 
the Church only in 1921 (laughter)‹that he had not realised 
it until then. That, of course, was silly, comrades. 
Lenin, of course, realised the necessity of combating the 
Church before 1921 too. But that was not the point. The 
point was to link a broad mass anti-religious campaign 
with the struggle for the vital interests of the masses, 
and to conduct it in such a way that it was understood 
by the masses and supported by them.

WORK OF APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. 55 
The same must be said of the Party¹s manoeuvre at 
the beginning of this year in connection with the grain 
procurement campaign. There are people who think that 
the Party has only now come to realise the necessity of 
a struggle against the kulak danger. That, of course, is 
silly, comrades. The Party has always realised the necessity 
for such a struggle and has waged it not in words, 
but in deeds. The specific feature of the manoeuvre undertaken 
by the Party at the beginning of this year is 
that this year the Party had the opportunity to link 
a determined struggle against the kulak speculating 
elements in the countryside with the struggle for the vital 
interests of the broad masses of the working people, 
and by means of this link it succeeded in winning the 
following of the majority of the labouring masses in the 
countryside and isolating the kulaks. 
The art of Bolshevik policy by no means consists in 
firing indiscriminately with all your guns on all fronts, 
regardless of conditions of time and place, and regardless 
of whether the masses are ready to support this or that 
step of the leadership. The art of Bolshevik policy consists 
in being able to choose the time and place and to 
take all the circumstances into account in order to concentrate 
fire on the front where the maximum results 
are to be attained most quickly. 
What results, indeed, should we now be having if 
are had undertaken a powerful blow at the kulaks three 
years ago, when we did not yet have the firm backing of 
the middle peasant, when the middle peasant was infuriated 
and was violently attacking the chairmen of 
our volost executive committees, when the poor peasants 
were dismayed at the consequences of NEP, when

J. V. S T A L I N 56 
we had only 75 per cent of the pre-war crop area, when 
we were confronted with the basic problem of expanding 
the production of food and raw materials in the countryside, 
and when we did not yet have a substantial 
food and raw materials base for industry? 
I have no doubt that we would have lost the battle, 
that we would not have succeeded in enlarging the crop 
area to the extent that we have succeeded in doing now, 
that we would have undermined the possibility of creating 
a food and raw materials base for industry, that we 
would have facilitated the strengthening of the kulaks, 
and that we would have repelled the middle peasants, 
and that, possibly, we would now be having most serious 
political complications in the country. 
What was the position in the countryside at the beginning 
of this year? Crop areas enlarged to pre-war dimensions, 
a securer raw materials and food base for 
industry, the majority of the middle peasants firmly 
backing the Soviet Government, a more or less organised 
poor peasantry, improved and stronger Party and 
Soviet organisations in the countryside. Is it not obvious 
that only because of these conditions were we able 
to count on serious success in organising a blow at 
the kulak speculating elements? Is it not clear that only 
imbeciles could fail to understand the vast difference 
between these two situations in the matter of organising 
a broad struggle of the masses against the capitalist elements 
in the countryside? 
There you have an example of how unwise it is to 
fire indiscriminately with all your guns on all fronts, 
regardless of conditions of time and place, and regardless 
of the relation between the contending forces.

WORK OF APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. 57 
That, comrades, is how matters stand with regard 
to the grain procurements. 
Let us pass now to the Shakhty affair. 
III 
THE SHAKHTY AFFAIR 
What was the class background of the Shakhty affair? 
Where do the roots of the Shakhty affair lie hidden, 
and from what class basis could this economic 
counter-revolution have sprung? 
There are comrades who think that the Shakhty affair 
was something accidental. They usually say: We 
were properly caught napping, we allowed our attention 
to slip; but if we had not been caught napping, there 
would have been no Shakhty affair. That there was an 
oversight here, and a pretty serious one, is beyond all 
doubt. But to put it all down to an oversight means to 
understand nothing of the essence of the matter. 
What do the facts, the documents in the Shakhty 
case, show? 
The facts show that the Shakhty affair was an economic 
counter-revolution, plotted by a section of the 
bourgeois experts, former coal-owners. 
The facts show, further, that these experts were banded 
together in a secret group and were receiving money 
for sabotage purposes from former owners now living 
abroad and from counter-revolutionary anti-Soviet capitalist 
organisations in the West. 
The facts show, lastly, that this group of bourgeois 
experts operated and wrought destruction to our industry 
on orders from capitalist organisations in the West.

J. V. S T A L I N 58 
And what does all this indicate? 
It indicates that i t is a matter here of economic 
intervention in our industrial affairs by West-European 
anti-Soviet capitalist organisations. At one time there 
was military and political intervention, which we succeeded 
in liquidating by means of a victorious civil war. 
Now we have an attempt at economic intervention, for 
the liquidation of which we do not need a civil war, 
but which we must liquidate all the same, and shall 
liquidate with all the means at our disposal. 
It would be foolish to believe that international capital 
will leave us in peace. No, comrades, that is not 
true. Classes exist, international capital exists, and it 
cannot look on calmly at the development of the country 
that is building socialism. Formerly, international capi 
t a l thought i t could overthrow the Soviet regime 
by means of outright armed intervention. The attempt 
failed. Now it is trying, and will go on trying, to undermine 
our economic strength by means of inconspicuous, 
not always noticeable but quite considerable, economic 
intervention, organising sabotage, engineering all sorts of 
³crises² in this or that branch of industry, and thereby 
facilitating the possibility of armed intervention in the 
future. All this is woven into the web of the class struggle 
of international capital against the Soviet regime, and 
there can be no question of anything accidental here. 
One thing or the other: 
either we continue to pursue a revolutionary policy, 
rallying the proletarians and the oppressed of all 
countries around the working class of the U.S.S.R.‹in 
which case international capital will do everything it 
can to hinder our advance;

WORK OF APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. 59 
or we renounce our revolutionary policy and agree 
to make a number of fundamental concessions to international 
capital‹in which case international capital, 
no doubt, will not be averse to ³assisting² us in converting 
our socialist country into a ³good² bourgeois 
republic. 
There are people who think that we can conduct an 
emancipatory foreign policy and at the same time have 
the European and American capitalists praising us for doing 
so. I shall not stop to show that such naive people do 
not and cannot have anything in common with our Party. 
Britain, for instance, demands that we join her in 
establishing predatory spheres of influence somewhere 
or other, in Persia, Afghanistan or Turkey, say, and assures 
us that if we made this concession, she would be 
prepared to establish ³friendship² with us. Well, what 
do you say, comrades, perhaps we should make this concession? 
Chorus of shouts. No! 
Stalin. America demands that we renounce in principle 
the policy of supporting the emancipation movement 
of the working class in other countries, and says that if 
we made this concession everything would go smoothly. 
Well, what do you say, comrades, perhaps we should 
make this concession? 
Chorus of shouts. No! 
Stalin. We could establish ³friendly² relations with 
Japan if we agreed to join her in dividing up Manchuria. 
Can we make this concession? 
Chorus of shouts. No! 
Stalin. Or, for instance, the demand is made 
that we ³loosen² our foreign trade monopoly and

J. V. S T A L I N 60 
agree to repay all the war and pre-war debts. Perhaps we 
should agree to this, comrades? 
Chorus of shouts. No! 
Stalin. But precisely because we cannot agree to these 
or similar concessions without being false to ourselves 
‹precisely because of this we must take it for granted 
that international capital will go on playing us every 
sort of scurvy trick, whether it be a Shakhty affair 
or something else of a similar nature. 
There you have the class roots of the Shakhty affair. 
Why was armed intervention by international capital 
possible in our country? Because there were in our 
country whole groups of military experts, generals and 
officers, scions of the bourgeoisie and the landlords, 
who were always ready to undermine the foundations 
of the Soviet regime. Could these officers and generals 
have organised a serious war against the Soviet regime 
if they had not received financial, military and every 
other kind of assistance from international capital? Of 
course not. Could international capital have organised 
serious intervention without the assistance of this group 
of whiteguard officers and generals? I do not think so. 
There were comrades among us at that time who 
thought that the armed intervention was something accidental, 
that if we had not released Krasnov, Mamontov 
and the rest from prison, there would have been no 
intervention. That, of course, is untrue. That the release 
of Mamontov, Krasnov and the other whiteguard generals 
did play a part in the development of civil war is 
beyond doubt. But that the roots of the armed intervention 
lay not in this, but in the class contradictions between 
the Soviet regime on the one hand, and interna

WORK OF APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. 61 
tional capital and its lackey generals in Russia on the 
other, is also beyond doubt. 
Could certain bourgeois experts, former mine owners, 
have organised the Shakhty affair here without the 
financial and moral support of international capital, 
without the prospect of international capital helping them 
to overthrow the Soviet regime? Of course not. Could 
international capital have organised in our country economic 
intervention, such as the Shakhty affair, if there 
had not been in our country a bourgeoisie, including a 
certain group of bourgeois experts who were ready to 
go to all lengths to destroy the Soviet regime? Obviously 
not. Do there exist at all such groups of bourgeois experts 
in our country as are ready to go to the length of 
economic intervention, of undermining the Soviet regime? 
I think there do. I do not think that there can be many 
of them. But that there do exist in our country certain 
insignificant groups of counter-revolutionary bourgeois 
experts‹far fewer than at the time of the armed intervention‹
is beyond doubt. 
It is the combination of these two forces that creates 
the soil for economic intervention in the U.S.S.R. 
And it is precisely this that constitutes the class 
background of the Shakhty affair. 
Now about the practical conclusions to be drawn from 
the Shakhty affair. 
I should like to dwell upon four practical conclusions 
indicated by the Shakhty affair. 
Lenin used to say that selection of personnel is one 
of the cardinal problems in the building of socialism. 
The Shakhty affair shows that we selected our economic 
cadres badly, and not only selected them badly, but

J. V. S T A L I N 62 
placed them in conditions which hampered their development. 
Reference is made to Order 33, and especially 
to the ³Model Regulations² accompanying the order.14 It 
is a characteristic feature of these model regulations that 
they confer practically all the rights on the technical 
director, leaving to the general director the right to 
settle conflicts, to ³represent,² in short, to twiddle his 
thumbs. It is obvious that under such circumstances 
our economic cadres could not develop as they should. 
There was a time when this order was absolutely necessary, 
because when it was issued we had no economic 
cadres of our own, we did not know how to manage 
industry, and had willy-nilly to assign the major rights 
to the technical director. But now this order has become 
a fetter. Now we have our own economic cadres 
with experience and capable of developing into real 
leaders of our industry. And for this very reason the 
time has come to abolish the obsolete model regulations 
and to replace them by new ones. 
It is said that it is impossible for Communists, and 
especially communist business executives who come 
from the working class, to master chemical formulas or 
technical knowledge in general. That is not true, comrades. 
There are no fortresses that the working people, the 
Bolsheviks, cannot capture. (Applause.) We captured 
tougher fortresses than these in the course of our struggle 
against the bourgeoisie. Everything depends on the 
desire to master technical knowledge and on arming ourselves 
with persistence and Bolshevik patience. But in order 
to alter the conditions of work of our economic cadres 
and to help them to become real and full-fledged masters 
of their job, we must abolish the old model regula

WORK OF APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. 63 
tions and replace them by new ones. Otherwise, we 
run the risk of maiming our personnel. 
Were some of our business executives who have now 
deteriorated worse than any of us? Why is it that they, 
and other comrades like them, began to deteriorate and 
degenerate and come to identify themselves in their way 
of living with the bourgeois experts? It is due to our 
wrong way of doing things in the business field; it is 
due to our business executives being selected and having 
to work in conditions which hinder their development, 
which convert them into appendages of the bourgeois 
experts. This way of doing things must be discarded, 
comrades. 
The second conclusion indicated to us by the Shakhty 
affair is that our cadres are being taught badly in our 
technical colleges, that our Red experts are not being 
trained properly. That is a conclusion from which there 
is no escaping. Why is it, for example, that many of 
our young experts do not get down to the job, and have 
turned out to be unsuitable for work in industry? Because 
they learned from books, they are book-taught experts, 
they have no practical experience, are divorced from 
production, and, naturally, prove a failure. But is it 
really such experts we need? No, it is not such experts 
we need, be they young experts three times over. We 
need experts‹whether Communists or non-Communists 
makes no difference‹who are strong not only in theory 
but also in practical experience, in their connection with 
production. 
A young expert who has never seen a mine and does 
not want to go down a mine, a young expert who has never 
seen a factory and does not want to soil his hands in

J. V. S T A L I N 64 
a factory, will never get the upper hand over the old 
experts, who have been steeled by practical experience 
but are hostile to our cause. It is easy to understand, 
therefore, why such young experts are given an unfriendly 
reception not only by the old experts, and not 
only by our business executives, but often even by the 
workers. But if we are not to have such surprises with 
our young experts, the method of training them must 
be changed, and changed in such a way that already in 
their first years of training in the technical colleges they 
have continuous contact with production, with factory, 
mine and so forth. 
The third conclusion concerns the question of enlisting 
the broad mass of the workers in the management 
of industry. What is the position in this respect, as revealed 
by the Shakhty evidence? Very bad. Shockingly 
bad, comrades. It has been revealed that the labour laws 
are violated, that the six-hour working day in underground 
work is not always observed, that safety regulations 
are ignored. Yet the workers tolerate it. And the 
trade unions say nothing. And the Party organisations 
take no steps to put a stop to this scandal. 
A comrade who recently visited the Donbas went 
down the pits and questioned the miners about their 
conditions of work. It is a remarkable thing that not 
one of the miners thought it necessary to complain of the 
conditions. ³How is life with you, comrades?² this comrade 
asked them. ³All right, comrade, we are living not 
so badly,² the miners replied. ³I am going to Moscow, 
what should I tell the centre?² he asked. ³Say that we 
are living not so badly,² was their answer. ³Listen, comrades, 
I am not a foreigner, I am a Russian, and I have

WORK OF APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. 65 
come here to learn the truth from you,² the comrade 
said. ³That¹s all one to us, comrade, we tell nothing but 
the truth whether to foreigners or to our own people,² 
the miners replied. 
That¹s the stuff our miners are made of. They are 
not just workers, they are heroes. There you have that 
wealth of moral capital we have succeeded in amassing 
in the hearts of the workers. And only to think that we 
are squandering this invaluable moral capital so iniquitously 
and criminally, like profligate and dissolute heirs 
to the magnificent legacy of the October Revolution! 
But, comrades, we cannot carry on for long on the old 
moral capital if we squander it so recklessly. It is time 
to stop doing that. High time! 
Finally, the fourth conclusion concerns checking 
fulfilment. The Shakhty affair has shown that as far 
as checking fulfilment is concerned, things could not 
be worse than they are in all spheres of administration‹
in the Party, in industry, in the trade unions. Resolutions 
are written, directives are sent out, but nobody 
wants to take the trouble to ask how matters stand with 
the carrying out of those resolutions and directives, 
whether they are really being carried out or are simply 
pigeon-holed. 
Ilyich used to say that one of the most serious questions 
in administering the country is the checking of fulfilment. 
Yet precisely here things could not possibly 
be worse. Leadership does not just mean writing resolutions 
and sending out directives. Leadership means checking 
fulfilment of directives, and not only their fulfilment, 
but the directives themselves‹whether they are 
right or wrong from the point of view of the actual

J. V. S T A L I N 66 
practical work. It would be absurd to think that all our directives 
are 100 per cent correct. That is never so, and 
cannot be so, comrades. Checking fulfilment consists precisely 
in our leading personnel testing in the crucible of 
practical experience not only the way our directives are 
being fulfilled, but the correctness of the directives themselves. 
Consequently, faults in this field signify that 
there are faults in all our work of leadership. 
Take, for example, the checking of fulfilment in the 
purely Party sphere. It is our custom to invite secretaries 
of okrug and gubernia committees to make reports 
to the Central Committee, in order to check how the 
C.C.¹s directives are being carried out. The secretaries 
report, they confess to shortcomings in their work. The 
C.C. takes them to task and passes stereotyped resolutions 
instructing them to give greater depth and breadth 
to their work, to lay stress on this or that, to pay serious 
attention to this or that, etc. The secretaries go back 
with those resolutions. Then we invite them again, and 
the same thing is repeated about giving greater depth 
and breadth to the work and so on and so forth. I do not 
say that all this work is entirely without value. No, 
comrades, it has its good sides in educating and bracing 
up our organisations. But it must be admitted that this 
method of checking fulfilment is no longer sufficient. 
It must be admitted that this method has to be supplemented 
by another, namely, the method of assigning 
members of our top Party and Soviet leadership to work 
in the localities. (A voice: ³A good idea!²) What I 
have in mind is the sending of leading comrades to the 
localities for temporary work, not as commanders, but 
as ordinary functionaries placed at the disposal of the

WORK OF APRIL JOINT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. 67 
local organisations. I think that this idea has a big future 
and may improve the work of checking fulfilment, 
if it is carried out honestly and conscientiously. 
If members of the Central Committee, members of 
the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, People¹s 
Commissars and their deputies, members of the 
Presidium of the A.U.C.C.T.U., and members of presidiums 
of trade-union central committees were to go regularly 
to the localities and work there, in order to get 
an idea of how things are being done, to study all the difficulties, 
all the good sides and bad sides, then I can assure 
you that this would be the most valuable and effective 
way of checking fulfilment. It would be the best 
way of enriching the experience of our highly respected 
leaders. And if this were to become a regular practice‹ 
and it certainly must become a regular practice‹I can 
assure you that the laws which we write here and the 
directives which we elaborate would be far more effective 
and to the point than is the case now. 
So much, comrades, for the Shakhty affair. 
IV 
GENERAL CONCLUSION 
We have internal enemies. We have external enemies. 
This, comrades, must not be forgotten for a single moment. 
We had a procurement crisis, which has already 
been liquidated. The procurement crisis marked the first 
serious attack on the Soviet regime launched by the 
capitalist elements of the countryside under NEP conditions.

J. V. S T A L I N 68 
We have the Shakhty affair, which is already being 
liquidated and undoubtedly will be liquidated. The 
Shakhty affair marks another serious attack on the Soviet 
regime launched by international capital and its 
agents in our country. It is economic intervention in 
our internal affairs. 
It need scarcely be said that these and similar attacks, 
both internal and external, may be repeated and 
in all likelihood will be repeated. Our task is to exercise 
the maximum vigilance and to be on the alert. And, 
comrades, if we are vigilant, we shall most certainly defeat 
our enemies in the future, just as we are defeating 
them now and have defeated them in the past. (Stormy 
and prolonged applause.) 
Pravda, No. 90, 
April 18, 1929

GREETINGS TO THE WORKERS 
OF KOSTROMA 
Fraternal greetings to the workers of Kostroma on 
this First of May, the occasion of the unveiling in Kostroma 
of a monument to Lenin, the founder of our Party! 
Long live the workers of Kostroma! 
Long live May Day! 
May the memory of Lenin live eternally in the 
hearts of the working class! 
J. Stalin 
April 30, 1928 
The newspaper Severnaya Pravda (Kostroma) 
No. 102, May 4, 1928

SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE EIGHTH 
CONGRESS OF THE ALL-UNION LENINIST 
YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE15 
May 16, 1928 
Comrades, it is the accepted thing at congresses 
to speak of achievements. That we have achievements 
is beyond question. They, these achievements, are, of 
course, not inconsiderable, and there is no reason to hide 
them. But, comrades, it has become a practice with us 
lately to talk so much of achievements, and sometimes 
so affectedly, that one loses all desire to speak of 
them once again. Allow me, therefore, to depart from 
the general practice and to say a few words not about 
our achievements, but about our weaknesses and our 
tasks in connection with these weaknesses. 
I am referring, comrades, to the tasks involved by the 
questions of our internal work of construction. 
These tasks relate to three questions: that of the 
line of our political work, that of stimulating the activity 
of the broad mass of the people in general and of 
the working class in particular, and of stimulating the 
struggle against bureaucracy, and, lastly, that of training 
new personnel for our work of economic construction.

SPEECH AT THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF THE A.U.L.Y.C.L. 71 
I 
STRENGTHEN THE READINESS FOR ACTION 
OF THE WORKING CLASS 
Let us begin with the first question. The characteristic 
feature of the period we are now passing through 
is that for five years already we have been building in 
conditions of peaceful development. When I say peaceful 
development, I am referring not only to the absence 
of war with external enemies, but also to the absence of 
the elements of civil war at home. That is what we mean 
by conditions of the peaceful development of our work 
of construction. 
You know that in order to win these conditions of 
peaceful development, we had to fight the capitalists 
of the whole world for three years. You know that we 
did win those conditions, and we consider that one of 
our greatest achievements. But, comrades, every gain, 
and this gain is no exception, has its obverse side. The 
conditions of peaceful development have not been without 
their effect on us. They have laid their imprint on 
our work, on our executive personnel, on their mentality. 
During these five years we have been advancing 
smoothly, as though on rails. And the effect of this 
has been to induce the belief in some of our executives 
that everything is going swimmingly, that we are 
as good as travelling on an express train, and that we 
are being carried on the rails non-stop straight to socialism. 
From this has sprung the theory of things going 
³of their own accord,² the theory of ³muddling through,² 
the theory that ³everything will come out right,²

J. V. S T A L I N 72 
that there are no classes in our country, that our 
enemies have calmed down, and that everything will go 
according to the book. Hence a certain tendency to 
inertia, to somnolence. Well, it is this mentality of 
somnolence, this mentality of relying on the work going 
right ³of its own accord² that constitutes the obverse 
side of the period of peaceful development. 
Why are such states of mind so dangerous? Because 
they throw dust into the eyes of the working class, prevent 
it from seeing its enemies, lull it with boastful 
talk about the weakness of our enemies, undermine its 
readiness for action. 
We must not allow ourselves to be reassured by the 
fact that we have a million members in our Party, two 
million in the Young Communist League and ten million 
in the trade unions, and believe that this is all that 
is required for complete victory over our enemies. 
That is not true, comrades. History tells us that some 
of the biggest armies perished because they grew conceited, 
had too much faith in their own strength, paid 
too little heed to the strength of their enemies, gave 
themselves over to somnolence, lost their readiness 
for action, and at a critical moment were caught unawares. 
The biggest party may be caught unawares, the biggest 
party may perish, if it does not learn the lessons 
of history and does not work day in and day out to forge 
the readiness for action of its class. To be caught unaware 
is a most dangerous thing, comrades. To be caught unawares 
is to fall prey to ³surprises,² to panic in face 
of the enemy. And panic leads to break-down, to defeat, 
to destruction.

SPEECH AT THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF THE A.U.L.Y.C.L. 73 
I could give you many examples from the history 
of our armies during the civil war, examples of small 
detachments routing big military formations when the 
latter were lacking in readiness for action. I could tell you 
how in 1920 three cavalry divisions, with a total of not 
less than 5,000 cavalrymen, were routed and put to disorderly 
flight by a single infantry battalion just because 
they, the cavalry divisions, were caught unawares and 
succumbed to panic in face of an enemy about whom they 
knew nothing, and who was extremely weak numerically 
and could have been shattered at one blow if these divisions 
had not been in a state of somnolence, and then 
of panic and confusion. 
The same must be said of our Party, our Young Communist 
League, our trade unions, our forces in general. 
It is not true that we no longer have class enemies, that 
they have been smashed and eliminated. No, comrades, 
our class enemies still exist. They not only exist, they 
are growing and trying to take action against the Soviet 
Government. 
That was shown by our procurement difficulties last 
winter, when the capitalist elements in the countryside 
tried to sabotage the policy of the Soviet Government. 
It was shown by the Shakhty affair, which was the 
expression of a joint attack on the Soviet regime launched 
by international capital and the bourgeoisie in our 
country. 
It is shown by numerous facts in the sphere of home 
and foreign policy, facts which are known to you and 
which there is no need to dwell on here. 
To keep silent about these enemies of the working 
class would he wrong. To underrate the strength of the

J. V. S T A L I N 74 
class enemies of the working class would be criminal. 
To keep silent about all this would be particularly wrong 
now, in the period of our peaceful development, when 
there is a certain favourable soil for the theory of somnolence 
and of things going ³of their own accord,² 
which undermines the readiness for action of the working 
class. 
The procurement crisis and the Shakhty affair were 
of tremendous educational value, because they shook 
up all our organisations, discredited the theory of things 
going ³of their own accord,² and once more stressed the 
existence of class enemies, showing that they are alive, 
are not dozing, and that in order to combat them we must 
enhance the strength of the working class, its vigilance, 
its revolutionary spirit, its readiness for action. 
From this follows the immediate task of the Party, 
the political line of its day-to-day work: to enhance 
the readiness of the working class for action against its 
class enemies. 
It must be said that this Y.C.L. congress, and especially 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, have now come closer 
than ever before to this task. You know that the importance 
of this task is being stressed by speakers here and 
by articles in Komsomolskaya Pravda. That is very good, 
comrades. It is necessary only that this task should 
not be regarded as a temporary and transient one, for 
the task of enhancing the readiness of the proletariat 
for action is one that must imbue all our work so long 
as there are classes in our country and so long as capitalist 
encirclement exists.

SPEECH AT THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF THE A.U.L.Y.C.L. 75 
II 
ORGANISE MASS CRITICISM 
FROM BELOW 
The second question concerns the task of combating 
bureaucracy, of organising mass criticism of our shortcomings, 
of organising mass control from below. 
Bureaucracy is one of the worst enemies of our progress. 
It exists in all our organisations‹Party, Y.C.L., 
trade-union and economic. When people talk of bureaucrats, 
they usually point to the old non-Party officials, 
who as a rule are depicted in our cartoons as men wearing 
spectacles. (Laughter.) That is not quite true, comrades. 
If it were only a question of the old bureaucrats, the 
fight against bureaucracy would be very easy. The 
trouble is that it is not a matter of the old bureaucrats. 
It is a matter of the new bureaucrats, bureaucrats who 
sympathise with the Soviet Government, and finally, 
communist bureaucrats. The communist bureaucrat is 
the most dangerous type of bureaucrat. Why? Because 
he masks his bureaucracy with the title of Party member. 
And, unfortunately, we have quite a number of such 
communist bureaucrats. 
Take our Party organisations. You have no doubt 
read about the Smolensk affair, the Artyomovsk affair 
and so on. What do you think, were they matters of 
chance? What is the explanation of these shameful 
instances of corruption and moral deterioration in 
certain of our Party organisations? The fact that Party 
monopoly was carried to absurd lengths, that the voice 
of the rank and file was stifled, that inner-Party democracy 
was abolished and bureaucracy became rife. How is

J. V. S T A L I N 76 
this evil to be combated? I think that there is not and 
cannot be any other way of combating this evil than 
by organising control from below by the Party masses, 
by implanting inner-Party democracy. What objection 
can there be to rousing the fury of the mass of the Party 
membership against these corrupt elements and giving 
it the opportunity to send such elements packing? 
There can hardly be any objection to that. 
Or take the Young Communist League, for instance. 
You will not deny, of course, that here and there in the 
Young Communist League there are utterly corrupt elements 
against whom it is absolutely essential to wage a 
ruthless struggle. But let us leave aside the corrupt 
elements. Let us take the latest fact of an unprincipled 
struggle waged by groups within the Young Communist 
League around personalities, a struggle which is poisoning 
the atmosphere in the Young Communist League. 
Why is it that you can find as many ³Kosarevites² and 
³Sobolevites² as you like in the Young Communist League, 
while Marxists have to be looked for with a candle? 
(Applause.) What does this indicate, if not that a process 
of bureaucratic petrification is taking place in certain 
sections of the Y.C.L. top leadership? 
And the trade unions? Who will deny that in the 
trade unions there is bureaucracy in plenty? We have 
production conferences in the factories. We have temporary 
control commissions in the trade unions. It is the task 
of these organisations to rouse the masses, to bring our 
shortcomings to light and to indicate ways and means 
of improving our constructive work. Why are these organisations 
not developing? Why are they not seething 
with activity? Is it not obvious that it is bureaucracy in

SPEECH AT THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF THE A.U.L.Y.C.L. 77 
the trade unions, coupled with bureaucracy in the Party 
organisations, that is preventing these highly important 
organisations of the working class from developing? 
Lastly, our economic organisations. Who will deny 
that our economic bodies suffer from bureaucracy? 
Take the Shakhty affair as an illustration. Does not the 
Shakhty affair indicate that our economic bodies are 
not speeding ahead, but crawling, dragging their feet? 
How are we to put an end to bureaucracy in all these 
organisations? 
There is only one sole way of doing this, and that is 
to organise control from below, to organise criticism 
of the bureaucracy in our institutions, of their shortcomings 
and their mistakes, by the vast masses of the 
working class. 
I know that by rousing the fury of the masses of the 
working people against the bureaucratic distortions in 
our organisations, we sometimes have to tread on the 
toes of some of our comrades who have past services to 
their credit, but who are now suffering from the disease 
of bureaucracy. But ought this to stop our work of organising 
control from below? I think that it ought not and 
must not. For their past services we should take off our 
hats to them, but for their present blunders and bureaucracy 
it would be quite in order to give them a good 
drubbing. (Laughter and applause.) How else? Why not 
do this if the interests of the work demand it? 
There is talk of criticism from above, criticism 
by the Workers¹ and Peasants¹ Inspection, by the Central 
Committee of our Party and so on. That, of course, 
is all very good. But it is still far from enough. More, 
it is by no means the chief thing now. The chief thing

J. V. S T A L I N 78 
now is to start a broad tide of criticism from below against 
bureaucracy in general, against shortcomings in our 
work in particular. Only by organising twofold pressure 
‹from above and from below‹and only by shifting the 
principal stress to criticism from below, can we count 
on waging a successful struggle against bureaucracy and 
on rooting it out. 
It would be a mistake to think that only the leaders 
possess experience in constructive work. That is 
not true, comrades. The vast masses of the workers 
who are engaged in building our industry are day by 
day accumulating vast experience in construction, experience 
which is not a whit less valuable to us than the 
experience of the leaders. Mass criticism from below, 
control from below, is needed by us in order that, among 
other things, this experience of the vast masses should 
not be wasted, but be reckoned with and translated into 
practice. 
From this follows the immediate task of the Party: 
to wage a ruthless struggle against bureaucracy, to organise 
mass criticism from below, and to take this criticism 
into account when adopting practical decisions for eliminating 
our shortcomings. 
It cannot be said that the Young Communist League, 
and especially Komsomolskaya Pravda, have not appreciated 
the importance of this task. The shortcoming here 
is that often the fulfilment of this task is not carried out 
completely. And in order to carry it out completely, 
it is necessary to give heed not only to criticism, but 
also to the results of criticism, to the improvements 
that are introduced as a result of criticism.

SPEECH AT THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF THE A.U.L.Y.C.L. 79 
III 
THE YOUTH MUST MASTER SCIENCE 
The third task concerns the question of organising 
new cadres for socialist construction. 
Before us, comrades, lies the gigantic task of reconstructing 
our entire national economy. In the sphere of agriculture, 
we must lay the foundation of large-scale, 
united, socially-conducted farming. You no doubt know 
from Comrade Molotov¹s manifesto16 published today that 
the Soviet Government is tackling the very formidable 
talk of uniting the small, scattered peasant farms 
into collective farms and creating new large state 
farms for grain production. Unless these tasks are 
accomplished, substantial and rapid progress will be impossible. 
Whereas in industry the Soviet regime rests upon the 
largest-scale and most highly concentrated form of production, 
in agriculture it rests upon the most scattered 
and small-scale peasant economy, which is of a semicommodity 
character and yields a far smaller surplus 
of marketable grain than the pre-war economy, despite 
the fact that the crop areas have reached pre-war levels. 
That is the basis for all sorts of difficulties that may 
arise in the sphere of grain procurements in future. In 
order to extricate ourselves from this situation, we must 
seriously set about organising large-scale socially-conducted 
production in agriculture. But in order to organise 
large-scale farming, we must have a knowledge of agricultural 
science. And knowledge entails study. Yet we 
have scandalously few people with a knowledge of 
agricultural science. Hence the task of training new,

J. V. S T A L I N 80 
young cadres of builders of a new, socially-conducted 
agriculture. 
In the sphere of industry the situation is much better. 
But, here, too, lack of new cadres of builders is retarding 
our progress. It suffices to recall the Shakhty 
affair to realise how acute the problem is of training new 
cadres of builders of socialist industry. Of course, we 
have old experts in the building of industry. But, firstly, 
there are very few of them, secondly, not all of them 
want to build a new industry, thirdly, many of them do 
not understand the new construction tasks, and, fourthly, 
a large proportion of them are already old and are 
going out of commission. In order to advance matters, 
we must train at a high speed new cadres of experts, 
drawn from the working class, the Communists and members 
of the Young Communist League. 
We have plenty of people who are willing to build 
and to direct the work of construction both in agriculture 
and in industry. But we have scandalously few people 
who know how to build and direct. On the contrary, 
our ignorance in this sphere is abysmal. More, there 
are people among us who are prepared to extol our lack 
of knowledge. If you are illiterate or cannot write grammatically 
and are proud of your backwardness‹you 
are a worker ³at the bench,² you deserve honour and respect. 
But if you have climbed out of your ignorance, 
have learned to read and write and have mastered science‹
you are an alien element who has ³broken away² 
from the masses, you have ceased to be a worker. 
I consider that we shall not advance a single step 
until we root out this barbarism and boorishness, 
this barbaric attitude towards science and men of cul

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
81 
ture. The working class cannot become the real master 
of the country if it does not succeed in overcoming its 
lack of culture, if it does not succeed in creating its own 
intelligentsia, if it does not master science and learn to 
administer economy on scientific lines. 
It must be realised, comrades, that the conditions 
of the struggle today are not what they were at the time 
of the civil war. At the time of the civil war it was possible 
to capture enemy positions by dash, courage, daring, 
by cavalry assaults. Today, in the conditions of peaceful 
economic construction, cavalry assaults can only do 
harm. Courage and daring are needed now as much as 
before. But courage and daring alone will not carry us 
very far. In order to beat the enemy now, we must know 
how to build industry, agriculture, transport, trade; we 
must abandon the haughty and supercilious attitude towards 
trade. 
In order to build, we must have knowledge, mastery 
of science. And knowledge entails study. We must study 
perseveringly and patiently. We must learn from everyone, 
both from our enemies and from our friends, 
especially from our enemies. We must clench our teeth 
and study, not fearing that our enemies may laugh at us, at 
our ignorance, at our backwardness. 
Before us stands a fortress. That fortress is called 
science, with its numerous branches of knowledge. We 
must capture that fortress at all costs. It is our youth 
who must capture that fortress, if they want to be builders 
of the new life, if they want to be real successors of 
the old guard. 
We cannot now confine ourselves to training 
communist cadres in general, Bolshevik cadres in general, 
SPEECH AT THE EIGHTH CONGRESS OF THE A.U.L.Y.C.L.

J. V. S T A L I N 82 
people who are able to prattle a little about everything. 
Dilettantism and the know-all attitude are now shackles 
on our feet. We now need Bolshevik experts in metallurgy, 
textiles, fuel, chemistry, agriculture, transport, 
trade, accountancy, and so on and so forth. We now need 
whole groups, hundreds and thousands of new Bolshevik 
cadres capable of becoming masters of their subject 
in the most diverse branches of knowledge. Failing this, 
it is useless to think of any swift rate of socialist construction 
in our country. Failing this, it is useless to think 
that we can overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist 
countries. 
We must master science, we must train new cadres of 
Bolshevik experts in all branches of knowledge, we must 
study, study and study most perseveringly. That is the 
task now. 
A mass campaign of the revolutionary youth for science 
‹that is what we need now, comrades. (Stormy applause. 
Cries of ³Hurrah!² and ³Bravo!² All rise.) 
Pravda, No. 113, 
May 17, 1928

TO KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 
On Its Tenth Anniversary 
Friendly greetings to Komsomolskaya Pravda, the 
militant organ of our worker and peasant youth! 
I wish it success on the difficult front of training 
the youth for an implacable struggle against the enemies 
of the working class, for the struggle for the complete 
victory of communism all over the world! 
Let Komsomolskaya Pravda be a signal bell that 
arouses the slumbering, heartens the weary, urges on the 
stragglers, scourges bureaucracy in our institutions, reveals 
shortcomings in our work, gives prominence to 
our achievements in construction, and thus facilitates the 
training of new people, of new builders of socialism, a 
new generation of young men and women capable of 
succeeding the old guard of Bolsheviks! 
The strength of our revolution lies in the fact that 
there is no division between our old and new generations 
of revolutionaries. We owe our victories to the fact that 
the old guard and the young guard march shoulder to 
shoulder, in a united front, in a single column, against 
our enemies, internal as well as external. 
The task is to preserve and fortify this unity. 
Let Komsomolskaya Pravda be an untiring advocate 
of the unity of the old and the young guard of Bolsheviks! 
J. Stalin 
May 26, 1928 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, No. 122, 
May 27, 1928

TO THE SVERDLOV UNIVERSITY 
On Its Tenth Anniversary 
The ten years¹ existence of the Sverdlov University17 
is a signal achievement of the Party on the front of the 
struggle for training new Leninist cadres. 
In these ten years the Sverdlov University has given 
the Party hundreds and thousands of young forces who 
are devoted to the cause of communism and have become 
successors to the old guard of Bolsheviks. 
In these ten years the university has fully justified 
its existence and shown that it is not for nothing that 
it bears the name of its founder, that foremost champion 
of communism, Y. M. Sverdlov. 
The task of the Sverdlov University is to train working-
class members of the Party to master the scientific 
method of Marx and Lenin and to apply it properly in 
the work of building socialism, and this task it has performed, 
is performing, and will continue to perform with 
honour. 
Congratulations to past and present Sverdlovians on 
the tenth anniversary of the Y. M. Sverdlov Communist 
University! 
Congratulations to the Sverdlovians of the anniversary 
graduation, the new detachment of builders of 
socialism! 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 122, 
May 27, 1928

ON THE GRAIN FRONT 
From a Talk to Students 
of the Institute of Red Professors, 
the Communist Academy and the Sverdlov University 
May 28, 1928 
Question: What should be considered as the basic 
cause of our difficulties in the matter of the grain 
supply? What is the way out of these difficulties? What, 
in connection with these difficulties, are the conclusions 
that must be drawn as regards the rate of development 
of our industry, particularly from the point of view of 
the relation between the light and heavy industries? 
Answer: At first sight it may appear that our grain 
difficulties are an accident, the result merely of faulty 
planning, the result merely of a number of mistakes 
committed in the sphere of economic co-ordination. 
But it may appear so only at first sight. Actually the 
causes of the difficulties lie much deeper. That faulty 
planning and mistakes in economic co-ordination have 
played a considerable part‹of that there cannot be 
any doubt. But to attribute everything to faulty planning 
and chance mistakes would be a gross error. It 
would be an error to belittle the role and importance 
of planning. But it would be a still greater error to exaggerate 
the part played by the planning principle, in the 
belief that we have already reached a stage of development 
when it is possible to plan and regulate everything. 
It must not be forgotten that in addition to elements 
which lend themselves to our planning activities there

J. V. S T A L I N 86 
are also other elements in our national economy which 
do not as yet lend themselves to planning; and that, lastly, 
there are classes hostile to us which cannot be overcome 
simply by the planning of the State Planning 
Commission. 
That is why I think that we must not reduce everything 
to a mere accident, to mistakes in planning, etc. 
And so, what is the basis of our difficulties on the 
grain front? 
The basis of our grain difficulties lies in the fact that 
the increase in the production of marketable grain is not 
keeping pace with the increase in the demand for grain. 
Industry is growing. The number of workers is growing. 
Towns are growing. And, lastly, the areas producing 
industrial crops (cotton, flax, sugar beet, etc.) are growing, 
creating a demand for grain. All this leads to a rapid 
increase in the demand for grain‹grain available 
for the market. But the production of marketable grain 
is increasing at a disastrously slow rate. 
It cannot be said that the grain stocks at the disposal 
of the state have been smaller this year than last, or 
the year before. On the contrary, we have had far more 
grain in the hands of the state this year than in previous 
years. Nevertheless, we are faced with difficulties as 
regards the grain supply. 
Here are a few figures. In 1925-26 we managed to 
procure 434,000,000 poods of grain by April 1. Of this 
amount, 123,000,000 poods were exported. Thus, there 
remained in the country 311,000,000 poods of the grain 
procured. In 1926-27 we had procured 596,000,000 
poods of grain by April 1. Of this amount, 153,000,000 
poods were exported. There remained in the country

ON THE GRAIN FRONT 87 
443,000,000 poods. In 1927-28 we had procured 576,000,000 
poods of grain by April 1. Of this amount, 27,000,000 
poods were exported. There remained in the country 
549,000,000 poods. 
In other words, this year, by April 1, the grain supplies 
available to meet the requirements of the country 
amounted to 100,000,000 poods more than last year, 
and 230,000,000 poods more than the year before last. 
Nevertheless, we are experiencing difficulties on the 
grain front this year. 
I have already said in one of my reports that the 
capitalist elements in the countryside, and primarily 
the kulaks, took advantage of these difficulties in order 
to disrupt Soviet economic policy. You know that the 
Soviet government adopted a number of measures aimed 
at putting a stop to the anti-Soviet action of the kulaks. 
I shall not therefore dwell on this matter here. In the 
present case it is another question that interests me. 
I have in mind the reasons for the slow increase in the 
production of marketable grain, the question why the 
increase in the production of marketable grain in our 
country is slower than the increase in the demand for 
grain, in spite of the fact that our crop area and the 
gross production of grain have already reached the prewar 
level. 
Indeed, is i t not a fact that our grain crop area 
has already reached the pre-war mark? Yes, it is a fact. 
Is it not a fact that already last year the gross production 
of grain was equal to the pre-war output, i.e., 
5,000 million poods? Yes, it is a fact. How, then, is 
it to be explained that, in spite of these circumstances, 
the amount of marketable grain we are producing is

J. V. S T A L I N 88 
only one half, and the amount we are exporting is 
only about one-twentieth, of the pre-war figure? 
The reason is primarily and chiefly the change in 
the structure of our agriculture brought about by the 
October Revolution, the passing from large-scale landlord 
and large-scale kulak farming, which provided the 
largest amount of marketable grain, to small- and middle-
peasant farming, which provides the smallest amount 
of marketable grain. The mere fact that before the war 
there were 15,000,000 to 16,000,000 individual peasant 
farms, whereas at present there are 24,000,000 to 
25,000,000 peasant farms, shows that now the basis of 
our agriculture is essentially small-peasant farming, 
which provides the least amount of marketable grain. 
The strength of large-scale farming, irrespective of 
whether it is landlord, kulak or collective farming, 
lies in the fact that large farms are able to employ machines, 
scientific methods, fertilizers, to increase the 
productivity of labour, and thus to produce the maximum 
quantity of marketable grain. On the other hand, 
the weakness of small-peasant farming lies in the fact 
that it lacks, or almost lacks, these opportunities, and 
as a result it is semi-consuming farming, yielding little 
marketable grain. 
Take, for instance, the collective farms and the state 
farms. They market 47.2 per cent of their gross output 
of grain. In other words, they yield relatively more 
marketable grain than did landlord farming in prewar 
days. But what about the small- and middle-peasant 
farms? They market only 11.2 per cent of their total 
output of grain. The difference, as you see, is quite 
striking.

ON THE GRAIN FRONT 89 
Here are a few figures illustrating the structure 
of grain production in the past, in the pre-war period, 
and at present, in the post-October period. These figures 
were supplied by Comrade Nemchinov, a member 
of the Collegium of the Central Statistical Board. It is 
not claimed that these figures are exact, as Comrade 
Nemchinov explains in his memorandum; they permit 
of only approximate calculations. But they are quite 
adequate to enable us to understand the difference 
between the pre-war period and the post-October period 
as regards the structure of grain production in general, 
and the production of marketable grain in particular. 
Marketable Grain 
Gross Grain (i. e., not con- 
Production sumed in the 
countryside) 
Percentage 
Millions Per Millions Per of marketof 
poods cent of poods cent able grain 
Pre-war 
1. Landlords . . . . 600 12.0 281.6 21.6 47.0 
2. Ku l aks . . . . . 1,900 38.0 650.0 50.0 34.0 
3. Middle and poor 
peasants . . . . . 2,500 50.0 369.0 28.4 14.7 
Total . . . 5,000 100.0 1,300.6 100.0 26.0 
Post-war 
(1926-27) 
1. State farms and 
collective farms . 80.0 1.7 37.8 6.0 47.2 
2. Ku laks . . . . . 617.0 13.0 126.0 20.0 20.0 
3. Middle and poor 
peasants . . . . . 4,052.0 85.3 466.2 74.0 11.2 
Total . . . 4,749.0 100.0 630.0 100.0 13.3

J. V. S T A L I N 90 
What does this table show? 
It shows, firstly, that the production of the overwhelming 
proportion of grain products has passed from 
the landlords and kulaks to the small and middle peasants. 
This means that the small and middle peasants, having 
completely emancipated themselves from the yoke of the 
landlords, and having, in the main, broken the strength 
of the kulaks, have thereby been enabled considerably 
to improve their material conditions. That is the 
result of the October Revolution. Here we see the effect, 
primarily, of the decisive gain which accrued to the 
main mass of the peasantry as a result of the October 
Revolution. 
It shows, secondly, that in our country the principal 
holders of marketable grain are the small and, primarily, 
the middle peasants. This means that not only 
as regards gross production of grain, but also as regards 
the production of marketable grain, the U.S.S.R. has 
become, as a result of the October Revolution, a land 
of small-peasant farming, and the middle peasant has 
become the ³central figure² in agriculture. 
I t shows, thirdly, that the abolition of landlord 
(large-scale) farming, the reduction of kulak (largescale) 
farming to less than one-third, and the passing 
to small-peasant farming with only 11 per cent of its 
output marketed, in the absence, in the sphere of grain 
production, of any more or less developed large-scale 
socially-conducted farming (collective farms and state 
farms), were bound to lead, and in fact have led, to a 
sharp reduction in the production of marketable grain as 
compared with pre-war times. It is a fact that the amount 
of marketable grain in our country is now half what

ON THE GRAIN FRONT 91 
it was before the war, although the gross output of 
grain has reached the pre-war level. 
That is the basis of our difficulties on the grain 
front. 
That is why our difficulties in the sphere of grain 
procurements must not be regarded as a mere accident. 
No doubt the situation has been aggravated to some 
extent by the fact that our trading organisations took 
upon themselves the unnecessary task of supplying grain 
to a number of small and middle-sized towns, and this 
was bound to reduce to a certain extent the state¹s 
grain reserves. But there are no grounds whatever for 
doubting that the basis of our difficulties on the grain 
front lies not in this particular circumstance, but in 
the slow development of the output of our agriculture 
for the market, accompanied by a rapid increase in 
the demand for marketable grain. 
What is the way out of this situation? 
Some people see the way out of this situation in a 
return to kulak farming, in the development and extension 
of kulak farming. These people dare not speak of 
a return to landlord farming, for they realise, evidently, 
that such talk is dangerous in our times. All the 
more eagerly, however, do they speak of the necessity 
of the utmost development of kulak farming in the interests 
of‹the Soviet regime. These people think that 
the Soviet regime can rely simultaneously on two opposite 
classes‹the class of the kulaks, whose economic 
principle is the exploitation of the working class, and 
the class of the workers, whose economic principle is 
the abolition of all exploitation. A trick worthy of 
reactionaries.

J. V. S T A L I N 92 
There is no need to prove that these reactionary 
³plans² have nothing in common with the interests of 
the working class, with the principles of Marxism, with 
the tasks of Leninism. Talk about the kulak being ³no 
worse² than the urban capitalist, about the kulak being 
no more dangerous than the urban Nepman, and 
therefore, about there being no reason to ³fear² the 
kulaks now‹such talk is sheer liberal chatter which lulls 
the vigilance of the working class and of the main mass 
of the peasantry. It must not be forgotten that in industry 
we can oppose to the small urban capitalist our 
large-scale socialist industry, which produces ninetenths 
of the total output of manufactured goods, 
whereas in the countryside we can oppose to largescale 
kulak farming only the still weak collective farms 
and state farms, which produce but one-eighth of the 
amount of grain produced by the kulak farms. To fail to 
understand the significance of large-scale kulak farming 
in the countryside, to fail to understand that the relative 
importance of the kulaks in the countryside is a hundred 
times greater than that of the small capitalists in 
urban industry, is to lose one¹s senses, to break with 
Leninism, to desert to the side of the enemies of the 
working class. 
What, then, is the way out of the situation? 
1) The way out lies, above all, in passing from 
small, backward and scattered peasant farms to united, 
large socially-conducted farms, equipped with machinery, 
armed with scientific knowledge and capable of producing 
the maximum amount of marketable grain. The way 
out lies in the transition from individual peasant farming 
to collective, socially-conducted economy in agriculture.

ON THE GRAIN FRONT 93 
Lenin called on the Party to organise collective farms 
from the very first days of the October Revolution. 
From that time onwards the propaganda of the idea of 
collective farming has not ceased in our Party. However, 
it is only recently that the call for the formation of 
collective farms has met with a mass response. This is 
to be explained primarily by the fact that the widespread 
development of a co-operative communal life 
in the countryside paved the way for a radical change 
in the attitude of the peasants in favour of collective 
farms, while the existence of a number of collective farms 
already harvesting from 150 to 200 poods per dessiatin, 
of which from 30 to 40 per cent represents a marketable 
surplus, is strongly attracting the poor peasants and 
the lower strata of the middle peasants towards the collective 
farms. 
Of no little importance in this connection is also 
the fact that only recently has it become possible for 
the state to lend substantial financial assistance to the 
collective-farm movement. We know that this year the 
state has granted twice the amount of money it did 
last year in aid of the collective farms (more than 
60,000,000 rubles). The Fifteenth Party Congress was 
absolutely right in stating that the conditions have 
already ripened for a mass collective-farm movement 
and that the stimulation of the collective-farm movement 
is one of the most important means of increasing the 
proportion of marketable grain in the country¹s grain 
production. 
According to the data of the Central Statistical 
Board, the gross production of grain by the collective 
farms in 1927 amounted to no less than 55,000,000 poods,

J. V. S T A L I N 94 
with an average marketable surplus of 30 per cent. The 
widespread movement at the beginning of this year 
for the formation of new collective farms and for 
the expansion of the old ones should considerably 
increase the grain output of the collective farms by the 
end of the year. The task is to maintain the present 
rate of development of the collective-farm movement, 
to enlarge the collective farms, to get rid of sham collective 
farms, replacing them by genuine ones, and to establish 
a system whereby the collective farms will deliver 
to the state and co-operative organisations the whole 
of their marketable grain under penalty of being deprived 
of state subsidies and credits. I think that, if these 
conditions are adhered to, within three or four years 
we shall be able to obtain from the collective farms as 
much as 100,000,000 poods of marketable grain. 
The collective-farm movement is sometimes contrasted 
with the co-operative movement, apparently on the 
assumption that collective farms are one thing, and 
co-operatives another. That, of course, is wrong. Some 
even go so far as to contrast collective farms with 
Lenin¹s co-operative plan. Needless to say, such contrasting 
has nothing in common with the truth. In actual 
fact, the collective farms are a form of co-operatives, the 
most striking form of producers¹ co-operatives. There 
are marketing co-operatives, there are supply co-operatives, 
and there are also producers¹ co-operatives. The 
collective farms are an inseparable and integral part 
of the co-operative movement in general, and of Lenin¹s 
co-operative plan in particular. To carry out Lenin¹s 
co-operative plan means to raise the peasantry from the 
level of marketing and supply co-operatives to the level

ON THE GRAIN FRONT 95 
of producers¹ co-operatives, of collective-farm co-operatives, 
so to speak. This, by the way, explains why our 
collective farms began to arise and develop only as a 
result of the development and consolidation of the marketing 
and supply co-operatives. 
2) The way out lies, secondly, in expanding and 
strengthening the old state farms, and in organising 
and developing new, large ones. According to the data 
of the Central Statistical Board, the gross production 
of grain in the existing state farms amounted in 1927 
to no less than 45,000,000 poods with a marketable surplus 
of 65 per cent. There is no doubt that, given a certain 
amount of state support, the state farms could considerably 
increase the production of grain. 
But the task does not end there. There is a decision 
of the Soviet government on the strength of which 
new large state farms (from 10,000 to 30,000 dessiatins 
each) are being organised in districts where there are 
no peasant holdings; and in five or six years these state 
farms should yield about 100,000,000 poods of marketable 
grain. The organisation of these state farms has already 
begun. The task is to put this decision of the Soviet 
government into effect at all costs. I think that, provided 
these tasks are fulfilled, within three or four years 
we shall be able to obtain from the old and new state 
farms about 80,000,000-100,000,000 poods of grain for 
the market. 
3) Finally, the way out lies in systematically increasing 
the yield of the individual small- and middlepeasant 
farms. We cannot and should not lend any support 
to the individual large kulak farms. But we can 
and should assist the individual small- and middle-peas

J. V. S T A L I N 96 
ant farms, helping them to increase their crop yields 
and drawing them into the channel of co-operative organisation. 
This is an old task; it was proclaimed with 
particular emphasis as early as 1921 when the tax in 
kind was substituted for the surplus-appropriation system. 
This task was reaffirmed by our Party at its Fourteenth18 
and Fifteenth Congresses. The importance of 
this task is now emphasised by the difficulties on the 
grain front. That is why this task must be fulfilled with 
the same persistence as the first two tasks will be, those 
concerning the collective farms and the state farms. 
All the data show that the yield of peasant farms 
can be increased by some 15 to 20 per cent in the course 
of a few years. At present no less than 5,000,000 wooden 
ploughs are in use in our country. Their replacement 
by modern ploughs alone would result in a very considerable 
increase in grain production in the country. This 
is apart from supplying the peasant farms with a certain 
minimum of fertilisers, selected seed, small machines, 
etc. The contract system, the system of signing contracts 
with whole villages for supplying them with seed, etc., 
on condition that in return they unfailingly deliver a 
certain quantity of grain products‹this system is the 
best method of raising the yield of peasant farms and of 
drawing the peasants into the co-operatives. I think that 
if we work persistently in this direction we can, within 
three or four years, obtain additionally from the small 
and middle individual peasant farms not less than 
100,000,000 poods of marketable grain. 
Thus, if all these tasks are fulfilled, the state can 
in three or four years¹ time have at its disposal 250,000,000 
to 300,000,000 additional poods of marketable grain‹

ON THE GRAIN FRONT 97 
a supply more or less sufficient to enable us to manoeuvre 
properly within the country as well as abroad. 
Such, in the main, are the measures which must 
be taken in order to solve the difficulties on the grain 
front. 
Our task at present is to combine these basic measures 
with current measures to improve planning in the 
sphere of supplying the countryside with goods, relieving 
our trading organisations of the duty of supplying 
grain to a number of small and middle-sized towns. 
Should not, in addition to these measures, a number 
of other measures be adopted‹measures, say, to reduce 
the rate of development of our industry, the growth 
of which is causing a considerable increase in the demand 
for grain, which at present is outstripping the 
increase in the production of marketable grain? No, 
not under any circumstances! To reduce the rate of development 
of industry would mean to weaken the working 
class; for every step forward in the development of 
industry, every new factory, every new works, is, as 
Lenin expressed it, ³a new stronghold² of the working 
class, one which strengthens the latter¹s position in the 
fight against the petty-bourgeois elemental forces, in the 
fight against the capitalist elements in our economy. On 
the contrary, we must maintain the present rate of development 
of industry: we must at the first opportunity 
speed it up in order to pour goods into the rural areas 
and obtain more grain from them, in order to supply 
agriculture, and primarily the collective farms and state 
farms, with machines, in order to industrialise agriculture 
and to increase the proportion of its output for the 
market.

J. V. S T A L I N 98 
Should we, perhaps, for the sake of greater ³caution,² 
retard the development of heavy industry so as 
to make light industry, which produces chiefly for the 
peasant market, the basis of our industry? Not under 
any circumstances! That would be suicidal; i t 
would undermine our whole industry, including light 
industry. It would mean abandoning the slogan of industrialising 
our country, it would mean transforming 
our country into an appendage of the world capitalist 
system of economy. 
In this respect we proceed from the well-known guiding 
principles which Lenin set forth at the Fourth 
Congress of the Comintern19 and which are absolutely 
binding for the whole of our Party. Here is what Lenin 
said on this subject at the Fourth Congress of the 
Comintern: 
³The salvation of Russia lies not only in a good harvest on 
the peasant farms‹that is not enough; and not only in the good 
condition of light industry, which provides the peasantry with 
consumer goods‹that, too, is not enough; we also need heavy 
industry.² 
Or again: 
³We are exercising economy in all things, even in schools. 
This must be so, because we know that unless we save heavy 
industry, unless we restore i t , we shall not be able to build 
up any industry; and without that we shall be doomed as an 
independent country² (Vol. XXVII, p. 349). 
These directives given by Lenin must never be forgotten. 
How will the measures proposed affect the alliance 
between the workers and the peasants? I think that these

ON THE GRAIN FRONT 99 
measures can only help to strengthen the alliance between 
the workers and the peasants. 
Indeed, if the collective farms and the state farms 
develop at increased speed; if, as a result of direct assistance 
given to the small and middle peasants, the 
yield of their farms increases and the co-operatives embrace 
wider and wider masses of the peasantry; if the 
state obtains the hundreds of millions of poods of additional 
marketable grain required for manoeuvring; if, 
as a result of these and similar measures, the kulaks 
are curbed and gradually overcome‹is it not clear that 
the contradictions between the working class and the 
peasantry within the alliance of the workers and peasants 
will thereby be smoothed out more and more; that the 
need for emergency measures in the procurement of grain 
will disappear; that wide masses of the peasantry will 
turn more and more to collective forms of farming, and 
that the fight to overcome the capitalist elements in 
the countryside will assume an increasingly mass and 
organised character? 
Is it not clear that the cause of the alliance between 
the workers and the peasants can only benefit by such 
measures? 
It must only be borne in mind that the alliance of the 
workers and peasants under the conditions of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat should not be viewed as an 
ordinary alliance. It is a special form of class alliance 
between the working class and the labouring masses of 
the peasantry, which sets itself the object: a) of strengthening 
the position of the working class; b) of ensuring 
the leading role of the working class within this alliance; 
c) of abolishing classes and class society. Any other

J. V. S T A L I N 100 
conception of the alliance of the workers and peasants 
is opportunism, Menshevism, S.-R.-ism‹anything you 
like, but not Marxism, not Leninism. 
How can the idea of the alliance of the workers and 
peasants be reconciled with Lenin¹s well-known thesis 
that the peasantry is ³the last capitalist class²? Is there 
not a contradiction here? The contradiction is only an 
apparent, a seeming one. Actually there is no contradiction 
here at all. In that same speech at the Third Congress 
of the Comintern20 in which Lenin characterised the peasantry 
as ³the last capitalist class,² he again and again 
substantiates the need for an alliance between the workers 
and the peasants, declaring that ³the supreme principle 
of the dictatorship is the maintenance of the alliance 
of the proletariat and the peasantry in order that the proletariat 
may retain its leading role and state power.² 
It is clear that Lenin, at any rate, saw no contradiction 
in this. 
How are we to understand Lenin¹s thesis that the 
peasantry is ³the last capitalist class²? Does it mean 
that the peasantry consists of capitalists? No, it 
does not. 
It means, firstly, that the individual peasantry is 
a special class, which bases its economy on the private 
ownership of the instruments and means of production 
and which, for that reason, differs from the class 
of proletarians, who base their economy on collective 
ownership of the instruments and means of production. 
It means, secondly, that the individual peasantry 
is a class which produces from its midst, engenders 
and nourishes, capitalists, kulaks and all kinds of exploiters 
in general.

ON THE GRAIN FRONT 101 
Is not this circumstance an insuperable obstacle 
to the organisation of an alliance of the workers and 
peasants? No, it is not. The alliance of the proletariat 
with the peasantry under the conditions of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat should not be regarded as an alliance 
with the whole of the peasantry. The alliance of 
the proletariat with the peasantry is an alliance of the 
working class with the labouring masses of the peasantry. 
Such an alliance cannot be effected without a struggle 
against the capitalist elements of the peasantry, against 
the kulaks. Such an alliance cannot be a stable one unless 
the poor peasants are organised as the bulwark of 
the working class in the countryside. That is why the 
alliance between the workers and the peasants under 
the present conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
can be effected only in accordance with Lenin¹s 
well-known slogan: Rely on the poor peasant, build 
a stable alliance with the middle peasant, never 
for a moment cease fighting against the kulaks. For 
only by applying this slogan can the main mass of the 
peasantry be drawn into the channel of socialist 
construction. 
You see, therefore, that the contradiction between 
Lenin¹s two formulas is only an imaginary, a seeming 
contradiction. Actually, there is no contradiction between 
them at all. 
Pravda, No. 127, 
June 2, 1928

LETTER TO THE MEMBERS 
OF THE PARTY AFFAIRS STUDY CIRCLE 
AT THE COMMUNIST ACADEMY 
Today I received Slepkov¹s theses on self-criticism. It 
appears that they were discussed in your circle. I have 
been told by members of the circle that these theses were 
circulated as a document that is intended not to criticise 
the line of the Central Committee, but to substantiate it. 
It would be wrong to deny that Party members have 
the right to criticise the line of the Central Committee. 
More, I am ready to grant that members of your study 
circle even have the right to put forward among themselves 
their own separate theses opposing the C.C.¹s 
position. Slepkov¹s theses, however, evidently do not 
aim at criticising the C.C.¹s line, or putting forward anything 
new in opposition to it, but at explaining and substantiating 
the position of the C.C. It is this, presumably, 
that explains why Slepkov¹s theses received certain 
currency in Moscow Party circles. 
Nevertheless, or, rather, for that very reason, I consider 
it my duty to declare that Slepkov¹s theses 
a) do not coincide with the C.C.¹s position on the 
slogan of self-criticism, and that 
b) they ³correct,² ³supplement² and, naturally, worsen 
it, to the advantage of the bureaucratic elements in 
our institutions and organisations. 
1) Incorrect, in the first place, is the line of Slepkov¹s 
theses. Slepkov¹s theses only superficially resem

LETTER TO MEMBERS OF PARTY AFFAIRS STUDY CIRCLE 103 
ble theses on the slogan of self-criticism. Actually, they 
are theses on the dangers of the slogan of self-criticism. 
There is no denying that every revolutionary slogan harbours 
certain possibilities of being distorted in practical 
use. Such possibilities also apply, of course, to the 
slogan of self-criticism. But to make these possibilities 
the central issue, the basis of theses on self-criticism, 
is to turn things upside down, to undermine the 
revolutionary significance of self-criticism, to assist the 
bureaucrats who are trying to evade self-criticism 
owing to the ³dangers² connected with it. I have no 
doubt that it will not be without a feeling of satisfaction 
that the bureaucratic elements in our Party and Soviet 
organisations will read Slepkov¹s theses. 
Has such a line anything in common with the C.C.¹s 
line on self-criticism, with the resolution of the April plenum 
of the C.C. and C.C.C. on the Shakhty affair, or with 
the C.C.¹s June appeal on the subject of self-criticism?21 
I think not. 
2) Incorrect, too, is the inner substance of Slepkov¹s 
theses. One of the most serious factors making self-criticism 
unavoidable, and at the same time one of the most 
important objects of self-criticism, is the bureaucracy of 
our organisations. 
Can we make any progress if we do not combat the 
bureaucracy of our Party and Soviet apparatus? 
No, we cannot! 
Can we organise control by the masses, stimulate the 
initiative and independent activity of the masses, draw 
the vast masses into the work of socialist construction, 
if we do not wage a determined struggle against bureaucracy 
in our organisations?

J. V. S T A L I N 104 
No, we cannot! 
Can we sap, weaken, discredit bureaucracy without 
giving effect to the slogan of self-criticism? 
No, we cannot! 
Is it possible, in theses dealing with the slogan of 
self-criticism, to evade discussing bureaucracy as a factor 
detrimental to our socialist construction and as one 
of the most important objects of self-criticism? 
Obviously, we cannot. 
How, then, is it to be explained that Slepkov contrived 
in his theses to say nothing about this burning 
question? How is it possible, in theses on self-criticism 
that are intended to substantiate the position of 
the C.C., to forget the most important task of self-criticism‹
that of combating bureaucracy? Yet i t i s a 
fact that in Slepkov¹s theses there is not a single word 
(literally not a single word!) about the bureaucracy of 
our organisations, about the bureaucratic elements in 
these organisations, about the bureaucratic perversions 
in the work of our Party and Soviet apparatus. 
Can this more than frivolous attitude towards the 
highly important question of combating bureaucracy be 
reconciled with the C.C.¹s position on the question of 
self-criticism, with such Party documents as the resolution 
of the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. on the 
Shakhty affair or the C.C.¹s June appeal on self-criticism? 
I think not. 
With communist greetings, 
J. Stalin 
June 8, 1928 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, No. 90, 
April 19, 1929

LENIN AND THE QUESTION 
OF THE ALLIANCE WITH THE MIDDLE 
PEASANT* 
Reply to Comrade S. 
Comrade S., 
It is not true that Lenin¹s slogan: ³To come to an 
agreement with the middle peasant, while never for a moment 
renouncing the fight against the kulak, and firmly 
relying solely on the poor peasant,² which he advanced 
in his well-known article on Pitirim Sorokin,22 is, as 
is alleged, a slogan of the ³period of the Poor Peasants¹ 
Committees,² a slogan of ³the end of the period of the 
so-called neutralisation of the middle peasantry.² That 
is absolutely untrue. 
The Poor Peasants¹ Committees were formed in June 
1918. By the end of October 1918, our forces in the 
countryside had already gained the upper hand over the 
kulaks, and the middle peasants had turned to the side 
of the Soviet power. It was on the basis of this turn that 
the decision of the Central Committee was taken to abolish 
the dual power of the Soviets and the Poor Peasants¹ 
Committees, to hold new elections to the volost 
and village Soviets, to merge the Poor Peasants¹ Committees 
with the newly-elected Soviets and, consequently, to 
dissolve the Poor Peasants¹ Committees. This decision was 
formally approved, as is well known, on November 9, 
* Slightly abridged.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 106 
1918, by the Sixth Congress of Soviets. I have in mind 
the decision of the Sixth Congress of Soviets of November 
9, 1918, on the village and volost Soviet elections 
and the merging of the Poor Peasants¹ Committees with 
the Soviets. 
But when did Lenin¹s article, ³The Valuable Admissions 
of Pitirim Sorokin,² appear, the article in which he proclaimed 
the slogan of agreement with the middle peasant 
in the place of the slogan of neutralising the middle peasant? 
It appeared on November 21, 1918, i.e., nearly 
two weeks after the decision of the Sixth Congress of Soviets. 
In this article Lenin plainly says that the policy 
of agreement with the middle peasant is dictated by the 
turn to our side made by the middle peasant. 
Here is what Lenin says: 
³Our task in the countryside is to destroy the landlord and 
smash the resistance of the exploiter and the kulak speculator. For 
this purpose we can rely firmly only on the semi-proletarians, 
the Œpoor peasants.¹ But the middle peasant is not our enemy. He 
vacillated, is vacillating and will continue to vacillate. The 
task of influencing the vacillators is not identical with the task 
of overthrowing the exploiter and defeating the active enemy. 
The task at the present moment i s to come to an agreement 
with the middle peasant, while never for a moment renouncing 
the fight against the kulak, and firmly relying solely on 
the poor peasant, for i t is precisely now that a turn in our 
direction on the part of the middle peasantry is inevitable,* owing 
to the causes above enumerated² (Vol. XXIII, p. 294). 
What follows from this? 
It follows from this that Lenin¹s slogan refers, not 
to the old period, not to the period of the Poor Peasants¹ 
Committees and the neutralisation of the middle peasant, 
* My italics.‹J. St.

LENIN AND THE ALLIANCE WITH THE MIDDLE PEASANT 107 
but to the new period, the period of agreement with the 
middle peasant. Thus, it reflects, not the end of the old 
period, but the beginning of a new period. 
But your assertion about Lenin¹s slogan is not only 
wrong from the formal point of view, not merely, so to 
speak, chronologically; it is wrong in substance. 
We know that Lenin¹s slogan regarding agreement with 
the middle peasant was proclaimed as a new slogan by 
the whole Party at the Eighth Party Congress (March 
1919). We know that the Eighth Party Congress was the 
congress which laid the foundation of our policy of a 
stable alliance with the middle peasant. It is known 
that our programme, the programme of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
was adopted also at the Eighth Congress of the Party. 
We know that that programme contains special points 
dealing with the Party¹s attitude towards the various 
groups in the countryside: the poor peasants, the middle 
peasants, and the kulaks. What do these points in the 
programme of the C.P.S.U.(B.) say regarding the social 
groups in the countryside and regarding our Party¹s attitude 
towards them? Listen: 
³In all its work in the countryside the R.C.P., as hitherto, 
relies on the proletarian and semi-proletarian strata of the rural population; 
first and foremost it organises these strata into an independent 
force by establishing Party units in the villages, forming organisations 
of poor peasants, a special type of trade unions of proletarians 
and semi-proletarians in the country side, and so forth, 
bringing them closer in every way to the urban proletariat and 
wresting them from the influence of the rural bourgeoisie and the 
small proprietor interests. 
³With respect to the kulaks, to the rural bourgeoisie, the 
policy of the R.C.P. is resolutely to combat their exploiting proclivities, 
to suppress their resistance to the Soviet policy.

J. V. S T A L I N 108
³Wi t h respect to the middle peasants, the policy of the 
R.C.P. is gradually and systematically to draw them into the 
work of socialist construction. The Party sets itself the task of 
separating them from the kulaks, of winning them to the side of 
the working class by carefully attending to their needs, of combating 
their backwardness by measures of ideological influence 
and not at all by measures of repression, and of striving in all 
cases where their vital interests are concerned to come to practical 
agreements with them, making concessions to them in determining 
the methods of carrying out socialist changes²* (Eighth 
Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), verbatim report, p. 35123). 
Try to find the slightest difference even in words between 
these points of the programme and Lenin¹s slogan! 
You will not find any difference, for there is none. More 
than that. There cannot be any doubt that Lenin¹s slogan 
not only does not contradict the decisions of the Eighth 
Congress on the middle peasant, but, on the contrary, 
is a most apt and exact formulation of these decisions. 
And it is a fact that the programme of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
was adopted in March 1919, at the Eighth Congress of the 
Party, which specially discussed the question of the 
middle peasant, while Lenin¹s article against Pitirim 
Sorokin, which proclaimed the slogan of agreement with 
the middle peasant, appeared in the press in November 
1918, four months before the Eighth Congress of the Party. 
Is it not clear that the Eighth Congress of the Party 
fully and entirely confirmed Lenin¹s slogan, proclaimed 
by him in his article against Pitirim Sorokin, as a slogan 
by which the Party must be guided in its work in the 
countryside during the whole of the present period of socialist 
construction? 
* All italics mine.‹J. St.

LENIN AND THE ALLIANCE WITH THE MIDDLE PEASANT 109 
What is the essential point of Lenin¹s slogan? 
The essential point of Lenin¹s slogan is that it embraces 
with remarkable precision the triune task of Party 
work in the countryside, expressed in a single condensed 
formula: a) rely on the poor peasant, b) establish agreement 
with the middle peasant, and c) never for a moment 
cease fighting against the kulaks. Try to take from this 
formula any one of its parts as a basis for work in the 
countryside at the present time and forget about the 
other parts, and you will inevitably find yourself in a 
blind alley. 
Is it possible in the present phase of socialist construction 
to reach a real and stable agreement with the 
middle peasant without relying on the poor peasant and 
without waging a fight against the kulak? 
It is not possible. 
Is it possible, under the present conditions of development, 
to wage a successful fight against the kulak 
without relying on the poor peasant and without 
reaching agreement with the middle peasant? 
It is not possible. 
How can this triune task of Party work in the countryside 
be most aptly expressed in one all-embracing 
slogan? I think that Lenin¹s slogan is the most apt expression 
of this task. It must be admitted that you cannot 
express it more aptly than Lenin. . . . 
Why is it necessary to emphasise the expediency of 
Lenin¹s slogan just now, precisely under the present conditions 
of work in the countryside? 
Because just now we see a tendency among certain 
comrades to break up this triune task of Party work 
in the countryside into parts and to sever these parts

J. V. S T A L I N 110 
from one another. This is fully borne out by the experience 
of our grain-procurement campaign in January 
and February of this year. 
Every Bolshevik knows that agreement must be 
reached with the middle peasant. But not everybody 
understands how this agreement is to be reached. Some 
think that agreement with the middle peasant can be 
brought about by abandoning the fight against the 
kulak, or by slackening this fight; because, they say, 
the fight against the kulak may frighten away a section 
of the middle peasantry, its well-to-do section. 
Others think that agreement with the middle peasant 
can be brought about by abandoning the work of 
organising the poor peasants, or by slackening this 
work; because, they say, the organisation of the poor 
peasants means singling out the poor peasants, and 
this may frighten the middle peasants away from us. 
The result of these deviations from the correct line 
is that such people forget the Marxist thesis that the 
middle peasantry is a vacillating class, that agreement 
with the middle peasants can be rendered stable only if 
a determined fight is carried on against the kulaks and 
if the work among the poor peasants is intensified; that 
unless these conditions are adhered to, the middle peasantry 
may swing to the side of the kulaks, as to a force. 
Remember what Lenin said at the Eighth Party 
Congress: 
³We have to determine our attitude to a class which has no 
definite and stable position.* The proletariat in its mass is in favour 
of socialism, the bourgeoisie in its mass is opposed to socialism; 
* My italics.‹J. St.

LENIN AND THE ALLIANCE WITH THE MIDDLE PEASANT 111 
to determine the relation between these two classes is easy. But 
when we pass to a stratum like the middle peasantry we find that 
it is a class that vacillates. The middle peasant is partly a property 
owner, partly a toiler. He does not exploit other representatives 
of the toilers. For decades he had to defend his position under 
the greatest difficulties; he suffered the exploitation of the landlords 
and the capitalists; he bore everything and yet at the same 
time he is a property owner. Our attitude to this vacillating class 
therefore presents enormous difficulties² (Eighth Congress of the 
R.C.P.(B.), verbatim report, p. 30024). 
But there are other deviations from the correct 
line, no less dangerous than those already mentioned. 
In some cases the fight against the kulak is indeed carried 
on, but it is carried on in such a clumsy and senseless 
manner that the blows fall on the middle and 
poor peasants. As a result, the kulak escapes unscathed, 
a rift is made in the alliance with the middle peasant, 
and a section of the poor peasants temporarily falls 
into the clutches of the kulak, who is fighting to undermine 
Soviet policy. 
In other cases attempts are made to transform the 
fight against the kulaks into dekulakisation, and the 
work of grain procurement into appropriation of surpluses, 
forgetting that under present conditions dekulakisation 
is folly and the surplus-appropriation system 
means not an alliance with, but a fight against, the 
middle peasant. 
What is the source of these deviations from the 
Party line? 
The source lies in failure to understand that the 
triple task of Party work in the countryside is a single 
and indivisible task; in failure to understand that the 
task of fighting the kulak cannot be separated from the

J. V. S T A L I N 112 
task of reaching agreement with the middle peasant, 
and that these two tasks cannot be separated from the 
task of converting the poor peasant into a bulwark of 
the Party in the countryside.* 
What must be done to ensure that these tasks are 
not separated from one another in the course of our 
current work in the countryside? 
We must, at least, issue a guiding slogan that will 
combine all these tasks in one general formula and, 
consequently, prevent these tasks from being separated 
from one another. 
Is there such a formula, such a slogan in our Party 
arsenal? 
Yes, there is. That formula is Lenin¹s slogan: ³To 
come to an agreement with the middle peasant, while 
* From this it follows that deviations from the correct line 
create a twofold danger to the alliance of the workers and peasants: 
a danger from the side of those who want, for instance, to 
transform the temporary emergency measures for grain procurement 
into a permanent or long-term policy of the Party; and 
a danger from the side of those who want to take advantage of 
the discontinuance of emergency measures in order to give the 
kulak a free hand, to proclaim complete freedom of trade, without 
any regulation of trade by state bodies. Hence, in order to ensure 
that the correct line is pursued the fight must be waged on two 
fronts. 
I take this opportunity to observe that our press does not 
always follow this rule and sometimes displays a certain onesidedness. 
In some cases, for instance, the press exposes those 
who want to transform the emergency measures for grain procurement 
which are of a temporary character, into a permanent 
line of our policy and who thus endanger the bond with the peasants. 
That is very good. But it is bad and wrong if at the same 
time our press fails to pay sufficient attention to and properly

LENIN AND THE ALLIANCE WITH THE MIDDLE PEASANT 113 
never for a moment renouncing the fight against the 
kulak, and firmly rely ing solely on the poor peasant.² 
That is why I think that this slogan is the most 
expedient and all-embracing slogan, that it must be 
brought to the forefront just now, precisely under the 
present conditions of our work in the countryside. 
You regard Lenin¹s slogan as an ³oppositionist² slogan 
and in your letter you ask: ³How is it that . . . this oppositionist 
slogan was printed in Pravda for May 1, 1928 . . . 
how can the fact be explained that this slogan appeared 
on the pages of Pravda, the organ of the Central Committee 
of the C.P.S.U.‹is this merely a technical oversight, 
or is it a compromise with the opposition on the question 
of the middle peasant?² 
expose those who endanger the bond from the other side, who 
succumb to the petty-bourgeois elemental forces, demand a slackening 
of the fight against the capitalist elements in the countryside 
and the establishment of complete freedom of trade, 
trade not regulated by the state, and thus undermine the bond with 
the peasants from the other end. That is bad. That is one-sidedness. 
It also happens that the press exposes those who, for instance, 
deny the possibility and expediency of improving the individual 
small- and middle-peasant farms, which at the present stage are 
the basis of agriculture. That is very good. But it is bad and wrong 
if at the same time the press does not expose those who belittle 
the importance of the collective farms and the state farms and 
who fail to see that the task of improving individual small- and 
middle-peasant farms must be supplemented in practice by the 
task of expanding the construction of collective and state farms. 
That is one-sidedness. 
In order to ensure that the correct line is pursued, the fight 
must be waged on two fronts, and all one-sidedness must be rejected.

J. V. S T A L I N 114 
That is very strongly put‹there¹s no denying! But 
³watch your step,² Comrade S.; otherwise you may, 
in your zeal, arrive at the conclusion that we must 
prohibit the printing of our programme, which fully 
confirms Lenin¹s slogan (this is a fact!), and which 
in the main was drawn up by Lenin (who was certainly 
not an oppositionist!), and which was adopted 
by the Eighth Congress of the Party (also not 
oppositionist!). Have more respect for the well-known 
points in our programme on the social groups in 
the countryside! Have more respect for the decisions 
of the Eighth Party Congress on the middle peasantry! 
. . . 
As for your phrase ³a compromise with the opposition 
on the question of the middle peasant,² I do not 
think it is worth refuting it; no doubt you wrote it 
in the heat of the moment. 
You seem to be disturbed by the fact that both 
Lenin¹s slogan and the Programme of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
adopted by the Eighth Congress of the Party speak of 
agreement with the middle peasant, whereas in his speech 
in opening the Eighth Congress Lenin spoke of a stable 
alliance with the middle peasant. Evidently, you 
think there is something in the nature of a contradiction 
in this. Perhaps you are even inclined to believe that 
the policy of agreement with the middle peasant is something 
in the nature of a departure from the policy of 
alliance with the middle peasant. That is wrong, Comrade 
S. That is a serious misconception. Only those who 
are able to read the letter of a slogan, but are unable to 
grasp i t s meaning, can think like that. Only those 
who are ignorant of the history of the slogan of alliance,

LENIN AND THE ALLIANCE WITH THE MIDDLE PEASANT 115 
of agreement with the middle peasant, can think like 
that. Only those can think like that who are capable 
of believing that Lenin, who in his opening speech at 
the Eighth Congress spoke about the policy of a 
³stable alliance² with the middle peasant, departed from 
his own position by saying in another speech at the same 
congress, and in the Party programme adopted by the 
Eighth Congress, that we now need a policy of ³agreement² 
with the middle peasant. 
What is the point then? The point is that both Lenin 
and the Party, in the shape of the Eighth Congress, make 
no distinction whatever between the concept ³agreement² 
and the concept ³alliance.² The point is that everywhere, 
in all his speeches at the Eighth Congress, Lenin places 
a sign of equality between the concept ³alliance² and 
the concept ³agreement.² The same must be said about 
the resolution of the Eighth Congress, ³The Attitude 
to the Middle Peasantry,² in which a sign of equality 
is placed between the concept ³agreement² and the 
concept ³alliance.² And since Lenin and the Party 
regard the policy of agreement with the middle peasant 
not as a casual and transient one, but as a long-term 
policy, they had, and have, every reason to call the 
policy of agreement with the middle peasant a policy 
of stable alliance with him and, conversely, to call 
the policy of stable alliance with the middle peasant 
a policy of agreement with him. One has only to read 
the verbatim report of the Eighth Congress of the Party 
and the resolution of that congress on the middle peasant 
to be convinced of this. 
Here is an excerpt from Lenin¹s speech at the Eighth 
Congress:

J. V. S T A L I N 116 
³Owing to the inexperience of Soviet officials and to the 
difficulties of the problem, the blows which were intended for 
the kulaks very frequently fell on the middle peasantry. Here 
we have sinned exceedingly. The experience we have gained in 
this respect will enable us to do everything to avoid this in the 
future. That is the task now facing us, not theoretically, but 
practically. You know very well that this task is a difficult one. 
We have no material advantages to offer the middle peasant; 
and he is a materialist, a practical man who demands definite, 
material advantages, which we are not now in a position to offer 
and which the country will have to do without, perhaps, for several 
months yet of severe struggle‹a struggle which now promises 
to end in complete victory. But there is a great deal we 
can do in our administrative work: we can improve our administrative 
apparatus and correct a host of abuses. The line of our 
Party, which has not done enough towards arriving at a bloc, 
an alliance, an agreement* with the middle peasantry, can and 
must be straightened out and corrected² (Eighth Congress of the 
R.C.P.(B.), verbatim report, p. 2025). 
As you see, Lenin makes no distinction between 
³agreement² and ³alliance.² 
And here are excerpts from the resolution of the 
Eighth Congress, ³The Attitude to the Middle Peasantry²: 
³To confuse the middle peasants with the kulaks, to extend 
to them, to any degree, the measures that are directed against the 
kulaks, means most grossly to violate, not only all Soviet decrees 
and all Soviet policy, but also al l the fundamental principles 
of communism, which point to agreement between the proletariat 
and the middle peasantry during the period of the resolute struggle 
of the proletariat for the overthrow of the bourgeoisie as one of 
the conditions for the painless transition to the abolition of all 
forms of exploitation. 
* My italics.‹J. St.

LENIN AND THE ALLIANCE WITH THE MIDDLE PEASANT 117 
³The middle peasantry, which possesses comparatively strong 
economic roots owing to the backwardness of agricultural technique, 
compared with industrial technique, even in the advanced 
capitalist countries, let alone Russia, will continue to exist 
for a fairly long time after the beginning of the proletarian revolution. 
That is why the tactics of Soviet officials in the countryside, 
as well as of active Party workers, must be based on the 
assumption of a long period of collaboration with the middle 
peasantry. . . . 
³. . . An absolutely correct policy pursued by the Soviet 
government in the countryside thus ensures alliance and agreement 
between the victorious proletariat and the middle peasantry. 
. . . 
³. . . The policy of the workers¹ and peasants¹ government 
and of the Communist Party must continue to be conducted in 
this spirit of agreement between the proletariat, together with 
the poor peasantry, and the middle peasantry²* (Eighth Congress 
of the R.C.P.(B.), verbatim report, pp. 370-7226). 
As you see, the resolution also makes no distinction 
between ³agreement² and ³alliance.² 
It will not be superfluous to observe that there is 
not a single word in this resolution of the Eighth Congress 
about a ³stable alliance² with the middle peasant. 
Does that mean, however, that the resolution thereby 
departs from the policy of a ³stable alliance² with 
the middle peasant? No, it does not. It only means that 
the resolution places a sign of equality between the concept 
³agreement,² ³collaboration,² and the concept 
³stable alliance.² For it is clear: there cannot be an 
³alliance² with the middle peasant without an ³agreement² 
with him, and the alliance with the middle peasant 
cannot be ³stable² unless there is ³a long period² 
of agreement and collaboration with him. 
* All italics mine.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 118 
Such are the facts. 
Either one or the other: either Lenin and the Eighth 
Congress of the Party departed from Lenin¹s statement 
about a ³stable alliance² with the middle peasant, 
or this frivolous assumption must be abandoned and 
it must be admitted that Lenin and the Eighth Congress 
of the Party made no distinction whatever between 
the concept ³agreement² and the concept ³stable alliance.² 
Thus, one who refuses to be a victim of idle pedantry, 
one who desires to grasp the true meaning of Lenin¹s 
slogan, which speaks of relying on the poor peasantry, 
of agreement with the middle peasantry and of fighting 
the kulaks, cannot fail to understand that the policy 
of agreement with the middle peasant is a policy of 
stable alliance with him. 
Your mistake is that you have failed to understand 
the fraudulent trick of the opposition and have fallen 
a prey to their provocation; you walked into the trap the 
enemy set for you. The oppositionist swindlers noisily 
assure us that they are in favour of Lenin¹s slogan of 
agreement with the middle peasant, but at the same time 
they drop the provocatory hint that ³agreement² with 
the middle peasant is one thing and a ³stable alliance² 
with him is something different. In this way they want 
to kill two birds with one stone: firstly, to conceal their 
real attitude to the middle peasantry, which is not one 
of agreement with the middle peasant, but of ³dissension 
with the middle peasant² (see the well-known 
speech of the oppositionist Smirnov, which I quoted 
at the Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Party Conference27); 
and, secondly, to catch the simpletons among the Bol

LENIN AND THE ALLIANCE WITH THE MIDDLE PEASANT 119 
sheviks with the alleged difference between ³agreement² 
and ³alliance,² and muddle them up completely, by 
driving them away from Lenin. 
And how do certain of our comrades react to this? 
Instead of tearing the mask from the oppositionist tricksters, 
instead of convicting them of deceiving the Party 
about their true position, they swallow the bait, walk 
into the trap, and allow themselves to be driven away 
from Lenin. The opposition is making a lot of noise 
about Lenin¹s slogan; the oppositionists are posing as 
adherents of Lenin¹s slogan; therefore, I must dissociate 
myself from this slogan, otherwise I may be confused 
with the opposition, otherwise I may be accused of 
³compromising with the opposition²‹such is the logic 
of these comrades! 
And this is not the only instance of the fraudulent 
tricks played by the opposition. Take, for instance, 
the slogan of self-criticism. Bolsheviks cannot but know 
that the slogan of self-criticism is one of the foundations 
of our Party activities: it is a means of strengthening 
the proletarian dictatorship, the soul of the Bolshevik 
method of training cadres. The opposition makes 
a lot of noise, asserting that it, the opposition, invented 
the slogan of self-criticism, that the Party stole this 
slogan from it, and thereby capitulated to the opposition. 
By acting in this way the opposition is trying 
to gain at least two ends: 
firstly, to deceive the working class and to conceal 
from it the fact that an abyss divides the opposition¹s 
³self-criticism,² the purpose of which is to destroy t he 
Party spirit, from Bolshevik self-criticism, the purpose 
of which is to strengthen the Party spirit;

J. V. S T A L I N 120 
secondly, to catch certain simpletons and to induce 
them to dissociate themselves from the Party slogan of 
self-criticism. 
And how do some of our comrades react to this? 
Instead of tearing the mask from the oppositionist tricksters 
and upholding the slogan of Bolshevik self-criticism, 
they walk into the trap, dissociate themselves from the 
slogan of self-criticism, dance to the tune of the opposition 
and . . . capitulate to it, in the mistaken belief 
that they are dissociating themselves from the opposition. 
A host of such instances could be quoted, 
But in our work we cannot dance to anybody¹s tune. 
Still less can we be guided in our work by what 
the oppositionists say about us. We must pursue our 
own path, brushing, aside both the fraudulent tricks 
of the opposition and the errors of certain of our Bolsheviks 
who fall victims to the provocation of the oppositionists. 
Remember the words quoted by Marx: ³Follow 
your own course, and let people talk!²28 
Written: June 12, 1928 
Published in Pravda, No. 152, 
July 3, 1928 
Signed: J. Stalin

TO THE MEMBERS¹ OF THE POLITICAL 
BUREAU OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
REPLY TO FRUMKIN 
(With Reference to Frumkin¹ s Letter of June 15, 1928) 
Frumkin¹s letter of June 15, 1928, deserves attentive 
consideration. 
Let us examine it point by point. 
1. Incorrect, in the first place, is Frumkin¹s appraisal 
of the international position of the U.S.S.R. 
It is the generally accepted opinion in the Party that 
the reason for the growth of the contradictions between 
the U.S.S.R. and its capitalist encirclement, the reason 
for the offensive of the capitalist states against the 
U.S.S.R., is the growth of the socialist elements in the 
U.S.S.R., the growth of the U.S.S.R.¹s influence on the 
working class in all countries and, hence, the danger 
which the developing U.S.S.R. represents for capitalism. 
That is precisely the way the Fifteenth Congress 
of our Party understood it, in saying in its resolution 
on the report of the Central Committee: ³The contradictions 
between the countries of the bourgeois encirclement 
and the U.S.S.R., whose victorious development 
is undermining the foundations of world capitalism, 
have grown more acute. The chief factors contributing 
to this increasing acuteness are the growth of the socialist 
elements in the U.S.S.R., the collapse of the hopes of 
the bourgeoisie that the proletarian dictatorship would

J. V. S T A L I N 122 
degenerate, coupled with the increasing international 
and revolutionary influence of the U.S.S.R.²*29 
We know that the Party elaborated this standpoint 
not casually and incidentally, but in the course of a desperate 
struggle against the opposition, who openly asserted 
that the reason for the offensive of imperialism 
against the U.S.S.R. was the weakening of the U.S.S.R. 
owing to its being in process of degeneration. 
Frumkin, however, fundamentally disagrees with the 
standpoint of the Party. He asserts that, on the contrary, 
³the basic and decisive factor determining the 
offensive of the capitalist world against the U.S.S.R. 
is that we are growing weaker, politically and economically.² 
What can there be in common between these two 
opposite estimates, one of which emanates from Frumkin 
and the other from the Fifteenth Congress of our 
Party? 
2. Even more incorrect is Frumkin¹s estimate of the 
internal situation in the U.S.S.R. Reading Frumkin¹s 
letter, one might think that the Soviet regime is on its 
last legs, that the country is on the verge of the abyss 
and that the downfall of the U.S.S.R. is a matter of 
only a few months, if not of a few days. The only thing 
he omitted to say is that we have ³sung our swan 
song.² 
We are accustomed to hearing the wailing of intellectuals 
about the ³doom² of the U.S.S.R. coming 
from the lips of the oppositionists. But is it seemly 
for Frumkin to follow the example of the opposition? 
* My italics.‹J. St.

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE C.C. 123 
It would be incorrect, of course, to underestimate 
the importance of our difficulties. But it would be even 
more incorrect to overestimate their importance, to 
lose our balance and succumb to panic. Undoubtedly, 
the kulak is furious with the Soviet Government: it 
would be strange to expect him to be friendly towards it. 
Undoubtedly, the kulak has an influence on a certain 
section of the poor and middle peasants. But to conclude 
from this that the sentiment of the majority of 
the poor and middle peasants is against the Soviet Government, 
that ³this sentiment is already beginning 
to spread to the working-class centres,² is to lose one¹s 
head and succumb to panic. It is with truth that the 
proverb says: ³Fear has big eyes.² 
One can imagine in what a state Frumkin would 
be if we had today not our present, but more serious 
difficulties‹a war, say, when vacillations of every 
kind would have a wide ³field of action.² 
3. Frumkin is absolutely wrong when he states that 
³the deterioration in our economic position has grown 
sharper owing to the new political line in relation to the 
countryside after the Fifteenth Congress.² This evidently 
refers to the measures taken by the Party at the 
beginning of this year to improve grain procurements. 
Frumkin regards these measures as harmful, as having 
caused a ³deterioration² in our position. 
It follows that the April plenum of the C.C. and 
C.C.C. was wrong when it established that 
a) ³the grain procurement difficulties were connected 
with the difficulties arising from the swift rate of industrialisation 
of the country dictated to the proletarian state 
by the entire international and internal situation, and

J. V. S T A L I N 124 
with the errors committed in the planned direction of the 
economy,² that 
b) ³the aggravation of the disproportion in market 
relations (between rural effective demand on the one 
hand, and the supply of manufactured goods on the 
other) is due to the increased incomes of the rural population, 
and especially of its well-to-do and kulak sections² 
(and not to the Party¹s measures‹J. St.) , and that 
c) ³the difficulties were aggravated and complicated by 
the endeavour of the kulak section of the rural population 
and the speculators to take advantage of them in order 
to force up grain prices and to disrupt the Soviet price 
policy²* (and not by the Party¹s measures‹J. St.). 
It follows that the April plenum of the C.C. and 
C.C.C. was wrong when it declared in its resolution 
on grain procurements that ³the above-mentioned measures 
of the Party, which were in part of an emergency 
character, ensured very great successes in increasing 
grain procurements.²*30 
I t follows, then, that Frumkin is right, and the 
April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. is wrong! 
Who, after all, is right‹Frumkin or the plenum 
of the C.C. and C.C.C.? 
Let us turn to the facts. 
What was the position at the beginning of January 
of this year? We had a deficit of 128,000,000 poods of 
grain as compared with last year. 
How were the procurements being carried out at that 
time? By letting them proceed of their own accord, 
without any emergency measures being taken by the 
* My italics.‹J. St.

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE C.C. 125 
Party, without any active interference by the Party in 
the procurements. 
What resulted from letting things go of their own 
accord and not exerting any pressure? A deficit of 
128,000,000 poods of grain. 
What would the results be now if the Party had followed 
Frumkin¹s advice and had not interfered, if the 
deficit of 128,000,000 poods of grain had not been made 
good before the spring, before the spring sowing? Our workers 
would now be going hungry, there would be hunger 
in the industrial centres, a break-down of our constructive 
work, hunger in the Red Army. 
Could the Party refrain from interfering and not go 
to the length of applying emergency measures? Obviously, 
it could not have acted otherwise than it did. 
What follows from this? It follows that our entire 
national economy would now be in a most dangerous 
crisis if we had not interfered in the matter of grain 
procurements in good time. 
There can be only one conclusion, and that is that 
Frumkin is absolutely wrong in coming out against t he 
decisions of the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. 
and in demanding their revision. 
4. Frumkin is absolutely wrong when he says: ³We 
must return to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Party Congresses.² 
We have no need to return to the Fifteenth 
Congress, for the Party stands fully and entirely by the 
decisions of the Fifteenth Congress. But Frumkin demands 
a return to the Fourteenth Congress. What does 
that mean? Does it not mean obliterating the whole 
path we have travelled and going backward instead of 
forward?

J. V. S T A L I N 126 
The Fifteenth Party Congress says in its resolution on 
³Work in the Countryside² that, in the interest of socialist 
development in the countryside, we must wage a 
³more resolute offensive against the kulak.²31 The Fourteenth 
Party Congress did not say this, and could not have 
said it in the conditions of that time. What, in that 
case, can Frumkin¹s demand for a ³return to the Fourteenth 
Congress² mean? It can mean only one thing, 
namely, renunciation of the policy of a ³more resolute 
offensive against the kulak.² 
It follows that Frumkin¹s demand that we return 
to the Fourteenth Congress would lead to renunciation 
of the decisions of the Fifteenth Party Congress. 
The Fifteenth Party Congress says in its resolution 
on ³Work in the Countryside² that ³in the present period, 
the task of uniting and transforming the small 
individual peasant farms into large collective farms 
must be made the Party¹s principal task in the 
countryside.²32 The Fourteenth Party Congress did not 
say this, and could not have said it in the conditions 
of that time. It could be said only by the time of the 
Fifteenth Congress, when, parallel with the old and 
unquestionably obligatory task of developing individual 
small- and middle-peasant farming, we were faced 
with the new practical task of developing collective farms, 
as farms producing large marketable surpluses. 
What, in that case, can be meant by Frumkin¹s 
demand for a ³return to the Fourteenth Congress²? 
It can mean only one thing: renunciation of the new 
practical task of developing collective farms. This, 
indeed, explains the fact that for the practical task of 
developing collective farms, Frumkin substitutes the

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE C.C. 127 
artful task of rendering ³maximum assistance to the 
poor peasants entering collectives.² 
It follows, therefore, that Frumkin¹s demand for 
a return to the Fourteenth Congress would lead to renunciation 
of the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress. 
The Fifteenth Party Congress says in its resolution 
on ³Directives for Drafting a Five-Year Plan for the 
National Economy² that ³it is necessary at the present 
time to give greater support to all viable forms of 
producers¹ co-operatives (communes, collective farms, 
artels, producers¹ co-operatives, co-operative factories, 
etc.), as well as to state farms, which must be raised to 
a higher level.²*33 The Fourteenth Party Congress did 
not say this, and could not have said it in the conditions 
of that time. It could be said only by the time of 
the Fifteenth Congress, when, parallel with the tasks 
of developing individual small- and middle-peasant 
farming on the one hand, and of developing collective 
farms on the other, we were faced with another new 
practical task, the task of developing state farms, as 
units producing the largest marketable surpluses. 
What, in that case, can be meant by Frumkin¹s 
demand for a ³return to the Fourteenth Congress²? It 
can mean only one thing: renunciation of the policy 
of ³raising the state farms to a higher level.² This, 
indeed, explains why for the positive task of developing 
state farms, as laid down by the Fifteenth Congress, 
Frumkin substitutes a negative task, namely, that ³state 
farms should not be expanded by shock or super-shock 
tactics,² although Frumkin cannot help knowing that 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
128 
here the Party is not setting itself, and cannot set itself, 
any ³super-shock² tasks, because we are only just 
beginning seriously to approach the question of organising 
new state farms. 
Again it follows that Frumkin¹s demand for a return 
to the Fourteenth Congress leads to renunciation of the 
decisions of the Fifteenth Congress. 
In view of all this, what value can be attached to 
Frumkin¹s assertion that the C.C. has ³departed² from 
the decisions of the Fifteenth Congress? Would it not 
be truer to say that Frumkin¹s whole letter is a badly 
camouflaged attempt to nullify the Fifteenth Congress 
decisions on a number of highly important questions? 
Is it not this that explains Frumkin¹s assertion that 
the resolution of the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. 
on grain procurements is ³half-hearted and ambiguous²? 
Would it not be truer to say that the resolution of the 
plenum is correct, and that it is Frumkin himself who 
is beginning to see things ³ambiguously² because of a 
certain ³half-heartedness² in his position? 
Frumkin¹s basic mistake is that he sees only one task, 
that of stimulating individual peasant farming, believing 
that our attitude towards agriculture is in the main 
restricted to this. 
His mistake is that he does not understand the new 
thing that the Party gave us at its Fifteenth Congress; 
he does not understand that we cannot now restrict ourselves 
to the one task of stimulating individual peasant 
farming, that this task must be supplemented by two 
new practical tasks: that of developing state farms and 
that of developing collective farms.

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE C.C. 129 
Frumkin does not understand that if the first task 
is not combined with the two others, we shall not be 
able to make good either in the matter of supplying the 
state with marketable grain, or in the matter of organising 
the entire national economy on socialist lines. 
Does this mean that we are already laying the principal 
stress on the state farms and collective farms? No, 
it does not. At the present stage, the principal stress 
must still be laid on raising the level of individual smalland 
middle-peasant farming. But it does mean that this 
task alone is no longer enough. It means that the time 
has come when this task must be practically supplemented 
by two new tasks‹the development of collective 
farms and the development of state farms. 
5. Absolutely incorrect is Frumkin¹s remark that 
³the outlawing of the kulak has led to lawless actions 
against the entire peasantry.² 
In the first place, it is not true that the kulak has 
been ³outlawed.² 
In the second place, if there is any meaning at all 
in Frumkin¹s words, it can only be that he is demanding 
that the Party should restore ³rights of citizenship² 
to the kulak, should restore political rights to the kulak 
(the right, say, to take part in elections to the Soviets, 
etc.). 
Does Frumkin think that the Party and the Soviet 
Government would gain by abolishing the restrictions 
on the kulaks? How can Frumkin¹s ³state of mind² be 
reconciled with the Fifteenth Congress decision to wage 
a ³more resolute offensive against the kulak²? 
Does Frumkin think that weakening the fight 
against the kulak will strengthen our alliance with the

J. V. S T A L I N 130 
middle peasant? Does it not occur to Frumkin that restoration 
of rights to the kulak would only facilitate 
the latter¹s efforts to sever the middle peasant from us? 
In view of all this, what value can be attached to 
Frumkin¹s talk about alliance with the middle peasant? 
Of course, it would be wrong to deny the infringement 
of laws by some of our officials in the countryside. 
It would be still more wrong to deny that, because of 
the clumsy way some of our officials are waging the 
fight against the kulak, blows intended for the kulak 
sometimes fall on the heads of the middle peasants, 
and even of the poor peasants. Unquestionably, a most 
resolute struggle is necessary against such distortions 
of the Party line. But how can it be concluded from 
this that the fight against the kulak must be relaxed, 
that restriction of the kulak¹s political rights must be 
renounced, and so on? 
6. Frumkin is right when he says that you cannot 
fight the kulaks by means of dekulakisation, as certain 
of our local officials are doing. But he is mistaken if 
he thinks that he has said anything new by this. To 
blame Comrade Molotov or Comrade Kubyak for these 
distortions, as Frumkin does, and to assert that the 
Party is not combating such distortions, is to commit 
the gravest injustice and to be guilty of unpardonable 
bad temper. 
7. Frumkin is right when he says that we must open 
peasant markets, the grain market. But be is mistaken if 
he thinks that he has said anything new by this. In the 
first place, the Party never was in favour of closing the 
peasant markets. In the second place, Frumkin cannot help 
knowing that, since closing of peasant markets did take

TO THE MEMBERS OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU OF THE C.C. 131 
place in certain districts, the centre promptly ordered 
the local organisations to reopen them immediately and 
to put a stop to such distortions. We know that this 
decision of the centre was circulated to the localities 
already towards the end of May (May 26), that is, two 
weeks before the appearance of Frumkin¹s letter. Frumkin 
could not help knowing this. Was it then worth 
while ³knocking at an open door²? 
8. Frumkin is right when he says that grain prices 
must be raised and that the fight against illicit distilling 
must be intensified. But, again, it would be strange 
to think that Frumkin has made some new discovery. 
The fight against illicit distilling has been going on 
since January of this year. It must and will be intensified, 
although Frumkin cannot but know that it will 
cause discontent in the countryside. As to raising grain 
prices, Frumkin cannot but know that a decision to 
raise grain prices at the beginning of the next procurement 
year was taken by the Political Bureau in February 
of this year, that is, four months before the appearance 
of Frumkin¹s letter. Once again: was it worth while 
³knocking at an open door² with regard to raising 
prices? 
9. At first glance it might appear that Frumkin¹s 
letter was composed with a view to defending the alliance 
with the middle peasant. But that is only an appearance. 
Actually, Frumkin¹s letter is a plea on behalf 
of making things easier for the kulak, a plea on behalf 
of abolishing the restrictions on the kulak. No one who 
desires to strengthen the alliance with the middle peasant 
can demand that the struggle against the kulak 
should be relaxed.

J. V. S T A L I N 132 
To ensure a stable alliance with the middle peasant 
is a most important task of our Party. But such an alliance 
can be ensured only if a resolute fight is waged 
against the kulak, only if the poor peasant is made the 
bulwark of the proletariat in the countryside, and, finally, 
only if we are ready and able to come to a lasting agreement 
with the middle peasant, one capable of reinforcing 
the alliance with him and strengthening the position 
of the proletariat in the struggle for socialist construction. 
Our policy in this field must aim not at a relaxation 
of the struggle against the capitalist elements in the countryside, 
but at ³agreement between the proletariat and the 
middle peasantry,² at ³a long period of collaboration with 
the middle peasantry,² at ³alliance and agreement between 
the victorious proletariat and the middle peasantry² 
(see the resolution of the Eighth Party Congress on 
³The Attitude to the Middle Peasantry²).34 
J. Stalin 
June 20, 1918 
Published for the first time

AGAINST VULGARISING THE SLOGAN 
OF SELF-CRITICISM 
The slogan of self-criticism must not be regarded 
as something temporary and transient. Self-criticism 
is a specific method, a Bolshevik method, of training the 
forces of the Party and of the working class generally 
in the spirit of revolutionary development. Marx himself 
spoke of self-criticism as a method of strengthening 
the proletarian revolution.35 As to self-criticism in our 
Party, its beginnings date back to the first appearance 
of Bolshevism in our country, to its very inception 
as a specific revolutionary trend in the working-class 
movement. 
We know that as early as the spring of 1904, when 
Bolshevism was not yet an independent political party 
but worked together with the Mensheviks within a single 
Social-Democratic party‹we know that Lenin was 
already calling upon the Party to undertake ³self-criticism 
and ruthless exposure of its own shortcomings.² 
Here is what Lenin wrote in his pamphlet One Step 
Forward, Two Steps Back: 
³They ( i . e . , the opponents of the Marxists‹J. St .) gloat 
and grimace over our controversies; and, of course, they will try 
to pick isolated passages from my pamphlet, which deals with 
the defects and shortcomings of our Party, and to use them for

J. V. S T A L I N 134 
their own ends. The Russian Social-Democrats are already steeled 
enough in battle not to be perturbed by these pin-pricks and 
to continue, in spite of them, their work of self-criticism and 
ruthless exposure of their own shortcomings,* which will unquestionably 
and inevitably be overcome as the working-class movement 
grows. As for those gentlemen, our opponents, let them try to 
give us a picture of the true state of affairs in their own Œparties¹ 
even remotely approximating that given by the minutes of our 
Second Congress!² (Vol. VI, p. 161.36) 
Therefore, those comrades are absolutely wrong 
who think that self-criticism is a passing phenomenon, 
a fashion which is bound speedily to go out of existence 
as every fashion usually does. Actually, self-criticism 
is an indispensable and permanent weapon in the arsenal 
of Bolshevism, one that is intimately linked with the 
very nature of Bolshevism, with its revolutionary spirit. 
It is sometimes said that self-criticism is something 
that is good for a party which has not yet come to 
power and has ³nothing to lose,² but that it is dangerous 
and harmful to a party which has already come to 
power, which is surrounded by hostile forces, and against 
which an exposure of its weaknesses may be exploited 
by its enemies. 
That is not true. It is quite untrue! On the contrary, 
just because Bolshevism has come to power, just because 
Bolsheviks may become conceited owing to the 
successes of our work of construction, just because Bolsheviks 
may fail to observe their weaknesses and thus 
make things easier for their enemies‹for these very 
reasons self-criticism is particularly needed now, after 
the assumption of power. 
* My italics.‹J. St.

AGAINST VULGARISING THE SLOGAN OF SELF-CRITICISM 135 
The purpose of self-criticism being to disclose and 
eliminate our errors and weaknesses, is it not clear 
that in the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
it can only facilitate Bolshevism¹s fight against 
the enemies of the working class? Lenin took into account 
these specific features of the situation which had arisen 
after the Bolsheviks had seized power when, in April- 
May 1920, he wrote in his pamphlet ³Left-Wing² Communism, 
an Infantile Disorder: 
³The attitude of a political party towards its own mistakes 
is one of the most important and surest ways of judging how serious 
the party is and how it in practice fulfils its obligations towards 
its class and the toiling masses. Frankly admitting a mistake,* 
ascertaining the reasons for it, analysing the circumstances which 
gave rise to it, and thoroughly discussing the means of correcting 
it‹that is the earmark of a serious party; that is the way it should 
perform its duties, that is the way it should educate and train 
the class, and then the masses² (Vol. XXV, p. 200). 
Lenin was a thousand times right when he said at 
the Eleventh Party Congress in March 1922: 
³The proletariat is not afraid to admit that this or that thing 
has succeeded splendidly in its revolution, and this or that has 
not succeeded. All revolutionary parties which have hitherto 
perished, did so because they grew conceited, failed to see where 
their strength lay, and feared to speak of their weaknesses.* But 
we shall not perish, for we do not fear to speak of our weaknesses 
and shall learn to overcome them² (Vol. XXVII, pp. 260-61). 
There is only one conclusion: that without self-criticism 
there can be no proper education of the Party, 
the class, and the masses; and that without proper 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 136 
education of the Party, the class, and the masses, there 
can bo no Bolshevism. 
Why has the slogan of self-criticism acquired special 
importance just now, at this particular moment 
of history, in 1928? 
Because the growing acuteness of class relations, 
both in the internal and external spheres, is more glaringly 
evident now than it was a year or two ago. 
Because the subversive activities of the class enemies 
of the Soviet Government, who are utilising our 
weaknesses, our errors, against the working class of 
our country, are more glaringly evident now than they 
were a year or two ago. 
Because we cannot and must not allow the lessons 
of the Shakhty affair and the ³procurement manoeuvres² 
of the capitalist elements in the countryside, 
coupled with our mistakes in planning, to go unheeded. 
If we want to strengthen the revolution and meet 
our enemies fully prepared, we must rid ourselves as 
quickly as possible of our errors and weaknesses, as disclosed 
by the Shakhty affair and the grain procurement 
difficulties. 
If we do not want to be caught unawares by all sorts 
of ³surprises² and ³accidents,² to the joy of the enemies 
of the working class, we must disclose as quickly 
as possible those weaknesses and errors of ours which 
have not yet been disclosed, but which undoubtedly 
exist. 
If we are tardy in this, we shall be facilitating the 
work of our enemies and aggravating our weaknesses 
and errors. But all this will be impossible if self-crit

AGAINST VULGARISING THE SLOGAN OF SELF-CRITICISM 137 
icism is not developed and stimulated, i f the vast 
masses of the working class and peasantry are not 
drawn into the work of bringing to light and eliminating 
our weaknesses and errors. 
The April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. was therefore 
quite right when it said in its resolution on the 
Shakhty affair: 
³The chief condition for the successful accomplishment of 
all the indicated measures is the effective implementation of the 
slogan of self-criticism issued by the Fifteenth Congress.²*37 
But in order to develop self-criticism, we must 
first overcome a number of obstacles standing in the 
way of the Party. These include the cultural backwardness 
of the masses, the inadequate cultural forces 
of the proletarian vanguard, our conservatism, our 
³communist vainglory,² and so on. But one of the most 
serious obstacles, if not the most serious of all, is the 
bureaucracy of our apparatus. I am referring to the 
bureaucratic elements to be found in our Party, government, 
trade-union, co-operative and all other organisations. 
I am referring to the bureaucratic elements who 
batten on our weaknesses and errors, who fear like the 
plague all criticism by the masses, all control by the 
masses, and who hinder us in developing self-criticism 
and ridding ourselves of our weaknesses and errors. 
Bureaucracy in our organisations must not be regarded 
merely as routine and red-tape. Bureaucracy is a manifestation 
of bourgeois influence on our organisations. 
Lenin was right when he said: 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 138 
³. . . We must realise that the fight against bureaucracy is 
an absolutely essential one, and that it is just as complicated as 
the fight against the petty-bourgeois elemental forces. Bureaucracy 
in our state system has become a malady of such gravity that 
it is spoken of in our Party programme, and that is because it is 
connected with these petty-bourgeois elemental forces and their wide 
dispersion²* (Vol. XXVI, p. 220). 
With all the more persistence, therefore, must the 
struggle against bureaucracy in our organisations be 
waged, if we really want to develop self-criticism and 
rid ourselves of the maladies in our constructive work. 
With all the more persistence must we rouse the 
vast masses of the workers and peasants to the task of 
criticism from below, of control from below, as the principal 
antidote to bureaucracy. 
Lenin was right when he said: 
³If we want to combat bureaucracy, we must enlist the cooperation 
of the rank and file² . . . for ³what other way is there 
of putting an end to bureaucracy than by enlisting the co-operation 
of the workers and peasants?²* (Vol. XXV, pp. 496 and 495.) 
But in order to ³enlist the co-operation² of the 
vast masses, we must develop proletarian democracy 
in all the mass organisations of the working class, and 
primarily within the Party itself. Failing this, selfcriticism 
will be nothing, an empty thing, a mere word. 
It is not just any kind of self-criticism that we need. 
We need such self-criticism as will raise the cultural 
level of the working class, enhance its fighting spirit, 
fortify its faith in victory, augment its strength and 
help it to become the real master of the country. 
* My italics.‹J. St.

AGAINST VULGARISING THE SLOGAN OF SELF-CRITICISM 139 
Some say that, once there is self-criticism, we do 
not need labour discipline, we can stop working and 
give ourselves over to prattling a little about everything. 
That would be not self-criticism but an insult 
to the working class. Self-criticism is needed not in 
order to shatter labour discipline, but to strengthen i t , 
in order that labour discipline may become conscious 
discipline, capable of withstanding petty-bourgeois 
slackness. 
Others say that, once there is self-criticism, we no 
longer need leadership, we can abandon the helm and 
let things ³take their natural course.² That would be 
not self-criticism but a disgrace. Self-criticism is needed 
not in order to relax leadership, but to strengthen it, in 
order to convert it from leadership on paper and of 
little authority into vigorous and really authoritative 
leadership. 
But there is another kind of ³self-criticism,² one 
that tends to destroy the Party spirit, to discredit t he 
Soviet regime, to weaken our work of construction, to 
corrupt our economic cadres, to disarm the working 
class, and to foster talk of degeneration. It was just this 
kind of ³self-criticism² that the Trotsky opposition was 
urging upon us only recently. It goes without saying 
that the Party has nothing in common with such ³selfcriticism.² 
It goes without saying that the Party will 
combat such ³self-criticism² with might and main. 
A strict distinction must be drawn between this 
³self-criticism,² which is alien to us, destructive and 
anti-Bolshevik, and our, Bolshevik self-criticism, the 
object of which is to promote the Party spirit, to consolidate 
the Soviet regime, to improve our constructive

J. V. S T A L I N 140 
work, to strengthen our economic cadres, to arm t he 
working class. 
Our campaign for intensifying self-criticism began 
only a few months ago. We have not yet the necessary 
data for a review of the first results of the campaign. But 
it may already be said that the campaign is beginning 
to yield beneficial fruits. 
It cannot be denied that the tide of self-criticism 
is beginning to mount and spread, extending to ever 
larger sections of the working class and drawing them 
into the work of socialist construction. This is borne 
out if only by such facts as the revival of the production 
conferences and the temporary control commissions. 
True, there are still attempts to pigeon-hole wellfounded 
and verified recommendations of the production 
conferences and temporary control commissions. 
Such attempts must be fought with the utmost detemination, 
for their purpose is to discourage the workers 
from self-criticism. But there is scarcely reason to doubt 
that such bureaucratic attempts will be swept away 
completely by the mounting tide of self-criticism. 
Nor can it be denied that, as a result of self-criticism, 
our business executives are beginning to smarten 
up, to become more vigilant, to approach questions of 
economic leadership more seriously, while our Party, 
Soviet, trade-union and all other personnel are becoming 
more sensitive and responsive to the requirements 
of the masses. 
True, it cannot be said that inner-Party democracy 
and working-class democracy generally are already 
fully established in the mass organisations of the working 
class. But there is no reason to doubt that further

AGAINST VULGARISING THE SLOGAN OF SELF-CRITICISM 141 
advances will be made in this field as the campaign 
unfolds. 
Nor can it be denied that, as a result of self-criticism, 
our press has become more lively and vigorous, 
while such detachments of our press workers as the 
organisations of worker and village correspondents are 
already becoming a weighty political force. 
True, our press still continues at times to skate on 
the surface; it has not yet learned to pass from individual 
critical remarks to deeper criticism, and from 
deep criticism to drawing general conclusions from the 
results of criticism and making plain what achievements 
have been attained in our constructive work as a result 
of criticism. But it can scarcely be doubted that advances 
will be made in this field as the campaign goes on. 
However, along with these good aspects of our campaign, 
it is necessary to note some bad aspects. I am 
referring to those distortions of the slogan of self-criticism 
which are already occurring at the beginning 
of the campaign and which, if they are not resisted at 
once, may give rise to the danger of self-criticism being 
vulgarised. 
1) It must be observed, in the first place, that a 
number of press periodicals are betraying a tendency 
to transplant the campaign from the field of businesslike 
criticisms of shortcomings in our socialist construction 
to the field of ostentatious outcries against excesses 
in private life. This may seem incredible. But, unfortunately, 
it is a fact. 
Take the newspaper Vlast Truda, for example, organ 
of the Irkutsk Okrug Party Committee and Okrug Soviet 
Executive Committee (No. 128). There you will

J. V. S T A L I N 142 
find a whole page peppered all over with ostentatious 
³slogans,² such as: ³Sexual Promiscuity‹a Bourgeois 
Vice²; ³One Glass Leads to Another²; ³Own Cottage 
Calls for Own Cow²; ³Double-Bed Bandits²; ³A Shot 
That Misfired,² and so on and so forth. What, one asks, 
can there be in common between these ³critical² shrieks, 
which are worthy of Birzhovka,38 and Bolshevik selfcriticism, 
the purpose of which is to improve our socialist 
construction? It is very possible that the author 
of these ostentatious items is a Communist. It is possible 
that he is burning with hatred of the ³class enemies² 
of the Soviet regime. But that he is straying from 
the right path, that he is vulgarising the slogan of selfcriticism, 
and that his voice is the voice not of our class, 
of that there cannot be any doubt. 
2) It must be observed, further, that even those 
organs of the press which, generally speaking, are not 
devoid of the ability to criticise correctly, that even 
they are sometimes inclined to criticise for criticism¹s 
sake, turning criticism into a sport, into sensationmongering. 
Take Komsomolskaya Pravda, for example. 
Everyone knows the services rendered by Komsomolskaya 
Pravda in stimulating self-criticism. But take 
the last issues of this paper and look at its ³criticism² 
of the leaders of the All-Union Central Council of Trade 
Unions‹a whole series of impermissible caricatures on 
the subject. Who, one asks, needs ³criticism² of this 
kind, and what effect can it have except to discredit 
the slogan of self-criticism? What is the use of such 
³criticism,² looked at, of course, from the standpoint 
of the interests of our socialist construction and not 
of cheap sensation-mongering designed to give the phi

AGAINST VULGARISING THE SLOGAN OF SELF-CRITICISM 143 
listine something to chuckle over? Of course, all forms 
of arms are required for self-criticism, including the 
³light cavalry.² But does this mean that the light cavalry 
must be turned into light-minded cavalry? 
3) It must be observed, lastly, that there is a definite 
tendency on the part of a number of our organisations 
to turn sell-criticism into a witch-hunt against 
our business executives, into an attempt to discredit 
them in the eyes of the working class. It is a fact that 
certain local organisations in the Ukraine and Central 
Russia have started a regular witch-hunt against some 
of our best business executives, whose only fault is that 
they are not 100 per cent immune from error. How else 
are we to understand the decisions of the local organisations 
to remove these executives from their posts, decisions 
which have no binding force whatever and which 
are obviously designed to discredit them? How else 
are we to understand the fact that these executives are 
criticised, but are given no opportunity to answer the 
criticism? When did we begin to pass off a ³Shemyaka 
court²* as self-criticism? 
Of course, we cannot demand that criticism should 
be 100 per cent correct. If the criticism comes from 
below, we must not ignore it even if it is only 5 or 10 
per cent correct. All that is true. But does this mean 
that we must demand that business executives should 
be 100 per cent immune from error? Is there any one 
in creation who is immune from error 100 per cent? Is 
it so hard to understand that it takes years and years to 
* A ³Shemyaka court²: an unjust court. (From an ancient 
Russian story about a judge named Shemyaka.)‹Tr.

J. V. S T A L I N 144 
train our economic cadres and that our attitude towards 
them must be one of the utmost consideration and 
solicitude? Is it so hard to understand that we need 
self-criticism not for the sake of a witch-hunt against 
our economic cadres, but in order to improve and 
perfect them? 
Criticise the shortcomings of our constructive work, 
but do not vulgarise the slogan of self-criticism and 
do not turn it into a medium for ostentatious exercises 
on such themes as ³Double-Bed Bandits,² ³A Shot That 
Misfired,² and so on. 
Criticise the shortcomings in our constructive work, 
but do not discredit the slogan of self-criticism and do 
not turn it into a means of cooking up cheap sensations. 
Criticise the shortcomings in our constructive work, 
but do not pervert the slogan of self-criticism and do 
not turn it into a weapon for witch-hunts against our 
business or any other executives. 
And the chief thing: do not substitute for mass criticism 
from below ³critical² fireworks from above; let 
the working-class masses come into it and display their 
creative initiative in correcting our shortcomings and 
in improving our constructive work. 
Pravda, No. 146, 
June 26, 1928 
Signed: J. Stalin

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)39 
July 4-12, 1928 
Published for the first time


THE PROGRAMME OF THE COMINTERN 
Speech Delivered on July 5, 1928 
The first thing we have to consider, comrades, is 
the size of the draft programme of the Comintern.40 
Some say that the draft programme is too large, 
too ponderous. They demand that it be compressed to 
a half or a third. They demand that some general formulas 
should be given in the programme and nothing 
more, and that these formulas be called a programme. 
I think that these demands are devoid of foundation. 
Those who demand that the programme be compressed 
to a half or even a third do not understand the tasks 
that confronted those who drew up the draft. The point 
is that the programme of the Comintern cannot be the 
programme of any one national party, or, say, a programme 
for only the ³civilised² nations. The programme 
must cover all the Communist Parties of the world, all 
nations, all peoples, both white and black. That is the 
basic and characteristic feature of the draft programme. 
But how is it possible to cover the basic needs and basic 
lines of work of all the sections of the Comintern, both 
Eastern and Western, if the programme is compressed 
to a half or a third? Let the comrades try to solve this 
insoluble problem. That is why I think that to compress

J. V. S T A L I N 148 
the programme to a half or a third would mean converting 
it from a programme into a mere list of abstract 
formulas without any value for the sections of the Comintern. 
Those who drew up the programme were faced with 
a double problem: on the one hand, to cover the chief 
and basic features of all the Communist Parties of the 
world, and, on the other hand, to do so in such a way 
that the various propositions of the programme should 
not be empty formulas, but should provide practical 
guiding principles for the most diverse countries and 
peoples, for the most diverse Communist Parties and 
communist groups. You must agree that i t is quite 
impossible to solve this double problem in a brief and 
concise draft. 
What is most curious is that the very comrades who 
propose that the programme be compressed to a half 
or even a third, also put forward proposals which would 
tend to expand the present draft programme to twice, 
if not three times its size. In point of fact, if we are to 
give in the draft programme lengthy formulations on 
the trade unions, on the co-operatives, on culture, on 
the European national minorities and so on, is it not 
obvious that the effect of this cannot be to compress 
the programme? The size of the present draft would 
have to be doubled, if not trebled. 
The same thing must be said of those comrades who 
demand either that the programme be a concrete instruction 
for the Communist Parties, or that it explain every 
possible thing, down to the individual propositions in 
it. In the first place, it is wrong to say that the programme 
must be only an instruction, or mainly an instruction.

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 149 
That is wrong. That cannot be demanded of a programme, 
to say nothing of the fact that the result would be to 
enlarge the size of the programme incredibly. In the 
second place, a programme cannot explain every possible 
thing, down to its individual declarative or theoretical 
propositions. That is the business of commentaries 
to the programme. A programme must not be confused 
with a commentary. 
The second question concerns the structure of the 
programme and the order of arrangement of the individual 
chapters within the draft programme. 
Some comrades demand that the chapter on the ultimate 
aim of the movement, on communism, be transferred 
to the end of the programme. I think that this 
demand also is devoid of foundation. Between the chapter 
on the crisis of capitalism and the chapter on the 
transition period, there is in the draft programme a 
chapter on communism, on the communist economic 
system. Is this arrangement of chapters correct? I consider 
that i t is quite correct. You cannot speak of 
the transition period without first speaking of the economic 
system, in this case the communist economic 
system, the transition to which the programme proposes. 
We speak of the transition period, the transition 
from capitalism to another economic system. But a 
transition to what, to what system exactly‹that is 
what must be first discussed before proceeding to describe 
the transition period itself. The programme should 
proceed from the unknown to the known, from the less 
known to the better known. To speak of the crisis of 
capitalism and then of the transition period, without 
first speaking of the system to which the transition is

J. V. S T A L I N 150 
to be made, would confuse the reader and infringe an 
elementary requirement of pedagogy, one that is at the 
same time a requirement for the structure of the programme. 
Well, the programme should make it easier 
for the reader in leading him from the less known to 
the better known, and not make it more difficult for 
him. 
Other comrades think that the paragraph on Social- 
Democracy ought not to be included in the second chapter 
of the draft programme, which deals with the first 
phase of the proletarian revolution and with the partial 
stabilisation of capitalism. They think that they are 
thereby raising a question of the structure of the programme. 
That is not so, comrades. Actually, it is a political 
question that confronts us here. To delete the paragraph 
on Social-Democracy from the second chapter 
would be to commit a political mistake in regard to one 
of the basic questions of the reasons for the partial stabilisation 
of capitalism. It is not a matter here of the 
structure of the programme, but of the appraisal of the 
political situation in the period of partial stabilisation, 
an appraisal of the counter-revolutionary role of Social- 
Democracy as one of the factors of this stabilisation. 
These comrades cannot but know that we cannot dispense 
with a paragraph on Social-Democracy in the chapter 
on the partial stabilisation of capitalism, because this 
stabilisation itself cannot be explained without describing 
the role of Social-Democracy as one of the major 
factors of the stabilisation. Otherwise, we should also 
have to exclude from this chapter the paragraph on 
fascism, and transfer it, like the paragraph on Social- 
Democracy, to the chapter on parties. But to exclude

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 151 
these two paragraphs‹on fascism and on Social-Democracy‹
from the chapter dealing with the partial 
stabilisation of capitalism would mean to disarm ourselves 
and deprive ourselves of all possibility of explaining 
the capitalist stabilisation. Obviously, we 
cannot agree to that. 
The question of NEP and war communism. NEP is a 
policy of the proletarian dictatorship which is designed 
to overcome the capitalist elements and to build a socialist 
economy by utilising the market and through the 
market, and not by direct products-exchange, without 
a market and apart from the market. Can capitalist 
countries, even the most highly developed, dispense 
with NEP in the transition from capitalism to 
socialism? I do not think that they can. In one degree 
or another, the New Economic Policy, with its market 
connections, and the utilisation of these market connections, 
will be absolutely essential for every capitalist 
country in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
We have comrades who deny this proposition. But 
what does denying this proposition mean? 
It means, in the first place, to hold that immediately 
after the proletariat has come to power we shall 
have ready to function 100 per cent a machinery of 
distribution and supply between town and country, 
between industry and small-scale production, which 
will make it possible to establish at once direct 
products-exchange, without a market, without commodity 
circulation, and without a money economy. The matter 
has only to be raised to realise how utterly absurd such 
an assumption is.

J. V. S T A L I N 152 
It means, in the second place, to hold that after the 
seizure of power by the proletariat the proletarian revolution 
must adopt the course of expropriating the middle 
and petty bourgeoisie, must take upon its shoulders the 
incredible burden of finding work and assuring means 
of subsistence for an artificially created army of millions 
of new unemployed. The matter has only to be 
raised to realise how ridiculous and foolish it would be 
for the proletarian dictatorship to adopt such a policy. 
One of the good things about NEP is that it relieves the 
proletarian dictatorship of these and similar difficulties. 
But it follows from this that NEP is an inevitable 
phase of the socialist revolution in all countries. 
Can the same thing be said of war communism? Can 
it be said that war communism is an inevitable phase 
of the proletarian revolution? No, it cannot. War communism 
is a policy forced upon the proletarian dictatorship 
by a situation of war and intervention; it is designed 
for the establishment of direct products-exchange between 
town and country, not through the market but apart 
from the market, chiefly by measures of an extra-economic 
and partially military character, and aims at 
organising such a distribution of products as can ensure 
the supply of the revolutionary armies at the front and 
of the workers in the rear. Obviously, if there had not 
been a situation of war and intervention, there would 
have been no war communism. Consequently, it cannot 
be asserted that war communism is an economically 
inevitable phase of development of the proletarian 
revolution. 
It would be incorrect to think that the proletarian 
dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. began its economic work

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 153 
with war communism. Some comrades incline towards 
this opinion. But it is a wrong opinion. On the contrary, 
the proletarian dictatorship in our country began its 
constructive work not with war communism, but with 
the proclamation of the principles of what is called the 
New Economic Policy. Everyone is familiar with Lenin¹s 
pamphlet, The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power,41 
which was published in the beginning of 1918, and in 
which Lenin first substantiated the principles of the 
New Economic Policy. True, this policy was temporarily 
interrupted by the conditions of intervention, and 
it was only three years later, when war and intervention 
had been ended, that it had to be resumed. But 
the fact that the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. 
had to return to the principles of the New Economic 
Policy, which had already been proclaimed at the beginning 
of 1918‹this fact plainly shows where the proletarian 
dictatorship must begin its constructive work 
on the day following the revolution, and on what it 
must base its constructive work‹if, of course, it is economic 
considerations we have in mind. 
Sometimes war communism is confused with the 
civil war, and the two are identified. That, of course, 
is incorrect. The seizure of power by the proletariat in 
October 1917 was undoubtedly a form of civil war. 
But it would be wrong to say that we began to apply 
war communism in October 1917. It is quite possible 
to conceive a state of civil war in which the methods 
of war communism are not applied, in which the principles 
of the New Economic Policy are not abandoned, 
as was the case in our country in the early part of 1918, 
before the intervention.

J. V. S T A L I N 154 
Some say that the proletarian revolutions will take 
place in isolation from one another, and that therefore 
not a single proletarian revolution will be able to escape 
intervention, and hence war communism. That is 
not true. Now that we have succeeded in consolidating 
Soviet power in the U.S.S.R., now that the Communist 
Parties in the principal capitalist countries have grown 
and the Comintern has increased in strength, there 
cannot and should not be isolated proletarian revolutions. 
We must not overlook such factors as the increasing 
acuteness of the crisis of world capitalism, the existence 
of the Soviet Union, and the growth of communism 
in all countries. (A voice: ³But the revolution in 
Hungary was isolated.²) That was in 1919.42 Now we 
are in 1928. It suffices to recall the revolution in Germany 
in 1923,43 when the proletarian dictatorship in 
the U.S.S.R. was getting ready to render direct assistance 
to the German revolution, to realise how utterly 
relative and conditional the arguments of some comrades 
are. (A voice: ³The isolated revolution in Germany‹ 
the isolation between France and Germany.²) You are 
confusing spatial remoteness with political isolation. 
Spatial remoteness is, of course, a factor. Nevertheless, 
it should not be confused with political isolation. 
And what about the workers in the interventionist 
countries?‹do you think they will remain silent if 
there is intervention in a German revolution, say, and 
will not strike at the interventionists from the rear? 
And what about the U.S.S.R. and its proletariat?‹ 
do you think that the proletarian revolution in the 
U.S.S.R. will look calmly on at the misdeeds of the 
interventionists?

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 155 
To injure the interventionists, it is by no means 
essential to establish spatial connection with the revolutionary 
country. It is enough to sting the interventionists 
at those points in their own territory which 
are most vulnerable to make them sense the danger 
and comprehend the full reality of proletarian solidarity. 
Suppose that we offended bourgeois Britain in the 
Leningrad area and caused her serious damage. Does 
it follow that Britain would necessarily take revenge 
on us in Leningrad? No, it does not. She might take 
revenge on us somewhere else, in Batum, Odessa, Baku, 
or Vladivostok, say. The same is true of the forms of 
assistance and support rendered by the proletarian 
dictatorship to a proletarian revolution in one of the 
countries of Europe, say, against imperialist interventionists. 
But while it cannot be admitted that intervention, 
and hence war communism, must necessarily occur in 
all countries, it can and should be admitted that they are 
more or less probable. Therefore, while not agreeing 
with the arguments of these comrades, I do agree with 
their conclusion, namely, that the formula in the draft 
programme which speaks of the possibility, in definite 
international conditions, of war communism in countries 
where a proletarian revolution has taken place, 
might be replaced by a formula saying that intervention 
and war communism are more or less probable. 
The question of the nationalisation of the land. I do 
not agree with those comrades who propose that the 
formula on the nationalisation of the land in the case 
of capitalistically developed countries should be altered, 
and who demand that in such countries the nationali

J. V. S T A L I N 156 
sation of all the land should be proclaimed on the first 
day of the proletarian revolution. 
Nor do I agree with those comrades who propose 
that nothing at all should be said about the nationalisation 
of all the land in the capitalistically developed countries. 
In my opinion, it would be better to speak, as the 
draft programme does, of the eventual nationalisation 
of all the land, with an addition to the effect that the 
right of the small and middle peasants to use of the land 
will be guaranteed. 
Those comrades are mistaken who think that the 
more capitalistically developed a country is, the easier 
it will be to nationalise all the land in that country. 
On the contrary, the more capitalistically developed a 
country is, the more difficult will it be to nationalise 
all the land, because the stronger are the traditions of 
private ownership of the land in that country, and the 
harder, therefore, will it be to combat those traditions. 
Read Lenin¹s theses on the agrarian question at 
the Second Congress of the Comintern,44 where he explicitly 
warns against hasty and incautious steps in this 
direction, and you will understand how mistaken the 
assertions of these comrades are. In the capitalistically 
developed countries private ownership of the land has 
existed for centuries, which cannot be said of the countries 
less developed capitalistically, where the principle 
of private ownership of the land has not yet become 
deeply rooted in the peasantry. Here, in Russia, 
the peasants at one time even used to say that the land 
belonged to no man, that i t was God¹s land. This, 
in fact, explains why as early as 1906, in expectation 
of a bourgeois-democratic revolution in our country,

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 157 
Lenin put forward the slogan of the nationalisation of 
all the land, with the proviso that the small and middle 
peasants should be guaranteed the use of the land, considering 
that the peasants would understand this and 
reconcile themselves to it. 
Is it not noteworthy, on the other hand, that in 1920, 
at the Second Congress of the Comintern, Lenin himself 
warned the Communist Parties of the capitalistically 
developed countries not to put forward immediately 
the slogan of nationalising all the land, since the peasants 
of these countries, imbued as they are with the 
private property instinct, would not stomach such a 
slogan at once. Can we ignore this difference and refuse 
to pay heed to Lenin¹s recommendations? Obviously, 
we cannot. 
The question of the inner substance of the draft programme. 
It appears that certain comrades consider that 
in its inner substance the draft programme is not quite 
international, because, they say, it is ³too Russian² 
in character. I have not heard such objections put forward 
here. But it appears that such objections exist 
in some circles round about the Comintern. 
What can have furnished grounds for such an opinion? 
Is it, perhaps, the fact that the draft programme 
contains a special chapter on the U.S.S.R.? But what 
can there be bad in that? Is our revolution, in its character, 
a national and only a national revolution, and 
not pre-eminently an international revolution? If so, 
why do we call it a base of the world revolutionary 
movement, an instrument for the revolutionary development 
of all countries, the motherland of the world 
proletariat?

J. V. S T A L I N 158 
There were people among us‹our oppositionists, 
for instance‹who considered that the revolution in 
the U.S.S.R. was exclusively or mainly a national revolution. 
It was on this point that they came to grief. 
It is strange that there are people round about the Comintern, 
it appears, who are prepared to follow in the 
footsteps of the oppositionists. 
Perhaps our revolution is, in type, a national and 
only a national revolution? But our revolution is a 
Soviet revolution, and the Soviet form of proletarian 
state is more or less obligatory for the dictatorship of 
the proletariat in other countries. It is not without 
reason that Lenin said that the revolution in the U.S.S.R. 
had ushered in a new era in the history of development, 
the era of Soviets. Does it not follow from this that, 
not only as regards its character but also as regards its 
type, our revolution is pre-eminently an international 
revolution, one that presents a pattern of what, in 
the main, a proletarian revolution should be in any 
country? 
Undoubtedly, the international character of our 
revolution imposes upon the proletarian dictatorship 
in the U.S.S.R. certain duties towards the proletarians 
and oppressed masses of the whole world. This was what 
Lenin had in mind when he said that the proletarian 
dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. exists in order to do 
everything possible for the development and victory 
of the proletarian revolution in other countries. But 
what follows from this? It follows, at least, that our 
revolution is part of the world revolution, a base and 
an instrument of the world revolutionary movement. 
Undoubtedly, too, not only has the revolution in

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 159 
the U.S.S.R. duties towards the proletarians of all countries, 
duties which it is discharging, but the proletarians 
of all countries have certain fairly important duties 
towards the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. 
These duties consist in supporting the proletariat of the 
U.S.S.R. in its struggle against internal and external 
enemies, in war against a war designed to strangle the 
proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R., in advocating 
that imperialist armies should directly go over to the 
side of the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R. in 
the event of an attack on the U.S.S.R. But does it not 
follow from this that the revolution in the U.S.S.R. 
is inseparable from the revolutionary movement in other 
countries, that the triumph of the revolution in the 
U.S.S.R. is a triumph for the revolution throughout the 
world? 
Is it possible, after all this, to speak of the revolution 
in the U.S.S.R. as being only a national revolution, 
isolated from and having no connection with the revolutionary 
movement throughout the world? 
And, on the other hand, is it possible, after all this, 
to understand anything at all about the world revolutionary 
movement, if it is considered out of connection 
with the proletarian revolution in the U.S.S.R.? 
What would be the value of the programme of the 
Comintern, which deals with the world proletarian revolution, 
if it ignored the fundamental question of the 
character and tasks of the proletarian revolution in 
the U.S.S.R., its duties towards the proletarians of 
all countries, and the duties of the proletarians of all 
countries towards the proletarian dictatorship in the 
U.S.S.R.?

J. V. S T A L I N 160 
That is why I think that the objections concerning 
the ³Russian character² of the draft programme of the 
Comintern bear the stamp‹how shall I put it mildly?‹ 
well, a bad stamp, an unpleasant flavour. 
Let us pass to a few separate remarks. 
I consider that those comrades are right who suggest 
amending the sentence on page 55 of the draft programme 
which speaks of the labouring sections of the 
rural population ³who follow the proletarian dictatorship.² 
This sentence is an obvious misunderstanding, 
or perhaps it is a proof-reader¹s error. It should be 
amended. 
But these comrades are quite wrong when they propose 
the inclusion in the draft programme of all the 
definitions of the dictatorship of the proletariat given 
by Lenin. (Laughter.) On page 52 we have the following 
definition of the dictatorship of the proletariat, taken 
in the main from Lenin: 
³The dictatorship of the proletariat is the continuation of 
its class struggle in new conditions. The dictatorship of the proletariat 
is a stubborn struggle‹bloody and bloodless, violent 
and peaceful, military and economic, educational and administrative‹
against the forces and traditions of the old society, against 
the external capitalist enemies, against the remnants of the exploiting 
classes at home, against the shoots of a new bourgeoisie 
that spring from the soil of commodity production which has not 
yet been eliminated.²45 
The draft programme contains also a number of other 
definitions of the dictatorship, corresponding to the 
particular tasks of the dictatorship at various stages 
of the proletarian revolution. I think that this is quite

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 161 
sufficient. (A voice: ³One of Lenin¹s formulations has 
been omitted.²) Lenin has whole pages on the dictatorship 
of the proletariat. If they were all to be included in 
the draft programme, I am afraid it would be increased 
to at least three times its size. 
Incorrect, too, is the objection raised by some comrades 
to the thesis on the neutralisation of the middle 
peasantry. In his theses at the Second Congress of the Comintern, 
Lenin explicitly states that on the eve of the seizure 
of power and in the first stage of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat in the capitalist countries the Communist 
Parties cannot count on anything more than neutralising 
the middle peasantry. Lenin explicitly states that only 
after the dictatorship of the proletariat has been consolidated 
can the Communist Parties count on organising 
a stable alliance with the middle peasant. Clearly, 
when compiling the draft programme, we could not ignore 
this directive of Lenin¹s, to say nothing of the fact 
that it coincides exactly with the experience of our revolution. 
Incorrect, too, is the comment on the national question 
made by a number of comrades. These comrades 
have no grounds for asserting that the draft programme 
ignores the national factors in the revolutionary movement. 
The question of the colonies is fundamentally a 
national one. Imperialist oppression, oppression in the 
colonies, national self-determination, the right of nations 
and colonies to secession, etc., are given sufficient 
prominence in the draft programme. 
If it is the national minorities in Central Europe 
that these comrades have in mind, this may be mentioned 
in the draft programme, but I am opposed to the

J. V. S T A L I N 162 
national question in Central Europe being given separate 
treatment in it. 
Lastly, as to the remarks made by a number of comrades 
on the statement that Poland is a country representing 
the second type of development towards proletarian 
dictatorship. These comrades think that the classification 
of countries into three types‹countries with a 
high capitalist development (America, Germany, Britain), 
countries with an average capitalist development 
(Poland, Russia before the February Revolution, etc.), 
and colonial countries‹is wrong. They maintain that 
Poland should be included in the first type of countries, 
that one can speak only of two types of countries‹capitalist 
and colonial. 
That is not true, comrades. Besides capitalistically 
developed countries, where the victory of the revolution 
will lead at once to the proletarian dictatorship, 
there are countries which are little developed capitalistically, 
where there are feudal survivals and a special 
agrarian problem of the anti-feudal type (Poland, Rumania, 
etc.), countries where the petty bourgeoisie, 
especially the peasantry, is bound to have a weighty 
word to say in the event of a revolutionary upheaval, 
and where the victory of the revolution, in order to lead 
to a proletarian dictatorship, can and certainly will require 
certain intermediate stages, in the form, say, of 
a dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. 
In our country, too, there were people, such as 
Trotsky, who before the February Revolution said that 
the peasantry was not of serious consequence, and that 
the slogan of the moment was ³no tsar, but a workers¹ 
government.² You know that Lenin emphatically dis

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 163 
sociated himself from this slogan and objected to any 
underestimation of the role and importance of the petty 
bourgeoisie, especially of the peasantry. There were 
some in our country at that time who thought that after 
the overthrow of tsarism the proletariat would at once 
occupy the predominating position. But how did it turn 
out in reality? It turned out that immediately after 
the February Revolution the vast masses of the petty 
bourgeoisie appeared on the scene and gave predominance 
to the petty-bourgeois parties, the Socialist-Revolutionaries 
and the Mensheviks. The Socialist-Revolutionaries 
and the Mensheviks, who had been tiny parties 
until then, ³suddenly² became the predominating force 
in the country. Thanks to what? Thanks to the fact that 
the vast masses of the petty bourgeoisie at first supported 
the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks. 
This, incidently, explains why the proletarian dictatorship 
was established in our country as a result of 
the more or less rapid growing over of the bourgeoisdemocratic 
revolution into a socialist revolution. 
There is scarcely reason to doubt that Poland and 
Rumania belong to the category of countries which will 
have to pass, more or less rapidly, through certain intermediate 
stages on the way to the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. 
That is why I think that these comrades are mistaken 
when they deny that there are three types of revolutionary 
movement on the way towards the dictatorship of the 
proletariat. Poland and Rumania are representative of 
the second type. 
These, comrades, are my remarks on the draft programme 
of the Comintern.

J. V. S T A L I N 164 
As to the style of the draft programme, or of certain 
individual formulations, I cannot affirm that in 
this respect the draft programme is perfect. It is to 
be presumed that some things will have to be improved, 
more precisely defined, that the style, perhaps, will 
have to be simplified, and so on. But that is a matter 
for the Programme Commission of the Sixth Congress 
of the Comintern.46

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE GRAIN PROBLEM 
Speech Delivered on July 9, 1928 
Comrades, before I pass to the specific question of 
our difficulties on the grain front, allow me to deal 
with some general questions of theoretical interest 
which arose here during the discussion at the plenum. 
First of all, the general question of the chief sources 
of development of our industry, the means of guaranteeing 
our present rate of industrialisation. 
Ossinsky and then Sokolnikov touched upon this 
question, perhaps without themselves realising it. It is 
a question of paramount importance. 
I think that there are two chief sources nourishing 
our industry: firstly, the working class; secondly, the 
peasantry. 
In the capitalist countries industrialisation was usually 
effected, in the main, by robbing other countries, 
by robbing colonies or defeated countries, or with the 
help of substantial and more or less enslaving loans 
from abroad. 
You know that for hundreds of years Britain collected 
capital from all her colonies and from all parts 
of the world, and was able in this way to make additional 
investments in her industry. This, incidentally,

J. V. S T A L I N 166 
explains why Britain at one time became the ³workshop 
of the world.² 
You know also that Germany developed her industry 
with the help, among other things, of the 5,000 million 
francs she levied as an indemnity on France after the 
Franco-Prussian war. 
One respect in which our country differs from the 
capitalist countries is that it cannot and must not engage 
in colonial robbery, or the plundering of other countries 
in general. That way, therefore, is closed to us. 
Neither, however, does our country have or want 
to have enslaving loans from abroad. Consequently, that 
way, too, is closed to us. 
What then remains? Only one thing, and that is to 
develop industry, to industrialise the country with the 
help of internal accumulations. 
Under the bourgeois system in our country, industry, 
transport, etc., were usually developed with the help 
of loans. Whether you take the building of new factories 
or the re-equipment of old ones, whether you take 
the laying of new railways or the erection of big electric 
power stations‹not one of these undertakings was able 
to dispense with foreign loans. But they were enslaving 
loans. 
Quite different is the situation in our country under 
the Soviet system. We are building the Turkestan Railway, 
with a length of 1,400 versts, which requires hundreds 
of millions of rubles. We are erecting the Dnieper 
Hydro-Electric Power Station, which also requires hundreds 
of millions of rubles. But have they involved us 
in any enslaving loans? No, they have not. All this 
is being done with the help of internal accumulations.

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 167 
But what are the chief sources of these accumulations? 
As I have said, there are two such sources: firstly, 
the working class, which creates values and advances 
our industry; secondly, the peasantry. 
The way matters stand with the peasantry in this respect 
is as follows: it not only pays the state the usual 
taxes, direct and indirect; it also overpays in the relatively 
high prices for manufactured goods‹that is in 
the first place, and it is more or less underpaid in the 
prices for agricultural produce‹that is in the second 
place. 
This is an additional tax levied on the peasantry 
for the sake of promoting industry, which caters for 
the whole country, the peasantry included. It is something 
in the nature of a ³tribute,² of a supertax, which we 
are compelled to levy for the time being in order to 
preserve and accelerate our present rate of industrial 
development, in order to ensure an industry for the 
whole country, in order to raise further the standard 
of life of the rural population and then to abolish altogether 
this additional tax, these ³scissors² between 
town and country. 
It is an unpalatable business, there is no denying. 
But we should not be Bolsheviks if we slurred over it 
and closed our eyes to the fact that, unfortunately, our 
industry and our country cannot at present dispense with 
this additional tax on the peasantry. 
Why do I speak of this? Because some comrades, apparently, 
do not understand this indisputable truth. 
They based their speeches on the fact that the peasants 
are overpaying for manufactured goods, which is absolutely 
true, and are being underpaid for agricultural

J. V. S T A L I N 168 
produce, which is also true. But what do they demand? 
They demand the establishment of replacement prices 
for grain, so that these ³scissors,² these underpayments 
and overpayments, would be done away with at once. 
But what would be the effect of doing away with the 
³scissors² this year or next year, say? The effect would 
be to retard the industrialisation of the country, including 
the industrialisation of agriculture, to undermine 
our young industry which is not yet firmly on its 
feet, and thus to strike at our entire national economy. 
Can we agree to this? Obviously, we cannot. Should the 
³scissors² between town and country, should all these 
underpayments and overpayments be done away with? 
Yes, they certainly should. Can we do away with them 
at once without weakening our industry, and hence our 
national economy? No, we cannot. 
What, then, should our policy be? It should be gradually 
to close the ³scissors,² to diminish the gap from 
year to year, by lowering the prices for manufactured 
goods and improving agricultural technique‹which 
cannot but result in reducing the cost of producing grain‹ 
and then, within the space of a number of years, to do 
away completely with this additional tax on the peasantry. 
Are the peasants capable of bearing this burden? 
They undoubtedly are: firstly, because this burden will 
grow lighter from year to year, and, secondly, because 
this additional tax is being levied not under conditions 
of capitalist development, where the masses of the peasantry 
are condemned to poverty and exploitation, but 
under Soviet conditions, where exploitation of the peasants 
by the socialist state is out of the question, and

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 169 
where this additional tax is being paid in a situation 
in which the living standards of the peasantry are steadily 
rising. 
That is how matters stand with regard to the basic 
sources of the industrialisation of our country at the 
present time. 
The second question concerns the problem of the 
bond with the middle peasant‹the problem of the aims 
of the bond and the means for effecting it. 
It would follow from what some comrades say that 
the bond between town and country, between the working 
class and the main mass of the peasantry, is based 
exclusively on textiles, on satisfying the personal requirements 
of the peasantry. Is this true? It is quite 
untrue, comrades. Of course, it is of immense importance 
to satisfy the peasants¹ personal requirements 
for textiles. That is how we began to establish the bond 
with the peasantry in the new conditions. But to assert 
on these grounds that the bond based on textiles 
is the beginning and end of the matter, that the bond 
based on satisfying the peasants¹ personal requirements 
is the all-inclusive or chief foundation of the economic 
alliance between the working class and the peasantry, 
is to commit a most serious error. Actually, the bond 
between town and country is based not only on satisfying 
the peasants¹ personal requirements, not only on 
textiles, but also on satisfying the economic requirements 
of the peasants as producers of agricultural products. 
It is not only cotton fabrics that we give the peasants. 
We also give them machines of all kinds, seeds, 
ploughs, fertilisers, etc., which are of the weightiest

J. V. S T A L I N 170 
importance for the advancement and socialist transformation 
of peasant farming. 
Hence, the bond is based not only on textiles, but 
also on metals. Without this, the bond with the peasantry 
would be insecure. 
In what way does the bond based on textiles differ 
from the bond based on metals? Primarily in the fact 
that the bond based on textiles chiefly concerns the peasants¹ 
personal requirements, without affecting, or affecting 
to a comparatively small extent, the production 
side of peasant farming, whereas the bond based on metals 
chiefly concerns the production side of peasant farming, 
improving it, mechanising it, making it more remunerative 
and paving the way for uniting the scattered and 
small peasant farms into large socially-conducted farms. 
It would be a mistake to think that the purpose of 
the bond is to preserve classes, the peasant class in 
particular. That is not so, comrades. That is not the 
purpose of the bond at all. The purpose of the bond is 
to bring the peasantry closer to the working class, the 
leader of our entire development, to strengthen the alliance 
of the peasantry with the working class, the leading 
force in the alliance, gradually to remould the peasantry, 
its mentality and its production, along collectivist lines, 
and thus to bring about the conditions for the abolition 
of classes. 
The purpose of the bond is not to preserve classes, 
but to abolish them. Whereas the bond based on textiles 
affects the production side of peasant farming very 
little and therefore, generally speaking, cannot result 
in the remoulding of the peasantry along collectivist lines 
and in the abolition of classes, the bond based upon

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 171 
metals, on the contrary, affects primarily the production 
side of peasant farming, its mechanisation and its 
collectivisation, and for this very reason should result 
in the gradual remoulding of the peasantry, in the gradual 
elimination of classes, including the peasant class. 
How, in general, can the peasant‹his mentality, 
his production‹be remoulded, remade, along the lines 
of bringing his mentality closer to that of the working 
class, along the lines of the socialist principle of production? 
What does this require? 
It requires, firstly, the widest agitation on behalf 
of collectivism among the peasant masses. 
It requires, secondly, implanting a co-operative communal 
life and the ever wider extension of our co-operative 
supply and marketing organisations to the millions of 
peasant farms. There can be no doubt that had it not 
been for the broad development of our co-operatives, 
we should not have that swing towards the collectivefarm 
movement that we observe among the peasants at 
the present time, for the development of supply and 
marketing co-operatives is in our conditions a means of 
preparing the peasants for going over to collective 
farming. 
But all this is still far from enough to remould the 
peasantry. The principal force for remoulding the peasantry 
along socialist lines lies in new technical means 
in agriculture, the mechanisation of agriculture, collective 
peasant labour, and the electrification of the country. 
Lenin has been referred to here, and a passage on 
the bond with peasant farming has been quoted from 
his works. But to take Lenin in part, without desiring 
to take him as a whole, is to misrepresent Lenin. Lenin

J. V. S T A L I N 172 
was fully aware that the bond with the peasantry based 
on textile goods is a very important matter. But he did 
not stop there, for, side by side with this, he insisted 
that the bond with the peasantry should be based also 
on metals, on supplying the peasant with machines, 
on the electrification of the country, that is, on all those 
things which promote the remaking and remoulding 
of peasant farming on collectivist lines. 
Please listen, for example, to the following quotation 
from Lenin: 
³The remaking of the small tiller, the remoulding of his 
whole mentality and habits, is a work of generations. As regards 
the small tiller, this problem can be solved, his whole mentality 
can be put on healthy lines, so to speak, only by the material 
base, by technical means, by introducing tractors and machines 
in agriculture on a mass scale, by electrification on a mass scale. 
That is what would remake the small tiller fundamentally and 
with immense rapidity² (Vol. XXVI, p. 239). 
Quite clearly, the alliance between the working 
class and the peasantry cannot be stable and lasting, the 
bond cannot be stable and lasting and cannot attain its 
purpose of gradually remoulding the peasantry, bringing 
it closer to the working class and putting it on collectivist 
lines, if the bond based on textiles is not supplemented 
by the bond based on metals. 
That is how Comrade Lenin understood the bond. 
The third question is that of the New Economic Policy 
(NEP) and the class struggle under NEP conditions. 
It is necessary first of all to establish the point 
that the principles of NEP were laid down by our Party 
not after war communism, as certain comrades sometimes 
assert, but before it, already at the beginning of 1918,

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 173 
when we were able for the first time to set about building 
a new, socialist economy. I could refer to Ilyich¹s 
pamphlet, The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power, 
published in the beginning of 1918, where the principles 
of NEP are set forth. When the intervention ended and 
the Party introduced NEP, it described it as a new economic 
policy because this policy had been interrupted 
by the intervention and we were in a position to apply 
it only after the intervention, after war communism, 
compared with which NEP really was a new economic 
policy. In confirmation of this, I consider it necessary 
to refer to the resolution of the Ninth Congress of Soviets, 
where it is stated in black and white that the principles 
of the New Economic Policy were laid down before war 
communism. This resolution, ³Preliminary Results of the 
New Economic Policy,² says the following: 
³What i s known as the New Economic Policy, the basic 
principles of which were precisely defined already at the time of 
the first respite, in the spring of 1918,* is based on a strict evaluation 
of the economic resources of Soviet Russia. The implementation 
of this policy, which was interrupted by the combined attack 
of the counter-revolutionary forces of the Russian landlords and 
bourgeoisie and European imperialism on the workers¹ and peasants¹ 
state, became possible only after the armed suppression 
of the counter-revolutionary attempts, at the beginning of 1921² 
(see Resolutions of the Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets, 
p. 1647). 
You will thus see how mistaken is the assertion of 
some comrades that it was only after war communism 
that the Party realised the necessity for building socialism 
in the conditions of a market and a money economy, 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 174 
that is, in the conditions of the New Economic Policy. 
And what follows from this? 
It follows, first of all, that NEP cannot be regarded 
as only a retreat. 
It follows, further, that NEP presumes a victorious 
and systematic socialist offensive on the capitalist elements 
in our economy. 
The opposition, in the shape of Trotsky, thinks 
that once NEP has been introduced, only one thing remains 
for us to do, and that is to retreat step by 
step, as we retreated at the beginning of NEP, ³extending² 
NEP and surrendering positions. I t i s on 
this incorrect conception of NEP that Trotsky bases 
his assertion that the Party ³extended² NEP and retreated 
from Lenin¹s position by permitting the renting of 
land and the hiring of labour in the countryside. Please 
listen to Trotsky¹s words: 
³But what is the significance of the Soviet Government¹s 
latest measures in the countryside‹sanctioning the renting of 
land and the hiring of labour‹all that which we call extending 
rural NEP. . . . But could we have abstained from extending NEP 
in the countryside? No, because then peasant farming would have 
fallen into decay, the market would have narrowed, and industry 
would have been retarded² (Trotsky, Eight Years, pp. 16-17). 
That is the length to which one may go if one gets 
into one¹s head the mistaken notion that NEP is a retreat 
and nothing but a retreat. 
Can i t be asserted that, in permitting the hiring 
of labour and the renting of land in the countryside, the 
Party ³extended² NEP, ³retreated² from Lenin¹s position 
and so on? Of course not! People who talk such nonsense 
have nothing in common with Lenin and Leninism.

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 175 
I might refer to Lenin¹s letter to Ossinsky of April 
1, 1922, where he speaks explicitly of the necessity of 
permitting the hiring of labour and the renting of land 
in the countryside. That was towards the end of the Eleventh 
Party Congress, where the question of work in the 
countryside, of NEP and its consequences had been 
widely discussed by the delegates. 
Here is a quotation from this letter, forming the 
draft of a resolution for the delegates at the Party congress: 
³On the question of the conditions for permitting the hiring 
of labour in agriculture and the renting of land, the Party Congress 
recommends all functionaries engaged in this field not to 
hamper either of these trends with excessive formalities, and to 
confine themselves to carrying out the decision of the last congress 
of Soviets, and also to studying what practical measures would 
be expedient in order to restrict the possibility of extremes and 
harmful excesses in this matter² (see Lenin Miscellany, IV, p. 39648). 
You see how foolish and baseless is the talk about 
an ³extension² of NEP, about a ³retreat² from Lenin¹s 
position in connection with the introduction of the 
renting of land and the hiring of labour in the countryside, 
etc. 
Why do I speak of this? 
Because the people who are talking about an ³extension² 
of NEP are seeking to use this talk as a justification 
for retreating in face of the capitalist elements in 
the countryside. 
Because people have arisen inside and around our 
Party who see in the ³extension² of NEP a means of 
³saving² the bond between the workers and the peasants, 
people who, on the grounds of the repeal of the emergency

J. V. S T A L I N 176 
measures, demand that the restrictions on the kulaks be 
discarded, and who demand that the capitalist elements 
in the countryside be given a free hand‹in the interests 
of the bond. 
Because the Party must be safeguarded against these 
anti-proletarian sentiments by all ways and means in 
our power. 
Not to go too far afield, I shall refer to a note from 
a comrade, Osip Chernov, a member of the staff of 
Bednota,49 in which he demands a series of relaxations 
for the kulaks, relaxations which would be nothing but 
a real and undisguised ³extension² of NEP. I do not 
know whether he is a Communist or not. But this comrade, 
Osip Chernov, who is a supporter of the Soviet 
regime and of the alliance between the workers and the 
peasants, is so muddled over the peasant question that 
it is difficult to distinguish him from an ideologist 
of the rural bourgeoisie. What, in his opinion, are the 
reasons for our difficulties on the grain front? ³The 
first reason,² he says, ³is unquestionably the progressive 
income tax system. . . . The second reason is the legal 
changes in the election regulations, the lack of clarity 
in the regulations as to who is to be regarded as a kulak.² 
What must be done to remove the difficulties? ³It 
is necessary in the first place,² he says, ³to abolish the 
progressive income tax system as it now stands, and replace 
it by a land taxation system, and to put a light 
tax on draught animals and major agricultural implements. 
. . . A second, and no less important, measure 
is to revise the election regulations, so as to make more 
prominent the signs showing where an exploiting, ku- 
lak farm begins.²

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 177 
There you have the ³extension² of NEP. As you see, 
the seed cast by Trotsky has not fallen on barren soil. 
Incorrect understanding of NEP gives rise to talk about 
³extension² of NEP, and talk about ³extension² of 
NEP results in all sorts of notes, articles, letters and 
proposals recommending that the kulak should be allowed 
a free hand, that he should be relieved of restrictions 
and enabled to enrich himself without hindrance. 
In reference to this same question, the question of 
NEP and the class struggle under NEP conditions, I 
should like to mention another fact. I am referring to 
the statement made by one of the comrades to the effect 
that, in connection with the grain procurements, the 
class struggle under NEP i s only of minor importance, 
that this class struggle is not and cannot be of 
any serious importance in our grain procurement difficulties. 
I must say, comrades, that I cannot at all agree with 
this statement. I think that, under the dictatorship of 
the proletariat, there is not and cannot be a single political 
or economic fact of any importance which does not 
reflect the existence of a class struggle in town or country. 
Does NEP abolish the dictatorship of the proletariat? 
Of course not! On the contrary, NEP is a specific 
form of expression and an instrument of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat. And is not the dictatorship 
of the proletariat a continuation of the class struggle? 
(Voices: ³True!²) How, then, can it be said that the class 
struggle plays only a minor role in such important political 
and economic facts as the kulaks¹ attack on Soviet 
policy at the time of the grain procurements and the 
counter-measures and offensive actions undertaken by

J. V. S T A L I N 178 
the Soviet Government against the kulaks and speculators 
in connection with the grain procurements? 
Is it not a fact that at the time of the grain procurement 
crisis we had the f i r s t serious attack by the 
capitalist elements of the countryside on Soviet policy 
under NEP conditions? 
Have classes and the class struggle ceased to exist 
in the countryside? 
Is it not true that Lenin¹s slogan about relying on 
the poor peasant, an alliance with the middle peasant 
and fighting against the kulaks is the basic slogan 
of our work in the countryside under the present conditions? 
And what is this slogan if not an expression of 
the class struggle in the countryside? 
Of course, our policy must by no means be regarded 
as a policy of fanning the class struggle. Why? Because 
fanning the class struggle would lead to civil war. Because, 
inasmuch as we are in power, and inasmuch as we 
have consolidated our power and the key positions are 
in the hands of the working class, it is not in our interest 
that the class struggle should assume the forms of civil 
war. But this in no way implies that the class struggle 
has been abolished, or that it will not grow sharper. 
Still less does it imply that the class struggle is not the 
decisive factor in our advancement. No, it does not. 
We often say that we are promoting socialist forms 
of economy in the sphere of trade. But what does that 
imply? It implies that we are squeezing out of trade 
thousands upon thousands of small and medium traders. 
Is it to be expected that these traders who have been 
squeezed out of the sphere of trade will keep silent and 
not attempt to organise resistance? Obviously not.

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 179 
We often say that we are promoting socialist forms 
of economy in the sphere of industry. But what does 
that imply? It implies that, by our advance towards 
socialism, we are squeezing out and ruining, perhaps 
without ourselves noticing it, thousands upon thousands 
of small and medium capitalist manufacturers. Is it to 
be expected that these ruined people will keep silent 
and not attempt to organise resistance? Of course not. 
We often say that it is necessary to restrict the exploiting 
proclivities of the kulaks in the countryside, 
that they must be heavily taxed and the right to rent 
land limited, that kulaks must not be allowed the right 
to vote in the election of Soviets, and so on and so forth. 
But what does that imply? It implies that we are gradually 
pressing upon and squeezing out the capitalist elements 
in the countryside, sometimes driving them to 
ruin. Is it to be presumed that the kulaks will be grateful 
to us for this and will not endeavour to organise part 
of the poor peasants or middle peasants against the Soviet 
Government¹s policy? Of course not. 
Is it not obvious that our whole forward movement, 
our every success of any importance in the sphere of 
socialist construction, is an expression and result of the 
class struggle in our country? 
But it follows from all this that the more we advance, 
the greater will be the resistance of the capitalist 
elements and the sharper the class struggle, while 
the Soviet Government, whose strength will steadily increase, 
will pursue a policy of isolating these elements, 
a policy of demoralising the enemies of the working 
class, a policy, lastly, of crushing the resistance of the 
exploiters, thereby creating a basis for the further

J. V. S T A L I N 180 
advance of the working class and the main mass of the 
peasantry. 
It must not be imagined that the socialist forms will 
develop, squeezing out the enemies of the working class, 
while our enemies retreat in silence and make way for 
our advance, that then we shall again advance and they 
will again retreat until ³unexpectedly² all the social 
groups without exception, both kulaks and poor peasants, 
both workers and capitalists, find themselves ³suddenly² 
and ³imperceptibly,² without struggle or commotion, 
in the lap of a socialist society. Such fairy-tales do 
not and cannot happen in general, and in the conditions 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat in particular. 
It never has been and never will be the case that 
a dying class surrenders its positions voluntarily without 
attempting to organise resistance. It never has been 
and never will be the case that the working class could 
advance towards socialism in a class society without 
struggle or commotion. On the contrary, the advance 
towards socialism cannot but cause the exploiting elements 
to resist the advance, and the resistance of the 
exploiters cannot but lead to the inevitable sharpening 
of the class struggle. 
That is why the working class must not be lulled 
with talk about the class struggle playing a secondary 
role. 
The fourth question concerns the problem of emergency 
measures against the kulaks and speculators. 
Emergency measures must not be regarded as something 
absolute and established once for all. Emergency 
measures are necessary and expedient in definite, emergency 
circumstances, when no other means of manoeuvr

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 181 
ing are available. Emergency measures are unnecessary 
and harmful in other circumstances, when other, flexible 
means of manoeuvring in the market are available. 
Those who think that emergency measures are a bad 
thing in all circumstances are mistaken. A systematic 
struggle must be waged against such people. But mistaken, 
too, are those who think that emergency measures 
are necessary and expedient at all times. A resolute 
struggle against such people is essential. 
Was it a mistake to resort to emergency measures 
in the conditions of the grain procurement crisis? It is 
now recognised by all that it was not a mistake, that, 
on the contrary, the emergency measures saved the 
country from a crisis of our whole economy. What induced 
us to resort to these measures? The deficit of 128,000,000 
poods of grain by January of this year, which we had to 
make good before the roads were spoiled by the spring 
thaws, at the same time ensuring a normal rate of grain 
procurement. Could we refrain from resorting to emergency 
measures in the absence of a reserve of about 
100,000,000 poods of grain essential for being able to 
hold out and to intervene in the market with the object 
of reducing grain prices, or in the absence of an adequate 
reserve of foreign currency essential for importing 
large quantities of grain from abroad? Obviously, we could 
not. And what would have happened if we had not made 
good this deficit? We should now be having a most 
serious crisis of our entire national economy, hunger in 
the towns and hunger in the army. 
If we had had a reserve of about 100,000,000 poods 
of grain with which to hold out and then wear down the 
kulak by intervening in the market with a view to

J. V. S T A L I N 182 
reducing grain prices, we should not, of course, have resorted 
to emergency measures. But you know very well 
that we had no such reserve. 
If at that time we had had a foreign currency reserve 
of 100,000,000 or 150,000,000 rubles with which to import 
grain from abroad, most likely we should not have resorted 
to emergency measures. But you know very well 
that we had no such reserve. 
Does that mean that we should continue to remain 
without a reserve in the future and again resort to the 
aid of emergency measures? No, it does not. On the contrary, 
we must do everything in our power to accumulate 
reserves and to rule out completely the necessity 
of resorting to any emergency measures. People who 
contemplate converting the emergency measures into a 
permanent or prolonged policy of our Party are dangerous, 
because they are playing with fire and are a source 
of danger to the bond. 
Does it follow from this that we must renounce once 
for all resort to emergency measures? No, it does not. 
We have no grounds for asserting that emergency circumstances 
necessitating resort to emergency measures 
will never recur. To assert that would be sheer quackery. 
Lenin demonstrated the necessity for the New Economic 
Policy; yet he did not consider it possible under 
NEP to renounce resort even to the methods of the Poor 
Peasants¹ Committees in certain conditions and under 
certain circumstances. Still less can we renounce once 
for all resort to emergency measures, which cannot be 
put on a par with so drastic a measure for combating 
the kulaks as the methods of the Poor Peasants¹ Committees.

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 183 
It may not be superfluous to recall an incident involving 
Preobrazhensky at the Eleventh Congress of 
our Party that has a direct bearing on the matter in 
hand. You know that at the Eleventh Congress in his 
theses on work in the countryside Preobrazhensky attempted 
to reject ³once for all² under NEP conditions the 
policy of combating the kulaks by the methods of the Poor 
Peasants¹ Committees. Preobrazhensky wrote in his theses: 
³The policy of repudiating this stratum (the kulaks and 
well-to-do peasants) and of gross extra-economic suppression 
of it by the methods of the Poor Peasants¹ Committees 
of 1918 would be a most harmful mistake² (§2). 
You know that Lenin replied to this as follows: 
³The second sentence of the second paragraph (directed 
against the methods of the Poor Peasants¹ Committees¹) is harmful 
and wrong, since war, for example, might compel us to resort to 
the methods of the Poor Peasants¹ Committees. This should be spoken 
of quite differently‹in this way, for example: in view of the 
paramount importance of improving agriculture and increasing 
its output, the policy of the proletariat towards the kulaks and 
well-to-do peasants at the present moment* should aim chiefly 
at r e s t r i c t i n g their exploiting efforts, and so forth. The 
whole point lies in the ways and means by which our state can 
and should restrict those efforts and protect the poor peasants. 
This must be studied and we must see to it that it is studied practically, 
but general phrases are f u t i l e² (see Lenin Miscellany, 
IV, p. 39150). 
Clearly, emergency measures must be regarded dialectically, 
for everything depends on the conditions of 
time and place. 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 184 
That, comrades, is how matters stand with the questions 
of a general character that arose in the course of 
the discussion. 
Allow me to pass now to the question of the grain 
problem and the basic causes of our difficulties on the 
grain front. 
I think that a number of comrades have committed 
the error of lumping together different kinds of causes 
of our difficulties on the grain front, of confusing temporary 
and circumstantial (specific) causes with chronic 
and fundamental causes. There are two sets of causes 
of our grain difficulties: chronic, fundamental causes, 
the elimination of which will require a number of years, 
and specific, circumstantial causes, which can be eliminated 
now, if a number of necessary measures are adopted 
and carried out. To lump all these causes together is to 
confuse the whole question. 
What is the underlying significance of our difficulties 
on the grain front? It is that they confront us squarely 
with the problem of grain, of grain production, with 
the problem of agriculture in general, and of cereal production 
in particular. 
Do we have a grain problem at all, as an urgent question? 
We undoubtedly do. One must be blind to doubt 
that the grain problem is now harassing every aspect of 
Soviet social life. We cannot live like gypsies, without 
grain reserves, without certain reserves in case of harvest 
failure, without reserves with which to manoeuvre 
in the market, without reserves against the contingency of 
war, and, lastly, without some reserves for export. Even 
the small peasant, for all the meagreness of his husbandry, 
cannot do without reserves, without certain stocks.

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 185 
Is it not clear that a great country covering one-sixth 
of the world cannot do without grain reserves for its internal 
and external requirements? 
Supposing the winter crop in the Ukraine had not 
perished and we had ended the grain procurement year 
just ³breaking even²‹could this have been considered 
enough? No, it could not. We cannot continue to live 
just ³breaking even.² We must have at our disposal a certain 
minimum of reserves if we want to uphold the position 
of the Soviet Government both internally and externally. 
Firstly, we are not guaranteed against armed attack. Do 
you think we can defend the country if we have no reserves 
of grain for the army? Those comrades were perfectly 
right who said here that the peasant today is not what 
he was six years ago, say, when he was afraid that he 
might lose his land to the landlord. The peasant is already 
forgetting the landlord. He is now demanding new 
and better conditions of life. Can we, in the event of enemy 
attack, wage war against the external enemy on 
the battle front, and at the same time against the muzhik 
in the rear in order to get grain urgently for the army? 
No, we cannot and must not. In order to defend the 
country, we must have certain stocks for supplying the 
army, if only for the first six months. Why do we need 
this six-months¹ breathing space? In order to give the 
peasant time to awaken to the situation, to realise the 
danger of the war, to see how matters stand and to be 
ready to do his bit for the common cause of the country¹s 
defence. If we content ourselves with just ³breaking 
even,² we shall never have reserves against the contingency 
of war.

J. V. S T A L I N 186 
Secondly, we are not guaranteed against complications 
in the grain market. A certain reserve is absolutely 
essential to enable us to intervene in the grain market 
and make our price policy effective. For we cannot, and 
must not, resort every time to emergency measures. 
But we shall never have such a reserve if we always 
find ourselves on the edge of a precipice and are content 
if we can end the procurement year just ³breaking 
even.² 
Thirdly, we are not guaranteed against crop failure. 
A certain grain reserve is absolutely essential to enable 
us in the event of crop failure to supply the famine 
areas at least to some extent and at least for some time. 
But we shall not have such a reserve if we do not increase 
the production of marketable grain and do not positively 
and decisively abandon the old habit of living without 
reserves. 
Lastly, a reserve is absolutely essential to enable 
us to export grain. We have to import equipment for 
industry. We have to import agricultural machines, tractors 
and spare parts for them. But this cannot be done 
if we do not export grain, if we do not accumulate a certain 
reserve of foreign currency obtained by exporting 
grain. Before the war we used to export from 500,000,000 
to 600,000,000 poods of grain annually. We were 
able to export so much because we went short ourselves. 
That is true. It should, however, be realised that all the 
same our marketable grain before the war was double 
what it is today. And it is just because we have now 
only half as much marketable grain that grain is ceasing 
to be an item of export. And what does ceasing to export 
grain mean? It means losing the source which ena

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 187 
bled us to import‹as we must import‹equipment for 
industry and tractors and machines for agriculture. Can 
we go on living in this way‹without accumulating grain 
reserves for export? No, we cannot. 
So you see how insecure and unstable our position 
in the matter of grain reserves is. 
This is apart from the fact that not only have we no 
grain reserves for all these four purposes; we have not 
even a minimum reserve to enable us to carry over without 
distress from one procurement year to the next 
and to supply the towns uninterruptedly in such difficult 
months as June and July. 
Can it then be denied that the grain problem is acute 
and that our difficulties on the grain front are serious? 
But, because of our grain difficulties, we are also 
having difficulties of a political character. Under no 
circumstances must this be forgotten, comrades. I am 
referring to the discontent which was to be observed 
among a certain section of the peasantry, among a certain 
section of the poor peasants, and also of the middle 
peasants, and which created a certain threat to the 
bond. 
Of course, it would be quite wrong to say, as Frumkin 
does in his note, that there is already an estrangement 
instead of the bond. That is not true, comrades. 
An estrangement would be a serious thing. An estrangement 
would mean the beginning of civil war, if not civil 
war itself. Don¹t let us frighten ourselves with ³terrible² 
words. Don¹t let us give way to panic. That would 
be unworthy of Bolsheviks. An estrangement would 
mean that the peasantry had broken with the Soviet 
Government. But if the peasant really had broken with

J. V. S T A L I N 188 
the Soviet Government, which is the chief purchaser of 
peasant grain, he would not be enlarging his crop area. 
Yet we find that this year the spring crop area has been 
enlarged in all the grain areas without exception. Does 
that look like estrangement? Can one call this state of 
things a ³hopeless prospect² for peasant farming, as 
Frumkin, for example, says it is? Does that look like a 
³hopeless prospect²? 
What is the basis of our grain difficulties, meaning 
by that the chronic and fundamental causes of the 
difficulties, and not the temporary, circumstantial 
ones? 
The basis of our grain difficulties lies in the increasingly 
scattered and divided character of agriculture. It 
is a fact that agriculture, especially grain farming, 
is growing smaller in scale, becoming increasingly 
less remunerative and less productive of marketable 
surpluses. Whereas before the revolution we had about 
15,000,000 or 16,000,000 peasant farms, now we have 
some 24,000,000 or 25,000,000; moreover, the process 
of division tends to become more marked. 
It is true that our crop area today falls little short of 
pre-war, and that the gross output of grain is only some 
five per cent less than it was before the war. But the trouble 
is that, in spite of all this, our output of marketable 
grain is only half, that is, about 50 per cent, of prewar. 
That is the root of the matter. 
What is the point? The point is that small-scale farming 
is less remunerative, produces smaller marketable 
surpluses and is less stable than large-scale farming. 
The Marxist thesis that small-scale production is less 
profitable than large-scale production fully applies to

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 189 
agriculture also. That is why, from one and the same area, 
small-scale peasant farming yields much less marketable 
grain than large-scale farming. 
What is the way out of this situation? 
There are three ways, as the Political Bureau resolution 
tells us. 
1. The way out is to raise the productivity of smalland 
middle-peasant farming as far as possible, to replace 
the wooden plough by the steel plough, to supply small 
and medium machines, fertiliser, seed and agronomic 
help, to organise the peasantry into co-operatives, to 
conclude contracts with whole villages, supplying them 
with the best-grade seed on loan and thus ensuring the 
peasants collective credit, and, lastly, to place big machines 
at their disposal through machine-hiring stations. 
Those comrades are mistaken who assert that smallpeasant 
farming has exhausted its potentialities for further 
development, and that therefore it is not worth 
while to give it any further help. That is quite untrue. 
Individual peasant farming still possesses no inconsiderable 
potentialities for development. One only has to 
know how to help it to realise these potentialities. 
Nor is Krasnaya Gazeta51 right in asserting that the 
policy of organising the individual peasant farms in 
supply and marketing co-operatives has not justified itself. 
That is quite untrue, comrades. On the contrary, the 
policy of organising supply and marketing co-operatives 
has justified itself fully, by creating a real basis among the 
peasantry for a swing towards the side of the collectivefarm 
movement. There is no doubt that if we had not 
developed supply and marketing co-operatives, we 
should not have that swing in the attitude of the peasantry

J. V. S T A L I N 190 
towards collective farming which now exists, and which 
is helping us to lead the collective-farm movement 
forward. 
2. The way out, further, is to help the poor and middle 
peasants gradually to unite their scattered small 
farms into large collective farms based on new technical 
equipment and collective labour, as being more profitable 
and yielding larger marketable surpluses. I have 
in mind all forms of uniting small farms into 
large, socially-conducted farms, from simple co-operatives 
to artels, which are incomparably more productive and 
yield far larger marketable surpluses than the scattered 
small-peasant farms. 
That is the basis for the solution of the problem. 
Comrades are mistaken when, while advocating collective 
farms, they accuse us of ³rehabilitating² smallpeasant 
farming. They evidently think that the attitude 
towards the individual peasant farms should be one of 
fighting and destroying them, and not of assisting them 
and drawing them over to our side. That is quite wrong, 
comrades. Individual peasant farming is in no need of 
³rehabilitation.² It is not very remunerative, it is true. 
But that does not mean that it is altogether unprofitable. 
We should be destroying the bond if we adopted 
the attitude of fighting and destroying individual peasant 
farming, departing from the Leninist position that 
the collective farms must render day-to-day assistance 
and support to the individual peasant farms. 
Even more mistaken are those who, while extolling 
the collective farms, declare that individual peasant 
farming is our ³curse.² This already smacks of downright 
war on peasant farming. Where do they get this

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DISTRIBUTION 
191 
idea from? If peasant farming is a ³curse,² how do they 
explain the alliance of the working class and the main 
mass of the peasantry? Alliance of the working class 
with a ³curse²‹can there be anything so fantastic? 
How can they say such things and at the same time 
preach in favour of the bond? They recall what Lenin said 
about the necessity of our gradually changing over from 
the peasant nag to the steel steed of industry. That is 
very good. But is that the way to change over from one 
horse to another? To proclaim peasant farming a ³curse² 
before a broad and powerful base has been created in the 
shape of a ramified system of collective farms‹would 
not the upshot be that we should be left without any 
horse, without any base at all? (Voices: ³Quite right!²) 
The mistake of these comrades is that they counterpose 
collective farming to individual peasant farming. But 
what we want is that these two forms of farming should 
not be counterposed to one another, but should be 
linked together in a bond, and that within the framework 
of this bond the collective farms should assist the individual 
peasant and help him little by little to go over 
to collectivist lines. Yes, what we want is that the peasants 
should look upon the collective farms not as their 
enemy, but as their friend who helps them and will 
help them to emancipate themselves from poverty. 
(Voices: ³True!²) If that is true, then you should not 
say that we are ³rehabilitating² individual peasant 
farming, or that peasant farming is our ³curse.² 
What should be said is that, compared with the big 
collective farm, the small-peasant farm is less profitable, 
or even the least profitable, but that all the same 
it is of some, not inconsiderable, benefit. But from what 
PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928

J. V. S T A L I N 192 
you say it follows that small-peasant farming is altogether 
unprofitable, and perhaps even harmful. 
That was not Lenin¹s opinion of small-peasant farming. 
Here is what he said on this score in his speech on 
³The Tax in Kind²: 
³If peasant farming can develop further, we must firmly 
assure its transition to the next stage too, and this transition to 
the next stage will inevitably consist in the small, isolated peasant 
farms, the least profitable and most backward, gradually 
uniting to form socially-conducted, large farms. That is how 
Socialists have always conceived it. And that is how our Communist 
Party conceives it² (Vol. XXVI, p. 299). 
It follows that individual peasant farming is after 
all of some benefit. 
It is one thing when a higher form of enterprise, largescale 
enterprise, contends against a lower form and 
ruins, kills it. That is what happens under capitalism. 
It is quite another thing when the higher form of enterprise 
does not ruin the lower form, but helps it to raise 
itself, to go over to collectivist lines. That is what 
happens under the Soviet system. 
And here is what Lenin says about the relations between 
the collective farms and the individual peasant 
farms: 
³In particular, we must see to it that the law of the Soviet 
Government (on collective farms and state farms‹J. St.) requiring 
that the state farms, agricultural communes and similar 
associations should render immediate and all-round assistance to 
the surrounding middle peasants, is actually, and moreover fully, 
carried out. Only if such assistance is in fact rendered is agreement 
with the middle peasant feasible.* Only in this way can, and 
should, his confidence be won² (Vol. XXIV, p. 175). 
* My italics.‹J. St.

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 193 
It follows from this that the collective farms and 
state farms must assist the peasant farms precisely as 
individual farms. 
Lastly, a third quotation from Lenin: 
³Only if we succeed in practice in showing the peasants the 
advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation 
of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of 
co-operative, artel farming, will the working class, which holds 
state power in i t s hands, actually prove to the peasant the 
correctness of its policy and actually secure the real and durable 
following of the vast masses of the peasantry² (Vol. XXIV, p. 579). 
You see how highly Lenin appreciated the value of 
the collective-farm movement for the socialist transformation 
of our country. 
It is extremely strange that some comrades in their 
long speeches focussed attention exclusively on the question 
of the individual peasant farms and did not say 
a single word, literally not a single word, about the task 
of promoting collective farms, as an urgent and decisive 
task of our Party. 
3. The way out, lastly, is to strengthen the old state 
farms and to promote new, large state farms, as being 
the economic units that are the most remunerative 
and yield the largest marketable surpluses. 
Such are the three principal tasks, the accomplishment 
of which will enable us to solve the grain problem, 
and thus do away with the very basis of our difficulties 
on the grain front. 
The specific feature of the present moment is that 
the first task, that of improving individual peasant farming, 
although it still remains our chief task, is already 
insufficient for the solution of the grain problem.

J. V. S T A L I N 194 
The specific feature of the present moment is that 
the first task must be supplemented in practice by the 
two new tasks of promoting collective farms and promoting 
state farms. 
Unless we combine these tasks, unless we work persistently 
along all these three channels, it will be impossible 
to solve the grain problem, whether in the sense 
of supplying the country with marketable grain or in 
the sense of transforming our entire national economy on 
socialist lines. 
What was Lenin¹s view of this matter? We have a 
document which shows that the Political Bureau resolution 
submitted to this plenum fully coincides with 
the practical plan for the development of agriculture 
which Lenin outlined in this document. I am referring 
to the ³Mandate of the C.L.D.² (Council of Labour and 
Defence) written in Lenin¹s own hand. It was published 
in May 1921. In this document Lenin analyses three 
groups of practical questions: the first group concerns 
trade and industry, the second group concerns the promotion 
of agriculture, and the third group concerns the 
various economic councils52 and regional conferences 
on the regulation of economic affairs. 
What does this document say on the subject of agriculture? 
Here is a quotation from the ³Mandate of the 
C.L.D.²: 
³Second group of questions. Promotion of agriculture: a) peasant 
farming, b) state farms, c) communes, d) artels, e) co-operatives, 
f) other forms of socially-conducted farming² (see Vol. 
XXVI, p. 374). 
You will see that the practical conclusions contained 
in the Political Bureau resolution on the solution of

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 195 
the grain problem, and of the agricultural problem in 
general, fully coincide with Lenin¹s plan as set forth 
in the ³Mandate of the C.L.D.² of 1921. 
It was very interesting to observe the truly youthful 
joy with which that giant, Lenin, who could move 
mountains and bring them face to face, greeted every 
item of news of the formation of a couple or so of collective 
farms, or of the arrival of tractors in some state 
farm. Here, for instance, is an excerpt from a letter to 
the Society for Technical Aid to Soviet Russia: 
³Dear Comrades, extremely gratifying reports have appeared 
in our newspapers regarding the work of members of your Society 
in the state farms of the Kirsanov Uyezd, Tambov Gubernia, 
and at Mitino Station, Odessa Gubernia, as well as regarding 
the work of a group of miners from the Donets Basin. . . . I am 
applying to the Presidium of the All-Russian Central Executive 
Committee requesting that the most outstanding farms should 
be classed as model farms and rendered special and priority assistance 
necessary for the favourable development of their work. 
I once more profoundly thank you in the name of our Republic, 
and request you to bear in mind that your assistance to us in the 
way of tractor cultivation of the soil is especially timely and 
valuable. I am particularly pleased to have this opportunity of 
congratulating you on your project to organise 200 agricultural 
communes² (Vol. XXVII, p. 309). 
And here is an excerpt from a letter to the Society of 
Friends of Soviet Russia in America: 
³Dear Comrades: I have just verified by a special request 
to the Perm Executive Committee, the extraordinary favourable 
news published in our press with reference to the work of the members 
of your Society headed by Harold Ware and organised as a 
Tractor Unit, in the Government of Perm, on a Soviet Farm* 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 196 
ŒToykino.¹ . . . I am appealing to the Presidium of the All-Russian 
Central Executive Committee to place this Soviet Farm in 
the ranks of Model Farms and to render it in every possible way 
special and extraordinary assistance in its constructive work, 
as well as supplying it with gasoline, metals and other material 
necessary for the organisation of a Repair Shop. Once more, I wish 
to thank you in the name of our Republic and to point out that 
no other form of relief is so timely and so important for us as the 
one rendered by you²* (Vol. XXVII, p. 308). 
So you see with what joy Lenin received every item 
of news, however small, regarding the development of 
collective farms and state farms. 
Let this be a lesson to all who think they can deceive 
history and dispense with collective farms and 
state farms in victoriously building socialism in our 
country. 
I am concluding, comrades. I think that the grain 
difficulties will not have been without their value for 
us. Our Party has learned and progressed by overcoming 
difficulties and crises of every kind. I think that the present 
difficulties will steel our Bolshevik ranks and induce 
them to tackle the solution of the grain problem in 
thorough fashion. And the solution of this problem will 
remove one of the biggest difficulties standing in the way 
of the socialist transformation of our country. 
* The text is as sent in English.‹Tr.

ON THE BOND BETWEEN THE WORKERS 
AND PEASANTS AND ON STATE FARMS 
From a Speech Delivered on July 11, 1928 
Some of the comrades reverted in their speeches on 
the state farms to yesterday¹s dispute on the question of 
the grain procurements. Well, let us revert to yesterday¹s 
dispute. 
What was the dispute about yesterday? First of all, 
about the ³scissors² between town and country. It was 
said that the peasant was still overpaying for manufactured 
goods and being underpaid for his agricultural 
produce. It was said that these overpayments and underpayments 
constitute a supertax on the peasantry, something 
in the nature of a ³tribute,² an additional tax 
for the sake of industrialisation, a tax which we must 
certainly abolish, but which we cannot abolish at once 
if we have no intention of undermining our industry, of 
undermining a definite rate of development of our industry, 
which works for the whole country and which 
advances our national economy towards socialism. 
There were some who did not like this. These comrades 
apparently fear to admit the truth. Well, that is 
a matter of taste. Some think that it is not advisable to 
tell the whole truth at a plenum of the Central Committee. 
But I think that at the plenum of the Central Committee 
of our Party it is our duty to tell the whole truth. It

J. V. S T A L I N 198 
should not be forgotten that the plenum of the Central 
Committee cannot be regarded as a mass meeting. Of 
course, ³supertax,² ³additional tax² are unpleasant words, 
for they hit hard. But, in the first place, it is not a 
question of words. In the second place, the words fully 
correspond to the facts. In the third place, they, these 
unpleasant words, are intended to hit hard and to 
compel Bolsheviks to set to work seriously to do away 
with this ³supertax,² to do away with the ³scissors.² 
And how can these unpleasant things be done away 
with? By systematically rationalising our industry 
and lowering prices of manufactured goods. By systematically 
improving agricultural technique and raising 
harvest yields, and gradually lowering the cost of 
agricultural produce. By systematically rationalising 
our trade and procurement apparatus. And so on and 
so forth. 
All this, of course, cannot be done in a year or two. 
But it has to be done without fail in the course of a few 
years if we want to save ourselves from all sorts of unpleasant 
things and from facts that hit us hard. 
Some of the comrades yesterday pressed hard for the 
abolition of the ³scissors² at once and as good as demanded 
the establishment of replacement prices for agricultural 
produce. I, as well as other comrades, objected to 
this and said that this demand was contrary to the 
interests of the industrialisation of the country at the 
present moment, and, consequently, was contrary to the 
interests of our state. 
That is what our dispute was about yesterday. 
Today, these comrades say that they no longer insist 
on a policy of replacement prices. Well, that is very

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 199 
good. It appears that yesterday¹s criticism was not without 
effect on these comrades. 
A second question concerns the collective farms and 
state farms. I remarked in my speech that it was unnatural 
and strange that, when speaking of measures for 
promoting agriculture in connection with the grain procurements, 
some comrades did not say a single word 
about such weighty measures as developing collective 
farms and state farms. How is it possible to ³forget² such 
a serious thing as the task of developing collective and 
state farms in agriculture? Do we not know that the task 
of developing individual peasant farming, important 
though it is at the present moment, is already insufficient, 
and that if we do not supplement this task in practice 
with the new tasks of developing collective farms 
and state farms, we shall not solve the grain farming 
problem and shall not escape from our difficulties, either 
in the sense of the socialist transformation of our entire 
national economy (and, hence, of peasant farming), 
or in the sense of ensuring the country definite reserves 
of marketable grain. 
In view of all this, how can the question of developing 
collective farms and state farms be ³forgotten,² evaded, 
passed over in silence? 
Let us pass now to the question of large state 
farms. The comrades who assert that there are no large 
grain farms in North America are mistaken. In 
point of fact, there are such farms both in North and 
South America. I might quote such a witness as Professor 
Tulaikov, who made a study of American agriculture and 
published his findings in the magazine Nizhneye Povolzhye53 
(No. 9)

J. V. S T A L I N 200 
Permit me to quote from Tulaikov¹s article. 
³The Montana wheat farm is owned by the Campbell 
Farming Corporation. It has an area of 95,000 acres, or about 
32,000 dessiatins. The farm is one continuous tract, divided for 
purposes of operation into four sections, what we would call 
khutors, each of which has a separate manager, the whole 
farm being managed by one person, the director of the corporation, 
Thomas Campbell. 
³This year, according to a press report, which emanates of 
course from the farm itself, about half the total area is under cultivation, 
and it is expected to secure about 410,000 bushels of 
wheat (about 800,000 poods). 20,000 bushels of oats and 70,000 
bushels of linseed. The income from the enterprise is expected 
to total 500,000 dollars. 
³On this farm, horses and mules are almost totally replaced 
by tractors, motor lorries and automobiles. Ploughing, planting 
and all field work in general, and harvesting in particular, are 
carried on day and night, the fields at night being flood-lit to 
enable the machines to work. Because of the vast extent of the 
fields, the machines can cover long distances without making a 
turn. For instance, reaper-threshers with a 24-foot header, if the 
state of the crops permits their use, travel 20 miles, that is, a 
little over 30 versts. Formerly, 40 horses and men would have 
been required for this work. Four sheaf-binders are hitched to 
one tractor, and cover a strip 40 feet wide and 28 miles long, that 
is, a distance of roughly 42 versts. Binders are used if the grain 
is not dry enough to be threshed at the same time as it is reaped. 
In that case, the binding device is removed from the reapers and 
the cut stalks are laid in rows with the help of a special conveyer. 
The rows are left lying 24 or 48 hours, during which time the grain 
dries and the seeds of the weeds-cut together with it fall to the 
ground. After this, the grain is taken up with a reaper-thresher 
the cutter of which has been replaced by an automatic lifting 
device which delivers the dried grain straight into the thresher 
drum, The machine is operated by only two men, one driving 
the tractor and the other tending the thresher. The grain pours 
straight from the thresher into six-ton trucks which carry it to

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 201 
the elevator, trains of ten trucks each being drawn by one tractor. 
The report says that in this way from 16,000 to 20,000 bushels 
of grain are threshed daily² (see Nizhneye Povolzhye, No. 9, September 
1927, pp. 38-39). 
There you have a description of one giant wheat 
farm of the capitalist type. There are giant farms of 
this kind in both North and South America. 
Some comrades said here that in the capitalist countries 
conditions for the development of such giant farms 
are not always favourable, or not altogether favourable, 
and therefore such farms are sometimes divided up into 
smaller units ranging from 1,000 to 5,000 dessiatins 
each. That is quite true. 
These comrades conclude from this that large-scale 
grain farming has no future under Soviet conditions 
either. There they are quite wrong. 
These comrades evidently fail to understand, or do 
not see, the difference in conditions between the capitalist 
system and the Soviet system. Under capitalism 
there is private ownership of land, and therefore absolute 
ground rent, which increases the cost of agricultural production 
and creates insuperable barriers to its serious 
progress. Under the Soviet system, however, there is 
neither private ownership of land nor absolute ground rent, 
which cannot but lower the cost of agricultural production 
and, consequently, cannot but facilitate the advance 
of large-scale agriculture along the road of technical 
and all other progress. 
Furthermore, under capitalism the object of large grain 
farms is to obtain the maximum profit, or, at any rate, 
such a profit on capital as might correspond to what 
is known as the average rate of profit, without which,

J. V. S T A L I N 202 
generally speaking, they cannot carry on or exist at all. 
This circumstance cannot but increase the cost of production, 
thereby creating the most serious obstacles to the 
development of large grain farms. Under the Soviet 
system, on the other hand, large grain farms, being 
at the same time state farms, do not at all require for 
their development either the maximum profit or the 
average profit, but can content themselves with a minimum 
profit (and sometimes do without any profit at 
all for a while), and this, coupled with the absence of 
absolute ground rent, creates exceptionally favourable conditions 
for the development of large grain farms. 
Lastly, whereas under capitalism there is no such 
thing as credit privileges or tax privileges for large 
grain farms, under the Soviet system, which is designed 
to give the utmost encouragement to socialist economy, 
such privileges exist and will continue to exist. 
All these and similar factors create under the Soviet 
system (as distinct from the capitalist system) very favourable 
conditions for promoting the development of 
state farms as large grain farms. 
Finally, there is the question of the state farms and 
collective farms as strong points for strengthening the 
bond, as strong points for ensuring the leading role of 
the working class. We need collective farms and state 
farms not only in order to ensure our long-range aim 
of the socialist transformation of the countryside. We 
need collective farms and state farms also in order to have 
socialist economic strong points in the countryside at 
this moment, these points being necessary for strengthening 
the bond and for ensuring the leading role of the 
working class within the framework of the bond. Can we

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 203 
count at this very moment on being able to create and 
develop such strong points? I have no doubt that we 
can, and should. Khlebotsentr54 reports that it has contracts 
with collective farms, artels and co-operatives, under 
which it is to receive from them 40,000,000 or 
50,000,000 poods of grain. As to the state farms, the data 
show that this year our old and new state farms should 
provide another 25,000,000 or 30,000,000 poods of marketable 
grain. 
If we add to that the 30,000,000-35,000,000 poods 
that the agricultural co-operatives should obtain from 
the individual peasant farms with which they have contractual 
arrangements, we shall have a full guarantee of 
over 100,000,000 poods of grain capable of serving as a 
definite reserve, at any rate in the home market. That, 
after all, is something. 
There you have the first results given by our socialist 
economic strong points in the countryside. 
And what follows from this? It follows that those 
comrades are mistaken who think that the working 
class is powerless in the matter of defending its socialist 
positions in the countryside, that only one thing remains 
for it to do, namely, endlessly to retreat and continuously 
to surrender its positions to the capitalist elements. No, 
comrades, that is not true. The working class is not so 
weak in the countryside as might appear to a superficial 
observer. That cheerless philosophy has nothing in common 
with Bolshevism. The working class has quite a 
number of economic strong points in the countryside, in 
the shape of state farms, collective farms, and supply 
and marketing co-operatives, relying on which it can 
strengthen the bond with the countryside, isolate the

J. V. S T A L I N 204 
kulak, and ensure its leadership. The working class, lastly, 
has a number of political strong points in the countryside, 
in the shape of the Soviets, in the shape of the organised 
poor peasants, and so on, relying on which it can 
strengthen its positions in the countryside. 
Relying on these economic and political bases in the 
countryside, and utilising all the means and resources 
(key positions, etc.) at the disposal of the proletarian 
dictatorship, the Party and the Soviet Government can 
confidently carry on the work of the socialist transformation 
of the countryside, step by step strengthening 
the alliance of the working class and peasantry, and 
step by step strengthening the leadership of the working 
class within that alliance. 
Particular attention in this connection should be 
paid to work among the poor peasants. It must be taken 
as a rule that, the better and more effective our work 
among the poor peasants is, the greater will be the prestige 
of the Soviet Government in the countryside, and, 
on the contrary, the worse our relations with the poor 
peasants are, the lower will be the prestige of the Soviet 
Government. 
We often speak of the alliance with the middle peasants. 
But in our conditions in order to strengthen this 
alliance a determined struggle must be waged against the 
kulaks, against the capitalist elements in the countryside. 
The Fifteenth Congress of our Party was therefore quite 
right when it issued the slogan of intensifying the offensive 
against the kulaks. But can a successful struggle 
be waged against the kulaks if work among the poor 
peasants is not intensified, if the poor peasants are not 
roused against the kulaks, if systematic aid is not ren

PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), JULY 4-12, 1928 205 
dered the poor peasants? Obviously not! The middle 
peasantry is a vacillating class. If our relations with the 
poor peasants are bad, if the poor peasants are not yet 
an organised support of the Soviet Government, the kulak 
feels that he is strong, and the middle peasant swings 
towards the kulak. And on the contrary: if our relations 
with the poor peasants are good, if the poor peasants 
are an organised support of the Soviet Government, 
the kulak feels that he is in a state of siege, and the 
middle peasant swings towards the working class. 
That is why I think that it is one of the most vital 
immediate tasks of our Party to intensify the work among 
the poor peasants, to organise the rendering of systematic 
assistance to the poor peasants, and, lastly, to turn 
the poor peasants themselves into an organised support 
of the working class in the countryside.

RESULTS OF THE JULY PLENUM 
OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 
Report to a Meeting 
of the Active of the Leningrad Organisation 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
July 13, 1928 
Comrades, the plenum of the Central Committee 
which has just concluded concerned itself with two sets 
of questions. 
The first set consists of questions relating to major 
problems of the Communist International in connection 
with the impending Sixth Congress. 
The second set consists of questions relating to our 
constructive work in the U.S.S.R. in the sphere of agriculture‹
the grain problem and grain procurements‹ 
and in the sphere of providing a technical intelligentsia, 
cadres of intellectuals coming from the ranks of the 
working class, for our industry. 
Let us begin with the first set of questions. 
I 
THE COMINTERN 
1. MAJOR PROBLEMS OF THE SIXTH CONGRESS 
OF THE COMINTERN 
What are the major problems which confront the 
Sixth Congress of the Comintern at the present time? 
If one looks at the stage passed through between the 
Fifth and Sixth Congresses, it is necessary first of all to

RESULTS OF THE JULY PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 207 
consider the contradictions which have ripened in this 
interval within the imperialist camp. 
What are these contradictions? 
At the time of the Fifth Congress very little was said 
about the Anglo-American contradiction as the principal 
one. It was even the custom at that time to speak 
of an Anglo-American alliance. On the other hand quite 
a lot was said about contradictions between Britain and 
France, between America and Japan, between the victors 
and the vanquished. The difference between that 
period and the present period is that, of the contradictions 
in the capitalist camp, that between American capitalism 
and British capitalism has become the principal one. 
Whether you take the question of oil, which is of decisive 
importance both for the development of the capitalist 
economy and for purposes of war; whether you take the 
question of markets, which are of the utmost importance 
for the life and development of world capitalism, 
because goods cannot be produced if there is no assured 
sale for them; whether you take the question of spheres 
of capital export, which is one of the most characteristic 
features of the imperialist stage; or whether, lastly, you 
take the question of the lines of communication with 
markets or sources of raw material‹you will find that 
all these main questions drive towards one principal 
problem, the struggle between Britain and America 
for world hegemony. Wherever America, a country 
where capitalism is growing gigantically, tries to butt 
in‹whether it be China, the colonies, South America, 
or Africa‹everywhere she encounters formidable obstacles 
in the shape of Britain¹s firmly established positions.

J. V. S T A L I N 208 
This, of course, does not do away with the other 
contradictions in the capitalist camp: between America 
and Japan, Britain and France, France and Italy, 
Germany and France and so on. But it does mean that 
these contradictions are linked in one way or another 
with the principal contradiction, that between capitalist 
Britain, whose star is declining, and capitalist America, 
whose star is rising. 
With what is this principal contradiction fraught? 
It is very likely fraught with war. When two giants come 
into collision, when they find the earth too small for both 
of them, they strive to cross swords in order to decide 
their dispute over world hegemony by war. 
That is the first thing to bear in mind. 
A second contradiction is that between imperialism 
and the colonies. This contradiction existed at the time 
of the Fifth Congress too. But only now has it assumed 
an acute character. We did not at that time have such 
a powerful development of the revolutionary movement 
in China, such a powerful shaking up of the vast masses 
of the Chinese workers and peasants as occurred a year 
ago and as is occurring now. And that is not all. We 
did not at that time, at the time of the Fifth Congress of 
the Comintern, have that powerful stirring of the labour 
movement and the national-liberation struggle in India 
which we have now. These two major facts bring squarely 
to the fore the question of the colonies and semi-colonies. 
With what is the growth of this contradiction 
fraught? It is fraught with national wars of liberation in 
the colonies and with intervention on the part of imperialism. 
This circumstance also must be borne in mind.

RESULTS OF THE JULY PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 209 
There is, lastly, a third contradiction‹that between 
the capitalist world and the U.S.S.R., one that is growing 
not less but more acute. Whereas at the time of 
the Fifth Congress of the Comintern it could be said that 
a certain equilibrium, unstable, it is true, but more or 
less prolonged, had been established between the two 
worlds, the two antipodes, the world of Soviets and the 
world of capitalism, now we have every ground for 
affirming that the days of this equilibrium are drawing 
to a close. 
It goes without saying that the growth of this contradiction 
cannot fail to be fraught with the danger of 
armed intervention. 
It is to be presumed that the Sixth Congress will 
take this circumstance also into consideration. 
Thus all these contradictions inevitably lead to one 
principal danger‹the danger of new imperialist wars 
and intervention. 
Therefore, the danger of new imperialist wars and 
intervention is the main question of the day. 
The most widespread method of lulling the working 
class and of diverting it from the struggle against the 
danger of war is present-day bourgeois pacifism, with 
its League of Nations, its preaching of ³peace,² its ³prohibition² 
of war, its talk of ³disarmament² and so forth. 
Many think that imperialist pacifism is an instrument 
of peace. That is absolutely wrong. Imperialist 
pacifism is an instrument for the preparation of war 
and for disguising this preparation by hypocritical talk 
of peace. Without this pacifism and its instrument, the 
League of Nations, preparation for war in the conditions 
of today would be impossible.

J. V. S T A L I N 210 
There are naïve people who think that since there 
is imperialist pacifism, there will be no war. That is quite 
untrue. On the contrary, whoever wishes to get at the 
truth must reverse this proposition and say: since imperialist 
pacifism and its League of Nations are flourishing, 
new imperialist wars and intervention are certain. 
And the most important thing in all this is that 
Social-Democracy is the main channel of imperialist pacifism 
within the working class‹consequently, it is capitalism¹s 
main support among the working class in preparing 
for new wars and intervention. 
But for the preparation of new wars pacifism alone 
is not enough, even if it is supported by so serious a 
force as Social-Democracy. For this, certain means of suppressing 
the masses in the imperialist centres are also 
needed. It is impossible to wage war for imperialism unless 
the rear of imperialism is strengthened. It is impossible 
to strengthen the rear of imperialism without suppressing 
the workers. And that is what fascism is for. 
Hence the growing acuteness of the inherent contradictions 
in the capitalist countries, the contradictions 
between labour and capital. 
On the one hand, preaching of pacifism through the 
mouths of the Social-Democrats in order more effectively 
to prepare for new wars; on the other hand, suppression of 
the working class in the rear, of the Communist Parties 
in the rear, by the use of fascist methods, in order then 
to conduct war and intervention more effectively‹such 
are the ways of preparing for new wars. 
Hence the tasks of the Communist Parties: 
Firstly, to wage an unceasing struggle against Social-
Democratism in all spheres‹in the economic and in

RESULTS OF THE JULY PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 211 
the political sphere, including in the latter the exposure 
of bourgeois pacifism with the task of winning the majority 
of the working class for communism. 
Secondly, to form a united front of the workers of 
the advanced countries and the labouring masses of the 
colonies in order to stave off the danger of war, or, if 
war breaks out, to convert imperialist war into civil 
war, smash fascism, overthrow capitalism, establish Soviet 
power, emancipate the colonies from slavery, and 
organise all-round defence of the first Soviet Republic in 
the world. 
Such are the principal problems and tasks confronting 
the Sixth Congress. 
These problems and tasks are being taken into account 
by the Executive Committee of the Comintern, 
as you will easily see if you examine the agenda of the 
Sixth Congress of the Comintern. 
2. THE PROGRAMME OF THE COMINTERN 
Closely linked with the question of the main problems 
of the international working-class movement is the 
question of the programme of the Comintern. 
The cardinal significance of the programme of the 
Comintern is that it scientifically formulates the basic 
tasks of the communist movement, indicates the principal 
means of accomplishing these tasks, and thus creates 
for the Comintern sections that clarity of aims and 
methods without which it is impossible to move forward 
with confidence. 
A few words about the specific features of the draft 
programme of the Comintern submitted by the Programme

J. V. S T A L I N 212 
Commission of the Executive Committee of the Comintern. 
At least seven such specific features might be 
noted. 
1) The draft provides a programme not for particular 
national Communist Parties, but for all Communist 
Parties taken together, covering what is common and 
basic to all of them. Hence it is a programme based on 
principle and theory. 
2) It was the custom formerly to provide a programme 
for the ³civilised² nations. The draft programme differs 
from this in that it is intended for all the nations 
of the world‹both white and black, both of the metropolitan 
countries and of the colonies. Hence its all-embracing, 
profoundly international character. 
3) The draft takes as its point of departure not 
some particular capitalism of some particular country 
or portion of the world, but the entire world system of 
capitalism, counterposing to it the world system of socialist 
economy. Hence its distinction from all hitherto existing 
programmes. 
4) The draft proceeds from the uneven development 
of the capitalist countries and draws the conclusion that 
the victory of socialism is possible in separate countries, 
thus envisaging the prospect of the formation of two parallel 
centres of attraction‹the centre of world capitalism 
and the centre of world socialism. 
5) Instead of the slogan of a United States of Europe, 
the draft puts forward the slogan of a federation of Soviet 
Republics which consists of advanced countries 
and colonies that have dropped, or are dropping, out of 
the imperialist system, and which is opposed in its 
struggle for world socialism to the world capitalist system.

RESULTS OF THE JULY PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 213 
6) The draft stresses opposition to Social-Democracyas 
the main support of capitalism in the working classand 
as the chief enemy of communism, and holds thatall 
other trends in the working class (anarchism, anarchosyndicalism, 
guild socialism,55 etc.) are in essence varieties 
of Social-Democratism. 
7) The draft puts in the forefront the task of consolidating 
the Communist Parties both in the West and 
in the East as a preliminary condition for ensuring the 
hegemony of the proletariat, and then also the dictatorship 
of the proletariat. 
The plenum of the Central Committee approved 
in principle the draft programme of the Comintern, and 
charged comrades having amendments to the draft to 
submit them to the Programme Commission of the Sixth 
Congress. 
So much for questions concerning the Comintern. 
Now let us turn to questions concerning our internal 
development. 
II 
QUESTIONS OF SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 
IN THE U.S.S.R. 
1. GRAIN PROCUREMENT POLICY 
Permit me to give a little historical information. 
What was the position by January 1 of this year? 
You know from the Party documents that by January 1 
of this year we had a deficit of 128,000,000 poods of grain 
as compared with the corresponding period last year. I 
shall not dilate on the reasons for this: they are set forth 
in the Party documents published in the press. The

J. V. S T A L I N 214 
important thing for us now is that we bad a deficit of 
128,000,000 poods. Yet only two or three months remained 
until the spring thaw on the roads. We were thus faced 
with the alternative: either to make up for lost time and 
establish a normal rate of grain procurement in future, 
or to face the inevitability of a serious crisis of our entire 
national economy. 
What had to be done to make up for lost time? It 
was necessary, in the first place, to strike at the kulaks 
and speculators who were forcing up grain prices andthreatening 
the country with hunger. It was necessary, 
in the second place, to consign the maximum quantity 
of manufactured goods to the grain-growing regions. 
It was necessary, lastly, to rouse all our Party organisations 
into activity and bring about a radical change in 
all our grain procurement work by putting an end to 
the practice of allowing things to go of their own accord. 
Thus we were compelled to resort to emergency measures. 
The measures we took proved effective, and by the end of 
March we had been able to secure 275,000,000 poods of 
grain. We not only made up for lost time, we not only 
averted a crisis of our whole economy, we not only caught 
up with last year¹s rate of grain procurement; we also 
had every possibility of emerging from the procurement 
crisis painlessly, if we maintained any normal rate of 
procurement in the subsequent months (April, May 
and June). 
Owing, however, to the failure of the winter crops in 
the South Ukraine, and partly in the North Caucasus, 
the Ukraine completely, and the North Caucasus partially, 
dropped out as supplying regions, depriving the 
Republic of 20,000,000-30,000,000 poods of grain. This

RESULTS OF THE JULY PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 215 
circumstance, combined with the fact that we had permitted 
an over-expenditure of grain, faced us with the unavoidable 
necessity of pressing harder on the other regions 
and thus of encroaching on the peasants¹ emergency 
stocks, and this could not but worsen the situation. 
Whereas we had succeeded in January-March in securing 
nearly 300,000,000 poods affecting only the peasants¹ 
manoeuvring stocks, in April-June we failed to 
secure even a hundred million poods, owing to the fact 
that we had to encroach on the peasants¹ emergency stocks, 
and at a time, moreover, when the harvest prospects 
were not yet clear. Nevertheless, grain had to be secured. 
Hence the renewed recourse to emergency measures, the 
arbitrary administrative measures, the infringements of 
revolutionary law, the house-to-house visitations, the 
unlawful searches and so on, which worsened the political 
situation in the country and created a threat to the 
bond. 
Was this a rupture of the bond? No, it was not. Was 
it, perhaps, some trifling matter not worthy of consideration? 
No, it was not a trifling matter. It was a threat 
to the bond between the working class and the peasantry. 
That, in fact, explains why some of our Party 
workers lacked the calmness and firmness necessary for 
appraising the situation soberly and without exaggeration. 
The subsequent good harvest prospects and the partial 
withdrawal of the emergency measures helped to 
calm the atmosphere and improve the situation. 
What is the nature of our difficulties on the grain 
front? What is the basis of these difficulties? Is it 
not a fact that we now have a grain crop area nearby

J. V. S T A L I N 216 
as large as before the war (only five per cent smaller)? Is 
it not a fact that we are now producing nearly as much 
grain as before the war (about 5,000 million poods, or 
only 200,000,000-300,000,000 poods less)? How is it 
that, in spite of this, we are producing only half as much 
marketable grain as in the pre-war period? 
It is because of the highly scattered character of 
our agriculture. Whereas before the war we had about 
16,000,000 peasant farms, now we have not less than 
24,000,000; moreover, the splitting up of the peasant 
households and peasant holdings is showing no tendency 
to cease. And what is small-peasant farming? It is the 
form of husbandry that produces the smallest marketable 
surplus, is the least remunerative, and is in the highest 
degree a natural, consuming form of husbandry, 
yielding a surplus of only 12-15 per cent of marketable 
grain. Yet our towns and industry are growing rapidly, construction 
is developing and the demand for marketable 
grain is growing at incredible speed. That is the basis 
of our difficulties on the grain front. 
Here is what Lenin said on this score in his speech 
on ³The Tax in Kind²: 
³If peasant farming can develop further, we must firmly 
assure its transition to the next stage too, and this transition 
to the next stage will inevitably consist in the small, isolated 
peasant farms, the least profitable and most backward, gradually 
uniting to form socially-conducted, large farms. That is how 
Socialists have always conceived it. That is how our Communist 
Party conceives it² (Vol. XXVI, p. 299). 
There, then, is the basis of our difficulties on the 
grain front. 
What is the way out?

RESULTS OF THE JULY PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 217 
The way out is, firstly, to improve small- and middlepeasant 
farming, giving i t every encouragement to 
expand its yield, its productivity. Our task is to replace 
the wooden plough by the steel plough, to supply pure 
seed, fertiliser and small types of machines, to embrace 
the individual peasant farms in a broad co-operative network 
by concluding agreements (contracts) with whole 
villages. There exists the method of concluding contracts 
between agricultural co-operatives and entire villages, 
the purpose of which is to supply the peasants with seed 
and thus obtain higher crop yields, to ensure the prompt 
delivery of grain by the peasants to the state, giving them 
in return a bonus in the shape of a certain addition to 
the contractual price, and to create stable relations between 
the state and the peasantry. Experience shows that 
this method is productive of tangible results. 
There are people who think that individual peasant 
farming has exhausted its potentialities and that there 
is no point in supporting it. That is not true, comrades. 
These people have nothing in common with the line of 
our Party. 
There are people, on the other hand, who think that 
individual peasant farming is the be-all and endall 
of agriculture. That also is not true. More, these 
people are obviously sinning against the principles of 
Leninism. 
We need neither detractors nor eulogisers of individual 
peasant farming. We need sober-minded politicians 
capable of obtaining from individual peasant farming 
the maximum that can be obtained from it, and at the 
same time capable of gradually transferring individual 
farming to collectivist lines.

J. V. S T A L I N 218 
The way out, secondly, is gradually to unite the isolated 
small- and middle-peasant farms into large collective 
and co-operative farms, which should be absolutely 
voluntary associations operating on a new technical 
basis, on the basis of tractors and other agricultural 
machines. 
In what does the advantage of collective farms over 
small farms consist? In the fact that they are large 
farms and are therefore able to utilise all the results 
of science and technology; they are more remunerative 
and stable; they are more productive and yield larger 
marketable surpluses. It should not be forgotten that 
the collective farms yield a surplus of from 30 to 35 
per cent of marketable grain, and that their yield is 
sometimes as high as 200 poods per dessiatin or more. 
The way out, lastly, is to improve the old state farms 
and establish new large state farms. It should be remembered 
that the state farms are the economic units which 
produce the largest marketable surpluses. We have state 
farms which yield a surplus of not less than 60 per cent 
of marketable grain. 
The task is correctly to combine all these three tasks 
and to work strenuously along all these three lines. 
The specific feature of the present moment is that 
fulfilment of the first task, that of improving individual 
small- and middle-peasant farming, while it is still 
our chief task in the sphere of agriculture, is already 
insufficient for the solution of the problem as a whole. 
The specific feature of the present moment is that 
the first task must be supplemented by two new practical 
tasks: promotion of collective farming and improvement 
of state farming.

RESULTS OF THE JULY PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 219 
But besides the basic causes, there were also 
specific, temporary causes which converted our procurement 
difficulties into a procurement crisis. What are 
these causes? The resolution of the plenum of the Central 
Committee includes among them the following: 
a) a disturbance of market equilibrium, aggravated by 
a more rapid increase of the peasants¹ effective demand 
than of the supply of manufactured goods, owing to the 
rise of rural incomes resulting from a series of good harvests, 
and especially to the rise of incomes of the wellto-
do and kulak strata; 
b) an unfavourable relation between grain prices and 
the prices of other agricultural produce, which lessened 
the incentive to sell grain surpluses, and which the Party, 
however, could not change in the spring of this year 
without damaging the interests of the economically 
weaker strata of the rural population; 
c) mistakes in planned management, chiefly as regards 
the timely consignment of manufactured goods to 
the countryside and the incidence of taxation (the low 
tax on the wealthier strata of the rural population), 
and also as regards proper expenditure of grain stocks; 
d) defects of the Party and Soviet procurement organisations 
(no united front, lack of energetic action, reliance 
on things going of their own accord); 
e) infringement of revolutionary law, arbitrary administrative 
measures, house-to-house visitations, partial 
closing of local markets, etc.; 
f) exploitation of all these unfavourable factors by 
the capitalist elements of town and country (kulaks, 
speculators) in order to undermine grain procurement 
and worsen the political situation in the country,

J. V. S T A L I N 220 
While it will require several years to put an end to 
the general causes, it is quite possible to do away at once 
with the specific, temporary causes and thus avert the 
possibility of a repetition of the grain procurement crisis. 
What is required in order to put an end to these specific 
causes? 
It requires: 
a) putting an immediate stop to the practice of houseto-
house visitations, unlawful searches and all other 
infringements of revolutionary law; 
b) putting an immediate stop to any kind of reversion 
to the surplus-appropriation system and to all attempts 
whatsoever to close peasant markets, with the adoption 
by the state of flexible forms of regulating trade; 
c) a certain increase of grain prices, differentiated 
according to region and kind of grain; 
d) proper organisation of the consignment of manufactured 
goods to the grain procurement areas; 
e) proper organisation of the supply of grain, not 
permitting over-expenditure; 
f) formation, without fail, of a state grain reserve. 
An honest and systematic carrying out of these measures, 
taking into account this year¹s favourable harvest, 
should create a situation that will rule out the 
necessity of resorting to emergency measures of any kind 
in the coming grain procurement campaign. 
It is the immediate task of the Party to see to it that 
these measures are carried out faithfully. 
The grain difficulties have faced us with the question 
of the bond, of the future of the alliance between the 
workers and peasants, of the means of strengthening this 
alliance. Some say that the bond no longer exists, that

RESULTS OF THE JULY PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 221 
the bond has been replaced by estrangement. That, of 
course, is foolish and worthy only of panicmongers. 
When there is no bond, the peasant loses faith in the 
morrow, he retires into himself, he ceases to believe in 
the stability of the Soviet Government, which is the 
chief purchaser of peasant grain, he begins to reduce his 
crop area, or at any rate does not risk enlarging it, fearing 
that there will again be house-to-house visitations, 
searches and so on and that his grain will be taken away 
from him. 
But what do we find in reality? We find that the 
spring crop area has been enlarged in all areas. It is a fact 
that in the principal grain-growing areas the peasant 
has enlarged his spring crop area by from 2 per cent 
to 15 and 20 per cent. Is it not clear that the peasant 
does not believe that the emergency measures will be 
permanent, and has every ground for believing that 
grain prices will be raised. Does that look like estrangement? 
This, of course, does not mean that there is no 
threat, or that there has been no threat, to the bond. But 
to conclude from this that there is estrangement is to 
lose one¹s head and become a slave to elemental forces. 
Some comrades think that, in order to strengthen 
the bond, the main stress must be shifted from heavy 
industry to light industry (textiles), believing that textiles 
are the principal and exclusive ³bond² industry. 
That is not true, comrades. It is quite untrue! 
Of course, the textile industry is of enormous importance 
for the establishment of goods exchange between 
socialist industry and peasant farming. But to think for 
this reason that textiles are the exclusive basis of the 
bond is to commit a very gross error. Actually, the bond

J. V. S T A L I N 222 
between industry and peasant farming is maintained not 
only through cotton goods, which the peasant requires 
for his personal consumption, but also through metals 
and through seed, fertiliser and agricultural machines 
of all kinds, which the peasant requires as a producer of 
grain. That is apart from the fact that the textile industry 
itself cannot develop or exist unless heavy industry, 
machine-building, develops. 
The need for the bond is not in order to preserve and 
perpetuate classes. The bond is needed in order to bring 
the peasantry closer to the working class, to re-educate 
the peasant, to remould his individualist mentality, to 
remake him in the spirit of collectivism, and thus pave 
the way for the elimination, the abolition of classes on 
the basis of a socialist society. Whoever does not realise 
this, or refuses to recognise it, is not a Marxist, not a 
Leninist, but a ³peasant philosopher,² who looks backward 
instead of forward. 
And how is the peasant to be remade, remoulded? 
First and foremost, he can be remoulded only through 
new technical equipment and through collective labour. 
Here is what Lenin says on this score: 
³The remaking of the small tiller, the remoulding of his 
whole mentality and habits, is a work of generations. As regards 
the small tiller, this problem can be solved, his whole mentality 
can be put on healthy lines, so to speak, only by the material 
base, by technical means, by introducing tractors and machines 
in agriculture on a mass scale, by electrification on a mass scale. 
That is what would remake the small tiller fundamentally and 
with immense rapidity² (Vol. XXVI, p. 239). 
Quite clearly, he who thinks that the bond can be 
guaranteed only through textiles, and forgets about met

RESULTS OF THE JULY PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 223 
als and machines, which transform peasant farming 
through collective labour, helps to perpetuate classes; 
he is not a proletarian revolutionary, he is a ³peasant 
philosopher.² 
Here is what Lenin says in another passage: 
³Only if we succeed in practice in showing the peasants the 
advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation 
of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by 
means of co-operative, artel farming, will the working class, which 
holds state power in its hands, actually prove to the peasant 
the correctness of its policy and actually secure the real and durable 
following of the vast masses of the peasantry² (Vol. XXIV, 
p. 579). 
That is how to ensure that the vast masses of the peasantry 
are really and durably won over to the side of 
the working class, to the side of socialism. 
It is sometimes said that to guarantee the bond we 
have only one reserve‹concessions to the peasantry. On 
this assumption the theory of continuous concessions is 
sometimes advanced, in the belief that the working class 
can strengthen its position by making continuous concessions. 
That is not true, comrades. It is quite untrue! 
Such a theory can only ruin matters. It is a theory of 
despair. 
In order to strengthen the bond, we must have at our 
disposal, besides the reserve of concessions, a number 
of other reserves, in the shape of economic strong 
points in the countryside (developed co-operatives, collective 
farms, state farms), and also in the shape of 
political strong points (energetic work among the poor 
peasants and assured support on the part of the poor 
peasants).

J. V. S T A L I N 224 
The middle peasantry is a vacillating class. If we do 
I not have the support of the poor peasant, if the Soviet 
Government is weak in the countryside, the middle peasant 
may swing towards the kulak. And, on the contrary, 
if we have the sure support of the poor peasant, it may 
be said with certainty that the middle peasant will swing 
towards the Soviet Government. Hence, systematic work 
among the poor peasants and ensuring them both seed 
and low-cost grain is an immediate task of the Party. 
2. TRAINING OF CADRES FOR THE WORK OF INDUSTRIAL 
CONSTRUCTION 
Let us pass now to the question of providing our 
industry with new cadres of a technical intelligentsia. 
This question concerns our difficulties in industry, 
difficulties which came to light in connection with the 
Shakhty affair. 
What is the essence of the Shakhty affair from the 
point of view of the improvement of industry? The essence 
and significance of the Shakhty affair lies in the 
fact that we proved to be practically unarmed and absolutely 
backward, scandalously backward, in the matter 
of providing our industry with a certain minimum 
of experts devoted to the cause of the working class. 
The lesson of the Shakhty affair is that we must expedite 
the formation, the training, of a new technical in 
telligentsia consisting of members of the working class 
devoted to the cause of socialism and capable of technically 
directing our socialist industry. 
That does not mean that we shall discard those experts 
who are not Soviet-minded or not Communists, but

RESULTS OF THE JULY PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 225 
who are willing to co-operate with the Soviet Government. 
I t does not mean that. We shall continue to 
strive with might and main to enlist the co-operation of 
non-Party experts, non-Party technicians, who are prepared 
to work hand in hand with the Soviet Government 
in building our industry. We by no means demand that 
they should renounce their social and political opinions 
at once, or change them immediately. We demand only 
one thing, and that is that they should co-operate with 
the Soviet Government honestly, once they have voluntarily 
agreed to do so. 
But the point is that such old experts who are prepared 
to work hand in hand with the Soviet Government 
are becoming relatively fewer and fewer. The point is 
that it is absolutely necessary to have a new force of 
young experts to succeed them. Well, the Party considers 
that the new replacements must be brought into being 
at an accelerated rate if we do not want to be faced with 
new surprises, and that they must come from the working 
class, from among the working people. That means 
creating a new technical intelligentsia capable of satisfying 
the needs of our industry. 
The facts show that the People¹s Commissariat of 
Education has failed to cope with this important task. 
We have no reason to believe that, if left to itself, the 
People¹s Commissariat of Education, which has very little 
connection with industry, and which is inert and 
conservative into the bargain, will be able to cope with 
this task in the near future. The Party, therefore, has 
come to the conclusion that the work of speedily forming 
a new technical intelligentsia must be divided 
among three People¹s Commissariats‹the People¹s Com

J. V. S T A L I N 226 
missariat of Education, the Supreme Council of National 
Economy and the People¹s Commissariat of Transport. 
The Party considers that this is the most expedient 
way of ensuring the required speed in this important 
work. That is why a number of technical colleges have 
been transferred to the Supreme Council of National Economy 
and the People¹s Commissariat of Transport. 
This, of course, does not mean that transfer of technical 
colleges is all that is required for speedily forming 
new cadres of a technical intelligentsia. Undoubtedly, 
material provision for the students will be a highly 
important factor. The Soviet Government has therefore 
decided to rate the expenditure on the training of new 
cadres on the same level of importance as expenditure 
on the capital development of industry, and has decided 
to allocate annually an additional sum of over 
40,000,000 rubles for this purpose. 
III 
CONCLUSION 
It must be admitted, comrades, that we have always 
learned from our difficulties and blunders. At any rate, 
it has been the case so far that history has taught us and 
tempered our Party in the school of difficulties, of 
crises of one kind or another, of mistakes of one kind or 
another that we have committed. 
So it was in 1918, when, as a result of our difficulties 
on the Eastern Front, of our reverses in the fight 
against Kolchak, we realised at last the necessity of 
creating a regular infantry, and really did create it.

RESULTS OF THE JULY PLENUM OF THE C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 227 
So it was in 1919, when, as a result of the difficulties 
on the Denikin Front, of Mamontov¹s raid into 
the rear of our armies, we realised at last the necessity 
of having a strong regular cavalry, and really did create 
it. 
I think that this is more or less the case today. The 
grain difficulties will not have been without their value 
for us. They will stir Bolsheviks into action and impel 
them to tackle in earnest the work of developing agriculture, 
especially of developing grain farming. Had it 
not been for these difficulties, it is doubtful whether the 
Bolsheviks would have tackled the grain problem seriously. 
The same must be said of the Shakhty affair and the 
difficulties resulting from it. The lessons of the Shakhty 
affair will not and cannot be without their value for our 
Party. I think that these lessons will impel us to face 
squarely the problem of creating a new technical intelligentsia 
capable of serving our socialist industry. 
By the way, you see that we have already taken the 
first serious step towards the solution of the problem 
of creating a new technical intelligentsia. Let us hope 
that this step will not be the last. (Stormy and prolonged 
applause.) 
Leningradskaya Pravda, No. 162, 
June 26, 1928

TO THE LENINGRAD OSOAVIAKHIM56 
The strengthening of the defence of the Soviet Union 
is the cause of all the working people. 
The proletarians of Leningrad were in the foremost 
ranks in the battles of the civil war. 
The proletarians of Leningrad must now, too, set 
an example of organisation, discipline and solidarity in 
preparing for defence of the Soviet Union against the 
enemies of the working class. 
I have no doubt that the Leningrad Osoaviakhim, 
which is a mass organisation of the Leningrad proletarians, 
will fulfil its duty to the land of the proletarian 
dictatorship. 
J. Stalin 
Krasnaya Gazeta (Leningrad), 
No. 163, July 15, 1928

LETTER TO COMRADE KUIBYSHEV 
Greetings, Comrade Kuibyshev! 
Cooper arrived today. The talk will take place tomorrow. 
We shall see what he has to say about the American 
plans. 
I have read Cooper¹s sixth report letter on the Dnieper 
Hydro-Electric Power Station. Of course, the other 
side must be heard too. However, it seems to me (such 
is my first impression) that Cooper is right and Winter 
is wrong. The generally recognised fact that the Cooper 
type of coffer-dam (which Winter opposed) has proved 
to be the only suitable one‹this fact alone shows that 
what Cooper has to say must certainly be listened to attentively. 
It would be well if Cooper¹s sixth letter were 
examined in the proper quarters and accepted in principle. 
How are things with you? I have heard that Tomsky 
has it in for you. He is a malicious fellow and not always 
clean in his methods. It seems to me he is wrong. I 
have read your report on rationalisation. It is the right 
sort of report. What more does Tomsky want of you? 
How are things going at the Tsaritsyn tractor works 
and the Leningrad tractor workshops? Can we hope 
they will be a success? 
Cordially, 
Stalin 
August 31, 1928 
Published for the first time

TO THE MEMORY 
OF COMRADE I. I. SKVORTSOV-STEPANOV 
Death has snatched from our ranks a staunch and 
steadfast Leninist, a member of the Central Committee 
of our Party, Comrade Skvortsov-Stepanov. 
For decades Comrade Skvortsov-Stepanov fought in 
our ranks, enduring all the hardships of the life of a 
professional revolutionary. Many thousands of comrades 
know him as one of the oldest and most popular of our 
Marxist writers. They know him also as a most active 
participant in the October Revolution. They know him, 
lastly, as a most devoted champion of the Leninist unity 
and iron solidarity of our Party. 
Comrade Skvortsov-Stepanov devoted his whole life 
of brilliant labour to the cause of the victory of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat. 
May the memory of Comrade Skvortsov-Stepanov live 
in the hearts of the working class! 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 235, 
October 9, 1928

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 
Speech Delivered at the Plenum 
of the Moscow Committee and Moscow Control 
Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
October 19, 1928 
I think, comrades, that we must first rid our minds 
of trivialities, of personal matters, and so forth, in order 
to settle the question which interests us, that of the Right 
deviation. 
Is there a Right, opportunist danger in our Party? 
Do there exist objective conditions favourable to the development 
of such a danger? How should this danger be 
fought? These are the questions that now confront us. 
But we shall not settle this question of the Right 
deviation unless we purge it of all the trivialities and 
adventitious elements which have surrounded it and 
which prevent us from understanding its essence. 
Zapolsky is wrong in thinking that the question of 
the Right deviation is an accidental one. He asserts that 
it is all not a matter of a Right deviation, but of petty 
squabbles, personal intrigues, etc. Let us assume for a 
moment that petty squabbles and personal intrigues do 
play some part here, as in all struggles. But to explain 
everything by petty squabbles and to fail to see the essence 
of the question behind the squabbles, is to depart 
from the correct, Marxist path. 
A large, united organisation of long standing, such 
as the Moscow organisation undoubtedly is, could not be

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232 
stirred up from top to bottom and set into motion by the 
efforts of a few squabblers or intriguers. No, comrades, 
such miracles do not happen. That is apart from the fact 
that the strength and power of the Moscow organisation 
cannot be estimated so lightly. Obviously, more profound 
causes have been at work here causes which have 
nothing to do with either petty squabbles or intrigues. 
Fruntov is also wrong; for although he admits the 
existence of a Right danger, he does not think it worth 
while for serious, busy people to concern themselves with 
it seriously. In his opinion, the question of the Right 
deviation is a subject for noise-makers, not for serious 
people. I quite understand Fruntov: he is so absorbed 
in the day-to-day practical work that he has no time to 
think about the prospects of our development. But that 
does not mean that we must convert the narrow, practical 
empiricism of certain of our Party workers into a dogma 
of our work of construction. A healthy practicalism 
is a good thing; but if it loses sight of the prospects in 
the work and fails to subordinate the work to the basic 
line of the Party, it becomes a drawback. And yet it 
should not be difficult to understand that the question 
of the Right deviation is a question of the basic line of 
our Party; it is the question as to whether the prospects 
of development outlined by our Party at the Fifteenth 
Congress are correct or incorrect. 
Those comrades who in discussing the problem of 
the Right deviation concentrate on the question of the 
individuals representing the Right deviation are also 
wrong. Show us who are the Rights and the conciliators, 
they say, name them, so that we can deal with them accordingly. 
That is not the correct way of presenting the

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 233 
question. Individuals, of course, play some part. Nevertheless, 
the question is not one of individuals, but 
of the conditions, of the situation, giving rise to the Right 
danger in the Party. Individuals can be kept out, but 
that does not mean that we have thereby cut the roots 
of the Right danger in our Party. Hence, the question 
of individuals does not settle the matter, although it 
is undoubtedly of interest. 
In this connection I cannot help recalling an incident 
which occurred in Odessa at the end of 1919 and 
the beginning of 1920, when our forces, having driven 
Denikin¹s forces out of the Ukraine, were crushing the 
last remnants of his armies in the area of Odessa. One 
group of Red Army men searched high and low for the ³Entente² 
in Odessa, convinced that if they could only capture 
it‹the Entente‹the war would be over. (General laughter.) 
It is conceivable that our Red Army men might 
have captured some representatives of the Entente in 
Odessa, but that, of course, would not have settled the 
question of the Entente, for the roots of the Entente 
did not lie in Odessa, although Odessa at that time was 
the Denikinites¹ last terrain, but in world capitalism. 
The same can be said of certain of our comrades, 
who in the question of the Right deviation concentrate 
on the individuals representing that deviation, and forget 
about the conditions that give rise to it. 
That is why we must first of all elucidate here the 
conditions that give rise to the Right, and also to the 
³Left² (Trotskyite), deviation from the Leninist line. 
Under capitalist conditions the Right deviation in 
communism signifies a tendency, an inclination that 
has not yet taken shape, it is true, and is perhaps not

J. V. S T A L I N 234 
yet consciously realised, but nevertheless a tendency 
of a section of the Communists to depart from the revolutionary 
line of Marxism in the direction of Social- 
Democracy. When certain groups of Communists deny 
the expediency of the slogan ³Class against class² in 
election campaigns (France), or are opposed to the Communist 
Party nominating its own candidates (Britain), 
or are disinclined to make a sharp issue of the fight 
against ³Left² Social-Democracy (Germany), etc., etc., 
it means that there are people in the Communist Parties 
who are striving to adapt communism to Social-Democratism. 
A victory of the Right deviation in the Communist 
Parties of the capitalist countries would mean the 
ideological rout of the Communist Parties and an 
enormous strengthening of Social-Democratism. And 
what does an enormous strengthening of Social-Democratism 
mean? It means the strengthening and consolidation 
of capitalism, for Social-Democracy is the main 
support of capitalism in the working class. 
Consequently, a victory of the Right deviation in 
the Communist Parties of the capitalist countries would 
lead to a development of the conditions necessary for the 
preservation of capitalism. 
Under the conditions of Soviet development, when capitalism 
has already been overthrown, but i t s roots 
have not yet been torn out, the Right deviation in communism 
signifies a tendency, an inclination that has 
not yet taken shape, it is true, and is perhaps not yet 
consciously realised, but nevertheless a tendency 
of a section of the Communists to depart from the 
general line of our Party in the direction of bourgeois

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 235 
ideology. When certain circles of our Communists 
strive to drag the Party back from the decisions of 
the Fifteenth Congress, by denying the need for an offensive 
against the capitalist elements in the countryside; 
or demand a contraction of our industry, in the belief 
that its present rapid rate of development is fatal for 
the country; or deny the expediency of subsidies to the 
collective farms and state farms, in the belief that such 
subsidies are money thrown to the winds; or deny the 
expediency of fighting against bureaucracy by methods 
of self-criticism, in the belief that self-criticism undermines 
our apparatus; or demand that the monopoly of 
foreign trade be relaxed, etc., etc., it means that there 
are people in the ranks of our Party who are striving, 
perhaps without themselves realising it, to adapt our 
socialist construction to the tastes and requirements of 
the ³Soviet² bourgeoisie. 
A victory of the Right deviation in our Party would 
mean an enormous strengthening of the capitalist elements 
in our country. And what does the strengthening 
of the capitalist elements in our country mean? It means 
weakening the proletarian dictatorship and increasing 
the chances of the restoration of capitalism. 
Consequently, a victory of the Right deviation in 
our Party would mean a development of the conditions 
necessary for the restoration of capitalism in our country. 
Have we in our Soviet country any of the conditions 
that would make the restoration of capitalism possible? 
Yes, we have. That, comrades, may appear strange, but 
it is a fact. We have overthrown capitalism, we have established 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, we are developing 
our socialist industry at a rapid pace and are

J. V. S T A L I N 236 
linking peasant economy with it. But we have not yet 
torn out the roots of capitalism. Where are these roots imbedded? 
They are imbedded in commodity production, 
in small production in the towns and, especially, the 
countryside. 
As Lenin says, the strength of capitalism lies ³in 
the strength of small production. For, unfortunately, 
small production i s s t i l l very, very widespread in 
the world, and small production engenders capitalism 
and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, hourly, spontaneously, 
and on a mass scale² (see Vol. XXV, p. 173). 
It is clear that, since small production bears a mass, 
and even a predominant character in our country, 
and since it engenders capitalism and the bourgeoisie 
continuously and on a mass scale, particularly under the 
conditions of NEP, we have in our country conditions 
which make the restoration of capitalism possible. 
Have we in our Soviet country the necessary means 
and forces to abolish, to eliminate the possibility of the 
restoration of capitalism? Yes, we have. And it is this 
fact that proves the correctness of Lenin¹s thesis on the 
possibility of building a complete socialist society in 
the U.S.S.R. For this purpose it is necessary to consolidate 
the dictatorship of the proletariat strengthen 
the alliance between the working class and peasantry, 
develop our key positions from the standpoint of industrialising 
the country, develop industry at a rapid rate, 
electrify the country, place the whole of our national 
economy on a new technical basis, organise the 
peasantry into co-operatives on a mass scale and increase 
the yield of its farms gradually unite the individual 
peasant farms into socially conducted, collective farms,

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 237 
develop state farms, restrict and overcome the capitalist 
elements in town and country, etc., etc. 
Here is what Lenin says on this subject: 
³As long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is 
a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. 
This must be borne in mind. Anyone who has carefully observed 
life in the countryside, as compared with life in the towns, knows 
that we have not torn out the roots of capitalism and have not undermined 
the foundation, the basis of the internal enemy. The 
latter depends on small-scale production, and there is only one 
way of undermining i t , namely, to place the economy of the 
country, including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical 
basis of modern large-scale production. And it is only electricity 
that is such a basis. Communism is Soviet power plus the 
electrification of the whole country. Otherwise, the country will 
remain a small-peasant country, and we have got to understand 
that clearly. We are weaker than capitalism, not only on a world 
scale, but also within the country. Everybody knows this. We are 
conscious of it, and we shall see to it that our economic base is 
transformed from a small-peasant base into a large-scale industrial 
base. Only when the country has been electrified, only when 
our industry, our agriculture, our transport system have been 
placed upon the technical basis of modern large-scale industry 
shall we achieve final victory² (Vol. XXVI, pp. 46-47). 
It follows, firstly, that as long as we live in a smallpeasant 
country, as long as we have not torn out the roots 
of capitalism, there is a surer economic basis for capitalism 
than for communism. It may happen that you 
cut down a tree but fail to tear out the roots; your strength 
does not suffice for this. Hence the possibility of the restoration 
of capitalism in our country. 
Secondly, it follows that besides the possibility of 
the restoration of capitalism there is also the possibility 
of the victory of socialism in our country, because

J. V. S T A L I N 238 
we can destroy the possibility of the restoration of capitalism, 
we can tear out the roots of capitalism and 
achieve final victory over capitalism in our country, 
if we intensify the work of electrifying the country, 
if we place our industry, agriculture and transport on 
the technical basis of modern, large-scale industry. 
Hence the possibility of the victory of socialism in our 
country. 
Lastly, it follows that we cannot build socialism 
in industry alone and leave agriculture to the mercy of 
spontaneous development on the assumption that the 
countryside will ³move by itself² following the lead of the 
towns. The existence of socialist industry in the towns 
is the principal factor in the socialist transformation 
of the countryside. But it does not mean that that 
factor is quite sufficient. If the socialist towns are to 
take the lead of the peasant countryside all the way, 
it is essential, as Lenin says, ³to place the economy 
of the country, including agriculture,* on a new technical 
basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production.² 
Does this quotation from Lenin contradict another 
of his statements, to the effect that ³NEP fully ensures 
us the possibility* of laying the foundation of a socialist 
economy²? No, it does not. On the contrary, the 
two statements fully coincide. Lenin by no means says 
that NEP gives us socialism ready-made. Lenin merely 
says that NEP ensures us the possibility of laying 
the foundation of a socialist economy. There is a great 
difference between the possibility of building socialism 
* My italics.‹J. St.

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 239 
and the actual building of socialism. Possibility and 
actuality must not be confused. It is precisely for the 
purpose of transforming possibility into actuality that 
Lenin proposes the electrification of the country and 
the placing of industry, agriculture and transport on the 
technical basis of modern large-scale production as a 
condition for the final victory of socialism in our country. 
But this condition for the building of socialism cannot 
be fulfilled in one or two years. It is impossible in 
one or two years to industrialise the country, build up 
a powerful industry, organise the vast masses of the peasantry 
into co-operatives, place agriculture on a new technical 
basis, unite the individual peasant farms into 
large collective farms, develop state farms, and restrict 
and overcome the capitalist elements in town and 
country. Years and years of intense constructive work 
by the proletarian dictatorship will be needed for this. 
And until that is accomplished‹and it can not be accomplished 
all at once‹we shall remain a small peasant 
country, where small production engenders capitalism 
and the bourgeoisie continuously and on a mass scale, 
and where the danger of the restoration of capitalism 
remains. 
And since our proletariat does not live in a vacuum, 
but in the midst of the most actual and real life with 
all its variety of forms, the bourgeois elements arising 
on the basis of small production ³encircle the proletariat 
on every side with petty bourgeois elemental 
forces, by means of which they permeate and corrupt the 
proletariat and continually cause relapses among the 
proletariat into petty-bourgeois spinelessness, disunity, 
individualism, and alternate moods of exaltation and

J. V. S T A L I N 240 
dejection² (Lenin, Vol. XXV, p. 189), thereby introducing 
into the ranks of the proletariat and of its Party 
a certain amount of vacillation, a certain amount of 
wavering. 
There you have the root and the basis of all sorts 
of vacillations and deviations from the Leninist line in 
the ranks of our Party. 
That is why the Right and ³Left² deviations in our 
Party cannot be regarded as a trifling matter. 
Where does the danger of the Right, frankly opportunist, 
deviation in our Party lie? In the fact that it 
underestimates the strength of our enemies, the strength 
of capitalism: it does not see the danger of the restoration 
of capitalism; it does not understand the mechanism 
of the class struggle under the dictatorship of the 
proletariat and therefore so readily agrees to make concessions 
to capitalism, demanding a slowing down of 
the rate of development of our industry, demanding concessions 
for the capitalist elements in town and country, 
demanding that the question of collective farms 
and state farms be relegated to the background, demanding 
that the monopoly of foreign trade be relaxed, 
etc., etc. 
There is no doubt that the triumph of the Right 
deviation in our Party would unleash the forces of capitalism, 
undermine the revolutionary positions of the proletariat 
and increase the chances of the restoration of 
capitalism in our country. 
Where does the danger of the ³Left² (Trotskyite) 
deviation in our Party lie? In the fact that i t overestimates 
the strength of our enemies, the strength of 
capitalism; it sees only the possibility of the restoration

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 241 
of capitalism, but cannot see the possibility of building 
socialism by the efforts of our country; it gives way 
to despair and is obliged to console itself with chatter 
about Thermidor tendencies in our Party. 
From the words of Lenin that ³as long as we live 
in a small peasant country, there is a surer economic 
basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism,² 
the ³Left² deviation draws the false conclusion that 
it is impossible to build socialism in the U.S.S.R. at 
all; that we cannot get anywhere with the peasantry; that 
the idea of an alliance between the working class and 
the peasantry is an obsolete idea; that unless a victorious 
revolution in the West comes to our aid the dictatorship 
of the proletariat in the U.S.S.R. must fall 
or degenerate; that unless we adopt the fantastic plan 
of super-industrialisation, even at the cost of a split 
with the peasantry, the cause of socialism in the U.S.S.R. 
must be regarded as doomed. 
Hence the adventurism in the policy of the ³Left² 
deviation. Hence its ³superhuman² leaps in the sphere 
of policy. 
There is no doubt that the triumph of the ³Left² 
deviation in our Party would lead to the working class 
being separated from its peasant base, to the vanguard 
of the working class being separated from the rest of 
the working-class masses, and, consequently, to the defeat 
of the proletariat and to facilitating conditions 
for the restoration of capitalism. 
You see, therefore, that both these dangers, the ³Left² 
and the Right, both these deviations from the Leninist 
line, the Right and the ³Left,² lead to the same result, 
although from different directions.

J. V. S T A L I N 242 
Which of these dangers is worse? In my opinion 
one is as bad as the other. 
The difference between these deviations from the 
point of view of successfully combating them consists 
in the fact that the danger of the ³Left² deviation is 
at the present moment more obvious to the Party than 
the danger of the Right deviation. The fact that an 
intense struggle has been waged against the ³Left² deviation 
for several years now has, of course, not been 
without its value for the Party. It is clear that the Party 
has learned a great deal in the years of the fight against 
the ³Left,² Trotskyite deviation and cannot now be 
easily deceived by ³Left² phrases. 
As for the Right danger, which existed before, but 
which has now become more prominent because of the 
growth of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces resulting 
from last year¹s grain-procurement crisis, I think it is not 
quite so obvious to certain sections of our Party. That 
is why our task must be‹while not in the least relaxing the 
fight against the ³Left,² Trotskyite danger‹to lay the 
emphasis on the fight against the Right deviation and 
to take all measures to make the danger of this deviation 
as obvious to the Party as the Trotskyite danger. 
The question of the Right deviation would not, perhaps, 
be as acute as it is now, were it not for the fact 
that it is connected with the difficulties accompanying 
our development. But the whole point is that the 
existence of the Right deviation complicates the difficulties 
accompanying our development and hinders our 
efforts to overcome these difficulties. And for the very 
reason that the Right danger hinders the efforts to overcome 
the difficulties, the question of overcoming the

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 243 
Right danger has assumed particularly great importance 
for us. 
A few words about the nature of our difficulties. 
It should be borne in mind that our difficulties should 
by no means be regarded as difficulties of stagnation 
or decline. There are difficulties that arise at a time 
of economic decline or stagnation, and in such cases 
efforts are made to render the stagnation less painful, 
or the decline less profound. Our difficulties have nothing 
in common with difficulties of that kind. The characteristic 
feature of our difficulties is that they are difficulties 
of expansion, difficulties of growth. When we 
speak about difficulties we usually mean by what percentage 
industry ought to be expanded, by what percentage 
the crop area ought to be enlarged, by how many poods 
the crop yield ought to be increased, etc., etc. And because 
our difficulties are those of expansion, and not of decline 
or stagnation, they should not be anything particularly 
dangerous for the Party. 
But difficulties are difficulties, nevertheless. And 
since in order to overcome difficulties it is necessary to 
exert all efforts, to display firmness and endurance, and 
since not everybody possesses sufficient firmness and 
endurance‹perhaps as a result of fatigue and overstrain, 
or because of a preference for a quiet life, free from struggle 
and commotion‹it is just here that vacillations and waverings 
begin to take place, tendencies to adopt the line of 
least resistance, talk about slowing down the rate of industrial 
development, about making concessions to the 
capitalist elements, about rejecting collective farms and 
state farms and, in general, everything that goes beyond 
the calm and familiar conditions of the daily routine.

J. V. S T A L I N 244 
But unless we overcome the difficulties in our path 
we shall make no progress. And in order to overcome 
the difficulties we must first defeat the Right danger, 
we must first overcome the Right deviation, which is 
hindering the fight against the difficulties and is trying 
to undermine our Party¹s will to fight and overcome 
the difficulties. 
I am speaking, of course, of a real fight against 
the Right deviation, not a verbal, paper fight. There 
are people in our Party who, to soothe their conscience, 
are quite willing to proclaim a fight against the Right 
danger in the same way as priests sometimes cry, ³Hallelujah! 
Hallelujah!² But they will not undertake any practical 
measures at all to organise the fight against the 
Right deviation on a firm basis, and to overcome this 
deviation in actual fact. We call this tendency a conciliatory 
tendency towards the Right, frankly opportunist, 
deviation. It is not difficult to understand that 
the fight against this conciliatory tendency is an integral 
part of the general fight against the Right deviation, 
against the Right danger. For it is impossible to overcome 
the Right, opportunist deviation without waging a systematic 
fight against the conciliatory tendency, which 
takes the opportunists under its wing. 
The question who are the exponents of the Right deviation 
is undoubtedly of interest, although it is not of 
decisive importance. We came across exponents of the 
Right danger in our lower Party organisations during 
the grain-procurement crisis last year, when a number 
of Communists in the volosts and villages opposed the 
Party¹s policy and worked towards forming a bond 
with kulak elements. As you know, such people were

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 245 
cleared out of the Party last spring, a matter specially 
referred to in the document of the Central Committee 
of our Party in February this year. 
But it would be wrong to say that there are no such 
people left in our Party. If we go higher up, to the uyezd 
and gubernia Party organisations, or if we dig deeper 
into the Soviet and co-operative apparatus, we could 
without difficulty find exponents of the Right 
danger and conciliation towards it. We know of 
³letters,² ³declarations,² and other documents written 
by a number of functionaries in our Party and Soviet 
apparatus, in which the drift towards the Right deviation 
is quite distinctly expressed. You know that these 
letters and documents were referred to in the verbatim 
report of the July plenum of the Central Committee. 
If we go higher still, and ask about the members 
of the Central Committee, we shall have to admit that 
within the Central Committee, too, there are certain 
elements, very insignificant it is true, of a conciliatory 
attitude towards the Right danger. The verbatim report 
of the July plenum of the Central Committee provides 
direct proof of this. 
Well, and what about the Political Bureau? Are there 
any deviations in the Political Bureau? In the Political 
Bureau there are neither Right nor ³Left² deviations 
nor conciliators towards those deviations. This 
must be said quite categorically. It is time to put a stop 
to the tittle-tattle spread by enemies of the Party and 
by the oppositionists of all kinds about there being a 
Right deviation, or a conciliatory attitude towards the 
Right deviation, in the Political Bureau of our Central 
Committee.

J. V. S T A L I N 246
Were there vacillations and waverings in the Moscow 
organisation, or in its top leadership, the Moscow Committee? 
Yes, there were. It would be absurd to assert now 
that there were no waverings, no vacillations there. 
The candid speech made by Penkov is direct proof of 
this. Penkov is by no means the least important person in 
the Moscow organisation and in the Moscow Committee. 
You heard him plainly and frankly admit that he had 
been wrong on a number of important questions of our 
Party policy. That does not mean, of course, that the 
Moscow Committee as a whole was subject to vacillation. 
No, it does not mean that. A document like the appeal 
of the Moscow Committee to the members of the Moscow 
organisation in October of this year undoubtedly shows 
that the Moscow Committee has succeeded in overcoming 
the vacillations of certain of its members. I have no 
doubt that the leading core of the Moscow Committee 
will be able completely to straighten out the situation. 
Certain comrades are dissatisfied with the fact that 
the district organisations interfered in this matter and 
demanded that an end be put to the mistakes and vacillations 
of certain leaders of the Moscow organisation. I 
do not see how this dissatisfaction can be justified. What 
is there wrong about district activists of the Moscow organisation 
raising the demand that an end be put to mistakes 
and vacillations? Does not our work proceed under 
the slogan of self-criticism from below? Is it not a fact 
that self-criticism increases the activity of the Party 
rank and file and of the proletarian rank and file in 
general? What is there wrong or dangerous in the fact 
that the district activists proved equal to the situation? 
Did the Central Committee act rightly in interfer

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 247 
ing in this matter? I think that it did. Berzin thinks that 
the Central Committee acted too drastically in demanding 
the removal of one of the district leaders to whom the 
district organisation was opposed. That is absolutely 
wrong. Let me remind Berzin of certain incidents in 
1919 or 1920, when some members of the Central Committee 
who were guilty of certain, in my opinion, not 
very serious errors in respect of the Party line were, 
on Lenin¹s suggestion, subjected to exemplary punishment, 
one of them being sent to Turkestan, and the other 
almost paying the penalty of expulsion from the Central 
Committee. 
Was Lenin right in acting as he did? I think he was 
quite right. The situation in the Central Committee 
then was not what it is now. Half the members of the 
Central Committee followed Trotsky, and the situation 
in the Central Committee was not a stable one. The Central 
Committee today is acting much more mildly. Why? 
Is it, perhaps, because we want to be more gentle than 
Lenin? No, that is not the point. The point is that the 
position of the Central Committee is more stable now 
than it was then, and the Central Committee can afford 
to act more mildly. 
Nor is Sakharov right in asserting that the intervention 
of the Central Committee was belated. Sakharov is 
wrong because he evidently does not know that, properly 
speaking, the intervention of the Central Committee began 
in February of this year. Sakharov can convince himself 
of that if he desires. It is true that the intervention 
of the Central Committee did not immediately yield 
required results. But it would be strange to blame the 
Central Committee for that.

J. V. S T A L I N 248 
Conclusions: 
1) the Right danger is a serious danger in our Party, 
for it is rooted in the social and economic situation in 
our country; 
2) the danger of the Right deviation is aggravated 
by the existence of difficulties which cannot be overcome 
unless the Right deviation and conciliation towards 
it are overcome; 
3) in the Moscow organisation there were vacillations 
and waverings, there were elements of instability; 
4) the core of the Moscow Committee, with the help 
of the Central Committee and the district activists, took 
all measures to put an end to these vacillations; 
5) there can be no doubt that the Moscow Committee 
will succeed in overcoming the mistakes which began to 
take shape in the past; 
6) our task is to put a stop to the internal struggle, 
to unite the Moscow organisation into a single whole, and 
to carry through the elections in the Party units successfully 
on the basis of fully developed self-criticism. 
(Applause.) 
Pravda, No. 247 
October 23, 1928

REPLY TO COMRADE SH. 
Comrade Sh., 
I have received your letter and must say that I cannot 
possibly agree with you. 
1) It is clear from the quotation from Lenin that 
so long as we remain a small-peasant country the danger 
of the restoration of capitalism will exist. You say 
that this opinion of Lenin¹s ³cannot be applied to the 
present period in the U.S.S.R.² Why, one asks? Are 
we not still a small-peasant country? 
Of course, inasmuch as our socialist industry is developing 
and collective forms of economy are beginning to take root 
in the countryside, the chances of the restoration of capitalism 
are diminishing. That is a fact. But does that mean that 
we have already ceased to be a small-peasant country? 
Does it mean that the socialist forms have developed to 
such an extent that the U.S.S.R. can no longer be considered 
a small-peasant country? It obviously does not. 
But what follows from this? Only one thing, namely, 
the danger of the restoration of capitalism in 
our country does exist. How can one contest such an 
obvious fact? 
2) You say in your letter: ³It would appear from 
what you said about the Right and the ŒLeft¹ deviations 
that our difference both with the Rights and with 
the ŒLefts¹ is only over the question of the rate of industrialisation. 
The question of the peasantry, on the

J. V. S T A L I N 250 
other hand, was referred to in your assessment of the 
Trotskyist position only sketchily. That gives rise to 
a very objectionable interpretation of your speech.² 
It is very possible that my speech* is interpreted 
differently by different people. That is a matter of taste. 
But that the thoughts expressed in your letter are not 
in accordance with reality is quite evident to me. I said 
plainly in my speech that the Right deviation ³underestimates 
the strength of capitalism² in our country, 
³does not see the danger of the restoration of capitalism,² 
³does not understand the mechanism of the class struggle,² 
³and therefore so readily agrees to make concessions 
to capitalism.² I said plainly in my speech that 
³the triumph of the Right deviation in our Party² would 
³increase the chances of the restoration of capitalism in 
our country.² You will realise, of course, that what is 
referred to here is not merely the rate of industrialisation. 
What more should be said about the Right deviation 
to satisfy you? 
As to the ³Left,² Trotskyist, deviation, I said plainly 
in my speech that it denies the possibility of building 
socialism in our country, rejects the idea of an alliance 
of the working class and the peasantry, and is prepared 
to carry out its fantastic plan of industrialisation at 
the cost of a split with the peasantry. I said in my speech 
(if you have read it) that ³the triumph of the ŒLeft¹ deviation 
in our Party would lead to the working class being 
separated from its peasant base, to the vanguard of the 
working class being separated from the rest of the working-
class masses, and, consequently, to the defeat of the 
* See pp. 231-48 in this volume.‹Ed.

REPLY TO COMRADE SH. 251 
proletariat and to facilitating conditions for the restoration 
of capitalism.² You will realise, of course, that what is 
referred to here is not merely the rate of industrialisation. 
I think that everything fundamental we have ever 
said against Trotskyism is said here. 
Of course, less was said in my speech about the ³Left² 
deviation than about the Right. But that is because 
the theme of my speech was the Right deviation, as I 
definitely specified at the beginning of my speech, and 
as was fully in accordance with the agenda of the joint 
plenum of the M.C. and M.C.C. But one thing cannot be 
denied, and that is that, despite this, everything fundamental 
that at all distinguishes Trotskyism from 
Leninism on the one hand, and from the Right deviation 
on the other, was said in my speech. 
What more should be said about Trotskyism in a 
speech devoted to the Right deviation to satisfy you? 
3) You are not satisfied with my statement that in 
the Political Bureau there are neither Right nor ³Left² 
deviations nor conciliation towards them. Was I justified 
in making such a statement? I was. Why? Because 
when the text of the Central Committee¹s message to the 
members of the Moscow organisation was adopted by the 
Political Bureau, not one of the members of the Political 
Bureau present voted against it. Is this a good or a bad 
thing? I think it is a good thing. Can such a fact be disregarded 
when characterising the Political Bureau in October 
1928? Obviously not. 
With communist greetings, 
J. Stalin 
October 27, 1928 
Published for the first time

TO THE LENINIST YOUNG COMMUNIST 
LEAGUE 
Greetings on the Day of the Tenth Anniversary 
of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League 
Greetings to the Leninist Young Communist League 
on its tenth anniversary! 
The Leninist Young Communist League was, and is, 
the young reserve of our revolution. Tens and hundreds 
of thousands of the finest representatives of the younger 
generation of workers and peasants have been trained 
in the ranks of the Young Communist League, received 
their revolutionary steeling and entered our Party, our 
Soviets, our trade unions, our Red Army, our Red Navy, 
our co-operatives, and our cultural organisations, to 
serve as the successors of the Bolshevik old guard. 
The Young Communist League has succeeded in this 
difficult task because it has worked under the guidance 
of the Party; it has been able in its activities to 
combine study in general, and the study of Leninism 
in particular, with its day-to-day practical work; it 
has been able to educate the younger generation of working 
men and women and peasant men and women in 
the spirit of internationalism; it has been able to find 
a common language between the old and the young 
Leninists, between the old and the young guard; it has 
been able to subordinate all its work to the interests 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the victory 
of socialist construction.

TO THE LENINIST YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE 253 
It is owing to this alone that the Young Communist 
League has succeeded in holding aloft the banner of 
Lenin. 
Let us hope that in the future, too, the Young Communist 
League will succeed in performing its duty towards 
our proletariat and the international proletariat. 
Greetings to the two-million reserve of our Party, 
the Leninist Young Communist League! 
Long live the young communist generation! 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 252, 
October 28, 1928

ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY 
OF THE FIRST CONGRESS OF WORKING 
WOMEN AND PEASANT WOMEN57 
Fraternal greetings to the women workers and all 
women toilers of town and country! 
I wish them success in the struggle for the abolition 
of exploitation, oppression, inequality, darkness and 
ignorance! 
In a united front with all the working people and 
under the leadership of the working class, forward to 
the abolition of capitalism, the consolidation of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, and the building of a new, 
socialist society! 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 267 
November 17, 1928

INDUSTRIALISATION 
OF THE COUNTRY AND THE RIGHT 
DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 
Speech Delivered 
at the Plenum of the C.P.S.U.(B.)58 
November 19, 1928 
I shall deal, comrades, with three main questions 
raised in the theses of the Political Bureau. 
Firstly, the industrialisation of the country and 
the fact that the key factor in industrialisation is the 
development of the production of the means of production, 
while ensuring the greatest possible speed of this 
development. 
Next, the fact that the rate of development of our 
agriculture lags extremely behind the rate of development 
of our industry, and that because of this the most 
burning question in our home policy today is that of 
agriculture, and especially the grain problem, the 
question how to improve, to reconstruct agriculture on 
a new technical basis. 
And, thirdly and lastly, the deviations from the line 
of the Party, the struggle on two fronts, and the fact 
that our chief danger at the present moment is the Right 
danger, the Right deviation.

J. V. S T A L I N 256 
I 
THE RATE OF DEVELOPMENT 
OF INDUSTRY 
Our theses proceed from the premise that a fast 
rate of development of industry in general, and of the 
production of the means of production in particular, 
is the underlying principle of, and the key to, the industrialisation 
of the country, the underlying principle 
of, and the key to, the transformation of our entire national 
economy along the lines of socialist development. 
But what does a fast rate of development of industry 
involve? It involves the maximum capital investment 
in industry. And that leads to a state of tension in all 
our plans, budgetary and non-budgetary. And, indeed, 
the characteristic feature of our control figures in the 
past three years, in the period of reconstruction, is that 
they have been compiled and carried out at a high tension. 
Take our control figures, examine our budget estimates, 
talk with our Party comrades‹both those who 
work in the Party organisations and those who direct 
our Soviet, economic and co-operative affairs‹and you 
will invariably find this one characteristic featureeverywhere, 
namely, the state of tension in our plans. 
The question arises: is this state of tension in our 
plans really necessary for us? Cannot we do without it? 
Is it not possible to conduct the work at a slower pace, 
in a more ³restful² atmosphere? Is not the fast rate of 
industrial development that we have adopted due to 
the restless character of the members of the Political 
Bureau and the Council of People¹s Commissars?

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 257 
Of course not! The members of the Political Bureau 
and the Council of People¹s Commissars are calm and 
sober people. Abstractly speaking, that is, if we disregarded 
the external and internal situation, we could, 
of course, conduct the work at a slower speed. But the 
point is that, firstly, we cannot disregard the external 
and internal situation, and, secondly, if we take the surrounding 
situation as our starting-point, it has to be admitted 
that it is precisely this situation that dictates 
a fast rate of development of our industry. 
Permit me to pass to an examination of this situation, 
of these conditions of an external and internal order 
that dictate a fast rate of industrial development. 
External conditions. We have assumed power in a 
country whose technical equipment is terribly backward. 
Along with a few big industrial units more or less based 
upon modern technology, we have hundreds and thousands 
of mills and factories the technical equipment of which is 
beneath all criticism from the point of view of modern 
achievements. At the same time we have around us a number 
of capitalist countries whose industrial technique is far 
more developed and up-to-date than that of our country. 
Look at the capitalist countries and you will see that their 
technology is not only advancing, but advancing by leaps 
and bounds, outstripping the old forms of industrial 
technique. And so we find that, on the one hand, we 
in our country have the most advanced system, the 
Soviet system, and the most advanced type of state power 
in the world, Soviet power, while, on the other hand, 
our industry, which should be the basis of socialism and 
of Soviet power, is extremely backward technically. 
Do you think that we can achieve the final victory of

J. V. S T A L I N 258 
socialism in our country so long as this contradiction 
exists? 
What has to be done to end this contradiction? To 
end it, we must overtake and outstrip the advanced 
technology of the developed capitalist countries. We 
have overtaken and outstripped the advanced capitalist 
countries in the sense of establishing a new political 
system, the Soviet system. That is good. But it is not 
enough. In order to secure the final victory of socialism 
in our country, we must also overtake and outstrip these 
countries technically and economically. Either we do 
this, or we shall be forced to the wall. 
This applies not only to the building of socialism. 
It applies also to upholding the independence of our 
country in the circumstances of the capitalist encirclement. 
The independence of our country cannot be upheld 
unless we have an adequate industrial basis for defence. 
And such an industrial basis cannot be created 
if our industry is not more highly developed technically. 
That is why a fast rate of development of our industry 
is necessary and imperative. 
The technical and economic backwardness of our 
country was not invented by us. This backwardness is 
age-old and was bequeathed to us by the whole history 
of our country. This backwardness was felt to be an 
evil both earlier, before the revolution, and later, after 
the revolution. When Peter the Great, having to 
deal with the more highly developed countries of the 
West, feverishly built mills and factories to supply 
the army and strengthen the country¹s defences, that 
was in its way an attempt to break out of the grip of 
this backwardness. It is quite understandable, however,

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 259 
that none of the old classes, neither the feudal aristocracy 
nor the bourgeoisie, could solve the problem of putting 
an end to the backwardness of our country. More 
than that, not only were these classes unable to solve 
this problem, they were not even able to formulate the 
task in any satisfactory way. The age-old backwardness 
of our country can be ended only on the lines of successful 
socialist construction. And it can be ended only by 
the proletariat, which has established its dictatorship 
and has charge of the direction of the country. 
It would be foolish to console ourselves with the 
thought that, since the backwardness of our country was 
not invented by us and was bequeathed to us by the whole 
history of our country, we cannot be, and do not have to be, 
responsible for it. That is not true, comrades. Since we 
have come to power and taken upon ourselves the task 
of transforming the country on the basis of socialism, 
we are responsible, and have to be responsible, for everything, 
the bad as well as the good. And just because we 
are responsible for everything, we must put an end to 
our technical and economic backwardness. We must 
do so without fail if we really want to overtake and 
outstrip the advanced capitalist countries. And only 
we Bolsheviks can do it. But precisely in order to accomplish 
this task, we must systematically achieve a 
fast rate of development of our industry. And that we 
are already achieving a fast rate of industrial development 
is now clear to everyone. 
The question of overtaking and outstripping the advanced 
capitalist countries technically and economically 
is for us Bolsheviks neither new nor unexpected. It 
was raised in our country as early as in 1917, before

J. V. S T A L I N 260 
the October Revolution. It was raised by Lenin as early 
as in September 1917, on the eve of the October Revolution, 
during the imperialist war, in his pamphlet 
The Impending Catastrophe and How to Combat It. 
Here is what Lenin said on this score: 
³The result of the revolution has been that the p o l i t i c a l 
system of Russia has in a few months caught up with that of the 
advanced countries. But that is not enough. The war is inexorable; 
it puts the alternative with ruthless severity: either perish, 
or overtake and outstrip the advanced countries e c o n o m ic 
a l l y a s w e l l. . . . Perish or drive full-steam ahead. That 
is the alternative with which history has confronted us² 
(Vol. XXI, p. 191). 
You see how bluntly Lenin put the question of ending 
our technical and economic backwardness. 
Lenin wrote all this on the eve of the October Revolution, 
in the period before the proletariat had taken 
power, when the Bolsheviks had as yet neither state 
power, nor a socialised industry, nor a widely ramified 
co-operative network embracing millions of peasants, 
nor collective farms, nor state farms. Today, when we 
already have something substantial with which to end 
completely our technical and economic backwardness, 
we might paraphrase Lenin¹s words roughly as follows: 
³We have overtaken and outstripped the advanced 
capitalist countries politically by establishing the dictatorship 
of the proletariat. But that is not enough. 
We must utilise the dictatorship of the proletariat, our 
socialised industry, transport, credit system, etc., the 
co-operatives, collective farms, state farms, etc., in 
order to overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist 
countries economically as well.²

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 261 
The question of a fast rate of development of industry 
would not face us so acutely as it does now if we had 
such a highly developed industry and such a highly 
developed technology as Germany, say, and if the relative 
importance of industry in the entire national 
economy were as high in our country as it is in Germany, 
for example. If that were the case, we could develop our 
industry at a slower rate without fearing to fall behind 
the capitalist countries and knowing that we could outstrip 
them at one stroke. But then we should not be 
so seriously backward technically and economically as 
we are now. The whole point is that we are behind 
Germany in this respect and are still far from having 
overtaken her technically and economically. 
The question of a fast rate of development of industry 
would not face us so acutely if we were not the only 
country but one of the countries of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat, if there were a proletarian dictatorship 
not only in our country but in other, more advanced countries 
as well, Germany and France, say. 
If that were the case, the capitalist encirclement 
could not be so serious a danger as it is now, the question 
of the economic independence of our country would naturally 
recede into the background, we could integrate 
ourselves into the system of more developed proletarian 
states, we could receive from them machines for making 
our industry and agriculture more productive, supplying 
them in turn with raw materials and foodstuffs, and we 
could, consequently, expand our industry at a slower 
rate. But you know very well that that is not yet the 
case and that we are still the only country of the proletarian 
dictatorship and are surrounded by capitalist

J. V. S T A L I N 262 
countries, many of which are far in advance of us technically 
and economically. 
That is why Lenin raised the question of overtaking 
and outstripping the economically advanced countries 
as one of life and death for our development. 
Such are the external conditions dictating a fast 
rate of development of our industry. 
Internal conditions. But besides the external conditions, 
there are also internal conditions which dictate 
a fast rate of development of our industry as the main 
foundation of our entire national economy. I am referring 
to the extreme backwardness of our agriculture, 
of its technical and cultural level. I am referring to the 
existence in our country of an overwhelming preponderance 
of small commodity producers, with their scattered 
and utterly backward production, compared with 
which our large-scale socialist industry is like an island 
in the midst of the sea, an island whose base is expanding 
daily, but which is nevertheless an island in the midst 
of the sea. 
We are in the habit of saying that industry is the 
main foundation of our entire national economy, including 
agriculture, that it is the key to the reconstruction 
of our backward and scattered system of agriculture 
on a collectivist basis. That is perfectly true. From 
that position we must not retreat for a single moment. 
But it must also be remembered that, while industry 
is the main foundation, agriculture constitutes the basis 
for industrial development, both as a market which 
absorbs the products of industry and as a supplier of 
raw materials and foodstuffs, as well as a source of 
the export reserves essential in order to import machinery

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 263 
for the needs of our national economy. Can we advance 
industry while leaving agriculture in a state of complete 
technical backwardness, without providing an agricultural 
base for industry, without reconstructing agriculture 
and bringing it up to the level of industry? No, 
we cannot. 
Hence the task of supplying agriculture with the 
maximum amount of instruments and means of production 
essential in order to accelerate and promote 
its reconstruction on a new technical basis. But for the 
accomplishment of this task a fast rate of development 
of our industry is necessary. Of course, the reconstruction 
of a disunited and scattered agriculture is an incomparably 
more difficult matter than the reconstruction of 
a united and centralised socialist industry. But that 
is the task that confronts us, and we must accomplish 
it. And it cannot be accomplished except by a fast rate 
of industrial development. 
We cannot go on indefinitely, that is, for too long 
a period, basing the Soviet regime and socialist construction 
on two different foundations, the foundation 
of the most large-scale and united socialist industry and 
the foundation of the most scattered and backward, 
small commodity economy of the peasants. We must 
gradually, but systematically and persistently, place our 
agriculture on a new technical basis, the basis of largescale 
production, and bring it up to the level of socialist 
industry. Either we accomplish this task‹in which case 
the final victory of socialism in our country will be assured, 
or we turn away from it and do not accomplish 
it‹in which case a return to capitalism may become 
inevitable.

J. V. S T A L I N 264 
Here is what Lenin says on this score: 
³As long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a 
surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. 
This must be borne in mind. Anyone who has carefully observed 
life in the countryside, as compared with life in the towns, knows 
that we have not torn out the roots of capitalism and have not 
undermined the foundation, the basis of the internal enemy. The 
latter depends on small-scale production, and there is only one 
way of undermining it, namely, to place the economy of the country, 
including agriculture, on a new technical basis, the technical 
basis of modern large-scale production. And it is only electricity 
that is such a basis. Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification 
of the whole country² (Vol. XXVI, p. 46). 
As you see, when Lenin speaks of the electrification 
of the country he means not the isolated construction 
of individual power stations, but the gradual ³placing 
of the economy of the country, including agriculture,* 
on a new technical basis, the technical basis of 
modern large-scale production,² which in one way or 
another, directly or indirectly, is connected with electrification. 
Lenin delivered this speech at the Eighth Congress 
of Soviets in December 1920, on the very eve of the introduction 
of NEP, when he was substantiating the socalled 
plan of electrification, that is, the GOELRO 
plan. Some comrades argue on these grounds that the 
views expressed in this quotation have become inapplicable 
under present conditions. Why, we ask? Because, 
they say, much water has flown under the bridges since 
then. It is, of course, true that much water has 
* My italics.‹J. St.

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 265 
flown under the bridges since then. We now have a developed 
socialist industry, we have collective farms on a 
mass scale, we have old and new state farms, we have a 
wide network of well-developed co-operative organisations, 
we have machine-hiring stations at the service 
of the peasant farms, we now practise the contract 
system as a new form of the bond, and we can put 
into operation all these and a number of other levers 
for gradually placing agriculture on a new technical 
basis. All this is true. But it is also true that, in spite 
of all this, we are still a small-peasant country where 
small-scale production predominates. And that is the 
fundamental thing. And as long as it continues to be 
the fundamental thing, Lenin¹s thesis remains valid 
that ³as long as we live in a small-peasant country, there 
is a surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for 
communism,² and that, consequently, the danger of 
the restoration of capitalism is no empty phrase. 
Lenin says the same thing, but in a sharper form, 
in the plan of his pamphlet, The Tax in Kind, which was 
written after the introduction of NEP (March-April 
1921): 
³I f we have electrification in 10-20 years, then the individualism 
of the small tiller, and freedom f o r h i m to trade 
locally are not a whit terrible. I f we do not have electrification, 
a return to capitalism will be inevitable anyhow.² 
And further on he says: 
³Ten or twenty years of correct relations with the peasantry, 
and victory on a world scale is assured (even if the proletarian 
revolutions, which are growing, are delayed); otherwise, 20-40 
years of the torments of whiteguard terrorism² (Vol. XXVI, 
p. 313).

J. V. S T A L I N 266
You see how bluntly Lenin puts the question: either 
electrification, that is, the ³placing of the economy 
of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical 
basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production,² 
or a return to capitalism. 
That is how Lenin understood the question of ³correct 
relations with the peasantry.² 
It is not a matter of coddling the peasant and regarding 
this as establishing correct relations with him, 
for coddling will not carry you very far. It is a matter 
of helping the peasant to place his husbandry ³on a new 
technical basis, the technical basis of modern largescale 
production²; for that is the principal way to rid 
the peasant of his poverty. 
And it is impossible to place the economy of the 
country on a new technical basis unless our industry and, 
in the first place, the production of means of production, 
are developed at a fast rate. 
Such are the internal conditions dictating a fast 
rate of development of our industry. 
It is these external and internal conditions which 
are the cause of the control figures of our national economy 
being under such tension. 
That explains, too, why our economic plans, both 
budgetary and non-budgetary, are marked by a state 
of tension, by substantial investments in capital development, 
the object of which is to maintain a fast rate of 
industrial development. 
It may be asked where this is said in the theses, 
in what passage of the theses. (A voice: ³Yes, where is 
it said?²) Evidence of this in the theses is the sum-total 
of capital investments in industry for 1928-29. After

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 267 
all, our theses are called theses on the control figures. 
That is so, is it not, comrades? (A voice: ³Yes.²) Well, 
the theses say that in 1928-29 we shall be investing 
1,650 million rubles in capital construction in industry. 
In other words, this year we shall be investing in 
industry 330,000,000 rubles more than last year. 
It follows, therefore, that we are not only maintaining 
the rate of industrial development, but are going 
a step farther by investing more in industry than last 
year, that is, by expanding capital construction in industry 
both absolutely and relatively. 
That is the crux of the theses on the control figures 
of the national economy. Yet certain comrades failed 
to observe this staring fact. They criticised the theses 
on the control figures right and left as regards petty 
details, but the most important thing they failed to 
observe. 
II 
THE GRAIN PROBLEM 
I have spoken so far of the first main question in the 
theses, the rate of development of industry. Now let us 
consider the second main question, the grain problem. A 
characteristic feature of the theses is that they lay stress 
on the problem of the development of agriculture in general, 
and of grain farming in particular. Are the theses 
right in doing so? I think they are. Already at the 
July plenum it was said that the weakest spot in the 
development of our national economy is the excessive 
backwardness of agriculture in general, and of grain 
farming in particular.

J. V. S T A L I N 268 
When, in speaking of our agriculture lagging behind 
our industry, people complain about it, they are, 
of course, not talking seriously. Agriculture always has 
lagged and always: will lag behind industry. That is 
particularly true in our conditions, where industry is 
concentrated to a maximum degree, while agriculture 
is scattered to a maximum degree. Naturally, a united 
industry will develop faster than a scattered agriculture. 
That, incidently, gives rise to the leading position 
of industry in relation to agriculture. Consequently, 
the customary lag of agriculture behind industry does 
not give sufficient grounds for raising the grain problem. 
The problem of agriculture, and of grain farming 
in particular, makes its appearance only when the customary 
lag of agriculture behind industry turns into 
an excessive lag in the rate of its development. The characteristic 
feature of the present state of our national 
economy is that we are faced by the fact of an excessive 
lag in the rate of development of grain farming behind 
the rate of development of industry, while at the same 
time the demand for marketable grain on the part of 
the growing towns and industrial areas is increasing 
by leaps and bounds. The task then is not to lower the 
rate of development of industry to the level of the development 
of grain farming (which would upset everything 
and reverse the course of development), but to 
bring the rate of development of grain farming into line 
with the rate of development of industry and to raise 
the rate of development of grain farming to a level that 
will guarantee rapid progress of the entire national 
economy, both industry and agriculture. 
Either we accomplish this task, and thereby solve

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 269 
the grain problem, or we do not accomplish it, and then 
a rupture between the socialist town and the smallpeasant 
countryside will be inevitable. 
That is how the matter stands, comrades. That is 
the essence of the grain problem. 
Does this not mean that what we have now is ³stagnation² 
in the development of agriculture or even its 
³retrogression²? That is what Frumkin actually asserts 
in his second letter, which at his request we distributed 
today to the members of the C.C. and C.C.C. He says 
explicitly in this letter that there is ³stagnation² in 
our agriculture. ³We cannot and must not,² he says, 
³talk in the press about retrogression, but within the 
Party we ought not to hide the fact that this lag is equivalent 
to retrogression.² 
Is this assertion of Frumkin¹s correct? I t i s , of 
course, incorrect! We, the members of the Political 
Bureau, absolutely disagree with this assertion, and the 
Political Bureau theses are totally at variance with such 
an opinion of the state of grain farming. 
In point of fact, what is retrogression, and how 
would it manifest itself in agriculture? It would obviously 
be bound to manifest itself in a backward, downward 
movement of agriculture, a movement away from the 
new forms of farming to the old, medieval forms. It 
would be bound to manifest itself by the peasants abandoning, 
for instance, the three-field system for the longfallow 
system, the steel plough and machines for the 
wooden plough, clean and selected seed for unsifted and 
low-grade seed, modern methods of farming for inferior 
methods, and so on and so forth. But do we observe anything 
of the kind? Does not everyone know that tens and

J. V. S T A L I N 270 
hundreds of thousands of peasant farms are annually 
abandoning the three-field for the four-field and multifield 
system, low-grade seed for selected seed, the 
wooden plough for the steel plough and machines, inferior 
methods of farming for superior methods? Is this 
retrogression? 
Frumkin has a habit of hanging on to the coat tails 
of some member or other of the Political Bureau in order 
to substantiate his own point of view. It is quite likely 
that in this instance, too, he will get hold of Bukharin¹s 
coat tails in order to show that Bukharin in his 
article, ³Notes of an Economist,² says ³the same thing.² 
But what Bukharin says is very far from ³the same thing.² 
Bukharin in his article raised the abstract, theoretical 
question of the possibility or danger of retrogression. 
In the abstract, such a formulation of the question is 
quite possible and legitimate. But what does Frumkin 
do? He turns the abstract question of the possibility 
of the retrogression of agriculture into a fact. And this 
he calls an analysis of the state of grain farming! Is 
it not ludicrous, comrades? 
It would be a fine Soviet government indeed if, 
in the eleventh year of its existence, it had brought 
agriculture into a state of retrogression! Why, a government 
like that would deserve not to be supported, but 
to be sent packing. And the workers would have sent 
such a government packing long ago, if it had reduced 
agriculture to a state of retrogression. Retrogression is 
a tune all sorts of bourgeois experts are harping on; 
they dream of our agriculture retrogressing. Trotsky 
at one time harped on the theme of retrogression. I 
did not expect to see Frumkin taking this dubious line.

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 271 
On what does Frumkin base his assertion about retrogression? 
First of all, on the fact that the grain crop 
area this year is less than it was last year. What is this 
fact due to? To the policy of the Soviet Government, 
perhaps? Of course not. It is due to the perishing of the 
winter crops in the steppe area of the Ukraine and partially 
in the North Caucasus, and to the drought in the 
summer of this year in the same area of the Ukraine. 
Had it not been for these unfavourable weather conditions, 
upon which agriculture is wholly and entirely dependent, 
our grain crop area this year would have been at 
least 1,000,000 dessiatins larger than it was last year. 
He bases his assertion, further, on the fact that 
our gross production of grain this year is only slightly 
(70,000,000 poods) greater, and that of wheat and rye 
200,000,000 poods less, than last year. And what is 
all this due to? Again to the drought and to the frosts 
which killed the winter crops. Had it not been for these 
unfavourable weather conditions, our gross production 
of grain this year would have exceeded last year¹s by 
300,000,000 poods. How can one ignore such factors 
as drought, frost, etc., which are of decisive significance 
for the harvest in this or that region? 
We are now making it our task to enlarge the crop 
area by 7 per cent, to raise crop yields by 3 per cent, 
and to increase the gross production of grain by, I 
think, 10 per cent. There need be no doubt that we shall doeverything 
in our power to accomplish these tasks. Butin 
spite of all our measures, it is not out of the question 
that we may again come up against a partial crop 
failure, frosts or drought in this or that region, in which 
case it is possible that these circumstances may cause

J. V. S T A L I N 272 
the gross grain output to fall short of our plans or even 
of this year¹s gross output. Will that mean that agriculture 
is ³retrogressing,² that the policy of the Soviet 
Government is to blame for this ³retrogression,² that 
we have ³robbed² the peasant of economic incentive, 
that we have ³deprived² him of economic prospects? 
Several years ago Trotsky fell into the same error, 
declaring that ³a little rain² was of no significance to 
agriculture. Rykov controverted him, and had the support 
of the overwhelming majority of the members of 
the C.C. Now Frumkin is falling into the same error, 
ignoring weather conditions, which are of decisive importance 
for agriculture, and trying to make the policy 
of our Party responsible for everything. 
What ways and means are necessary to accelerate 
the rate of development of agriculture in general, and 
of grain farming in particular? 
There are three such ways, or channels: 
a) by increasing crop yields and enlarging the area 
sown by the individual poor and middle peasants; 
b) by further development of collective farms; 
c) by enlarging the old and establishing new state 
farms. 
All this was already mentioned in the resolution 
of the July plenum. The theses repeat what was said 
at the July plenum, but put the matter more concretely, 
and state it in terms of figures in the shape of definite 
investments. Here, too, Frumkin finds something to cavil 
at. He thinks that, since individual farming is put 
in the first place and the collective farms and state farms 
in the second and third, this can only mean that his 
view-point has triumphed. That is ridiculous, comrades.

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
273 
It is clear that if we approach the matter from the point 
of view of the relative importance of each form of agriculture, 
individual farming must be put in the first 
place, because it provides nearly six times as much 
marketable grain as the collective farms and state farms. 
But if we approach the matter from the point of view 
of the type of farming, of which form of economy is 
most akin to our purpose, first place must be given to 
the collective farms and state farms, which represent 
a higher type of agriculture than individual peasant 
farming. Is it really necessary to show that both points 
of view are equally acceptable to us? 
What is required in order that our work should 
proceed along all these three channels, in order that the 
rate of development of agriculture, and primarily of 
grain farming, should be raised in practice? 
It is necessary, first of all, to direct the attention 
of our Party cadres to agriculture and focus it on concrete 
aspects of the grain problem. We must put aside 
abstract phrases and talking about agriculture in general 
and get down, at last, to working out practical measures 
for the furtherance of grain farming adapted to the 
diverse conditions in the different areas. It is time to 
pass from words to deeds and to tackle at last the 
concrete question how to raise crop yields and to enlarge 
the crop areas of the individual poor- and middlepeasant 
farms, how to improve and develop further the 
collective farms and state farms, how to organise the rendering 
of assistance by the collective farms and state 
farms to the peasants by way of supplying them with 
better seed and better breeds of cattle, how to organise 
assistance for the peasants in the shape of machines 
INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION

J. V. S T A L I N 274 
and other implements through machine-hiring stations, 
how to extend and improve the contract system and agricultural 
co-operation in general, and so on and so forth. 
(A voice: ³That is empiricism.²) Such empiricism is 
absolutely essential, for otherwise we run the risk of 
drowning the very serious matter of solving the grain 
problem in empty talk about agriculture in general. 
The Central Committee has set itself the task of 
arranging for concrete reports on agricultural development 
by our principal workers in the Council of People¹s 
Commissars and the Political Bureau who are responsible 
for the chief grain regions. At this plenum you 
are to hear a report by Comrade Andreyev on the ways 
of solving the grain problem in the North Caucasus. 
I think that we shall next have to hear similar reports 
in succession from the Ukraine, the Central Black Earth 
region, the Volga region, Siberia, etc. This is absolutely 
necessary in order to turn the Party¹s attention to 
the grain problem and to get our Party workers at last 
to formulate concretely the questions connected with 
the grain problem. 
It is necessary, in the second place, to ensure that 
our Party workers in the countryside make a strict distinction 
in their practical work between the middle 
peasant and the kulak, do not lump them together 
and do not hit the middle peasant when it is the 
kulak that has to be struck at. It is high time to put 
a stop to these errors, if they may be called such. Take, 
for instance, the question of the individual tax. We 
have the decision of the Political Bureau, and the corresponding 
law, about levying an individual tax on not 
more than 2-3 per cent of the households, that is, on

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 275 
the wealthiest section of the kulaks. But what actually 
happens? There are a number of districts where 10, 12 and 
even more per cent of the households are taxed, with the 
result that the middle section of the peasantry is affected. 
Is it not time to put a stop to this crime? 
Yet, instead of indicating concrete measures for 
putting a stop to these and similar outrages, our dear 
³critics² indulge in word play, proposing that the words 
³the wealthiest section of the kulaks² be replaced by 
the words ³the most powerful section of the kulaks² 
or ³the uppermost section of the kulaks.² As if it were 
not one and the same thing! It has been shown that the 
kulaks constitute about 5 per cent of the peasantry. It 
has been shown that the law requires the individual tax 
to be levied on only 2-3 per cent of the households, 
that is, on the wealthiest section of the kulaks. It has 
been shown that in practice this law is being violated in 
a number of areas. Yet, instead of indicating concrete 
measures for putting a stop to this, the ³critics² indulge 
in verbal criticism and refuse to understand that this does 
not alter things one iota. Sheer hair-splitters! (A voice: 
³They propose that the individual tax should be levied 
on all kulaks.²) Well then, they should demand the repeal 
of the law imposing an individual tax on 2-3 per 
cent. Yet I have not heard that anybody has demanded the 
repeal of the individual tax law. It is said that individual 
taxation is arbitrarily extended in order to supplement 
the local budget. But you must not supplement the local 
budget by breaking the law, by infringing Party directives. 
Our Party exists, it has not been liquidated yet. 
The Soviet Government exists, it has not been liquidated 
yet. And if you have not enough funds for your local

J. V. S T A L I N 276 
budget, then you must ask to have your local budget 
reconsidered, and not break the law or disregard Party 
instructions. 
It is necessary, next, to give further incentives to 
individual poor- and middle-peasant farming. Undoubtedly, 
the increase in grain prices already introduced, 
practical enforcement of revolutionary law, practical 
assistance to the poor- and middle-peasant farms in 
the shape of the¹ contract system, and so on, will 
considerably increase the peasant¹s economic incentive. 
Frumkin thinks that we have killed or nearly killed 
the peasant¹s incentive by robbing him of economic 
prospects. That, of course, is nonsense. If it were true, 
it would be incomprehensible what the bond, the alliance 
between the working class and the main mass of the 
peasantry, actually rests on. It cannot be thought, surely, 
that this alliance rests on sentiment. It must be 
realised, after all, that the alliance between the working 
class and the peasantry is an alliance on a business basis, 
an alliance of the interests of two classes, a class alliance 
of the workers and the main mass of the peasantry 
aiming at mutual advantage. It is obvious that if we 
had killed or nearly killed the peasant¹s economic incentive 
by depriving him of economic prospects, there 
would be no bond, no alliance between the working class 
and the peasantry. Clearly, what is at issue here is not 
the ³creation² or ³release² of the economic incentive of 
the poor- and middle-peasant masses, but the strengthening 
and further development of this incentive, to the 
mutual advantage of the working class and the main mass 
of the peasantry. And that is precisely what the theses 
on the control figures of the national economy indicate.

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 277 
It is necessary, lastly, to increase the supply of goods 
to the countryside. I have in mind both consumer goods 
and, especiaIly, production goods (machines, fertilisers, 
etc.) capable of increasing the output of agricultural 
produce. It cannot be said that everything in this 
respect is as it should be. You know that symptoms of 
a goods shortage are still far from having been eliminated, 
and will probably not be eliminated so soon. The 
illusion exists in certain Party circles that we can put 
an end to the goods shortage at once. That, unfortunately, 
is not true. It should be borne in mind that the symptoms 
of a goods shortage are connected, firstly, with the 
growing prosperity of the workers and peasants and the 
gigantic increase of effective demand for goods, production 
of which is growing year by year but which are 
not enough to satisfy the whole demand, and, secondly, 
with the present period of the reconstruction of industry. 
The reconstruction of industry involves the transfer 
of funds from the sphere of producing means of consumption 
to the sphere of producing means of production. 
Without this there can be no serious reconstruction 
of industry, especially in our, Soviet conditions. But 
what does this mean? It means that money is being invested 
in the building of new plants, and that the number 
of towns and new consumers is growing, while 
the new plants can put out additional commodities in 
quantity only after three or four years. It is easy to realise 
that this is not conducive to putting an end to the 
goods shortage. 
Does this mean that we must fold our arms and acknowledge 
that we are impotent to cope with the symp

J. V. S T A L I N 278 
toms of a goods shortage? No, it does not. The fact is that 
we can and should adopt concrete measures to mitigate, 
to moderate the goods shortage. That is something we 
can and should do at once. For this, we must speed up 
the expansion of those branches of industry which directly 
contribute to the promotion of agricultural production 
(the Stalingrad Tractor Works, the Rostov Agricultural 
Machinery Works, the Voronezh Seed Sortter 
Factory, etc., etc.). For this, further, we must as far 
as possible expand those branches of industry which contribute 
to an increase in output of goods in short supply 
(cloth, glass, nails, etc.). And so on and so forth. 
Kubyak said that the control figures of the national 
economy propose to assign less funds this year to 
individual peasant farming than last year. That, I think, 
is untrue. Kubyak apparently loses sight of the fact 
that this year we are giving the peasants credit under 
the contract system to the sum of about 300,000,000 rubles 
(nearly 100,000,000 more than last year). If this is 
taken into account, and it must be taken into account, 
it will be seen that this year we are assigning more 
for the development of individual peasant farming 
than last year. As to the old and new state farms and 
collective farms, we are investing in them this year 
about 300,000,000 rubles (some 150,000,000 more than 
last year). 
Special attention needs to be paid to the collective 
farms, the state farms and the contract system. These 
things should not be regarded only as means of increasing 
our stocks of marketable grain. They are at the same 
time a new form of bond between the working class and 
the main mass of the peasantry.

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 279 
Enough has already been said about the contract 
system and I shall not dwell upon it any further. 
Everyone realises that the application of this system on 
a mass scale makes it easier to unite the efforts of the 
individual peasant farms, introduces an element of 
permanency in the relations between the state and the 
peasantry, and so strengthens the bond between town and 
country. 
I should like to draw your attention to the collective 
farms, and especially to the state farms, as levers 
which facilitate the reconstruction of agriculture on a 
new technical basis, causing a revolution in the minds 
of the peasants and helping them to shake off conservatism, 
routine. The appearance of tractors, large agricultural 
machines and tractor columns in our grain 
regions cannot but have its effect on the surrounding 
peasant farms. Assistance rendered the surrounding peasants 
in the way of seed, machines and tractors will undoubtedly 
be appreciated by the peasants and taken as 
a sign of the power and strength of the Soviet state, 
which is trying to lead them on to the high road of a 
substantial improvement of agriculture. We have not 
taken this circumstance into account until now and, 
perhaps, still do not sufficiently do so. But I think 
that this is the chief thing that the collective farms and 
state farms are contributing and could contribute at the 
present moment towards solving the grain problem and 
the strengthening of the bond in its new forms. 
Such, in general, are the ways and means that we 
must adopt in our work of solving the grain problem.

J. V. S T A L I N 280 
III 
COMBATING DEVIATIONS 
AND CONCILIATION TOWARDS 
THEM 
Let us pass now to the third main question of our 
theses, that of deviations from the Leninist line. 
The social basis of the deviations is the fact that smallscale 
production predominates in our country, the fact 
that small-scale production gives rise to capitalist elements, 
the fact that our Party is surrounded by pettybourgeois 
elemental forces, and, lastly, the fact that certain 
of our Party organisations have been infected by 
these elemental forces. 
There, in the main, lies the social basis of the deviations. 
All these deviations are of a petty-bourgeois character. 
What is the Right deviation, which is the one chiefly 
in question here? In what direction does it tend to go? 
It tends towards adaptation to bourgeois ideology, towards 
adaptation of our policy to the tastes and requirements 
of the ³Soviet² bourgeoisie. 
What threat does the Right deviation hold out, if 
it should triumph in our Party? It would mean the ideological 
rout of our Party, a free rein for the capitalist 
elements, the growth of chances for the restoration of 
capitalism, or, as Lenin called it, for a ³return to capitalism.² 
Where is the tendency towards a Right deviation 
chiefly lodged? In our Soviet, economic, co-operative 
and trade-union apparatuses, and in the Party appara

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 281 
tus as well, especially in its lower links in the countryside. 
Are there spokesmen of the Right deviation among 
our Party members? There certainly are. Rykov mentioned 
the example of Shatunovsky, who declared against 
the building of the Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station. 
There can be no question but that Shatunovsky was guilty 
of a Right deviation, a deviation towards open opportunism. 
All the same, I think that Shatunovsky is not a 
typical illustration of the Right deviation, of its physiognomy. 
I think that in this respect the palm should go to 
Frumkin. (Laughter.) I am referring to his first letter 
(June 1928) and then to his second letter, which was 
distributed here to the members of the C.C. and C.C.C. 
(November 1928). 
Let us examine both these letters. Let us take the 
³basic propositions² of the first letter. 
1) ³The sentiment in the countryside, apart from a 
small section of the poor peasants, is opposed to us.² Is 
that true? It is obviously untrue. If it were true, the 
bond would not even be a memory. But since June 
(the letter was written in June) nearly six months have 
passed, yet anyone, unless he is blind, can see that 
the bond between the working class and the main mass 
of the peasantry continues and is growing stronger. Why 
does Frumkin write such nonsense? In order to scare 
the Party and make it give way to the Right deviation. 
2) ³The line taken lately has led to the main mass of the 
middle peasants being without hope, without prospects.² 
Is that true? I t i s quite untrue. I t i s obvious that 
i f in the spring of this year the main mass of the 
middle peasants had been without economic hope or

J. V. S T A L I N 282 
prospects they would not have enlarged the spring 
crop area as they did in all the principal grain-growing 
regions. The spring sowing takes place in April-May. 
Well, Frumkin¹s letter was written in June. In our 
country, under the Soviet regime, who is the chief purchaser 
of cereals? The state and the co-operatives, which 
are linked with the state. It is obvious that if the mass 
of middle peasants had been without economic prospects, 
if they were in a state of ³estrangement² from 
the Soviet Government, they would not have enlarged 
the spring crop area for the benefit of the state, as the 
principal purchaser of grain. Frumkin is talking obvious 
nonsense. Here again he is trying to scare the Party 
with the ³horrors² of hopeless prospects in order to make 
it give way to his, Frumkin¹s, view. 
3) ³We must return to the Fourteenth and Fifteenth 
Congresses.² That the Fifteenth Congress has simply 
been tacked on here without rhyme or reason, of that 
there can be no doubt. The crux here is not in the Fifteenth 
Congress, but in the slogan: Back to the Fourteenth 
Congress. And what does that mean? It means 
renouncing ³intensification of the offensive against the 
kulak² (see Fifteenth Congress resolution). I say this 
not in order to deprecate the Fourteenth Congress. I say 
it because, in calling for a return to the Fourteenth Congress, 
Frumkin is rejecting the step forward which the 
Party made between the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Congresses, 
and, in rejecting it, he is trying to pull the 
Party back. The July plenum of the Central Committee 
pronounced its opinion on this question. It stated plainly 
in its resolution that people who try to evade the Fifteenth 
Congress decision‹³to develop further the of

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 283 
fensive against the kulaks²‹are ³an expression of bourgeois 
tendencies in our country.² I must tell Frumkin 
plainly that when the Political Bureau formulated this 
item of the resolution of the July plenum, it had him 
and his first letter in mind. 
4) ³Maximum assistance to the poor peasants entering 
collectives.² We have always to the best of our 
ability and resources rendered the maximum assistance 
to the poor peasants entering, or even not entering, 
collectives. There is nothing new in this. What is 
new in the Fifteenth Congress decisions compared with 
those of the Fourteenth Congress is not this but that 
the Fifteenth Congress made the utmost development 
of the collective-farm movement one of the cardinal 
tasks of the day. When Frumkin speaks of maximum 
assistance to the poor peasants entering collectives, 
he is in point of fact turning away from, evading, the 
task set the Party by the Fifteenth Congress of developing 
the collective-farm movement to the utmost. In 
point of fact, Frumkin is against developing the work 
of strengthening the socialist sector in the countryside 
along the line of collective farms. 
5) ³State farms should not be expanded by shock 
or super-shock tactics.² Frumkin cannot but know that 
we are only beginning to work seriously to expand the 
old state farms and to create new ones. Frumkin cannot 
but know that we are assigning for this purpose far less 
money than we ought to assign if we had any reserves 
for it. The words ³by shock or super-shock tactics² 
were put in here to strike people with ³horror² and 
to conceal his own disinclination for any serious expansion 
of the state farms. Frumkin, in point of fact, is

J. V. S T A L I N 284 
here expressing his opposition to strengthening the socialist 
sector in the countryside along the line of the 
state farms. 
Now gather all these propositions of Frumkin¹s 
together, and you get a bouquet characteristic of the 
Right deviation. 
Let us pass to Frumkin¹s second letter. In what 
way does the second letter differ from the first? In that 
it aggravates the errors of the first letter. The first said 
that middle-peasant farming was without prospects. The 
second speaks of the ³retrogression² of agriculture. The 
first letter said that we must return to the Fourteenth 
Congress in the sense of relaxing the offensive against 
the kulak. The second letter, however, says that ³we 
must not hamper production on the kulak farms.² The 
first letter said nothing about industry. But the second 
letter develops a ³new² theory to the effect that less 
should be assigned for industrial construction. Incidentally, 
there are two points on which the two letters 
agree: concerning the collective farms and concerning 
the state farms. In both letters Frumkin pronounces 
against the development of collective farms and state 
farms. It is clear that the second letter aggravates the 
errors of the first. 
About the theory of ³retrogression² I have already 
spoken. There can be no doubt that this theory is the 
invention of bourgeois experts, who are always ready to 
raise a cry that the Soviet regime is doomed. Frumkin 
has allowed himself to be scared by the bourgeois experts 
who have their roost around the People¹s Commissariat 
of Finance, and now he is himself trying to 
scare the Party so as to make it give way to the Right

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 285 
deviation. Enough has been said, too, about the collective 
farms and state farms. So there is no need to repeat 
i t . Let us examine the two remaining points: about 
kulak farming and about capital investment in industry. 
Kulak farming. Frumkin says that ³we must not hamper 
production on the kulak farms.² What does that 
mean? It means not preventing the kulaks from developing 
their exploiting economy. But what does not preventing 
the kulaks from developing their exploiting economy 
mean? It means allowing a free rein to capitalism in 
the countryside, allowing it freedom, liberty. We get 
the old slogan of the French liberals: ³laissez faire, laissez 
passer,² that is, do not prevent the bourgeoisie from 
doing its business, do not prevent the bourgeoisie from 
moving freely. 
This slogan was put forward by the old French liberals 
at the time of the French bourgeois revolution, 
at the time of the struggle against the feudal regime, 
which was fettering the bourgeoisie and not allowing 
it to develop. It follows, then, that we must now go over 
from the socialist slogan‹³ever-increasing restrictions 
on the capitalist elements² (see the theses on the control 
figures)‹to the bourgeois-liberal slogan: do not hamper 
the development of capitalism in the countryside. Why, 
are we really thinking of turning from Bolsheviks into 
bourgeois liberals? What can there be in common between 
this bourgeois-liberal slogan of Frumkin¹s and the 
line of the Party? 
(Frumkin. ³Comrade Stalin, read the other points 
also.²) I shall read the whole point: ³We must not 
hamper production on the kulak farms either, while 
at the same time combating their enslaving exploitation.²

J. V. S T A L I N 286 
My dear Frumkin, do you really think the second part 
of the sentence improves matters and does not make 
them worse? What does combating enslaving exploitation 
mean? Why, the slogan of combating enslaving exploitation 
is a slogan of the bourgeois revolution, directed 
against feudal-serf or semi-feudal methods of exploitation. 
We did indeed put forward this slogan when we 
were advancing towards the bourgeois revolution, differentiating 
between the enslaving form of exploitation, 
which we were striving to abolish, and the non-enslaving, 
so-called ³progressive² form of exploitation, which we 
could not at that time restrict or abolish, inasmuch 
as the bourgeois system remained in force. But at that 
time we were advancing towards a bourgeois-democratic 
republic. Now, however, if I am not mistaken, we have 
a socialist revolution, which is heading, and cannot but 
I head, for the abolition of all forms of exploitation, including 
³progressive² forms. Really, do you want us 
to turn back from the socialist revolution, which we 
are developing and advancing, and revert to the slogans 
of the bourgeois revolution? How can one bring oneself 
to talk such nonsense? 
Further, what does not hampering kulak economy 
mean? It means giving the kulak a free hand. And what 
does giving the kulak a free hand mean? It means giving 
him power. When the French bourgeois liberals demanded 
that the feudal government should not hamper the development 
of the bourgeoisie, they expressed it concretely 
in the demand that the bourgeoisie should be given 
power. And they were right. In order to be able to develop 
properly, the bourgeoisie must have power. Consequently, 
to be consistent, you should say: admit the

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 287 
kulak to power. For it must be understood, after all, 
that you cannot but restrict the development of kulak 
economy if you take power away from the kulaks and 
concentrate it in the hands of the working class. Those 
are the conclusions that suggest themselves on reading 
Frumkin¹s second letter. 
Capital construction in industry. When we discussed 
the control figures we had three figures before us: the 
Supreme Council of National Economy asked for 
825,000,000 rubles; the State Planning Commission was 
willing to give 750,000,000 rubles; the People¹s Commissariat 
of Finance would give only 650,000,000 rubles. 
What decision on this did the Central Committee of our 
Party adopt? It fixed the figure at 800,000,000 rubles, 
that is, exactly 150,000,000 rubles more than the 
People¹s Commissariat of Finance proposed. That the 
People¹s Commissariat of Finance offered less is, of 
course, not surprising: the stinginess of the People¹s 
Commissariat of Finance is generally known; it has to 
be stingy. But that is not the point just now. The point 
is that Frumkin defends the figure of 650,000,000 rubles 
not out of stinginess, but because of his new-fangled 
theory of ³feasibility,² asserting in his second letter 
and in a special article in the periodical of the People¹s 
Commissariat of Finance that we shall certainly do injury 
to our economy if we assign to the Supreme Council of 
National Economy more than 650,000,000 rubles for capital 
construction. And what does that mean? It means that 
Frumkin is against maintaining the present rate of the 
development of industry, evidently failing to realise that 
if it were slackened this really would do injury to our 
entire national economy.

J. V. S T A L I N 288 
Now combine these two points in Frumkin¹s second 
letter, the point concerning kulak farming and the point 
concerning capital construction in industry, add the 
theory of ³retrogression,² and you get the physiognomy 
of the Right deviation. 
You want to know what the Right deviation is and 
what it looks like? Read Frumkin¹s two letters, study 
them, and you will understand. 
So much for the physiognomy of the Right deviation. 
But the theses speak not only of the Right deviation. 
They speak also of the so-called ³Left² deviation. 
What is the ³Left² deviation? Is there really a so-called 
³Left² deviation in the Party? Are there in our Party, 
as our theses say, anti-middle-peasant trends, superindustrialisation 
trends and so on? Yes, there are. What 
do they amount to? They amount to a deviation towards 
Trotskyism. That was said already by the July plenum. 
I am referring to the July plenum¹s resolution on grain 
procurement policy, which speaks of a struggle on two 
fronts: against those who want to hark back from the 
Fifteenth Congress‹the Rights, and against those who 
want to convert the emergency measures into a permanent 
policy of the Party‹the ³Lefts,² the trend 
towards Trotskyism. 
Clearly, there are elements of Trotskyism and a 
trend towards the Trotskyist ideology within our Party. 
About four thousand persons, I think, voted against 
our platform during the discussion which preceded the 
Fifteenth Party Congress. (A voice: ³Ten thousand.²) 
I think that if ten thousand voted against, then twice 
ten thousand Party members who sympathise with Trotskyism 
did not vote at all, because they did not attend

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 289 
the meetings. These are the Trotskyist elements who 
have not left the Party, and who, it must be supposed, 
have not yet rid themselves of the Trotskyist ideology. 
Furthermore, I think that a section of the Trotskyists 
who later broke away from the Trotskyist organisation 
and returned to the Party have not yet succeeded in shaking 
off the Trotskyist ideology and are also, presumably, 
not averse to disseminating their views among Party 
members. Lastly, there is the fact that we have a certain 
recrudescence of the Trotskyist ideology in some of our 
Party organisations. Combine all this, and you get all 
the necessary elements for a deviation towards Trotskyism 
in the Party. 
And that is understandable: with the existence of 
petty-bourgeois elemental forces, and the pressure that 
these forces exert on our Party, there cannot but be 
Trotskyist trends in it. It is one thing to arrest Trotskyist 
cadres or expel them from the Party. It is another thing 
to put an end to the Trotskyist ideology. That will be 
more difficult. And we say that wherever there is a Right 
deviation, there is bound to be also a ³Left² deviation. 
The ³Left² deviation is the shadow of the Right deviation. 
Lenin used to say, referring to the Otzovists, that 
the ³Lefts² are Mensheviks, only turned inside-out. 
That is quite true. The same thing must be said of the 
present ³Lefts.² People who deviate towards Trotskyism 
are in fact also Rights, only turned inside-out, Rights 
who cloak themselves with ³Left² phrases. 
Hence the fight on two fronts‹both against the 
Right deviation and against the ³Left² deviation. 
It may be said: if the ³Left² deviation is in essence 
the same thing as the Right opportunist deviation, then

J. V. S T A L I N 290 
what is the difference between them, and where do you 
actually get two fronts? Indeed, if a victory of the Rights 
means increasing the chances of the restoration of capitalism, 
and a victory of the ³Lefts² would lead to the 
same result, what difference is there between them, and 
why are some called Rights and others ³Lefts²? And if 
there is a difference between them, what is it? Is it not 
true that the two deviations have the same social roots, 
that they are both petty-bourgeois deviations? Is it 
not true that both these deviations, if they were to 
triumph, would lead to one and the same result? What, 
then, is the difference between them? 
The difference is in their platforms, their demands, 
their approach and their methods. 
If, for example, the Rights say: ³It was a mistake to 
build the Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station,² and the 
³Lefts,² on the contrary, declare: ³What is the use 
of one Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station, let us have a 
Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station every year² (laughter), 
i t must be admitted that there obviously is a 
difference. 
If the Rights say: ³Let the kulak alone, allow him 
to develop freely,² and the ³Lefts,² on the contrary, 
declare: ³Strike not only at the kulak, but also at the 
middle peasant, because he is just as much a private owner 
as the kulak,² it must be admitted that there obviously 
is a difference. 
If the Rights say: ³Difficulties have arisen, is it 
not time to quit?² and the ³Lefts,² on the contrary, 
declare: ³What are difficulties to us, a fig for your difficulties‹
full speed ahead!² (laughter), it must be admitted 
that there obviously is a difference.

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 291 
There you have a picture of the specific platform 
and the specific methods of the ³Lefts.² This, in fact, 
explains why the ³Lefts² sometimes succeed in luring 
a part of the workers over to their side with the help 
of high-sounding ³Left² phrases and by posing as the 
most determined opponents of the Rights, although all 
the world knows that they, the ³Lefts,² have the same 
social roots as the Rights, and that they not infrequently 
join in an agreement, a bloc, with the Rights in order 
to fight the Leninist line. 
That is why it is obligatory for us, Leninists, to 
wage a fight on two fronts‹both against the Right 
deviation and against the ³Left² deviation. 
But if the Trotskyist trend represents a ³Left² deviation, 
does not this mean that the ³Lefts² are more to 
the Left than Leninism? No, it does not. Leninism is 
the most Left (without quotation marks) trend in the 
world labour movement. We Leninists belonged to the 
Second International down to the outbreak of the imperialist 
war as the extreme Left group of the Social- 
Democrats. We did not remain in the Second International 
and we advocated a split in the Second International 
precisely because, being the extreme Left group, we did 
not want to be in the same party as the petty-bourgeois 
traitors to Marxism, the social-pacifists and social-chauvinists. 
It was these tactics and this ideology that subsequently 
became the basis of all the Bolshevik parties 
of the world. In our Party, we Leninists are the sole 
Lefts without quotation marks. Consequently, we Leninists 
are neither ³Lefts² nor Rights in our own Party. 
We are a party of Marxist-Leninists. And within our

J. V. S T A L I N 292 
Party we combat not only those whom we call openly 
opportunist deviators, but also those who pretend to 
be ³Lefter² than Marxism, ³Lefter² than Leninism, and 
who camouflage their Right, opportunist nature with 
high-sounding ³Left² phrases. 
Everybody realises that when people who have not yet 
rid themselves of Trotskyist trends are called ³Lefts,² 
it is meant ironically. Lenin referred to the ³Left Communists² 
as Lefts sometimes with and sometimes without 
quotation marks. But everyone realises that Lenin 
called them Lefts ironically, thereby emphasising 
that they were Lefts only in words, in appearance, but 
that in reality they represented petty-bourgeois Right 
trends. 
In what possible sense can the Trotskyist elements 
be called Lefts (without quotation marks), if only yesterday 
they joined in a united anti-Leninist bloc with 
openly opportunist elements and linked themselves 
directly and immediately with the anti-Soviet strata 
of the country? Is it not a fact that only yesterday we 
had an open bloc of the ³Lefts² and the Rights against 
the Leninist Party, and that that bloc undoubtedly had 
the support of the bourgeois elements? And does 
not this show that they, the ³Lefts² and the Rights, 
could not have joined together in a united bloc if they 
did not have common social roots, if they were not of a 
common opportunist nature? The Trotskyist bloc fell 
to pieces a year ago. Some of the Rights, such as Shatunovsky, 
left the bloc. Consequently, the Right members 
of the bloc will now come forward as Rights, while the 
³Lefts² will camouflage their Rightism with ³Left² 
phrases. But what guarantee is there that the ³Lefts²

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 293 
and the Rights will not find each other again? (Laughter.) 
Obviously, there is not, and cannot be, any guarantee of 
that. 
But if we uphold the slogan of a fight on two fronts, 
does this mean that we are proclaiming the necessity of 
Centrism in our Party? What does a fight on two fronts 
mean? Is this not Centrism? You know that that is exactly 
how the Trotskyists depict matters: there are the 
³Lefts,² that is, ³we,² the Trotskyists, the ³real Leninists²; 
there are the ³Rights,² that i s , a l l the rest; 
and, lastly, there are the ³Centrists,² who vacillate 
between the ³Lefts² and the Rights. Can that be considered 
a correct view of our Party? Obviously not. Only 
people who have become confused in all their concepts and 
who have long ago broken with Marxism can say that. It 
can be said only by people who fail to see and to understand 
the difference in principle between the Social-Democratic 
party of the pre-war period, which was the party of 
a bloc of proletarian and petty-bourgeois interests, and the 
Communist Party, which is the monolithic party of the 
revolutionary proletariat. 
Centrism must not be regarded as a spatial concept: 
the Rights, say, sitting on one side, the ³Lefts² on the 
other, and the Centrists in between. Centrism is a political 
concept. Its ideology is one of adaptation, of subordination 
of the interests of the proletariat to the interests 
of the petty bourgeoisie within one common party. 
This ideology is alien and abhorrent to Leninism. 
Centrism was a phenomenon that was natural in the 
Second International of the period before the war. There 
were Rights (the majority), Lefts (without quotation 
marks), and Centrists, whose whole policy consisted

J. V. S T A L I N 294 
in embellishing the opportunism of the Rights with 
Left phrases and subordinating the Lefts to the Rights. 
What, at that time, was the policy of the Lefts, 
of whom the Bolsheviks constituted the core? It was one 
of determinedly fighting the Centrists, of fighting for 
a split with the Rights (especially after the outbreak 
of the imperialist war) and of organising a new, revolutionary 
International consisting of genuinely Left, genuinely 
proletarian elements. 
Why was it possible that there could arise at that 
time such an alignment of forces within the Second 
International and such a policy of the Bolsheviks within 
it? Because the Second International was at that 
time the party of a bloc of proletarian and petty-bourgeois 
interests serving the interests of the petty-bourgeois 
social-pacifists, social-chauvinists. Because the 
Bolsheviks could not at that time but concentrate their 
fire on the Centrists, who were trying to subordinate the 
proletarian elements to the interests of the petty bourgeoisie. 
Because the Bolsheviks were obliged at that time 
to advocate the idea of a split, for otherwise the proletarians 
could not have organised their own monolithic 
revolutionary Marxist party. 
Can it be asserted that there is a similar alignment 
of forces in our Communist Party, and that the same 
policy must be practised in it as was practised by the 
Bolsheviks in the parties of the Second International 
of the period before the war? Obviously not. It cannot, 
because it would signify a failure to understand the difference 
in principle between Social-Democracy, as the 
party of a bloc of proletarian and petty-bourgeois elements, 
and the monolithic Communist Party of the revo

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 295 
lutionary proletariat. They (the Social-Democrats) had 
one underlying class basis for the party. We (the Communists) 
have an entirely different underlying basis. 
With them (the Social-Democrats) Centrism was a natural 
phenomenon, because the party of a bloc of heterogeneous 
interests cannot get along without Centrists, 
and the Bolsheviks were obliged to work for a split. 
With us (the Communists) Centrism is purposeless 
and incompatible with the Leninist Party principle, 
since the Communist Party is the monolithic party of 
the proletariat, and not the party of a bloc of heterogeneous 
class elements. 
And since the prevailing force in our Party is the 
most Left of the trends in the world labour movement 
(the Leninists), a splitting policy in our Party has not 
and cannot have any justification from the standpoint 
of Leninism. (A voice: ³Is a split possible in our Party, 
or not?²) The point is not whether a split is possible; 
the point is that a splitting policy in our monolithic 
Leninist Party cannot be justified from the standpoint 
of Leninism. 
Whoever fails to understand this difference in principle 
is going against Leninism and is breaking with 
Leninism. 
That is why I think that only people who have 
taken leave of their senses and have lost every shred of 
Marxism can seriously assert that the policy of our 
Party, the policy of waging a fight on two fronts, is 
a Centrist policy. 
Lenin always waged a fight on two fronts in our 
Party‹both against the ³Lefts² and against outright 
Menshevik deviations. Study Lenin¹s pamphlet, ³Left

J. V. S T A L I N 296 
Wing² Communism, an Infantile Disorder, study the 
history of our Party, and you will realise that our Party 
grew and gained strength in a struggle against both deviations‹
the Right and the ³Left.² The fight against 
the Otzovists and the ³Left² Communists, on the one 
hand, and the fight against the openly opportunist deviation 
before, during and after the October Revolution, 
on the other hand‹such were the phases that our Party 
passed through in its development. Everyone is familiar 
with the words of Lenin that we must wage a fight both 
against open opportunists and against ³Left² doctrinaires. 
Does this mean that Lenin was a Centrist, that he 
pursued a Centrist policy? It obviously does not. 
That being the case, what do our Right and ³Left² 
deviators represent? 
As to the Right deviation, it is not, of course, the 
opportunism of the pre-war Social-Democrats. A deviation 
towards opportunism is not yet opportunism. 
We are familiar with the explanation Lenin gave of the 
concept of deviation. A deviation to the Right is something 
which has not yet taken the shape of opportunism 
and which can be corrected. Consequently, a deviation 
to the Right must not be identified with out-and-out 
opportunism. 
As to the ³Left² deviation, it is something diametrically 
opposite to what the extreme Lefts in the prewar 
Second International, that i s , the Bolsheviks, 
represented. Not only are the ³Left² deviators not 
Lefts without quotation marks, they are essentially 
Right deviators, with the difference, however, that 
they unconsciously camouflage their true nature by 
means of ³Left² phrases. It would be a crime against

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 297 
the Party not to perceive the vast difference between 
the ³Left² deviators and genuine Leninists, who are 
the only Lefts (without quotation marks) in our Party. 
(A voice: ³What about the legalisation of deviations?²) 
If waging an open fight against deviations is legalisation, 
then it must be confessed that Lenin ³legalised² 
them long ago. 
These deviators, both Rights and ³Lefts,² are 
recruited from the most diverse elements of the nonproletarian 
strata, elements who reflect the pressure 
of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces on the Party 
and the degeneration of certain sections of the Party. 
Former members of other parties; people in the Party 
with Trotskyist trends; remnants of former groups in 
the Party; Party members in the state, economic, cooperative 
and trade-union apparatuses who are becoming 
(or have become) bureaucratised and are linking 
themselves with the outright bourgeois elements in 
these apparatuses; well-to-do Party members in our 
rural organisations who are merging with the kulaks, 
and so on and so forth‹such is the nutritive medium 
for deviations from the Leninist line. It is obvious that 
these elements are incapable of absorbing anything 
genuinely Left and Leninist. They are only capable of 
nourishing the openly opportunist deviation, or the 
so-called ³Left² deviation, which masks its opportunism 
with Left phrases. 
That is why a fight on two fronts is the only correct 
policy for the Party. 
Further. Are the theses correct in saying that our 
chief method of fighting the Right deviation should be 
that of a full-scale ideological struggle? I think they

J. V. S T A L I N 298 
are. It would be well to recall the experience of the 
fight against Trotskyism. With what did we begin the 
fight against Trotskyism? Was it, perhaps, with organisational 
penalties? Of course not! We began it with 
an ideological struggle. We waged it from 1918 to 1925. 
Already in 1924 our Party and the Fifth Congress of the 
Comintern passed a resolution on Trotskyism defining 
it as a petty-bourgeois deviation. Nevertheless, Trotsky 
continued to be a member of our Central Committee 
and Political Bureau. Is that a fact, or not? It is a fact. 
Consequently, we ³tolerated² Trotsky and the Trotskyists 
on the Central Committee. Why did we allow them 
to remain in leading Party bodies? Because at that time 
the Trotskyists, despite their disagreements with the 
Party, obeyed the decisions of the Central Committee 
and remained loyal. When did we begin to apply organisational 
penalties at all extensively? Only after 
the Trotskyists had organised themselves into a faction, 
set up their factional centre, turned their faction into 
a new party and began to summon people to anti-Soviet 
demonstrations. 
I think that we must pursue the same course in the 
fight against the Right deviation. The Right deviation 
cannot as yet be regarded as something which has taken 
definite shape and crystallised, although it is gaining 
ground in the Party. It is only in process of taking shape 
and crystallising. Do the Right deviators have a 
faction? I do not think so. Can it be said that they do 
not submit to the decisions of our Party? I think we have 
no grounds yet for accusing them of this. Can it be affirmed 
that the Right deviators will certainly organise 
themselves into a faction? I doubt it. Hence the conclu

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 299 
sion that our chief method of fighting the Right deviation 
at this stage should be that of a full-scale ideological 
struggle. This is all the more correct as there is an opposite 
tendency among some of the members of our Party‹ 
a tendency to begin the fight against the Right deviation 
not with an ideological struggle, but with organisational 
penalties. They say bluntly: Give us ten or twenty of 
these Rights and we¹ll make mincemeat of them in a 
trice and so put an end to the Right deviation. I think, 
comrades, that such sentiments are wrong and dangerous. 
Precisely in order to avoid being carried away by such 
sentiments, and in order to put the fight against the Right 
deviation on correct lines, it must be said plainly and 
resolutely that our chief method of fighting the Right 
deviation at this stage is an ideological struggle. 
Does that mean that we rule out all organisational 
penalties? No, it does not. But it does undoubtedly mean 
that organisational penalties must play a subordinate 
role, and if there are no instances of infringement of 
Party decisions by Right deviators, we must not 
expel them from leading organisations or institutions. 
(A voice: ³What about the Moscow experience?²) 
I do not think that there were any Rights among 
the leading Moscow comrades. There was in Moscow an 
incorrect attitude towards Right sentiments. More accurately, 
it could be said that there was a conciliatory 
tendency there. But I cannot say that there was a Right 
deviation in the Moscow Committee. (A voice: ³But was 
there an organisational struggle?²) 
There was an organisational struggle, although it 
played a minor role. There was such a struggle because 
new elections are being held in Moscow on the basis of

J. V. S T A L I N 300 
self-criticism, and district meetings of actives have 
the right to replace their secretaries. (Laughter.) 
(A voice: ³Were new elections of our secretaries announced?²) 
Nobody has forbidden new elections of 
secretaries. There is the June appeal of the Central Committee, 
which expressly says that development of selfcriticism 
may become an empty phrase if the lower 
organisations are not assured the right to replace any 
secretary, or any committee. What objection can you 
raise to such an appeal? (A voice: ³Before the Party Conference?²) 
Yes, even before the Party Conference. 
I see an incredulous smile on the faces of some comrades. 
That will not do, comrades. I see that some of you have 
an irrepressible desire to remove certain spokesmen of 
the Right deviation from their posts as quickly as possible. 
But that, dear comrades, is no solution of the problem. 
Of course, it is easier to remove people from their 
posts than to conduct a broad and intelligent campaign 
explaining the Right deviation, the Right danger, and 
how to combat it. But what is easiest must not be considered 
the best. Be so good as to organise a broad explanatory 
campaign against the Right danger, be so 
good as not to grudge the time for it, and then you will 
see that the broader and deeper the campaign, the worse 
it will be for the Right deviation. That is why I think 
that the central point of our fight against the Right deviation 
must be an ideological struggle. 
As to the Moscow Committee, I do not know that 
anything can be added to what Uglanov said in his reply 
to the discussion at the plenum of the Moscow Committee 
and Moscow Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
He said plainly:

INDUSTRIALISATION AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 301 
³If we recall a little history, if we recall how I fought 
Zinoviev in Leningrad in 1921, it will be seen that at 
that time the Œaffray¹ was somewhat fiercer. We were 
the victors then because we were in the right. We have 
been beaten now because we are in the wrong. It will 
be a good lesson.² 
It follows that Uglanov has been waging a fight now 
just as at one time he waged a fight against Zinoviev. 
Against whom, may it be asked, has he been waging his 
present fight? Evidently, against the policy of the C.C. 
Against whom else could he have waged it? On what 
basis could he have waged this fight? Obviously, on the 
basis of conciliation towards the Right deviation. 
The theses, therefore, quite rightly stress, as one of 
the immediate tasks of our Party, the necessity of waging 
a fight against conciliation towards deviations from 
the Leninist line, especially against conciliation towards 
the Right deviation. 
Finally, a last point. The theses say that we must 
particularly stress the necessity at this time of fighting 
the Right deviation. What does that mean? It means 
that at this moment the Right danger is the chief danger 
in our Party. A fight against Trotskyist trends, and a 
concentrated fight at that, has been going on already for 
some ten years. This fight has resulted in the rout of 
the main Trotskyist cadres. It cannot be said that the 
fight against the openly opportunist trend has been waged 
of late with equal intensity. It has not been waged with 
special intensity because the Right deviation is still in 
a period of formation and crystallisation, growing and 
gaining strength because of the strengthening of the pettybourgeois 
elemental forces, which have been fostered

J. V. S T A L I N 302 
by our grain procurement difficulties. The chief blow 
must therefore be aimed at the Right deviation. 
In conclusion, I should like, comrades, to mention 
one more fact, which has not been mentioned here and 
which, in my opinion, is of no little significance. We, 
the members of the Political Bureau, have laid before 
you our theses on the control figures. In my speech, I 
upheld these theses as unquestionably correct. I do not 
say that certain corrections may not be made in the theses. 
But that they are in the main correct and assure the 
proper carrying out of the Leninist line, of that there 
can be no doubt whatever. Well, I must tell you that 
we in the Political Bureau adopted these theses unanimously. 
I think that this fact is of some significance in 
view of the rumours which are now and again spread in 
our ranks by diverse ill-wishers, opponents and enemies 
of our Party. I have in mind the rumours to the effect 
that in the Political Bureau we have a Right deviation, 
a ³Left² deviation, conciliation and the devil knows 
what besides. Let these theses serve as one more proof, 
the hundredth or hundred and first, that we in the Political 
Bureau are all united. 
I should like this plenum to adopt these theses, in 
principle, with equal unanimity. (Applause.) 
Pravda, No. 273, 
November 24, 1928

TO THE WORKERS 
OF THE ³KATUSHKA² FACTORY, 
TO THE WORKERS OF THE YARTSEVO 
FACTORY, SMOLENSK GUBERNIA59 
I hail your initiative in organising emulation for 
the exemplary carrying out of the election campaign 
to the Soviets. 
Elections to the Soviets‹the organs of the dictatorship 
of the working class‹should be the vital concern 
of the workers themselves. 
Your participation in the election campaign should 
not be confined to carrying out in proper, Bolshevik 
fashion the elections in your own town, the elections 
to the town Soviets. 
A more difficult, but no less necessary, task is to 
take a direct part in the election campaign in the countryside. 
The outcome of the Soviet elections will largely 
depend on the extent to which the working class in 
the towns and the agricultural labourers and poor peasants 
in the countryside take part in the campaign, exert 
their influence on its progress, take the lead of the 
middle peasants, force the kulaks into the background, 
and thus assure the leadership of the working class in

J. V. S T A L I N 304 
the countryside. Therefore, the interchange of challenges 
to emulation that you have initiated in the press will be 
of great significance in rousing the workers for a wide 
participation in the election campaign. 
I wish you success. 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 274, 
November 25, 1928

TO THE WORKERS OF THE KRASNY 
PROFINTERN FACTORY, BEZHITSA 
Fraternal greetings to the workers of the Krasny 
Profintern Factory. I congratulate you on accepting the 
challenge of the workers of the ³Katushka² and Yartsevo 
factories. I wish you success in the Soviet election campaign. 
Please excuse me for not being able to pay a visit 
to your factory. 
J. Stalin 
November 29, 1928 
Pravda, No. 278, 
November 30, 1928

ON THE TENTH ANNIVERSARY 
OF THE FRUNZE MILITARY ACADEMY 
OF THE WORKERS¹ AND PEASANTS¹ 
RED ARMY 
Hearty congratulations to the Frunze Military Academy 
on its tenth anniversary. 
I wish it success and continued progress. 
Stalin 
Pravda, No. 286 
December 9, 1928

THE RIGHT DANGER 
IN THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY 
Speech Delivered 
at the Meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. 
December 19, 1928 
Comrades, since Comrade Molotov has already stated 
here the views of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation, I have 
only to say a few words. I intend to touch upon three 
questions which came up in the course of the discussion, 
and that only lightly. 
These questions are: the problem of the capitalist 
stabilisation, the problem of the class battles of the 
proletariat in connection with the growing shakiness of 
the stabilisation, and the problem of the German Communist 
Party. 
I have to note with regret that on all these three 
questions both Humbert-Droz and Serra landed in the 
quagmire of craven opportunism. Humbert-Droz, it is 
true, has so far spoken only on formal questions. But 
I am referring to his speech on matters of principle at 
the meeting of the Political Secretariat of the E.C.C.I., 
where the question of the Rights and the conciliators in 
the German Communist Party was discussed. I think that 
it is precisely this speech that forms the ideological 
basis of the position taken up at this meeting by the 
minority in the E.C.C.I. Presidium. Consequently, Humbert-
Droz¹s speech on matters of principle at the meeting

J. V. S T A L I N 308 
of the Political Secretariat of the E.C.C.I. cannot be 
passed over in silence. 
I said that Humbert-Droz and Serra have landed in 
the quagmire of craven opportunism. What does that 
mean? It means that, besides overt opportunism, there 
is also covert opportunism, which fears to show its 
true face. And this is precisely the opportunism of 
conciliation towards the Right deviation. Conciliation 
is craven opportunism. I must, I repeat, note with regret 
that both these comrades have landed in the quagmire 
of craven opportunism. 
Permit me to demonstrate this by a few facts. 
I 
THE PROBLEM OF THE CAPITALIST 
STABILISATION 
The Comintern holds that the present capitalist 
stabilisation is a temporary, insecure, shaky and decaying 
stabilisation which will become more and more shaken 
as the capitalist crisis develops. 
This by no means contradicts the generally known 
fact that capitalist technology and rationalisation are 
advancing. More, it is just because they are advancing 
that the inherent unsoundness and decay of the stabilisation 
is developing. 
Yet what did Humbert-Droz say in his speech in the 
Political Secretariat of the E.C.C.I.? He flatly denied 
the shakiness and insecurity of the stabilisation. He 
bluntly declared in his speech that ³the Sixth World 
Congress virtually condemned the vague general formula 
that the stabilisation is unsound, shaky, etc.² He

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY 309 
bluntly declared that the Sixth Congress thesis on the 
third period says nothing about the stabilisation being 
shaky. Can it be considered that Humbert-Droz is correct 
in making this assertion? No, it cannot. It cannot, 
because the Sixth Congress of the Comintern said the 
very opposite of what Humbert-Droz claimed in his 
speech. In the paragraph on the third period, the Sixth 
Congress of the Comintern plainly states that: 
³this period (i.e., the third period‹J. St.) inevitably leads, 
through the further development of the contradictions of the 
capitalist stabilisation, to a further shaking* of the capitalist 
stabilisation and to a sharp accentuation of the general crisis of 
capitalism.²60 
Mark, ³a further shaking of the stabilisation.². . . 
What does that mean? I t means that the stabilisation 
is already shaky and insecure, and that in the third 
period it will become further shaken. Yet Humbert- 
Droz permits himself to scoff at all, including the German 
Communist Party, who say that the stabilisation 
is shaky and decaying, who say that the present struggle 
of the working class is undermining and disintegrating 
the capitalist stabilisation. Whom is Humbert-Droz 
scoffing at? Obviously, at the decisions of the Sixth 
Congress. 
It follows that, under the guise of upholding the 
decisions of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, Humbert-
Droz is actually revising them, and is thereby sliding 
into an opportunist conception of the stabilisation. 
So much for the formal side of the matter. 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 310 
Let us now examine the substance of the matter. If 
it cannot be said that the present stabilisation is shaky, 
or unsound, or insecure, then, after all, what is it? Only 
one thing remains, and that is to declare that the stabilisation 
is secure, and at any rate is growing firmer. 
But if we are faced by a capitalist stabilisation that is 
growing firmer, what can be meant by saying that the 
crisis of world capitalism is growing sharper and deeper? 
Is it not clear that this leaves no room for any deepening 
of the capitalist crisis? Is it not clear that Humbert-Droz 
has become entangled in his own contradictions? 
Further. Lenin said that, under imperialism, the 
development of capitalism is a double process: a growth 
of capitalism in some countries, on the one hand, and 
a decay of capitalism in other countries, on the other 
hand. Is this thesis of Lenin¹s correct? And if it is correct, 
is it not clear that the capitalist stabilisation cannot 
be other than decaying? 
Lastly, a few words about some generally known facts. 
We have such facts as the desperate conflicts between 
imperialist groups for markets and fields of capital 
export. 
We have such facts as the frenzied growth of armaments 
in the capitalist countries, the formation of new 
military alliances and the manifest preparations for new 
imperialist wars. 
We have such facts as the growing acuteness of the 
contradictions between the two imperialist giants, America 
and Britain, each of which is trying to draw all other 
countries into its orbit. 
We have, lastly, such facts as the existence of the 
Soviet Union and its progress and success in all fields

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY 311 
of development, in the economic field and in the cultural 
and political field‹the Soviet Union, whose existence 
alone, not to speak of its progress, is shaking and 
disintegrating the very foundations of world capitalism. 
How, after this, can Marxists, Leninists, Communists 
assert that the capitalist stabilisation is not shaky and 
decaying, that it is not being shaken by the very course 
of things from year to year and from day to day? 
Does Humbert-Droz, and Serra with him, realise into 
what a quagmire they are landing? 
From this error spring the other errors of Humbert- 
Droz and Serra. 
II 
THE PROBLEM OF THE CLASS BATTLES 
OF THE PROLETARIAT 
Just as erroneous is Humbert-Droz¹s opinion of the 
class battles of the proletariat in the capitalist countries, 
of their character and significance. It follows from 
Humbert-Droz¹s speech at the meeting of the Political 
Secretariat that the struggle of the working class, its 
spontaneous clashes with the capitalists, are in the main 
only of a defensive character, and that the leadership 
of this struggle on the part of the Communist Parties 
should be carried out only within the framework of the 
existing reformist trade unions. 
Is that right? No, it is wrong. To assert that means 
to drag in the wake of events. Humbert-Droz forgets 
that the struggle of the working class is now taking 
place on the basis of a stabilisation that is becoming 
shaken, that the battles of the working class not

J. V. S T A L I N 312 
infrequently bear the character of counter-battles, of a 
counter-offensive and a direct offensive against the 
capitalists. Humbert-Droz fails to see anything new 
in the battles of the working class in the recent period. 
He fails to see such things as the Lodz general strike, 
the economic strikes for better conditions of labour in 
France, Czechoslovakia and Germany, the mighty mobilisation 
of the proletarian forces in Germany in the fights 
against the lock-out of the metalworkers, and so on and 
so forth. 
What do these and similar facts show, what do they 
indicate? That deep within the capitalist countries the 
pre-conditions for a new revolutionary upsurge of the 
working-class movement are ripening. And that is the 
new element which Humbert-Droz and Serra fail to see, 
fail to observe, and which never will be observed at 
all by comrades who have become accustomed to looking 
backward instead of forward. 
And what does looking backward instead of forward 
mean? It means dragging in the wake of events, failing 
to see what is new in developments, and being caught 
by surprise. It means renouncing the leading role of 
the Communist Parties in the working-class movement. 
That was precisely what caused the German Communist 
Party leadership to come to grief in the 1923 revolution. 
Consequently, he who does not want to repeat the 
mistakes of 1923 must rouse the minds of the Communists 
and urge them onward, must prepare the masses 
for the coming battles, must take every measure to ensure 
that the Communist Parties are not left behind in 
the wake of events and that the working class is not 
caught by surprise.

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY 313 
I t i s extremely strange that Humbert-Droz and 
Serra forget these things. 
At the time of the Ruhr battles the German Communists 
noted the fact that the unorganised workers proved 
to be more revolutionary than the organised workers. 
Humbert-Droz is outraged by this and declares that it 
could not have been so. Strange! Why could it not have 
been so? There are about a million workers in the Ruhr. 
Of them, about two hundred thousand are organised 
in trade unions. The trade unions are directed by reformist 
bureaucrats who are connected in all manner 
of ways with the capitalist class. Why is it surprising, 
then, that the unorganised workers proved to be more 
revolutionary than the organised? Could it indeed have 
been otherwise? 
I might tell you of even more ³surprising² facts 
from the history of the revolutionary movement in Russia. 
With us, it happened not infrequently that the masses 
proved to be more revolutionary than (some of) their 
communist leaders. That is well known to all the Russian 
Bolsheviks. It was this that Lenin had in mind 
when he said that we must not only teach the masses, 
but also learn from the masses. What is surprising is 
not these facts, but that Humbert-Droz does not understand 
such simple things taken from the sphere of practical 
revolutionary experience. 
The same must be said of Serra. He does not approve 
of the fact that the German Communists, in their 
struggle to organise the locked-out metalworkers, went 
beyond the framework of the existing trade unions 
and shook this framework. He regards this as an infringement 
of the resolutions of the Fourth Congress of the

J. V. S T A L I N 314 
Profintern.61 He claims that the Profintern called upon 
Communists to work only within the trade unions. That 
is nonsense, comrades! The Profintern did not call for 
anything of the kind. To say that is to condemn the Communist 
Party to the role of a passive observer of the class 
battles of the proletariat. To say that is to bury the idea 
of the leading role of the Communist Party in the working-
class movement. 
The merit of the German Communists is precisely 
that they did not allow themselves to be scared by talk 
about ³the framework of the trade unions² and went 
beyond this framework by organising the struggle of 
the non-organised workers against the will of the tradeunion 
bureaucrats. The merit of the German Communists 
is precisely that they sought for and found new forms 
of struggle and organisation of the unorganised workers. 
It is possible that in doing so they committed a number 
of trifling errors. But no new undertaking is ever free 
from errors. From the fact that we must work within 
the reformist trade unions‹provided only that they 
are mass organisations‹it does not at all follow that we 
must confine our mass work to work within the reformist 
trade unions, that we must become slaves of the 
standards and demands of those unions. If the reformist 
leadership is identifying itself with capitalism 
(see the resolutions of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern 
and the Fourth Congress of the Profintern), while 
the working class is waging a struggle against capitalism, 
can it be affirmed that the struggle of the working 
class, led by the Communist Party, can avoid breaking 
to some extent the existing reformist framework of 
the trade unions? Obviously, this cannot be affirmed

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY 315 
without landing into opportunism. Therefore, a situation 
is quite conceivable in which it may be necessary 
to create parallel mass associations of the working 
class, against the will of the trade-union bosses who 
have sold themselves to the capitalists. We already have 
such a situation in America. It is quite possible that 
things are moving in the same direction in Germany too. 
III 
THE PROBLEM OF THE GERMAN 
COMMUNIST PARTY 
Is the German Communist Party to be or not to be 
organised and united, with an iron internal discipline?‹ 
that is the question, comrades. It is a question not only 
of the Rights or of the conciliators, but of the very existence 
of the German Communist Party. There is a German 
Communist Party. But alongside and within the 
German Communist Party there are two forces which 
are disintegrating the Party from within and creating a 
threat to its existence. They are, firstly, the Right faction, 
who are organising within the Communist Party a 
new, anti-Leninist party, with its own centre and its own 
press organs, and who day after day are violating its 
discipline. They are, secondly, a group of conciliators 
whose vacillations are strengthening the Right faction. 
I shall not stop to show that the Right faction is 
breaking with Marxism-Leninism and waging a desperate 
struggle against the Comintern. That was shown 
long ago. Nor shall I stop to show that the group of 
conciliators are violating the Sixth Congress resolution 
on waging a systematic fight against the Rights.

J. V. S T A L I N 316 
That, too, was shown long ago. The point now is that 
this situation in the German Communist Party cannot 
be tolerated any longer. The point is that to tolerate 
any longer an ³order² of things in which the 
Rights poison the atmosphere with Social-Democratic 
ideological rubbish and systematically violate the elementary 
principles of Party discipline, while the conciliators 
bring grist to the mill of the Rights, would be to 
go against the Comintern and to violate the elementary 
demands of Marxism-Leninism. 
A situation has arisen similar to (if not worse than) 
the one which existed in the C.P.S.U.(B.) in the last 
phase of the struggle against Trotskyism, when the Party 
and the Comintern were obliged to expel the Trotskyists 
from their ranks. Everybody sees that now. But 
Humbert-Droz and Serra do not see it, or pretend not 
to see it. That means that they are prepared to support 
both the Rights and the conciliators, even at the cost 
of the complete disintegration of the German Communist 
Party. 
In opposing the expulsion of the Rights, Humbert- 
Droz and Serra refer to the resolution of the Sixth 
Congress which says that Right deviations must be 
overcome by means of an ideological struggle. That is 
perfectly true. But these comrades forget that the resolutions 
of the Sixth Congress by no means limit the struggle 
of the Communist Parties against the Right danger 
to measures of an ideological order. While speaking of 
methods of ideological struggle against deviations from 
the Leninist line, the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, 
in its resolution on Bukharin¹s report, at the same time 
declared that:

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY 317 
³far from precluding, this presumes the utmost strengthening 
of iron inner-Party discipline, unqualified subordination of the 
minority to the majority, unqualified subordination of the lower 
bodies, as well as of other Party organisations (groups in parliament, 
groups in trade unions, the press, etc.) to the leading Party 
centres.²*62 
I t i s extremely strange that Humbert-Droz and 
Serra forget this thesis of the resolution of the Sixth 
Congress of the Comintern. It is extremely strange that 
all conciliators, both those who consider themselves 
conciliators and those who repudiate the name, when 
pleading the Sixth Congress resolution systematically 
forget this important thesis of the Communist International. 
What is to be done if, instead of the utmost strengthening 
of iron inner-Party discipline, we have in the 
German Communist Party glaring instances of the 
most unceremonious violation of all discipline both by 
the Rights and, to some extent, by some of the conciliators? 
Can such a situation be tolerated any longer? 
What is to be done if, instead of unqualified subordination 
of the lower bodies, groups in trade unions and 
certain organs of the Party press to the leading Party 
centre, we have in the German Communist Party glaring 
instances of the grossest violation of this demand 
of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern by the Rights 
and, to a certain extent, by some of the conciliators? 
Can such a situation be tolerated any longer? 
You are familiar with the conditions for admission 
to the Comintern endorsed by the Second Congress.63 
I am referring to the twenty-one points. The first point 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 318 
of these conditions says that ³the periodical and nonperiodical 
press and all Party publishing houses must 
be completely subordinated to the Central Committee of the 
Party,* irrespective of whether at the given moment the 
Party as a whole is legal or illegal.² You know that the 
Right faction have two press organs at their disposal. 
You know that those press organs refuse even to hear 
of any subordination to the Central Committee of the 
German Communist Party. The question arises, can such 
a scandalous state of affairs be tolerated any longer? 
The 12th point of the twenty-one conditions says 
that the Party must be ³organised on the most centralised 
lines,² that within it must ³prevail iron discipline 
bordering upon military discipline.²* You know that the 
Rights in the German Communist Party refuse to recognise 
iron discipline, or any discipline whatever, except their 
own, factional discipline. The question arises, can this 
scandalous state of affairs be tolerated any longer? 
Or perhaps you will say that the conditions endorsed 
by the Second Congress of the Comintern are not 
binding on the Rights? 
Humbert-Droz and Serra raise an outcry here about 
imaginary violators of decisions of the Communist International. 
At the present time, in the shape of the 
Rights we have real (not imaginary) violators of the 
fundamental principles of the Communist International. 
Why, then, do they keep silent? Is it not because 
they want, under the guise of a verbal defence of Comintern 
decisions, to smuggle through a defence of the Rights 
and a revision of these decisions? 
* My italics.‹J. St.

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY 319 
Particularly interesting is Serra¹s statement. He 
vows and swears that he is against the Rights, against 
he conciliators, and so forth. But what conclusion does 
he draw from this? Is it, do you think, the necessity 
of fighting the Rights and the conciliators? Nothing of 
the kind! He draws from this the extremely strange conclusion 
that it is necessary, in his opinion, to reorganise 
the existing Political Bureau of the Central Committee 
of the German Communist Party. 
Just think! The Political Bureau of the C.C. of the 
German Communist Party is waging a determined struggle 
against the Right danger and against the vacillations of 
the conciliators; Serra is in favour of a fight against the 
Rights and the conciliators; therefore, Serra proposes that 
the Rights and the conciliators should be left alone, that 
the fight against the Rights and the conciliators should 
be relaxed, and that the composition of the Political 
Bureau of the C.C. of the German Communist Party 
should be altered in a conciliatory direction. What a 
³conclusion²! 
Serra will pardon me if I say here without mincing 
words that his position on this question is reminiscent 
of that of a provincial pettifogger who tries to make out 
that white is black, and black white. It is what we call 
a pettifogging defence of opportunist elements. 
Serra proposes that the Political Bureau of the C.C. 
of the German Communist Party should be reorganised, 
that is, that some members should be removed from it 
and others put in, that they should he replaced by others. 
Why does not Serra say bluntly and frankly‹replaced 
by whom? (Serra: ³By those whom the Sixth 
Congress of the Comintern wanted.²) But the Sixth Con

J. V. S T A L I N 320 
gress certainly did not suggest rehabilitating conciliators. 
On the contrary, i t charged us with waging a 
systematic fight against conciliation. And precisely 
because this obligation has not been carried out by the 
conciliators, we have now, after the Sixth Congress, 
the decision of the E.C.C.I. Presidium of October 6, 
1928, on the Rights and the conciliators. Serra wants 
to assume the role of sole interpreter of the decisions 
of the Sixth Congress. That claim of Serra¹s is entirely 
unwarranted. The interpreter of the decisions of the Sixth 
Congress is the Executive Committee of the Comintern 
and its Presidium. I see that Serra does not agree with 
the decision of the E.C.C.I. Presidium of October 6, 
although he has not said so plainly. 
What is the conclusion? There is only one conclusion: 
the position of Humbert-Droz and Serra on the 
question of the German Communist Party is one of 
craven, pettifogging defence of the Rights against the 
German Communist Party and the Comintern. 
IV 
THE RIGHTS IN THE C.P.G. 
AND IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 
I learned today from some of the speeches made here 
that some of the German conciliators plead in their justification 
the speech I made at the November plenum 
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)* on the methods of combating 
Right elements. As you know, I said in my speech (it 
has been published) that at this stage of development 
* See pp. 255-302 in this volume.‹Ed.

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY 321 
of the fight against the Right danger in the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
the chief method of struggle is the ideological struggle, 
which does not exclude the application of organisational 
penalties in individual cases. I based this thesis on 
the fact that the Rights in the C.P.S.U.(B.) had not 
yet crystallised, did not yet represent a group or a faction, 
and had not yet provided a single instance of 
violation or non-fulfilment of decisions of the C.C., 
C.P.S.U.(B.). I stated in my speech that if the Rights were 
to pass to a factional struggle and begin to violate decisions 
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), they would be treated 
in the same way as the Trotskyists were treated in 1927. 
That is clear, one would think. Is it not then stupid 
to refer to my speech as an argument in favour of the 
Rights in Germany, where the Rights have already passed 
to factional methods of struggle and systematically 
violate decisions of the C.C., C.P.G., or as an argument 
in favour of the conciliators in Germany, who have not 
yet broken, and are apparently unwilling to break, with 
the Right faction? I think that nothing more stupid 
than such a plea can be imagined. Only people who 
have abandoned all logic can fail to understand the vast 
difference between the position of the Rights in 
the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the position of the Rights in the 
C.P.G. 
In point of fact, the Rights in the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
do not yet constitute a faction, and it is indisputable 
that they are loyally carrying out the decisions of the 
C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). The Rights in Germany, on the contrary, 
already have a faction, headed by a factional centre, 
and systematically trample underfoot decisions of 
the C.C., C.P.G. Is it not obvious that at this moment

J. V. S T A L I N 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
322 
the methods of fighting the Rights cannot be the same 
in these two parties? 
Further. Here in the U.S.S.R. Social-Democracy 
does not exist as an organised and serious force capable 
of fostering and stimulating the Right danger in the 
C.P.S.U.(B.). In Germany, on the contrary, there is 
alongside the Communist Party the stronger and fairly 
firmly organised Social-Democratic Party, which fosters 
the Right deviation in the German Communist Party 
and objectively converts this deviation into its agency. 
Is it not obvious that one must be blind not to perceive 
the vast difference between the situations in the 
U.S.S.R. and in Germany? 
Lastly, there is one other circumstance. Our Party 
grew and gained strength in fierce battles against 
the Mensheviks; moreover, for a number of years those 
battles took the form of direct civil war against them. 
Do not forget that in the October Revolution we 
Bolsheviks overthrew the Mensheviks and Socialist- 
Revolutionaries, as being the Left wing of the counterrevolutionary 
imperialist bourgeoisie. This, incidently, 
explains why nowhere, in no other Communist Party 
in the world, is the tradition of struggle against open 
opportunism so strong as it is in the C.P.S.U.(B.). We 
have only to recall the Moscow organisation, especially 
the Moscow Committee, where there were instances of 
conciliatory vacillation; we have only to recall how the 
working-class Party members in Moscow at a single 
stroke straightened out the line of the Moscow Committee 
in a couple of months‹we have only to recall all 
this to realise how strong in our Party is the tradition of 
struggle against open opportunism.

THE RIGHT DANGER IN THE GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY 323 
Call the same thing be said of the German Communist 
Party? You will no doubt agree with me that, unfortunate]
y, it cannot. More than that, we cannot deny 
that the Communist Party in Germany is still far from 
having rid itself of Social-Democratic traditions, which 
foster the Right danger in the C.P.G. 
There you have the conditions in Germany and the 
conditions in the U.S.S.R., and they show that the 
difference in conditions dictates different methods of 
fighting the Right danger in the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the 
C.P.G. 
Only people devoid of an elementary Marxist perception 
can fail to understand this simple thing. 
In the commission which drafted the resolution64 
of the November Plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), a 
group of comrades proposed that the basic provisions 
of the resolution should be extended to other sections 
of the Comintern, including the German section. We rejected 
this proposal, declaring that the conditions of 
struggle against the Right danger in the C.P.G. differed 
cardinally from those in the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
V 
THE DRAFTS FOR THE OPEN 
AND CLOSED LETTERS 
A couple of words regarding the draft resolutions 
submitted by the E.C.C.I. commissions. Serra considers 
that these drafts bear the character of provincial resolutions. 
Why, one asks? Because, it appears, the draft 
of the open letter does not contain an analysis of the 
political situation which engenders the Right danger.

J. V. S T A L I N 324 
That is ridiculous, comrades. We have such an analysis 
in the decisions of the Sixth Congress. Is there any 
need to repeat it? I think that it should not be repeated. 
As a matter of fact, we might have confined ourselves 
to a brief resolution on the Rights, who systematically 
violate the decisions of the Sixth Congress and are therefore 
liable to expulsion, and on the conciliators, who 
are not waging a fight against the Rights and therefore 
deserve to be given a most serious warning. 
If, however, we did not confine ourselves to a brief 
resolution, it was in order to explain to the workers the 
nature of the Right deviation, to show them the true 
face of the Brandlers and Thalheimers, to show them 
what they were in the past and what they are now, to show 
how long the Comintern has spared them in the hope 
of correcting them, how long the Communists have tolerated 
them in their midst, and why the presence of 
such people in the Comintern cannot be tolerated any 
longer. 
That is why the draft resolution is longer than might 
have been expected at first glance. 
Comrade Molotov has already said here that the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation associates itself with these 
draft resolutions. I can only repeat Comrade Molotov¹s 
statement. 
Bolshevik, No. 23-24, 
1928

REPLY TO KUSHTYSEV 
Comrade Kushtysev, 
I have received your letter of December 11, 1928. 
Your question might at first sight appear to be correct. 
Actually, it will not stand the slightest criticism. 
It should be easy to understand that when Lenin says 
that ³Soviet power plus electrification is communism,² 
he does not mean by this that there will be any kind of political 
power under communism, nor does he mean that 
if we have seriously set about electrifying the country 
we have thereby already achieved communism. 
What did Lenin mean to say when making this 
statement? In my opinion, all he meant to say was that 
Soviet power alone is not enough for the advance towards 
communism, that in order to advance towards 
communism the Soviet power must electrify the country 
and transfer the entire national economy to large-scale 
production, and that the Soviet power is prepared to 
take this course in order to arrive at communism. 
Lenin¹s dictum implies nothing more than the readiness 
of the Soviet power to advance towards communism 
through electrification. 
We often say that our republic is a socialist one. 
Does this mean that we have already achieved socialism, 
done away with classes and abolished the state (for the

J. V. S T A L I N 326 
achievement of socialism implies the withering away of 
the state)? Or does i t mean that classes, the state, 
and so on, will still exist under socialism? Obviously 
not. Are we entitled in that case to call our republic 
a socialist one? Of course, we are. From what standpoint? 
From the standpoint of our determination and 
our readiness to achieve socialism, to do away with 
classes, etc. 
Perhaps, Comrade Kushtysev, you would agree to 
listen to Lenin¹s opinion on this point? If so, then listen: 
³No one, I think, in considering the question of the economy 
of Russia has ever denied its transitional character. Nor, I think 
has any Communist denied that the term Socialist Soviet Republic 
signifies the determination of the Soviet power to achieve the 
transition to socialism, and not at all that the new economic order 
is a socialist order² (Vol. XXII, p. 513). 
Clear, I think. 
With communist greetings, 
J. Stalin 
December 28, 1928 
Published for the first time

THEY HAVE SUNK TO NEW DEPTHS 
The necessity of raising with the utmost sharpness 
the question of the Trotskyist underground organisation 
i s dictated by a l l i t s recent activities, which 
compel the Party and the Soviet Government to adopt 
an attitude towards the Trotskyists fundamentally different 
from that of the Party towards them before the 
Fifteenth Congress. 
The open demonstration of the Trotskyists in the 
streets on November 7, 1927, was a turning-point, when 
the Trotskyist organisation showed that it was breaking 
not only with the Party, but also with the Soviet 
regime. 
This demonstration was preceded by a whole series 
of anti-Party and anti-Soviet acts: the forcible seizure 
of a government building for a meeting (the Moscow 
Higher Technical School), the organisation of underground 
printing plants, etc. However, prior to the Fifteenth 
Congress the Party still adopted measures with 
regard to the Trotskyist organisation testifying to the 
desire of the Party leadership to induce the Trotskyists 
to mend their ways, to induce them to admit their errors, 
to induce them to return to the Party path. For 
a number of years, beginning with the 1923 discussion, 
the Party patiently pursued this line‹the line, chiefly, 
of an ideological struggle. And even at the Fifteenth Party 
Congress it was precisely such measures against the

J. V. S T A L I N 328 
Trotskyist organisation that were considered, notwithstanding 
the fact that the Trotskyists had ³passed from 
disagreements over tactics to disagreements of a programmatic 
character, revising the views of Lenin and sinking 
to the position of Menshevism.² (Resolution of the Fifteenth 
Congress.)65 
The year that has elapsed since the Fifteenth Congress 
has shown that the Fifteenth Congress was right 
in deciding to expel active Trotskyists from the Party. 
In the course of 1928 the Trotskyists completed their conversion 
from an underground anti-Party group into an 
underground anti-Soviet organisation. This was the new 
element which during 1928 compelled the Soviet authorities 
to adopt repressive measures against active members 
of this underground anti-Soviet organisation. 
The organs of authority of the proletarian dictatorship 
cannot permit that in the land of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat there should exist an underground anti- 
Soviet organisation which, although insignificant in 
membership, nevertheless has its printing plants and 
its committees, which is attempting to organise anti- 
Soviet strikes, and which is going to the length of preparing 
its followers for civil war against the organs 
of the proletarian dictatorship. But it is precisely to 
such depths that the Trotskyists have sunk‹once a 
faction within the Party, they have now become an underground 
anti-Soviet organisation. 
Naturally, all the anti-Soviet, Menshevik elements 
in the country are expressing their sympathy with the 
Trotskyists and are now grouping around them. 
The struggle of the Trotskyists against the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) had i t s own logic, and this logic has

THEY HAVE SUNK TO NEW DEPTHS 329 
brought them into the anti-Soviet camp. Trotsky began 
by advising his followers in January 1928 to strike at 
the leadership of the C.P.S.U.(B.), without setting 
themselves up against the U.S.S.R. However, the logic 
of the struggle brought Trotsky to a point at which his 
blows against the leadership of the C.P.S.U.(B.), against 
the guiding force of the proletarian dictatorship, were 
inevitably directed against the dictatorship of the 
proletariat itself, against the U.S.S.R., against our 
entire Soviet society. 
The Trotskyists have tried in every way to discredit 
the Party, which directs the country, and the 
organs of Soviet Government in the eyes of the working 
class. In his letter of instructions of October 21, 1928, 
which he sent abroad and which was published not 
only in the organ of the renegade Maslow, but also in 
whiteguard organs (Rul,66 etc.), Trotsky makes the slanderous 
anti-Soviet allegation that the system existing 
in the U.S.S.R. is ³Kerenskyism turned inside-out,² 
calls for the organisation of strikes and the disruption 
of the collective agreement campaign, and in fact prepares 
his cadres for the possibility of another civil war. 
Other Trotskyists say bluntly that in preparing for 
civil war ³we must stop at nothing and not be deterred 
by any rules, written or unwritten.² 
The slanders against the Red Army and its leaders 
which the Trotskyists disseminate in the underground 
and foreign renegade press and, through it, in the whiteguard 
press abroad, show that the Trotskyists do not 
stop at directly inciting the international bourgeoisie 
against the Soviet state. The Red Army and its leaders 
are depicted in these documents as the army of a future

J. V. S T A L I N 330 
Bonapartist coup. Moreover, the Trotskyist organisation 
is trying, on the one hand, to split the Comintern sections, 
to disintegrate the ranks of the Comintern by 
creating its factions everywhere, and, on the other hand, 
is inciting against the U.S.S.R. the elements who as 
it is are hostile to the Soviet state. 
The revolutionary phrases in the writings of the 
Trotskyists can no longer conceal the counter-revolutionary 
essence of the Trotskyist appeals. At the Tenth 
Party Congress, in connection with the Kronstadt mutiny, 
Lenin warned the Party that even ³the whiteguards 
strive, and are able, to disguise themselves as Communists, 
and even as Œmore Left¹ than the Communists, solely 
in order to weaken and overthrow the bulwark of the 
proletarian revolution in Russia.² Lenin at that time 
cited as an example the way in which the Mensheviks 
utilised the disagreements within the R.C.P.(B.) in order 
actually to egg on and support the Kronstadt mutineers, 
the Socialist-Revolutionaries and the whiteguards, while 
pretending, in case the mutiny failed, to be supporters 
of the Soviet regime with only slight amendments.67 
The Trotskyist underground organisation has given full 
proof that it is the sort of camouflaged organisation that 
at the present time rallies around it all the elements 
hostile to the proletarian dictatorship. The Trotskyist 
organisation is in fact now fulfilling the same role as 
the Menshevik party once fulfilled in the U.S.S.R. in 
its struggle against the Soviet regime. 
The subversive activities of the Trotskyist organisation 
demand that the Soviet authorities wage an implacable 
fight against this anti-Soviet organisation. This 
explains the measures taken recently by the OGPU

THEY HAVE SUNK TO NEW DEPTHS 331 
to liquidate this anti-Soviet organisation (arrests and 
deportations). 
Apparently, by no means all Party members clearly 
realise that between the former Trotskyist Opposition 
within the C.P.S.U.(B.) and the present Trotskyist 
anti-Soviet underground organisation outside the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) there is already an impassable gulf. Yet 
it is high time to understand and appreciate this obvious 
truth. Hence the ³liberal² attitude that certain Party 
members sometimes display towards active figures in 
the Trotskyist underground organisation is absolutely 
impermissible. All Party members must appreciate this. 
More, it must be explained to the whole country, to the 
broad strata of the workers and peasants, that the illegal 
Trotskyist organisation is an anti-Soviet organisation, 
an organisation hostile to the proletarian dictatorship. 
Let those Trotskyists who have not yet fully committed 
themselves also ponder over this new situation 
created by their leaders and by the activities of the 
Trotskyist underground anti-Soviet organisation. 
One or the other: either with the Trotskyist underground 
anti-Soviet organisation against the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
and against the proletarian dictatorship in the U.S.S.R., 
or complete rupture with the Trotskyist anti-Soviet 
underground organisation and withdrawal of any kind 
of support of this organisation. 
Published for the first time

BUKHARIN¹S GROUP AND THE RIGHT 
DEVIATION IN OUR PARTY 
From Speeches Delivered at a Joint Meeting 
of the Political Bureau of the C.C. 
and the Presidium of the C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 
at the End of January and the Beginning 
of February 1929 
(Brief Record) 
Comrades, sad though it is, we have to record the 
fact that within our Party a separate Bukharin group 
has been formed, consisting of Bukharin, Tomsky and 
Rykov. The Party knew nothing of the existence of 
this group before‹the Bukharinites carefully concealed 
its existence from the Party. But now the fact is known 
and evident. 
This group, as is seen from their statement, has 
its own separate platform, which it counterposes to 
the Party¹s policy. It demands, firstly‹in opposition 
to the existing policy of the Party‹a slower rate of 
development of our industry, asserting that the present 
rate of industrial development is ³fatal.² It demands, 
secondly‹also in opposition to the policy of the Party 
‹curtailment of the formation of state farms and collective 
farms, asserting that they do not and cannot play 
any serious part in the development of our agriculture. 
It demands, thirdly‹also in opposition to the policy 
of the Party‹the granting of full freedom to private 
trade and renunciation of the regulating function of 
the state in the sphere of trade, asserting that the regu

BUKHARIN¹S GROUP AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 333 
lating function of the state renders the development 
of trade impossible. 
In other words, Bukharin¹s group is a group of 
Right deviators and capitulators who advocate not the 
elimination, but the free development of the capitalist 
elements in town and country. 
At the same time, Bukharin¹s group opposes the 
emergency measures against the kulaks and ³excessive² 
taxation of the kulaks, and unceremoniously levels 
against the Party the accusation that, in applying such 
measures, it is in point of fact conducting a policy of 
³military and feudal exploitation of the peasantry.² 
Bukharin needed this ludicrous accusation in order to 
take the kulaks under his protection, and in doing so 
he confused and lumped together the labouring peasants 
and the kulaks. 
Bukharin¹s group demands that the Party radically 
change its policy along the lines of the group¹s 
platform. They declare further that if the Party¹s policy 
is not changed, Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky will 
resign. 
Such are the facts which have been established in 
the course of the discussion at this joint meeting of the 
Political Bureau of the C.C. and the Presidium of the 
C.C.C. 
It has been established, furthermore, that on the 
instructions of this group, Bukharin conducted secret 
negotiations with Kamenev with a view to forming a 
bloc of the Bukharinites and the Trotskyists against 
the Party and its Central Committee. Evidently, having 
no hope that their platform would carry the day in the 
Central Committee of our Party, the Bukharinites

J. V. S T A L I N 334 
thought it necessary to form such a bloc behind the back 
of the Party¹s Central Committee. 
Were there disagreements between us before? There 
were. The first outbreak occurred prior to the July plenum 
of the C.C. (1928). The disagreements concerned 
these same questions: the rate of industrial development, 
the state farms and collective farms, full freedom for 
private trade, emergency measures against the kulaks. 
At the plenum, however, the matter ended with the adoption 
of a united and common resolution on all these 
questions. We all believed at that time that Bukharin 
and his followers had renounced their errors, and that 
the disagreements had been resolved by the adoption 
of a common resolution. This was the basis which gave 
rise to the statement on the unity of the Political Bureau 
and the absence of disagreements within it, which 
was signed by all the members of the Political Bureau 
(July 1928). 
A second outbreak of disagreements among us occurred 
prior to the November plenum of the (C.C. Bukharin¹s 
article, ³Notes of an Economist,² clearly indicated 
that all was not well in the Political Bureau, that one 
of the members of the Political Bureau at any rate was 
trying to revise or ³correct² the C.C.¹s line. At any 
rate we, the majority of the members of the Political 
Bureau, had no doubt that the ³Notes of an Economist² 
was an eclectic anti-Party article, designed to slow down 
the rate of industrial development and to change our 
policy in the countryside along the lines of Frumkin¹s 
well-known letter. To this must be added the question 
of the resignation of Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky. 
The fact is that at that time Rykov, Bukharin and Tom

BUKHARIN¹S GROUP AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 335 
sky came to the commission which was drafting the resolution 
on the control figures and declared that they 
were resigning. However, in the course of the work of 
the commission on the control figures all disagreements 
were smoothed over in one way or another: the present 
rate of industrial development was preserved, the further 
development of state farms and collective farms was 
approved, maximum taxation of the kulaks was preserved, 
the regulating function of the state in the sphere of trade 
was also preserved, the ludicrous accusation that the 
Party was conducting a policy of ³military and feudal 
exploitation of the peasantry² was repudiated amid 
the general laughter of the members of the commission, 
and the three withdrew their resignation. As a 
result, we had a common resolution on the control 
figures adopted by all the members of the Political 
Bureau. As a result, we had the Political Bureau¹s 
decision to the effect that a l l i t s members should 
declare both at the November plenum of the C.C. and 
outside i t that the Political Bureau was united and 
that there were no disagreements within the Political 
Bureau. 
Could we have known at that time that Bukharin, 
Rykov and Tomsky were voting for the joint resolution 
only for appearance¹s sake, that they were keeping their 
specific points of difference with the Party to themselves, 
that Bukharin and Tomsky would in reality 
practise what amounted to a refusal to work in the 
A.U.C.C.T.U., in the Comintern and on Pravda, that Kamenev 
had among his private papers a certain ³memorandum² 
which makes it clear that we have within the 
C.C. a separate group with its own platform, a group

J. V. S T A L I N 336 
which is trying to form a bloc with the Trotskyists 
against the Party? 
Obviously, we could not have known that. 
It is now clear to all that disagreements exist and 
that they are serious. Bukharin is apparently envious 
of the laurels of Frumkin. Lenin was a thousand times 
right when he said in a letter to Shlyapnikov as far back 
as 1916 that Bukharin was ³devilishly unstable in politics.²
68 Now this instability has been communicated 
by Bukharin to the members of his group. 
The principal misfortune of the Bukharinites is that 
they have a faith, a conviction that making things 
easier for the kulak and untying his hands is the way 
to solve our grain and all other difficulties. They think 
that if we make things easier for the kulak, if we do not 
restrict his exploiting tendencies, if we let him have 
his own way, and so on, the difficulties will disappear 
and the political state of the country will improve. It goes 
without saying that this naïve faith of the Bukharinites 
in the saving power of the kulak is such ludicrous nonsense 
as not even to be worth criticising. The Bukharinites¹ 
misfortune is that they do not understand the mechanics 
of the class struggle, do not understand that the 
kulak is an inveterate enemy of the working people, 
an inveterate enemy of our whole system. They do not 
understand that a policy of making things easier for 
the kulak and untying his hands would worsen the entire 
political state of the country, improve the chances 
of the capitalist elements in the country, lose us the poor 
peasants, demoralise the middle peasants, and bring 
about a rupture with the working class of our country. They 
do not understand that no untying of the hands of the

BUKHARIN¹S GROUP AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 337 
kulak is capable of easing our grain difficulties in any 
way, for the kulak will not voluntarily give us grain 
anyhow so long as there exists the policy of procurement 
prices and state regulation of the grain market‹and 
we cannot abandon the policy of state regulation of trade 
if we do not want to undermine the Soviet system, the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. The Bukharinites¹ misfortune 
is that they do not understand these simple and 
elementary things That is apart from the fact that the 
policy of untying the hands of the capitalist elements 
is absolutely incompatible, theoretically and politically, 
with the principles of Lenin¹s policy and of 
Leninism. 
That is all very well, comrades may say, but what 
is the way out, what must be done in connection with 
the appearance on the scene of Bukharin¹s group? 
As to the way out of the situation, the majority of the 
comrades have already expressed their opinion. The 
majority of the comrades demand that this meeting 
should be firm and categorically reject Bukharin¹s and 
Tomsky¹s resignation (Rykov has already withdrawn 
his). The majority of the comrades demand that this 
joint meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.C. and 
Presidium of the C.C.C. should condemn the Rightopportunist, 
capitulatory platform of Bukharin, Tomsky 
and Rykov, that it should condemn the attempt 
of Bukharin and his group to form an anti-Party 
bloc with the Trotskyists. I fully subscribe to theseproposals. 
The Bukharinites disagree with this decision. They 
would like to be allowed freedom of factional grouping‹
in defiance of the Party Rules. They would like

J. V. S T A L I N 338 
to be allowed freedom to violate decisions of the Party 
and the C.C.‹in defiance of the vital interests of the 
Party. On what grounds, it may be asked? 
According to them, if rank-and-file Party members 
do not obey C.C. decisions, they must be punished with 
all the severity of Party law; but if so-called leaders, 
members of the Political Bureau, say, violate C.C. decisions, 
not only must they not be punished, they must 
simply not even be criticised, for criticism in such 
a case is qualified by them as ³being put through the 
mill.² 
Obviously, the Party cannot accept this false view. 
If we were to proclaim one law for the leaders and another 
for the ³common people² in the Party, there 
would be nothing left either of the Party or of Party 
discipline. 
They complain of ³being put through the mill.² 
But the hollowness of this complaint is apparent. If 
Bukharin has the right to write such a crassly anti- 
Party article as the ³Notes of an Economist,² then all 
the more have Party members the right to criticise such 
an article. If Bukharin and Tomsky allow themselves 
the right to violate a C.C. decision by stubbornly refusing 
to work in the posts entrusted to them, then all 
the more have Party members the right to criticise 
them for such conduct. If this is what they call ³being 
put through the mill,² then let them explain what they 
understand by the slogan of self-criticism, inner-Party 
democracy, and so on. 
It is said that Lenin would certainly have acted 
more mildly than the C.C. is now acting towards Tomsky 
and Bukharin. That is absolutely untrue. The situation

BUKHARIN¹S GROUP AND THE RIGHT DEVIATION 339 
now is that two members of the Political Bureau systematically 
violate C.C. decisions, stubbornly refuse to 
remain in posts assigned to them by the Party, yet, 
instead of punishing them, the Central Committee of 
the Party has for two months already been trying to 
persuade them to remain in their posts. And‹just 
recall‹how did Lenin act in such cases? You surely 
remember that just for one small error committed by 
Tomsky, Comrade Lenin packed him off to Turkestan. 
Tomsky. With Zinoviev¹s benevolent assistance, and 
partly yours. 
Stalin. If what you mean to say is that Lenin could 
be persuaded to do anything of which he was not himself 
convinced, that can only arouse laughter. . . . Recall 
another fact, for example, the case of Shlyapnikov, 
whose expulsion from the C.C. Lenin recommended 
because he had criticised some draft decision of the 
Supreme Council of National Economy in the Party unit 
of that body. 
Who can deny that Bukharin¹s and Tomsky¹s present 
crimes in grossly violating C.C. decisions and openly 
creating a new opportunist platform against the Party 
are far graver than were the offences of Tomsky and 
Shlyapnikov in the cases mentioned? Yet, not only 
is the Central Committee not demanding that either of 
them should be excluded from the C.C. or be assigned 
to somewhere in Turkestan, but it is confining itself to 
attempts to persuade them to remain in their posts, 
while at the same time, of course, exposing their non- 
Party, and at times downright anti-Party, line. What 
greater mildness do you want?

J. V. S T A L I N 340
Would it not be truer to say that we, the C.C. majority, 
are treating the Bukharinites too liberally and 
tolerantly, and that we are thereby, perhaps, involuntarily 
encouraging their factional anti-Party ³work²? 
Has not the time come to stop this liberalism? 
I recommend that the proposal of the majority of 
the members of this meeting be approved, and that we 
pass to the next business. 
Published for the first time

REPLY TO BILL-BELOTSERKOVSKY 
Comrade Bill-Belotserkovsky, 
I am very late in replying. But better late than 
never. 
1) I consider that to raise the question of ³Rights² 
and ³Lefts² in literature (and, hence, in the theatre also) 
is in itself incorrect. In our country today the concept 
³Right² or ³Left² is a Party concept, properly speaking 
an inner-Party concept. ³Rights² or ³Lefts² are people 
who deviate to one side or the other from the purely 
Party line. It would therefore be strange to apply these 
concepts to such a non-Party and incomparably wider 
sphere as literature, the theatre, and so on. They might 
at a stretch be applied to some Party (communist) circle 
in the field of literature. Within such a circle there 
might be ³Rights² and ³Lefts.² But to apply them to 
literature, at the present stage of its development, where 
there are trends of every description, even anti-Soviet and 
downright counter-revolutionary trends, would be turning 
all concepts topsy-turvy. It would be truer in the 
case of literature to use class terms, or even the terms 
³Soviet,² ³anti-Soviet,² ³revolutionary,² ³anti-revolutionary,² 
etc.

J. V. S T A L I N 342 
2) It follows from this that I cannot regard ³Golovanovism²
69 either as a ³Right² or a ³Left² danger‹it 
lies outside the bounds of Party trends. ³Golovanovism² 
is a phenomenon of an anti-Soviet order. It does not 
of course follow from this that Golovanov himself is 
incorrigible, that he cannot rid himself of his errors, 
that he has to be hounded and persecuted even when 
he is prepared to renounce his errors, that he must be 
forced in this way to leave the country. 
Or take, for example, Bulgakov¹s ³Flight,² which 
likewise cannot be regarded as a manifestation either 
of a ³Left² or a ³Right² danger. ³Flight² is the manifestation 
of an attempt to evoke pity, if not sympathy, 
for certain sections of the anti-Soviet émigrés‹hence, 
an attempt to justify or semi-justify whiteguardism. 
In its present form, ³Flight² is an anti-Soviet phenomenon. 
However, I should have nothing against the staging 
of ³Flight,² if to his eight dreams Bulgakov were to 
add one or two others, where he depicted the inner 
social mainsprings of the civil war in the U.S.S.R., so 
that the audience might understand that all these 
Seraphims and all sorts of university lecturers, who are 
³honest² in their own way, were ejected from Russia not 
by the caprice of the Bolsheviks, but because (in spite 
of their ³honesty²) they were sitting on the necks of the 
people, that, in expelling these ³honest² supporters 
of exploitation, the Bolsheviks were carrying out the 
will of the workers and peasants and were therefore 
acting quite rightly. 
3) Why are Bulgakov¹s plays staged so often? Presumably 
because we have not enough of our own plays

REPLY TO BILL-BELOTSERKOVSKY 343 
suitable for staging. For lack of the genuine article, 
even ³Days of the Turbins² is accepted instead. Of 
course, it is very easy to ³criticise² and to demand the 
banning of non-proletarian literature. But what is 
easiest must not be considered the best. It is not a 
matter of banning but of step by step ousting the 
old and new non-proletarian trash from the stage by 
competing against it, by creating genuine, interesting, 
artistic Soviet plays capable of replacing it. Competition 
is a big and serious matter, because only in an 
atmosphere of competition can we arrive at the formation 
and crystallisation of our proletarian literature. 
As to ³Days of the Turbins² itself, it is not such 
a bad play, because it does more good than harm. Don¹t 
forget that the chief impression it leaves with the spectator 
is one that is favourable to the Bolsheviks: ³If 
even such people as the Turbins are compelled to lay 
down their arms and submit to the will of the people 
because they realise that their cause is definitely lost, 
then the Bolsheviks must be invincible and there is 
nothing to be done about it.² ³Days of the Turbins² is a 
demonstration of the all-conquering power of Bolshevism. 
Of course, the author is altogether ³innocent² of 
this demonstration. But that is not our affair. 
4) It is true that Comrade Svidersky very often commits 
the most incredible mistakes and distortions. 
But it is also true that the Repertory Committee in its 
work commits at least as many mistakes, though of an 
opposite nature. Recall ³Crimson Island,² ³Conspiracy 
of the Equals² and the similar trash that for some

J. V. S T A L I N 344 
reason or other is so readily sanctioned for the really 
bourgeois Kamerny Theatre. 
5) As to the ³rumours² about ³liberalism,² let us 
rather not talk about that‹you would do better to 
leave ³rumours² to the gossiping wives of Moscow 
traders. 
J. Stalin 
February 2, 1929 
Published for the first time

TO THE WORKING MEN AND WOMEN 
OF THE KRASNY TREUGOLNIK FACTORY 
Dear Comrades, Working Men and Women of Krasny 
Treugolnik, accept my friendly congratulations on 
the introduction of the seven-hour day at the Krasny 
Treugolnik factory. 
Your brothers and sisters in the capitalist countries 
work ten, twelve and fourteen hours a day. We, the working 
men and women of our workers¹ and peasants¹ 
state, will from now on work seven hours a day. 
Let it be known to all that the workers of the 
U.S.S.R. stand in the foremost ranks of the workingclass 
of the world! 
May our banner‹the banner of the building of socialism‹
become the banner of the workers of all countries! 
Accept my apologies for not being able to be present 
personally at your celebrations. 
J. Stalin 
February 2, 1929 
Leningradskaya Pravda, No. 28, 
February 3, 1929

TELEGRAM TO THE RED ARMY MEN, 
COMMANDERS AND POLITICAL OFFICERS 
OF THE FIRST RED CAVALRY DIVISION, 
PROSKUROV70 
Fraternal greetings to the Red Army men, commanders 
and political officers of the First Red Cossack 
Regiment of the Red Cavalry Division. I wish you 
success in your work and victory over the enemies of 
the workers and peasants. 
Stalin 
February 22, 1929 
Published for the first time

GREETINGS TO SELSKOKHOZYAISTVENNAYA 
GAZETA 
Greetings and best wishes to Selskokhozyaistvennaya 
Gazeta71! I wish it success in its work of investigating 
and elucidating questions of the development of agriculture 
on the basis of Marxist-Leninist theory. 
Let us hope that it will become an organising centre 
of the active builders who are furthering the difficult 
work of the socialist reconstruction of our agriculture. 
J. Stalin 
Selskokhozyaistvennaya Gazeta, No. 1, 
March 1, 1929

THE NATIONAL QUESTION 
AND LENINISM 
Reply to Comrades Meshkov, Kovalchuk, 
and Others 
I have received your letters. They are similar to 
a number of letters on the same subject I have received 
from other comrades during the past few months. I have 
decided, however, to answer you particularly, because 
you put things more bluntly and thereby help the achievement 
of clarity. True, the answers you give in your 
letters to the questions raised are wrong, but that is 
another matter‹of that we shall speak below. 
Let us get down to business. 
1. THE CONCEPT ³NATION² 
The Russian Marxists have long had their theory 
of the nation. According to this theory, a nation is a 
historically constituted, stable community of people, 
formed on the basis of the common possession of four 
principal characteristics, namely: a common language, a 
common territory, a common economic life, and a common 
psychological make-up manifested in common specific 
features of national culture. This theory, as we 
know, has received general recognition in our Party. 
It is evident from your letters that you consider 
this theory inadequate. You therefore propose that the

THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND LENINISM 349 
four characteristics of a nation be supplemented by a fifth, 
namely, that a nation possesses its own, separate national 
state. You consider that there is not and cannot 
be a nation unless this fifth characteristic is present. 
I think that the scheme you propose, with its new, 
fifth characteristic of the concept ³nation,² is profoundly 
mistaken and cannot be justified either theoretically 
or in practice, politically. 
According to your scheme, only such nations are 
to be recognised as nations as have their own state, separate 
from others, whereas all oppressed nations which 
have no independent statehood would have to be deleted 
from the category of nations; moreover, the struggle of 
oppressed nations against national oppression and the 
struggle of colonial peoples against imperialism would 
have to be excluded from the concept ³national movement² 
and ³national-liberation movement.² 
More than that. According to your scheme we would 
have to assert: 
a) that the Irish became a nation only after the 
formation of the ³Irish Free State,² and that before 
that they did not constitute a nation; 
b) that the Norwegians were not a nation before 
Norway¹s secession from Sweden, and became a nation 
only after that secession; 
c) that the Ukrainians were not a nation when the 
Ukraine formed part of tsarist Russia; that they became 
a nation only after they seceded from Soviet Russia 
under the Central Rada and Hetman Skoropadsky, but 
again ceased to be a nation after they united their 
Ukrainian Soviet Republic with the other Soviet Republics 
to form the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

J. V. S T A L I N 350 
A great many such examples could be cited. 
Obviously, a scheme which leads to such absurd 
conclusions cannot be regarded as a scientific scheme. 
In practice, politically, your scheme inevitably 
leads to the justification of national, imperialist oppression, 
whose exponents emphatically refuse to recognise 
as real nations oppressed and unequal nations which 
have no separate national state of their own, and consider 
that this circumstance gives them the right to 
oppress these nations. 
That is apart from the fact that your scheme provides 
a justification for the bourgeois nationalists in 
our Soviet Republics who argue that the Soviet nations 
ceased to be nations when they agreed to unite their 
national Soviet Republics into a Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics. 
That is how matters stand with regard to ³supplementing² 
and ³amending² the Russian Marxist theory 
of the nation. 
Only one thing remains, and that is to admit that 
the Russian Marxist theory of the nation is the only 
correct theory. 
2. THE RISE AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF NATIONS 
One of the grave mistakes you make is that you lump 
together all existing nations and fail to see any fundamental 
difference between them. 
There are different kinds of nations. There are nations 
which developed in the epoch of rising capital

THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND LENINISM 351 
ism, when the bourgeoisie, destroying feudalism and 
feudal disunity, gathered the parts of nations together 
and cemented them. These are the so-called ³modern² 
nations. 
You assert that nations arose and existed before 
capitalism. But how could nations have arisen and existed 
before capitalism, in the period of feudalism, 
when countries were split up into separate, independent 
principalities, which, far from being bound together by 
national ties, emphatically denied the necessity for 
such ties? Your erroneous assertions notwithstanding, 
there were no nations in the pre-capitalist period, nor 
could there be, because there were as yet no national 
markets and no economic or cultural national centres, 
and, consequently, there were none of the factors which 
put an end to the economic disunity of a given people 
and draw its hitherto disunited parts together into one 
national whole. 
Of course, the elements of nationhood‹language, 
territory, common culture, etc.‹did not fall from the 
skies, but were being formed gradually, even in the precapitalist 
period. But these elements were in a rudimentary 
state and, at best, were only a potentiality, 
that is, they constituted the possibility of the formation 
of a nation in the future, given certain favourable conditions. 
The potentiality became a reality only in the period 
of rising capitalism, with its national market and 
its economic and cultural centres. 
In this connection it would be well to recall the 
remarkable words of Lenin on the subject of the rise 
of nations, contained in his pamphlet What the ³Friendsof 
the People² Are and How They Fight the Social

J. V. S T A L I N 352 
Democrats. Controverting the Narodnik Mikhailovsky, 
who derived the rise of nationalities and national unity 
from the development of gentile ties, Lenin says: 
³And so, national ties are a continuation and generalisation 
of gentile ties! Mr. Mikhailovsky, evidently, borrows his ideas 
of the history of society from the fairy-tale that is taught to schoolboys. 
The history of society‹this copybook doctrine runs‹is 
that first there was the family, that nucleus of all society . . . 
then the family grew into the tribe, and the tribe grew into the 
state. If Mr. Mikhailovsky solemnly repeats this childish nonsense, 
it only goes to show‹apart from everything else‹that 
he has not the slightest notion of the course even of Russian history. 
While one might speak of gentile life in ancient Rus, there can 
be no doubt that by the Middle Ages, the era of the Muscovite 
tsars, these gentile ties no longer existed, that is to say, the state 
was based not at all on gentile unions but on territorial unions: 
the landlords and the monasteries took their peasants from various 
localities, and the village communities thus formed were 
purely territorial unions. But one could hardly speak of national 
ties in the true sense of the word at that time: the state was divided 
into separate lands, sometimes even principalities, which preserved 
strong traces of former autonomy, peculiarities of administration, 
at times their own troops (the local boyars went to 
war at the head of their own companies), their own customs borders, 
and so forth. Only the modern period of Russian history 
(beginning approximately with the seventeenth century) is characterised 
by an actual merging of al l such regions, lands 
and principalities into a single whole. This merging, most 
esteemed Mr. Mikhailovsky, was not brought about by gentile 
ties, nor even by their continuation and generalisation: it was 
brought about by the growth of exchange between regions, the 
gradual growth of commodity circulation and the concentration 
of the small local markets into a single, all-Russian market. Since 
the leaders and masters of this process were the merchant capitalists, 
the creation of these national ties was nothing but the creation 
of bourgeois ties² (see Vol. 1, pp. 72-7372).

THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND LENINISM 353 
That is how matters stand with regard to the rise 
of the so-called ³modern² nations. 
The bourgeoisie and its nationalist parties were 
throughout this period the chief leading force of such 
nations. Class peace within the nation for the sake of 
³national unity²; expansion of the territory of one¹s own 
nation by seizure of the national territories of others; 
distrust and hatred of other nations, suppression of 
national minorities; a united front with imperialism‹ 
such is the ideological, social and political stock-intrade 
of these nations. 
Such nations must be qualified as bourgeois nations. 
Examples are the French, British, Italian, North- 
American and other similar nations. The Russian, Ukrainian, 
Tatar, Armenian, Georgian and other nations in 
Russia were likewise bourgeois nations before the establishment 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat and the 
Soviet system in our country. 
Naturally, the fate of such nations is linked with 
the fate of capitalism; with the fall of capitalism, such nations 
must depart from the scene. 
It is precisely such bourgeois nations that Stalin¹s 
pamphlet Marxism and the National Question has in mind 
when it says that ³a nation is not merely a historical category 
but a historical category belonging to a definite 
epoch, the epoch of rising capitalism,² that ³the fate of 
a national movement, which is essentially a bourgeois 
movement, is naturally bound up with the fate of the 
bourgeoisie,² that ³the final disappearance of a national 
movement is possible only with the downfall of the bourgeoisie,² 
and that ³only under the reign of socialism 
can peace be fully established.²73

J. V. S T A L I N 354 
That is how matters stand with regard to the bourgeois 
nations. 
But there are other nations. These are the new, 
Soviet nations, which developed and took shape on the 
basis of the old, bourgeois nations after the overthrow 
of capitalism in Russia, after the elimination of the 
bourgeoisie and its nationalist parties, after the establishment 
of the Soviet system. 
The working class and its internationalist party 
are the force that cements these new nations and leads 
them. An alliance between the working class and the 
working peasantry within the nation for the elimination 
of the survivals of capitalism in order that socialism 
may be built triumphantly; abolition of the survivals 
of national oppression in order that the nations and national 
minorities may be equal and may develop freely; 
elimination of the survivals of nationalism in order 
that friendship may be knit between the peoples and 
internationalism firmly established; a united front with 
a l l oppressed and unequal nations in the struggle 
against the policy of annexation and wars of annexation, 
in the struggle against imperialism‹such is the 
spiritual, and social and political complexion of 
these nations. 
Such nations must be qualified as socialist nations. 
These new nations arose and developed on the basis 
of old, bourgeois nations, as a result of the elimination 
of capitalism‹by their radical transformation on 
socialist lines. Nobody can deny that the present socialist 
nations of the Soviet Union‹the Russian, Ukrainian, 
Byelorussian, Tatar, Bashkir, Uzbek, Kazakh, 
Azerbaijanian, Georgian, Armenian and other nations‹

THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND LENINISM 355 
differ radically from the corresponding old, bourgeois 
nations of the old Russia both in class composition and 
spiritual complexion and in social and political interests 
and aspirations. 
Such are the two types of nations known to history. 
You do not agree with linking the fate of nations, in 
this case the old, bourgeois nations, with the fate of 
capitalism. You do not agree with the thesis that, with 
the elimination of capitalism, the old, bourgeois nations 
will be eliminated. But with what indeed could 
the fate of these nations be linked if not with the fate 
of capitalism? Is it so difficult to understand that when 
capitalism disappears, the bourgeois nations it gave 
rise to must also disappear? Surely, you do not think 
that the old, bourgeois nations can exist and develop 
under the Soviet system, under the dictatorship of the 
proletariat? That would be the last straw. . . . 
You are afraid that the elimination of the nations 
existing under capitalism is tantamount to the elimination 
of nations in general, to the elimination of all 
nations. Why, on what grounds? Are you really unaware 
of the fact that, besides bourgeois nations, there are 
other nations, socialist nations, which are much more 
solidly united and capable of surviving than any bourgeois 
nation? 
Your mistake lies precisely in the fact that you 
see no other nations except bourgeois nations, and, consequently, 
you have overlooked the whole epoch of formation 
of socialist nations in the Soviet Union, nations 
which arose on the ruins of the old, bourgeois nations. 
The fact of the matter is that the elimination of 
the bourgeois nations signifies the elimination not of

J. V. S T A L I N 356 
nations in general, but only of the bourgeois nations. 
On the ruins of the old, bourgeois nations new, socialist 
nations are arising and developing, and they are 
far more solidly united than any bourgeois nation, because 
they are exempt from the irreconcilable class contradictions 
that corrode the bourgeois nations, and are 
far more representative of the whole people than any 
bourgeois nation. 
3. THE FUTURE OF NATIONS 
AND OF NATIONAL LANGUAGES 
You commit a grave error in putting a sign of 
equality between the period of the victory of socialism in 
one country and the period of the victory of socialism 
on a world scale, in asserting that the disappearance of 
national differences and national languages, the merging 
of nations and the formation of one common language, 
are possible and necessary not only with the victory 
of socialism on a world scale, but also with the victory 
of socialism in one country. Moreover, you confuse entirely 
different things: ³the abolition of national oppression² 
with ³the elimination of national differences,² ³the 
abolition of national state barriers² with ³the dying 
away of nations,² with ³the merging of nations.² 
It must be pointed out that for Marxists to confuse 
these diverse concepts is absolutely impermissible. National 
oppression in our country was abolished long ago, 
but i t by no means follows from this that national 
differences have disappeared and that nations in our 
country have been eliminated. National state barriers, 
together with frontier guards and customs, were

THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND LENINISM 357 
abolished in our country long ago, but it by no means 
follows from this that the nations have already become 
merged and that the national languages have disappeared, 
that these languages have been supplanted by 
some one language common to all our nations. 
You are displeased with the speech I delivered at the 
Communist University of the Peoples of the East 
(1925),74 in which I repudiated the thesis that with 
the victory of socialism in one country, in our country, 
for example, national languages will die away, that the 
nations will be merged, and in place of the national languages 
one common language will appear. 
You consider that this statement of mine contradicts 
Lenin¹s well-known thesis that it is the aim of socialism 
not only to abolish the division of mankind into 
small states and every form of isolation of nations, 
not only to bring the nations closer together, but also 
to merge them. 
You consider, further, that it also contradicts another 
of Lenin¹s theses, namely, that with the victory 
of socialism on a world scale, national differences and 
national languages will begin to die away, that after 
this victory national languages will begin to be supplanted 
by one common language. 
That is quite wrong, comrades. It is a profound illusion. 
I have already said that it is impermissible for Marxists 
to confuse and lump together such diverse phenomena 
as ³the victory of socialism in one country² and 
³the victory of socialism on a world scale.² It should 
not be forgotten that these diverse phenomena reflect 
two entirely different epochs, distinct from one another

J. V. S T A L I N 358 
not only in time (which is very important), but in their 
very nature. 
National distrust, national isolation, national enmity 
and national conflicts are, of course, stimulated 
and fostered not by some ³innate² sentiment of national 
animosity, but by the striving of imperialism to subjugate 
other nations and by the fear inspired in these nations 
by the menace of national enslavement. Undoubtedly, 
so long as world imperialism exists this striving and 
this fear will exist‹and, consequently, national distrust, 
national isolation, national enmity and national 
conflicts will exist in the vast majority of countries. 
Can it be asserted that the victory of socialism and the 
abolition of imperialism in one country signify the 
abolition of imperialism and national oppression in 
the majority of countries? Obviously not. But it follows 
from this that the victory of socialism in one country, 
notwithstanding the fact that i t seriously weakens 
world imperialism, does not and cannot create the 
conditions necessary for the merging of the nations and 
the national languages of the world into one integral 
whole. 
The period of the victory of socialism on a world 
scale differs from the period of the victory of socialism 
in one country primarily in the fact that it will abolish 
imperialism in all countries, will abolish both the striving 
to subjugate other nations and the fear inspired by 
the menace of national enslavement, will radically undermine 
national distrust and national enmity, will unite 
the nations into one world socialist economic system, 
and will thus create the real conditions necessary for the 
gradual merging of all nations into one.

THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND LENINISM 359 
Such is the fundamental difference between these 
two periods. 
But it follows from this that to confuse these two 
different periods and to lump them together is to commit 
an unpardonable mistake. Take the speech I delivered 
at the Communist University of the Toilers of 
the East. There I said: 
³Some people (Kautsky, for instance) talk of the creation of a 
single universal language and the dying away of all other languages 
in the period of socialism. I have little faith in this theory 
of a single, all-embracing language. Experience, at any rate, speaks 
against rather than for such a theory. Until now what has happened 
has been that the socialist revolution has not diminished but rather 
increased the number of languages; for, by stirring up the lowest 
sections of humanity and pushing them on to the political arena, 
it awakens to new life a number of hitherto unknown or littleknown 
nationalities. Who could have imagined that the old, tsarist 
Russia consisted of not less than fifty nations and national groups? 
The October Revolution, however, by breaking the old chains and 
bringing a number of forgotten peoples and nationalities on to 
the scene, gave them new life and a new development.²75 
From this passage it is evident that I was opposing 
people of the type of Kautsky, who always was and 
has remained a dilettante on the national question, who 
does not understand the mechanics of the development of 
nations and has no inkling of the colossal power of stability 
possessed by nations, who believes that the merging 
of nations is possible long before the victory of socialism, 
already under the bourgeois-democratic order, and who, 
servilely praising the assimilating ³work² of the Germans 
in Bohemia, light-mindedly asserts that the Czechs 
are almost Germanised, that, as a nation, the Czechs 
have no future.

J. V. S T A L I N 360 
From this passage it is evident, further, that what I 
had in mind in my speech was not the period of the 
victory of socialism on a world scale, but exclusively 
the period of the victory of socialism in one country. And 
I affirmed (and continue to affirm) that the period of 
the victory of socialism in one country does not create 
the necessary conditions for the merging of nations 
and national languages, that, on the contrary, this period 
creates favourable conditions for the renaissance and 
flourishing of the nations that were formerly oppressed 
by tsarist imperialism and have now been liberated from 
national oppression by the Soviet revolution. 
From this passage it is apparent, lastly, that you 
have overlooked the colossal difference between the two 
different historical periods, that, because of this, you 
have failed to understand the meaning of Stalin¹s 
speech and, as a result, have got lost in the wilderness of 
your own errors. 
Let us pass to Lenin¹s theses on the dying away and 
merging of nations after the victory of socialism on a 
world scale. 
Here is one of Lenin¹s theses, taken from his article, 
³The Socialist Revolution and the Right of Nations to 
Self-Determination,² published in 1916, which, for some 
reason, is not quoted in full in your letters: 
³The aim of socialism is not only to abolish the division 
of mankind into small states and all isolation of nations, not 
only to draw the nations together, but to merge them. . . . 
Just as mankind can arrive at the abolition of classes only by 
passing through a transition period of the dictatorship of the 
oppressed class, so mankind can arrive at the inevitable merging of 
nations only by passing through a transition period of complete

THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND LENINISM 361 
liberation of all the oppressed nations, i.e., of their freedom of 
secession² (see Vol. XIX, p. 4076). 
And here is another thesis of Lenin¹s, which you likewise 
do not quote in full: 
³As long as national and state differences exist among peoples 
and countries‹and these differences will continue to exist 
for a very, very long time even after the dictatorship of the proletariat 
has been established on a world scale‹the unity of international 
tactics of the communist working-class movement of 
all countries demands, not the elimination of variety, not the 
abolition of national differences (that is a foolish dream at the 
present moment), but such an application of the fundamental 
principles of communism (Soviet power and the dictatorship of 
the proletariat) as would correctly modify these principles in certain 
particulars, correctly adapt and apply them to national and 
national-state differences² (Vol. XXV, p. 227). 
It should be noted that this passage is from Lenin¹s 
pamphlet ³Left-Wing² Communism, an Infantile Disorder, 
published in 1920, that is, after the victory of the 
socialist revolution in one country, after the victory of 
socialism in our country. 
From these passages it is evident that Lenin does 
not assign the process of the dying away of national differences 
and the merging of nations to the period of the 
victory of socialism in one country, but exclusively to 
the period after the establishment of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat on a world scale, that is, to the period 
of the victory of socialism in all countries, when the 
foundations of a world socialist economy have already 
been laid. 
From these passages it is evident, further, that the 
attempt to assign the process of the dying away of national 
differences to the period of the victory of socialism

J. V. S T A L I N 362 
in one country, in our country, is qualified by Lenin as 
a ³foolish dream.² 
From these passages it is evident, moreover, that 
Stalin was absolutely right when, in the speech he delivered 
at the Communist University of the Toilers of 
the East, he denied that it was possible for national 
differences and national languages to die away in the 
period of the victory of socialism in one country, in our 
country, and that you were absolutely wrong in upholding 
something that is the direct opposite of Stalin¹s 
thesis. 
From these passages it is evident, lastly, that, in confusing 
the two different periods of the victory of socialism, 
you failed to understand Lenin, distorted Lenin¹s 
line on the national question and, as a consequence, 
involuntarily headed for a rupture with Leninism. 
It would be incorrect to think that after the defeat 
of world imperialism national differences will be abolished 
and national languages will die away immediately, 
at one stroke, by decree from above, so to speak. Nothing 
is more erroneous than this view. To attempt to 
bring about the merging of nations by decree from 
above, by compulsion, would be playing into the hands 
of the imperialists, i t would spell disaster to the 
cause of the liberation of nations, and be fatal to the 
cause of organising co-operation and fraternity among 
nations. Such a policy would be tantamount to a policy 
of assimilation. 
You know, of course, that the policy of assimilation 
is absolutely excluded from the arsenal of Marxism- 
Leninism, as being an anti-popular and counter-revolutionary 
policy, a fatal policy.

THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND LENINISM 363 
Furthermore, we know that nations and national languages 
possess an extraordinary stability and tremendous 
power of resistance to the policy of assimilation. 
The Turkish assimilators‹the most brutal of all assimilators‹
mangled and mutilated the Balkan nations for 
hundreds of years, yet not only did they fail to destroy 
them, but in the end were forced to capitulate. The tsarist-
Russian Russifiers and the German-Prussian Germanisers, 
who yielded little in brutality to the Turkish 
assimilators, rent and mangled the Polish nation for 
over a hundred years, just as the Persian and Turkish 
assimilators for hundreds of years rent and mangled and 
massacred the Armenian and Georgian nations, yet, far 
from destroying these nations, in the end they were also 
forced to capitulate. 
All these circumstances must be taken into account 
in order correctly to forecast the probable course of events 
as regards the development of nations directly after the 
defeat of world imperialism. 
It would be a mistake to think that the first stage 
of the period of the world dictatorship of the proletariat 
will mark the beginning of the dying away of nations 
and national languages, the beginning of the formation 
of one common language. On the contrary, the first 
stage, during which national oppression will be completely 
abolished, will be a stage marked by the growth 
and flourishing of the formerly oppressed nations and 
national languages, the consolidation of equality among 
nations, the elimination of mutual national distrust, 
and the establishment and strengthening of international 
ties among nations. 
Only in the second stage of the period of the world

J. V. S T A L I N 364 
dictatorship of the proletariat, to the extent that a single 
world socialist economy is built up in place of the world 
capitalist economy‹only in that stage will something 
in the nature of a common language begin to take shape; 
for only in that stage will the nations feel the need to 
have, in addition to their own national languages, a 
common international language‹for convenience of 
intercourse and of economic, cultural and political cooperation. 
Consequently, in this stage, national languages 
and a common international language will exist 
side by side. It is possible that, at first, not one world 
economic centre will be formed, common to all nations 
and with one common language, but several zonal economic 
centres for separate groups of nations, with a separate 
common language for each group of nations, and 
that only later will these centres combine into one 
common world socialist economic centre, with one language 
common to all the nations. 
In the next stage of the period of world dictatorship 
of the proletariat‹when the world socialist system 
of economy becomes sufficiently consolidated and socialism 
becomes part and parcel of the life of the peoples, 
and when practice convinces the nations of the 
advantages of a common language over national languages‹
national differences and languages will begin to 
die away and make room for a world language, common 
to all nations. 
Such, in my opinion, is the approximate pictureof 
the future of nations, a picture of the developmentof 
the nations along the path to their merging in thefuture.

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
365 
4. THE POLICY OF THE PARTY 
ON THE NATIONAL QUESTION 
One of your mistakes is that you regard the national 
question not as a part of the general question of the social 
and political development of society, subordinated 
to this general question, but as something self-contained 
and constant, whose direction and character remain 
basically unchanged throughout the course of history. 
Hence you fail to see what every Marxist sees, namely, 
that the national question does not always have one and 
the same character, that the character and tasks of the 
national movement vary with the different periods in 
the development of the revolution. 
Logically, i t is this that explains the deplorable 
fact that you so lightly confuse and lump together diverse 
periods of development of the revolution, and fail 
to understand that the changes in the character and 
tasks of the revolution in the various stages of its development 
give rise to corresponding changes in the character 
and aims of the national question, that in conformity 
with this the Party¹s policy on the national question 
also changes, and that, consequently, the Party¹s 
policy on the national question in one period of development 
of the revolution cannot be violently severed 
from that period and arbitrarily transferred to another 
period. 
The Russian Marxists have always started out from 
the proposition that the national question is a part of 
the general question of the development of the revolution, 
that at different stages of the revolution the national 
question has different aims, corresponding to the 
THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND LENINISM

J. V. S T A L I N 366 
character of the revolution at each given historical 
moment, and that the Party¹s policy on the national 
question changes in conformity with this. 
In the period preceding the First World War, when 
history made a bourgeois-democratic revolution the task 
of the moment in Russia, the Russian Marxists linked 
the solution of the national question with the fate of 
the democratic revolution in Russia. Our Party held that 
the overthrow of tsarism, the elimination of the survivals 
of feudalism, and the complete democratisation 
of the country provided the best solution of the national 
question that was possible within the framework of capitalism. 
Such was the policy of the Party in that period. 
It is to this period that Lenin¹s well-known articles 
on the national question belong, including the article 
³Critical Remarks on the National Question² where 
Lenin says: 
³. . . I assert that there is only one solution of the national 
question, in so far as one is possible at all in the capitalist world‹ 
and that solution is consistent democratism. In proof, I would 
cite, among others, Switzerland² (vol. XVII, p. 15077). 
To this same period belongs Stalin¹s pamphlet, Marxism 
and the National Question, which among other 
things says: 
³The final disappearance of a national movement is possible 
only with the downfall of the bourgeoisie. Only under the reign 
of socialism can peace be fully established. But even within the 
framework of capitalism it is possible to reduce the national struggle 
to a minimum to undermine it at the root, to render it as 
harmless as possible to the proletariat. This is borne out, for example, 
by Switzerland and America. It requires that the country

THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND LENINISM 367 
should be democratised and the nations be given the opportunity 
of free development.²78 
In the next period, the period of the First World 
War, when the prolonged war between the two imperialist 
coalitions undermined the might of world imperialism, 
when the crisis of the world capitalist system 
reached an extreme degree, when, alongside the working 
class of the ³metropolitan countries,² the colonial and 
dependent countries also joined the movement for emancipation, 
when the national question grew into the national 
and colonial question, when the united front of the 
working class of the advanced capitalist countries and 
of the oppressed peoples of the colonies and dependent 
countries began to be a real force, when, consequently, 
the socialist revolution became the question of the moment, 
the Russian Marxists could no longer content themselves 
with the policy of the preceding period, and they 
found it necessary to link the solution of the national 
and colonial question with the fate of the socialist revolution. 
The Party held that the overthrow of the power of capital 
and the organisation of the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
the expulsion of the imperialist troops from the 
colonial and dependent countries and the securing of the 
right of these countries to secede and to form their own 
national states, the elimination of national enmity and 
nationalism and the strengthening of international ties 
between peoples, the organisation of a single socialist 
national economy and the establishment on this basis 
of fraternal co-operation among peoples, constituted the 
best solution of the national and colonial question under 
the given conditions.

J. V. S T A L I N 368 
Such was the policy of the Party in that period. 
That period is still far from having entered into full 
force, for it has only just begun; but there is no doubt 
that it will yet have its decisive word to say. . . . 
A question apart is the present period of development 
of the revolution in our country and the present 
policy of the Party. 
It should be noted that so far our country has proved 
to be the only one ready to overthrow capitalism. And 
it really has overthrown capitalism and organised the 
dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Consequently, we still have a long way to go to the 
establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat on 
a world scale, and still more to the victory of socialism 
in all countries. 
It should be noted, further, that in putting an end 
to the rule of the bourgeoisie, which has long since 
abandoned its old democratic traditions, we, in passing, 
solved the problem of the ³complete democratisation 
of the country, ² abolished the system of national 
oppression and established equality of nations in our 
country. 
As we know, these measures proved to be the best 
way of eliminating nationalism and national enmity, 
and of establishing mutual confidence among the peoples. 
It should be noted, lastly, that the abolition of national 
oppression led to the national revival of the formerly 
oppressed nations of our country, to the development 
of their national cultures, to the strengthening 
of friendly, international ties among the peoples of our 
country and to their mutual co-operation in the work 
of building socialism.

THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND LENINISM 369 
It should be borne in mind that these regenerated 
nations are not the old, bourgeois nations, led by the 
bourgeoisie, but new, socialist nations, which have arisen 
on the ruins of the old nations and are led by the internationalist 
party of the labouring masses. 
In view of this, the Party considered it necessary to 
help the regenerated nations of our country to rise to their 
feet and attain their full stature, to revive and develop 
their national cultures, widely to develop schools, theatres 
and other cultural institutions functioning in the 
native languages, to nationalise‹that is, to staff with 
members of the given nation‹the Party, trade-union, 
co-operative, state and economic apparatuses, to train 
their own, national, Party and Soviet cadres, and to 
curb all elements‹who are, indeed, few in number‹that 
try to hinder this policy of the Party. 
This means that the Party supports, and will continue 
to support, the development and flourishing of the national 
cultures of the peoples of our country, that it will 
encourage the strengthening of our new, socialist nations, 
that it takes this matter under its protection and 
guardianship against anti-Leninist elements of any 
kind. 
It is apparent from your letters that you do not 
approve this policy of our Party. That is because, 
firstly, you confuse the new, socialist nations with 
the old, bourgeois nations and do not understand that 
the national cultures of our new, Soviet nations are in 
content socialist cultures. Secondly, it is because‹you 
will excuse my bluntness‹you have a very poor grasp 
of Leninism and are badly at sea on the national 
question.

J. V. S T A L I N 370 
Consider, by way of example, the following elementary 
matter. We all say that a cultural revolution is 
needed in our country. If we mean this seriously and are 
not merely indulging in idle chatter, then we must 
take at least the first step in this direction: namely, we 
must make primary education, and later secondary education, 
compulsory for all citizens of the country, irrespective 
of their nationality. It is obvious that without 
this no cultural development whatever, let alone the socalled 
cultural revolution, will be possible in our country. 
More, without this there will be neither any real 
progress of our industry and agriculture, nor any reliable 
defence of our country. 
But how is this to be done, bearing in mind that 
the percentage of illiteracy in our country is still very 
high, that in a number of nations of our country there 
are 80-90 per cent of illiterates? 
What is needed is to cover the country with an extensive 
network of schools functioning in the native languages, 
and to supply them with staffs of teachers who 
know the native languages. 
What is needed is to nationalise‹that is, to staff 
with members of the given nation‹all the administrative 
apparatus, from Party and trade-union to state and 
economic. 
What is needed is widely to develop the press, the 
theatre, the cinema and other cultural institutions functioning 
in the native languages. 
Why in the native languages?‹it may be asked. 
Because only in their native, national languages can the 
vast masses of the people be successful in cultural, 
political and economic development.

THE NATIONAL QUESTION AND LENINISM 371 
In view of all that has been said, I think it should 
not he so difficult to understand that Leninists cannot 
pursue any other policy on the national question than 
the one which is now being pursued in our country‹ 
provided, of course, they want to remain Leninists. 
Is not that so? 
Well, then let us leave it at that. 
I think I have answered all your questions and 
doubts. 
With communist greetings, 
J. Stalin 
March 18, 1929 
Published for the first time


N O T E S 
1 During his journey in Siberia, lasting from January 15 to February 
6. 1928, J. V. Stalin visited the principal grain-growing 
regions. He attended a meeting of the Bureau of the Siberian 
Territorial Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) in Novosibirsk, 
meetings of the bureaux of okrug committees of the C.P.S.U.(B.), 
and conferences of the actives of the Barnaul, Biisk. Rubtsovsk 
and Omsk okrug Party organisations, together with representatives 
of the Soviets and the procurement bodies. Thanks to 
the political and organisational measures carried out by 
J. V. Stalin, the Siberian Party organisations were able to 
ensure fulfilment of the grain procurement plan. p. 3 
2 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, p. 51. p. 10 
3 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, p. 465. p. 10 
4 The Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) took place in Moscow, 
December 2-19, 1927. The congress discussed the political 
and organisational reports of the Central Committee, the reports 
of the Central Auditing Commission of the Central Control 
Commission and Workers¹ and Peasants¹ Inspection, and 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the Executive Committee 
of the Comintern; it also discussed the directives for the drawing 
up of a five-year plan for the development of the national 
economy and a report on work in the countryside; it 
heard the report of the congress commission on the question 
of the opposition and elected the central bodies of the Party. 
On December 3, J. V. Stalin delivered the political report of 
the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and on December 7 
he replied to the discussion. On December 12, the congress 
elected J. V. Stalin a member of the commission for drafting

NOTES 374 
the resolution on the report about the work of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
delegation in the Executive Committee of the Comintern. The 
congress approved the political and organisational line of the 
Party¹s Central Committee and instructed it to continue to 
pursue a policy of peace and of strengthening the defence capacity 
of the U.S.S.R., to continue with unrelaxing tempo the 
socialist industrialisation of the country, to extend and strengthen 
the socialist sector in town and countryside and to steer 
a course towards eliminating the capitalist elements from the 
national economy. The congress gave instructions for the drawing 
up of the First Five-Year Plan for the Development of the 
National Economy of the U.S.S.R. The congress passed a resolution 
calling for the fullest development of the collectivisation 
of agriculture, outlined a plan for the extension of collective 
farms and state farms and indicated the methods of fighting 
for the collectivisation of agriculture. The Fifteenth Congress 
has gone into the history of the Party as the Collectivisation 
of Agriculture Congress. In its decisions on the opposition, 
directed towards the liquidation of the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc, the 
congress noted that the disagreements between the Party and the 
opposition had developed into programmatic disagreements, 
that the Trotskyist opposition had taken the path of anti-Soviet 
struggle, and declared that adherence to the Trotskyist 
opposition and the propagation of its views were incompatible 
with membership of the Bolshevik Party. The congress approved 
the decision of the joint meeting of the Central Committee 
and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) of November 
1927 to expel Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party 
and decided to expel from the Party all active members of 
the Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc. (On the Fifteenth Congress of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.), see History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course, 
Moscow 1954, pp. 447-49. For the resolutions and decisions 
of the congress, see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, 
Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 
1953, pp. 313-71.) p. 11 
5 See Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, p. 355. 
p. 11

NOTES 375 
6 This refers to the discussion forced upon the Party by the 
Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition bloc. A general Party discussion 
was proclaimed by the Central Committee in October 1927, 
two months before the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B). 
For the discussion, see History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short 
Course, Moscow 1954, p. 442. p. 15 
7 See Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, p. 362. 
p. 17 
8 The joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), with 
participation of members of the Central Auditing Commission, 
was held on April 6-11, 1928. It discussed the grain procurements 
in the current year and the organisation of the grain procurement 
campaign in 1928-29, the report of a commission set 
up by the Political Bureau on practical measures for eliminating 
the shortcomings revealed by the Shakthy affair, and the plan 
of work of the Political Bureau and plenum of the Central Committee 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.) for 1928. At a meeting of the plenum 
on April 10, J. V. Stalin spoke on the report of the Political 
Bureau commission and was elected to a commission set 
up for the final drafting of the resolution on the Shakhty affair 
and on the practical tasks of the fight against shortcomings 
in the work of economic construction. The plenum adopted 
a special resolution providing for the sending every year of 
members of the Central Committee and of the Presidium of the 
C.C.C. and other leading personnel to the localities in order 
to strengthen the fight against shortcomings in local work and 
to improve practical guidance by the central bodies. (For the 
resolutions of the plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), 
see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 
372-90) p. 30 
9 This refers to the sabotage activities of a counter-revolutionary 
organisation of bourgeois experts in Shakhty and other 
Donbas areas which was discovered in the early part of 1928

NOTES 376 
For the Shakhty affair, see pp. 38, 57-68 in this volume, and 
History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course, Moscow 1954, p. 454. 
p. 30 
10 The Bulletin of the Workers¹ and Peasants¹ Inspection was published 
periodically in Pravda from March 15, 1928, to November 
28, 1933. Its object was to enlist the co-operation of the 
broad masses of the working people in the fight against bureaucracy. 
p. 35 
11 Komsomolskaya Pravda (Y.C.L. Truth)‹daily organ of the 
Central Committee and Moscow Committee of the All-Union 
Leninist Young Communist League, published from May 24, 
1925. p. 36 
12 V. I. Lenin, Letter to V. M. Molotov on a Plan for the Political 
Report at the Eleventh Party Congress (see Works, 4th 
Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 223-24). p. 40 
13 The Eighth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.), held in Moscow, March 
18-23, 1919, defined the Party¹s new policy towards the middle 
peasant‹a policy of stable alliance with him‹the principles 
of which were outlined by Lenin in his report on work in 
the countryside (see V. I . Lenin, Works , 4th Russ. ed., 
Vol. 29, pp. 175-96, and History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short 
Course, Moscow 1954, pp. 361-67). p. 51 
14 This refers to Circular No. 33, March 29, 1926, of the Supreme 
Council of National Economy of the U.S.S.R. on ³Organisation 
of the Management of Industrial Establishments² and the accompanying 
³General Regulations on the Rights and Duties 
of Technical Directors of Factories in the Metallurgical and 
Electro-technical Industries.² p. 62 
15 The Eighth Congress of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist 
League was held in Moscow, May 5-16, 1928. It discussed 
the results and prospects of socialist construction and 
the tasks of communist education of the youth; reports of the Central 
Committee and Central Auditing Commission of the Y.C.L.;

NOTES 377 
the report of the Y.C.L. delegation in the Communist 
Youth International; work and education of the youth in connection 
with the five-year plan of development of the national 
economy; work of the Y.C.L. among children, and other 
questions. J. V. Stalin delivered a speech at the final sitting 
of the Congress on May 16. p. 70 
16 This refers to the message of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) entitled 
³For the Socialist Reconstruction of the Countryside (Principal 
Tasks of Departments for Work in the Countryside),² 
addressed to the Central Committees of all the national Communist 
Parties, to the bureaux of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), and 
to the territorial, regional, gubernia, okrug and uyezd committees 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.). The message was signed by V. M. Molotov 
as Secretary of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and published in Pravda, 
No. 112, May 16, 1928. p. 79 
17 In 1918, on the initiative of Y. M. Sverdlov, short-term agitation 
and propaganda courses were organised under the auspices 
of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. In January 
1919 they were renamed the School of Soviet Work. This school 
formed the basis of the Central School of Soviet and Party 
Work, instituted by decision of the Eighth Congress of the 
R.C.P.(B.). In the latter half of 1919 the Central School was 
transformed into the Y. M. Sverdlov Communist University. 
The tenth anniversary of the Sverdlov University was celebrated 
on May 28, 1928. p. 84 
18 The Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was held in Moscow, 
December 18-31, 1925. J. V. Stalin delivered the political 
report of the Central Committee. The congress put as the central 
task of the Party the struggle for the socialist industrialisation 
of the country, as being the basis for building socialism 
in the U.S.S.R. In its resolutions, the congress stressed the importance 
of further strengthening the alliance between the working 
class and the middle peasants, while relying on the poor 
peasants in the struggle against the kulaks. The congress pointed 
to the necessity of supporting and furthering the development 
of agriculture by means of more efficient farming methods and

NOTES 378 
drawing an ever greater number of the peasant farms, through 
the co-operatives, into the channel of socialist construction. 
(For the resolutions and decisions of the congress, see Resolutions 
and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and 
Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 73-137. For 
the Fourteenth Congress, see History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), 
Short Course, Moscow 1954, pp. 428-33.) p. 96 
19 This refers to V. I. Lenin¹s report on ³Five Years of the Russian 
Revolution and Prospects of the World Revolution² at 
the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, held from November 5 
to December 5, 1922 (see V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed. 
Vol. 33, pp. 380-94). p. 98 
20 This refers to V. I. Lenin¹s report on ³The Tactics of the 
R.C.P.² at the Third Congress of the Comintern, held from 
June 22 to July 12, 1921 (see V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. 
ed., Vol. 32, pp. 454-72). p. 100 
21 This refers to the appeal of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) ³To All 
Party Members, to Al l Workers,² published in Pravda, 
No. 128, June 3, 1928. p. 103 
22 V. I. Lenin, ³Valuable Admissions of Pitirim Sorokin² (see 
Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 28, p. 171). p. 105 
23 See Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part I, 1953, p. 425. 
p. 108 
24 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, p. 183. p. 111 
25 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, p. 139. p. 116 
26 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, pp. 193, 194, 
196. p. 117

NOTES 379 
27 The Sixteenth Moscow Gubernia Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
was held on November 20-28, 1927. At the morning sitting on 
November 23, J. V. Stalin spoke on ³The Party and the Opposition² 
(see Works, Vol. 10, pp. 257-74). p. 118 
28 These words from Dante¹s Divine Comedy were quoted by 
Marx as a motto in the preface to the first German edition of 
Capital (see K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, 
Moscow 1951, p. 410). p. 120 
29 See Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, p. 315. 
p. 122 
30 See Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part I I , 1953, 
pp. 372-80. p. 124 
31 See Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, p. 352. 
p. 126 
32 See Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, p. 355. 
p. 126 
33 See Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, p. 342. 
p. 127 
34 See Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part I, 1953, pp. 447, 
448. p. 132 
35 K. Marx, The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte (see 
K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, Moscow 1951, 
p. 228). p. 133 
36 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 7, p. 190. p. 134

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
NOTES 380 
37 See Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, p. 390. 
p. 137 
38 Birzhovka (Birzheviye Vedomosti‹Stock Exchange News)‹a 
bourgeois newspaper founded in St. Petersburg in 1880. Its 
unscrupulousness and venality made its name a by-word. 
At the end of October 1917 it was shut down by the Revolutionary 
Military Committee of the Petrograd Soviet.
p. 142 
39 The plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), July 4-12, 1928, heard 
and took note of an information report on the questions to 
be discussed by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, and approved 
in principle the draft programme of the Comintern. It 
adopted resolutions on grain procurement policy in connection 
with the general economic situation, on the organisation of 
new (grain) state farms, and on improving the training of new 
experts. At the sittings on July 5, 9 and 11, J. V. Stalin delivered 
the speeches which are published in this volume. (For 
the resolutions of the plenum, see Resolutions and Decisions 
of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee 
Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 391-404.) p. 145 
40 The draft programme of the Communist International, which 
had been discussed at the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 
in July 1928, was drawn up by the Programme Commission 
appointed by the Fifth Congress of the Comintern (June-July 
1924). J. V. Stalin was a member of the commission and directed 
the drafting of the programme. The draft, adopted by 
the Programme Commission of the E.C.C.I. on May 25, 1928 
and approved by the July plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), 
formed the basis of the Programme of the Communist International 
endorsed by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern 
(July-September 1928). Regarding the draft programme, see 
pp. 211-13 in this volume. p. 147 
41 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 27, pp. 207-46. 
p. 153

NOTES 381 
42 A Soviet Republic was proclaimed in Hungary on March 21, 
1919. Its position from the very first was a very difficult one. 
The country was in the throes of a severe financial and food 
crisis, and had to contend with internal counter-revolution 
and with the Entente, which organised an economic blockade 
of Soviet Hungary and armed intervention. The Hungarian 
Social-Democrats who had joined the government of the 
Hungarian Republic conducted treasonable undermining activities 
in the rear and at the front, and negotiated with Entente 
agents for the overthrow of the Soviet power. In August 1919 the 
Hungarian revolution was crushed by the joint efforts of the 
internal counter-revolution and the forces of intervention. 
p. 154 
43 This refers to the profound revolutionary crisis in Germany 
in the autumn of 1923, when, as the result of a powerful revolutionary 
movement, workers¹ governments were set up in 
Saxony and Thuringia and an armed uprising of the workers 
took place in Hamburg. However, the revolution of 1923 in 
Germany was defeated. p. 154 
44 V. I. Lenin, ³Preliminary Draft of Theses on the Agrarian Question² 
(see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 129-41). p. 156 
45 See Draft Programme of the Communist International, Moscow 
and Leningrad, 1928, p. 52; see also V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th 
Russ. ed., Vol. 30, pp. 75-76, and Vol. 31, p. 27. p. 160 
46 The Sixth Congress of the Comintern was held in Moscow, July 
17-September 1, 1928. It discussed a report on the activities 
of the E.C.C.I. and reports of the Executive Committee of the 
Communist Youth International and of the International Control 
Commission, measures for combating the danger of imperialist 
wars, the programme of the Communist International, the 
revolutionary movement in the colonies and semi-colonies, 
the economic situation in the U.S.S.R. and the situation in the 
C.P.S.U.(B.), and endorsed the Rules of the Comintern. The 
congress drew attention to the growth of the internal contra

NOTES 382 
dictions of capitalism, which were inevitably leading to a 
further shaking of the capitalist stabilisation and to a sharp accentuation 
of the general crisis of capitalism. The congress defined 
the tasks of the Communist International springing from the 
new conditions of the working-class struggle. In its resolution 
on the situation in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and 
in the C.P.S.U.(B.), the congress took note of the achievements 
of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and their importance 
in strengthening the revolutionary positions of the international 
proletariat, and called upon the working people of the world to 
defend the Soviet Union. J. V. Stalin was elected to the Presidium 
of the congress, to the Programme Commission and 
to the Political Commission set up to draft the theses on 
the international situation and the tasks of the Communist 
International. p. 164 
47 See Decisions and Resolutions of Congresses of Soviets of the 
R.S.F.S.R., Moscow 1939, p. 225. p. 173 
48 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, p. 293. p. 175 
49 Bednota (The Poor)‹a daily newspaper, organ of the C.C., 
C.P.S.U.(B.), published in Moscow from March 1918 to January 
1931. p. 176 
50 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, p. 212.
p. 183 
51 Krasnaya Gazeta (Red Newspaper)‹a daily newspaper published 
by the Leningrad Soviet of Workers¹, Peasants¹ and Red 
Army Men¹s Deputies from January 1918 to February 1939. 
p. 189 
52 This refers to the local economic conferences. They were In 
existence in 1921-23 under the Executive Committees of the 
Soviets. p. 194 
53 Nizhneye Povolzhye (Lower Volga)‹a monthly magazine published 
in Saratov by the Lower Volga Regional and Saratov

NOTES 383 
Gubernia Planning Commissions from 1924, and by the Saratov 
Gubernia and Territorial Planning Commission from 1926. 
From August 1932 to 1933 it was published by the Territorial 
Planning Commission in Stalingrad. p. 199 
54 Khlebotsentr‹the all-Russian central union of agricultural 
co-operatives for the production, processing and sale of cereals 
and oil-seed. It existed from 1926 to 1931. p. 203 
55 Guild socialism‹a Social-Democratic reformist trend profoundly 
hostile to Marxism which arose in Great Britain in 
the 1900¹s. It denies the class character of the state, rejects the 
class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and 
preaches the uniting of workers, intellectuals and technicians into 
a federation of national industrial guilds and the conversion 
of the latter into organs of administration of industry within 
the framework of the bourgeois state. By rejecting revolutionary 
methods of struggle, guild socialism condemns the 
working class to passivity and complete subordination to the 
bourgeoisie. p. 213 
56 This message was written by J. V. Stalin in connection with 
Defence Week, held in the Soviet Union on July 15-22,1928. 
p. 228 
57 The First All-Russian Congress of Working Women and Peasant 
Women was convened by the Central Committee of the 
R.C.P.(B.) in Moscow, November 16-21, 1918, with the object of 
organising the political education of working women and peasant 
women and drawing them into active participation in socialist 
construction. The congress was attended by 1,147 delegates. 
On November 19 it was addressed by V. I. Lenin. (For the 
congress and its importance, see V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. 
ed., Vol. 28, pp. 160-62, and J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 5, 
pp. 356-59.) p. 254 
58 The plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), 
together with members of the Central Control Commission 
and the Central Auditing Commission, was held on November

NOTES 384 
16-24. 1928. It examined the control figures of the national 
economy for 1928-29, and also the following questions: the 
first results and wider use of the seven-hour working day; 
the recruitment of workers into the Party and regulation of the 
Party¹s growth; a report of the North Caucasian Territorial 
Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on work in the countryside; 
and measures for the progress of agriculture. J. V. Stalin¹s 
speech, Industrialisation of the Country and the Right Deviation 
in the C.P.S.U.(B.), was delivered on November 19 in connection 
with the first item of the agenda. On November 20, 
J. V. Stalin was elected to the commission set up by the plenum 
to draft the resolution on the control figures of the national 
economy for 1928-29. (For the resolutions of the plenum of 
the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. 
Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 
1953, pp. 405-28). p. 255 
59 On November 21, 1928, a meeting was held at the ³Katushka² 
garment factory, Smolensk, to discuss the organisation of emulation 
for the exemplary carrying out of the elections to the 
Soviets in the Smolensk Gubernia. At the meeting the workers 
resolved to ensure 100 per cent participation of the workers 
and members of their families in the elections to the Soviets, to 
arrange a pre-election interchange of challenges to emulation in 
the press, and to send a challenge to the workers of the Yartsevo 
textile factory and other factories in the Smolensk, 
Bryansk and Kaluga gubernias. The workers sent a letter to 
J. V. Stalin and M. I. Kalinin informing them of their election 
as honorary chairmen of the interchange in the press and 
requesting advice on the organisation of emulation for the exemplary 
carrying out of the elections to the Soviets. p. 303 
60 See Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, 
Part 6. Theses, Resolutions, Decisions and Appeals, Moscow 
and Leningrad, 1929, p. 57. p. 309 
61 The Fourth Congress of the Red International of Labour Unions 
(Profintern), was held in Moscow from March 17 to April 3,

NOTES 385 
1928. It discussed, among other questions: the results and immediate 
tasks of the international trade-union movement; 
young workers in the trade-union movement; the organisational 
question; measures to combat fascism and yellow trade unions; 
the trade-union movement in the colonies and semi-colonies. 
In its resolutions, the congress stressed that with the capitalist 
stabilisation becoming more and more shaken the class struggle 
was mounting and growing more acute, and that all the activities 
of the Profintern should be concentrated on winning the 
masses and leading their struggle against capital. The congress 
pointed out that the central task of the Profintern was to win 
over the reformist trade unions and to take the lead of strikes 
in spite of the resistance of the reformist leaders. In its resolution 
on organisational questions, the congress stressed that the 
revolutionary trade unions must carry on day-to-day work 
to draw the broad strata of the proletariat into the trade unions. 
p. 314 
62 See Verbatim Report of the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, 
Part 6. Theses, Resolutions, Decisions and Appeals, Moscow 
and Leningrad, 1929, p. 80. p. 317 
63 This refers to the resolution on ³Conditions for Admission to 
the Communist International² endorsed by the Second Congress 
of the Comintern on August 6. 1920. The theses of this 
resolution, which were discussed by a special commission and 
submitted to the congress, had been written by V. I. Lenin 
(see V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 181-87).
p. 317 
64 This refers to the resolution on ³The Control Figures of the National 
Economy for 1928-29,² which was drafted under the direction 
of J. V. Stalin by the commission set up by the November 
plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and which was adopted 
by the plenum on November 24, 1928. The concluding part 
of the plenum resolution pointed to the necessity of waging 
a fight on two fronts and defined the methods of fighting 
the Right danger, as the chief danger in the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
(see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses,

NOTES 386 
Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, 
pp. 418-20). p. 323 
65 For the Fifteenth Party Congress resolution on ³The Opposition,² 
see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, 
Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, 
pp. 368-70. p. 328 
66 Rul (Helm)‹a Cadet whiteguard émigré newspaper, published 
in Berlin from November 1920 to October 1931. p. 329 
67 See V. I. Lenin, ³Preliminary Draft of the Resolution of the 
Tenth Congress of the R.C.P. on Party Unity,² Works, 4th Russ. 
ed., Vol. 32, pp. 217-19. p. 330 
68 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 35, p. 168. p. 336 
69 ³Golovanovism² manifested itself in attempts on the part 
of a certain section of the theatrical profession to transplant 
the old, bourgeois habits and methods of work to the Soviet 
theatre. In 1926-28 a group of actors of the Bolshoi Theatre, 
headed by orchestra conductor Golovanov, opposed the reform 
of the theatre¹s repertory in conformity with the higher standards 
and requirements of the broad strata of the working people 
and the tasks of socialist development. The group took up a 
hostile attitude to the general body of the theatre and refused 
to promote young talent. Measures taken by the Party for the 
reconstruction of the work of the Soviet theatres resulted in 
³Golovanovism² being overcome. p. 342 
70 J. V. Stalin¹s telegram to the Red Army men, commanders 
and political officers of the First Red Cossack Regiment of 
the Red Cavalry Division, stationed at Proskurov, was sent 
on the occasion of the eleventh anniversary of the Red Army. 
p. 346 
71 Selskokhozyaistvennaya Gazeta (Agricultural Newspaper)‹a daily 
newspaper, organ of the Council of People¹s Commissars of 
the U.S.S.R., published from March 1, 1929, to January 29,

NOTES 387 
1930, when it was converted into the newspaper Sotsialisticheskoye 
Zemledeliye (Socialist Agriculture). p. 347 
72 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 1, pp. 137-38. 
p. 352 
73 See J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 2, pp. 313, 322. p. 353 
74 J. V. Stalin, ³The Political Tasks of the University of the 
Peoples of the East² (see Works, Vol. 7, pp. 135-54). p. 357 
75 See J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 7, p. 141. p. 359 
76 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, pp. 135-36. 
p. 361 
77 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 20, p. 23. 
p. 366 
78 See J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 2, pp. 322-23. p. 367


BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 
(1 9 2 8 -March 1 9 2 9) 
1 9 2 8 
January 7 
January 10 
January 11 
January 13 
January 15 
January 18 
January 22 
J. V. Stalin has a talk with S. M. Kirov, Secretary 
of the Leningrad Regional Committee, 
C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin has a talk with the Chairman of 
the Tver Cotton Textile Trust on questions of 
the rationalisation of production. 
J. V. Stalin has a talk with representatives of 
Party and Soviet organs of the Bryansk Gubernia 
on the work of industry and on collective 
agreements. 
J. V. Stalin has a talk with representatives of 
the Union of Agricultural Co-operatives, Khlebotsentr, 
Khleboprodukt and the People¹s 
Commissariat of Trade of the U.S.S.R. 
J. V. Stalin leaves for Siberia in connection 
with the unsatisfactory state of the grain procurements 
in that territory. 
J. V. Stalin attends a meeting in Novosibirsk 
of the Bureau of the Siberian Territorial Committee 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.) together with representatives 
of the grain procurement organisations. 
J. V. Stalin conducts a conference in Barnaul 
of the active of the Barnaul organisation of

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 390 
January 23 
January 27 
and 28 
February 6 
February 9-26 
February 10 
February 13 
February 23 
February 25 
the C.P.S.U.(B.) together with representatives 
of the Biisk and Rubtsovsk okrug Party organisations 
on the fulfilment of the grain procurement 
plan. 
At a meeting of the Bureau of the Rubtsovsk 
Okrug Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), J. V. Stalin 
speaks on the progress of grain procurements 
in the area. 
J. V. Stalin takes part in a discussion on grain 
procurements at meetings of the Bureau of the 
Omsk Okrug Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J . V. Stalin arrives back in Moscow from 
Siberia. 
J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Ninth 
Plenum of the Executive Committee of the 
Comintern. 
J . V. Stalin has a talk with A. A. Zhdanov 
Secretary of the Nizhni-Novgorod Gubernia 
Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin writes a letter to all organisations 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on ³First Results of the 
Procurement Campaign and the Further Tasks of 
the Party.² 
J . V. Stalin¹s greetings to the Red Army on 
its tenth anniversary are published in Krasnaya 
Zvezda, No. 46. 
J . V. Stalin speaks on ³Three Distinctive 
Features of the Red Army² at a plenum of the 
Moscow Soviet held in celebration of the tenth 
anniversary of the Red Army.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 391 
February 26 
March 21 
March 28 
April 6-11 
April 10 
J. V. Stalin attends a parade of troops of the 
Moscow Garrison and a demonstration of the 
working people on the Red Square, Moscow, 
arranged in honour of the tenth anniversary 
of the Red Army. 
J. V. Stalin visits an exhibition of the Association 
of Artists of Revolutionary Russia dedicated 
to the tenth anniversary of the Red 
Army. 
J . V. Stalin has a talk with members of the 
staffs of the newspaper Pravda and the magazine 
Bolshevik. 
J. V. Stalin has a talk with the Secretary of 
the Omsk Okrug Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
on grain procurements. 
J. V. Stalin has a talk with representatives of 
the Stalingrad Gubernia Committee of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) and of the Gubernia Executive 
Committee on reorganisation of administrative 
districts. 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of a joint plenum 
of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin speaks at the joint plenum of the 
C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on the report 
of the commission set up by the Political Bureau 
of the C.C. to recommend practical measures 
to eliminate the shortcomings revealed 
by the Shakhty affair. The plenum elects 
J . V. Stalin to the commission appointed to 
prepare the final draft of the resolution on this 
question.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 392 
April 13 
April 30 
May 1 
May 9 
May 16 
May 26 
May 27 
J. V. Stalin delivers a report to a meeting of 
the active of the Moscow organisation of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) on The Work of the April Joint 
Plenum of the Central Committee and Central 
Control Commission. 
J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to 
the workers of Kostroma in connection with the 
unveiling of a monument to V. I . Lenin in 
Kostroma on May 1, 1928. 
J . V. Stalin attends the May Day parade of 
troops of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration 
of the working people on the Red 
Square, Moscow. 
J. V. Stalin received a delegation of students of 
the Sverdlov Communist University. 
J. V. Stalin has a talk with the head of the Chief 
Metal Board of the Supreme Council of National 
Economy of the U.S.S.R. on reconstruction 
of the metal industry. 
J . V Stalin delivers a speech a t the Eighth 
Congress of the All-Union Leninist Young 
Communist League 
J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to 
Komsomolskaya Pravda in connection with the 
newspaper¹s third anniversary. The greetings 
are published in Komsomolskaya Pravda, No. 122, 
May 27, 1928. 
J. V. Stalin¹s greetings to the Sverdlov Communist 
University on its tenth anniversary are 
published in Pravda, No. 122.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 393 
May 28 
May 30 
June 8 
June 12 
June 20 
June 26 
July 4-12 
July 5 
J. V. Stalin attends a meeting in the Bolshoi 
Theatre, Moscow, in celebration of the tenth 
anniversary of the Sverdlov Communist University. 
J . V. Stalin has a talk with students of the 
Institute of Red Professors, the Communist 
Academy and the Sverdlov Communist University 
about the situation on the grain front. 
J. V. Stalin receives the Secretaries of the Tula, 
Smolensk, Yaroslavl and Vladimir Gubernia 
Committees, C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the Party affairs 
study circle a t the Communist Academy on 
Slepkov¹s theses on self-criticism. 
J. V. Stalin writes an article ³Lenin and the 
Question of the Alliance with the Middle Peasant. 
Reply to Comrade S.² The article was 
published in Pravda, No. 152, July 3, 1928. 
J. V. Stalin writes a letter ³To the Members of 
the Political Bureau of the Central Committee. 
Reply to Frumkin. (With Reference to Frumkin¹s 
Letter of June 15, 1928.)² 
J. V. Stalin¹s article ³Against Vulgarising the 
Slogan of Self-Criticism² is published in Pravda, 
No. 146. 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of the 
C.C.. C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J . V. Stalin delivers a speech on ³The Programme 
of the Comintern² at the plenum of the 
C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.).

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 394 
July 9 
July 11 
July 13 
July 16 
July 17 
July 19 
July 30 
August 31 
J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on ³Industrialisation 
and the Grain Problem² at the plenum 
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin delivers a speech ³On the Bond 
between the Workers and Peasants and on 
State Farms² a t the plenum of the C.C., 
C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J . V. Stalin delivers a report on Results of 
the July Plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 
at a meeting of the active of the Leningrad 
organisation of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin¹s message ³To the Leningrad Osoaviakhim² 
in connection with Defence Week 
is published in Krasnaya Gazeta (Leningrad), 
No. 163. 
The Sixth Congress of the Comintern elects 
J. V. Stalin to the Presidium of the congress. 
J . V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation to the Sixth Congress 
of the Comintern and is elected to the delegation¹s 
bureau. 
J. V. Stalin is elected to the commission set 
up by the Sixth Congress of the Comintern 
to draft the Comintern Programme. 
J. V. Stalin is elected to the Political Commission 
set up by the Sixth Congress of the 
Comintern to draft theses on the international 
situation and the tasks of the Communist International. 
J. V. Stalin writes a letter to V. V. Kuibyshev.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 395 
September 1 
September 3 
October 9 
October 12 
October 19 
October 27 
October 28 
October 30 
November 6 
November 7 
The Sixth Congress of the Comintern elects 
J. V. Stalin a member of the Executive Committee 
of the Comintern. 
A plenum of the E.C.C.I. elects J. V. Stalin a 
member of its Presidium. 
Pravda, No. 235, publishes the obituary notice, 
³To the Memory of Comrade I. I. Skvortsov- 
Stepanov,² written by J. V. Stalin. 
. V. Stalin attends the funeral of I. I. Skvortsov- 
Stepanov. 
J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on ³The Right 
Danger in the C.P.S.U.(B.)² at a plenum of 
the Moscow Committee and Moscow Control 
Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin writes a ³Reply to Comrade Sh.² 
J. V. Stalin receives the Chairman of the Central 
Committee of the Railwaymen¹s Union. 
J . V. Stalin¹s message of greetings ³To the 
Leninist Young Communist League² on the 
occasion of i t s tenth anniversary i s published 
in Pravda, No. 252. 
J . V. Stalin receives representatives of the 
Central Students Bureau of the All-Union 
Central Council of Trade Unions. 
J. V. Stalin attends a meeting of the Moscow 
Soviet in celebration of the eleventh anniversary 
of the Great October Socialist Revolution. 
J. V. Stalin attends the parade of troops of the 
Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of the 
working people on the Red Square, Moscow.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 396 
November 16-2 
November 17 
November 19 
November 20 
November 25 
November 26 
November 27 
November 29 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of the 
C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J . V. Stalin¹s message of greetings ³On the 
Tenth Anniversary of the First Congress of 
Working Women and Peasant Women² i s 
published in Pravda, No. 267. 
J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on Industrialisation 
of the Country and the Right Deviation 
in the C.P.S.U.(B.) at a plenum of the C.C., 
C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin is elected to the commission set up 
by the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) to 
draft the resolution on the control figures of 
the national economy of the U.S.S.R. for 1928- 
29. 
J. V. Stalin¹s letter to the workers of the ³Katushka² 
and Yartsevo factories, Smolensk Gubernia, 
in connection with the organisation 
of emulation for the exemplary carrying out 
of the elections to the Soviets i s published 
in Pravda, No. 274. 
J. V. Stalin receives the secretaries of the district 
committees of the Moscow city organisation 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin receives leading Y.C.L. officials. 
J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the 
workers of the Krasny Profintern Factory 
(Bezhitsa) in connection with the campaign 
for the elections to the Soviets. The greetings 
are published in Pravda, No. 278, November 30, 
1928.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 397 
December 4 
December 9 
December 12 
December 19 
December 28 
End of January 
and beginning 
of February 
February 2 
J . V. Stalin has a talk with a delegation of 
worker and peasant correspondents. 
J. V. Stalin¹s greetings to the Frunze Military 
Academy on its tenth anniversary are published 
in Pravda, No. 286, 
J . V. Stalin has a talk with members of the 
staff of Izvestia. 
J . V. Stalin delivers a speech on The Right 
Danger in the German Communist Party at 
a sitting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I. 
J. V. Stalin has a talk with leading officials of 
the Komi Region on the reorganisation of administrative 
districts. 
J . V. Stalin writes a ³Reply to Kushtysev.² 
J. V. Stalin delivers speeches on ³Bukharin¹s 
Group and the Right Deviation in Our Party² 
a t a joint meeting of the Political Bureau 
of the C.C. and Presidium of the C.C.C., 
C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin writes a ³Reply to Bill-Belotserkovsky.² 
J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to 
the working men and women of the Krasny Treugolnik 
Factory in connection with the adoption 
of the seven-hour day. The greetings are published 
in Leningradskaya Pravda, No. 28, February 
3, 1929. 
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DISTRIBUTION 
398 BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 
February 12 
February 22 
March 1 
March 14 
March 18 
March 30 
J . V. Stalin has a talk with a delegation of 
Ukrainian writers. 
J. V. Stalin sends a telegram of greetings to the 
Red Army men, commanders and political officers 
of the First Red Cossack Regiment, stationed 
at Proskurov, on the occasion of the 
eleventh anniversary of the Red Army. 
J. V. Stalin¹s greetings on the occasion of the 
publication of Selskokhozyaistvennaya Gazeta 
are published in the first issue of the newspaper. 
The Second Leningrad Regional Party Conference 
elects J. V. Stalin to the Leningrad Regional 
Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin writes ³The National Question and 
Leninism. Reply to Comrades Meshkov, Kovalchuk, 
and Others.² 
J. V. Stalin attends a joint meeting of the Presidiums 
of the Central Executive Committee of 
the U.S.S.R., of the All-Russian Central Executive 
Committee, and of the Councils of 
People¹s Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and 
R.S.F.S.R., arranged in honour of M. I. Kalinin 
on the occasion of his tenth anniversary as 
President of the A.R.C.E.C. and C.E.C. of 
the U.S.S.R.

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics