W O R K E R S O F A L L C O U N T R I E S, U N I T E !

From Marx to Mao 
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Page 
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI 
THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.). Speech 
Delivered at the Plenum of the Central Committee and 
Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) in 
April 1929. (Verbatim Report) . . . . . . . . . 1 
I. One Line or Two Lines? . . . . . . . . . 3 
II. Class Changes and Our Disagreements . . . . 11 
III. Disagreements in Regard to the Comintern . . 21 
IV. Disagreements in Regard to Internal Policy . . 29 
a) The Class Struggle . . . . . . . . . . . 30 
b) The Intensification of the Class Struggle . . . . . 37 
c) The Peasantry . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 
d) NEP and Market Relations . . . . . . . . 46 
e) The So-Called ³Tribute² . . . . . . . . . 52 
f) The Rate of Development of Industry and the New Forms 
of the Bond . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 
g) Bukharin as a Theoretician . . . . . . . . . 72 
h) A Five-Year Plan or a Two-Year Plan . . . . . 84 
i) The Question of the Crop Area . . . . . . . 87 
j) Grain Procurements . . . . . . . . . . . 91 
k) Foreign Currency Reserves and Grain Imports . . . 98 
V. Questions of Party Leadership . . . . . . . . 101 
a) The Factionalism of Bukharinıs Group . . . . . 102 
b) Loyalty and Collective Leadership . . . . . . 104 
c) The Fight Against the Right Deviation . . . . . 109 
VI. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

CONTENTS VIII 
EMULATION AND LABOUR ENTHUSIASM OF THE 
MASSES. Foreword to E. Mikulinaıs Pamphlet ³Emulation 
of the Masses² . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 
TO COMRADE FELIX KON. Copy to Comrade Kolotilov, 
Secretary, Regional Bureau of the Central Committee, 
Ivanovo-Voznesensk Region . . . . . . . . . . 118 
TO THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE OF THE 
UKRAINE ON ITS TENTH ANNIVERSARY . . . 122 
ENTRY IN THE LOG-BOOK OF THE CRUISER ³CHERVONA 
UKRAINA² . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 
A YEAR OF GREAT CHANGE. On the Occasion of the 
Twelfth Anniversary of the October Revolution . . . 124 
I. In the Sphere of Productivity of Labour . . . . 125 
II. In the Sphere of Industrial Construction . . . . 127 
III. In the Sphere of Agricultural Development . . . 13 1 
Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 
TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE NEWSPAPER 
TREVOGA, ORGAN OF THE SPECIAL FAR EASTERN 
ARMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 
A NECESSARY CORRECTION . . . . . . . . . 143 
TO ALL ORGANISATIONS AND COMRADES WHO SENT 
GREETINGS ON THE OCCASION OF COMRADE 
STALINıS FIFTIETH BIRTHDAY . . . . . . . 146 
CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY 
IN THE U.S.S.R. Speech Delivered at a Conference of 
Marxist Students of Agrarian Questions, December 27, 
1929 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 
I. The Theory of ³Equilibrium² . . . . . . . 149 
II. The Theory of ³Spontaneity² in Socialist Construction 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153

CONTENTS IX 
III. The Theory of the ³Stability² of Small-Peasant 
Farming. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155 
IV. Town and Country . . . . . . . . . . . 162 
V. The Nature of Collective Farms . . . . . . 167 
VI. The Class Changes and the Turn in the Partyıs 
Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172 
VII. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 
LETTER TO A. M. GORKY . . . . . . . . . . 179 
CONCERNING THE POLICY OF ELIMINATING THE 
KULAKS AS A CLASS . . . . . . . . . . 184 
REPLY TO THE SVERDLOV COMRADES . . . . . 190 
I. The Sverdlov Studentsı Questions . . . . . . 190 
II. Comrade Stalinıs Reply . . . . . . . . . 192 
DIZZY WITH SUCCESS. Concerning Questions of the Collective-
Farm Movement . . . . . . . . . . . 197 
LETTER TO COMRADE BEZYMENSKY . . . . . . 206 
REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES . . . . 207 
TO THE FIRST GRADUATES OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
ACADEMY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 5 
REPLY TO COMRADE M. RAFAIL. (Regional Trade-Union 
Council, Leningrad.) Copy to Comrade Kirov, Secretary 
Regional Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) . . . . . 23 7 
AGRICULTURAL MACHINERY WORKS, ROSTOV . . 240 
TRACTOR WORKS, STALINGRAD . . . . . . . . 241 
POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO 
THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.), 
June 27, 1930 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 242

CONTENTS X 
I. The Growing Crisis of World Capitalism and the 
External Situation of the U.S.S.R. . . . . . . . 242 
1. The World Economic Crisis . . . . . . . . . 244 
2. The Intensification of the Contradictions of Capitalism . . 254 
3. The Relations Between the U.S.S.R. and the Capitalist 
States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262 
II. The Increasing Advance of Socialist Construction and 
the Internal Situation in the U.S.S.R. . . . . . . 269 
1. The Growth of the National Economy as a Whole . . . 270 
2. Successes in Industrialisation . . . . . . . . . 272 
3. The Key Position of Socialist Industry and Its Rate of 
Growth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275 
4. Agriculture and the Grain Problem . . . . . . . 282 
5. The Turn of the Peasantry Towards Socialism and the Rate 
of Development of State Farms and Collective Farms . . 288 
6. The Improvement in the Material and Cultural Conditions of 
the Workers and Peasants. . . . . . . . . . 299 
7. Difficulties of Growth the Class Struggle and the Offensive 
of Socialism Along the Whole Front . . . . . . . 3 0 9 
8. The Capitalist or the Socialist System of Economy . . . 3 2 6 
9. The Next Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 4 
a) General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 3 4 
b) Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 1 
c) Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 2 
d) Transport. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 4 7 
III. The Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348 
1. Questions of the Guidance of Socialist Construction . . 352 
2. Questions of the Guidance of Inner-Party Affairs . . . . 362 
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 8 6 
Biographical Chronicle (April 1929-June 1930) . . . . 400

PREFACE 
The twelfth volume of J. V. Stalinıs Works contains 
writings and speeches of the period from April 1929 to 
June 1930. 
This was a time when the Bolshevik Party was developing 
a general offensive of socialism along the whole 
front, mobilising the working class and the labouring 
masses of the peasantry for the fight to reconstruct the 
entire national economy on a socialist basis, and to 
fulfil the first five-year plan. The Bolshevik Party was 
effecting a decisive turn in policy‹the transition from 
the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the 
kulaks to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class 
on the basis of complete collectivisation. The Party 
was accomplishing a historic task of the proletarian 
revolution‹the most difficult since the conquest of power‹
the switching of millions of individual peasant 
farms to the path of collective farming, the path of socialism. 
In his speech at the plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., 
C.P.S.U.(B.) in April 1929 on ³The Right Deviation 
in the C.P.S.U.(B),² published in full for the first 
time in this volume, J. V. Stalin analyses the class 
changes which had taken place in the U.S.S.R. and in 
the capitalist countries, and points to the increasing

PREFACE XII 
socialist offensive in our country against the capitalist 
elements of town and country and the consequent sharpening 
of the class struggle. J. V. Stalin shows that 
the partial stabilisation of capitalism was being shattered 
and that the elements of a revolutionary upsurge 
in the capitalist countries were accumulating, and he substantiates 
the need for intensifying the struggle against 
the Right elements in the Communist Parties. 
J. V. Stalin denounces the anti-Party factional activities 
of Bukharinıs group, their double-dealing and 
their secret negotiations with the Trotskyists for the 
organisation of a bloc against the Party. 
J. V. Stalin stresses that the Right deviation and 
conciliation towards it were the chief danger at that 
period, exposes the Right capitulators as enemies of 
Leninism and agents of the kulaks, and lays bare the 
bourgeois-liberal, anti-revolutionary nature of the Rightopportunist 
³theory² that the kulaks would grow 
peacefully into socialism. In the struggle against the 
Bukharin opposition, J. V. Stalin develops Leninıs thesis 
that the exploiting classes must be eliminated by means 
of a fierce class struggle of the proletariat. He shows 
that the Right capitulatorsı opportunist line on questions 
of class struggle was linked with Bukharinıs anti- 
Leninist errors concerning the theory of the state. 
In the struggle against the Right opportunists, 
J. V. Stalin upholds and develops the Marxist-Leninist 
theory of the state and of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
In the article ³Emulation and Labour Enthusiasm 
of the Masses,² J. V. Stalin defines socialist emulation 
as the communist method of building socialism, as the

PREFACE XIII 
lever with which the working people are destined to 
transform the entire economic and cultural life of the 
country on the basis of socialism. 
In ³A Year of Great Change,² J. V. Stalin assesses 
the year 1929 as one of great achievements on all fronts 
of socialist construction: in the sphere of labour productivity, 
and in the development of industry and agriculture. 
Noting the success of the collective-farm movement, 
he shows that the main mass of the peasantry 
‹the middle peasants‹were joining the collective 
farms, and that, as a result of the individual peasant 
farming taking the path of socialism, the last sources 
for the restoration of capitalism in the country were 
being eliminated. 
Proceeding from V. I. Leninıs co-operative plan, 
J. V. Stalin elaborates the theory of collectivisation 
of agriculture and indicates the practical ways and means 
of putting it into practice. 
In his speech ³Concerning Questions of Agrarian 
Policy in the U.S.S.R.,² J. V. Stalin exposes the bourgeois 
and Right-opportunist theories of ³equilibrium,² 
of ³spontaneity² in socialist construction, and of the 
stability² of small-peasant farming, and demonstrates 
the advantages of large-scale collective economy 
in agriculture. He defines the nature of collective farming 
as a socialist form of economy, and substantiates the 
change from the policy of restricting and ousting the 
capitalist elements in the countryside to the policy of 
eliminating the kulaks as a class on the basis of complete 
collectivisation 
In ³Dizzy With Success,² ³Reply to Collective-Farm 
Comrades² and other works, J. V. Stalin denounces

PREFACE XIV 
³Leftist² distortions of the Party line in the development 
of collective farms, indicates the ways and means 
of correcting these distortions, and shows that the chief 
and basic link in the collective-farm movement at the 
given stage was the agricultural artel. 
This volume, contains the ³Political Report of the 
Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.),² in which J. V. Stalin gives a profound 
analysis of the crisis of world capitalism and reveals 
the sharpening of the contradictions of the capitalist 
system. Describing the relations between the U.S.S.R. 
and the capitalist states, he defines the foreign policy 
of the Soviet state as a consistent policy of peace. He 
shows the growing economic progress of the U.S.S.R. 
and the superiority of the socialist economic system over 
the capitalist system, and defines the nature and tasks 
of the sweeping socialist offensive along the whole front. 
Mobilising the Party to combat deviations in the national 
question he shows that the period of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat and the building of socialism 
in the U.S.S.R. is one of the development of national 
cultures, socialist in content and national in form. 
The volume contains hitherto unpublished letters of 
J. V. Stalin to Felix Kon, A. M. Gorky and Comrades 
Bezymensky and Rafail. 
Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute 
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

APRIL !(@(_ JUNE !(#)


THE RIGHT DEVIATION 
IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.)* 
Speech Delivered at the Plenum of 
the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.) in April 19291 
(Verbatim Report) 
Comrades, I shall not touch on the personal factor, 
although i t played a rather conspicuous part in the 
speeches of some of the comrades of Bukharinıs group. I 
shall not touch on it because it is a trivial matter, and 
it is not worth while dwelling on trivial matters. 
Bukharin spoke of his private correspondence with me. He 
read some letters and it can be seen from them that although 
we were still on terms of personal friendship 
quite recently, now we differ politically. The same note 
could be detected in the speeches of Uglanov and Tomsky. 
How does it happen, they say, we are old Bolsheviks, 
and suddenly we are at odds and unable to respect 
one another. 
I think that all these moans and lamentations are not 
worth a brass farthing. Our organisation is not a family 
circle, nor an association of personal friends; it is the 
political party of the working class. We cannot allow 
interests of personal friendship to be placed above the 
interests of our cause. 
* The present text of this speech contains over 30 pages 
which were not published in the press at the time.‹Ed.

J. V. S T A L I N 2 
Things have come to a sorry pass, comrades, if the 
only reason why we are called old Bolsheviks is that we 
are old. Old Bolsheviks are respected not because they 
are old, but because they are at the same time eternally 
fresh, never-aging revolutionaries. If an old Bolshevik 
swerves from the path of the revolution, or degenerates 
and fails politically, then, even if he is a hundred 
years old, he has no right to call himself an old 
Bolshevik; he has no right to demand that the Party 
should respect him. 
Further, questions of personal friendship cannot be 
put on a par with political questions, for, as the saying 
goes, friendship is all very well, but duty comes first. 
We all serve the working class, and if the interests of 
personal friendship clash with the interests of the revolution, 
then personal friendship must come second. As 
Bolsheviks we cannot have any other attitude. 
I shall not touch either on the insinuations and 
veiled accusations of a personal nature that were contained 
in the speeches of comrades of the Bukharin opposition. 
Evidently these comrades are attempting to cover 
up the underlying political basis of our disagreements 
with insinuations and equivocations. They want to substitute 
petty political scheming for politics. Tomskyıs 
speech is especially noteworthy in this respect. His was 
the typical speech of a trade-unionist politician who 
attempts to substitute petty political scheming for 
politics. However, that trick of theirs wonıt work. 
Let us get down to business.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 3 
I 
ONE LINE OR TWO LINES? 
Have we a single, common, general line or have we 
two lines? That, comrades, is the basic question. 
In his speech here, Rykov said that we have a single 
general line and that if we do have some ³insignificant² 
disagreements, it is because there are ³shades of 
difference² in the interpretation of the general line. 
Is that correct? Unfortunately, it is not. And it is 
not merely incorrect, but it is absolutely contrary to 
the truth. If we really have only one line, and there are 
only shades of difference between us, then why did 
Bukharin run off to yesterdayıs Trotskyites led by Kamenev, 
in an effort to set up with them a factional bloc 
directed against the Central Committee and its Political 
Bureau? Is it not a fact that Bukharin spoke there 
of a ³fatal² line of the Central Committee, of Bukharinıs, 
Tomskyıs and Rykovıs disagreements in principle with 
the Central Committee of the Party, of the need for a 
drastic change in the composition of the Political Bureau 
of the Central Committee? 
If there is only one line, why did Bukharin conspire 
with yesterdayıs Trotskyites against the Central 
Committee, and why did Rykov and Tomsky aid him 
in this undertaking? 
If there is only one general line, how can one part 
of the Political Bureau, which supports the single, common, 
general line, be allowed to undermine the other 
part, which supports the same general line? 
Can a policy of such shifts be allowed if we have 
a single, common, general line?

J. V. S T A L I N 4 
If there is only one line, how are we to account for 
Bukharinıs declaration of January 30, which was wholly 
and solely aimed against the Central Committee and its 
general line? 
If there is only one line, how are we to account for 
the declaration of the trio (Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky) 
of February 9, in which, in a brazen and grossly slanderous 
manner, they accuse the Party: a) of a policy 
of military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry, b) of 
a policy of fostering bureaucracy, and c) of a policy of disintegrating 
the Comintern? 
Perhaps these declarations are just ancient history? 
Perhaps it is now considered that these declarations 
were a mistake? Perhaps Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky 
are prepared to take back these undoubtedly mistaken 
and anti-Party declarations? If that is the case, let them 
say so frankly and honestly. Then everyone will understand 
that we have only one line and that there are only 
shades of difference between us. But, as is evident from 
the speeches of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, they 
would not do that. And not only would they not do 
that, but they have no intention of repudiating these 
declarations of theirs in the future, and they state that 
they adhere to their views as set forth in the declarations. 
Where then is the single, common, general line? 
If there is only one line, and, in the opinion of 
Bukharinıs group, the Party line consists in pursuing a 
policy of military-feudal exploitation of the peasantry, 
then do Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky really wish to 
join us in pursuing this fatal policy, instead of combating 
it? That is indeed absurd.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 5 
If there is only one line, and, in the opinion of the 
Bukharin opposition, the Party line consists in fostering 
bureaucracy, then do Rykov, Bukharin and Tomsky 
really wish to join us in fostering bureaucracy within 
the Party, instead of combating it? That is indeed nonsense. 
If there is only one line, and, in the opinion of the 
Bukharin opposition, the Party line consists in disintegrating 
the Comintern, then do Rykov, Bukharin and 
Tomsky really wish to join us in disintegrating the 
Comintern, instead of combating this policy? How are 
we to believe such nonsense? 
No, comrades, there must be something wrong with 
Rykovıs assertion that we have a single, common line. 
Whichever way you look at it, if we bear in mind the 
facts just set forth regard ing the declarations and conduct 
of Bukharinıs group, there is something amiss with 
the business of one, common line. 
If there is only one line, then how are we to account 
for the policy of resigning adopted by Bukharin, Rykov 
and Tomsky? Is it conceivable that where there is a 
common general line, one part of the Political Bureau 
would systematically refuse to implement the repeated 
decisions of the Central Committee of the Party and 
continue to sabotage Party work for six months? If 
we really have a single, common, general line, how are 
we to account for this disruptive policy of resigning 
that is being methodically pursued by one part of the 
Political Bureau? 
From the history of our Party we know of examples 
of the policy of resigning. We know, for instance, that 
on the day after the October Revolution some comrades,

J. V. S T A L I N 6
led by Kamenev and Zinoviev, refused the posts assigned 
to them and demanded that the policy of the Party should 
be changed. We know that at that time they sought to 
justify the policy of resigning by demanding the creation 
of a coalition government that would include the Mensheviks 
and Socialist-Revolutionaries, in opposition to 
the Central Committee of our Party whose policy was to 
form a purely Bolshevik government. But at that time 
there was some sense in the policy of resigning, because 
it was based on the existence of two different lines, one 
of which was for forming a purely Bolshevik government, 
and the other for forming a coalition government 
jointly with the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. 
That was clear and comprehensible. But we see 
no logic, no logic whatsoever, when the Bukharin opposition, 
on the one hand, proclaims the unity of the 
general line, and, on the other hand, pursues a policy 
of resigning, adopted from that of Zinoviev and Kamenev 
in the period of the October Revolution. 
One thing or the other‹either there is only one 
line, in which case Bukharin and his friendsı policy of 
resigning is incomprehensible and inexplicable; or we 
have two lines, in which case the policy of resigning is 
perfectly comprehensible and explicable. 
If there is only one line, how are we to explain the 
fact that the trio of the Political Bureau‹Rykov, 
Bukharin and Tomsky‹deemed it possible, during the 
voting in the Political Bureau, to abstain when the 
main theses on the five-year plan and on the peasant 
question were being adopted? Does it ever happen that 
there is a single general line but that one section of the 
comrades abstains from voting on the main questions

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 7 
of our economic policy? No, comrades, such wonders do 
not occur. 
Finally, if there is only one line, and there are only 
shades of difference between us, why did the comrades 
of the Bukharin opposition‹Bukharin, Rykov and 
Tomsky‹reject the compromise proposed by a commission 
of the Political Bureau on February 7 of this year? 
Is it not a fact that this compromise gave Bukharinıs 
group a perfectly acceptable way out of the impasse 
in which it had landed itself? 
Here is the text of this compromise proposed by 
the majority of the Central Committee on February 7 
of this year: 
³After an exchange of views in the commission it was ascertained 
that: 
³1) Bukharin admits that his negotiations with Kamenev 
were a political error; 
³2) Bukharin admits that the assertions contained in his 
Œdeclarationı of January 30, 1929, alleging that the Central Committee 
is in fact pursuing a policy of Œmilitary-feudal exploitation 
of the peasantry,ı that the Central Committee is disintegrating 
the Comintern and is fostering bureaucracy within the 
Party‹that all these assertions were made in the heat of the 
moment, during passionate polemics, that he does not maintain 
these assertions any longer, and considers that there are no 
differences between him and the Central Committee on these 
questions; 
³3) Bukharin recognises, therefore, that harmonious work 
in the Political Bureau is possible and necessary; 
³4) Bukharin withdraws hi s resignation both as regards 
Pravda and as regards the Comintern; 
³5) consequently, Bukharin withdraws his declaration of January 
30. 
³On the basis of the above, the commission considers i t 
possible not to submit its draft resolution containing a political

J. V. S T A L I N 8
appraisal of Bukharinıs errors to the joint meeting of the Political 
Bureau and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, 
and suggests that the joint meeting of the Political Bureau and the 
Presidium of the Central Control Commission withdraw from 
circulation all existing documents (verbatim reports of speeches, 
etc.). 
³The commission requests the Political Bureau and the Presidium 
of the C.C.C. to provide Bukharin with all the conditions 
necessary for his normal work as editor-in-chief of Pravda 
and Secretary of the Executive Committee of the Comintern.² 
Why did Bukharin and his friends reject this compromise 
if we really have only one line, and if there are 
only shades of difference between us? Is it not perfectly 
obvious that Bukharin and his friends should have been 
extremely eager to accept the compromise proposed by 
the Political Bureau, so as to put an end to the tension 
existing within the Party and create an atmosphere 
conducive to unanimity and harmony in the work of 
the Political Bureau? 
There is talk of the unity of the Party, of collective 
work in the Political Bureau. But is i t not obvious 
that anyone who wants genuine unity and values the 
collective principle in work should have accepted the 
compromise? Why then did Bukharin and his friends 
reject this compromise? 
Is it not obvious that if we had only one line, then 
there would never have been either the trioıs declaration 
of February 9 or Bukharin and his friendsı refusal to 
accept the compromise proposed by the Political Bureau 
of the Central Committee? 
No, comrades, if we bear in mind the facts set forth 
above, there must be something amiss with the business 
of your one, common line.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 9 
It turns out that in reality we have not one line, 
but two lines; one of them being the line of the Central 
Committee and the other the line of Bukharinıs 
group. 
In his speech, Rykov did not tell the truth when he 
declared that we have only one general line. He sought 
thereby to disguise his own line, which differs from the 
Party line, for the purpose of stealthily undermining 
the Party line. The policy of opportunism consists precisely 
in attempting to slur over disagreements, to 
gloss over the actual situation within the Party, to disguise 
oneıs own position and to make it impossible for 
the Party to attain complete clarity. 
Why does opportunism need such a policy? Because 
it enables opportunists to carry out in effect their own 
line, which differs from the Party line, behind a smoke 
screen of talk about the unity of the line. In his speech 
at the present plenum of the Central Committee and 
Central Control Commission Rykov adopted this opportunist 
standpoint. 
Would you care to hear a characterisation of the 
opportunist in general, as given by Comrade Lenin in 
one of his articles? This characterisation is important 
for us not only because of its general significance, but 
also because it fits Rykov perfectly. 
Here is what Lenin says about the specific features 
of opportunism and of opportunists: 
³When we speak of fighting opportunism, we must never 
forget the feature characteristic of the whole of present-day opportunism 
in every sphere, namely, its indefiniteness, diffuseness, 
elusiveness. An opportunist, by his very nature, always evades 
formulating an issue definitely and decisively, he seeks a

J. V. S T A L I N 10 
middle course, he wriggles like a snake between two mutually 
exclusive points of view, trying to Œagreeı with both and to reduce 
his differences of opinion to petty amendments, doubts, 
righteous and innocent suggestions, and so on and so forth² 
(Vol. VI, p. 320). 
There you have a portrait of the opportunist, who 
dreads clearness and definiteness and who strives to 
gloss over the actual state of affairs, to slur over the 
actual disagreements in the Party. 
Yes, comrades, one must be able to face the facts 
no matter how unpleasant they may be. God forbid 
that we should become infected with the disease of fear 
of the truth. Bolsheviks, incidentally, are different 
from all other parties because they do not fear the truth 
and are not afraid of facing the truth no matter how 
bitter it may be. And in the present case the truth is 
that in fact we have not got a single, common line. 
There is one line, the Party line, the revolutionary, 
Leninist line. But side by side with it there is another 
line, the line of Bukharinıs group, which is combating 
the Party line by means of anti-Party declarations, 
by means of resignations, by means of slander and 
camouflaged undermining activities against the Party, 
by means of backstairs negotiations with yesterdayıs 
Trotskyites for the purpose of setting up an anti-Party 
bloc. This second line is the opportunist line. 
There you have a fact that no amount of diplomatic 
verbiage or artful statements about the existence of a 
single line, etc., etc., can disguise.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 11 
II 
CLASS CHANGES AND OUR DISAGREEMENTS 
What are our disagreements? What are they connected 
with? 
They are connected, first of all, with the class changes 
that have been taking place recently in our country and 
in capitalist countries. Some comrades think that the 
disagreements in our Party are of an accidental nature. 
That is wrong, comrades. That is quite wrong. The disagreements 
in our Party have their roots in the class 
changes, in the intensification of the class struggle 
which has been taking place lately and which marks 
a turning point in development. 
The chief mistake of Bukharinıs group is that it 
fails to see these changes and this turning point; it 
does not see them, and does not want to notice them. 
That, in fact, explains the failure to understand the 
new tasks of the Party and of the Comintern, which 
is the characteristic feature of the Bukharin opposition. 
Have you noticed, comrades, that the leaders of 
the Bukharin opposition, in their speeches at the plenum 
of the Central Committee and the Central Control 
Commission, completely evaded the question of the 
class changes in our country, that they did not say a 
single word about the intensification of the class struggle 
and did not even remotely hint at the fact that our 
disagreements are connected with this very intensification 
of the class struggle? They talked about everything, 
about philosophy and about theory, but they 
did not say a single word about the class changes which

J. V. S T A L I N 12 
determine the orientation and the practical activity of 
our Party at the present moment. 
How is this strange fact to be explained? Is it forgetfulness, 
perhaps? Of course not! Political leaders 
cannot forget the chief thing. The explanation is that 
they neither see nor understand the new revolutionary 
processes now going on both here, in our country, and 
in the capitalist countries. The explanation is that 
they have overlooked the chief thing, they have overlooked 
those class changes, which a political leader has 
no right to overlook. This is the real explanation for 
the confusion and unpreparedness displayed by the 
Bukharin opposition in face of the new tasks of our Party. 
Recall the recent events in our Party. Recall the 
slogans our Party has issued lately in connection with 
the new class changes in our country. I refer to such 
slogans as the slogan of self-criticism, the slogan of intensifying 
the fight against bureaucracy and of purging 
the Soviet apparatus, the slogan of training new economic 
cadres and Red experts, the slogan of strengthening 
the collective-farm and state-farm movement, the 
slogan of an offensive against the kulaks, the slogan of 
reducing production costs and radically improving the 
methods of trade-union work, the slogan of purging the 
Party, etc. To some comrades these slogans seemed staggering 
and dizzying. Yet it is obvious that these slogans 
are the most necessary and urgent slogans of the Party 
at the present moment. 
The whole thing began when, as a result of the Shakhty 
affair,2 we raised in a new way the question of new 
economic cadres, of training Red experts from the ranks 
of the working class to take the place of the old experts.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 13 
What did the Shakhty affair reveal? I t revealed 
that the bourgeoisie was still far from being crushed; 
that it was organising and would continue to organise 
wrecking activities to hamper our work of economic 
construction; that our economic, trade-union and, to 
a certain extent, Party organisations had failed to 
notice the undermining operations of our class enemies, 
and that it was therefore necessary to exert all efforts 
and employ all resources to reinforce and improve our organisations, 
to develop and heighten their class vigilance. 
In this connection the slogan of self-criticism became 
sharply stressed. Why? Because we cannot improve 
our economic, trade-union and Party organisations, 
we cannot advance the cause of building socialism 
and of curbing the wrecking activities of the bourgeoisie, 
unless we develop criticism and self-criticism to 
the utmost, unless we place the work of our organisations 
under the control of the masses. It is indeed a 
fact that wrecking has been and is going on not only in 
the coal-fields, but also in the metallurgical industries, 
in the war industries, in the Peopleıs Commissariat of 
Transport, in the gold and platinum industries, etc., 
etc. Hence the slogan of self-criticism. 
Further, in connection with the grain-procurement 
difficulties, in connection with the opposition of the 
kulaks to the Soviet price policy, we stressed the question 
of developing collective farms and state farms to 
the utmost, of launching an offensive against the kulaks, 
of organising grain procurements by means of pressure 
on the kulak and well-to-do elements. 
What did the grain-procurement difficulties reveal? 
They revealed that the kulak was not asleep, that the

J. V. S T A L I N 14 
kulak was growing, that he was busy undermining the 
policy of the Soviet government, while our Party, 
Soviet and co-operative organisations‹at all events, some 
of them‹either failed to see the enemy, or adapted 
themselves to him instead of fighting him. 
Hence the new stress laid on the slogan of self-criticism, 
on the slogan of checking and improving our 
Party, co-operative and procurement organisations generally. 
Further, in connection with the new tasks of reconstructing 
industry and agriculture on the basis of socialism, 
there arose the slogan of systematically reducing 
production costs, of strengthening labour discipline, of 
developing socialist emulation, etc. These tasks called 
for a revision of the entire activities of the trade unions 
and Soviet apparatus, for radical measures to put new 
life into these organisations and for purging them of 
bureaucratic elements. 
Hence the stress laid on the slogan of fighting 
bureaucracy in the trade unions and in the Soviet apparatus. 
Finally, the slogan of purging the Party. It would 
be ridiculous to think that it is possible to strengthen 
our Soviet, economic, trade-union and co-operative organisations, 
that it is possible to purge them of the 
dross of bureaucracy, without giving a sharp edge to 
the Party itself. There can be no doubt that bureaucratic 
elements exist not only in the economic and cooperative, 
trade-union and Soviet organisations, but in 
the organisations of the Party itself. Since the Party 
is the guiding force of all these organisations, it is obvious 
that purging the Party is the essential condition

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 15 
for thoroughly revitalising and improving all the other 
organisations of the working class. Hence the slogan of 
purging the Party. 
Are these slogans a matter of accident? No, they 
are not. You see yourselves that they are not accidental. 
They are necessary links in the single continuous chain 
which is called the offensive of socialism against the elements 
of capitalism. 
They are connected, primarily, with the period of 
the reconstruction of our industry and agriculture on 
the basis of socialism. And what is the reconstruction 
of the national economy on the basis of socialism? It 
is the offensive of socialism against the capitalist elements 
of the national economy along the whole front. 
It is a most important advance of the working class of 
our country towards the complete building of socialism. 
But in order to carry out this reconstruction we 
must first of all improve and strengthen the cadres of 
socialist construction‹the economic, Soviet and tradeunion 
cadres and also Party and co-operative cadres; 
we must give a sharp edge to all our organisations, purge 
them of dross; we must stimulate the activity of the 
vast masses of the working class and peasantry. 
Further, these slogans are connected with the fact 
of the resistance of the capitalist elements of the national 
economy to the offensive of socialism. The so-called 
Shakhty affair cannot be regarded as something accidental. 
³Shakhtyists² are at present entrenched in every 
branch of our industry. Many of them have been 
caught, but by no means all of them. The wrecking activities 
of the bourgeois intelligentsia are one of the most 
dangerous forms of resistance to developing socialism.

J. V. S T A L I N 16 
The wrecking activities are all the more dangerous 
because they are connected with international capital. 
Bourgeois wrecking is undoubtedly an indication of the 
fact that the capitalist elements have by no means laid 
down their arms, that they are gathering strength for 
fresh attacks on the Soviet regime. 
As for the capitalist elements in the countryside, there 
is still less reason to regard as accidental the opposition 
of the kulaks to the Soviet price policy, which has 
been going on for over a year already. Many people 
are still unable to understand why it is that until 1927 
the kulak gave his grain of his own accord, whereas 
since 1927 he has ceased to do so. But there is nothing surprising 
in it. Formerly the kulak was still relatively 
weak; he was unable to organise his farming properly; 
he lacked sufficient capital to improve his farm and so 
he was obliged to bring all, or nearly all, his surplus 
grain to the market. Now, however, after a number of 
good harvests, since he has been able to build up his 
farm, since he has succeeded in accumulating the necessary 
capital, he is in a position to manoeuvre on the 
market, he is able to set aside grain, this currency of 
currencies, as a reserve for himself, and prefers to bring 
to the market meat, oats, barley and other secondary 
crops. It would be ridiculous now to hope that the kulak 
can be made to part with his grain voluntarily. 
There you have the root of the resistance which the 
kulak is now offering to the policy of the Soviet regime. 
And what does the resistance offered by the capitalist 
elements of town and country to the socialist offensive 
represent? It represents a regrouping of the forces of

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 17 
the class enemies of the proletariat for the purpose of 
defending the old against the new. It is not difficult to 
understand that these circumstances cannot but lead to 
an intensification of the class struggle. But if we are 
to break the resistance of the class enemies and clear the 
way for the advance of socialism, we must, besides everything 
else, give a sharp edge to all our organisations, 
purge them of bureaucracy, improve their cadres and 
mobilise the vast masses of the working class and labouring 
strata of the countryside against the capitalist 
elements of town and country. 
It was on the basis of these class changes that our 
Partyıs present slogans arose. 
The same must be said about the class changes in 
capitalist countries. It would be ridiculous to think that 
the stabilisation of capitalism has remained unchanged. 
Still more ridiculous would it be to assert that the stabilisation 
is gaining in strength, that it is becoming secure. 
As a matter of fact, capitalist stabilisation is 
being undermined and shaken month by month and 
day by day. The intensification of the struggle for foreign 
markets and raw materials, the growth of armaments, the 
growing antagonism between America and Britain, 
the growth of socialism in the U.S.S.R., the swing to the 
Left of the working class in the capitalist countries, 
the wave of strikes and class conflicts in the European 
countries, the growing revolutionary movement in 
the colonies, including India, the growth of communism 
in all countries of the world‹all these are facts which 
indicate beyond a doubt that the elements of a new 
revolutionary upsurge are accumulating in the capitalist 
countries.

J. V. S T A L I N 18 
Hence the task of intensifying the fight against 
Social-Democracy, and, above all, against its ³Left² wing, 
as being the social buttress of capitalism. 
Hence the task of intensifying the fight in the Communist 
Parties against the Right elements, as being the 
agents of Social-Democratic influence. 
Hence the task of intensifying the fight against conciliation 
towards the Right deviation, as being the refuge 
of opportunism in the Communist Parties. 
Hence the slogan of purging the Communist Parties 
of Social-Democratic traditions. 
Hence the so-called new tactics of communism in 
the trade unions. 
Some comrades do not understand the significance and 
importance of these slogans. But a Marxist will always 
understand that, unless these slogans are put into effect, 
the preparation of the proletarian masses for new class 
battles is unthinkable, victory over Social-Democracy 
is unthinkable, and the selection of real leaders of the 
communist movement, capable of leading the working 
class into the fight against capitalism, is impossible. 
Such, comrades, are the class changes in our country 
and in the capitalist countries, on the basis of which 
the present slogans of our Party both in its internal 
policy and in relation to the Comintern have arisen. 
Our Party sees these class changes. It understands 
the significance of the new tasks and it mobilises forces 
for their fulfilment. That is why it is facing events fully 
armed. That is why it does not fear the difficulties confronting 
it, for it is prepared to overcome them. 
The misfortune of Bukharinıs group is that it does 
not see these class changes and does not understand the

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 19 
new tasks of the Party. And it is precisely because it 
does not understand them that it is in a state of complete 
bewilderment, is ready to flee from difficulties, to retreat 
in the face of difficulties, to surrender the positions. 
Have you ever seen fishermen when a storm is brewing 
on a big river‹such as the Yenisei? I have seen them 
many a time. In the face of a storm one group of fishermen 
will muster all their forces, encourage their fellows 
and boldly guide the boat to meet the storm: ³Cheer up, 
lads, keep a tight hold of the tiller, cut the waves, weıll 
win through!² 
But there is another type of fishermen‹those who, on 
sensing a storm, lose heart, begin to snivel and demoralise 
their own ranks: ³Itıs terrible, a storm is brewing: 
lie down, lads, in the bottom of the boat, shut your eyes, 
letıs hope sheıll make the shore somehow.² (General 
laughter.) 
Does it still need proof that the line and conduct 
of Bukharinıs group exactly resembles the line and conduct 
of the second group of fishermen, who retreat in 
panic in the face of difficulties? 
We say that in Europe the conditions are maturing for 
a new revolutionary upsurge, that this circumstance 
dictates to us new tasks along the line of intensifying 
the fight against the Right deviation in the Communist 
Parties and of driving the Right deviators out of the 
Party, of intensifying the fight against conciliation, 
which screens the Right deviation, of intensifying the 
fight against Social-Democratic traditions in the Communist 
Parties, etc., etc. But Bukharin answers us that 
all this is nonsense, that no such new tasks confront us,

J. V. S T A L I N 
FROM MARX 
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20 
that the whole fact of the matter is that the majority 
in the Central Committee wants to ³haul² him, i.e., 
Bukharin, ³over the coals.² 
We say that the class changes in our country dictate 
to us new tasks which call for a systematic reduction of 
costs of production and improvement of labour discipline 
in industry, that these tasks cannot be carried out without 
radical change in the practices of work of the trade 
unions. But Tomsky answers us that all this is nonsense, 
that no such new tasks confront us, that the whole fact 
of the matter is that the majority in the Central Committee 
wants to ³haul² him, i.e., Tomsky, ³over the 
coals.² 
We say that the reconstruction of the national economy 
dictates to us new tasks along the line of intensifying 
the fight against bureaucracy in the Soviet and economic 
apparatus, of purging this apparatus of rotten 
and alien elements, wreckers, etc., etc. But Rykov 
answers us that all this is nonsense, that no such new 
tasks confront us, that the whole fact of the matter is 
that the majority in the Central Committee wants to 
³haul² him, i.e., Rykov, ³over the coals.² 
Now, is this not ridiculous, comrades? Is it not obvious 
that Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky see nothing 
but their own navels? 
The misfortune of Bukharinıs group is that it does 
not see the new class changes and does not understand 
the new tasks of the Party. And it is precisely because it 
does not understand them that it is compelled to drag in 
the wake of events and to yield to difficulties. 
There you have the root of our disagreements.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 21 
III 
DISAGREEMENTS IN REGARD 
TO THE COMINTERN 
I have already said that Bukharin does not see and 
does not understand the new tasks of the Comintern 
along the line of driving the Rights out of the Communist 
Parties, of curbing conciliation, and of purging the 
Communist Parties of Social Democratic traditions‹ 
tasks which are dictated by the maturing conditions for 
a new revolutionary upsurge. This thesis is fully confirmed 
by our disagreements on Comintern questions. 
How did the disagreements in this sphere begin? 
They began with Bukharinıs theses at the Sixth Congress3 
on the international situation. As a rule, theses 
are first examined by the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
In this case, however, that condition was not observed. 
What happened was that the theses, signed by Bukharin, 
were sent to the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) at the 
same time as they were distributed to the foreign delegations 
at the Sixth Congress. But the theses proved to 
be unsatisfactory on a number of points. The delegation 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was obliged to introduce about 
twenty amendments into the theses. 
This created a rather awkward situation for Bukharin. 
But who was to blame for that? Why was it necessary 
for Bukharin to distribute the theses to the foreign 
delegations before they had been examined by the delegation 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.)? Could the delegation of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) refrain from introducing amendments if 
the theses proved to be unsatisfactory? And so it came 
about that the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) issued

J. V. S T A L I N 22 
what were practically new theses on the international 
situation, which the foreign delegations began to counterpose 
to the old theses signed by Bukharin. Obviously, 
this awkward situation would not have arisen if Bukharin 
had not been in a hurry to distribute his theses to the 
foreign delegations. 
I should like to draw attention to four principal 
amendments which the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) introduced 
into Bukharinıs theses. I should like to draw 
attention to these principal amendments in order to illustrate 
more clearly the character of the disagreements 
on Comintern questions. 
The first question is that of the character of the 
stabilisation of capitalism. According to Bukharinıstheses 
it appeared that nothing new is taking place at 
the present time to shake capitalist stabilisation, but 
that, on the contrary, capitalism is reconstructing itself 
and that, on the whole, it is maintaining itself more or 
less securely. Obviously, the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
could not agree with such a characterisation of what is 
called the third period, i.e., the period through which we 
are now passing. The delegation could not agree with it 
because to retain such a characterisation of the third 
period might give our critics grounds for saying that we 
have adopted the point of view of so-called capitalist 
³recovery,² i.e., the point of view of Hilferding, a point of 
view which we Communists cannot adopt. Owing to this, 
the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) introduced an amendment 
which makes it evident that capitalist stabilisation 
is not and cannot be secure, that it is being shaken 
and will continue to be shaken by the march of events, 
owing to the aggravation of the crisis of world capitalism.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 23 
This question, comrades, is of decisive importance 
for the Sections of the Comintern. Is capitalist stabilisation 
being shaken or is it becoming more secure? It 
is on this that the whole line of the Communist Parties 
in their day-to-day political work depends. Are we passing 
through a period of decline of the revolutionary movement, 
a period of the mere gathering of forces, or are 
we passing through a period when the conditions are 
maturing for a new revolutionary upsurge, a period of 
preparation of the working class for future class battles? 
It is on this that the tactical line of the Communist Parties 
depends. The amendment of the delegation of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.), subsequently adopted by the congress, is 
a good one for the very reason that it gives a clear line 
based on the latter prospect, the prospect of maturing 
conditions for a new revolutionary upsurge. 
The second question is that of the fight against 
Social-Democracy. In Bukharinıs theses it was stated that 
the fight against Social-Democracy is one of the fundamental 
tasks of the Sections of the Comintern. That, of 
course, is true. But it is not enough. In order that the 
fight against Social-Democracy may be waged successfully, 
stress must be laid on the fight against the socalled 
³Left² wing of Social-Democracy, that ³Left² 
wing which, by playing with ³Left² phrases and thus 
adroitly deceiving the workers, is retarding their mass 
defection from Social-Democracy. It is obvious that unless 
the ³Left² Social-Democrats are routed it will be 
impossible to overcome Social-Democracy in general. 
Yet in Bukharinıs theses the question of ³Left² Social- 
Democracy was entirely ignored. That, of course, was 
a great defect. The delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was

J. V. S T A L I N 24 
therefore obliged to introduce into Bukharinıs theses 
an appropriate amendment, which was subsequently 
adopted by the congress. 
The third question is that of the conciliatory tendency 
in the Sections of the Comintern. Bukharinıs 
theses spoke of the necessity of fighting the Right deviation, 
but not a word was said there about fighting conciliation 
towards the Right deviation. That, of course, 
was a great defect. The point is that when war is declared 
on the Right deviation, the Right deviators usually disguise 
themselves as conciliators and place the Party in 
an awkward position. To forestall this manoeuvre of 
the Right deviators we must insist on a determined fight 
against conciliation. That is why the delegation of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) considered it necessary to introduce into 
Bukharinıs theses an appropriate amendment, which was 
subsequently adopted by the congress. 
The fourth question is that of Party discipline. In 
Bukharinıs theses no mention was made of the necessity 
of maintaining iron discipline in the Communist Parties. 
That also was a defect of no little importance. Why? 
Because in a period when the fight against the Right deviation 
is being intensified, in a period when the slogan 
of purging the Communist Parties of opportunist elements 
is being put into effect, the Right deviators usually 
organise themselves as a faction, set up their own 
factional discipline and disrupt and destroy the discipline 
of the Party. To protect the Party from the factional 
sorties of the Right deviators we must insist on iron discipline 
in the Party and on the unconditional subordination 
of Party members to this discipline. Without that 
there can be no question of waging a serious fight against

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 25 
the Right deviation. That is why the delegation of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) introduced into Bukharinıs theses an appropriate 
amendment, which was subsequently adopted 
by the Sixth Congress. 
Could we refrain from introducing these amendments 
into Bukharinıs theses? Of course not. In olden times it 
was said about the philosopher Plato: We love Plato, but 
we love truth even more. The same must be said about 
Bukharin: We love Bukharin, but we love truth, the Party 
and the Comintern even more. That is why the delegation 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.) found itself obliged to introduce these 
amendments into Bukharinıs theses. 
That, so to speak, was the first stage of our disagreements 
on Comintern questions. 
The second stage of our disagreements is connected 
with what is known as the Wittorf and Thälmann case. 
Wittorf was formerly secretary of the Hamburg organisation, 
and was accused of embezzling Party funds. For 
this he was expelled from the Party. The conciliators in 
the Central Committee of the German Communist Party, 
taking advantage of the fact that Wittorf had been close 
to Comrade Thälmann, although Comrade Thälmann 
was in no way implicated in Wittorf ıs crime, converted 
the Wittorf case into a Thälmann case, and set out to 
overthrow the leadership of the German Communist 
Party. No doubt you know from the press that at that 
time the conciliators Ewert and Gerhart succeeded 
temporarily in winning over a majority of the Central 
Committee of the German Communist Party against Comrade 
Thälmann. And what followed? They removed Thälmann 
from the leadership, began to accuse him of corruption 
and published a ³corresponding² resolution

J. V. S T A L I N 26 
without the knowledge and sanction of the Executive 
Committee of the Comintern. 
Thus, instead of the directive of the Sixth Congress 
of the Comintern about fighting conciliation being carried 
out, instead of a fight against the Right deviation 
and against conciliation, there was, in fact, a most gross 
violation of this directive, there was a fight against 
the revolutionary leadership of the German Communist 
Party, a fight against Comrade Thälmann, with the 
object of covering up the Right deviation and of consolidating 
the conciliatory tendency in the ranks of the German 
Communists. 
And so, instead of swinging the tiller over and correcting 
the situation, instead of restoring the validity 
of the violated directive of the Sixth Congress and calling 
the conciliators to order, Bukharin proposed in his wellknown 
letter to sanction the conciliatorsı coup, to hand 
over the German Communist Party to the conciliators, 
and to revile Comrade Thälmann in the press again by 
issuing another statement declaring him to be guilty. 
And this is supposed to be a ³leader² of the Comintern! 
Can there really be such ³leaders²? 
The Central Committee discussed Bukharinıs proposal 
and rejected it. Bukharin, of course, did not like 
that. But who is to blame? The decisions of the Sixth 
Congress were adopted not in order that they should be 
violated but in order that they should be carried out. If 
the Sixth Congress decided to declare war on the Right deviation 
and conciliation towards it, keeping the leadership 
in the hands of the main core of the German Communist 
Party, headed by Comrade Thälmann, and if it occurred 
to the conciliators Ewert and Gerhart to upset that

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 27 
decision, it was Bukharinıs duty to call the conciliators to 
order and not to leave in their hands the leadership of the 
German Communist Party. It is Bukharin, who ³forgot² 
the decisions of the Sixth Congress, who is to blame. 
The third stage of our disagreements is connected with 
the question of the fight against the Rights in the German 
Communist Party, with the question of routing the 
Brandler and Thalheimer faction, and of expelling the 
leaders of that faction from the German Communist 
Party. The ³position² taken up by Bukharin and his 
friends on that cardinal question was that they persistently 
avoided taking part in settling it. At bottom, it was 
the fate of the German Communist Party that was being 
decided. Yet Bukharin and his friends, knowing this, 
nevertheless continually hindered matters by systematically 
keeping away from the meetings of the bodies which 
had the question under consideration. For the sake of 
what? Presumably, for the sake of remaining ³clean² 
in the eyes of both the Comintern and the Rights in the 
German Communist Party. For the sake of being able 
subsequently to say: ³It was not we, the Bukharinites, 
who carried out the expulsion of Brandler and Thalheimer 
from the Communist Party, but they, the majority 
in the Central Committee.² And that is what is called 
fighting the Right danger! 
Finally, the fourth stage of our disagreements. It is 
connected with Bukharinıs demand prior to the November 
plenum of the Central Committee4 that Neumann 
be recalled from Germany and that Comrade Thälmann, 
who, it was alleged, had criticised in one of his speeches 
Bukharinıs report at the Sixth Congress, be called to 
order. We, of course, could not agree with Bukharin,

J. V. S T A L I N 28 
since there was not a single document in our possession 
supporting his demand. Bukharin promised to submit 
documents against Neumann and Thälmann but never 
submitted a single one. Instead of documents, he 
distributed to the members of the delegation of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) copies of the speech delivered by Humbert-
Droz at the Political Secretariat of the E.C.C.I., 
the very speech which was subsequently qualified by the 
Presidium of the E.C.C.I. as an opportunist speech. By 
distributing Humbert-Drozıs speech to the members of 
the delegation of the C.P.S.U.(B.), and by recommending 
it as material against Thälmann, Bukharin wanted to 
prove the justice of his demand for the recall of Neumann 
and for calling Comrade Thälmann to order. In 
fact, however, he thereby showed that he identified himself 
with the position taken up by Humbert-Droz, a position 
which the E.C.C.I. regards as opportunist. 
Those, comrades, are the main points of our disagreements 
on Comintern questions. 
Bukharin thinks that by conducting a struggle 
against the Right deviation and conciliation towards it 
in the Sections of the Comintern, by purging the German 
and Czechoslovak Communist Parties of Social-Democratic 
elements and traditions, and by expelling the 
Brandlers and the Thalheimers from the Communist 
Parties, we are ³disintegrating² the Comintern, ³ruining² 
the Comintern. We, on the contrary, think that by 
carrying out such a policy and by laying stress on the 
fight against the Right deviation and conciliation towards 
it, we are strengthening the Comintern, purging 
it of opportunists, bolshevising its Sections and helping 
the Communist Parties to prepare the working class for

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 29 
the future revolutionary battles, for the Party is 
strengthened by purging itself of dross. 
You see that these are not merely shades of difference 
in the ranks of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), 
but quite serious disagreements on fundamental questions 
of Comintern policy. 
IV 
DISAGREEMENTS IN REGARD 
TO INTERNAL POLICY 
I have spoken above on the class changes and the class 
struggle in our country. I said that Bukharinıs group is 
afflicted with blindness and does not see these changes, 
does not understand the new tasks of the Party. I said 
that this has caused bewilderment among the Bukharin 
opposition, has made i t fearful of difficulties and 
ready to yield to them. 
It cannot be said that these mistakes of the Bukharinites 
are purely accidental. On the contrary, they are 
connected with the stage of development we have already 
passed through and which is known as the period of restoration 
of the national economy, a period during which 
construction proceeded peace fully, automatically, so to 
speak; during which the class changes now taking place 
did not yet exist; and during which the intensification of 
the class struggle that we now observe was not yet in 
evidence. 
But we are now at a new stage of development, distinct 
from the old period, from the period of restoration. 
We are now in a new period of construction, the period 
of the reconstruction of the whole national economy on the

J. V. S T A L I N 30 
basis of socialism. This new period is giving rise to new 
class changes, to an intensification of the class struggle. 
It demands new methods of struggle, the regrouping of 
our forces, the improvement and strengthening of all our 
organisations. 
The misfortune of Bukharinıs group is that it 
is living in the past, that it fails to see the specific 
features of this new period and does not understand the 
need for new methods of struggle. Hence its blindness, 
its bewilderment, its panic in the face of difficulties. 
a) THE CLASS STRUGGLE 
What is the theoretical basis of this blindness and 
bewilderment of Bukharinıs group? 
I think that the theoretical basis of this blindness 
and bewilderment is Bukharinıs incorrect, non-Marxist 
approach to the question of the class struggle in our country. 
I have in mind Bukharinıs non-Marxist theory of 
the kulaks growing into socialism, his failure to understand 
the mechanics of the class struggle under the dictatorship 
of the proletariat. 
The passage from Bukharinıs book, The Path to 
Socialism, on the kulaks growing into socialism has 
been quoted several times here. But it has been quoted 
here with some omissions. Permit me to quote it in full. 
This is necessary, comrades, in order to demonstrate 
the full extent of Bukharinıs departure from the Marxist 
theory of the class struggle. 
Listen: 
³The main network of our co-operative peasant organisations 
will consist of co-operative units, not of a kulak, but of a

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 31 
Œtoilerı type, units that grow into the system of our general state 
organs and thus become links in the single chain of socialist economy. 
On the other hand, the kulak co-operative nests will, similarly, 
through the banks, etc., grow into the same system; but they will 
be to a certain extent an alien body, similar, for instance, to the 
concession enterprises.²* 
In quoting this passage from Bukharinıs pamphlet, 
some comrades, for some reason or other, omitted the 
last phrase about the concessionaires. Rosit, apparently 
desiring to help Bukharin, took advantage of this and 
shouted here from his seat that Bukharin was being 
misquoted. And yet, the crux of this whole passage lies 
precisely in the last phrase about the concessionaires. For 
if concessionaires are put on a par with the kulaks, and 
the kulaks are growing into socialism‹what follows 
from that? The only thing that follows is that the concessionaires 
are also growing into socialism; that not 
only the kulaks, but the concessionaires, too, are growing 
into socialism. (General laughter.) 
That is what follows. 
Rosit. Bukharin says, ³an alien body.² 
Stalin. Bukharin says not ³an alien body,² but ³to a 
certain extent an alien body.² Consequently, the kulaks 
and concessionaires are ³to a certain extent² an alien 
body in the system of socialism. But Bukharinıs mistake 
is precisely that, according to him, kulaks and concessionaires, 
while being ³to a certain extent² an alien 
body, nevertheless grow into socialism. 
Such is the nonsense to which Bukharinıs theory 
leads. 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 32 
Capitalists in town and country, kulaks and concessionaires, 
growing into socialism‹such is the absurdity 
Bukharin has arrived at. 
No, comrades, that is not the kind of ³socialism² 
we want. Let Bukharin keep it for himself. 
Until now, we Marxist-Leninists were of the opinion 
that between the capitalists of town and country, on the 
one hand, and the working class, on the other hand, 
there is an irreconcilable antagonism of interests. That is 
what the Marxist theory of the class struggle rests on. 
But now, according to Bukharinıs theory of the capitalistsı 
peaceful growth into socialism, all this is turned upside 
down, the irreconcilable antagonism of class interests 
between the exploiters and the exploited disappears, 
the exploiters grow into socialism. 
Rosit. That is not true, the dictatorship of the proletariat 
is presumed. 
Stalin. But the dictatorship of the proletariat isthe 
sharpest form of the class struggle. 
Rosit. Yes, that is the whole point. 
Stalin. But, according to Bukharin, the capitalists 
grow into this very dictatorship of the proletariat. How 
is it that you cannot understand this, Rosit? Against 
whom must we fight, against whom must we wage the 
sharpest form of the class struggle, if the capitalists of 
town and country grow into the system of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat? 
The dictatorship of the proletariat is needed for the 
purpose of waging a relentless struggle against the capitalist 
elements, for the purpose of suppressing the bourgeoisie 
and of uprooting capitalism. But if the capitalists 
of town and country, if the kulak and the concession

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 33 
aire are growing into socialism, is the dictatorship 
of the proletariat needed at all? If it is, then for the 
suppression of what class is it needed? 
Rosit. The whole point is that, according to Bukharin, 
the growing into presumes the class struggle. 
Stalin. I see that Rosit has sworn to be of service 
to Bukharin. But his service is really like that of the bear 
in the fable; for in his eagerness to save Bukharin he is 
actually hugging him to death. It is not without reason 
that it is said, ³An obliging fool is more dangerous than 
an enemy.² (General laughter.) 
One thing or the other: either there is an irreconcilable 
antagonism of interests between the capitalist class 
and the class of the workers who have come to power 
and have organised their dictatorship, or there is no such 
antagonism of interests, in which case only one thing 
remains‹namely, to proclaim the harmony of class 
interests. 
One thing or the other: 
either Marxıs theory of the class struggle, or the 
theory of the capitalists growing into socialism; 
either an irreconcilable antagonism of class interests, 
or the theory of harmony of class interests. 
We can understand ³socialists² of the type of Brentano 
or Sydney Webb preaching about socialism growing 
into capitalism and capitalism into socialism, for these 
³socialists² are really anti-socialists, bourgeois liberals. 
But one cannot understand a man who wishes to be a 
Marxist, and who at the same time preaches the theory 
of the capitalist class growing into socialism. 
In his speech Bukharin tried to reinforce the theory 
of the kulaks growing into socialism by referring to a

J. V. S T A L I N 34 
well-known passage from Lenin. He asserted that Lenin 
says the same thing as Bukharin. 
That is not true, comrades. It is a gross and unpardonable 
slander against Lenin. 
Here is the text of this passage from Lenin: 
³Of course, in our Soviet Republic the social order is based 
on the collaboration of two classes: the workers and peasants, in 
which the ŒNepmen,ı i.e., the bourgeoisie, are now permitted to 
participate on certain conditions² (Vol. XXVII, p. 405). 
You see that there is not a word here about the capitalist 
class growing into socialism. All that is said is 
that we have ³permitted² the Nepmen, i.e., the bourgeoisie, 
³on certain conditions² to participate in the 
collaboration between the workers and the peasants. 
What does that mean? Does it mean that we have 
thereby admitted the possibility of the Nepmen growing 
into socialism? Of course not. Only people who have lost 
all sense of shame can interpret the quotation from Lenin 
in that way. All that it means is that at present we do 
not destroy the bourgeoisie, that at present we do not 
confiscate their property, but permit them to exist on 
certain conditions, i.e., provided they unconditionally 
submit to the laws of the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
which lead to increasingly restricting the capitalists 
and gradually ousting them from national-economic 
life.
Can the capitalists be ousted and the roots of capitalism 
destroyed without a fierce class struggle? No, 
they cannot. 
Can classes be abolished if the theory and practice 
of the capitalists growing into socialism prevails? No,

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 35 
they cannot. Such theory and practice can only cultivate 
and perpetuate classes, for this theory contradicts the 
Marxist theory of the class struggle. 
But the passage from Lenin is wholly and entirely 
based on the Marxist theory of the class struggle under 
the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
What can there be in common between Bukharinıs 
theory of the kulaks growing into socialism and Leninıs 
theory of the dictatorship as a fierce class struggle? 
Obviously, there is not, and cannot be, anything in 
common between them. 
Bukharin thinks that under the dictatorship of the 
proletariat the class struggle must die down and come 
to an end so that the abolition of classes may be brought 
about. Lenin, on the contrary, teaches us that classes 
can be abolished only by means of a stubborn class struggle, 
which under the dictatorship of the proletariat 
becomes even fiercer than it was before the dictatorship 
of the proletariat. 
³The abolition of classes,² says Lenin, ³requires a long, difficult 
and stubborn class struggle, which, after the overthrow of 
the power of capital, after the destruction of the bourgeois state, 
after the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
d o e s n o t d i s a p p e a r (as the vulgar representatives of 
the old socialism and the old Social-Democracy imagine), but 
merely changes its forms and in many respects becomes even 
fiercer² (Vol. XXIV, p. 315). 
That i s what Lenin says about the abolition of 
classes. 
The abolition of classes by means of the fierce class 
struggle of the proletariat‹such is Leninıs formula.

J. V. S T A L I N 36 
The abolition of classes by means of the extinction of 
the class struggle and by the capitalists growing into socialism‹
such is Bukharinıs formula. 
What can there be in common between these two 
formulas? 
Bukharinıs theory of the kulaks growing into socialism 
is therefore a departure from the Marxist-Leninist 
theory of the class struggle. It comes close to the theory 
propounded by Katheder-Socialism.5 
That is the basis of all the errors committed by 
Bukharin and his friends. 
It may be said that it is not worth while dwelling 
at length on Bukharinıs theory of the kulaks growing 
into socialism, since it itself speaks, and not only speaks, 
but cries out, against Bukharin. That is wrong, comrades! 
As long as that theory was kept hidden it was 
possible not to pay attention to it‹there are plenty of 
such stupid things in what various comrades write! 
Such has been our attitude until quite lately. But recently 
the situation has changed. The petty-bourgeois 
elemental forces, which have been breaking out in recent 
years, have begun to encourage this anti-Marxist theory 
and made it topical. Now it cannot be said that 
it is being kept hidden. Now this strange theory of 
Bukharinıs is aspiring to become the banner of the Right 
deviation in our Party, the banner of opportunism. That 
is why we cannot now ignore this theory. That is why 
we must demolish it as a wrong and harmful theory, 
so as to help our Party comrades to fight the Right deviation.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 37 
b) THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE CLASS STRUGGLE 
Bukharinıs second mistake, which follows from his 
first one, consists in a wrong, non-Marxist approach 
to the question of the intensification of the class struggle, 
of the increasing resistance of the capitalist elements 
to the socialist policy of the Soviet government. 
What is the point at issue here? Is it that the capitalist 
elements are growing faster than the socialist sector 
of our economy, and that, because of this, they are 
increasing their resistance, undermining socialist construction? 
No, that is not the point. Moreover, it is 
not true that the capitalist elements are growing faster 
than the socialist sector. If that were true, socialist 
construction would already be on the verge of collapse. 
The point is that socialism is successfully attacking 
the capitalist elements, socialism is growing faster than 
the capitalist elements; as a result the relative importance 
of the capitalist elements is declining, and for the 
very reason that the relative importance of the capitalist 
elements is declining the capitalist elements realise 
that they are in mortal danger and are increasing 
their resistance. 
And they are still able to increase their resistance 
not only because world capitalism is supporting them, 
but also because, in spite of the decline in their relative 
importance, in spite of the decline in their relative growth 
as compared with the growth of socialism, there is still 
taking place an absolute growth of the capitalist elements, 
and this, to a certain extent, enables them to accumulate 
forces to resist the growth of socialism.

J. V. S T A L I N 38 
It is on this basis that, at the present stage of development 
and under the present conditions of the relation 
of forces, the intensification of the class struggle and 
the increase in the resistance of the capitalist elements 
of town and country are taking place. 
The mistake of Bukharin and his friends lies in failing 
to understand this simple and obvious truth. Their 
mistake lies in approaching the matter not in a Marxist, 
but in a philistine way, and trying to explain the intensification 
of the class struggle by all kinds of accidental 
causes: the ³incompetence² of the Soviet apparatus, the 
³imprudent² policy of local comrades, the ³absence² of 
flexibility, ³excesses,² etc., etc. 
Here, for instance, is a quotation from Bukharinıs 
pamphlet, The Path to Socialism, which demonstrates an 
absolutely non-Marxist approach to the question of the 
intensification of the class struggle: 
³Here and there the class struggle in the countryside breaks out 
in its former manifestations, and, as a rule, this intensification is 
provoked by the kulak elements. When, for instance, kulaks, 
or people who are growing rich at the expense of others and have 
wormed their way into the organs of Soviet power, begin to shoot 
village correspondents, that is a manifestation of the class struggle 
in its most acute form. (This is not true, for the most acute form 
of the struggle is rebellion.‹J. Stalin) However, such incidents, 
as a rule, occur in those places where the local Soviet apparatus 
is weak. As this apparatus improves, as all the lower units 
of Soviet power become stronger, as the local, village, Party 
and Young Communist League organisations improve and 
become stronger, such phenomena, it is perfectly obvious, will 
become more and more rare and will finally disappear without 
a trace.²* 
* My italics.‹J. St.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 39 
It follows, therefore, that the intensification of the 
class struggle is to be explained by causes connected 
with the character of the apparatus, the competence or 
incompetence, the strength or weakness of our lower 
organisations. 
It follows, for instance, that the wrecking activities 
of the bourgeois intellectuals in Shakhty, which are a form 
of resistance of the bourgeois elements to the Soviet 
government and a form of intensification of the class 
struggle, are to be explained, not by the relation of class 
forces, not by the growth of socialism, but by the incompetence 
of our apparatus. 
It follows that before the wholesale wrecking occurred 
in the Shakhty area, our apparatus was a good one, 
but that later, the moment wholesale wrecking occurred, 
the apparatus, for some unspecified reason, suddenly 
became utterly incompetent. 
It follows that until last year, when grain procurements 
proceeded automatically and there was no particular 
intensification of the class struggle, our local organisations 
were good, even ideal; but that from last 
year, when the resistance of the kulaks assumed particularly 
acute forms, our organisations have suddenly 
become bad and utterly incompetent. 
That is not an explanation, but a mockery of an explanation. 
That is not science, but quackery. 
What then is the actual reason for this intensification 
of the class struggle? 
There are two reasons. 
Firstly, our advance, our offensive, the growth of 
socialist forms of economy both in industry and in 
agriculture, a growth which is accompanied by a

J. V. S T A L I N 40 
corresponding ousting of certain sections of capitalists in 
town and country. The fact is that we are living according 
to Leninıs formula: ³Who will beat whom?² Will we 
overpower them, the capitalists‹engage them, as Lenin 
put it, in the last and decisive fight‹or will they overpower 
us? 
Secondly, the fact that the capitalist elements have 
no desire to depart from the scene voluntarily; they 
are resisting, and will continue to resist socialism, for 
they realise that their last days are approaching. And 
they are still able to resist because, in spite of the decline 
of their relative importance, they are nevertheless 
growing in absolute numbers; the petty bourgeoisie in 
town and country, as Lenin said, daily and hourly 
produces from its midst capitalists, big and small, and 
these capitalist elements go to all lengths to preserve their 
existence. 
There have been no cases in history where dying 
classes have voluntarily departed from the scene. There 
have been no cases in history where the dying bourgeoisie 
has not exerted all its remaining strength to preserve 
its existence. Whether our lower Soviet apparatus 
is good or bad, our advance, our offensive will diminish 
the capitalist elements and oust them, and they, the 
dying classes, will carry on their resistance at all costs. 
That is the basis for the intensification of the class 
struggle in our country. 
The mistake of Bukharin and his friends is that 
they identify the growing resistance of the capitalists 
with the growth of the latter ıs relative importance. 
But there are absolutely no grounds for this identification. 
There are no grounds because the fact that the

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 41 
capitalists are resisting by no means implies that they 
have become stronger than we are. The very opposite 
is the case. The dying classes are resisting, not because 
they have become stronger than we are, but because 
socialism is growing faster than they are, and they are 
becoming weaker than we are. And precisely because 
they are becoming weaker, they feel that their last days 
are approaching and are compelled to resist with all 
the forces and all the means in their power. 
Such is the mechanics of the intensification of the 
class struggle and of the resistance of the capitalists 
at the present moment of history. 
What should be the policy of the Party in view of 
this state of affairs? 
The policy should be to arouse the working class 
and the exploited masses of the countryside, to increase 
their fighting capacity and develop their mobilised preparedness 
for the fight against the capitalist elements 
in town and country, for the fight against the resisting 
class enemies. 
The Marxist-Leninist theory of the class struggle 
is valuable, among other reasons, because it facilitates 
the mobilisation of the working class against the 
enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Wherein lies the harm of the Bukharin theory of the 
capitalists growing into socialism and of the Bukharin 
conception of the intensification of the class struggle? 
It lies in the fact that it lulls the working class to 
sleep, undermines the mobilised preparedness of the revolutionary 
forces of our country, demobilises the working 
class and facilitates the attack of the capitalist 
elements against the Soviet regime.

J. V. S T A L I N 42 
c) THE PEASANTRY 
Bukharinıs third mistake is on the question of the 
peasantry. As you know, this question is one of the 
most important questions of our policy. In the conditions 
prevailing in our country, the peasantry consists 
of various social groups, namely, the poor peasants, 
the middle peasants and the kulaks. It is obvious that 
our attitude to these various groups cannot be the same. 
The poor peasant as the support of the working class, 
the middle peasant as the ally, the kulak as the class 
enemy‹such is our attitude to these social groups. All 
this is clear and generally known. 
Bukharin, however, regards the matter somewhat 
differently. In his description of the peasantry this differentiation 
is omitted, the existence of social groups 
disappears, and there remains but a single drab patch, 
called the countryside. According to him, the kulak is 
not a kulak, and the middle peasant is not a middle 
peasant, but there is a sort of uniform poverty in the 
countryside. That is what he said in his speech here: 
Can our kulak really be called a kulak? he said. Why, 
he is a pauper! And our middle peasant, is he really 
like a middle peasant? Why, he is a pauper, living on 
the verge of starvation. Obviously, such a view of the 
peasantry is a radically wrong view, incompatible with 
Leninism. 
Lenin said that the individual peasantry i s the 
last capitalist class. Is that thesis correct? Yes, it is 
absolutely correct. Why is the individual peasantry 
defined as the last capitalist class? Because, of the two 
main classes of which our society is composed, the peas

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 43 
antry is the class whose economy is based on private 
property and small commodity production. Because the 
peasantry, as long as it remains an individual peasantry 
carrying on small commodity production, produces capitalists 
from its midst, and cannot help producing them, 
constantly and continuously. 
This fact is of decisive importance for us in the question 
of our Marxist attitude to the problem of the alliance 
between the working class and the peasantry. This 
means that we need, not just any kind of alliance with 
the peasantry, but only such an alliance as is based on 
the struggle against the capitalist elements of the peasantry. 
As you see, Leninıs thesis about the peasantry being 
the last capitalist class not only does not contradict 
the idea of an alliance between the working class and the 
peasantry, but, on the contrary, supplies the basis for 
this alliance as an alliance between the working class 
and the majority of the peasantry directed against the 
capitalist elements in general and against the capitalist 
elements of the peasantry in the countryside in particular. 
Lenin advanced this thesis in order to show that 
the alliance between the working class and the peasantry 
can be stable only if it is based on the struggle 
against those capitalist elements which the peasantry 
produces from its midst. 
Bukharinıs mistake is that he does not understand 
and does not accept this simple thing, he forgets about 
the social groups in the countryside, he loses sight of the 
kulaks and the poor peasants, and all that remains is 
one uniform mass of middle peasants.

J. V. S T A L I N 44 
This is undoubtedly a deviation to the Right on 
the part of Bukharin, in contradistinction to the ³Left,² 
Trotskyite, deviation, which sees no other social groups 
in the countryside than the poor peasants and the kulaks, 
and which loses sight of the middle peasants. 
Wherein lies the difference between Trotskyism and 
Bukharinıs group on the question of the alliance with 
the peasantry? It lies in the fact that Trotskyism is 
opposed to the policy of a stable alliance with the 
middle-peasant masses, while Bukharinıs group is in favour 
of any kind of alliance with the peasantry in general. 
There is no need to prove that both these positions are 
wrong and that they are equally worthless. 
Leninism unquestionably stands for a stable alliance 
with the main mass of the peasantry, for an alliance 
with the middle peasants; but not just any kind 
of alliance, however, but such an alliance with the 
middle peasants as ensures the leading role of the working 
class, consolidates the dictatorship of the proletariat 
and facilitates the abolition of classes. 
³Agreement between the working class and the peasantry,² 
says Lenin, ³may be taken to mean anything. If we do not bear in 
mind that, from the point of view of the working class, agreement 
is permissible, correct and possible in principle only if it supports 
the dictatorship of the working class and is one of the measures 
aimed at the abolition of classes, then the formula of agreement 
between the working class and the peasantry remains, of course, 
a formula to which all the enemies of the Soviet regime and all 
the enemies of the dictatorship subscribe² (Vol. XXVI, p. 387). 
And further: 
³At present,² says Lenin, ³the proletariat holds power and 
guides the state. It guides the peasantry. What does guiding the

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 45 
peasantry mean? It means, in the first place, pursuing a course 
towards the abolition of classes, and not towards the small producer. 
If we wandered away from this radical and main course we 
should cease to be socialists and should find ourselves in the 
camp of the petty bourgeoisie, in the camp of the Socialist-Revolutionaries 
and Mensheviks, who are now the most bitter enemies 
of the proletariat² (ibid., pp. 399-400). 
There you have Leninıs point of view on the question 
of the alliance with the main mass of the peasantry, 
of the alliance with the middle peasants. 
The mistake of Bukharinıs group on the question 
of the middle peasant is that it does not see the dual 
nature, the dual position of the middle peasant between 
the working class and the capitalists. ³The middle 
peasantry is a vacillating class,² said Lenin. Why? 
Because, on the one hand, the middle peasant is a toiler, 
which brings him close to the working class, but, 
on the other hand, he is a property owner, which brings 
him close to the kulak. Hence the vacillations of the 
middle peasant. And this is true not only theoretically. 
These vacillations manifest themselves also in practice, 
daily and hourly. 
³As a toiler,² says Lenin, ³the peasant gravitates towards 
socialism, preferring the dictatorship of the workers to the dictatorship 
of the bourgeoisie. As a seller of grain, the peasant 
gravitates towards the bourgeoisie, towards freedom of trade, 
i . e . , back to the Œhabitual,ı old, Œtime-hallowedı capitalism² 
(Vol. XXIV, p. 314). 
That is why the alliance with the middle peasant can 
be stable only if it is directed against the capitalist 
elements, against capitalism in general, if it guarantees

J. V. S T A L I N 46 
the leading role of the working class in this alliance, if 
it facilitates the abolition of classes. 
Bukharinıs group forgets these simple and obvious 
things. 
d) NEP AND MARKET RELATIONS 
Bukharinıs fourth mistake is on the question of 
NEP (the New Economic Policy). Bukharinıs mistake 
is that he fails to see the two-fold character of NEP, 
he sees only one aspect of NEP. When we introduced 
NEP in 1921, we directed its spearhead against War 
Communism, against a regime and system which excluded 
any and every form of freedom for private trade. We 
considered, and still consider, that NEP implies a certain 
freedom for private trade. Bukharin remembers 
this aspect of the matter. That is very good. 
But Bukharin is mistaken in supposing that this 
is the only aspect of NEP. Bukharin forgets that NEP 
has also another aspect. The point is that NEP by no 
means implies complete freedom for private trade, the 
free play of prices in the market. NEP is freedom for 
private trade within certain limits, within certain boundaries, 
with the proviso that the role of the state as the 
regulator of the market is guaranteed. That, precisely, is 
the second aspect of NEP. Moreover, this aspect of NEP 
is more important for us than the first. In our country 
there is no free play of prices in the market, such as is 
usually the case in capitalist countries. We, in the 
main, determine the price of grain. We determine the price 
of manufactured goods. We try to carry out a policy 
of reducing production costs and reducing prices of man

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 47 
ufactured goods, while striving to stabilise the prices 
of agricultural produce. Is it not obvious that such special 
and specific market conditions do not exist in capitalist 
countries? 
From this it follows that as long as NEP exists, 
both its aspects must be retained: the first aspect, which 
is directed against the regime of War Communism and 
aims at ensuring a certain freedom for private trade, 
and the second aspect, which is directed against complete 
freedom for private trade, and aims at ensuring 
the role of the state as the regulator of the market. 
Destroy one of these aspects, and the New Economic 
Policy disappears. 
Bukharin thinks that danger can threaten NEP 
only ³from the Left,² from people who want to abolish 
all freedom of trade. That is not true. It is a gross error. 
Moreover, such a danger is the least real at the present 
moment, since there is nobody, or hardly anybody, 
in our local and central organisations now who does not 
understand the necessity and expediency of preserving 
a certain measure of freedom of trade. 
The danger from the Right, from those who want 
to abolish the role of the state as regulator of the market, 
who want to ³emancipate² the market and thereby 
open up an era of complete freedom for private trade, 
is much more real. There cannot be the slightest doubt 
that the danger of disrupting NEP from the Right is 
much more real at the present time. 
It should not be forgotten that the petty-bourgeois 
elemental forces are working precisely in this direction, 
in the direction of disrupting NEP from the Right. It 
should also be borne in mind that the outcries of the

J. V. S T A L I N 48 
kulaks and the well-to-do elements, the outcries of the 
speculators and profiteers, to which many of our comrades 
often yield, bombard NEP from precisely this 
quarter. The fact that Bukharin does not see this second, 
and very real, danger of NEP being disrupted 
undoubtedly shows that he has yielded to the pressure 
of the petty-bourgeois elemental forces. 
Bukharin proposes to ³normalise² the market and 
to ³manoeuvre² with grain-procurement prices according 
to areas, i.e., to raise the price of grain. What 
does this mean? It means that he is not satisfied with 
Soviet market conditions, he wants to put a brake on 
the role of the state as the regulator of the market and 
proposes that concessions be made to the petty-bourgeois 
elemental forces, which are disrupting NEP from the 
Right. 
Let us assume for a moment that we followed 
Bukharinıs advice. What would be the result? We raise 
the price of grain in the autumn, let us say, at the beginning 
of the grain-purchasing period. But since there 
are always people on the market, all sorts of speculators 
and profiteers, who can pay three times as much for 
grain, and since we cannot keep up with the speculators, 
for they buy some ten million poods in all while 
we have to buy hundreds of millions of poods, those 
who hold grain will all the same continue to hold it 
in expectation of a further rise in price. Consequently, 
towards the spring, when the stateıs real need for grain 
mainly begins, we should again have to raise the price 
of grain. But what would raising the price of grain in 
the spring mean? It would mean ruining the poor and 
economically weaker strata of the rural population, who

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 49 
are themselves obliged to buy grain in the spring, partly 
for seed and partly for food‹the very grain which they 
sold in the autumn at a lower price. Can we by such 
operations obtain any really useful results in the way of 
securing a sufficient quantity of grain? Most probably 
not, for there will always be speculators and profiteers 
able to pay twice and three times as much for the same 
grain. Consequently, we would have to be prepared to 
raise the price of grain once again in a vain effort to 
catch up with the speculators and profiteers. 
From this, however, i t follows that once having 
started on the path of raising grain prices we should 
have to continue down the slippery slope without any 
guarantee of securing a sufficient quantity of grain. 
But the matter does not end there. 
Firstly, having raised grain-procurement prices, we 
should next have to raise the prices of agricultural raw 
materials as well, in order to maintain a certain proportion 
in the prices of agricultural produce. 
Secondly, having raised grain-procurement prices, 
we should not be able to maintain low retail prices of 
bread in the towns‹consequently, we should have to 
raise the selling price of bread. And since we cannot 
and must not injure the workers, we should have to increase 
wages at an accelerated pace. But this is bound 
to lead to a rise in the prices of manufactured goods, 
for, otherwise, there could be a diversion of resources 
from the towns into the countryside to the detriment 
of industrialisation. 
As a result, we should have to adjust the prices of 
manufactured goods and of agricultural produce not on 
the basis of falling or, at any rate, stabilised prices, but

J. V. S T A L I N 50 
on the basis of rising prices, both of grain and of manufactured 
goods. 
In other words, we should have to pursue a policy 
of raising the prices of manufactured goods and agricultural 
produce. 
It is not difficult to understand that such ³manoeuvring² 
with prices can only lead to the complete nullification 
of the Soviet price policy, to the nullification 
of the role of the state as the regulator of the market, 
and to giving a free rein to the petty-bourgeois elemental 
forces. 
Who would profit by this? 
Only the well-to-do strata of the urban and rural 
population, for expensive manufactured goods and agricultural 
produce would necessarily become out of the 
reach both of the working class and of the poor and 
economically weaker strata of the rural population. It 
would profit the kulaks and the well-to-do, the Nepmen 
and other prosperous classes. 
That, too, would be a bond, but a peculiar one, a 
bond with the wealthy strata of the rural and urban 
population. The workers and the economically weaker 
strata of the rural population would have every right 
to ask us: Whose government are you, a workersı and 
peasantsı government or a kulak and Nepmenıs government? 
A rupture with the working class and the economically 
weaker strata of the rural population, and a bond 
with the wealthy strata of the urban and rural population‹
that is what Bukharinıs ³normalisation² of the 
market and ³manoeuvring² with grain prices according 
to areas must lead to.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 51 
Obviously, the Party cannot take this fatal path. 
The extent to which all conceptions of NEP in Bukharinıs 
mind have become muddled and the extent to 
which he is firmly held captive by the petty-bourgeois 
elemental forces is shown, among other things, by the 
more than negative attitude he displays to the question 
of the new forms of trade turnover between town and 
country, between the state and the peasantry. He is 
indignant and cries out against the fact that the state has 
become the supplier of goods for the peasantry and 
that the peasantry is becoming the supplier of grain for 
the state. He regards this as a violation of all the rules 
of NEP, as almost the disruption of NEP. Why? On 
what grounds? 
What can there be objectionable in the fact that the 
state, state industry, is the supplier, without middlemen, 
of goods for the peasantry, and that the peasantry is 
the supplier of grain for industry, for the state, also 
without middlemen? 
What can there be objectionable, from the point of 
view of Marxism and a Marxist policy, in the fact that 
the peasantry has already become the supplier of cotton, 
beet and flax for the needs of state industry, and that 
state industry has become the supplier of urban goods, 
seed and instruments of production for these branches 
of agriculture? 
The contract system is here the principal method 
of establishing these new forms of trade turnover between 
town and country. But is the contract system contrary 
to the principles of NEP? 
What can there be objectionable in the fact that, 
thanks to this contract system, the peasantry is becoming

J. V. S T A L I N 52 
the stateıs supplier not only of cotton, beet and flax, 
but also of grain? 
If trade in small consignments, petty trade, can be 
termed trade turnover, why cannot trade in large consignments, 
conducted by means of agreements concluded 
in advance (contracts) as to price and quality of goods 
be regarded as trade turnover? 
Is it difficult to understand that it is on the basis 
of NEP that these new, mass forms of trade turnover 
between town and country based on the contract system 
have arisen, that they mark a very big step forward on 
the part of our organisations as regards strengthening 
the planned, socialist direction of our national economy? 
Bukharin has lost the capacity to understand these 
simple and obvious things. 
e) THE SO-CALLED ³TRIBUTE² 
Bukharinıs fifth mistake (I am speaking of his principal 
mistakes) is his opportunist distortion of the Party 
line on the question of the ³scissors² between town 
and country, on the question of the so-called ³tribute.² 
What is the point dealt with in the well-known resolution 
of the joint meeting of the Political Bureau and the 
Presidium of the Central Control Commission (February 
1929) on the question of the ³scissors²? What is said 
there is that, in addition to the usual taxes, direct and 
indirect, which the peasantry pays to the state, the peasantry 
also pays a certain supertax in the form of 
an over-payment for manufactured goods, and in the 
form of an under-payment received for agricultural 
produce.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 53 
Is it true that this supertax paid by the peasantry 
actually exists? Yes, it is. What other name have we 
for this supertax? We also call it the ³scissors,² the 
³diversion² of resources from agriculture into industry 
for the purpose of speeding up our industrial development. 
Is this ³diversion² necessary? We all agree that, as 
a temporary measure, it is necessary if we really wish 
to maintain a speedy rate of industrial development. 
Indeed, we must at all costs maintain a rapid growth of 
our industry, for this growth is necessary not only for 
industry itself, but primarily for agriculture, for the 
peasantry, which at the present time needs most of all 
tractors, agricultural machinery and fertilisers. 
Can we abolish this supertax at the present time? 
Unfortunately, we cannot. We must abolish it at the 
first opportunity, in the next few years. But we cannot 
abolish it at the present moment. 
Now, as you see, this supertax obtained as a result 
of the ³scissors² does constitute ³something in the nature 
of a tribute.² Not a tribute, but ³something in 
the nature of a tribute.² It is ³something in the nature 
of a tribute² on account of our backwardness. We need 
this supertax to stimulate the development of our industry 
and to do away with our backwardness. 
But does this mean that by levying this additional 
tax we are thereby exploiting the peasantry? No, it 
does not. The very nature of the Soviet regime precludes 
any sort of exploitation of the peasantry by the state. 
It was plainly stated in the speeches of our comrades 
at the July plenum6 that under the Soviet regime exploitation 
of the peasantry by the socialist state is ruled

J. V. S T A L I N 54 
out; for a constant rise in the well-being of the labouring 
peasantry is a law of development of Soviet society, 
and this rules out any possibility of exploiting the peasantry. 
Is the peasantry capable of paying this additional 
tax? Yes, it is. Why? 
Firstly, because the levying of this additional tax 
is effected under conditions of a constant improvement 
of the material position of the peasantry. 
Secondly, because the peasants have their own private 
husbandry, the income from which enables them 
to meet the additional tax, and in this they differ from 
the industrial workers, who have no private husbandry, 
but who nonetheless devote all their energies to the cause 
of industrialisation. 
Thirdly, because the amount of this additional tax 
is being reduced year by year. 
Are we right in calling this additional tax ³something 
in the nature of a tribute²? Unquestionably, we 
are. By our choice of words we are pointing out to our 
comrades that this additional tax is detestable and undesirable, 
and that its continuance for any considerable 
period is impermissible. By giving this name to the 
additional tax on the peasantry we intend to convey 
that we are levying it not because we want to, but because 
we are forced to, and that we, Bolsheviks, must 
take all measures to abolish this additional tax at the 
first opportunity, as soon as possible. 
Such is the essence of the question of the ³scissors,² 
the ³diversion,² the ³supertax,² of what the abovementioned 
documents designate as ³something in the 
nature of a tribute.²

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 55 
At f i r s t , Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky tried to 
wrangle over the word ³tribute,² and accused the Party 
of pursuing a policy of military-feudal exploitation of 
the peasantry. But now even the blind can see that this 
was just an unscrupulous attempt of the Bukharinites 
at gross slander against our Party. Now, even they themselves 
are compelled tacitly to acknowledge that their 
chatter about military-feudal exploitation was a resounding 
failure. 
One thing or the other: 
either the Bukharinites recognise the inevitability, 
at the present time, of the ³scissors² and ³diversion² of 
resources from agriculture into industry‹in which case 
they are forced to admit that their accusations are of a 
slanderous nature, and that the Party is entirely right; 
or they deny the inevitability, at the present time, 
of the ³scissors² and ³diversion,² but in that case 
let them say it frankly, so that the Party may class 
them as opponents of the industrialisation of our country. 
I could, incidentally, refer to a number of speeches 
of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky, in which they recognise 
without any reservations the inevitability, at the 
present time, of the ³scissors² and ³diversion² of resources 
from agriculture into industry. And this, indeed, 
is equivalent to an acceptance of the formula 
³something in the nature of a tribute.² 
Well then, do they continue to uphold the point of 
view with regard to the ³diversion,² and the preservation 
of the ³scissors² at the present time, or not? Let 
them say it frankly. 
Bukharin. The diversion is necessary, but ³tribute² 
is an unfortunate word. (General laughter.)

J. V. S T A L I N 56 
Stalin. Consequently, we do not differ on the essence 
of the question; consequently, the ³diversion² of resources 
from agriculture into industry, the so-called ³scissors,² 
the additional tax, ³something in the nature of 
a tribute²‹is a necessary though temporary means for 
industrialising our country at the present time. 
Very well. Then what is the point at issue? Why 
all the tumult? They do not like the word ³tribute² or 
the words ³something in the nature of a tribute,² because 
they believe that this expression is not commonly used 
in Marxist literature? 
Well then, let us discuss the word ³tribute.² 
I assert, comrades, that this word has long been in 
use in our Marxist literature, in Comrade Leninıs writings, 
for example. This may surprise some people who 
do not read Leninıs works, but it is a fact, comrades. 
Bukharin vehemently asserted here that ³tribute² is an 
unfitting word to use in Marxist literature. He was indignant 
and surprised at the fact that the Central Committee 
of the Party, and Marxists in general, take the 
liberty of using the word ³tribute.² But what is surprising 
in this, if there is proof that this word has long 
been in use in the writings of such a Marxist as Comrade 
Lenin. Or perhaps, from Bukharinıs viewpoint, Lenin 
does not qualify as a Marxist? Well, you should be 
straightforward about it, dear comrades. 
Take for example the article ³ŒLeft-Wingı Childishness 
and Petty-Bourgeois Mentality² (May 1918), which 
was written by no less a Marxist than Lenin, and read 
the following passage: 
³The petty bourgeois who hoards his thousands is an enemy 
of state capitalism; he wants to employ these thousands just for

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 57 
himself, against the poor, in opposition to any kind of state control; 
yet the sum total of these thousands amounts to many thousands 
of millions that supply a base for speculation, which undermines 
our socialist construction. Let us assume that a certain number of 
workers produce in a few days values equal to 1,000. Let us then 
assume that 200 out of this total vanishes owing to petty speculation, 
all kinds of pilfering and of ³dodging² Soviet decrees 
and regulations by small property owners. Every class-conscious 
worker would say: If I could give up 300 out of the 1,000 for 
the sake of achieving better order and organisation, I would willingly 
give up 300 instead of 200, because to reduce this ³tribute² 
later on, to, say, 100 or 50, will be quite an easy matter under 
the Soviet regime, once we have achieved order and organisation 
and once we have completely overcome the disruption of all 
state monopoly by small property owners² (Vol. XXII, p. 515). 
That is clear, I think. Should Lenin on this account 
be declared an advocate of the policy of militaryfeudal 
exploitation of the working class? Just try, dear 
comrades! 
A voice. Nevertheless the term ³tribute² has never 
been used in relation to the middle peasant. 
Stalin. Do you believe by any chance that the middle 
peasant is closer to the Party than the working 
class? You are some Marxist! (General laughter.) If we, 
the Party of the working class, can speak of ³tribute² 
when it concerns the working class, why cannot we do 
so when it concerns the middle peasantry, which is only 
our ally? 
Some of the faultfinding people may imagine that 
the word ³tribute² in Leninıs article ³ŒLeft-Wingı Childishness² 
is just a slip of the pen, an accidental slip. 
A check-up on this point, however, will show that the 
suspicions of those fault-finding people are entirely 
groundless. Take another article, or rather a pamphlet,

J. V. S T A L I N 58 
written by Lenin: The Tax in Kind (April 1921) and read 
page 324 (Vol. XXVI, p. 324). You will see that the 
above-quoted passage regarding ³tribute² is repeated 
by Lenin word for word. Finally, take Leninıs article 
³The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Power² (Vol. XXII, 
p. 448, March-April 1918), and you will see that in it, 
too, Lenin speaks of the ³tribute (without quotation 
marks) which we are paying for our backwardness in 
the matter of organising accounting and control from 
below on a nationwide scale.² 
It turns out that the word ³tribute² is very far from 
being a fortuitous element in Leninıs writings. Comrade 
Lenin uses this word to stress the temporary nature 
of the ³tribute,² to stimulate the energy of the Bolsheviks 
and to direct it so as at the first opportunity, to 
abolish this ³tribute,² the price the working class has 
to pay for our backwardness and our ³muddling.² 
It turns out that when I use the expression ³something 
in the nature of a tribute² I find myself in quite 
good Marxist company, that of Comrade Lenin. 
Bukharin said here that Marxists should not tolerate 
the word ³tribute² in their writings. What kind 
of Marxists was he speaking about? If he had in mind 
such Marxists, if they may be so called, as Slepkov, 
Maretsky, Petrovsky, Rosit, etc., who are more like 
liberals than Marxists, then his indignation is perfectly 
justified. If, on the other hand, he has in mind real 
Marxists, Comrade Lenin, for example, then it must 
be admitted that among them the word ³tribute² has 
been in use for a long time, while Bukharin, who is not 
well acquainted with Leninıs writings, is wide of the 
mark.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 59 
But this does not fully dispose of the question of 
the ³tribute.² The point is that it was no accident that 
Bukharin and his friends took exception to the word 
³tribute² and began to speak of a policy of militaryfeudal 
exploitation of the peasantry. Their outcry about 
military-feudal exploitation was undoubtedly meant to 
express their extreme dissatisfaction with the Party 
policy towards the kulaks that is being applied by our 
organisations. Dissatisfaction with the Leninist policy 
of the Party in its leadership of the peasantry, dissatisfaction 
with our grain-procurement policy, with our policy 
of developing collective farms and state farms to 
the utmost, and lastly, the desire to ³emancipate² the 
market and to establish complete freedom for private 
trade‹that is what was expressed in Bukharinıs howling 
about a policy of military-feudal exploitation of 
the peasantry. 
In the history of our Party I cannot recall any other 
instance of the Party being accused of pursuing a policy 
of military-feudal exploitation. That weapon against 
the Party was not borrowed from the arsenal of Marxists. 
Where, then, was i t borrowed from? From the 
arsenal of Milyukov, the leader of the Cadets. When 
the Cadets wish to sow dissension between the working 
class and the peasantry, they usually say: You, 
Messieurs the Bolsheviks, are building socialism on the 
corpses of the peasants. When Bukharin raises an outcry 
about the ³tribute,² he is singing to the tune of Messieurs 
the Milyukovs, and is following in the wake of 
the enemies of the people.

J. V. S T A L I N 60 
f) THE RATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF INDUSTRY 
AND THE NEW FORMS OF THE BOND 
Finally, the question of the rate of development of 
industry and of the new forms of the bond between town 
and country. This is one of the most important questions 
of our disagreements. Its importance lies in the fact 
that it is the converging point of all the threads of our 
practical disagreements about the economic policy of the 
Party. 
What are the new forms of the bond, what do they 
signify from the point of view of our economic policy? 
They signify, first of all, that besides the old forms 
of the bond between town and country, whereby industry 
chiefly satisfied the personal requirements of the peasant 
(cotton fabrics, footwear, and textiles in general, etc.), 
we now need new forms of the bond, whereby industry 
will satisfy the productive requirements of peasant economy 
(agricultural machinery, tractors, improved seed, 
fertilisers, etc.). 
Whereas formerly we satisfied mainly the personal 
requirements of the peasant, hardly touching the productive 
requirements of his economy, now, while continuing 
to satisfy the personal requirements of the peasant, 
we must do our utmost to supply agricultural machinery, 
tractors, fertilisers, etc., which have a direct bearing on 
the reconstruction of agricultural production on a new 
technical basis. 
As long as it was a question of restoring agriculture 
and of the peasants putting into use the land formerly 
belonging to the landlords and kulaks, we could be content 
with the old forms of the bond. But now, when it is

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 61 
a question of reconstructing agriculture, that is not 
enough. Now we must go further and help the peasantry 
to reorganise agricultural production on the basis of 
new technique and collective labour. 
Secondly, they signify that simultaneously with the 
re-equipment of our industry, we must begin seriously 
re-equipping agriculture too. We are re-equipping, and 
have already partly re-equipped our industry, placing 
it on a new technical basis, supplying it with new, 
improved machinery and new, improved cadres. We 
are building new mills and factories and are reconstructing 
and extending the old ones; we are developing the 
metallurgical, chemical and machine-building industries. 
On this basis new towns are springing up, new 
industrial centres are multiplying and the old ones are 
expanding. On this basis the demand for food products 
and for raw materials for industry is growing. But 
agriculture continues to employ the old equipment, the old 
methods of tillage practised by our fore-fathers, the old, 
primitive, now useless, or nearly useless technique, the old, 
small-peasant, individual forms of farming and labour. 
Consider, for example, the fact that before the Revolution 
we had nearly 16,000,000 peasant households, 
while now there are no less than 25,000,000. What does 
this indicate if not that agriculture is becoming more 
and more scattered and disunited. And the characteristic 
feature of scattered small farms is that they are unable 
properly to employ technique, machines, tractors and 
scientific agronomic knowledge, that they are farms with 
a small marketable surplus. 
Hence the insufficient output of agricultural produce 
for the market.

J. V. S T A L I N 62 
Hence the danger of a rift between town and country, 
between industry and agriculture. 
Hence the necessity for increasing the rate of development 
of agriculture, bringing it up to that of our 
industry. 
And so, in order to eliminate this danger of a rift, 
we must begin seriously re-equipping agriculture on the 
basis of new technique But in order to re-equip it we 
must gradually unite the scattered individual peasant 
farms into large farms, into collective farms; we must 
build up agriculture on the basis of collective labour, 
we must enlarge the collectives, we must develop the 
old and new state farms, we must systematically employ 
the contract system on a mass scale in all the principal 
branches of agriculture, we must develop the system of 
machine and tractor stations which help the peasantry 
to master the new technique and to collectivise labour‹ 
in a word, we must gradually transfer the small individual 
peasant farms to the basis of large-scale collective 
production, for only large-scale production of a sociallyconducted 
type is capable of making full use of scientific 
knowledge and modern technique, and of advancing 
the development of our agriculture with giant 
strides. 
This, of course, does not mean that we must neglect 
poor and middle individual peasant farming. Not at 
all. Poor and middle individual peasant farming plays 
a predominant part in supplying industry with food and 
raw materials, and will continue to do so in the immediate 
future. For that very reason we must continue to assist 
poor and middle individual peasant farms which have 
not yet united into collective farms.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 63 
But this does mean that individual peasant farming 
alone is no longer adequate. That is shown by our grainprocurement 
difficulties. That is why the development 
of poor and middle individual peasant farming must be 
supplemented by the widest possible development of collective 
forms of farming and of state farms. 
That is why we must make a bridge between individual 
poor- and middle-peasant farming and collective, 
socially-conducted forms of farming by means of the contract 
system on a mass scale, by means of machine 
and tractor stations and by the fullest development of 
a co-operative communal life in order to help the peasants 
to transfer their small, individual farming on to the 
lines of collective labour. 
Failing this it will be impossible to develop agriculture 
to any extent. Failing this it will be impossible 
to solve the grain problem. Failing this it will be impossible 
to save the economically weaker strata of the 
peasantry from poverty and ruin. 
Finally, this signifies that we must develop our industry 
to the utmost as the principal source from which 
agriculture will be supplied with the means required 
for its reconstruction: we must develop our iron and 
steel, chemical and machine-building industries; we must 
build tractor works, agricultural-machinery works, etc. 
There is no need to prove that it is impossible to 
develop collective farms, that it is impossible to develop 
machine and tractor stations, without drawing the main 
mass of the peasantry into collective forms of farming, 
with the aid of the contract system on a mass scale, 
without supplying agriculture with a fairly large quantity 
of tractors, agricultural machinery, etc.

J. V. S T A L I N 64 
But it will be impossible to supply the countryside 
with machines and tractors unless we accelerate the 
development of our industry. Hence, rapid development 
of our industry is the key to the reconstruction of agriculture 
on the basis of collectivism. 
Such is the significance and importance of the new 
forms of the bond. 
Bukharinıs group is obliged to admit, in words, the 
necessity of the new forms of the bond. But it is an 
admission only in words, with the intention, under cover 
of a verbal recognition of the new forms of the bond, 
of smuggling in something which is the very opposite. 
Actually, Bukharin is opposed to the new forms of the 
bond. Bukharinıs starting point is not a rapid rate of 
development of industry as the lever for the reconstruction 
of agriculture, but the development of individual 
peasant farming. He puts in the foreground the ³normalisation² 
of the market and permission for the free play 
of prices on the agricultural produce market, complete 
freedom for private trade. Hence his distrustful attitude 
to the collective farms which manifested itself in 
his speech at the July plenum of the Central Committee 
and in his theses prior to that July plenum. Hence his 
disapproval of any form of emergency measures against 
the kulaks during grain procurement. 
We know that Bukharin shuns emergency measures 
as the devil shuns holy water. 
We know that Bukharin is still unable to understand 
that under present conditions the kulak will not supply a 
sufficient quantity of grain voluntarily, of his own accord. 
That has been proved by our two yearsı experience 
of grain-procurement work.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 65 
But what if, in spite of everything, there is not enough 
marketable grain? To this Bukharin replies: Do not 
worry the kulaks with emergency measures; import grain 
from abroad. Not long ago he proposed that we import 
about 50,000,000 poods of grain, i.e., to the value of 
about 100,000,000 rubles in foreign currency. But what 
if foreign currency is required to import equipment for 
industry? To this Bukharin replies: Preference must be 
given to grain imports‹thus, evidently, relegating imports 
of equipment for industry to the background. 
It follows, therefore, that the basis for the solution 
of the grain problem and for the reconstruction of agriculture 
is not a rapid rate of development of industry, 
but the development of individual peasant farming, 
including kulak farming, on the basis of a free market 
and the free play of prices in the market. 
Thus we have two different plans of economic policy. 
The Partyıs plan: 
1. We are re-equipping industry (reconstruction). 
2. We are beginning seriously to re-equip agriculture 
(reconstruction). 
3. For this we must expand the development of collective 
farms and state farms, employ on a mass scale 
the contract system and machine and tractor stations as 
means of establishing a bond between industry and agriculture 
in the sphere of production. 
4. As for the present grain-procurement difficulties, 
we must admit the permissibility of temporary emergency 
measures that are backed by the popular support of the 
middle- and poor-peasant masses, as one of the means 
of breaking the resistance of the kulaks and of obtaining 
from them the maximum grain surpluses necessary for

J. V. S T A L I N 66 
dispensing with imported grain and saving foreign currency 
for the development of industry. 
5. Individual poor- and middle-peasant farming plays, 
and will continue to play, a predominant part in supplying 
the country with food and raw materials; 
but alone it is no longer adequate‹the development 
of individual poor- and middle-peasant farming must 
therefore be supplemented by the development of collective 
farms and state farms, by the contract system 
on a mass scale, by accelerating the development of 
machine and tractor stations, in order to facilitate the 
ousting of the capitalist elements from agriculture and 
the gradual transfer of the individual peasant farms on to 
the lines of large-scale collective farming, on to the lines 
of collective labour. 
6. But in order to achieve all this, it is necessary 
first of all to accelerate the development of industry, 
of the metallurgical chemical and machine-building industries, 
tractor works, agricultural-machinery works, etc. 
Failing this it will be impossible to solve the grain problem 
just as it will be impossible to reconstruct agriculture. 
Conclusion: the key to the reconstruction of agriculture 
is a rapid rate of development of our industry. 
Bukharinıs plan: 
1. ³Normalise² the market; permit the free play of 
prices on the market and a rise in the price of grain, 
undeterred by the fact that this may lead to a rise in the 
prices of manufactured goods, raw materials and bread. 
2. The utmost development of individual peasant 
farming accompanied by a certain reduction of the rate 
of development of collective farms and state farms (Bu

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67 
kharinıs theses in July and his speech at the July plenum). 
3. Grain procurements to proceed automatically, 
excluding at any time or under any circumstances even 
a partial use of emergency measures against the kulaks, 
even though such measures are supported by the middleand 
poor-peasant masses. 
4. In the event of shortage of grain, to import about 
100 million rublesı worth of grain. 
5. And if there is not enough foreign currency to 
pay for grain imports and imports of equipment for industry, 
to reduce imports of equipment and, consequently, 
the rate of development of our industry‹otherwise 
our agriculture will simply ³mark time,² or even 
³directly decline.² 
Conclusion: the key to the reconstruction of agriculture 
is the development of individual peasant farming. 
That is how it works out, comrades! 
Bukharinıs plan is a plan to reduce the rate of development 
of industry and to undermine the new forms 
of the bond. 
Such are our disagreements. 
Sometimes the question is asked: Have we not been 
late in developing the new forms of the bond, in developing 
collective farms, state farms, etc.? 
Some people assert that the Party was at least about 
two years late in starting with this work. That is wrong, 
comrades. It is absolutely wrong. Only noisy ³Lefts,² 
who have no conception of the economy of the U.S.S.R., 
can talk like that. 
What is meant by being late in this matter? If it 
is a question of foreseeing the need for collective farms 
THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

J. V. S T A L I N 68 
and state farms, then we can say that we began that 
at the time of the October Revolution. There cannot 
be the slightest doubt that already then‹at the time 
of the October Revolution‹the Party foresaw the need 
for collective farms and state farms. Lastly, one can 
take our programme, adopted at the Eighth Congress of 
the Party (March 1919). The need for collective farms 
and state farms is recognised there quite clearly. 
But the mere fact that the top leadership of our 
Party fore saw the need for collective farms and state 
farms was not enough for carrying into effect and organising 
a mass movement for collective farms and state 
farms. Consequently, it is not a matter of foreseeing, 
but of carrying out a plan of collective-farm and statefarm 
development. But in order to carry out such a 
plan a number of conditions are required which did not 
exist before, and which came into existence only recently. 
That is the point, comrades. 
In order to carry out the plan for a mass movement 
in favour of collective farms and state farms, it is necessary, 
first of a l l , that the Partyıs top leadership 
should be supported in this matter by the mass of the 
Party membership. As you know, ours is a Party of a 
million members. It was therefore necessary to convince 
the mass of the Party membership of the correctness 
of the policy of the top leadership. That is the first 
point. 
Further, it is necessary that a mass movement in 
favour of collective should arise within the peastry, 
that the peasants‹far from fearing the collective 
farms‹should themselves join the collective farms

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 69 
and become convinced by experience of the advantage 
of collective farming over individual farming. This is 
a serious matter, requiring a certain amount of time. 
That is the second point. 
Further, it is necessary that the state should possess 
the material resources required to finance collectivefarm 
development, to finance the collective farms and 
state farms. And this, dear comrades, is a matter that 
requires many hundreds of millions of rubles. That is the 
third point. 
Finally, it is necessary that industry should be fairly 
adequately developed so as to be able to supply agriculture 
with machinery, tractors, fertilisers, etc. That 
is the fourth point. 
Can it be asserted that all these conditions existed 
here two or three years ago? No, it cannot. 
It must not be forgotten that we are a party in power, 
not in opposition. An opposition party can issue 
slogans‹I am speaking of fundamental practical slogans 
of the movement‹in order to carry them into effect 
after coming into power. Nobody can accuse an opposition 
party of not carrying out its fundamental slogans 
immediately, for everybody knows that it is not the 
opposition party which is at the helm, but other parties. 
In the case of a party in power, however, such as 
our Bolshevik Party is, the matter is entirely different. 
The slogans of such a party are not mere agitational 
slogans, but something much more than that, for they 
have the force of practical decision, the force of law, and 
must be carried out immediately. Our Party cannot issue 
a practical slogan and then defer its implementation. 
That would be deceiving the masses. For a practical

J. V. S T A L I N 70 
slogan to be issued, especially so serious a slogan as 
transferring the vast masses of the peasantry on to the 
lines of collectivism, the conditions must exist that will 
enable the slogan to be carried out directly; finally, 
these conditions must be created, organised. That is why 
it is not enough for the Partyıs top leadership merely 
to foresee the need for collective farms and state farms. 
That is why we also need the conditions to enable us 
to realise, to carry out, our slogans immediately. 
Was the mass of our Party membership ready for 
the utmost development of collective farms and state 
farms, say, some two or three years ago? No, it was not 
ready. The serious turn of the mass of the Party membership 
towards the new forms of the bond began only 
with the first serious grain-procurement difficulties. It 
required those difficulties for the mass of the Party 
membership to become conscious of the full necessity of 
accelerating the adoption of the new forms of the bond, 
and primarily, of the collective farms and state farms, 
and resolutely to support its Central Committee in this 
matter. This is one condition which did not exist before, 
but which does exist now. 
Was there any serious movement among the vast 
masses of the peasantry in favour of collective farms or 
state farms some two or three years ago? No, there was 
not. Everybody knows that two or three years ago the 
peasantry was hostilely disposed to the state farms, 
while they contemptuously called the collective farms 
the ³kommunia,² regarding them as something utterly 
useless. And now? Now, the situation is different. Now 
we have whole strata of the peasantry who regard 
the state farms and collective farms as a source of assist

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 71 
ance to peasant farming in the way of seed, pedigree 
cattle, machines and tractors. Now we have only to 
supply machines and tractors, and collective farms will 
develop at an accelerated pace. 
What was the cause of this change of attitude among 
certain, fairly considerable, strata of the peasantry? 
What helped to bring it about? 
In the first place, the development of the co-operatives 
and a co-operative communal life. There can be 
no doubt that without the powerful development of the 
co-operatives, particularly the agricultural co-operatives, 
which produced among the peasantry a psychological 
background in favour of the collective farms, we would 
not have that urge towards the collective farms which 
is now displayed by whole strata of the peasantry. 
An important part in this was also played by the 
existence of well-organised collective farms, which set 
the peasants good examples of how agriculture can be 
improved by uniting small peasant farms into large, 
collective, farms. 
The existence of well-organised state farms, which 
helped the peasants to improve their methods of farming, 
also played its part here. I need not mention other 
facts with which you are all familiar. There you have 
another condition which did not exist before, but which 
does exist now. 
Further, can it be asserted that we were able some 
two or three years ago to give substantial financial aid 
to the collective farms and state farms, to assign hundreds 
of millions of rubles for this purpose? No, it cannot 
be asserted. You know very well that we even 
lacked sufficient means for developing that minimum of

J. V. S T A L I N 72 
industry without which no industrialisation at all is 
possible, let alone the reconstruction of agriculture. 
Could we take those means from industry, which is the 
basis for the industrialisation of the country, and transfer 
them to the collective farms and state farms? Obviously, 
we could not. But now? Now we have the means 
for developing the collective farms and state farms. 
Finally, can it be asserted that some two or three 
years ago our industry was an adequate basis for supplying 
agriculture with large quantities of machines, 
tractors, etc.? No, it cannot be asserted. At that time our 
task was to create the minimum industrial basis required 
for supplying machines and tractors to agriculture in 
the future. It was on the creation of such a basis that our 
scanty financial resources were then spent. And now? 
Now we have this industrial basis for agriculture. At 
all events, this industrial basis is being created at a 
very rapid rate. 
It follows that the conditions required for the mass 
development of the collective farms and state farms were 
created only recently. 
That is how matters stand, comrades. 
That is why it cannot be said that we were late in 
developing the new forms of the bond. 
g) BUKHARIN AS A THEORETICIAN 
Such, in the main, are the principal mistakes committed 
by the theoretician of the Right opposition, Bukharin, 
on the fundamental questions of our policy. 
It is said that Bukharin is one of the theoreticians 
of our Party. This is true, of course. But the point is

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 73 
that not all is well with his theorising. This is evident 
if only from the fact that on questions of Party theory 
and policy he has piled up the heap of mistakes which I 
have just described. These mistakes, mistakes on Comintern 
questions, mistakes on questions of the class 
struggle, the intensification of the class struggle, the 
peasantry, NEP, the new forms of the bond‹these 
mistakes could not possibly have occurred accidentally. 
No, these mistakes are not accidental. These mistakes of 
Bukharinıs followed from his wrong theoretical line, 
from the defects in his theories. Yes, Bukharin is a theoretician, 
but he is not altogether a Marxist theoretician; 
he is a theoretician who has much to learn before he can 
become a Marxist theoretician. 
Reference has been made to the letter in which Comrade 
Lenin speaks of Bukharin as a theoretician. Let us 
read this letter: 
³Of the younger members of the Central Committee,² says 
Lenin, ³I should like to say a few words about Bukharin and 
Pyatakov. In my opinion, they are the most outstanding forces 
(of the youngest ones), and regarding them the following should 
be borne in mind: Bukharin is not only a very valuable and important 
theoretician in our Party, he is also legitimately regarded 
as the favourite of the whole Party, but it is very doubtful whether 
his theoretical views can be classed as fully Marxist, for there 
is something scholastic in him (he has never studied and, I think, 
has never fully understood dialectics)²* (Verbatim report of the 
July plenum, 1926, Part IV, p. 66). 
Thus, he is a theoretician without dialectics. A 
scholastic theoretician. A theoretician about whom it 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 74 
was said: ³It is very doubtful whether his theoretical 
views can be classed as fully Marxist.² That is how Lenin 
characterised Bukharinıs theoretical complexion. 
You can well understand, comrades, that such a 
theoretician has still much to learn. And if Bukharin 
understood that he is not yet a full-fledged theoretician, 
that he still has much to learn, that he is a theoretician 
who has not yet mastered dialectics‹and dialectics 
is the soul of Marxism‹if he understood that, he would 
be more modest, and the Party would only benefit thereby. 
But the trouble is that Bukharin is wanting in 
modesty. The trouble is that not only is he wanting in 
modesty, but he even presumes to teach our teacher 
Lenin on a number of questions and, above all, on the 
question of the state. And that is Bukharinıs misfortune. 
Allow me in this connection to refer to the wellknown 
theoretical controversy which flared up in 1916 
between Lenin and Bukharin on the question of the 
state. This is important for us in order to expose both 
Bukharinıs inordinate pretensions to teach Lenin and 
the roots of his theoretical weaknesses on such important 
questions as the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
the class struggle, etc. 
As you know, an article by Bukharin appeared in 
1916 in the magazine Internatsional Molodyozhy,7 signed 
Nota Bene; this article was in point of fact directed 
against Comrade Lenin. In this article Bukharin wrote: 
³. . . It is quite a mistake to seek the difference between 
the Socialists and the Anarchists in the fact that the former are 
in favour of the state while the latter are against it. The real 
difference is that revolutionary Social-Democracy desires to

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 75 
organise the new social production as centralised production, i.e., 
technically the most advanced production; whereas decentralised 
anarchist production would mean only retrogression to old 
technique, to the old form of enterprises. . . .² 
³. . . Social-Democracy, which is, or at least should be, the 
educator of the masses, must now more than ever emphasise its 
hostility in principle to the state. . . . The present war has shown 
how deeply the roots of the state idea have penetrated the souls 
of the workers.² 
Criticising these views of Bukharinıs, Lenin says in 
a well known article published in 1916: 
³This is wrong. The author raises the question of the difference 
in the attitude of Socialists and Anarchists towards the 
state. But he replies not to this question, but to another, namely, 
the difference in the attitude of Socialists and Anarchists towards 
the economic foundation of future society. That, of course, is 
a very important and necessary question. But it does not follow 
that the main point of difference in the attitude of the Socialists 
and Anarchists towards the state can be ignored. The Socialists 
are in favour of utilising the modern state and its institutions in 
the struggle for the emancipation of the working class, and they 
also urge the necessity of utilising the state for the peculiar transitional 
form from capitalism to socialism. This transitional 
form, which is also a state, is the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
The Anarchists want to Œabolishı the state, to Œblow it upı (³sprengen²), 
as Comrade Nota Bene expresses it in one place, erroneously 
ascribing this view to the Socialists. The Socialists‹unfortunately 
the author quotes the words of Engels relevant to this subject 
rather incompletely‹hold that the state will Œwither away,ı 
will gradually Œfall asleepı after the bourgeoisie has been expropriated.² 
. . . 
³In order to Œemphasiseı out Œhostility in principleı to the 
state, we must indeed understand it Œclearly.ı This clarity, however, 
our author lacks. His phrase about the Œroots of the state 
ideaı is entirely muddled, non-Marxist and non-socialist. It is 
not Œthe state ideaı that has clashed with the repudiation of the

J. V. S T A L I N 76 
idea of the state, but opportunist policy (i.e., an opportunist, 
reformist, bourgeois attitude towards the state) that has clashed 
with revolutionary Social-Democratic policy (i.e., with the revolutionary 
Social-Democratic attitude to the bourgeois state and 
towards utilising the state against the bourgeoisie in order to overthrow 
it). These are entirely different things² (Vol. XIX, p. 296). 
I think it is clear what the point at issue is, and 
what a semi-anarchist mess Bukharin has got into! 
Sten. At that time Lenin had not yet fully formulated 
the necessity for ³blowing up² the state. Bukharin, while 
committing anarchist mistakes, was approaching a formulation 
of the question. 
Stalin. No, that is not what we are concerned with 
at present. What we are concerned with is the attitude 
towards the state in general. The point is that in Bukharinıs 
opinion the working class should be hostile in principle 
to any kind of state, including the working-class 
state. 
Sten. Lenin then only spoke about utilising the state; 
he said nothing in his criticism of Bukharin regarding 
the ³blowing up² of the state. 
Stalin. You are mistaken, the ³blowing up² of the 
state is not a Marxist formula, it is an anarchist formula. 
Let me assure you that the point here is that, 
in the opinion of Bukharin (and of the Anarchists), the 
workers should emphasise their hostility in principle 
to any kind of state, and, therefore, also to the state 
of the transition period, to the working-class state. 
Just try to explain to our workers that the working 
class must become imbued with hostility in principle to 
the proletarian dictatorship, which, of course, is also a 
state.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 77 
Bukharinıs position, as set forth in his article in 
Internatsional Molodyozhy, is one of repudiating the state 
in the period of transition from capitalism to socialism. 
Bukharin overlooked a ³trifle² here, namely, the 
whole transition period, during which the working class 
cannot do without its own state if it really wants to suppress 
the bourgeoisie and build socialism. That is the 
first point. 
Secondly, it is not true that at the time Comrade 
Lenin in his criticism did not deal with the theory of 
³blowing up,² of ³abolishing² the state in general. 
Lenin not only dealt with this theory, as is evident from 
the passages I have quoted, but he criticised and demolished 
it as an anarchist theory, and counterposed to 
it the theory of forming and utilising a new state after the 
overthrow of the bourgeoisie, namely, the state of the 
proletarian dictatorship. 
Finally, the anarchist theory of ³blowing up² and 
³abolishing² the state must not be confused with the 
Marxist theory of the ³withering away² of the proletarian 
state or the ³breaking up,² the ³smashing² of the 
bourgeois state machine. There are persons who are inclined 
to confuse these two different concepts in the 
belief that they express one and the same idea. But 
that is wrong. Lenin proceeded precisely from the Marxist 
theory of ³smashing² the bourgeois state machine and 
the ³withering away² of the proletarian state when he 
criticised the anarchist theory of ³blowing up² and ³abolishing² 
the state in general. 
Perhaps it will not be superfluous if, for the sake 
of greater clarity, I quote here one of Comrade Leninıs 
manuscripts on the state, apparently written at the end

J. V. S T A L I N 78 
of 1916, or the beginning of 1917 (before the February 
Revolution of 1917). From this manuscript it is easily 
seen that: 
a) in criticising Bukharinıs semi-anarchist errors 
on the question of the state, Lenin proceeded from the 
Marxist theory of the ³withering away² of the proletarian 
state and the ³smashing² of the bourgeois state 
machine; 
b) although Bukharin, as Lenin expressed i t , ³is 
nearer to the truth than Kautsky,² nevertheless, ³instead 
of exposing the Kautskyites, he helps them with 
his mistakes.² 
Here is the text of this manuscript: 
³Of extremely great importance on the question of the state 
is the letter of Engels to Bebel dated March 18-28, 1875. 
³Here is the most important passage in full: 
³. . . ŒThe free peopleıs state is transformed into the free 
state. Taken in its grammatical sense, a free state is one where 
the state is free in relation to its citizens, hence a state with a 
despotic government. The whole talk about the state should be 
dropped, especially since the Commune, which was no longer a state 
in the proper sense of the word. The ³peopleıs state² has been 
thrown in our faces by the Anarchists to the point of disgust, 
although already Marxıs book against Proudhon and later the 
Communist Manifesto directly declare that with the introduction 
of the socialist order of society the state will dissolve of itself (sich 
auflöst) and disappear. As, therefore, the state is only a transitional 
institution which is used in the struggle, in the revolution, 
in order to hold down oneıs adversaries by force, it is pure nonsense 
to talk of a free peopleıs state: so long as the proletariat 
still uses (Engelsı italics) the state, it does not use it in the interests 
of freedom but in order to hold down its adversaries, and as 
soon as it becomes possible to speak of freedom the state as such 
ceases to exist. We would therefore propose to replace the word state 
(Engelsı italics) everywhere by the word ³community² (Gemein

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 79 
wesen), a good old German word which can very well represent 
the French word ³commune.²ı 
³This is, perhaps, the most remarkable, and certainly, the 
most pronounced passage, so to speak, in the works of Marx and 
Engels Œagainst the state.ı 
³(1) ŒThe whole talk about the state should be dropped.ı 
³(2) ŒThe Commune was no longer a state in the proper sense 
of the word.ı (What was it, then? A transitional form from the 
state to no state, obviously!) 
³(3) The Œpeopleıs stateı has been Œthrown in our facesı (in 
die Zähne geworfen, literally‹thrown in our teeth) by the Anarchists 
too long (that is, Marx and Engels were ashamed of the obvious 
mistake made by their German friends; but they regarded 
it, and of course, in the circumstances that then existed, correctly 
regarded it as a far less serious mistake than that made by the 
Anarchists. This NB!!). 
³(4) The state will Œdisintegrate (³dissolve²) (Nota Bene) 
of itself and disappearı . . . (compare later ³will wither away²) 
Œwith the introduction of the socialist order of societyı. . . . 
³(5) The state is a Œtemporary institutionı which is used 
Œin the struggle, in the revolutionı . . . (used by the proletariat, 
of course). . . . 
³(6) The state is needed not for freedom, but for holding down 
(Niederhaltung is not suppression in the proper sense of the word, 
but preventing restoration, keeping in submission) the adversaries 
of the proletariat. 
³(7) When there will be freedom, there will be no state. 
³(8) ŒWeı (i.e., Engels and Marx) would propose to replace 
the word Œstateı Œeverywhereı (in the programme) by the word Œcommunityı 
(Gemeinwesen), Œcommuneı!!! 
³This shows how Marx and Engels were vulgarised and defiled 
not only by the opportunists, but also by Kautsky. 
³The opportunists have not understood a single one of these 
eight rich ideas!! 
³They have taken only what is practically necessary for the 
present time: to utilise the political struggle, to utilise the present 
state to educate, to train the proletariat, to Œwrest concessions.ı 
That is correct (as against the Anarchists), but that is

J. V. S T A L I N 80 
only 
 part of Marxism, if one can thus express it arithmetically. 
³In his propagandist works, and publications generally, 
Kautsky has completely slurred over (or forgotten? or not understood?) 
points 1, 2, 5, 6, 7 and 8, and the ŒZerbrechenı of Marx (in 
his controversy with Pannekoek in 1912 or 1913, Kautsky (see 
below, pp. 45-47) completely dropped into opportunism on this 
question.) 
³What distinguishes us from the Anarchists is (a) the use 
of the state now and (ß) during the proletarian revolution (the Œdictatorship 
of the proletariatı)‹points of very great importance in 
practice at this moment. (But it is these very points that Bukharin 
forgot!) 
³What distinguishes us from the opportunists is the more 
profound, Œmore permanentı truths regarding (aa) the Œtemporaryı 
nature of the state, (ßß) the harm of Œchatter ı about i t 
now, (..) the not entirely state character of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, (dd) the contradiction be tween the state and 
freedom, (ee) the more correct idea (concept, programmatic 
term) Œcommunityı instead of state, (..) Œsmashingı (Zerbrechen) 
of the bureaucratic-military machine. 
³It must not be forgotten also that the avowed opportunists in 
Germany (Bernstein, Kolb, etc.) directly repudiate the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, while the official programme and Kautsky 
indirectly repudiate it, by not saying anything about it in 
their day-to-day agitation and tolerating the renegacy of Kolb 
and Co. 
³In August 1916, Bukharin was written to: ŒAllow your 
ideas about the state to mature.ı Without, however, allowing them 
to mature, he broke into print, as ŒNota Bene,ı and did it in such 
a way that, instead of exposing the Kautskyites, he helped them 
with his mistakes!! Yet, as a matter of fact, Bukharin is nearer 
to the truth than Kautsky.²8 
Such is the brief history of the theoretical controversy 
on the question of the state. 
It would seem that the matter is clear: Bukharin 
made semi-anarchist mistakes‹it is time to correct

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 81 
those mistakes and proceed further in the footsteps of 
Lenin. But only Leninists can think like that. Bukharin, 
it appears, does not agree. On the contrary, he asserts 
that it was not he who was mistaken, but Lenin; that it 
was not he who followed, or ought to have followed, in 
the footsteps of Lenin, but, on the contrary, that it was 
Lenin who found himself compelled to follow in the footsteps 
of Bukharin. 
You do not believe this, comrades? In that case, 
listen further. After the controversy in 1916, nine years 
later, during which interval Bukharin maintained silence, 
and a year after the death of Lenin‹namely, in 1925‹ 
Bukharin published an article in the symposium Revolutsia 
Prava, entitled ³Concerning the Theory of the 
Imperialist State,² which previously had been rejected 
by the editors of Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata9 (i.e., by 
Lenin). In a footnote to this article Bukharin bluntly 
declares that it was not Lenin but he, Bukharin, who was 
right in this controversy. That may seem incredible, 
comrades, but it is a fact. 
Listen to the text of this footnote: 
³V. I. (i.e., Lenin) wrote a short article containing criticism 
of the article in Internatsional Molodyozhy. The reader will easily 
see that I had not made the mistake attributed to me, for I clearly 
saw the need for the dictatorship of the proletariat; on the other 
hand, from Ilyichıs article it will be seen that at that time he 
was wrong about the thesis on Œblowing upı the state (bourgeois 
state, of course), and confused that question with the question of 
the withering away of the dictatorship of the proletariat.* Perhaps 
I should have enlarged on the subject of the dictatorship at that 
time. But in justification I may say that at that time there was 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 82 
such a wholesale exaltation of the bourgeois state by the Social- 
Democrats that it was natural to concentrate all attention on the 
question of blowing up that machine. 
³When I arrived in Russia from America and saw Nadezhda 
Konstantinovna* (that was at our illegal Sixth Congress and at 
that time V. I. was in hiding) her first words were: ŒV. I. asked 
me to tell you that he has no disagreements with you now over 
the question of the state.ı Studying this question, Ilyich came 
to the same conclusions** regarding Œblowing up,ı but he developed 
this theme, and later the theory of the dictatorship, to such an 
extent as to create a whole epoch in the development of theoretical 
thought in this field.² 
That is how Bukharin writes about Lenin a year 
after Leninıs death. 
There you have a pretty example of the hypertrophied 
pretentiousness of a half-educated theoretician! 
Quite possibly, Nadezhda Konstantinovna did tell 
Bukharin what he writes here. But what conclusions can 
be drawn from this fact? The only conclusion that can 
be drawn is that Lenin had certain grounds for believing 
that Bukharin had renounced or was ready to renounce 
his mistakes. That is all. But Bukharin thought differently. 
He decided that henceforth, not Lenin, but he, 
i.e., Bukharin, must be regarded as the creator, or, at 
least, the inspirer of the Marxist theory of the state. 
Hitherto we have regarded ourselves as Leninists, 
and we continue to do so. But it now appears that both 
Lenin and we, his disciples, are Bukharinites. Rather 
funny, comrades. But thatıs what happens when one 
has to deal with Bukharinıs puffed-up pretentiousness. 
* Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya, Lenin's wife.‹Tr. 
** My italics.‹J. St.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 83 
It might be thought that Bukharinıs footnote to the 
above-mentioned article was a slip of the pen, that he 
wrote something silly, and then forgot about it. But 
it turns out that that is not the case. Bukharin, it turns 
out, spoke in all seriousness. That is evident, for example, 
from the fact that the statement he made in this 
footnote regarding Leninıs mistakes and Bukharinıs correctness 
was republished recently, namely, in 1927, i.e., 
two years after Bukharinıs first attack on Lenin, in a 
biographical sketch of Bukharin written by Maretsky, 
and it never occurred to Bukharin to protest against 
this . . . boldness of Maretsky. Obviously Bukharinıs 
attack on Lenin cannot be regarded as accidental. 
It appears, therefore, that Bukharin is right, and 
not Lenin, that the inspirer of the Marxist theory of the 
state is not Lenin, but Bukharin. 
Such, comrades, is the picture of the theoretical 
distortions and the theoretical pretensions of Bukharin. 
And this man, after all this, has the presumption 
to say in his speech here that there is ³something rotten² 
in the theoretical line of our Party, that there is a deviation 
towards Trotskyism in the theoretical line of our 
Party! 
And this is said by that same Bukharin who is making 
(and has made in the past) a number of gross theoretical 
and practical mistakes, who only recently was a 
pupil of Trotskyıs, and who only the other day was 
seeking to form a bloc with the Trotskyites against the 
Leninists and was paying them visits by the backdoor. 
Is that not funny, comrades?

J. V. S T A L I N 84 
h) A FIVE-YEAR PLAN OR A TWO-YEAR PLAN 
Permit me now to pass to Rykovıs speech. While 
Bukharin tried to provide a theoretical basis for the 
Right deviation, Rykov attempted in his speech to provide 
it with a basis of practical proposals and to frighten 
us with ³horrors² drawn from our difficulties in 
the sphere of agriculture. That does not mean that Rykov 
did not touch upon theoretical questions. He did touch 
upon them. But in doing so he made at least two serious 
mistakes. 
In his draft resolution on the five-year plan, which 
was rejected by the commission of the Political Bureau, 
Rykov says that ³the central idea of the five-year plan 
is to increase the productivity of labour of the people.² 
In spite of the fact that the commission of the Political 
Bureau rejected this absolutely false line, Rykov defended 
it here in his speech. 
Is it true that the central idea of the five-year plan 
in the Soviet country is to increase the productivity of 
labour? No, it is not true. It is not just any kind of increase 
in the productivity of labour of the people that 
we need. What we need is a specific increase in the productivity 
of labour of the people, namely, an increase 
that will guarantee the systematic supremacy of the socialist 
sector of the national economy over the capitalist sector. 
A five-year plan which overlooks this central idea is 
not a five-year plan, but five-year rubbish. 
Every society, capitalist and pre-capitalist society 
included, is interested in increasing the productivity 
of labour in general. The difference between Soviet society 
and every other society lies in the very fact that it

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 85 
is interested not in just any kind of increase of the productivity 
of labour, but in such an increase as will ensure 
the supremacy of socialist forms of economy over 
other forms, and primarily over capitalist forms of 
economy, and will thus ensure that the capitalist forms 
of economy are overcome and ousted. But Rykov forgot 
this really central idea of the five-year plan of development 
of Soviet society. That is his first theoretical 
mistake. 
His second mistake is that he does not distinguish, 
or does not want to understand the distinction‹from 
the point of view of trade turnover‹between, let us 
say, a collective farm and all kinds of individual enterprises, 
including individual capitalist enterprises. Rykov 
assures us that from the point or view of trade turnover 
on the grain market, from the point of view of 
obtaining grain, he does not see any difference between 
a collective farm and a private holder of grain; to him, 
therefore, it is a matter of indifference whether we buy 
grain from a collective farm, a private holder, or an 
Argentinian grain merchant. That is absolutely wrong. It 
is a repetition of the statement of Frumkin, who at one 
time used to assure us that it was a matter of indifference 
to him where and from whom we bought grain, 
whether from a private dealer or from a collective farm. 
That is a masked form of defence, of rehabilitation, 
of justification of the kulakıs machinations on the 
grain market. That this defence is conducted from the 
point of view of trade turn over does not alter the fact 
that it is, nevertheless, a justification of the kulakıs 
machinations on the grain market. If from the viewpoint 
of trade turnover there is no difference between

J. V. S T A L I N 86 
collective and non-collective forms of economy, is it 
worth while developing collective farms, granting them 
privileges and devoting ourselves to the difficult task 
of overcoming the capitalist elements in agriculture? It 
is obvious that Rykov has taken a wrong line. That is 
his second theoretical mistake. 
But this is by the way. Let us pass to the practical 
questions raised in Rykovıs speech. 
Rykov said here that in addition to the five-year 
plan we need another, a parallel plan, namely, a twoyear 
plan for the development of agriculture. He justified 
this proposal for a parallel two-year plan on the 
grounds of the difficulties experienced in agriculture. He 
said: the five-year plan was a good thing and he was in 
favour of it; but if at the same time we drew up a twoyear 
plan for agriculture it would be still better‹otherwise 
agriculture would get into a fix. 
On the face of it there appears to be nothing wrong 
with this proposal. But upon closer scrutiny we find 
that the two-year plan for agriculture was invented in 
order to emphasise that the five-year plan is unreal, a 
plan merely on paper. Could we agree to that? No, we 
could not. We said to Rykov: If you are dissatisfied 
with the five-year plan with regard to agriculture, if 
you think that the funds we are assigning in the fiveyear 
plan for developing agriculture are inadequate, then 
tell us plainly what your supplementary proposals are, 
what additional investments you propose‹we are ready 
to include these additional investments in agriculture 
in the five-year plan. And what happened? We 
found that Rykov had no supplementary proposals to 
make about additional investments in agriculture. The

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 87 
question arises: Why then a parallel two-year plan for 
agriculture? 
We said to him further: In addition to the five-year 
plan there are yearly plans which are part of the fiveyear 
plan. Let us include in the first two of the yearly 
plans the concrete additional proposals for developing 
agriculture that you have, that is, if you have any at 
all. And what happened? We found that Rykov had 
no such concrete plans for additional assignments to 
propose. 
We then realised that Rykovıs proposal for a twoyear 
plan was not made for the purpose of developing 
agriculture, but arose from a desire to emphasise that 
the five-year plan was unreal, a plan merely on paper, 
from a desire to discredit the five-year plan. For ³conscience² 
sake, for appearance sake, a five-year plan; 
but for work, for practical purposes, a two-year plan‹ 
that was Rykovıs strategy. Rykov brought the two-year 
plan on the scene in order subsequently, during the practical 
work of carrying out the five-year plan, to counterpose 
it to the five-year plan, reconstruct the fiveyear 
plan and adapt it to the two-year plan by paring 
down and curtailing the assignments for industry. 
It was on these grounds that we rejected Rykovıs 
proposal for a parallel two-year plan. 
i) THE QUESTION OF THE CROP AREA 
Rykov tried here to frighten the Party by asserting 
that the crop area throughout the U.S.S.R. is showing 
a steady tendency to diminish. Moreover, he threw out 
the hint that the policy of the Party was to blame for

J. V. S T A L I N 88 
the diminution of the crop area. He did not say outright 
that we are faced with a retrogression of agriculture, 
but the impression left by his speech is that something 
like retrogression is taking place. 
Is it true that the crop area is showing a steady 
tendency to diminish? No, it is not true. Rykov made 
use of average figures of the crop area throughout the 
country. But the method of average figures, if it is not 
corrected by data for individual districts, cannot be 
regarded as a scientific method. 
Rykov has, perhaps, read Leninıs Development of 
Capitalism in Russia. If he has read it he ought to remember 
how Lenin inveighed against the bourgeois economists 
for using the method of average figures showing 
the expansion of the crop area and ignoring the data for 
individual districts. It is strange that Rykov should 
now repeat the mistakes of the bourgeois economists. 
Now, if we examine the changes in the crop area according 
to districts, i.e., if we approach the matter scientifically, 
it will be seen that in certain districts the crop 
area is expanding steadily, while in others it sometimes 
diminishes, depending chiefly on meteorological conditions; 
moreover, there are no facts to indicate that there 
is a steady diminution of the crop area anywhere, even 
in a single important grain growing district. 
Indeed, there has recently been a decrease in the crop 
area in districts which have been affected by frost or 
drought, in certain regions of the Ukraine, for instance. 
. . . 
A voice. Not the whole Ukraine. 
Schlichter. In the Ukraine the crop area has increased 
by 2.7 per cent.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 89 
Stalin. I am referring to the steppe regions of the 
Ukraine. In other districts, for instance in Siberia, 
the Volga region, Kazakhstan, and Bashkiria, which 
were not affected by un favourable weather conditions, 
the crop area has been steadily expanding. 
How is it that in certain districts the crop area is 
steadily expanding, while in others it sometimes diminishes? 
It cannot really be asserted that the Party has 
one policy in the Ukraine and another in the east or in 
the central area of the U.S.S.R. That would be absurd, 
comrades. Obviously weather conditions are of no little 
importance here. 
It is true that the kulaks are reducing their crop 
areas irrespective of weather conditions. For that, if 
you like, the policy of the Party, which is to support 
the poor- and middle-peasant masses against the kulaks, 
is ³to blame.² But what if it is? Did we ever pledge 
ourselves to pursue a policy which would satisfy all 
social groups in the countryside, including the kulaks? 
And, moreover, how can we pursue a policy which would 
satisfy both the exploiters and the exploited‹if we 
desire at all to pursue a Marxist policy? What is there 
strange in the fact that, as a result of our Leninist policy, 
which is intended to restrict and overcome the 
capitalist elements in the countryside, the kulaks begin 
partly to reduce the area of their crops? What else would 
you expect? 
Perhaps this policy is wrong? Then let them tell 
us so plainly. Is it not strange that people who call themselves 
Marxists are so frightened as to try to make out 
that the partial reduction of crop areas by the kulaks 
is a decrease of the crop area as a whole, forgetting that

J. V. S T A L I N 90 
besides the kulaks there are also the poor and middle 
peasants, whose crop area is expanding, that there are 
the collective farms and state farms, whose crop area is 
growing at an increasing rate? 
Finally, one more error in Rykovıs speech regarding 
the crop area. Rykov complained here that in certain 
places, namely, where there has been the greatest development 
of collective farms, the tillage of the individual 
poor and middle peasants is beginning to diminish. 
That is true. But what is wrong with that? How 
could it be otherwise? If the poor- and middle-peasant 
farms are beginning to abandon individual tillage and 
are going over to collective farming, is it not obvious 
that the growth in size and numbers of the collective 
farms is bound to result in a decrease of the tillage 
of the individual poor and middle peasants? But what 
would you expect? 
The collective farms now have something over two 
million hectares of land. At the end of the five-year 
plan period, the collective farms will have more than 
25,000,000 hectares. At whose expense does the tillage 
of the collective farms expand? At the expense of the 
tillage of the individual poor and middle peasants. But 
what would you expect? How else is the individual 
farming of the poor and middle peasants to be transferred 
on to the lines of collective farming? Is it not obvious 
that in a large number of areas the tillage of the 
collective farms will expand at the expense of individual 
tillage? 
It is strange that people refuse to understand these 
elementary things.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 91 
j) GRAIN PROCUREMENTS 
A lot of fairy-tales have been told here about our 
grain difficulties. But the main features of our current 
grain difficulties have been overlooked. 
First of all, it has been forgotten that this year we 
harvested about 500-600 million poods of rye and 
wheat‹I refer to the gross harvest‹less than last year. 
Could this fail to affect our grain procurements? Of 
course it was bound to affect them. 
Perhaps the policy of the Central Committee is responsible 
for this? No, the policy of the Central Committee 
has nothing to do with it. The explanation lies 
in the serious crop failure in the steppe regions of the 
Ukraine (frost and drought), and the partial crop failure 
in the North Caucasus, the Central Black Earth region, 
and the North-Western region. 
That is the principal reason why our grain procurements 
(rye and wheat) in the Ukraine by April 1 last 
year totalled 200,000,000 poods, while this year the 
total barely reached 26-27 million poods. 
That also explains the drop in wheat and rye procurements 
in the Central Black Earth region to about oneeighth 
and in the North Caucasus to about one-fourth. 
In certain regions in the East, grain procurements 
this year almost doubled. But this could not compensate, 
and, of course, did not compensate, for our grain deficit 
in the Ukraine, the North Caucasus and the Central 
Black Earth region. 
It must not be forgotten that in normal harvest years 
the Ukraine and the North Caucasus provide about one 
half of the total grain procurements in the U.S.S.R.

J. V. S T A L I N 92 
It is strange that Rykov lost sight of this fact. 
Finally, the second circumstance, which constitutes 
the chief feature of our current grain-procurement difficulties. 
I refer to the resistance of the kulak elements 
in the countryside to the grain-procurement policy of 
the Soviet government. Rykov ignored this circumstance. 
But to ignore it means to ignore the chief factor in grain 
procurements. What does the experience of the past two 
years as regard grain procurements show? It shows that 
the well-to-do strata of the countryside, who hold considerable 
grain surpluses and play an important role in 
the grain market, refuse to deliver voluntarily the necessary 
quantity of grain at the prices fixed by the Soviet 
government. In order to provide bread for the towns and 
industrial centres, for the Red Army and the regions growing 
industrial crops, we require about 500,000,000 poods 
of grain annually. We are able to procure 300-350 million 
poods coming in automatically. The remaining 
150,000,000 poods have to be secured through organised 
pressure on the kulaks and the well-to-do strata 
of the rural population. That is what our experience of 
grain procurements during the past two years shows. 
What has happened during these two years? Why 
these changes? Why were automatic deliveries adequate 
before, and why are they inadequate now? What has happened 
is that during these years the kulak and well-to-do 
elements have grown, the series of good harvests has not 
been without benefit to them, they have become stronger 
economically; they have accumulated a little capital 
and now are in a position to manoeuvre in the market; 
they hold back their grain surpluses in expectation of 
high prices, and get a living from other crops.

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 93 
Grain should not be regarded as an ordinary commodity. 
Grain is not like cotton, which cannot be eaten 
and which cannot be sold to everybody. Unlike cotton, 
grain, under our present conditions, is a commodity 
which everybody will take and without which it is impossible 
to exist. The kulak takes this into account 
and holds back his grain, infecting the grain holders 
in general by his example. The kulak knows that grain 
is the currency of currencies. The kulak knows that a 
surplus of grain is not only a means of self-enrichment, 
but also a means of enslaving the poor peasant. Under 
present conditions, grain surpluses in the hands of the 
kulak is a means of economically and politically strengthening 
the kulak elements. Therefore, by taking these 
grain surpluses from the kulaks, we not only facilitate 
the supply of grain to the towns and the Red Army, 
but we also destroy a means of strengthening the kulaks 
economically and politically. 
What must be done to obtain these grain surpluses? 
We must, first of all, abolish the harmful and dangerous 
mentality of letting matters take their own course. Grain 
procurements must be organised. The poor- and middlepeasant 
masses must be mobilised against the kulaks, 
and their public support organised for the measures of 
the Soviet government to increase grain procurements. 
The significance of the Urals-Siberian method of grain 
procurement, which is based on the principle of selfimposed 
obligations, lies precisely in the fact that it 
makes it possible to mobilise the labouring strata of the 
rural population against the kulaks for the purpose of 
increasing grain procurements. Experience has shown 
that this method gives us good results. Experience has

J. V. S T A L I N 94 
shown that these good results are obtained in two directions: 
firstly, we extract the grain surpluses from 
the well-to-do strata of the rural population and thereby 
help to supply the country; secondly, we mobilise on 
this basis the poor- and middle-peasant masses against the 
kulaks, educate them politically and organise them into 
a vast, powerful, political army supporting us in the 
countryside. Certain comrades fail to realise the importance 
of this latter factor. Yet i t is one of the important 
results, if not the most important result, of the 
Urals-Siberian method of grain procurement. 
It is true that this method is sometimes coupled 
with the employment of emergency measures against 
the kulaks, which evokes comical howls from Bukharin 
and Rykov. But what is wrong with it? Why should 
we not, sometimes, under certain conditions, employ 
emergency measures against our class enemy, against 
the kulaks? Why is it regarded as permissible to arrest 
speculators in the towns by hundreds and exile them 
to the Turukhansk region, but not permissible to take 
the grain surpluses from the kulaks‹who are speculating 
in grain and trying to seize the Soviet government 
by the throat and to enslave the poor peasants‹by 
methods of public compulsion and at prices at which 
the poor and middle peasants sell their grain to our 
procurement organisations? Where is the logic in this? 
Has our Party ever declared that it is opposed in principle 
to the employment of emergency measures against 
speculators and kulaks? Have we no laws against speculators? 
Evidently, Rykov and Bukharin are opposed in 
principle to any employment of emergency measures

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 95 
against the kulaks. But that is bourgeois-liberal policy, 
not Marxist policy. Surely you know that, after the introduction 
of the New Economic Policy, Lenin even expressed 
himself in favour of a return to the policy of 
Poor Peasantsı Committees, under certain conditions 
of course. And what indeed is the partial employment of 
emergency measures against the kulaks? Not even a drop 
in the ocean compared with the policy of Poor Peasantsı 
Committees. 
The adherents of Bukharinıs group hope to persuade 
the class enemy voluntarily to forego his interests and 
voluntarily to deliver his grain surpluses to us. They 
hope that the kulak, who has grown stronger, who is 
speculating, who is able to hold out by selling other 
products and who conceals his grain surpluses‹they 
hope that this kulak will give us his grain surpluses 
voluntarily at our procurement prices. Have they lost 
their senses? Is it not obvious that they do not understand 
the mechanics of the class struggle, that they do 
not know what classes are? 
Do they know how the kulaks jeer at our officials 
and the Soviet government at village meetings called 
to promote grain procurements? Have they heard of 
such facts as, for instance, what happened in Kazakhstan, 
when one of our agitators tried for two hours to 
persuade the holders of grain to deliver grain for supplying 
the country, and a kulak stepped forward with 
a pipe in his mouth and said: ³Do us a little dance, 
young fellow, and I will let you have a couple of poods of 
grain.² 
Voices. The swine! 
Stalin. Try to persuade people like that.

J. V. S T A L I N 96 
Class is class, comrades. You cannot get away from 
that truth. The Urals-Siberian method is a good one 
for the very reason that it helps to rouse the poor- and 
middle-peasant strata against the kulaks, it helps to 
smash the resistance of the kulaks and compels them to 
deliver the grain surpluses to the Soviet government 
bodies. 
The most fashionable word just now among Bukharinıs 
group is the word ³excesses² in grain procurements. 
That word is the most current commodity among them, 
since it helps them to mask their opportunist line. When 
they want to mask their own line they usually say: We, 
of course, are not opposed to pressure being brought to 
bear upon the kulak, but we are opposed to the excesses 
which are being committed in this sphere and which 
hurt the middle peasant. They then go on to relate 
stories of the ³horrors² of these excesses; they read letters 
from ³peasants,² panic-stricken letters from comrades, 
such as Markov, and then draw the conclusion: the policy 
of bringing pressure to bear upon the kulaks must be 
abandoned. 
How do you like that? Because excesses are committed 
in carrying out a correct policy, that correct policy, it 
seems, must be abandoned. That is the usual trick of the 
opportunists: on the pretext that excesses are committed 
in carrying out a correct line, abolish that line and replace 
it by an opportunist line. Moreover, the supporters 
of Bukharinıs group very carefully hush up the fact 
that there is another kind of excesses, more dangerous 
and more harmful,‹namely, excesses in the direction of 
merging with the kulak, in the direction of adaptation 
to the well-to-do strata of the rural population, in

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 97 
the direction of abandoning the revolutionary policy 
of the Party for the opportunist policy of the Right deviators. 
Of course, we are all opposed to those excesses. None 
of us wants the blows directed against the kulaks to 
hurt the middle peasants. That is obvious, and there can 
be no doubt about it. But we are most emphatically 
opposed to the chatter about excesses, in which Bukharinıs 
group so zealously indulges, being used to scuttle 
the revolutionary policy of our Party and replace it by 
the opportunist policy of Bukharinıs group. No, that 
trick of theirs wonıt work. 
Point out at least one political measure taken by 
the Party that has not been accompanied by excesses 
of one kind or another. The conclusion to be drawn from 
this is that we must combat excesses. But can one on 
these grounds decry the line itself, which is the only correct 
line? 
Take a measure like the introduction of the sevenhour 
day. There can be no doubt that this is one of the 
most revolutionary measures carried out by our Party in 
the recent period. Who does not know that this measure, 
which by its nature is a profoundly revolutionary one, 
is frequently accompanied by excesses, sometimes of a 
most objectionable kind? Does that mean that we ought 
to abandon the policy of introducing the seven-hour day? 
Do the supporters of the Bukharin opposition understand 
what a mess they are getting into in playing 
up the excesses committed during the grain-procurement 
campaign?

J. V. S T A L I N 98
k) FOREIGN CURRENCY RESERVES AND GRAIN IMPORTS 
Lastly, a few words about grain imports and our reserves 
of foreign currency. I have already mentioned the 
fact that Rykov and his close friends several times raised 
the question of importing grain from abroad. At first 
Rykov spoke of the need to import some 80-100 million 
poods of grain. This would require about 200 million 
rublesı worth of foreign currency. Later, he raised the 
question of importing 50,000,000 poods, that is, for 100 
million rublesı worth of foreign currency. We rejected 
this suggestion, as we had come to the conclusion that it 
was preferable to bring pressure to bear upon the kulaks 
and wring out of them their quite substantial grain surpluses, 
rather than expend foreign currency earmarked 
for imports of equipment for our industry. 
Now Rykov makes a change of front. Now he asserts 
that the capitalists are offering us grain on credit, but that 
we refuse to take it. He said that several telegrams had 
passed through his hands, telegrams showing that the 
capitalists are willing to let us have grain on credit. 
Moreover, he tried to make it appear that there are people 
in our ranks who refuse to accept grain on credit either 
owing to a whim or for some other inexplicable reasons. 
That is all nonsense, comrades. It would be absurd 
to imagine that the capitalists in the West have suddenly 
begun to take pity on us, that they are willing to give 
us some tens of millions of poods of grain practically 
free of charge or on long-term credit. That is nonsense, 
comrades. 
What is the point then? The point is that for the 
past six months various capitalist groups have been prob

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 99 
ing us, probing our financial possibilities, our financial 
standing, our endurance. They approach our trade representatives 
in Paris, Czechoslovakia, America and the 
Argentine with offers of grain on very short-term credit, 
not exceeding three, or, at the most, six months. Their 
object is not so much to sell us grain on credit, as to 
find out whether our position is really very difficult, 
whether our financial possibilities are really exhausted, 
or, whether our financial position is strong, and whether 
we will snatch at the bait that they have thrown out. 
There are big disputes going on now in the capitalist 
world on the subject of our financial possibilities. Some 
say that we are already bankrupt, and that the fall of 
Soviet power is a matter of a few months, if not weeks. 
Others say that this is not true, that Soviet power is firmly 
rooted, has financial possibilities and sufficient grain. 
At the present time our task is to display the requisite 
firmness and stamina, not to succumb to mendacious 
promises of grain on credit, and to show the capitalist 
world that we shall manage without importing 
grain. That is not just my personal opinion. That is the 
opinion of the majority of the Political Bureau. 
For this reason we decided to decline the offer of 
philanthropists of the Nansen type to import into the 
U.S.S.R. a million dollarsı worth of grain on credit. 
For the same reason we gave a negative answer to all 
those intelligence agents of the capitalist world in Paris, 
America and Czechoslovakia, who were offering us a small 
quantity of grain on credit. 
For the same reason we decided to exercise the utmost 
economy in grain consumption, and the maximum 
degree of organising efficiency in grain procurement.

J. V. S T A L I N 100 
By doing so, we sought to achieve two aims: on the 
one hand to do without importing grain and thus keep 
our foreign currency for importing equipment, and, on 
the other hand, to show all our enemies that we stand 
on firm ground and have no intention of succumbing to 
promises of alms. 
Was this policy correct? I believe that it was the 
only correct policy. It was correct not only because we 
found here, within our own country, new possibilities of 
obtaining grain. It was correct, too, because by managing 
without grain imports and by sweeping aside the intelligence 
agents of the capitalist world, we have strengthened 
our international position, improved our financial 
standing and exploded all idle chatter about ³the 
impending collapse² of Soviet power. 
The other day we held certain preliminary talks 
with representatives of German capitalists. They are 
promising us a 500,000,000 credit, and it looks as though 
they in fact consider it necessary to grant us this credit 
so as to ensure Soviet orders for their industry. 
A few days ago we had the visit of a delegation of 
British Conservatives, who also consider it necessary to 
recognise the stability of Soviet power and the expediency 
of granting us credits so as to ensure Soviet orders for 
their industry. 
I believe that we would not have had these new possibilities 
of obtaining credits, in the first place from 
the Germans, and then from one group of British capitalists, 
if we had not displayed the necessary firmness 
that I spoke of earlier. 
Consequently, the point is not that we are refusing 
some imaginary grain on imaginary long-term credit

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 101 
because of an alleged whim. The point is that we must 
be able to size up our enemies, to discern their real desires, 
and to display the stamina necessary for consolidating 
our international position. 
That, comrades, is the reason why we have refused 
to import grain. 
As you see, the question of grain imports is far from 
being as simple as Rykov would have us believe. The 
question of grain imports is one that concerns our international 
position. 
V 
QUESTIONS OF PARTY LEADERSHIP 
Thus we have reviewed all the principal questions 
relating to our disagreements in the sphere of theory as 
well as in the sphere of the policy of the Comintern and 
the internal policy of our Party. From what has been 
said it is apparent that Rykovıs statement about the 
existence of a single line does not correspond to the real 
state of affairs. From what has been said it is apparent 
that we have in fact two lines. One line is the general 
line of the Party, the revolutionary Leninist line of 
our Party. The other line is the line of Bukharinıs group. 
This second line has not quite crystallised yet, partly 
because of the incredible confusion of views within 
the ranks of Bukharinıs group, and partly because this 
second line, being of little importance in the Party, tries 
to disguise itself in one way or another. Nevertheless, 
as you have seen, this line exists, and it exists as a 
line which is distinct from the Party line, as a line

J. V. S T A L I N 102 
opposed to the general Party line on almost all questions 
of our policy. This second line is that of the Right d eviation. 
Let us pass now to questions of Party leadership. 
a) THE FACTIONALISM OF BUKHARINıS GROUP 
Bukharin said that there is no opposition within our 
Party, that Bukharinıs group is not an opposition. That 
is not true, comrades. The discussion at the plenum showed 
quite clearly that Bukharinıs group constitutes a new 
opposition. The oppositional work of this group consists 
in attempts to revise the Party line; it seeks to revise 
the Party line and is preparing the ground for replacing 
the Party line by another line, the line of the opposition, 
which can be nothing but the line of the Right deviation. 
Bukharin said that the group of three does not constitute 
a factional group. That is not true, comrades. 
Bukharinıs group has all the characteristics of a faction. 
There is the platform the factional secrecy, the policy 
of resigning, the organised struggle against the Central 
Committee. What more is required? Why hide the truth 
about the factionalism of Bukharinıs group, when it is 
self-evident? The very reason why the plenum of the 
Central Committee and Central Control Commission has 
met is to tell all the truth here about our disagreements. 
And the truth is that Bukharinıs group is a factional 
group. And it is not merely a factional group, but‹I 
would say‹the most repulsive and the pettiest of all 
the factional groups that ever existed in our Party. 
This is evident if only from the fact that it is now 
attempting to use for its factional aims such an insig

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 103 
nificant and petty affair as the disturbances in Adjaria. 
In point of fact, what does the so-called ³revolt² 
in Adjaria amount to in comparison with such revolts 
as the Kronstadt revolt? I believe that in comparison 
with this the so-called ³revolt² in Adjaria is not even 
a drop in the ocean. Were there any instances of 
Trotskyites or Zinovievites attempting to make use 
of the serious revolt which occurred in Kronstadt to 
combat the Central Committee, the Party? It must be 
admitted, comrades, that there were no such instances. 
On the contrary, the opposition groups which existed 
in our Party at the time of that serious revolt helped the 
Party in suppressing it, and they did not dare to make 
use of it against the Party. 
Well, and how is Bukharinıs group acting now? 
You have already had evidence that it is attempting 
in the pettiest and most offensive way to utilise against 
the Party the microscopic ³revolt² in Adjaria. What 
is this if not an extreme degree of factional blindness 
and factional degeneration? 
Apparently, it is being demanded of us that no disturbances 
should occur in our border regions which have 
common frontiers with capitalist countries. Apparently, 
it is being demanded of us that we should carry out a policy 
which would satisfy all classes of our society, the 
rich and the poor, the workers and the capitalists. 
Apparently, it is being demanded of us that there should 
be no discontented elements. Have not these comrades 
from Bukharinıs group gone out of their minds? 
How can anybody demand of us, people of the proletarian 
dictatorship who are waging a struggle against 
the capitalist world, both inside and outside our country,

J. V. S T A L I N 104 
that there should be no discontented elements in our 
country, and that disturbances should not sometimes 
occur in certain border regions which have common 
frontiers with hostile countries? For what purpose then 
does the capitalist encirclement exist, if not to enable 
international capital to apply all its efforts to organise 
actions by discontented elements in our border regions 
against the Soviet regime? Who, except empty-headed 
liberals, would raise such demands? Is it not obvious 
that factional pettiness can sometimes produce in people 
a typically liberal blindness and narrow-mindedness? 
b) LOYALTY AND COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP 
Rykov assured us here that Bukharin is one of the 
most ³irreproachable² and ³loyal² Party members in his 
attitude towards the Central Committee of our Party. 
I am inclined to doubt it. We cannot take Rykovıs 
word for it. We demand facts. And Rykov is unable to 
supply facts. 
Take, for example, such a fact as the negotiations 
Bukharin conducted behind the scenes with Kamenevıs 
group, which is connected with the Trotskyites; the negotiations 
about setting up a factional bloc, about changing 
the policy of the Central Committee, about changing 
the composition of the Political Bureau, about using the 
grain-procurement crisis for attacking the Central Committee. 
The question arises: Where is Bukharinıs ³loyal² and 
³irreproachable² attitude towards his Central Committee? 
Is not such behaviour, on the contrary, a violation 
of any kind of loyalty to his Central Committee, to his 
Party, on the part of a member of the Political Bureau?

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 105 
If this is called loyalty to the Central Committee, then 
what is the word for betrayal of oneıs Central Committee? 
Bukharin likes to talk about loyalty and honesty, 
but why does he not try to examine his own conscience 
and ask himself whether he is not violating in the most 
dishonest manner the elementary requirements of loyalty 
to his Central Committee when he conducts secret 
negotiations with Trotskyites against his Central 
Committee and thereby betrays his Central Committee? 
Bukharin spoke here about the lack of collective 
leadership in the Central Committee of the Party, and 
assured us that the requirements of collective leadership 
were being violated by the majority of the Political 
Bureau of the Central Committee. 
Our plenum, of course, has put up with everything. 
It can even tolerate this shameless and hypocritical 
assertion of Bukharinıs. But one must have really lost all 
sense of shame to make so bold as to speak in this way at 
the plenum against the majority of the Central Committee. 
In truth, how can we speak of collective leadership 
if the majority of the Central Committee, having harnessed 
itself to the chariot of state, is straining all its 
forces to move it forward and is urging Bukharinıs 
group to give a helping hand in this arduous task, while 
Bukharinıs group is not only not helping its Central 
Committee but, on the contrary, is hampering it in every 
way, is putting a spoke in its wheels, is threatening to 
resign, and comes to terms with enemies of the Party, 
with Trotskyites, against the Central Committee of our 
Party? 
Who, indeed, but hypocrites can deny that Bukharin, 
who is setting up a bloc with the Trotskyites

J. V. S T A L I N 106 
against the Party, and is betraying his Central Committee, 
does not want to and will not implement collective 
leadership in the Central Committee of our Party? 
Who, indeed, but the blind can fail to see that if 
Bukharin nevertheless chatters about collective leadership 
in the Central Committee, putting the blame on 
the majority of the Central Committee, he is doing so 
with the object of disguising his treacherous conduct? 
It should be noted that this is not the first time 
that Bukharin has violated the elementary requirements 
of loyalty and collective leadership in relation to the 
Central Committee of the Party. The history of our Party 
knows of instances when, in Leninıs lifetime, in the period 
of the Brest Peace, Bukharin, being in the minority 
on the question of peace, rushed to the Left Socialist- 
Revolutionaries, who were the enemies of our Party, 
conducted backstairs negotiations with them, and attempted 
to set up a bloc with them against Lenin and 
the Central Committee. What agreement he was trying 
to reach at the time with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries‹
we, unfortunately, do not yet know.10 But we 
do know that at the time the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries 
were planning to arrest Lenin and carry out 
an anti-Soviet coup dıétat. . . . But the most amazing 
thing is that, while rushing to the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries 
and conspiring with them against the Central 
Committee, Bukharin continued, just as he is doing 
now, to clamour about the necessity of collective leadership. 
The history of our Party knows, too, of instances 
when, in Leninıs lifetime, Bukharin, who had a majority 
in the Moscow Regional Bureau of our Party and the sup

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 107 
port of a group of ³Left² Communists, called on all Party 
members to express lack of confidence in the Central 
Committee of the Party, to refuse to submit to its decisions 
and to raise the question of splitting our Party. 
That was during the period of the Brest Peace, after 
the Central Committee had already decided that it was 
necessary to accept the conditions of the Brest Peace. 
Such is the character of Bukharinıs loyalty and collective 
leadership. 
Rykov spoke here about the necessity of collective 
work. At the same time he pointed an accusing finger 
at the majority of the Political Bureau, asserting that 
he and his close friends were in favour of collective 
work, while the majority of the Political Bureau, consequently, 
were against it. However, Rykov was unable 
to cite a single fact in support of his assertion. 
In order to expose this fable of Rykovıs, let me cite 
a few facts, a few examples which will show you how 
Rykov carries out collective work. 
First example. You have heard the story about the 
export of gold to America. Many of you may believe that 
the gold was shipped to America by decision of the 
Council of Peopleıs Commissars or the Central Committee, 
or with the consent of the Central Committee, or with 
its knowledge. But that is not true, comrades. The Central 
Committee and the Council of Peopleıs Commissars 
have had nothing to do with this matter. There is a ruling 
which prohibits the export of gold without the approval 
of the Central Committee. But this ruling was violated. 
Who was it that authorised the export? It turns 
out that the shipment of gold was authorised by one of 
Rykovıs deputies with Rykovıs knowledge and consent.

J. V. S T A L I N 108 
Is that collective work? 
Second example. This concerns negotiations with one 
of the big private banks in America, whose property was 
nationalised after the October Revolution, and which 
is now demanding compensation for its losses. The Central 
Committee has learned that a representative of our State 
Bank has been discussing terms of compensation with 
that bank. 
Settlement of private claim is, as you are aware, a 
very important question inseparably connected with 
our foreign policy. One might think that these negotiations 
were conducted with the approval of the Council 
of Peopleıs Commissars or the Central Committee. However, 
that is not the case, comrades. The Central Committee 
and the Council of Peopleıs Commissars have had 
nothing to do with this matter. Subsequently, upon 
learning about these negotiations, the Central Committee 
decided to stop them. But the question arises: Who 
authorised these negotiations? It turns out that they 
were authorised by one of Rykovıs deputies with Rykovıs 
knowledge and consent. 
Is that collective work? 
Third example. This concerns the supplying of agricultural 
machinery to kulaks and middle peasants. The 
point is that the EKOSO of the R.S.F.S.R.,11 which is 
presided over by one of Rykovıs deputies for matters 
concerning the R.S.F.S.R., decided to reduce the supply 
of agricultural machines to the middle peasants and 
increase the supply of machines to the upper strata of 
the peasantry, i.e., to the kulaks. Here is the text of this 
anti-Party, anti-Soviet ruling of the EKOSO of the 
R.S.F.S.R.:

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 109 
³In the Kazakh and Bashkir A.S.S.R., the Siberian and 
Lower Volga territories, the Middle Volga and Urals regions, the 
proportion of sales of farm machines and implements set forth in 
this paragraph shall be increased to 20 per cent for the upper 
strata of the peasantry and decreased to 30 per cent for the middle 
strata.² 
How do you like that? At a time when the Party is 
intensifying the offensive against the kulaks and is 
organising the masses of the poor and middle peasants 
against the kulaks, the EKOSO of the R.S.F.S.R. 
adopts a decision to reduce the level of deliveries of 
farm machinery to the middle peasants and increase 
the level of deliveries to the upper strata of the peasantry. 
And it is suggested that this is a Leninist, communist 
policy. 
Subsequently, when the Central Committee learned 
about this incident, i t annulled the decision of the 
EKOSO. But who was it that authorised this anti-Soviet 
ruling? It was authorised by one of Rykovıs deputies, 
with Rykovıs knowledge and consent. 
Is that collective work? 
I believe that these examples are sufficient to show 
how Rykov and his deputies practise collective work. 
c) THE FIGHT AGAINST THE RIGHT DEVIATION 
Bukharin spoke here of the ³civil execution² of three 
members of the Political Bureau, who, he says, ³were 
being hauled over the coals² by the organisations of our 
Party. He said that the Party had subjected these three 
members of the Political Bureau‹Bukharin, Rykov and 
Tomsky‹to ³civil execution² by criticising their errors

J. V. S T A L I N 110 
in the press and at meetings, while they, the three members 
of the Political Bureau, were ³compelled² to keep 
silent. 
All that is nonsense, comrades. Those are the false 
words of a Communist gone liberal who is trying to weaken 
the Party in its fight against the Right deviation. 
According to Bukharin, if he and his friends have become 
entangled in Right deviationist mistakes, the Party 
has no right to expose those mistakes, the Party must 
stop fighting the Right deviation and wait until it shall 
please Bukharin and his friends to renounce their mistakes. 
Is not Bukharin asking too much from us? Is he not 
under the impression that the Party exists for him, and 
not he for the Party? Who is compelling him to keep 
silent, to remain in a state of inaction when the whole 
Party is mobilised against the Right deviation and is 
conducting determined attacks against difficulties? Why 
should not he, Bukharin, and his close friends come forward 
now and engage in a determined fight against the Right 
deviation and conciliation towards it? Can anyone doubt 
that the Party would welcome Bukharin and his close 
friends if they decided to take this not so difficult step? 
Why do they not decide to take this step, which, after 
all, is their duty? Is it not because they place the interests 
of their group above the interests of the Party 
and its general line? Whose fault is it that Bukharin, 
Rykov and Tomsky are missing in the fight against the 
Right deviation? Is it not obvious that talk about the 
³civil execution² of the three members of the Political 
Bureau is a poorly camouflaged attempt on the part 
of the three members of the Political Bureau to compel

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 111 
the Party to keep silent and to stop fighting against the 
Right deviation? 
The fight against the Right deviation must not be 
regarded as a secondary task of our Party. The fight 
against the Right deviation is one of the most decisive 
tasks of our Party. If we, in our own ranks, in our own 
Party, in the political General Staff of the proletariat, 
which is directing the movement and is leading the proletariat 
forward‹if we in this General Staff should allow 
the free existence and the free functioning of the Right 
deviators, who are trying to demobilise the Party, demoralise 
the working class, adapt our policy to the tastes 
of the ³Soviet² bourgeoisie, and thus yield to the difficulties 
of our socialist construction‹if we should allow 
all this, what would it mean? Would it not mean that we 
are ready to put a brake on the revolution, disrupt our 
socialist construction, flee from difficulties, and surrender 
our positions to the capitalist elements? 
Does Bukharinıs group understand that to refuse to 
fight the Right deviation is to betray the working class, 
to betray the revolution? 
Does Bukharinıs group understand that unless we 
overcome the Right deviation and conciliation towards 
it, it will be impossible to overcome the difficulties facing 
us, and that unless we overcome these difficulties it will be 
impossible to achieve decisive successes in socialist 
construction? 
In view of this, what is the worth of this pitiful 
talk about the ³civil execution² of three members of the 
Political Bureau? 
No, comrades, the Bukharinites will not frighten the 
Party with liberal chatter about ³civil execution.² The

J. V. S T A L I N 112 
Party demands that they should wage a determined fight 
against the Right deviation and conciliation towards it 
side by side with all the members of the Central Committee 
of our Party. It demands this of Bukharinıs group in 
order to help to mobilise the working class, to break down 
the resistance of the class enemies and to organise decisive 
victory over the difficulties of our socialist construction. 
Either the Bukharinites will fulfil this demand of 
the Party, in which case the Party will welcome them, or 
they will not do so, in which case they will have only 
themselves to blame. 
VI 
CONCLUSIONS 
I pass to the conclusions. 
I submit the following proposals: 
1) We must first of all condemn the views of Bukharinıs 
group. We must condemn the views of this group 
as set forth in its declarations and in the speeches of 
its representatives, and state that these views are incompatible 
with the Party line and fully coincide with the 
position of the Right deviation. 
2) We must condemn Bukharinıs secret negotiations 
with Kamenevıs group as the most flagrant expression 
of the disloyalty and factionalism of Bukharinıs group. 
3) We must condemn the policy of resigning that was 
being practised by Bukharin and Tomsky, as a gross violation 
of the elementary requirements of Party discipline. 
4) Bukharin and Tomsky must be removed from their 
posts and warned that in the event of the slightest

THE RIGHT DEVIATION IN THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 113 
attempt at insubordination to the decisions of the Central 
Committee, the latter will be forced to exclude both of 
them from the Political Bureau. 
5) We must take appropriate measures forbidding 
members and candidate members of the Political Bureau, 
when speaking publicly, to deviate in any way from the 
line of the Party and the decisions of the Central Committee 
or of its bodies. 
6) We must take appropriate measures so that press 
organs, both Party and Soviet, newspapers as well as 
periodicals, should fully conform to the line of the Party 
and the decisions of its leading bodies. 
7) We must adopt special provisions, including even 
expulsion from the Central Committee and from the Party, 
for persons who attempt to violate the confidential 
nature of the decisions of the Party, its Central Committee 
and Political Bureau. 
8) We must distribute the text of the resolution of 
the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central 
Control Commission on inner-Party questions to all the 
local Party organisations and to the delegates to the Sixteenth 
Party Conference,12 without publishing it in the 
press for the time being. 
That, in my opinion, is the way out of this situation. 
Some comrades insist that Bukharin and Tomsky 
should be immediately expelled from the Political Bureau 
of the Central Committee. I do not agree with these 
comrades. In my opinion, for the time being we can do 
without resorting to such an extreme measure. 
Published in full for the first time

EMULATION AND LABOUR ENTHUSIASM 
OF THE MASSES 
Forward to E. Mikulinaıs Pamphlet 
³Emulation of the Masses² 
It is hardly open to doubt that one of the most important 
features‹if not the most important‹of our constructive 
work at the present moment is the wide development 
of emulation among the vast masses of the workers. 
Emulation between whole mills and factories in 
the most diverse corners of our boundless country; emulation 
between workers and peasants; emulation between 
collective farms and state farms; registration of these 
mass-scale production challenges in specific agreements 
of the working people‹all these are facts which leave 
no doubt whatever that socialist emulation among the 
masses has already become a reality. 
A mighty upsurge of production enthusiasm among the 
masses of the working people has begun. 
Now even the most confirmed sceptics are forced to 
admit this. 
³Far from extinguishing emulation,² Lenin says, ³socialism 
for the first time creates the opportunity for employing it 
on a really wide and on a really mass scale, for really drawing 
the majority of the working people into the arena of such work as 
enables them to display their abilities, develop their capacities, 
reveal their talents, of which there is an untapped spring among 
the people, and which capitalism crushed, suppressed and strangled 
among thousands and millions.². . .

EMULATION AND LABOUR ENTHUSIASM OF THE MASSES 115 
. . .³Only now is the opportunity created on a wide scale 
for a truly mass display of enterprise, emulation and bold initiative² 
. . . because ³for the first time after centuries of working 
for others, of working under compulsion for the exploiters, it has 
become possible to work for oneself.² . . . 
. . .³Now that a socialist Government is in power, our task 
is to organise emulation.²13 
It was from these propositions of Lenin that the Sixteenth 
Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) proceeded when it 
issued the special appeal for emulation to the workers 
and all labouring people. 
Certain ³comrades² of the bureaucratic type think 
that emulation is just the latest Bolshevik fashion, and 
that, as such, it is bound to die out when the ³season² 
passes. These bureaucratic ³comrades² are, of course, 
mistaken. In point of fact, emulation is the communist 
method of building socialism, on the basis of the maximum 
activity of the vast masses of the working people. In 
point of fact, emulation is the lever with which the working 
class is destined to transform the entire economic 
and cultural life of the country on the basis of socialism.
Other ³comrades² of the bureaucratic type, frightened 
by the powerful tide of emulation, are trying to 
compress it within artificial bounds and canalise it, 
to ³centralise² the emulation movement, to narrow its 
scope and thus deprive it of its most important feature‹ 
the initiative of the masses. It goes without saying that 
the hopes of the bureaucrats will not be realised. At any 
rate, the Party will make every effort to shatter them. 
Socialist emulation must not be regarded as a bureaucratic 
undertaking. Socialist emulation is a manifestation

J. V. S T A L I N 116 
of practical revolutionary self-criticism by the masses, 
springing from the creative initiative of the vast 
masses of the working people. All who, wittingly or unwittingly, 
restrict this self-criticism and creative initiative 
of the masses must be brushed aside as an impediment 
to our great cause. 
The bureaucratic danger manifests itself concretely 
above all in the fact that it shackles the energy, initiative 
and independent activity of the masses, keeps concealed 
the colossal reserves latent in the depths of our 
system, deep down in the working class and peasantry, 
and prevents these reserves from being utilised in the 
struggle against our class enemies. It is the task of socialist 
emulation to smash these bureaucratic shackles, 
to afford broad scope for the unfolding of the energy and 
creative initiative of the masses, to bring to light the 
colossal reserves latent in the depths of our system, and 
to throw them into the scale in the struggle against our 
class enemies both inside and outside our country. 
Socialist emulation is sometimes confused with competition. 
That is a great mistake. Socialist emulation and 
competition exhibit two entirely different principles. 
The principle of competition is: defeat and death for 
some and victory and domination for others. 
The principle of socialist emulation is: comradely 
assistance by the foremost to the laggards, so as to 
achieve an advance of all. 
Competition says: Destroy the laggards so as to establish 
your own domination. 
Socialist emulation says: Some work badly, others 
I work well, yet others best of all‹catch up with the best 
and secure the advance of all.

EMULATION AND LABOUR ENTHUSIASM OF THE MASSES 117 
That, in fact, explains the unprecedented production 
enthusiasm which has gripped the vast masses of the working 
people as a result of socialist emulation. It goes without 
saying that competition can never call forth anything 
resembling this enthusiasm of the masses. 
Of late, articles and comments on emulation have been 
more frequent in our press. They discuss the philosophy 
of emulation, the roots of emulation, the possible 
results of emulation and so on. But one rarely finds an 
article which gives any coherent description of how emulation 
is put into effect by the masses themselves, what 
the vast masses of the workers experience when practising 
emulation and signing agreements, a description showing 
that the masses of the workers regard emulation as 
their own cause, near and dear to them. Yet this side of 
emulation is of the highest importance for us. 
I think that Comrade E. Mikulinaıs pamphlet is the 
first attempt to give a coherent exposition of data from 
the practice of emulation, showing it as an undertaking 
of the masses of the working people themselves. The 
merit of this pamphlet is that it gives a simple and 
truthful account of those deep-lying processes of the 
great upsurge of labour enthusiasm that constitute the 
inner driving force of socialist emulation. 
May 11, 1929 
Pravda, No. 114, 
May 22, 1929 
Signed: J. Stalin

TO COMRADE FELIX KON 
Copy to Comrade Kolotilov, Secretary, Regional Bureau 
of the Central Committee, Ivanovo-Voznesensk Region 
Comrade Kon, 
I have received Comrade Russovaıs article on Comrade 
Mikulinaıs pamphlet (Emulation of the Masses). Here 
are my observations: 
1) Comrade Russovaıs review gives the impression 
of being too one-sided and biassed. I am prepared to grant 
that there is no such person as the spinner Bardina, and 
that there is no spinning shed in Zaryadye. I am also 
prepared to grant that the Zaryadye mills are ³cleaned 
once a week.² It can be admitted that Comrade Mikulina 
was perhaps misled by one of her informants and 
was guilty of a number of gross inaccuracies, which, of 
course, is blameworthy and unpardonable. But is that 
the point? Is the value of the pamphlet determined by individual 
details, and not by its general trend? A famous 
author of our time, Comrade Sholokhov, commits a number 
of very gross errors in his Quiet Flows the Don and 
says things which are positively untrue about Syrtsov, 
Podtyolkov, Krivoshlykov and others; but does it follow 
from this that Quiet Flows the Don is no good at all and 
deserves to be withdrawn from sale? 
What is the merit of Comrade Mikulinaıs pamphlet? 
It is that it popularises the idea of emulation and in

TO COMRADE FELIX KON 119 
fects the reader with the spirit of emulation. That is what 
matters, and not a few individual mistakes. 
2) It is possible that, because of my foreword to 
Comrade Mikulinaıs pamphlet, the critics expected too 
much of it and thought it must be something out of the 
ordinary, and being disappointed in their expectations 
they decided to punish its author. But that is wrong and 
unfair. Of course, Comrade Mikulinaıs pamphlet is not 
a scientific work. It is an account of the emulation deeds 
of the masses, of the practice of emulation. Nothing more. 
Comrade Mikulina is not to blame if my foreword gave 
rise to an exaggerated opinion about her‹actually very 
modest‹pamphlet. That is no reason for punishing the 
author or the readers of the pamphlet on that account, 
by withdrawing it from sale. Only works of a non- 
Soviet trend, only anti-Party and anti-proletarian 
works may be withdrawn from sale. There is nothing 
anti-Party or anti-Soviet in Comrade Mikulinaıs pamphlet. 
3) Comrade Russova is particularly incensed with 
Comrade Mikulina for having ³misled Comrade Stalin.² 
One cannot but appreciate the concern shown by Comrade 
Russova for Comrade Stalin. But it does not seem 
to me that there is any call for it. 
In the first place, it is not so easy to ³mislead Comrade 
Stalin.² 
Secondly, I do not in the least repent having furnished 
a foreword to an inconsiderable pamphlet by a person 
unknown in the literary world, because I think that, 
notwithstanding its individual and, perhaps, gross mistakes, 
Comrade Mikulinaıs pamphlet will be of great value 
to the masses of the workers.

J. V. S T A L I N 120 
Thirdly, I am emphatically opposed to supplying 
forewords only to pamphlets and books by the ³bigwigs² 
of the literary world, by literary ³lights,² ³coryphees² 
and so on. I think it is high time for us to abandon this 
aristocratic habit of giving prominence to literary ³bigwigs,² 
who are prominent enough as it is, and from whose 
³greatness² young literary forces have to suffer, writers 
who are known to none and ignored by all. 
We have hundreds and thousands of young and capable 
people who are striving with might and main to 
rise to the surface and contribute their mite to the common 
treasury of our work of construction. But their 
efforts are often unavailing, because they are very often 
kept down by the vanity of the literary ³lights,² by 
the bureaucracy and callousness of some of our organisations, 
and, lastly, by the envy (which has not yet 
evolved into emulation) of men and women of their own 
generation. One of our tasks is to break down this blank 
wall and to give scope to the young forces, whose name 
is legion. My foreword to an inconsiderable pamphlet by 
an author unknown in the literary world is an attempt 
to take a step towards-accomplishing this task. I shall 
in the future, too, provide forewords only to simple and 
unassuming pamphlets by simple and unknown authors 
belonging to the younger forces. It is possible that this 
procedure may not be to the liking of some of the snobs. 
But what do I care? I have no fondness for snobs anyhow. 
. . . 
4) I think that the Ivanovo-Voznesensk comrades 
would do well to call Comrade Mikulina to Ivanovo- 
Voznesensk and give her a ³rap on the knuckles² for the 
errors she has committed. I am by no means opposed

TO COMRADE FELIX KON 121 
to having Comrade Mikulina properly taken to task 
in the press for her errors. But I am decidedly opposed 
to having this undeniably capable authoress done to 
death and buried. 
As to withdrawing Comrade Mikulinaıs pamphlet from 
sale, in my opinion that wild idea should be left ³without 
sequel.² 
With communist greetings,
J. Stalin 
July 9, 1929 
Published for the first time

TO THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE 
OF THE UKRAINE ON ITS TENTH 
ANNIVERSARY 
Ardent greetings on its tenth anniversary to the 
Leninist Young Communist League of the Ukraine, which 
was tried and tested in the battles of the Civil War, which 
is successfully promoting socialist emulation and is actively 
participating in building Ukrainian socialist culture. 
J. Stalin 
Moscow, July 10, 1929 
Pravda, No. 157 
July 12, 1929

ENTRY IN THE LOG-BOOK 
OF THE CRUISER ³CHERVONA UKRAINA² 
Have been on board the Cruiser ³Chervona Ukraina.² 
Have attended a concert of amateur talent given by the 
crew. 
General impression: splendid men, courageous and 
cultured comrades who are ready for everything in behalf 
of our common cause. 
It is a pleasure to work with such comrades. It is 
a pleasure to fight our enemies alongside such warriors. 
With such comrades, the whole world of exploiters and 
oppressors can be vanquished. 
I wish you success, friends aboard the ³Chervona 
Ukraina²! 
J. Stalin 
July 25, 1929 
The newspaper Krasny Chernomorets 
(Sevastopol), No. 260, 
November 7, 1929

A YEAR OF GREAT CHANGE 
On the Occasion of the Twelfth Anniversary 
of the October Revolution 
The past year was a year of great change on all the 
fronts of socialist construction. The keynote of this change 
has been, and continues to be, a determined offensive 
of socialism against the capitalist elements in town and 
country. The characteristic feature of this offensive is 
that it has already brought us a number of decisive successes 
in the principal spheres of the socialist reconstruction 
of our national economy. 
We may, therefore, conclude that our Party succeeded 
in making good use of our retreat during the first 
stages of the New Economic Policy in order, in the subsequent 
stages, to organise the change and to launch a 
successful offensive against the capitalist elements. 
When NEP was introduced Lenin said: 
³We are now retreating, going back as it were; but we are 
doing this in order, by retreating first, afterwards to take a run and 
make a more powerful leap forward. It was on this condition 
alone that we retreated in pursuing our New Economic Policy . . . 
in order to start a most persistent advance after our retreat² (Vol. 
XXVII, pp. 361-62).

A YEAR OF GREAT CHANGE 125 
The results of the past year show beyond a doubt 
that in its work the Party is successfully carrying out 
this decisive directive of Leninıs. 
* 
* 
* 
If we take the results of the past year in the sphere 
of economic construction, which is of decisive importance 
for us, we shall find that the successes of our offensive 
on this front, our achievements during the past year, can 
be summed up under three main heads. 
I 
IN THE SPHERE OF PRODUCTIVITY OF LABOUR 
There can scarcely be any doubt that one of the most 
important facts in our work of construction during the 
past year is that we have succeeded in bringing about 
a decisive change in the sphere of productivity of labour. 
This change has found expression in a growth of the creative 
initiative and intense labour enthusiasm of the vast 
masses of the working class on the front of socialist construction. 
This is our first fundamental achievement 
during the past year. 
The growth of the creative initiative and labour 
enthusiasm of the masses has been stimulated in three main 
directions: 
a) the fight‹by means of self-criticism‹against 
bureaucracy, which shackles the labour initiative and 
labour activity of the masses; 
b) the fight‹by means of socialist emulation‹against 
labour shirkers and disrupters of proletarian labour 
discipline;

J. V. S T A L I N 126 
c) the fight‹by the introduction of the uninterrupted 
working-week‹against routine and inertia in industry. 
As a result we have a tremendous achievement on 
the labour front in the form of labour enthusiasm and 
emulation among the vast masses of the working class 
in all parts of our boundless country. The significance of 
this achievement is truly inestimable; for only the labour 
enthusiasm and zeal of the vast masses can guarantee 
that progressive increase of labour productivity without 
which the final victory of socialism over capitalism in 
our country is inconceivable. 
³In the last analysis,² says Lenin, ³productivity of labour 
is the most important, the principal thing for the victory of a 
new social system. Capitalism created a productivity of labour 
unknown under serfdom. Capitalism can be utterly vanquished, 
and will be utterly vanquished, by the fact that socialism creates 
a new and much higher productivity of labour² (Vol. XXIV, 
p. 342). 
Proceeding from this, Lenin considered that: 
³We must become imbued with the labour enthusiasm, the 
will to work and the persistence upon which the speedy salvation of 
the workers and peasants, the salvation of the national economy 
now depends² (Vol. XXV, p. 477). 
That is the task Lenin set our Party. 
The past year has shown that the Party is successfully 
carrying out this task and is resolutely overcoming 
the obstacles that stand in its path. 
Such is the position regarding the Partyıs first important 
achievement during the past year.

A YEAR OF GREAT CHANGE 127 
II 
IN THE SPHERE OF INDUSTRIAL 
CONSTRUCTION 
Inseparably connected with the first achievement of 
the Party is its second achievement. This second achievement 
of the Party consists in the fact that during 
the past year we have in the main successfully solved 
the problem of accumulation for capital construction in 
heavy industry, we have accelerated the development of 
the production of means of production and created 
the prerequisites for transforming our country into a 
metal country. 
That is our second fundamental achievement during 
the past year. 
The problem of light industry presents no special 
difficulties. We solved that problem several years ago. 
The problem of heavy industry is more difficult and 
more important. 
It is more difficult because its solution demands 
colossal investments, and, as the history of industrially 
backward countries has shown, heavy industry cannot 
manage without huge long-term loans. 
It is more important because, unless we develop 
heavy industry, we cannot build any industry at all, 
we cannot carry out any industrialisation. 
And as we have not received, and are not receiving, 
either long-term loans or credits of any long-term 
character, the acuteness of the problem for us becomes 
more than obvious. 
It is precisely for this reason that the capitalists 
of all countries refuse us loans and credits, for they

J. V. S T A L I N 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
128 
sume that we cannot by our own efforts cope with the 
problem of accumulation, that we shall suffer shipwreck 
in the task of reconstructing our heavy industry, and 
be compelled to come to them cap in hand, for enslavement. 
But what do the results of our work during the past 
year show in this connection? The significance of the 
results of the past year is that they shatter to bits the 
anticipations of Messieurs the capitalists. 
The past year has shown that, in spite of the overt 
and covert financial blockade of the U.S.S.R., we did 
not sell ourselves into bondage to the capitalists, that 
by our own efforts we have successfully solved the problem 
of accumulation and laid the foundation for heavy 
industry. Even the most inveterate enemies of the working 
class cannot deny this now. 
Indeed, since, in the first place, capital investments 
in large-scale industry last year amounted to over 
1,600,000,000 rubles, of which about 1,300,000,000 rubles 
were invested in heavy industry, while capital investments 
in large-scale industry this year will amount to 
over 3,400,000,000 rubles, of which over 2,500,000,000 
rubles will be invested in heavy industry; and since, in 
the second place, the gross output of large-scale industry 
last year showed an increase of 23 per cent, including a 
30 per cent increase in the output of heavy industry, 
while the increase in the gross output of large-scale industry 
this year should be 32 per cent, including a 46 per 
cent increase in the output of heavy industry‹is it not 
clear that the problem of accumulation for the building 
up of heavy industry no longer presents insuperable difficulties 
for us?

A YEAR OF GREAT CHANGE 129 
How can anyone doubt that we are advancing at 
an accelerated pace in the direction of developing our 
heavy industry, exceeding our former speed and leaving 
behind our ³age-old² backwardness? 
Is i t surprising after this that the targets of the 
five-year plan were exceeded during the past year, 
and that the optimum variant of the five-year plan, 
which the bourgeois scribes regard as ³wild fantasy,² 
and which horrifies our Right opportunists (Bukharinıs 
group), has actually turned out to be a minimum 
variant? 
³The salvation of Russia,² says Lenin, ³lies not only in a 
good harvest on the peasant farms‹that is not enough; and not 
only in the good condition of light industry, which provides the 
peasantry with consumer goods‹that, too, is not enough; we 
also need heavy industry. . . . Unless we save heavy industry, 
unless we restore it, we shall not be able to build up any industry; 
and without it we shall be doomed altogether as an independent 
country. . . . Heavy industry needs state subsidies. If we do 
not provide them, then we are doomed as a civilised state‹let 
alone as a socialist state² (Vol. XXVII, p. 349). 
That is how sharply Lenin formulated the problem of 
accumulation and the task of the Party in building up 
heavy industry. 
The past year has shown that our Party is successfully 
coping with this task, resolutely overcoming all 
obstacles in its path. 
This does not mean, of course, that industry will not 
encounter any more serious difficulties. The task of 
building up heavy industry involves not only the problem 
of accumulation. It also involves the problem of cadres, 
the problem:

J. V. S T A L I N 130 
a) of enlisting tens of thousands of Soviet-minded 
technicians and experts for the work of socialist construction, 
and 
b) of training new Red technicians and Red experts 
from among the working class. 
While the problem of accumulation may in the main 
be regarded as solved, the problem of cadres still awaits 
solution. And the problem of cadres is now‹when we 
are engaged in the technical reconstruction of industry 
‹the key problem of socialist construction. 
³The chief thing we lack,² says Lenin, ³is culture, ability 
to administer. . . . Economically and politically, N E P fully 
ensures us the possibility of laying the foundation of a socialist 
economy. It is Œonlyı a matter of the cultural forces of the proletariat 
and of its vanguard² (Vol. XXVII, p. 207). 
It is obvious that Lenin refers here primarily to the 
problem of ³cultural forces,² the problem of the cadres 
for economic construction in general, and for building and 
managing industry in particular. 
But from this it follows that, in spite of important 
achievements in the sphere of accumulation, which are 
of vital significance for heavy industry, the problem of 
building heavy industry cannot be regarded as fully 
solved until we have solved the problem of cadres. 
Hence the task of the Party is to tackle the problem 
of cadres in all seriousness and to conquer this fortress 
at all costs. 
Such is the position regarding our Partyıs second 
achievement during the past year.

A YEAR OF GREAT CHANGE 131 
III 
IN THE SPHERE OF AGRICULTURAL 
DEVELOPMENT 
Finally, about the Partyıs third achievement during 
the past year, an achievement organically connected 
with the two previous ones. I am referring to the radical 
change in the development of our agriculture from small, 
backward, individual farming to large-scale, advanced 
collective agriculture, to joint cultivation of the land, to 
machine and tractor stations, to artels, collective farms, 
based on modern technique, and, finally, to giant 
state farms, equipped with hundreds of tractors and 
harvester combines. 
The Partyıs achievement here consists in the fact 
that in a whole number of areas we have succeeded in 
turning the main mass of the peasantry away from the 
old, capitalist path of development‹which benefits only 
a small group of the rich, the capitalists, while the vast 
majority of the peasants are doomed to ruin and utter 
poverty‹to the new, socialist path of development, 
which ousts the rich, the capitalists, and re-equips 
the middle and poor peasants along new lines, equipping 
them with modern implements, with tractors and 
agricultural machinery, so as to enable them to climb 
out of poverty and enslavement to the kulaks on to the 
high road of co-operative, collective cultivation of the 
land. 
The achievement of the Party consists in the fact 
that we have succeeded in bringing about this radical 
change deep down in the peasantry itself, and in securing 
the following of the broad masses of the poor and middle

J. V. S T A L I N 132 
peasants in spite of incredible difficulties, in spite of 
the desperate resistance of retrograde forces of every 
kind, from kulaks and priests to philistines and Right 
opportunists. 
Here are some figures. 
In 1928, the crop area of the state farms amounted 
to 1,425,000 hectares with a marketable grain output 
of more than 6,000,000 centners (over 36,000,000 poods), 
and the crop area of the collective farms amounted to 
1,390,000 hectares with a marketable grain output of 
about 3,500,000 centners (over 20,000,000 poods). 
In 1929, the crop area of the state farms amounted 
to 1,816,000 hectares with a marketable grain output 
of about 8,000,000 centners (nearly 47,000,000 poods), 
and the crop area of the collective farms amounted to 
4,262,000 hectares with a marketable grain output of 
about 13,000,000 centners (nearly 78,000,000 poods). 
In the coming year, 1930, the crop area of the state 
farms, according to the plan, will probably amount to 
3,280,000 hectares with a marketable grain output of 
18,000,000 centners (approximately 110,000,000 poods), 
and the crop area of the collective farms will certainly 
amount to 15,000,000 hectares with a marketable grain 
output of about 49,000,000 centners (approximately 
300,000,000 poods) 
In other words, in the coming year, 1930, the marketable 
grain output of the state farms and collective farms 
will amount to over 400,000,000 poods or more than 50 
per cent of the marketable grain output of the whole of 
agriculture (grain sold outside the rural districts). 
It must be admitted that such an impetuous speed of 
development is unequalled even by our socialised,

A YEAR OF GREAT CHANGE 133 
large-scale industry, which in general is marked by the 
outstanding speed of its development. 
It is clear that our young large-scale socialist 
agriculture (the collective farms and state farms) has a 
great future before it and that its development will 
be truly miraculous. 
This unprecedented success in the development of 
collective farming is due to a variety of causes, of which 
the following at least should be mentioned. 
It is due, first of all, to the fact that the Party carried 
out Leninıs policy of educating the masses by consistently 
leading the masses of the peasantry to collective 
farming through implanting a co-operative communal 
life. It is due to the fact that the Party waged a successful 
struggle against those who tried to run ahead of 
the movement and force the development of collective 
farming by means of decrees (the ³Left² phrasemongers)- 
as well as against those who tried to drag the Party back 
and remain in the wake of the movement (the Right 
blockheads). Had it not pursued such a policy the Party 
would not have been able to transform the collectivefarm 
movement into a real mass movement of the peasants 
themselves. 
³When the Petrograd proletariat and the soldiers of the Petrograd 
garrison took power,² says Lenin, ³they fully realised 
that our constructive work in the countryside would encounter 
great difficulties; that there it was necessary to proceed more gradually; 
that to attempt to introduce collective cultivation of the 
land by decrees, by legislation, would be the height of folly; 
that an insignificant number of enlightened peasants might agree 
to this, but that the vast majority of the peasants had no such 
object in view. We, therefore, confined ourselves to what was absolutely 
essential in the interests of the development of the

J. V. S T A L I N 134 
revolution: in no case to run ahead of the development of the 
masses, but to wait until, as a result of their own experience 
and their own struggle, a progressive movement grew up² (Vol. 
XXIII, p. 252). 
The reason why the Party achieved a great victory 
on the front of collective-farm development is that it 
exactly carried out this tactical directive of Leninıs. 
Secondly, this unprecedented success in agricultural 
development is due to the fact that the Soviet government 
correctly recognised the growing needs of the peasants 
for new implements, for modern technique; it correctly 
recognised that the old forms of cultivation leave the 
peasantry in a hopeless position and, taking all this 
into account, it came to their aid in good time by organising 
machine-hiring stations, tractor columns and 
machine and tractor stations; by organising collective cultivation 
of the land, by establishing collective farms, 
and finally, by having the state farms give every assistance 
to peasant farming. 
For the first time in the history of mankind there 
has appeared a government, that of the Soviets, which 
has proved by deeds its readiness and ability to give the 
labouring masses of the peasantry systematic and lasting 
assistance in the sphere of production. 
Is it not obvious that the labouring masses of the 
peasantry, suffering from age-long lack of agricultural 
equipment, were bound to reach out eagerly for this assistance 
and join the collective-farm movement? 
And can one be surprised if henceforth the old slogan 
of the workers, ³face to the countryside,² is supplemented, 
as seems likely, by the new slogan of the collective-
farm peasants, ³face to the town²?

A YEAR OF GREAT CHANGE 135 
Lastly, this unprecedented success in collectivefarm 
development is due to the fact that the matter 
was taken in hand by the advanced workers of our country. 
I am referring to the workersı brigades, tens and hundreds 
of which are scattered in the principal regions of 
our country. It must be acknowledged that of all existing 
and potential propagandists of the collective-farm 
movement among the peasant masses, the worker propagandists 
are the best. What can there be surprising 
in the fact that the workers have succeeded in convincing 
the peasants of the advantages of large-scale collective 
farming over individual small farming, the more 
so as the existing collective farms and state farms are 
striking examples of these advantages? 
Such was the basis for our achievement in collectivefarm 
development, an achievement which, in my opinion, 
is the most important and decisive of all our achievements 
in recent years. 
All the objections raised by ³science² against the 
possibility and expediency of organising large grain factories 
of 40,000 to 50,000 hectares each have collapsed and 
crumbled to dust. Practice has refuted the objections 
of ³science,² and has once again shown that not only has 
practice to learn from ³science² but ³science² also 
would do well to learn from practice. 
Large grain factories do not take root in capitalist 
countries. But ours is a socialist country. This ³slight² 
difference must not be overlooked. 
In capitalist countries large grain factories cannot 
be organised without previously buying a number of 
plots of land or without the payment of absolute ground 
rent, which cannot fail to burden production with

J. V. S T A L I N 136 
colossal expenses, for private ownership of land exists 
there. In our country, on the other hand, neither absolute 
ground rent, nor the sale and purchase of land exist, 
which cannot fail to create favourable conditions for 
the development of large grain farms, for in our country 
there is no private ownership of land. 
In capitalist countries the large grain farms aim at 
obtaining the maximum profit, or, at all events, a profit 
equal to the so-called average rate of profit, failing 
which, generally speaking, there would be no incentive 
to invest capital in grain production. In our country, 
on the contrary, the large grain farms, being state undertakings, 
need neither the maximum profit, nor the 
average rate of profit for their development; they can limit 
themselves to a minimum profit, and sometimes even 
manage without any profit, which again creates favourable 
conditions for the development of large grain farms. 
Finally, under capitalism large grain farms do not 
enjoy special credit privileges or special tax privileges, 
whereas under the Soviet system, which is designed to 
support the socialist sector, such privileges exist and 
will continue to exist. 
Esteemed ³science² forgot all this. 
There have collapsed and crumbled to dust the assertions 
of the Right opportunists (Bukharinıs group) that: 
a) the peasants would not join the collective farms, 
b) the accelerated development of collective farms 
could only cause mass discontent and estrangement between 
the peasantry and the working class, 
c) the ³high road² of socialist development in the 
countryside is not the collective farms, but the cooperatives,

A YEAR OF GREAT CHANGE 137 
d) the development of collective farms and the offensive 
against the capitalist elements in the countryside 
might deprive the country of grain altogether. 
All that has collapsed and crumbled to dust as 
old bourgeois-liberal rubbish. 
Firstly, the peasants are joining the collective farms; 
they are joining by whole villages, volosts, and districts. 
Secondly, the mass collective-farm movement is not 
weakening the bond, but strengthening it, by putting 
it on a new, production basis. Now even the blind can 
see that if there is any serious dissatisfaction among 
the main mass of the peasantry it is not because of the 
collective-farm policy of the Soviet government, but 
because the Soviet government is unable to keep pace 
with the growth of the collective-farm movement as 
regards supplying the peasants with machines and tractors. 
Thirdly, the controversy about the ³high road² of 
socialist development in the countryside is a scholastic 
controversy, worthy of young petty-bourgeois liberals 
of the type of Eichenwald and Slepkov. It is obvious 
that, as long as there was no mass collective-farm 
movement, the ³high road² was the lower forms of the 
co-operative movement‹supply and marketing co-operatives; 
but when the higher form of the co-operative 
movement‹the collective farm‹appeared, the latter 
became the ³high road² of development. 
The high road (without quotation marks) of socialist 
development in the countryside is Leninıs co-operative 
plan, which embraces all forms of agricultural cooperation, 
from the lowest (supply and marketing cooperatives) 
to the highest (producersı and collective

J. V. S T A L I N 138 
farm co-operatives). To counterpose collective farms to 
co-operatives is to make a mockery of Leninism and to 
acknowledge oneıs own ignorance. 
Fourthly, now even the blind can see that without 
the offensive against the capitalist elements in the 
countryside, and without the development of the collective-
farm and state-farm movement, we would not 
have achieved the decisive successes of this year in the 
matter of grain procurements, nor could the state have 
accumulated, as i t has already done, an emergency 
reserve of grain totalling tens of millions of poods. 
More than that, it can now be confidently asserted 
that, thanks to the growth of the collective-farm and 
state-farm movement, we are definitely emerging, or 
have already emerged, from the grain crisis. And if 
the development of the collective farms and state farms 
is accelerated, there is no reason to doubt that in about 
three yearsı time our country will be one of the worldıs 
largest grain producers, if not the largest. 
What is the new feature of the present collectivefarm 
movement? The new and decisive feature of the 
present collective farm movement is that the peasants 
are joining the collective farms not in separate groups, 
as was formerly the case, but by whole villages, volosts, 
districts, and even okrugs. 
And what does that mean? It means that the middle 
peasant is joining the collective farm. And that is the 
basis of that radical change in the development of agriculture 
that constitutes the most important achievement 
of the Soviet government during the past year. 
Trotskyismıs Menshevik ³conception² that the working 
class is incapable of securing the following of the

A YEAR OF GREAT CHANGE 139 
main mass of the peasantry in the work of socialist 
construction is collapsing and being smashed to smithereens. 
Now even the blind can see that the middle peasant 
has turned towards the collective farm. Now it 
is obvious to all that the five-year plan of industry and 
agriculture is a five-year plan of building a socialist 
society, that those who do not believe in the possibility 
of completely building socialism in our country have 
no right to greet our five-year plan. 
The last hope of the capitalists of all countries, who 
are dreaming of restoring capitalism in the U.S.S.R.‹ 
³the sacred principle of private property²‹is collapsing 
and crumbling to dust. The peasants, whom they regarded 
as material that fertilises the soil for capitalism, are 
abandoning en masse the lauded banner of ³private property² 
and are going over to the lines of collectivism, of 
socialism. The last hope for the restoration of capitalism 
is collapsing. 
This, by the way, explains the desperate efforts 
of the capitalist elements in our country to rouse all 
the forces of the old world against advancing socialism 
‹efforts which are leading to an intensification of the 
class struggle. Capital does not want ³to grow into² 
socialism. 
This also explains the furious howl against Bolshevism 
which has been raised recently by the watchdogs 
of capital, by the Struves and Hessens, the Milyukovs 
and Kerenskys, the Dans and Abramoviches and 
their like. The last hope for the restoration of capitalism 
is disappearing‹that is no joke for them. 
What other explanation for the violent rage of our 
class enemies and this frenzied howling of the lackeys

J. V. S T A L I N 140 
of capital can there be except the fact that our Party 
has actually achieved a decisive victory on the most 
difficult front of socialist construction? 
³Only if we succeed,² says Lenin, ³in practice in showing 
the peasants the advantages of common, collective, co-operative, 
artel cultivation of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant 
by means of co-operative, artel farming, will the working 
class, which holds state power in its hands, actually prove to the 
peasant the correctness of its policy and actually secure the real 
and durable following of the vast masses of the peasantry² (Vol. 
XXIV, p. 579). 
That is how Lenin put the question of the ways of 
winning the vast masses of the peasantry to the side of 
the working class, of the ways of transferring the peasants 
on to the lines of collective-farm development. 
The past year has shown that our Party is successfully 
coping with this task and is resolutely overcoming 
every obstacle standing in its path. 
³In a communist society,² says Lenin, ³the middle peasants 
will be on our side only when we alleviate and improve their 
economic conditions. If tomorrow we could supply 100,000 firstclass 
tractors, provide them with fuel, provide them with drivers 
(you know very well that at present this is fantasy), the middle 
peasant would say: ŒI am for the kommuniaı (i.e., for communism). 
But in order to do that we must first defeat the international 
bourgeoisie, we must compel it to give us these tractors, 
or we must so develop our productivity as to be able to provide 
them ourselves. That is the only correct way to pose this question² 
(Vol. XXIV, p. 170). 
That is how Lenin put the question of the ways of 
technically re-equipping the middle peasant, of the ways 
of winning him to the side of communism.

A YEAR OF GREAT CHANGE 141 
The past year has shown that the Party is successfully 
coping with this task too. We know that by the 
spring of the coming year, 1930, we shall have over 
60,000 tractors in the fields, a year later we shall have 
over 100,000 tractors, and two years after that, over 
250,000 tractors. We are now able to accomplish and 
even to exceed what was considered ³fantasy² several years 
ago.
And that is why the middle peasant has turned towards 
the ³kommunia.² 
Such is the position regarding our Partyıs third 
achievement. 
Such are the fundamental achievements of our Party 
during the past year. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We are advancing full steam ahead along the path 
of industrialisation‹to socialism, leaving behind the ageold 
³Russian² backwardness. 
We are becoming a country of metal, a country of 
automobiles, a country of tractors. 
And when we have put the U.S.S.R. on an automobile, 
and the muzhik on a tractor, let the worthy capitalists, 
who boast so much of their ³civilisation,² try to 
overtake us! We shall yet see which countries may then 
be ³classified² as backward and which as advanced. 
November 3, 1929 
Pravda, No. 259, 
November 7, 1929 
Signed: J. Stalin

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD 
OF THE NEWSPAPER TREVOGA, ORGAN 
OF THE SPECIAL FAR EASTERN ARMY14 
Fraternal greetings to the men and commanders of 
the Special Far Eastern Army, who are upholding the 
rights and interests of the October Revolution against 
the encroachments of the Chinese landlords and capitalists! 
Keep a keen watch on every movement of the Chinese 
counter-revolutionaries, answer every blow with a 
crushing blow, and thus help our brothers in China, the 
Chinese workers and peasants, to smash the landlord 
and capitalist yoke. 
Remember that on this festive day the vast masses 
of the working people of the U.S.S.R. are thinking 
of you with affection, and together with you are celebrating 
the great anniversary and sharing your rejoicing 
over the successes of the Special Far Eastern Army. 
Long Live the October Revolution! 
Long Live the Special Far Eastern Army! 
Long Live the workers and peasants of China! 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 259, 
November 7, 1929

A NECESSARY CORRECTION 
Pravda, in its issue of December 16 (No. 296), printed 
(in its ³Party Affairs² section) an unsigned article 
entitled ³Must There Be Confusion?² criticising one of 
the statements of an article in Komsomolskaya Pravda,15 
³Introductory Essay on Leninism,² which discussed the 
question of the most favourable conditions for a revolutionary 
breach of the world imperialist front. 
The author quotes the following passage from the 
criticised article: ³Leninism teaches that the revolution 
begins where the imperialist chain has its weakest 
link.² He further equates this passage with the following 
passage from Bukharinıs Economics of the Transition 
Period: ³The collapse of the capitalist world system 
began with the weakest national-economic systems.² The 
author then quotes Leninıs critical observations directed 
against this passage from Bukharinıs book and draws 
the conclusion that the article ³Introductory Essay on 
Leninism² in Komsomolskaya Pravda is guilty of an error 
similar to that of Bukharinıs. 
It seems to me that the author of the article ³Must 
There Be Confusion?² is mistaken. Under no circumstances 
can the thesis‹³the imperialist chain breaks

J. V. S T A L I N 144 
where it is weakest²‹be equated with Bukharinıs thesis: 
³the imperialist chain breaks where the nationaleconomic 
system is weakest.² Why? Because the former 
speaks of the weakness of the imperialist chain 
which has to be breached, that is, it speaks of the weakness 
of the imperialist forces, whereas Bukharin speaks 
of the weakness of the national-economic system of the 
country which (the country) has to breach the imperialist 
chain, that is, of the weakness of the anti-imperialist 
forces. That is by no means one and the same thing. 
More than that, these are two opposite theses. 
According to Bukharin, the imperialist front breaks 
where the national-economic system is weakest. That, 
of course, is untrue. If it were true, the proletarian 
revolution would have begun not in Russia, but somewhere 
in Central Africa. The ³Introductory Essay on 
Leninism,² however, says something that is the very 
opposite of Bukharinıs thesis, namely, that the imperialist 
chain breaks where it (the chain) is weakest. 
And that is quite true. The chain of world imperialism 
breaks in a particular country precisely because it is 
in that country that it (the chain) is weakest at the particular 
moment. Otherwise, it would not break. Otherwise, 
the Mensheviks would be right in their fight 
against Leninism. 
And what determines the weakness of the imperialist 
chain in a particular country? The existence of a 
certain minimum of industrial development and cultural 
level in that country. The existence in that country 
of a certain minimum of an industrial proletariat. 
The revolutionary spirit of the proletariat and of the 
proletarian vanguard in that country. The existence in

A NECESSARY CORRECTION 145 
that country of a substantial ally of the proletariat (the 
peasantry, for example), an ally capable of following 
the proletariat in a determined struggle against imperialism. 
Hence, a combination of conditions which render 
the isolation and overthrow of imperialism in that 
country inevitable. 
The author of the article ³Must There Be Confusion?² 
has obviously confused two entirely different things. 
Indeed‹must there be confusion? 
Pravda, No. 298, 
December 18, 1929 
Signed: J. St.

TO ALL ORGANISATIONS AND COMRADES 
WHO SENT GREETINGS ON THE OCCASION 
OF COMRADE STALINıS FIFTIETH BIRTHDAY 
Your congratulations and greetings I place to the 
credit of the great Party of the working class which 
bore me and reared me in its own image and likeness. And 
just because I place them to the credit of our glorious 
Leninist Party, I make bold to tender you my Bolshevik 
thanks. 
You need have no doubt, comrades, that I am prepared 
in the future, too, to devote to the cause of the 
working class, to the cause of the proletarian revolution 
and world communism, all my strength, all my ability 
and, if need be, all my blood, drop by drop. 
With deep respect, 
J. Stalin 
December 21, 1929 
Pravda, No. 302 
December 22, 1929

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN 
POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R. 
Speech Delivered at a Conference 
of Marxist Students of Agrarian Questions 
December 27, 192916 
Comrades, the main fact of our social and economic 
life at the present time, a fact which is attracting universal 
attention, is the tremendous growth of the collective-
farm movement. 
The characteristic feature of the present collectivefarm 
movement is that not only are the collective-farms 
being joined by individual groups of poor peasants, as 
has been the case hitherto, but that they are being 
joined by the mass of the middle peasants as well. This 
means that the collective-farm movement has been transformed 
from a movement of individual groups and sections 
of the labouring peasants into a movement of millions 
and millions of the main mass of the peasantry. 
This, by the way, explains the tremendously important 
fact that the collective-farm movement, which has assumed 
the character of a mighty and growing antikulak 
avalanche, is sweeping the resistance of the kulak 
from its path, is shattering the kulak class and paving 
the way for extensive socialist construction in the 
countryside. 
But while we have reason to be proud of the practical 
successes achieved in socialist construction, the 
same cannot be said with regard to our theoretical work

J. V. S T A L I N 148 
in the economic field in general, and in that of agriculture 
in particular. More than that, it must be admitted 
that theoretical thought is not keeping pace with our 
practical successes, that there is a certain gap between 
our practical successes and the development of theoretical 
thought. Yet it is essential that theoretical work 
should not only keep pace with practical work but 
should keep ahead of it and equip our practical workers 
in their fight for the victory of socialism. 
I shall not dwell at length here on the importance 
of theory. You are quite well aware of its importance. 
You know that theory, if it is genuine theory, gives 
practical workers the power of orientation, clarity of 
perspective, confidence in their work, faith in the victory 
of our cause. All this is, and necessarily must be, 
immensely important in our work of socialist construction. 
The unfortunate thing is that precisely in this 
sphere, in the sphere of the theoretical treatment of 
questions of our economy, we are beginning to lag behind. 
How else can we explain the fact that in our country, 
in our social and political life, various bourgeois 
and petty-bourgeois theories on questions of our economy 
are still current? How can we explain the fact that 
these theories and would-be theories are not yet meeting 
with a proper rebuff? How can we explain the fact that 
a number of fundamental theses of Marxist-Leninist political 
economy, which are the most effective antidote 
to bourgeois and petty-bourgeois theories, are beginning 
to be forgotten, are not popularised in our press, 
are for some reason not placed in the foreground? Is 
it difficult to understand that unless a relentless fight 
against bourgeois theories is waged on the basis of

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R. 149 
Marxist-Leninist theory, it will be impossible to achieve 
complete victory over our class enemies? 
New practical experience is giving rise to a new 
approach to the problems of the economy of the transition 
period. Questions of NEP, of classes, of the rate 
of construction, of the bond with the peasantry, of the 
Partyıs policy, are now presented in a new way. If 
we are not to lag behind practice we must immediately 
begin to work on all these problems in the light of the 
new situation. Unless we do this it will be impossible 
to overcome the bourgeois theories which are stuffing 
the heads of our practical workers with rubbish. Unless 
we do this i t will be impossible to eradicate these 
theories which are acquiring the tenacity of prejudices. 
For only by combating bourgeois prejudices in the field 
of theory is it possible to consolidate the position of 
Marxism-Leninism. 
Permit me now to characterise at least a few of 
these bourgeois prejudices which are called theories, and 
to demonstrate their unsoundness in the light of certain 
key problems of our work of construction. 
I 
THE THEORY OF ³EQUILIBRIUM² 
You know, of course, that the so-called theory of 
³equilibrium² between the sectors of our national economy 
is still current among Communists. This theory, 
of course, has nothing in common with Marxism. Nevertheless, 
it is a theory that is being spread by a number 
of people in the camp of the Right deviators.

J. V. S T A L I N 150 
This theory assumes that we have, in the first place, 
a socialist sector‹which is one compartment, as it 
were‹and that in addition we have a non-socialist or, 
if you like, capitalist sector‹which is another compartment. 
These two ³compartments² are on different 
rails and glide peacefully forward, without touching 
each other. Geometry teaches that parallel lines do not 
meet. But the authors of this remarkable theory believe 
that these parallel lines will meet eventually, and that 
when they do, we shall have socialism. This theory 
overlooks the fact that behind these so-called ³compartments² 
there are classes, and that the movement of 
these compartments takes place by way of a fierce class 
struggle, a life-and-death struggle, a struggle on the principle 
of ³who will beat whom?² 
It is not difficult to realise that this theory has 
nothing in common with Leninism. It is not difficult 
to realise that, objectively, the purpose of this theory 
is to defend the position of individual peasant farming, 
to arm the kulak elements with a ³new² theoretical 
weapon in their struggle against the collective farms, and 
to discredit the collective farms. 
Nevertheless, this theory is s t i l l current in our 
press. And it cannot be said that it has met with a serious 
rebuff, let alone a crushing rebuff, from our theoreticians. 
How can this incongruity be explained except 
by the backwardness of our theoretical thought? 
And yet, all that is needed is to take from the treasury 
of Marxism the theory of reproduction and set it 
up against the theory of equilibrium of the sectors for 
the latter theory to be wiped out without leaving a 
trace. Indeed, the Marxist theory of reproduction teaches

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R. 151 
that modern society cannot develop without accumulating 
from year to year, and accumulation is impossible 
unless there is expanded reproduction from year 
to year. This is clear and comprehensible. Our largescale, 
centralised, socialist industry is developing according 
to the Marxist theory of expanded reproduction; 
for it is growing in volume from year to year, it has 
its accumulations and is advancing with giant strides. 
But our large-scale industry does not constitute the 
whole of the national economy. On the contrary, 
small-peasant economy still predominates in it. Can 
we say that our small peasant economy is developing 
according to the principle of expanded reproduction? 
No, we cannot. Not only is there no annual expanded 
reproduction in the bulk of our small-peasant 
economy, but, on the contrary, it is seldom able to achieve 
even simple reproduction. Can we advance our socialised 
industry at an accelerated rate while we have such 
an agricultural basis as small-peasant economy, which 
is incapable of expanded reproduction, and which, in 
addition, is the predominant force in our national economy? 
No, we cannot. Can Soviet power and the work of 
socialist construction rest for any length of time on two 
different foundations: on the most large-scale and concentrated 
socialist industry, and the most disunited 
and backward, small-commodity peasant economy? No, 
they cannot. Sooner or later this would be bound to end 
in the complete collapse of the whole national economy. 
What, then, is the way out? The way out lies in 
making agriculture large-scale, in making it capable of 
accumulation, of expanded reproduction, and in thus transforming 
the agricultural basis of the national economy.

J. V. S T A L I N 152 
But how is it to be made large-scale? 
There are two ways of doing this. There is the capitalist 
way, which is to make agriculture large-scale 
by implanting capitalism in agriculture‹a way which 
leads to the impoverishment of the peasantry and to 
the development of capitalist enterprises in agriculture. 
We reject this way as incompatible with Soviet economy. 
There is another way: the socialist way, which is 
to introduce collective farms and state farms into agriculture, 
the way which leads to uniting the smallpeasant 
farms into large collective farms, employing 
machinery and scientific methods of farming, and capable 
of developing further, for such farms can achieve expanded 
reproduction. 
And so, the question stands as follows: either one 
way or the other, either back‹to capitalism, or forward 
‹to socialism. There is not, and cannot be, any third way. 
The theory of ³equilibrium² is an attempt to indicate 
a third way. And precisely because it is based on 
a third (non-existent) way, i t i s utopian and anti- 
Marxist. 
You see, therefore, that all that was needed was to 
counterpose Marxıs theory of reproduction to this theory 
of ³equilibrium² of the sectors for the latter theory 
to be wiped out without leaving a trace. 
Why, then, do our Marxist students of agrarian questions 
not do this? In whose interest is it that the ridiculous 
theory of ³equilibrium² should have currency 
in our press while the Marxist theory of reproduction is 
kept hidden?

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R. 153 
II 
THE THEORY OF ³SPONTANEITY² 
IN SOCIALIST CONSTRUCTION 
Let us now take the second prejudice in political 
economy, the second bourgeois type of theory. I have in 
mind the theory of ³spontaneity² in socialist construction‹
a theory which has nothing in common with 
Marxism, but which is being zealously advocated by 
our comrades of the Right camp. 
The authors of this theory assert approximately the 
following. There was a time when capitalism existed in 
our country, industry developed on a capitalist basis, 
and the countryside followed the capitalist town spontaneously, 
automatically, becoming transformed in the 
image of the capitalist town. Since that is what happened 
under capitalism, why should not the same thing 
happen under the Soviet economic system as well? Why 
should not the countryside, small-peasant farming, automatically 
follow the socialist town, becoming transformed 
spontaneously in the image of the socialist town? 
On these grounds the authors of this theory assert that 
the countryside can follow the socialist town automatically. 
Hence, the question arises: Is it worth our while 
bothering about organising state farms and collective 
farms; is it worth while breaking lances over this if 
the countryside may in any case follow the socialist 
town? 
Here you have another theory which, objectively, 
seeks to supply the capitalist elements in the countryside 
with a new weapon for their struggle against the 
collective farms.

J. V. S T A L I N 154 
The anti-Marxist nature of this theory is beyond 
all doubt. 
Is i t not strange that our theoreticians have not 
yet taken the trouble to explode this queer theory which 
is stuffing the heads of our practical collective-farm 
workers with rubbish? 
There is no doubt that the leading role of the socialist 
town in relation to the small-peasant, individualist 
countryside is a great one and of inestimable value. It 
is indeed upon this that the role of industry in transforming 
agriculture is based. But is this factor sufficient to 
cause the small-peasant countryside automatically to 
follow the town in the work of socialist construction? 
No, it is not sufficient. 
Under capitalism the countryside automatically followed 
the town because the capitalist economy of the 
town and the individual small-commodity economy of 
the peasant are, basically, economies of the same type. 
Of course, small-peasant commodity economy is not yet 
capitalist economy. But it is, basically, the same type 
of economy as capitalist economy since it rests on private 
ownership of the means of production. Lenin was 
a thousand times right when, in his notes on Bukharinıs 
Economics of the Transition Period, he referred to the 
³commodity-capitalist tendency of the peasantry² in 
contrast to the ³socialist tendency of the proletariat.²*17 
It is this that explains why ³small production engenders 
capitalism and the bourgeoisie continuously, daily, 
hourly, spontaneously, and on a mass scale²18 (Lenin). 
Is it possible to say that basically small-commodity 
* Leninıs italics.‹J. St.

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R. 155 
peasant economy is the same type of economy as socialist 
production in the towns? Obviously, it is impossible 
to say so without breaking with Marxism. Otherwise 
Lenin would not have said that ³as long as we live in 
a small-peasant country, there is a surer economic basis 
for capitalism in Russia than for communism.²19 
Consequently, the theory of ³spontaneity² in socialist 
construction is a rotten, anti-Leninist theory. 
Consequently, in order that the small-peasant countryside 
should follow the socialist town, it is necessary, 
apart from everything else, to introduce in the countryside 
large socialist farms in the form of state farms and 
collective farms, as bases of socialism, which‹headed 
by the socialist town‹will be able to take the lead of the 
main mass of the peasantry. 
Consequently, the theory of ³spontaneity² in socialist 
construction is an anti-Marxist theory. The socialist 
town can lead the small-peasant countryside, only by introducing 
collective farms and state farms and by transforming 
the countryside after a new, socialist pattern. 
It is strange that the anti-Marxist theory of ³spontaneity² 
in socialist construction has hitherto not met 
with a proper rebuff from our agrarian theoreticians. 
III 
THE THEORY OF THE ³STABILITY² 
OF SMALL-PEASANT FARMING 
Let us now take the third prejudice in political 
economy, the theory of the ³stability² of small-peasant 
farming. Everybody is familiar with the argument of 
bourgeois political economy that the well-known Marxist

J. V. S T A L I N 156 
thesis about the advantages of large-scale production 
over small production applies only to industry, and 
does not apply to agriculture. Social-Democratic 
theoreticians like David and Hertz, who advocate this 
theory, have tried to ³base themselves² on the fact 
that the small peasant is enduring and patient, that he 
is ready to bear any privation if only he can hold on 
to his little plot of land, and that, as a consequence, 
small-peasant economy displays stability in the struggle 
against large-scale economy in agriculture. 
It is not difficult to understand that such ³stability² 
is worse than any instability. It is not difficult to understand 
that this anti-Marxist theory has only one 
aim: to eulogise and strength en the capitalist system, 
which ruins the vast masses of small peasants. And it is 
precisely because this theory pursues this aim that it 
has been so easy for Marxists to shatter it. 
But that is not the point just now. The point is 
that our practice, our reality, is providing new arguments 
against this theory, yet our theoreticians, strangely 
enough, either will not, or cannot, make use of 
this new weapon against the enemies of the working 
class. I have in mind our practice in abolishing private 
ownership of land, our practice in nationalising the land, 
our practice which liberates the small peasant from his 
slavish attachment to his little plot of land and thereby 
helps the change from small-scale peasant farming to largescale 
collective farming. 
Indeed, what is it that has tied, is still tying and 
will continue to tie the small peasant of Western Europe 
to his small-commodity farming? Primarily, and mainly, 
the fact that he owns his little plot of land, the ex

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R. 157 
istence of private ownership of land. For years he saved 
up money in order to buy a little plot of land; he bought it, 
and of course he does not want to part with it, preferring 
to endure any privation, preferring to sink into barbarism 
and abject poverty, if only he can hold on to his 
little plot of land, the basis of his individual economy. 
Can it be said that this factor, in this form, continues 
to operate in our country, under the Soviet system? 
No, it cannot be said. It cannot be said because 
there is no private ownership of land in our country. 
And precisely because there is no private ownership of 
land in our country, our peasants do not display that 
slavish attachment to a plot of land which is seen in the 
West. And this circumstance cannot but facilitate the 
change from small-peasant farming to collective farming. 
That is one of the reasons why the large farms, the 
collective farms of our countryside, are able in our country, 
where the land is nationalised, to demonstrate so 
easily their superiority over the small peasant farms. 
That is the great revolutionary significance of the 
Soviet agrarian laws which abolished absolute rent, 
abolished the private ownership of land and carried out 
the nationalisation of the land. 
But it follows from this that we now have at our command 
a new argument against the bourgeois economists 
who proclaim the stability of small-peasant farming in 
its struggle against large-scale farming. 
Why then is this new argument not sufficiently utilised 
by our agrarian theoreticians in their struggle 
against all the various bourgeois theories? 
When we nationalised the land our point of departure 
was, among other things, the theoretical premises

J. V. S T A L I N 158 
laid down in the third volume of Capital, in Marxıs 
well-known book Theories of Surplus-Value, and in 
Leninıs works on agrarian questions, which represent an 
extremely rich treasury of theoretical thought. I am 
referring to the theory of ground rent in general, and 
the theory of absolute ground rent in particular. It is 
now clear that the theoretical principles laid down in 
these works have been brilliantly confirmed by the 
practical experience of our work of socialist construction 
in town and country. 
The only incomprehensible thing is why the antiscientific 
theories of ³Soviet² economists like Chayanov 
should be freely current in our press, while Marxıs, 
Engelsı and Leninıs works of genius dealing with the 
theory of ground rent and absolute ground rent are not 
popularised and brought into the foreground, but are kept 
hidden. 
You, no doubt, remember Engelsı well-known pamphlet 
The Peasant Question. You, of course, remember 
with what circumspection Engels approaches the question 
of the transition of the small peasants to the path 
of co-operative farming, to the path of collective farming. 
Permit me to quote the passage in question from 
Engels: 
³We are decidedly on the side of the small peasant; we shall 
do everything at all permissible to make his lot more bearable, 
to facilitate his transition to the co-operative should he decide 
to do so, and even to make it possible for him to remain on his 
little plot of land for a protracted length of time to think the matter 
over, should he still be unable to bring himself to this decision.²*20 
* My italics.‹J. St.

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R. 159 
You see with what circumspection Engels approaches 
the question of the transition of individual peasant 
farming to collectivist lines. How are we to explain 
this circumspection displayed by Engels, which at first 
sight seems exaggerated? What did he proceed from? 
Obviously, he proceeded from the existence of private 
ownership of land, from the fact that the peasant has 
³his little plot of land² which he will find it hard to 
part with. Such is the peasantry in the West. Such is the 
peasantry in capitalist countries, where private ownership 
of land exists. Naturally, great circumspection is needed 
there. 
Can it be said that such a situation exists in our 
country, in the U.S.S.R.? No, it cannot. It cannot be 
said because here we have no private ownership of land 
chaining the peasant to his individual farm. It cannot 
be said because in our country the land is nationalised, 
and this facilitates the transition of the individual 
peasant to collectivist lines. 
That is one of the reasons for the comparative ease 
and rapidity with which the collective-farm movement 
has of late been developing in our country. 
It is to be regretted that our agrarian theoreticians 
have not yet attempted to bring out with the proper 
clarity this difference between the situation of the peasantry 
in our country and in the West. And yet this 
would be of the utmost value not only for us, working 
in the Soviet Union, but for Communists in all countries. 
For it is not a matter of indifference to the proletarian 
revolution in the capitalist countries whether, 
from the first day of the seizure of power by the proletariat, 
socialism will have to be built there on the

J. V. S T A L I N 160 
basis of the nationalisation of the land or without this 
basis. 
In my recent article (³A Year of Great Change²*), 
I advanced certain arguments to prove the superiority 
of large-scale farming over small farming; in this I had 
in mind large state farms. It is self-evident that all 
these arguments fully and entirely apply also to collective 
farms as large economic units. I am speaking 
not only of developed collective farms, which have machines 
and tractors at their disposal, but also of collective 
farms in their primary stage, which represent, as 
it were, the manufacture period of collective-farm development 
and are based on peasant farm implements. I 
am referring to the collective farms in their primary 
stage which are now being formed in the areas of complete 
collectivisation, and which are based upon the 
simple pooling of the peasantsı implements of production. 
Take, for instance, the collective farms of the Khoper 
area in the former Don region. Outwardly, from 
the point of view of technical equipment, these collective 
farms scarcely differ from small-peasant farms (few 
machines, few tractors). And yet the simple pooling of 
the peasantsı implements of production within the collective 
farms has produced results of which our practical 
workers have never dreamt. What are these results? 
The fact that the transition to collective farming 
has brought about an increase of the crop area by 30, 
40 and 50 per cent. How are these ³dizzying² results 
to be explained? By the fact that the peasants, who 
* See this volume, pp. 124-141. ‹Ed.

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R. 161 
were powerless under the conditions of individual labour, 
have been transformed into a mighty force once 
they have pooled their implements and have united in 
collective farms. By the fact that it has become possible 
for the peasants to till neglected land and virgin 
soil, which is difficult to cultivate by individual labour. 
By the fact that the peasants have been enabled 
to avail themselves of virgin soil. By the fact that wasteland, 
isolated plots, field boundaries, etc., etc., could 
now be cultivated. 
The question of cultivating neglected land and virgin 
soil is of tremendous importance for our agriculture. 
You know that the pivot of the revolutionary movement 
in Russia in the old days was the agrarian question. 
You know that one of the aims of the agrarian movement 
was to do away with the shortage of land. At 
that time there were many who thought that this shortage 
of land was absolute, i.e., that there was in Russia 
no more free land suitable for cultivation. And what 
has actually proved to be the situation? Now it is quite 
clear that scores of millions of hectares of free land 
were and still are available in the U.S.S.R. But the 
peasants were quite unable to till this land with their 
wretched implements. And precisely because they were 
unable to till neglected land and virgin soil, they longed 
for ³soft soil,² for the soil which belonged to the 
landlords, for soil which could be tilled with the aid of 
peasant implements by individual labour. That was at 
the bottom of the ³land shortage.² It is not surprising, 
therefore, that our Grain Trust, which is equipped with 
tractors, is now able to place under cultivation some 
twenty million hectares of free land, land unoccupied

J. V. S T A L I N 162 
by peasants and unfit for cultivation by individual 
labour with the aid of small-peasant implements. 
The significance of the collective-farm movement in 
all its phases‹both in its primary and in its more developed 
phase when it is equipped with tractors‹lies, for 
one thing, in the fact that it is now possible for the peasants 
to place under cultivation neglected land and virgin 
soil. That is the secret of the tremendous expansion 
of the crop area attending the transition of the peasants 
to collective labour. That is one of the reasons for 
the superiority of the collective farms over individual 
peasant farms. 
It goes without saying that the superiority of the 
collective farms over the individual peasant farms will 
become even more incontestable when our machine and 
tractor stations and tractor columns come to the aid of 
the primary-stage collective farms in the areas of complete 
collectivisation, and when the collective farms will 
be in a position to own tractors and harvester combines. 
IV 
TOWN AND COUNTRY 
In regard to the so-called ³scissors,² there is a prejudice, 
fostered by bourgeois economists, against which 
a merciless war must be declared, as against all the other 
bourgeois theories that, unfortunately, are circulated 
in the Soviet press. I have in mind the theory which 
alleges that the October Revolution brought the peasantry 
fewer benefits than the February Revolution, that, 
in fact, the October Revolution brought no benefits to 
the peasantry.

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R. 163 
At one time this prejudice was boosted in our press 
by a ³Soviet² economist. This ³Soviet² economist, it 
is true, later renounced his theory. (A voice: ³Who was 
it?²) It was Groman. But this theory was seized upon 
by the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition and used against the 
Party. Moreover, there are no grounds for claiming that 
it is not current even now in ³Soviet² public circles. 
This is a very important question, comrades. It 
touches upon the problem of the relations between town 
and country. It touches upon the problem of eliminating 
the antithesis between town and country. It touches 
upon the very urgent question of the ³scissors.² I think, 
therefore, that it is worth while examining this strange 
theory. 
Is it true that the October Revolution brought no 
benefits to the peasants? Let us turn to the facts. 
I have before me the table drawn up by Comrade 
Nemchinov, the well-known statistician, which was published 
in my article ³On the Grain Front.²21 From this 
table it is seen that in pre-revolutionary times the landlords 
³produced² not less than 600,000,000 poods of 
grain. Hence, the landlords were then the holders of 
600,000,000 poods of grain. 
The kulaks, as shown in this table, at that time ³produced² 
1,900,000,000 poods of grain. That represents the 
very great power which the kulaks wielded at that time. 
The poor and middle peasants, as shown in the same 
table, produced 2,500,000,000 poods of grain. 
That was the situation in the old countryside, prior 
to the October Revolution. 
What changes have taken place in the countryside 
since October? I quote the figures from the same table.

J. V. S T A L I N 164 
Take, for instance, the year 1927. How much did the 
landlords produce in that year? Obviously, they produced 
nothing and could not produce anything because they 
had been abolished by the October Revolution. You 
will realise that that must have been a great relief to 
the peasantry; for the peasants were liberated from the 
yoke of the landlords. That, of course, was a great gain 
for the peasantry, obtained as a result of the October 
Revolution. 
How much did the kulaks produce in 1927? Six hundred 
million poods of grain instead of 1,900,000,000. 
Thus, during the period following the October Revolution 
the kulaks had lost more than two-thirds of their 
power. You will realise that this was bound to ease the 
situation of the poor and middle peasants. 
And how much did the poor and middle peasants 
produce in 1927? Four thousand million poods, instead 
of 2,500,000,000 poods. Thus, after the October Revolution 
the poor and middle peasants began to produce 
1,500,000,000 poods more grain than in pre-revolutionary 
times. 
There you have facts which show that the October 
Revolution brought colossal gains to the poor and middle 
peasants. 
That is what the October Revolution brought to the 
poor and middle peasants. 
How, after this, can it be asserted that the October 
Revolution brought no benefits to the peasants? 
But that is not all, comrades. The October Revolution 
abolished private ownership of land, did away with 
the purchase and sale of land, carried out the nationalisation 
of the land. What does this mean? It means that

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R. 165 
now the peasant has no need to buy land in order to 
produce grain. Formerly he was saving up for years in 
order to acquire land; he got into debt, went into bondage, 
if only he could buy a piece of land. The expense 
which the purchase of land involved naturally increased 
the cost of production of grain. Now, the peasant 
does not have to do that. He can produce grain now without 
buying land. Consequently, the hundreds of millions 
of rubles that formerly were spent by the peasants for 
the purchase of land now remain in their pockets. Does 
this ease the situation of the peasants or not? Obviously, 
it does. 
Further. Until recently, the peasant was compelled 
to dig the soil with old-fashioned implements by 
individual labour. Everyone knows that individual 
labour, equipped with old-fashioned, now unsuitable, 
instruments of production, does not bring the gains 
required to enable one to lead a tolerable existence, 
systematically improve oneıs material position, develop 
oneıs culture and emerge on to the high road of socialist 
construction. Today, after the accelerated development 
of the collective-farm movement, the peasants are 
able to combine their labour with that of their neighbours, 
to unite in collective farms, to plough virgin 
soil, to utilise neglected land, to obtain machines and 
tractors and thereby double or even treble the productivity 
of labour. And what does this mean? I t means 
that today the peasant, by joining the collective farm, 
is able to produce much more than formerly with the 
same expenditure of labour. It means, therefore, that 
grain will be produced much more cheaply than was 
the case until quite recently. It means, finally, that,

J. V. S T A L I N 166 
with stable prices, the peasant can obtain much more 
for his grain than he has obtained up to now. 
How, after all this, can it be asserted that the October 
Revolution brought no gains to the peasantry? 
Is it not clear that those who utter such fictions 
obviously slander the Party and the Soviet power? 
But what follows from all this? 
It follows that the question of the ³scissors,² the 
question of doing away with the ³scissors,² must now 
be approached in a new way. It follows that if the collective-
farm movement grows at the present rate, the 
³scissors² will be abolished in the near future. It follows 
that the question of the relations between town and 
country is now put on a new basis, that the antithesis 
between town and country will disappear at an accelerated 
pace. 
This circumstance, comrades, is of very great importance 
for our whole work of construction. It transforms 
the mentality of the peasant and turns him towards 
the town. It creates the basis for eliminating the antithesis 
between town and country. It creates the basis for 
the slogan of the Party‹²face to the countryside²‹ 
to be supplemented by the slogan of the peasant collective-
farmers: ³face to the town.² 
Nor is there anything surprising in this, for the peasant 
is now receiving from the town machines, tractors, 
agronomists, organisers and, finally, direct assistance 
in fighting and overcoming the kulaks. The old 
type of peasant, with his savage distrust of the town, 
which he regarded as a plunderer, is passing into the 
background. His place is being taken by the new peasant, 
by the collective-farm peasant, who looks to the

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R. 167 
town with the hope of receiving real assistance in production. 
The place of the old type of peasant who was 
afraid of sinking to the level of the poor peasants and 
only stealthily (for he could be deprived of the franchise!) 
rose to the position of a kulak, is being taken by the 
new peasant, with a new prospect before him‹that of 
joining a collective farm and emerging from poverty 
and ignorance on to the high road of economic and cultural 
progress. 
That is the turn things are taking, comrades. 
It is all the more regrettable, comrades, that our 
agrarian theoreticians have not taken all measures to 
explode and eradicate all bourgeois theories which seek 
to discredit the gains of the October Revolution and the 
growing collective-farm movement. 
V 
THE NATURE OF COLLECTIVE FARMS 
The collective farm, as a type of economy, is one of 
the forms of socialist economy. There can be no doubt 
whatever about that. 
One of the speakers here tried to discredit the collective 
farms. He asserted that the collective farms, as 
economic organisations, have nothing in common with 
the socialist form of economy. I must say, comrades, 
that such a characterisation of the collective farms is 
absolutely wrong. There can be no doubt that it has 
nothing in common with the true state of affairs. 
What determines the type of an economy? Obviously, 
the relations between people in the process of production. 
How else can the type of an economy be determined?

J. V. S T A L I N 168 
But is there in the collective farms a class of people who 
own the means of production and a class of people who 
are deprived of these means of production? Is there an 
exploiting class and an exploited class in the collective 
farms? Does not the collective farm represent the socialisation 
of the principal instruments of production on 
land belonging to the state? What grounds are there for 
asserting that the collective farms, as a type of economy, 
do not represent one of the forms of socialist 
economy? 
Of course, there are contradictions in the collective 
farms. Of course, there are individualistic and even 
kulak survivals in the collective farms, which have not 
yet disappeared, but which are bound to disappear in 
the course of time as the collective farms become stronger, 
as they are provided with more machines. But can 
it be denied that the collective farms as a whole, with 
all their contradictions and shortcomings, the collective 
farms as an economic fact, represent, in the main, a 
new path of development of the countryside, the path of 
socialist development of the countryside in contradistinction 
to the kulak, capitalist path of development? 
Can it be denied that the collective farms (I am speaking 
of real, not sham collective farms) represent, under 
our conditions, a base and centre of socialist construction 
in the countryside‹a base and centre which have 
grown up in desperate clashes with the capitalist elements? 
Is it not clear that the attempts of some comrades 
to discredit the collective farms and declare them a 
bourgeois form of economy are devoid of all foundation? 
In 1923 we did not yet have a mass collective-farm 
movement. Lenin, in his pamphlet On Co-operation, had

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R. 169 
in mind all forms of co-operation, both its lower forms 
(supply and marketing co-operatives) and its higher 
forms (collective farms). What did he say at that time 
about co-operation, about co-operative enterprises? Here 
is a quotation from Leninıs pamphlet On Co-operation: 
³Under our present system, co-operative enterprises differ 
from private capitalist enterprises because they are collective 
enterprises, but they do not differ* from socialist enterprises if 
the land on which they are situated and the means of production 
belong to the state, i.e., the working class² (Vol. XXVII, p. 396). 
Hence, Lenin takes the co-operative enterprises not 
by themselves, but in connection with our present system, 
in connection with the fact that they function on land 
belonging to the state, in a country where the means 
of production belong to the state; and, regarding them 
in this light, Lenin declares that co-operative enterprises 
do not differ from socialist enterprises. 
That is what Lenin says about co-operative enterprises 
in general. 
Is it not clear that there is all the more ground for 
saying the same about the collective farms in our period? 
This, by the way, explains why Lenin regarded the 
³mere growth of co-operation² under our conditions as 
³identical with the growth of socialism.² 
As you see, the speaker I referred to above, in trying 
to discredit the collective farms, committed a grave 
mistake against Leninism. 
This mistake led him to another mistake‹about 
the class struggle in the collective farms. The speaker 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 170 
portrayed the class struggle in the collective farms in 
such vivid colours that one might think that the class 
struggle in the collective farms does not differ from 
the class struggle in the absence of collective farms. Indeed, 
one might think that in the collective farms it becomes 
even fiercer. Incidentally, the speaker mentioned is not 
the only one who has erred in this matter. Idle talk 
about the class struggle, squealing and shrieking about 
the class struggle in the collective farms, is now characteristic 
of all our noisy ³Lefts.² The most comical thing 
about this squealing is that the squealers ³see² the 
class struggle where it does not exist, or hardly exists, but 
fail to see it where it does exist and is glaringly manifest. 
Are there elements of the class struggle in the collective 
farms? Yes, there are. There are bound to be 
elements of the class struggle in the collective farms 
as long as there still remain survivals of individualistic 
or even kulak mentality, as long as there still exists 
a certain degree of material inequality. Can it be said 
that the class struggle in the collective farms is equivalent 
to the class struggle in the absence of collective 
farms? No, it cannot. The mistake our ³Left² phrasemongers 
make lies precisely in not seeing the difference. 
What does the class struggle imply in the absence 
of collective farms, prior to the establishment of collective 
farms? It implies a fight against the kulak who 
owns the instruments and means of production and who 
keeps the poor peasants in bondage with the aid of those 
instruments and means of production. It is a life-anddeath 
struggle. 
But what does the class struggle imply with the collective 
farms in existence? It implies, firstly, that the

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
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DISTRIBUTION 
171 
kulak has been defeated and deprived of the instruments 
and means of production. It implies, secondly, 
that the poor and middle peasants are united in collective 
farms on the basis of the socialisation of the principal 
instruments and means of production. It implies, 
finally, that it is a struggle between members of collective 
farms, some of whom have not yet rid themselves 
of individualistic and kulak survivals and are striving 
to turn the inequality that exists to some extent in 
the collective farms to their own advantage, while the 
others want to eliminate these survivals and this inequality. 
Is it not clear that only the blind can fail to 
see the difference between the class struggle with the 
collective farms in existence and the class struggle in 
the absence of collective farms? 
It would be a mistake to believe that once collective 
farms exist we have all that is necessary for building 
socialism. It would be all the more a mistake to believe 
that the members of the collective farms have already 
become socialists. No, a great deal of work has still 
to be done to remould the peasant collective farmer, 
to set right his individualistic mentality and to transform 
him into a real working member of a socialist 
society. And the more rapidly the collective farms are 
provided with machines, the more rapidly they are 
supplied with tractors, the more rapidly will this be 
achieved. But this does not in the least belittle the very 
great importance of the collective farms as a lever for 
the socialist transformation of the countryside. The 
great importance of the collective farms lies precisely 
in that they represent the principal base for the employment 
of machinery and tractors in agriculture, that 
CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R.

J. V. S T A L I N 172 
they constitute the principal base for remoulding the 
peasant, for changing his mentality in the spirit of 
socialism. Lenin was right when he said: 
³The remaking of the small tiller, the remoulding of his 
whole mentality and habits, is a work of generations. As regards 
the small tiller, this problem can be solved, his whole mentality 
can be put on healthy lines, so to speak, only by the material 
base, by technical means, by introducing tractors and machines 
in agriculture on a mass scale, by electrification on a mass scale² 
(Vol. XXVI, p. 239). 
Who can deny that the collective farms are indeed 
that form of socialist economy which alone can draw the 
vast masses of the small individual peasants into largescale 
farming, with its machines and tractors as the 
levers of economic progress, the levers of the socialist 
development of agriculture? 
Our ³Left² phrasemongers have forgotten all that. 
And our speaker has forgotten about it, too. 
VI 
THE CLASS CHANGES AND THE TURN 
IN THE PARTYıS POLICY 
Finally, the question of the class changes in our 
country and the offensive of socialism against the capitalist 
elements in the countryside. 
The characteristic feature in the work of our Party 
during the past year is that we, as a Party, as the Soviet 
power: 
a) have developed an offensive along the whole 
front against the capitalist elements in the countryside;

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R. 173 
b) that this offensive, as you know, has yielded and 
continues to yield very appreciable, positive results. 
What does this mean? It means that we have passed 
from the policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies 
of the kulaks to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as 
a class. It means that we have carried out, and are continuing 
to carry out, one of the decisive turns in our 
whole policy. 
Until recently the Party adhered to the policy of 
restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks. As 
you know, this policy was proclaimed as far back as 
the Eighth Party Congress. It was again announced at 
the time of the introduction of NEP and at the Eleventh 
Congress of our Party. We all remember Leninıs 
well-known letter about Preobrazhenskyıs theses22 (1922), 
in which Lenin once again returned to the need for pursuing 
this policy. Finally, this policy was confirmed by 
the Fifteenth Congress of our Party. And it was this 
policy that we were pursuing until recently. 
Was this policy correct? Yes, it was absolutely correct 
at the time. Could we have undertaken such an offensive 
against the kulaks some five years or three years 
ago? Could we then have counted on success in such an 
offensive? No, we could not. That would have been the 
most dangerous adventurism. It would have been a very 
dangerous playing at an offensive. For we should certainly 
have failed, and our failure would have strengthened 
the position of the kulaks. Why? Because we did 
not yet have in the countryside strongpoints in the form 
of a wide network of state farms and collective farms 
which could be the basis for a determined offensive against 
the kulaks. Because at that time we were not yet able to

J. V. S T A L I N 174 
replace the capitalist production of the kulaks by the socialist 
production of the collective farms and state farms. 
In 1926-27, the Zinoviev-Trotsky opposition did 
its utmost to impose upon the Party the policy of an 
immediate offensive against the kulaks. The Party did 
not embark on that dangerous adventure, for it knew 
that serious people cannot afford to play at an offensive. 
An offensive against the kulaks is a serious matter. It 
should not be confused with declamations against the 
kulaks. Nor should it be confused with a policy of pinpricks 
against the kulaks, which the Zinoviev-Trotsky 
opposition did its utmost to impose upon the Party. 
To launch an offensive against the kulaks means that 
we must smash the kulaks, eliminate them as a class. 
Unless we set ourselves these aims, an offensive would 
be mere declamation, pinpricks, phrase-mongering, anything 
but a real Bolshevik offensive. To launch an offensive 
against the kulaks means that we must prepare for it 
and then strike at the kulaks, strike so hard as to prevent 
them from rising to their feet again. That is what 
we Bolsheviks call a real offensive. Could we have undertaken 
such an offensive some five years or three 
years ago with any prospect of success? No, we could not. 
Indeed, in 1927 the kulaks produced over 600,000,000 
poods of grain, about 130,000,000 poods of which they 
marketed outside the rural districts. That was a rather 
serious power, which had to be reckoned with. How much 
did our collective farms and state farms produce at that 
time? About 80,000,000 poods, of which about 35,000,000 
poods were sent to the market (marketable grain). Judge 
for yourselves, could we at that time have replaced the 
kulak output and kulak marketable grain by the out

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R. 175 
put and marketable grain of our collective farms and 
state farms? Obviously, we could not. 
What would it have meant to launch a determined 
offensive against the kulaks under such conditions? It 
would have meant certain failure, strengthening the 
position of the kulaks and being left without grain. That 
is why we could not and should not have undertaken 
a determined offensive against the kulaks at that time, 
in spite of the adventurist declamations of the Zinoviev- 
Trotsky opposition. 
But today? What is the position now? Today, we 
have an adequate material base for us to strike at the 
kulaks, to break their resistance, to eliminate them as 
a class, and to replace their output by the output of the 
collective farms and state farms. You know that in 1929 
the grain produced on the collective farms and state 
farms amounts to not less than 400,000,000 poods 
(200,000,000 poods below the gross output of the kulak 
farms in 1927). You also know that in 1929 the collective 
farms and state farms have supplied more than 
130,000,000 poods of marketable grain (i.e., more than 
the kulaks in 1927). Lastly, you know that in 1930 
the gross grain output of the collective farms and state farms 
will amount to not less than 900,000,000 poods of grain 
(i.e., more than the gross output of the kulaks in 1927), 
and their output of marketable grain will be not less 
than 400,000,000 poods (i.e., incomparably more than 
the kulaks supplied in 1927). 
That is how matters stand with us now, comrades. 
There you have the change that has taken place in 
the economy of our country. 
Now, as you see, we have the material base which

J. V. S T A L I N 176 
enables us to replace the kulak output by the output of 
the collective farms and state farms. It is for this very 
reason that our determined offensive against the kulaks 
is now meeting with undeniable success. 
That is how an offensive against the kulaks must be 
carried on, if we mean a genuine and determined offensive 
and not mere futile declamations against the kulaks. 
That is why we have recently passed from the policy 
of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks 
to the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class. 
Well, and what about the policy of dekulakisation? 
Can we permit dekulakisation in the areas of complete 
collectivisation? This question is asked in various quarters. 
A ridiculous question! We could not permit dekulakisation 
as long as we were pursuing the policy of restricting 
the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks, as long as 
we were unable to go over to a determined offensive 
against the kulaks, as long as we were unable to replace 
the kulak output by the output of the collective farms 
and state farms. At that time the policy of not permitting 
dekulakisation was necessary and correct. But now? 
Now things are different. Now we are able to carry on 
a determined offensive against the kulaks, break their 
resistance, eliminate them as a class and replace their 
output by the output of the collective farms and state 
farms. Now, dekulakisation is being carried out by the 
masses of poor and middle peasants themselves, who are 
putting complete collectivisation into practice. Now, 
dekulakisation in the areas of complete collectivisation 
is no longer just an administrative measure. Now, 
it is an integral part of the formation and development of 
the collective farms. Consequently it is now ridiculous

CONCERNING QUESTIONS OF AGRARIAN POLICY IN THE U.S.S.R. 177 
and foolish to discourse at length on dekulakisation. 
When the head is off, one does not mourn for the hair. 
There is another question which seems no less ridiculous: 
whether the kulaks should be permitted to join 
the collective farms. Of course not, for they are sworn 
enemies of the collective-farm movement. 
VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
The above, comrades, are six key questions which 
the theoretical work of our Marxist students of agrarian 
questions cannot ignore. 
The importance of these questions lies, above all, 
in the fact that a Marxist analysis of them makes it 
possible to eradicate all the various bourgeois theories 
which sometimes‹to our shame‹are circulated by our 
own comrades, by Communists, and which stuff the heads 
of our practical workers with rubbish. And these 
theories should have been eradicated and discarded long 
ago. For only in a relentless fight against these and 
similar theories can theoretical thought among Marxist 
students of agrarian questions develop and grow strong. 
The importance of these questions lies, lastly, in 
the fact that they give a new aspect to the old problems 
of the economy of the transition period. 
Questions of NEP, of classes, of the collective farms, 
of the economy of the transition period, are now presented 
in a new way. 
The mistake of those who interpret NEP as a retreat, 
and only as a retreat, must be exposed. As a matter of 
fact, even when the New Economic Policy was being

J. V. S T A L I N 178 
introduced, Lenin said that it was not only a retreat, 
but also the preparation for a new, determined offensive 
against the capitalist elements in town and country. 
The mistake of those who think that NEP is necessary 
only as a link between town and country must be 
exposed. It is not just any kind of link between town 
and country that we need. What we need is a link that 
will ensure the victory of socialism. And if we adhere 
to NEP it is because it serves the cause of socialism. 
When it ceases to serve the cause of socialism we shall 
get rid of it. Lenin said that NEP had been introduced 
in earnest and for a long time. But he never said it had 
been introduced for all time. 
We must also raise the question of popularising the 
Marxist theory of reproduction. We must examine the 
question of the structure of the balance sheet of our 
national economy. What the Central Statistical Board 
published in 1926 as the balance sheet of the national 
economy is not a balance sheet, but a juggling with 
figures. Nor is the manner in which Bazarov and Groman 
treat the problem of the balance sheet of the national 
economy suitable. The structure of the balance 
sheet of the national economy of the U.S.S.R. must be 
worked out by the revolutionary Marxists if they desire 
at all to devote themselves to the questions of the 
economy of the transition period. 
It would be a good thing if our Marxist economists were 
to appoint a special group to examine the problems of the 
economy of the transition period in the new way in which 
they are presented at the present stage of development. 
Pravda, No. 309, 
December 29, 1929

LETTER TO A. M. GORKY 
Dear Alexei Maximovich, 
Heaps of apologies, and please donıt be down on 
me for my tardy (too tardy!) reply. I am dreadfully overworked. 
What is more, I have not been altogether well. 
That, of course, is no excuse. But it may serve as a sort 
of explanation. 
1) We cannot do without self-criticism. We simply 
cannot, Alexei Maximovich. Without i t , stagnation, 
corruption of the apparatus, growth of bureaucracy, 
sapping of the creative initiative of the working class, 
are inevitable. Of course, self-criticism provides material 
for our enemies. You are quite right about that. But it 
also provides material (and a stimulus) for our advancement, 
for unleashing the constructive energies of the working 
people, for the development of emulation, for shock 
brigades, and so on. The negative aspect is counterbalanced 
and outweighed by the positive aspect. 
It is possible that our press gives too much prominence 
to our shortcomings, and sometimes even (involuntarily) 
advertises them. That is possible and even probable. 
And, of course, it is bad. You demand, therefore, 
that our shortcomings should be counterbalanced (I 
would say: outweighed) by our achievements. You are,

J. V. S T A L I N 180 
of course, right about that too. We shall most certainly 
repair this defect, and without delay. You need have no 
doubt of that. 
2) Our youth are of various kinds. There are the 
grumblers, the tired and the despairing (like Zenin). 
There are those who are cheerful, high-spirited, of strong 
will and indomitably determined to achieve victory. It 
cannot be the case that now, when we are breaking the 
old relations in life and building new ones, when the 
customary roads and paths are being torn up and new, 
uncustomary ones laid, when whole sections of the population 
who used to live in plenty are being thrown 
out of their rut and are falling out of the ranks, making 
way for millions of people who were formerly oppressed 
and downtrodden‹it cannot be the case that 
the youth should represent a homogeneous mass of 
people who sympathise with us, that there should be 
no differentiation and division among them. Firstly, 
among the youth there are sons of wealthy parents. Secondly, 
even if we take the youth who are our own (in 
social status), not all of them have the hardiness, the 
strength, the character and the understanding to appreciate 
the picture of the tremendous break-up of the old 
and the feverish building of the new as a picture of something 
which has to be and which is therefore desirable, 
something, moreover, which has little resemblance 
to a heavenly idyll of ³universal bliss² that is to afford 
everyone the opportunity of ³taking his ease² and ³basking 
in happiness.² Naturally, in such a ³racking turmoil,² 
we are bound to have people who are weary, 
overwrought, worn-out, despairing, dropping out of 
the ranks and, lastly, deserting to the camp of the enemy.

LETTER TO A. M. GORKY 181 
These are the unavoidable ³overhead costs² of revolution. 
The main thing now is that the tone among the 
youth is set not by the grumblers, but by our militant 
Young Communist Leaguers, the nucleus of a new and 
numerous generation of Bolshevik destroyers of capitalism, 
of Bolshevik builders of socialism, of Bolshevik 
deliverers of all who are oppressed and enslaved. 
Therein lies our strength. And therein lies the pledge of 
our victory. 
3) That, of course, does not mean that we should 
not try to diminish the number of grumblers, whiners, 
doubters, and so on, by bringing organised ideological 
(and all other) influence to bear on them. On the contrary, 
one of the chief tasks of our Party, our cultural 
organisations, our press and our Soviets is to organise 
this influence and to secure substantial results. We 
(our friends) therefore, wholeheartedly accept your suggestions: 
a) to start a magazine, Za Rubezhom,23 and 
b) to publish a series of popular symposia on The 
Civil War, inviting the participation of A. Tolstoy and 
other literary artists. 
It is only necessary to add that neither of these undertakings 
can be placed under the direction of Radek 
or any of his friends. It is not a question of Radekıs 
good intentions or good faith. It is a question of the 
logic of the factional struggle, which (i.e., the struggle) 
he and his friends have not fully renounced (certain 
important disagreements have remained and these will 
impel them to fight). The history of our Party (and not 
only the history of our Party) teaches that the logic

J. V. S T A L I N 182 
of things is stronger than the logic of human intentions. 
It will be safer to entrust the direction of these undertakings 
to politically staunch comrades, and to invite Radek 
and his friends as collaborators. That will be safer. 
4) After thoroughly discussing the question of starting 
a special magazine, O Voine (On War), we came to the 
conclusion that there are no grounds at the present time 
for publishing such a magazine. We think that it is 
more expedient to deal with questions of war (I am referring 
to imperialist war) in the existing political journals. 
The more so as questions of war cannot be severed 
from questions of politics, of which war is an expression. 
As to war stories, they will have to be published 
with great discrimination. The book market is filled 
with a mass of literary tales describing the ³horrors² 
of war and inculcating a revulsion against all war (not only 
imperialist but every other kind of war). These are 
bourgeois-pacifist stories, and not of much value. We 
need stories which will lead the reader from the horrors 
of imperialist war to the necessity of getting rid of the 
imperialist governments which organise such wars. Besides, 
we are not against all wars. We are a g a i n s t 
imperialist wars, as being counter-revolutionary wars. 
But we are f o r liberating, anti-imperialist, revolutionary 
wars, despite the fact that such wars, as we know, are 
not only not exempt from the ³horrors of bloodshed² 
but even abound in them. 
It seems to me that Voronskyıs line in wanting to 
launch a campaign against the ³horrors² of war differs 
very little from the line of the bourgeois pacifists. 
5) You are quite right in saying that here, in our 
press, great confusion prevails on the subject of anti

LETTER TO A. M. GORKY 183 
religious propaganda. Extraordinary stupidities are sometimes 
committed, which bring grist to the mill of 
our enemies. There is a great deal of work before us in 
this field. But I have not yet had the opportunity of 
discussing your suggestions with our comrades engaged 
in anti-religious work. I shall write to you about this 
next time. 
6) I cannot do what Kamegulov asks. No time! Besides, 
what sort of a critic am I, the devil take it! 
Thatıs all. 
I warmly clasp your hand and wish you good health. 
Thanks for your greetings. 
J. Stalin 
I am told you need a physician from Russia. Is that 
so? Whom do you want? Let us know and we shall send 
him. 
J. St. 
January 17, 1930 
Published for the first time

CONCERNING THE POLICY OF ELIMINATING 
THE KULAKS AS A CLASS 
The article, ³The Elimination of the Kulaks as a 
Class,² in No. 16 of Krasnaya Zvezda24 is undeniably correct 
in the main, but it contains two inaccuracies of 
formulation. It seems to me that these inaccuracies must 
be corrected. 
1. The article says: 
³In the restoration period, we conducted a policy of restricting 
the capitalist elements of town and country. With the inauguration 
of the reconstruction period, we passed from the policy of 
restricting to the policy of ousting them.² 
This statement is incorrect. The policy of restricting 
the capitalist elements and the policy of ousting 
them are not two different policies. They are one and 
the same policy. Ousting the capitalist elements in the 
countryside is an inevitable result and component part 
of the policy of restricting the capitalist elements, the 
policy of restricting the kulaksı exploiting tendencies. 
Ousting the capitalist elements in the countryside must 
not be regarded as equivalent to ousting the kulaks as a 
class. Ousting the capitalist elements in the countryside 
means ousting and overcoming individual sections of the 
kulaks, those unable to bear the burden of taxation and 
the Soviet governmentıs system of restrictive measures.

CONCERNING POLICY OF ELIMINATING KULAKS AS A CLASS 185 
Naturally, the policy of restricting the kulaksı exploiting 
tendencies, the policy of restricting the capitalist 
elements in the countryside, cannot but lead to the ousting 
of individual sections of the kulaks. Consequently, 
ousting individual sections of the kulaks cannot be regarded 
otherwise than as an inevitable result and a component 
part of the policy of restricting the capitalist 
elements in the countryside. 
We pursued this policy not only in the restoration 
period, but also in the period of reconstruction, and in 
the period following the Fifteenth Congress (December 
1927), and in the period of the Sixteenth Conference of 
our Party (April 1929), as well as after that conference 
right down to the summer of 1929, when the phase of complete 
collectivisation set in, and when the change to the 
policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class began. 
If one examines the most important documents of our 
Party from, say, the Fourteenth Congress in December 
1925 (see the resolution on the report of the Central 
Committee25) to the Sixteenth Conference in April 1929 
(see the resolution on ³Ways and Means of Promoting 
Agriculture²26), one cannot fail to notice that the thesis 
about ³restricting the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks,² 
or about ³restricting the growth of capitalism in 
the countryside² always goes side by side with the thesis 
about ³ousting the capitalist elements in the countryside,² 
about ³overcoming the capitalist elements in the countryside.² 
What does that mean? 
It means that the Party does not separate the ousting 
of the capitalist elements in the countryside from the 
policy of restricting the exploiting tendencies of the

J. V. S T A L I N 186 
kulaks, from the policy of restricting the capitalist 
elements in the countryside. 
Both the Fifteenth Party Congress and the Sixteenth 
Conference stood whole-heartedly for the policy of ³restricting 
the exploiting proclivities of the agricultural 
bourgeoisie² (Fifteenth Congress resolution on ³Work in 
the Countryside²27), for the policy of ³adopting new measures 
to restrict the development of capitalism in the 
countryside² (ibid.), for the policy of ³resolutely restricting 
the exploiting tendencies of the kulaks² (see Fifteenth 
Congress resolution on the five-year plan28), for the policy 
of ³an offensive against the kulaks² in the sense 
of ³passing to further, more systematic and persistent 
restriction of the kulak and private trader² (ibid.), for 
the policy of ³still more resolute economic ousting² of 
the ³elements of private-capitalist economy² in town 
and country (see Fifteenth Congress resolution on the 
report of the Central Committee29). 
Consequently, a) the author of the above-mentioned 
article is wrong in depicting the policy of restricting 
the capitalist elements and the policy of ousting them 
as two different policies. The facts show that what we 
have here is one general policy of restricting capitalism, 
a component part and result of which is the ousting of 
individual sections of the kulaks. 
Consequently, b) the author of the above-mentioned 
article is wrong in asserting, that the ousting of the capitalist 
elements in the countryside began only in the 
period of reconstruction in the period of the Fifteenth 
Congress. In point of fact, the ousting took place both before 
the Fifteenth Congress, in the restoration period, 
and after the Fifteenth Congress, in the reconstruction

CONCERNING POLICY OF ELIMINATING KULAKS AS A CLASS 187 
period. In the period of the Fifteenth Congress the policy 
of restricting the kulaksı exploiting tendencies was only 
intensified by new and additional measures, as a result of 
which the ousting of individual sections of the kulaks 
was also bound to be intensified. 
2. The article says: 
³The policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class entirely 
follows from the policy of ousting the capitalist elements, being 
a continuation of this policy in a new stage.² 
This statement is inaccurate and, therefore, untrue. 
Naturally, the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class 
could not have fallen from the skies. The way for it was 
prepared by the entire preceding period of restricting, 
and hence of ousting, the capitalist elements in the countryside. 
But this does not mean that it does not differ 
radically from the policy of restricting (and ousting) the 
capitalist elements in the countryside, that it is a continuation 
of the restriction policy. To say what our author 
says is to deny that there has been a change in the development 
of the countryside since the summer of 1929. 
To say what he does is to deny that during this period 
we have executed a turn in our Partyıs policy in the 
countryside. To say what he does is to create a certain 
ideological refuge for the Right elements in our Party, 
who are now clinging to the Fifteenth Congress decisions 
in opposition to the Partyıs new policy, just as at one 
time Frumkin clung to the Fourteenth Congress decisions 
in opposition to the policy of promoting collective farms 
and state farms. 
What was the point of departure of the Fifteenth 
Congress in proclaiming an intensification of the policy

J. V. S T A L I N 188 
of restricting (and ousting) the capitalist elements in 
the countryside? Its point of departure was that, despite 
this restricting of the kulaks, they, as a class, 
nevertheless were bound to remain for the time being. 
On those grounds, the Fifteenth Congress left in 
force the law on renting land, although it knew very 
well that it was mostly kulaks who rented land. On those 
grounds, the Fifteenth Congress left in force the law on 
hiring labour in the countryside, and demanded that it 
should be strictly observed. On those grounds, it was 
again proclaimed that dekulakisation was impermissible. 
Do these laws and decisions contradict the policy of 
restricting (and ousting) the capitalist elements in the 
countryside? Certainly not. Do these laws and decisions 
contradict the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class? 
Certainly, they do! Consequently, these laws and decisions 
must now be set aside in the areas of complete collectivisation, 
which is spreading by leaps and bounds. 
Incidentally, they have already been set aside by the very 
progress of the collective-farm movement in the areas of 
complete collectivisation. 
Can it, then, be affirmed that the policy of eliminating 
the kulaks as a class is a continuation of the policy 
of restricting (and ousting) the capitalist elements in 
the countryside? Obviously, it cannot. 
The author of the above-mentioned article forgets 
that the kulak class, as a class, cannot be ousted by 
taxation measures or any other restrictions, if this class 
is allowed to retain instruments of production and the 
right to free use of land, and if in our practical activity 
we preserve in the countryside the law on hiring labour, the 
law on renting land, and the ban on dekulakisation. The

CONCERNING POLICY OF ELIMINATING KULAKS AS A CLASS 189 
author forgets that the policy of restricting the exploiting 
tendencies of the kulaks enables us to count only on ousting 
individual sections of the kulaks, which does not 
contradict, but, on the contrary, presumes the preservation 
for the time being of the kulaks as a class. As a 
means of ousting the kulaks as a class, the policy of restricting 
and ousting individual sections of the kulaks is inadequate. 
In order to oust the kulaks as a class, the resistance 
of this class must be smashed in open battle 
and it must be deprived of the productive sources of its 
existence and development (free use of land, instruments 
of production, land-renting, right to hire labour, etc.). 
That is a turn towards the policy of eliminating the 
kulaks as a class. Without it, talk about ousting the 
kulaks as a class is empty prattle, acceptable and profitable 
only to the Right deviators. Without it, no substantial, 
let alone complete, collectivisation of the countryside 
is conceivable. That is well understood by our 
poor and middle peasants, who are smashing the kulaks 
and introducing complete collectivisation. That, evidently, 
is not yet understood by some of our comrades. 
Hence, the Partyıs present policy in the countryside 
is not a continuation of the old policy, but a turn away 
from the old policy of restricting (and ousting) the capitalist 
elements in the countryside towards the new policy 
of eliminating the kulaks as a class. 
Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 18, 
January 21, 1930 
Signed: J. Stalin

REPLY TO THE SVERDLOV COMRADES30 
I 
THE SVERDLOV STUDENTSı QUESTIONS 
1. In the theses on the tactics of the R.C.P.(B.), 
adopted by the Third Congress of the Comintern,31 Lenin 
spoke of the existence of two main classes in Soviet 
Russia. 
We now speak of eliminating the kulaks and the new 
bourgeoisie as a class. 
Does this mean that in the NEP period a third class 
has taken shape in our country? 
2. In your address to the conference of Marxist students 
of agrarian questions, you said: ³If we adhere to 
NEP it is because it serves the cause of socialism. When 
it ceases to serve the cause of socialism we shall get rid 
of it.² How is this ³getting rid of² to be understood, 
and what form will it take? 
3. What amendments will the Party, as decisive successes 
in collectivisation and in eliminating the kulaks 
as a class are achieved, have to make in the slogan which 
now determines the relations between the proletariat and 
the various strata of the peasantry: ³To come to an 
agreement with the middle peasant, while never for a moment 
renouncing the fight against the kulak, and firmly 
relying solely on the poor peasant² (Lenin)?32

REPLY TO THE SVERDLOV COMRADES 191 
4. By what methods should the elimination of the 
kulaks as a class be brought about? 
5. Wi l l not the simultaneous application of two 
slogans: one for the areas of complete collectivisation‹ 
elimination of the kulaks as a class, and the other for 
the areas of incomplete collectivisation‹restriction and 
ousting of the kulaks, lead in the latter areas to the 
self-elimination of the kulaks (dissipation of their property, 
means of production)? 
6. What influence may the elimination of the kulaks 
as a class and the sharpening of the class struggle in 
our country, and the economic crisis and the rise of the 
tide of revolution in the capitalist countries, have on the 
duration of the ³respite²? 
7. What is your opinion of the possibility of the present 
revolutionary upsurge in the capitalist countries 
passing into a direct revolutionary situation? 
8. How should the new advances among the working 
class, characterised by the decision of entire factory 
shops to join the Party, be assessed from the standpoint 
of the further relations between the Party and the working 
class? 
9. In connection with the tremendous scope of the 
collective-farm movement, the extension of the Party 
organisation in the countryside becomes a practical question. 
What should be our policy in relation to the limits 
of such extension, and in relation to admission of the 
various groups of collective farmers into the Party? 
10. What is your attitude towards the disputes that 
are taking place among the economists on cardinal problems 
of political economy?

J. V. S T A L I N 192 
II 
COMRADE STALINıS REPLY 
First question. Lenin spoke of two main classes. But 
he knew, of course, that there was a third, the capitalist 
class (the kulaks, the urban capitalist bourgeoisie). 
The kulaks and the urban capitalist bourgeoisie did not, 
of course, ³take shape² as a class only after the introduction 
of NEP. They existed also before NEP, but as 
a secondary class. NEP, in its first stages, to some extent 
facilitated the growth of this class. But it assisted the 
growth of the socialist sector to an even greater extent. 
With the launching by the Party of an offensive along 
the whole front, matters have taken a sharp turn towards 
the undermining and abolition of the class of rural, and 
partly of urban, capitalists. 
For the sake of accuracy, it should be noted that the 
Party has not given instructions to extend the slogan of 
eliminating the kulaks as a class to the new, urban bourgeoisie. 
It is necessary to distinguish between the Nepmen, 
who were in the main deprived of their production 
base long ago, and therefore play no substantial part in 
our economic life, and the kulaks, who until very recently 
possessed enormous economic weight in the countryside, 
and whom we are only now depriving of their 
production base. 
It seems to me that some of our organisations forget 
this difference and commit the error of trying to ³supplement² 
the slogan of eliminating the kulaks as a class 
with the slogan of eliminating the urban bourgeoisie. 
Second question. The sentence in my speech at the 
conference of Marxist students of agrarian questions

REPLY TO THE SVERDLOV COMRADES 193 
should be understood as meaning that we shall ³get rid 
of NEP² when we are no longer under the necessity of 
permitting a certain freedom for private trade, when 
permitting it would yield only adverse results, and when 
we are in a position to establish economic relations between 
town and country through our own trading organisations, 
without private trade with its private turnover 
and tolerance of a certain revival of capitalism. 
Third question. It is clear that as the collectives 
come to embrace the majority of the areas of the 
U.S.S.R., the kulaks will be eliminated‹hence this part 
of Ilyichıs formula will lapse. As regards the middle 
and poor peasants in the collective farms, they will, as 
the latter become equipped with machines and tractors, 
merge into a single category of working members of the 
collectivised countryside. Correspondingly, the concepts 
³middle peasant² and ³poor peasant² should in the future 
disappear from our slogans. 
Fourth question. The principal method of bringing 
about the elimination of the kulaks as a class is that of 
mass collectivisation. All other measures must be adapted 
to this principal method. Everything that runs counter 
to this method or detracts from its effectiveness must 
be rejected. 
Fifth question. The slogans, ³elimination of the kulaks 
as a class² and ³restriction of the kulaks² must 
not be conceived as two independent and equal slogans. 
From the moment we passed to the policy of eliminating 
the kulaks as a class, this slogan became the chief slogan; 
and in the areas of incomplete collectivisation the 
slogan of restricting the kulaks changed from an independent 
slogan into a subsidiary slogan, an auxiliary of

J. V. S T A L I N 194 
the chief slogan, into a slogan which facilitates the creation 
in these areas of the conditions for a transition to 
the chief slogan. As you see, in the new conditions of 
today, the status of the slogan ³restriction of the kulaks² 
is radically different from what it was a year ago 
and earlier. 
It is to be noted that, unfortunately, some of our 
press organs do not appreciate this specific feature. 
I t is possible and probable that in the areas of 
incomplete collectivisation a section of the kulaks, 
in anticipation of dekulakisation, will resort to ³selfelimination² 
and ³dissipate their property and means of 
production.² Measures, of course, must be taken to prevent 
this. But it does not at all follow that we should 
permit dekulakisation, not as part of collectivisation, 
but as something independent, undertaken before and 
without collectivisation. To permit that would be to 
replace the policy of socialising confiscated kulak property 
in the collective farms by a policy of sharing out 
this property for the personal enrichment of individual 
peasants. Such replacement would be a step backward, 
not forward. There is only one way of preventing ³dissipation² 
of kulak property, and that is to work harder for 
collectivisation in the areas where it is incomplete. 
Sixth question. The means and conditions you enumerate 
may considerably shorten the duration of the ³respite.² 
But they are certainly bound to strengthen and 
multiply our means of defence. Very much will depend 
on the international situation, on the growth of the contradictions 
within the camp of international capitalism, 
on the further development of the international economic 
crisis. But that is another question.

REPLY TO THE SVERDLOV COMRADES 195 
Seventh question. No hard and fast line can be drawn 
between a ³revolutionary upsurge² and a ³direct revolutionary 
situation.² One cannot say: ³Up to this 
point we have a revolutionary upsurge; beyond it, we 
have a leap to a direct revolutionary situation.² Only 
scholastics can put the question in that way. The first 
usually passes ³imperceptibly² into the second. The 
task is to prepare the proletariat at once for decisive 
revolutionary battles, without waiting for the ³onset² 
of what is called a direct revolutionary situation. 
Eighth question. The desire of entire factory shops 
and even of whole factories to join the Party is a sign of 
the tremendous revolutionary upsurge of the vast masses 
of the working class, a sign of the correctness of the 
Partyıs policy, a sign of publicly expressed approval 
of this policy by the broad mass of the working class. 
But it does not at all follow from this that we must admit 
into the Party all who desire to join it. In the shops 
and factories there are all sorts of people, even saboteurs. 
The Party must therefore continue to apply its 
tried and tested method of individual approach to each 
applicant for membership, and of individual admission 
to the Party. We need not only quantity, but quality. 
Ninth question. I t goes without saying that numerically 
the Party in the collective farms will grow 
at a more or less rapid rate. It is desirable that all 
the elements of the collective-farm movement who have 
been most steeled in fighting against the kulaks, especially 
farm labourers and poor peasants, should find application 
for their energies in the ranks of the Party. Naturally, 
individual approach and individual admission into 
the Party must be applied here with especial persistence.

J. V. S T A L I N 196 
Tenth question. It seems to me that in the disputes 
among the economists there is much that is scholastic 
and far-fetched. Setting aside the external aspect of the 
disputes, the main errors of the contending sides are 
the following: 
a) neither side has proved capable of properly applying 
the method of fighting on two fronts: both against 
³Rubinism² and against ³mechanism²;33 
b) both sides have been diverted from the basic 
questions of Soviet economy and world imperialism into 
the realm of talmudic abstractions, thus wasting two 
years of effort on abstract themes‹to the satisfaction 
and advantage, of course, of our enemies. 
With communist greetings, 
J. Stalin 
February 9, 1930 
Pravda, No. 40, 
February 10, 1930

DIZZY WITH SUCCESS 
Concerning Questions 
of the Collective-Farm Movement 
The Soviet governmentıs successes in the sphere of 
the collective-farm movement are now being spoken of 
by every one. Even our enemies are forced to admit that 
the successes are substantial. And they really are very 
great. 
It is a fact that by February 20 of this year 50 per 
cent of the peasant farms throughout the U.S.S.R. had 
been collectivised. That means that by February 20, 
1930, we had overfulfilled the five-year plan of collectivisation 
by more than 100 per cent. 
It is a fact that on February 28 of this year the collective 
farms had already succeeded in stocking upwards 
of 36,000,000 centners, i.e., about 220,000,000 poods, 
of seed for the spring sowing, which is more than 90 per 
cent of the plan. It must be admitted that the accumulation 
of 220,000,000 poods of seed by the collective farms 
alone‹after the successful fulfilment of the grainprocurement 
plan‹is a tremendous achievement. 
What does all this show? 
That a radical turn of the countryside towards socialism 
may be considered as already achieved. 
There is no need to prove that these successes are 
of supreme importance for the fate of our country, for the 
whole working class, which is the leading force of our

J. V. S T A L I N 198 
country, and, lastly, for the Party itself. To say nothing 
of the direct practical results, these successes are of immense 
value for the internal life of the Party itself, 
for the education of our Party. They imbue our Party 
with a spirit of cheerfulness and confidence in its strength. 
They arm the working class with confidence in the victory 
of our cause. They bring forward additional millions 
of reserves for our Party. 
Hence the Partyıs task is: to consolidate the successes 
achieved and to utilise them systematically for 
our further advancement. 
But successes have their seamy side, especially when 
they are attained with comparative ³ease²‹²unexpectedly,² 
so to speak. Such successes sometimes induce 
a spirit of vanity and conceit: ³We can achieve anything!², 
³Thereıs nothing we canıt do!² People not infrequently 
become intoxicated by such successes; they 
become dizzy with success, lose all sense of proportion 
and the capacity to understand realities; they show a 
tendency to overrate their own strength and to underrate 
the strength of the enemy; adventurist attempts are 
made to solve all questions of socialist construction ³in 
a trice.² In such a case, there is no room for concern 
to consolidate the successes achieved and to utilise them 
systematically for further advancement. Why should 
we consolidate the successes achieved when, as it is, we 
can dash to the full victory of socialism ³in a trice²: ³We 
can achieve anything!², ³Thereıs nothing we canıt do!² 
Hence the Partyıs task is: to wage a determined 
struggle against these sentiments, which are dangerous 
and harmful to our cause, and to drive them out of the 
Party.

DIZZY WITH SUCCESS 199 
It cannot be said that these dangerous and harmful 
sentiments are at all widespread in the ranks of our 
Party. But they do exist in our Party, and there are no 
grounds for asserting that they will not become stronger. 
And if they should be allowed free scope, then there can 
be no doubt that the collective-farm movement will be 
considerably weakened and the danger of its breaking 
down may become a reality. 
Hence the task of our press is: systematically to 
denounce these and similar anti-Leninist sentiments. 
A few facts. 
1. The successes of our collective-farm policy are 
due, among other things, to the fact that it rests on 
the voluntary character of the collective-farm movement 
and on taking into account the diversity of conditions in 
the various regions of the U.S.S.R. Collective farms must 
not be established by force. That would be foolish and 
reactionary. The collective-farm movement must rest 
on the active support of the main mass of the peasantry. 
Examples of the formation of collective farms in the developed 
areas must not be mechanically transplanted to 
underdeveloped areas. That would be foolish and reactionary. 
Such a ³policy² would discredit the collectivisation 
idea at one stroke. In determining the speed and methods 
of collective-farm development, careful consideration 
must be given to the diversity of conditions in the various 
regions of the U.S.S.R. 
Our grain-growing areas are ahead of all others in 
the collective-farm movement. Why is this? 
Firstly, because in these areas we have the largest 
number of already firmly-established state farms and collective 
farms, thanks to which the peasants have had the

J. V. S T A L I N 200 
opportunity to convince themselves of the power and 
importance of the new technical equipment, of the power 
and importance of the new, collective organisation of 
farming. 
Secondly, because these areas have had two yearsı 
schooling in the fight against the kulaks during the 
grain-procurement campaigns, and this could not but 
facilitate the development of the collective-farm movement. 
Lastly, because these areas in recent years have been 
extensively supplied with the best cadres from the industrial 
centres. 
Can it be said that these especially favourable conditions 
also exist in other areas, the consuming areas, 
for example, such as our northern regions, or in areas 
where there are still backward nationalities, such as 
Turkestan, say? 
No, it cannot be said. 
Clearly, the principle of taking into account the diversity 
of conditions in the various regions of the U.S.S.R. 
is, together with the voluntary principle, one of the 
most important prerequisites for a sound collectivefarm 
movement. 
But what actually happens sometimes? Can it be said 
that the voluntary principle and the principle of taking 
local peculiarities into account are not violated in a 
number of areas? No, that cannot be said, unfortunately. 
We know, for example, that in a number of the northern 
areas of the consuming zone, where conditions for the 
immediate organisation of collective farms are comparatively 
less favourable than in the grain-growing areas, 
attempts are not infrequently made to replace preparatory

DIZZY WITH SUCCESS 201 
work for the organisation of collective farms by bureaucratic 
decreeing of the collective-farm movement, paper 
resolutions on the growth of collective farms, organisation 
of collective farms on paper‹collective farms which 
have as yet no reality, but whose ³existence² is proclaimed 
in a heap of boastful resolutions. 
Or take certain areas of Turkestan, where conditions 
for the immediate organisation of collective farms 
are even less favourable than in the northern regions of 
the consuming zone. We know that in a number of 
areas of Turkestan there have already been attempts 
to ³overtake and outstrip² the advanced areas of the 
U.S.S.R. by threatening to use armed force, by threatening 
that peasants who are not yet ready to join the 
collective farms will be deprived of irrigation water and 
manufactured goods. 
What can there be in common between this Sergeant 
Prishibeyev ³policy² and the Partyıs policy of relying 
on the voluntary principle and of taking local peculiarities 
into account in collective-farm development? 
Clearly, there is not and cannot be anything in common 
between them. 
Who benefits by these distortions, this bureaucratic 
decreeing of the collective-farm movement, these unworthy 
threats against the peasants? Nobody, except 
our enemies! 
What may these distortions lead to? To strengthening 
our enemies and to discrediting the idea of the collective-
farm movement. 
Is it not clear that the authors of these distortions, 
who imagine themselves to be ³Lefts,² are in reality 
bringing grist to the mill of Right opportunism?

J. V. S T A L I N 202 
2. One of the greatest merits of our Partyıs political 
strategy is that it is able at any given moment to pick out 
the main link in the movement, by grasping which the 
Party draws the whole chain towards one common goal in 
order to achieve the solution of the problem. Can it be 
said that the Party has already picked out the main link 
of the collective-farm movement in the system of collective-
farm development? Yes, this can and should be said. 
What is this chief link? 
Is it, perhaps, association for joint cultivation of the 
land? No, it is not that. Associations for joint cultivation 
of the land, in which the means of production are not 
yet socialised, are already a past stage of the collectivefarm 
movement. 
Is it, perhaps, the agricultural commune? No, it 
is not that. Communes are still of isolated occurrence 
in the collective farm movement. The conditions are not 
yet ripe for agricultural communes‹in which not only 
production, but also distribution is socialised‹to be the 
predominant form. 
The main link of the collective-farm movement, its 
predominant form at the present moment, the link which 
has to be grasped now, is the agricultural artel. 
In the agricultural artel, the basic means of production, 
primarily for grain-farming‹labour, use of the 
land, machines and other implements, draught animals 
and farm buildings‹are socialised. In the artel, the household 
plots (small vegetable gardens, small orchards), 
the dwelling houses, a part of the dairy cattle, small 
livestock, poultry, etc., are not socialised. 
The artel is the main link of the collective-farm movement 
because it is the form best adapted for solving

DIZZY WITH SUCCESS 203 
the grain problem. And the grain problem is the main 
link in the whole system of agriculture because, if it is 
not solved, it will be impossible to solve either the problem 
of stock-breeding (small and large), or the problem 
of the industrial and special crops that provide the principal 
raw materials for industry. That is why the agricultural 
artel is the main link in the system of the collective-
farm movement at the present moment. 
That is the point of departure of the ³Model Rules² 
for collective farms, the final text of which is published 
today.* 
And that should be the point of departure of our 
Party and Soviet workers, one of whose duties it is to 
make a thorough study of these Rules and to carry them 
out down to the last detail. 
Such is the line of the Party at the present moment. 
Can it be said that this line of the Party is being 
carried out without violation or distortion? No, it cannot, 
unfortunately. We know that in a number of areas 
of the U.S.S.R., where the struggle for the existence of 
the collective farms is still far from over, and where 
artels are not yet consolidated, attempts are being made 
to skip the artel framework and to leap straight away 
into the agricultural commune. The artel is still not consolidated, 
but they are already ³socialising² dwelling 
houses, small livestock and poultry; moreover, this 
³socialisation² is degenerating into bureaucratic decreeing 
on paper, because the conditions which would make 
such socialisation necessary do not yet exist. One might 
* Pravda, March 2, 1930.

J. V. S T A L I N 204 
think that the grain problem has already been solved in 
the collective farms, that it is already a past stage, that the 
principal task at the present moment is not solution of the 
grain problem, but solution of the problem of livestockand 
poultry-breeding. Who, we may ask, benefits from 
this blockheaded ³work² of lumping together different 
forms of the collective-farm movement? Who benefits 
from this running too far ahead, which is stupid and harmful 
to our cause? Irritating the collective-farm peasant by 
³socialising² dwelling houses, all dairy cattle, all small 
livestock and poultry, when the grain problem is still 
unsolved, when the artel form of collective farming is 
not yet consolidated‹is it not obvious that such a ³policy² 
can be to the satisfaction and advantage only of our 
sworn enemies? 
One such overzealous ³socialiser² even goes so far 
as to issue an order to an artel containing the following 
instructions: ³Within three days, register all the poultry 
of every household²; establish posts of special ³commanders² 
for registration and supervision; ³occupy the key 
positions in the artel²; ³command the socialist battle 
without quitting your posts² and‹of course‹get a tight 
grip on the whole life of the artel. 
What is this‹a policy of directing the collective 
farms, or a policy of disrupting and discrediting them? 
I say nothing of those ³revolutionaries²‹save the 
mark!‹who begin the work of organising artels by removing 
the bells from the churches. Just imagine, removing 
the church bells‹how r-r-revolutionary! 
How could there have arisen in our midst such blockheaded 
exercises in ³socialisation,² such ludicrous attempts 
to over-leap oneself, attempts which aim at by

DIZZY WITH SUCCESS 205 
passing, classes and the class struggle, and which in fact 
bring grist to the mill of our class enemies? 
They could have arisen only in the atmosphere of our 
³easy² and ³unexpected² successes on the front of collective-
farm development. 
They could have arisen only as a result of the blockheaded 
belief of a section of our Party: ³We can achieve 
anything!², ³Thereıs nothing we canıt do!² 
They could have arisen only because some of our comrades 
have become dizzy with success and for the moment 
have lost clearness of mind and sobriety of vision. 
To correct the line of our work in the sphere of collective-
farm development, we must put an end to these 
sentiments. 
That is now one of the immediate tasks of the Party. 
The art of leadership is a serious matter. One must 
not lag behind the movement, because to do so is to lose 
contact with the masses. But neither must one run too 
far ahead, because to run too far ahead is to lose the 
masses and to isolate oneself. He who wants to lead a 
movement and at the same time keep in touch with the 
vast masses must wage a fight on two fronts‹against 
those who lag behind and against those who run too far 
ahead. 
Our Party is strong and invincible because, when 
leading a movement, it is able to preserve and multiply 
its contacts with the vast masses of the workers and peasants. 
Pravda, No. 60, 
March 2, 1930 
Signed: J. Stalin

LETTER TO COMRADE BEZYMENSKY 
Comrade Bezymensky, 
I am somewhat late in replying. 
I am not an expert on literature, and certainly not 
a critic. Nevertheless, since you insist, I can give you 
my personal opinion. 
I have read both The Shot and A Day In Our Life. 
There is nothing ³petty-bourgeois² or ³anti-Party² in 
these works. Both, and especially The Shot, may, for our 
time, be considered models of revolutionary proletarian art. 
True, they contain certain vestiges of Young Communist 
vanguardism. Reading these works, the unsophisticated 
reader might even get the impression that it is not the 
Party that corrects the mistakes of the youth, but the 
other way round. But this defect is not the main feature 
of these works, nor the message they convey. Their message 
lies in the concentration on the shortcomings of our 
apparatus and in their profound belief that these shortcomings 
can be corrected. That is the chief thing in both 
The Shot and A Day In Our Life. That is also their principal 
merit. And this merit more than compensates for 
and altogether overshadows what, it seems to me, are 
minor defects dating back to the past. 
With communist greetings, 
J. Stalin 
March 19, 1930 
Published for the first time

REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES 
It is evident from the press that Stalinıs article, 
³Dizzy with Success,²* and the decision adopted by the 
Central Committee on ³The Fight Against Distortions of 
the Party Line in the Collective-Farm Movement²34 have 
evoked numerous comments among practical workers in 
the collective-farm movement. In this connection, I have 
received lately a number of letters from collective-farm 
comrades asking for replies to questions raised in them. 
It was my duty to reply to these letters in private correspondence. 
But this proved impossible, because more 
than half the letters contained no indication of the addresses 
of their writers (they had forgotten to give them). 
Yet the questions touched upon in the letters are of immense 
political interest for all our comrades. Moreover, 
I could not, of course, leave unanswered those comrades 
who forgot to give their addresses. I am therefore 
obliged to reply to the letters of the collectivefarm 
comrades publicly, that is, through the press, 
extracting from them all the questions requiring to 
be dealt with. I do this all the more readily as I have 
a direct decision of the Central Committee on this 
subject. 
First question. What is the root of the errors in the 
peasant question? 
* See pp. 197-205 in this volume.‹Ed.

J. V. S T A L I N 208 
Reply. A wrong approach to the middle peasant. Resort 
to coercion in economic relations with the middle 
peasant. Forgetfulness of the fact that the economic bond 
with the masses of the middle peasants must be built not 
on the basis of coercive measures, but on the basis of 
agreement with the middle peasant, of alliance with him. 
Forgetfulness of the fact that the basis of the collectivefarm 
movement at the present moment is an alliance 
of the working class and poor peasantry with the middle 
peasant against capitalism in general, against the kulak 
in particular. 
As long as the offensive against the kulak was waged 
in a united front with the middle peasant, all went well. 
But when some of our comrades became intoxicated with 
success and began imperceptibly to slip from the path of 
an offensive against the kulak on to the path of a struggle 
against the middle peasant, when, in pursuit of high 
collectivisation percentages, they began to apply coercion 
to the middle peasant, depriving him of the suffrage, 
³dekulakising² and expropriating him, the offensive began 
to assume a distorted form and the united front with the 
middle peasant to be undermined, and, naturally, the 
kulak obtained an opportunity of trying to rise to his feet 
again. 
It has been forgotten that coercion, which is necessary 
and useful in the fight against our class enemies, 
is impermissible and disastrous when applied to the 
middle peasant, who is our ally. 
It has been forgotten that cavalry charges, which are 
necessary and useful for accomplishing tasks of a military 
character, are unsuitable and disastrous for accomplishing 
the tasks of collective-farm development, which,

REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES 209 
moreover, is being organised in alliance with the middle 
peasant. 
That is the root of the errors in the peasant question. 
Here is what Lenin says about economic relations 
with the middle peasant: 
³Most of all, we must take as our basis the truth that here, 
by the very nature of the case, nothing can be achieved by methods 
of coercion. Here the economic task is an entirely different one. 
Here there is not that top section which can be cut away, while 
leaving the whole foundation and the whole building intact. 
That top section, which in the town was represented by the capitalists, 
does not exist here. To apply coercion here would ruin 
the whole matter. . . . Nothing could be more stupid than the very 
idea of coercion in the sphere of the economic relations of the middle 
peasant² (Vol. XXIV, p. 168). 
Further: 
³The use of coercion against the middle peasantry would do 
very great harm. This stratum is a numerous one, many millions 
strong. Even in Europe‹where it nowhere attains to such strength, 
where technology and culture, urban life, railways, are immensely 
developed, and where it would be easiest of all to contemplate 
its use‹nobody, not a single one of the most revolutionary Socialists, 
has ever proposed the use of coercive measures against the 
middle peasantry² (Vol. XXIV, p. 167). 
That is clear, I think. 
Second question. What are the chief errors in the 
collective-farm movement? 
Reply. There are, at least, three such errors. 
1) In building collective farms, Leninıs voluntary 
principle has been violated. The basic directives of the 
Party and the Model Rules of the Agricultural Artel

J. V. S T A L I N 210 
about the voluntary character of collective-farm development 
have been violated. 
Leninism teaches that the peasants must be brought 
to adopt collective farming voluntarily, by convincing 
them of the ad vantages of socially-conducted, collective 
farming over individual farming. Leninism teaches 
that the peasants can be convinced of the advantages 
of collective farming only if it is demonstrated 
and proved to them in actual fact and by experience that 
collective farming is better than individual farming, 
that it is more profitable than individual farming and 
that it offers both poor and middle peasants a way out of 
poverty and want. Leninism teaches that, without these 
conditions, collective farms cannot be stable. Leninism 
teaches that any attempt to impose collective farming 
by force, any attempt to establish collective farms 
by compulsion can only have adverse results, can 
only repel the peasants from the collective-farm movement. 
And, indeed, as long as this basic rule was observed, 
the collective-farm movement registered success after 
success. But some of our comrades, intoxicated with success, 
began to neglect this rule, began to display excessive 
haste and, in their pursuit of high collectivisation 
percentages, began to establish collective farms by means 
of compulsion. It is not surprising that the adverse results 
of such a ³policy² soon showed themselves. The 
collective farms which had sprung up so rapidly began 
to melt away just as rapidly, and a section of the 
peasantry, who only yesterday had had the greatest confidence 
in the collective farms, began to turn away from 
them.

REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES 211 
That is the first and chief error in the collectivefarm 
movement. 
Here is what Lenin says concerning the voluntary 
principle of building collective farms: 
³Our task now is to pass to socially-conducted cultivation 
of the land to large-scale farming in common. But there can be 
no compulsion by the Soviet government; there is no law that 
makes it compulsory. The agricultural commune is founded voluntarily, 
the passing to socially-conducted cultivation of the land 
can only be voluntary; there cannot be the slightest compulsion 
by the workersı and peasantsı government in this respect, 
nor does the law allow it. If any of you has observed such compulsion, 
you must know that it is an abuse, a violation of the law, 
which we are doing our utmost to correct, and shall correct²* 
(Vol. XXIV, p. 43). 
Further: 
³Only if we succeed in practice in showing the peasants the 
advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation 
of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means 
of co-operative, artel farming, will the working class, which holds 
state power in its hands, actually prove to the peasant the correctness 
of its policy and actually secure the real and durable following 
of the vast masses of the peasantry. Hence the importance 
of every kind of measure to promote co-operative, artel agriculture 
can hardly be overestimated. We have millions of individual 
farms in our country, scattered and dispersed in the depths of the 
countryside. Only when it is proved in practice, by experience 
easily understood by the peasants, that the transition to the cooperative, 
artel form of agriculture is essential and possible, 
only then shall we be entitled to say that in this vast peasant 
country, Russia, an important step towards socialist agriculture 
has been taken² (Vol. XXIV, pp. 579-80). 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 212 
Lastly, one more passage from the works of Lenin: 
³While encouraging co-operative associations of all kinds, 
and equally agricultural communes of middle peasants, the representatives 
of the Soviet government must not allow their formation 
to involve the slightest compulsion. Only such associations 
are valuable as are constituted by the peasants themselves on 
their free initiative, and the advantages of which have been verified 
by them in practice. Excessive haste in this matter is harmful, 
because it is only capable of strengthening the middle peasantsı 
prejudice against innovations. Representatives of the Soviet government 
who take the liberty of resorting even to indirect, to 
say nothing of direct, compulsion with a view to uniting the peasants 
in communes must be called to the strictest account and removed 
from work in the countryside²* (Vol. XXIV, p. 174). 
That is clear, I think. 
It scarcely needs proof that the Party will carry out 
these injunctions of Leninıs with the utmost stringency. 
2) In building collective farms, Leninıs principle 
of taking into account the diversity of conditions in 
the various regions of the U.S.S.R. has been violated. 
It has been forgotten that in the U.S.S.R. there are the 
most diverse regions, with differing forms of economy 
and levels of culture. It has been forgotten that among 
them there are advanced regions, average regions and 
backward regions. It has been forgotten that rates of progress 
of the collective-farm movement and the methods 
of collective-farm development cannot be uniform in these 
far from uniform regions. 
³It would be a mistake,² Lenin says, ³if we were simply 
to write stereotyped decrees for all parts of Russia, if the Bolshe- 
* My italics.‹J. St.

REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES 213 
vik-Communists, Soviet officials in the Ukraine and the Don region, 
began extending them wholesale and without discrimination 
to other regions² . . . for ³under no circumstances do we bind 
ourselves to a single stereotyped pattern, or decide once and for 
all that our experience, the experience of Central Russia, can be 
transplanted in its entirety to all the border regions² (Vol. XXIV, 
pp. 125-26). 
Lenin further says: 
³To stereotype Central Russia, the Ukraine and Siberia, 
to make them conform to a particular stereotyped pattern, would 
be the greatest folly² (Vol. XXVI, p. 243). 
Lastly, Lenin makes it obligatory for the Caucasian 
Communists 
³to understand the specific character of their position, of the position 
of their republics, as distinct from the position and conditions 
of the R.S.F.S.R.; to understand the necessity of not copying our 
tactics, but of thoughtfully modifying them in accordance with the 
difference in he concrete conditions² (Vol. XXVI, p. 191). 
That is clear, I think. 
On the basis of these injunctions of Lenin, the Central 
Committee of our Party, in its decision on ³The Rate 
of Collectivisation² (see Pravda, January 6, 1930),35 
divided the regions of the U.S.S.R., as regards the rate 
of collectivisation, into three groups, of which the North 
Caucasus, the Middle Volga and the Lower Volga may in 
the main complete collectivisation by the spring of 1931, 
other grain-growing regions (the Ukraine, the Central 
Black Earth region, Siberia, the Urals, Kazakhstan, etc.) 
by the spring of 1932, while the remaining regions may 
extend collectivisation to the end of the five-year plan 
period, that is, until 1933.

J. V. S T A L I N 214 
But what actually happened? It turned out that some 
of our comrades, intoxicated by the first successes of the 
collective-farm movement, cheerfully forgot both Leninıs 
in junctions and the Central Committeeıs decision. The 
Moscow Region, in its feverish pursuit of inflated collectivisation 
figures, began to orientate its officials towards 
completing collectivisation in the spring of 1930, 
although it had no less than three years at its disposal 
(to the end of 1932). The Central Black Earth region, 
not desiring to ³lag behind the others,² began to orientate 
its officials towards completing collectivisation by 
the first half of 1930, although it had no less than two 
years at its disposal (to the end of 1931). And the Transcaucasians 
and Turkestanians, in their eagerness to ³overtake 
and outstrip² the advanced regions, began to orientate 
themselves on completing collectivisation ³at the 
earliest,² although they had fully four years at their 
disposal (to the end of 1933). 
Naturally, with such a quick-fire ³tempo² of collectivisation, 
the areas less prepared for the collective-
farm movement, in their eagerness to ³outstrip² 
the better prepared areas, found themselves obliged 
to resort to strong administrative pressure, endeavouring 
to compensate the missing factors needed for a 
rapid rate of progress of the collective-farm movement 
by their own administrative ardour. The consequences 
are known. Everyone knows of the muddle which 
resulted in these areas, and which had to be straightened 
out by the interference of the Central Committee. 
That is the second error in the collective-farm movement.

REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES 215 
3) In building collective farms, Leninıs principle 
that it is impermissible to skip over an uncompleted 
form of movement was violated. Also violated was 
Leninıs principle of not running ahead of the development 
of the masses, of not decreeing the movement of the masses, 
of not becoming divorced from the masses, but of moving 
together with the masses and impelling them forward, 
bringing them to our slogans and helping them to 
convince themselves of the correctness of our slogans 
through their own experience. 
³When the Petrograd proletariat and the soldiers of the 
Petrograd garrison took power,² says Lenin, ³they fully realised 
that our constructive work in the countryside would encounter great 
difficulties; that there it was necessary to proceed more gradually; 
that to attempt to introduce collective cultivation of the land by 
decrees, by legislation, would be the height of folly; that an insignificant 
number of enlightened peasants might agree to this, 
but that the vast majority of the peasants had no such object 
in view. We , therefore, confined ourselves to what was absolutely 
essential in the interests of the development of the 
revolution: in no case to run ahead of the development of 
the masses, but to wait until, as a result of their own experience 
and their own struggle, a progressive movement grew up²* 
(Vol. XXIII, p. 252). 
Proceeding from these injunctions of Lenin, the Central 
Committee, in its decision on ³The Rate of Collectivisation² 
(see Pravda, January 6, 1930), laid down 
that: 
a) the chief form of the collective-farm movement 
at the present moment is the agricultural artel, 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
216 
b) in view of this, it is necessary to draw up model 
rules for the agricultural artel, as the chief form of the 
collective-farm movement, 
c) ³decreeing² the collective-farm movement from 
above and ³playing at collectivisation² must not be allowed 
in our practical work. 
That means that at the present time we must steer 
our course not towards the commune, but towards the 
agricultural artel, as the chief form of collective-farm 
development; that we must not allow skipping over the 
agricultural artel to the commune; that ³decreeing² of 
collective farms and ³playing at collective farms² 
must not be substituted for the mass movement of the 
peasants in favour of collective farms. 
That is clear, I think. 
But what actually happened? It turned out that some 
of our comrades, intoxicated by the first successes of 
the collective-farm movement, cheerfully forgot both 
Leninıs injunctions and the C.C.ıs decision. Instead of 
organising a mass movement in favour of the agricultural 
artel, these comrades began to ³transfer² the individual 
peasants straight to the rules of the commune. Instead 
of consolidating the artel form of the movement, 
they began compulsorily ³socialising² small livestock, 
poultry, non-commercial dairy cattle and dwelling 
houses. 
The results of this haste, which is impermissible for 
a Leninist, are now known to all. As a rule, of course, 
they failed to create stable communes. But, on the other 
hand, they lost control of a number of agricultural artels. 
True, ³good² resolutions remained. But what is the 
use of them?

REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES 217 
That is the third error in the collective-farm movement. 
Third question. How could these errors have arisen, 
and how must the Party correct them? 
Reply. They arose because of our rapid successes in 
the collective-farm movement. Success sometimes turns 
peopleıs heads. It not infrequently gives rise to extreme 
vanity and conceit. That may very easily happen to representatives 
of a party which is in power, especially in 
the case of a party like ours, whose strength and prestige 
are almost immeasurable. Here, instances of communist 
vainglory, which Lenin combated so vehemently, are 
quite possible. Here, belief in the omnipotence of decrees, 
resolutions and orders is quite possible. Here, there 
is a real danger of the Partyıs revolutionary measures 
being converted into empty bureaucratic decreeing by 
individual representatives of the Party in one corner 
or another of our boundless country. I have in mind not 
only local officials, but also individual regional officials, 
and even individual members of the Central Committee. 
³Communist vainglory,² says Lenin, ³means that a man, 
who is a member of the Communist Party, and has not yet been 
purged from it, imagines that he can solve all his problems by 
issuing Communist decrees² (Vol. XXVII, pp. 50-51). 
That is the soil from which sprang the errors in the 
collective-farm movement, the distortions of the Party 
line in collective-farm development. 
Wherein lies the danger of these errors and distortions, 
if they are persisted in, if they are not eliminated 
rapidly and completely?

J. V. S T A L I N 218 
The danger here lies in the fact that these errors lead 
us straight to the discrediting of the collective-farm 
movement, to dissension in our relations with the middle 
peasants, to the disorganisation of the poor peasants, to 
confusion in our ranks, to the weakening of all our work 
of socialist construction, to the revival of the kulaks. 
In short, these errors have a tendency to push us 
from the path of strengthening the alliance with the 
main mass of the peasantry, of strengthening the proletarian 
dictatorship, on to the path of a rupture with 
these masses, on to the path of undermining the proletarian 
dictatorship. 
This danger was already in evidence in the latter 
half of February, at the time when a section of our comrades, 
dazzled by the earlier successes, went off at a 
gallop from the Leninist path. The Central Committee 
of the Party was alive to this danger and intervened 
without delay, instructing Stalin to issue a warning to 
the over-presumptuous comrades in a special article on 
the collective-farm movement. There are some who think 
that the article, ³Dizzy with Success,² was the result 
of Stalinıs personal initiative. That, of course, is nonsense. 
It is not in order that personal initiative in a matter 
like this may be taken by anyone, whoever he might be, 
that we have a Central Committee. It was a reconnaissance-
in-depth by the C.C. And when the depth and 
extent of the errors were ascertained, the C.C. lost no 
time in striking at these errors with all the strength 
of its authority, by publishing its well-known resolution 
of March 15, 1930. 
It is with difficulty that people who in their frantic 
course are dashing headlong towards the abyss can be

REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES 219 
halted and turned back to the right path. But our C.C. 
is called the Central Committee of the Leninist party precisely 
because it is able to overcome difficulties even 
greater than these. And, in the main, it has already overcome 
these difficulties. 
It is difficult in cases like this for whole detachments 
of the Party to stop in their course, to turn back 
in time to the right path and to re-form their ranks on 
the march. But our Party is called Leninıs party precisely 
because it is sufficiently flexible to overcome such 
difficulties. And, in the main, it has already overcome 
these difficulties. 
The chief thing here is to have the courage to acknowledge 
oneıs errors and the moral strength to eliminate 
them as quickly as possible. Fear of acknowledging oneıs 
errors after being intoxicated by recent successes, fear 
of self-criticism, reluctance to correct oneıs errors rapidly 
and resolutely‹that is the chief difficulty. One 
has only to overcome this difficulty, one has only to 
cast aside inflated numerical targets and bureaucratic 
maximalism, one has only to transfer oneıs attention to 
the tasks of building the collective farms organisationally 
and economically, and not a trace of the errors will 
remain. There is no reason to doubt that, in the main, 
the Party has already overcome this dangerous difficulty. 
³All revolutionary parties which have hitherto perished,² 
Lenin says, ³did so because they grew conceited, failed to see where 
their strength lay and feared to speak of their weaknesses. But 
we shall not perish, for we do not fear to speak of our weaknesses 
and shall learn to overcome them²* (Vol. XXVII, pp. 260-61). 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 220 
These words of Lenin must not be forgotten. 
Fourth question. Is not the fight against distortions 
of the Party line a step backward, a retreat? 
Reply. Of course not! This can be said to be a retreat 
only by people who consider persistence in errors 
and distortions an advance, and the fight against errors, 
a retreat. Advancing by piling up errors and distortions!‹
a fine ³advance,² thereıs no gainsaying. . . . 
We have put forward the agricultural artel as the 
principal form of the collective-farm movement at the 
present moment and have provided appropriate model 
rules to serve as a guide in the work of collective-farm 
development. Are we retreating from that? Of course not! 
We have put forward consolidation of the production 
bond of the working class and the poor peasants with the 
middle peasants as the basis of the collective-farm movement 
at the present moment. Are we retreating from that? 
Of course not! 
We have put forward the slogan of eliminating the 
kulaks as a class as the chief slogan of our practical 
work in the countryside at the present moment. Are we 
retreating from that? Of course not! 
Already in January 1930 we adopted a definite rate 
of collectivisation of agriculture in the U.S.S.R., dividing 
the regions of the U.S.S.R. into a number of groups, 
and fixing its own special rate for each group. Are we 
retreating from that? Of course not! 
How, then, can it be said that the Party is ³retreating²? 
We want people who have committed errors and distortions 
to retreat from their errors. We want blockheads 
to retreat from their blockheadedness to the position of

REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES 221 
Leninism. We want this, because only then will it be possible 
to continue the real offensive against our class 
enemies. Does this mean that we are taking a step backwards? 
Of course not! It only means that we want to 
carry out a proper offensive, and not blockheaded playing 
at an offensive. 
Is it not obvious that only cranks and ³Left² distorters 
can consider this stand of the Party a retreat? 
People who talk about a retreat fail to understand 
at least two things. 
a) They do not know the laws of an offensive. They 
do not understand that an offensive without consolidating 
captured positions is an offensive that is doomed to 
failure. 
When may an offensive‹in the military sphere, say 
‹be successful? When you do not confine yourself to advancing 
headlong, but endeavour at the same time to 
consolidate the positions captured, regroup your forces in 
conformity with changing conditions, move up the rear 
services, and bring up the reserves. Why is all this necessary? 
In order to guarantee yourself against surprises, 
to liquidate any break-throughs, against which no offensive 
is guaranteed, and thus pave the way for the complete 
rout of the enemy. The mistake made by the Polish 
army in 1920, if we consider only the military side of 
the matter, was that it ignored this rule. That, incidentally, 
explains why, after having dashed headlong to 
Kiev it was then forced to make just as headlong a 
retreat to Warsaw. The mistake made by the Soviet 
army in 1920, if again we consider only the military 
side of the matter, was that it duplicated the mistake 
of the Poles in its advance on Warsaw.

J. V. S T A L I N 222 
The same must be said about the laws of an offensive 
on the front of the class struggle. It is impossible to 
conduct a successful offensive with the object of annihilating 
the class enemies, without consolidating captured 
positions, without regrouping forces, without providing 
reserves for the front, without moving up rear services, 
and so on. 
The whole point is that the blockheads do not understand 
the laws of an offensive. The whole point is that 
the Party does understand them and puts them into effect. 
b) They do not understand the class nature of the 
offensive. They shout about an offensive. But an offensive 
against which class, and in alliance with which class? 
We are conducting an offensive against the capitalist 
elements in the countryside in alliance with the middle 
peasant, because only such an offensive can bring us 
victory. But what is to be done if, owing to the misguided 
ardour of individual sections of the Party, the offensive 
begins to slide from the proper path and its sharp 
edge is turned against our ally, the middle peasant? 
Is it just any kind of an offensive that we need, and not 
an offensive against a definite class, and in alliance 
with a definite class? Don Quixote also imagined he 
was conducting an offensive against his enemies when 
he attacked a windmill. But we know that he got 
his head broken in this offensive, if one can call it 
that. 
Apparently, our ³Left² distorters are envious of the 
laurels of Don Quixote. 
Fifth question. Which is our chief danger, the Right 
or the ³Left²?

REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES 223 
Reply. Our chief danger at the present time is the 
Right danger. The Right danger has been, and still is, 
the chief danger. 
Does not this thesis contradict that in the Central 
Committeeıs decision of March 15, 1930, to the effect 
that the errors and distortions of the ³Left² distorters 
are now the chief hindrance to the collective-farm movement? 
No, it does not. The fact of the matter is that 
the errors of the ³Left² distorters in regard to the collective-
farm movement are such as create a favourable 
situation for the strengthening and consolidation of the 
Right deviation in the Party. Why? Because these errors 
present the Partyıs line in a false light‹consequently, 
they make it easier to discredit the Party, and 
therefore they facilitate the struggle of the Right elements 
against the Partyıs leadership. Discrediting the 
Party leadership is just that elementary ground on which 
alone the struggle of the Right deviators against the 
Party can be waged. This ground is provided for the 
Right deviators by the ³Left² distorters, by their errors 
and distortions. Therefore, if we are to fight successfully 
against Right opportunism, we must overcome the errors 
of the ³Left² opportunists. Objectively, the ³Left² distorters 
are allies of the Right deviators. 
Such is the peculiar connection between ³Left² opportunism 
and Right deviationism. 
I t is this connection that explains the fact that 
some of the ³Lefts² so often suggest a bloc with the 
Rights. This, too, explains the peculiar phenomenon that 
a section of the ³Lefts,² who only yesterday were ³executing² 
a dashing offensive and trying to collectivise 
the U.S.S.R. in a matter of two or three weeks, are

J. V. S T A L I N 224 
today lapsing into passivity, losing heart and effectively 
surrendering the field to the Right deviators, thus pursuing 
a line of real retreat (without quotation marks!) 
in face of the kulaks. 
The specific feature of the present moment is that 
a fight against the errors of the ³Left² distorters is 
a pre-condition for a successful fight against Right opportunism 
and a distinctive form of this fight. 
Sixth question. How is the exodus of a section of 
the peasants from the collective farms to be assessed? 
Reply. The exodus of a section of the peasants signifies 
that of late a certain number of unsound collective 
farms were formed which are now being cleansed of their 
unstable elements. That means that sham collective 
farms will disappear while the sound ones will remain 
and grow stronger. I consider this a perfectly normal 
thing. Some comrades are driven to despair by it, give 
way to panic, and convulsively clutch at inflated collectivisation 
percentages. Others gloat over it and prophesy the 
³collapse² of the collective-farm movement. Both are cruelly 
mistaken. Both are far removed from a Marxist understanding 
of the nature of the collective-farm movement. 
Primarily, it is so-called dead souls that are withdrawing 
from the collective farms. It is not even a withdrawal 
but rather the revelation of a vacuum. Do we 
need dead souls? Of course not. I think that the North 
Caucasians and the Ukrainians are acting quite rightly in 
dissolving collective farms with dead souls and in organising 
really live and really stable collective farms. The 
collective-farm movement will only benefit from this. 
Secondly, it is alien elements, which are definitely 
hostile to our cause, that are withdrawing. It is obvious

REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES 225 
that the sooner such elements are ejected, the better it 
will be for the collective-farm movement. 
Lastly, it is vacillating elements, which cannot be 
called either alien elements or dead souls, that are withdrawing. 
These are peasants whom today we have not 
yet succeeded in convincing of the rightness of our cause, 
but whom we shall certainly convince tomorrow. The 
withdrawal of such peasants is a serious, although temporary, 
loss to the collective-farm movement. Consequently, 
one of the most urgent tasks of the collectivefarm 
movement now is to fight for the vacillating elements 
in the collective farms. 
It follows that the exodus of a section of the peasants 
from the collective farms is not entirely a bad 
thing. It follows that, inasmuch as this exodus relieves 
the collective farms of dead souls and definitely alien 
elements, it is the sign of a beneficent process making 
the collective farms healthier and stronger. 
A month ago it was estimated that collectivisation 
in the grain-growing regions amounted to over 60 per 
cent. It is now clear that, as regards genuine and more 
or less stable collective farms, that figure was definitely 
exaggerated. If, after the exodus of a section of the peasants, 
the collective-farm movement is consolidated at 40 
per cent collectivisation in the grain-growing regions‹and 
that is certainly feasible‹it will be a very great achievement 
for the collective-farm movement at the present 
moment. I take an average figure for the grain-growing 
regions, although I am well aware that we have individual 
areas of complete collectivisation where the figure 
is 80-90 per cent. Forty per cent collectivisation in 
the grain growing regions means that by the spring of

J. V. S T A L I N 226 
1930 we shall have succeeded in fulfilling the original 
five-year plan of collectivisation twice over. 
Who will venture to deny the decisive character of 
this historic achievement in the socialist development 
of the U.S.S.R.? 
Seventh question. Are the vacillating peasants acting 
rightly in withdrawing from the collective farms? 
Reply. No, they are acting wrongly. In withdrawing 
from the collective farms they are going against their 
own interests, for only the collective farms offer the 
peasants a way out of poverty and ignorance. In withdrawing 
from the collective farms, they make their position 
worse, because they deprive themselves of those privileges 
and advantages which the Soviet government accords 
the collective farms. Errors and distortions in the 
collective farms are no reason for withdrawing from them. 
Errors must be corrected by joint effort, while remaining 
in the collective farms. They can be corrected the more 
easily as the Soviet government will fight them with 
might and main. 
Lenin says: 
³The small-farming system under commodity production 
cannot save mankind from the poverty and oppression of the 
masses² (Vol. XX, p. 122). 
Lenin says: 
³Small-scale farming provides no escape from poverty² (Vol. 
XXIV, p. 540). 
Lenin says: 
³If we continue as of old on our small farms, even as free 
citizens on free land, we shall still be faced with inevitable ruin² 
(Vol. XX, p. 417).

REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES 227 
Lenin says: 
³Only with the help of common, artel, co-operative labour 
can we escape from the impasse into which the imperialist war has 
landed us² (Vol. XXIV, p. 537). 
Lenin says: 
³We must pass to common cultivation in large model farms,² 
for ³otherwise there will be no escaping from the dislocation, 
from the truly desperate situation in which Russia finds itself² 
(Vol. XX, p. 418). 
What does all that signify? 
It signifies that collective farms are the sole means 
that offer the peasants a way out of poverty and ignorance. 
Clearly, peasants who withdraw from the collective 
farms are acting wrongly. 
Lenin says: 
³You all know, of course, from all the activity of the Soviet 
government what immense importance we attach to communes, 
artels and all organisations generally which aim at the transformation, 
at gradually assisting this transformation, of small, individual 
peasant farming into socially conducted, co-operative or 
artel farming²* (Vol. XXIV, p. 579). 
Lenin says: 
³The Soviet government gave direct preference to communes 
and co-operatives by putting them in the forefront²* (Vol. XXIII, 
p. 399). 
What does that mean? 
It means that the Soviet government will accord 
privileges and preferences to the collective farms as 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 228 
compared with the individual farms. It means that it 
will accord privileges to the collective farms as regards 
provision of land, as regards supply of machines, tractors, 
seed grain, etc., as regards tax relief, and as regards 
provision of credits. 
Why does the Soviet government accord privileges and 
preferences to the collective farms? 
Because the collective farms are the only means by 
which the peasants can rid themselves of poverty. 
Because preferential assistance to the collective farms 
is the most effective form of assistance to the poor and 
middle peasants. 
A few days ago the Soviet government decided to 
exempt from taxation for two years all socially-owned 
draught animals in the collective farms (horses, oxen, 
etc.), and all cows, pigs, sheep and poultry, both those 
collectively owned by the collective farms and those individually 
owned by the collective farmers. 
The Soviet government has decided, in addition, to 
postpone to the end of the year repayment of arrears on 
credits granted to collective farmers and to cancel all 
fines and court penalties levied prior to April 1 on 
peasants who have joined collective farms. 
I t has decided, lastly, to carry out without fail 
the granting of credits to collective farms in the present 
year to the amount of 500,000,000 rubles. 
These privileges will aid the peasant collective farmers. 
They will aid those peasant collective farmers 
who have stood firm against the exodus, who have become 
steeled in the fight against the enemies of the collective 
farms, who have defended the collective farms and have 
held aloft the great banner of the collective-farm move

REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES 229 
ment. They will aid the poor- and middle-peasant collective 
farmers, who now constitute the main core of our 
collective farms, who will strengthen and give shape to 
our collective farms, and who will win millions upon millions 
of peasants for socialism. They will aid those peasant 
collective farmers who now constitute the principal 
cadres of the collective farms, and who fully deserve to 
be called heroes of the collective-farm movement. 
These privileges the peasants who have left the collective 
farms will not receive. 
Is it not clear that peasants who withdraw from the 
collective farms are making a mistake? 
Is it not clear that only by returning to the collective 
farms can they ensure receiving these privileges? 
Eighth question. What is to be done with the communes? 
Should they not be dissolved? 
Reply. No, they should not be dissolved and there is 
no reason for doing so. I am referring to real communes, 
not those existing on paper. In the grain-growing regions 
of the U.S.S.R. there are a number of splendid 
communes which deserve to be encouraged and supported. 
I have in mind the old communes which have withstood 
years of ordeal, which have become steeled in the 
struggle and have fully justified their existence. They 
should not be dissolved, but should be converted into 
artels. 
The formation and management of communes is a complicated 
and difficult matter. Large and stable communes 
can exist and develop only if they have experienced 
cadres and tried and tested leaders. A hasty replacement 
of the rules of the artel by the rules of the commune 
can only repel the peasants from the collective-farm

J. V. S T A L I N 230 
movement. Hence this matter must be approached with 
the utmost care and without any sort of haste. The artel is 
a simpler affair and more easily understood by the broad 
masses of the peasants. That is why at the present time 
the artel is the most widespread form of the collectivefarm 
movement. Only as the agricultural artels become 
stronger and more firmly established can the basis be 
created for a mass movement of the peasants towards 
communes. But that will not be soon. Hence the commune, 
which constitutes a higher form, can become the 
chief link in the collective-farm movement only in the 
future. 
Ninth question. What is to be done with the kulaks? 
Reply. So far we have spoken of the middle peasant. 
The middle peasant is an ally of the working class, and 
our policy towards him must be a friendly one. As for the 
kulak, that is another matter. The kulak is an enemy of 
the Soviet regime. There is not and cannot be peace between 
him and us. Our policy towards the kulaks is to 
eliminate them as a class. That does not mean, of course, 
that we can eliminate them at one stroke. But it does 
mean that we shall work to surround them and to eliminate 
them. 
Here is what Lenin says about the kulaks: 
³The kulaks are most bestial, brutal and savage exploiters, 
who in the history of other countries have time and again restored 
the power of the landlords, tsars, priests and capitalists. The kulaks 
are more numerous than the landlords and capitalists. Nevertheless, 
the kulaks are a minority of the people. . . . These 
bloodsuckers have grown rich on the want suffered by the people 
during the war; they have raked in thousands and hundreds of 
thousands of rubles by raising the prices of grain and other products. 
These spiders have grown fat at the expense of the peas

REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES 231 
ants who have been ruined by the war, and at the expense of the 
hungry workers. These leeches have sucked the blood of the toilers 
and have grown the richer, the more the workers in the cities 
and factories have suffered hunger. These vampires have been 
gathering and are gathering the landed estates into their hands; 
they keep on enslaving the poor peasants² (Vol. XXIII, pp. 206-07). 
We tolerated these bloodsuckers, spiders and vampires, 
while pursuing a policy of restricting their exploiting 
tendencies. We tolerated them, because we had nothing 
with which to replace kulak farming, kulak production. 
Now we are in a position to replace, and more than 
replace, their farming by our collective farms and state 
farms. There is no reason to tolerate these spiders and 
bloodsuckers any longer. To tolerate any longer these 
spiders and bloodsuckers, who set fire to collective farms, 
murder collective farms leaders and try to disrupt cropsowing, 
would be going against the interests of the workers 
and peasants. 
Hence the policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class 
must be pursued with all the persistence and consistency 
of which Bolsheviks are capable. 
Tenth question. What is the immediate practical task 
of the collective farms? 
Reply. The immediate practical task of the collective 
farms lies in the fight for crop-sowing, for the maximum 
enlargement of crop areas, for proper organisation 
of crop-sowing. 
All other tasks of the collective farms must now be 
adapted to the task of sowing the crops. 
All other work in the collective farms must be subordinated 
to the work of organising the sowing of the 
crops.

J. V. S T A L I N 232 
That means that the stamina of the collective farms 
and of their non-Party active, the ability of the leaders and 
Bolshevik core of the collective farms will be tested not by 
resounding resolutions and high-flown greetings, but by 
practical performance in properly organising the cropsowing. 
But to fulfil this practical task with honour, the attention 
of collective-farm officials must be turned to the 
economic questions of collective-farm development, to the 
questions of the internal development of the collective 
farms. 
Until recently, the attention of collective-farm officials 
was focused on the chase for high collectivisation 
figures; moreover, people refused to see the difference 
between real collectivisation and collectivisation on paper. 
This infatuation for figures must now be discarded. 
The attention of the officials must now be concentrated 
on consolidating the collective farms, on giving them 
organisational shape, on organising their practical work. 
Until recently, the attention of collective-farm officials 
was concentrated on organising large collectivefarm 
units, so called ³giants,² which not infrequently 
degenerated into cumbrous bureaucratic headquarters, 
devoid of economic roots in the villages. Consequently, 
real work was swamped by window-dressing. This infatuation 
for display must now be discarded. The attention 
of officials must now be concentrated on the organisational 
and economic work of the collective farms in the villages. 
When this work achieves proper success, ³giants² will 
make their appearance of themselves. 
Until recently, little attention was paid to drawing 
middle peasants into the work of managing the collective

REPLY TO COLLECTIVE-FARM COMRADES 233 
farms. Yet there are some remarkably fine farmers 
among the middle peasants, who could become excellent 
collective-farm executives. This defect in our work must 
now be eliminated. The task now is to draw the finest 
elements among the middle peasants into the work of 
managing the collective farms and to give them the opportunity 
to develop their abilities in this sphere. 
Until recently, insufficient attention was paid to work 
among peasant women. The past period has shown that 
work among peasant women is the weakest part of our 
work. This defect must now be eliminated resolutely, 
once and for all. 
Until recently, the Communists in a number of 
areas assumed that they could solve all the problems of 
collective-farm development by their own efforts. Because 
of this assumption, they did not pay sufficient attention 
to drawing non-Party people into responsible work 
in the collective farms, to promoting non-Party people 
to managerial work in the collective farms, to organising 
a large group of non-Party activists in the collective farms. 
The history of our Party has proved, and the past period in 
collective-farm development has once more demonstrated, 
i t , that this line is radically wrong. If Communists 
were to shut themselves up in their shells and wall themselves 
off from non-Party people, they would ruin the 
entire work. If the Communists have succeeded in covering 
themselves with glory in the battles for socialism, 
while the enemies of communism have been beaten, it 
is due, among other things, to the fact that the Communists 
knew how to enlist the co-operation of the finest 
elements among the non-Party people, that they knew 
how to draw forces from the broad non-Party strata, how

J. V. S T A L I N 234 
to surround their Party with large numbers of non-Party 
activists. This defect in our work among the non-Party 
people must now be eliminated resolutely, once and 
for all. 
Correcting these defects in our work, eliminating 
them completely, means precisely putting the economic 
work of the collective farms on sound lines. 
And so: 
1) Proper organisation of the crop-sowing‹that is 
the task. 
2) Concentration of attention on the economic questions 
of the collective-farm movement‹that is the means 
necessary for accomplishing this task. 
Pravda, No. 92, 
April 3, 1930 
Signed: J. Stalin

TO THE FIRST GRADUATES 
OF THE INDUSTRIAL ACADEMY 
The training of new cadres for socialist industry from 
the ranks of the working class and the labouring people 
generally, cadres capable of providing social and political, 
as well as production and technical, leadership for 
our enterprises, is a cardinal task of the moment. 
Unless this task is fulfilled, it will be impossible 
to convert the U.S.S.R. from a backward into an advanced 
country, from an agrarian into an industrial country, 
into a country of electricity and metal, of machines 
and tractors. 
The Industrial Academy is one of the most important 
workshops for training such cadres in our country. 
The first contingent of graduates of the Industrial 
Academy is its first arrow launched into the camp of our 
enemies, into the camp of production routine and technical 
backwardness. 
Let us hope that the new leaders of industry who 
are today quitting the walls of the Academy will display 
in practice exemplary labour enthusiasm and genuinely 
revolutionary activity in promoting a Bolshevik tempo 
of constructive work.

J. V. S T A L I N 236 
Greetings to the first graduates of the Industrial 
Academy, which is providing the country with a new 
Bolshevik detachment of leaders of our socialist industry, 
leaders fortified with technical knowledge. 
J. Stalin 
April 25, 1930 
Pravda, No. 115, 
April 26, 1930

REPLY TO COMRADE M. RAFAIL 
(Regional Trade-Union Council, Leningrad) 
Copy to Comrade Kirov, Secretary, 
Regional Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
Comrade Rafail, 
Owing to lack of time, I shall answer briefly: 
1) There is, and can be, no analogy between the 
C.C.ıs action in March of this year against excesses 
in the collective-farm movement and the Brest 
period or the period of the introduction of NEP. In the 
latter cases it was a matter of a turn in policy. In the 
first case, in March 1930, there was no turn in policy. 
All we did was to put a check on the comrades who had 
got out of hand. Consequently, all the arguments you base 
upon analogy, even though an incomplete one, fall to the 
ground. 
2) There really was a turn in policy in the affairs 
of the collective-farm movement (as a result of the turn 
towards the collective farms on the part of the mass of 
the middle peasants) but it was not in March 1930, but in 
the latter half of 1929. The beginning of this turn in 
policy was already made at the Fifteenth Congress of 
our Party (see the resolution on ³Work in the Countryside²). 
This turn, as I have already said, assumed a purely 
practical character at the close of 1929. You undoubtedly

J. V. S T A L I N 238 
know that the C.C. gave precise shape to the new policy 
and laid down rates of development of the collectivefarm 
movement for the various regions of the U.S.S.R. 
in its decision of January 5, 1930. The facts bear out that 
this decision of the C.C. was fully and entirely correct 
on all points. 
Was there any lag on the part of the C.C. behind the 
progress of the movement? I think that, as far as theoretical 
prevision and elaboration of an appropriate political 
line are concerned, there was no lag whatever. 
Was there a lag on the part of any considerable sections 
of the Party or of individual members of the C.C. 
in their practical policy? There certainly was. Otherwise, 
there would have been no fight for the general line 
and against deviations either in the Party or in the C.C. 
itself. 
3) Is it possible for a ruling party instantaneously 
to grasp the coming into being of new processes, and also 
instantaneously to reflect them in its practical policy? 
I think it is not possible. It is not possible, because the 
facts occur first of all, then their reflection in the consciousness 
of the most advanced elements of the Party, 
and only after that does the moment come when the 
new processes are perceived by the minds of the mass 
of Party members. Do you remember what Hegel said: 
³The owl of Minerva makes its flight only at night²? 
In other words, consciousness lags somewhat behind the 
facts. 
The difference in this respect between the turn in 
our policy in the latter half of 1929 and the turns at 
the time of Brest and the introduction of NEP is 
that in the latter half of 1929 the Party became con

REPLY TO COMRADE M. RAFAIL 239 
scious of the new processes in objective reality sooner than 
i t did in the case of the turns at the time of Brest 
and the introduction of NEP. The explanation of 
this is that in the interval the Party had succeeded in 
perfecting itself, and its cadres had become more perceptive. 
With communist greetings, 
J. Stalin 
May 31, 1930 
Published for the first time

AGRICULTURE MACHINERY WORKS, 
ROSTOV 
I congratulate the workers, technical personnel and 
entire executive staff of the Agricultural Machinery 
Works on their victory. Your victory is a great one, 
if only because the Agricultural Machinery Works alone 
is to produce, in accordance with its full programme, 
farm machinery to the value of 115,000,000 rubles 
annually, whereas all the 900 agricultural machinery 
works that existed before the war together produced farm 
machinery to the value of only 70,000,000 rubles 
annually. 
My best wishes for the successful fulfilment of this 
programme. 
Stalin 
June 16, 1930 
Pravda, No. 165, 
June 17, 1930

TRACTOR WORKS, STALINGRAD 
Greetings and congratulations on their victory to 
the workers and executive personnel of the giant Red 
Banner Tractor Works, the first in the U.S.S.R. The 
50,000 tractors which you are to produce for our country 
every year will be 50,000 projectiles shattering the old 
bourgeois world and clearing the way for the new, socialist 
order in the countryside. 
My best wishes for the successful fulfilment of your 
programme. 
J. Stalin 
June 17, 1930 
Pravda, No. 166, 
June 18, 1930

POLITICAL REPORT OF THE CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE TO THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS 
OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)36 
June 27, 1930 
I 
THE GROWING CRISIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM 
AND THE EXTERNAL SITUATION OF THE U.S.S.R. 
Comrades, since the Fifteenth Congress two and a 
half years have passed. Not a very long period one would 
think. Nevertheless, during this period most important 
changes have taken place in the life of peoples and 
states. If one were to characterise the past period in two 
words, it could be called a turning point period. It 
marked a turning point not only for us, for the U.S.S.R., 
but also for the capitalist countries all over the world. 
Between these two turning points, however, there is a 
fundamental difference. Whereas for the U.S.S.R. this 
turning point meant a turn in the direction of a new and 
bigger economic upswing, for the capitalist countries 
it meant a turn towards economic decline. Here, in the 
U.S.S.R., there i s a growing upswing of socialist 
development both in industry and in agriculture. 
There, among the capitalists, there is growing economic 
crisis both in industry and in agriculture. 
Such is the picture of the present situation in a 
few words. 
Recall the state of affairs in the capitalist countries 
two and a half years ago. Growth of industrial

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 243 
production and trade in nearly all the capitalist countries. 
Growth of production of raw materials and food 
in nearly all the agrarian countries. A halo around the 
United States as the land of the most full-blooded capitalism. 
Triumphant hymns of ³prosperity.² Grovelling to 
the dollar. Panegyrics in honour of the new technology, 
in honour of capitalist rationalisation. Proclamation of an 
era of the, ³recovery² of capitalism and of the unshakable 
firmness of capitalist stabilisation. ³Universal² noise 
and clamour about the ³inevitable doom² of the 
Land of Soviets, about the ³inevitable collapse² of the 
U.S.S.R. 
That was the state of affairs yesterday. 
And what is the picture today? 
Today there is an economic crisis in nearly all the 
industrial countries of capitalism. Today there is an 
agricultural crisis in all the agrarian countries. Instead 
of ³prosperity² there is mass poverty and a colossal 
growth of unemployment. Instead of an upswing in 
agriculture there is the ruin of the vast masses of the 
peasants. The illusions about the omnipotence of capitalism 
in general, and about the omnipotence of North 
American capitalism in particular, are collapsing. The 
triumphant hymns in honour of the dollar and of capitalist 
rationalisation are becoming fainter and fainter. 
Pessimistic wailing about the ³mistakes² of capitalism is 
growing louder and louder. And the ³universal² clamour 
about the ³inevitable doom² of the U.S.S.R. is giving 
way to ³universal² venomous hissing about the necessity 
of punishing ³that country² that dares to develop its 
economy when crisis is reigning all around. 
Such is the picture today.

J. V. S T A L I N 244 
Things have turned out exactly as the Bolsheviks said 
they would two or three years ago. 
The Bolsheviks said that in view of the restricted 
limits of the standard of living of the vast masses of 
the workers and peasants, the further development of 
technology in the capitalist countries, the growth of 
productive forces and of capitalist rationalisation, 
must inevitably lead to a severe economic crisis. The 
bourgeois press jeered at the ³queer prophesies² of the 
Bolsheviks. The Right deviators dissociated themselves 
from this Bolshevik forecast and for the Marxist analysis 
substituted liberal chatter about ³organised capitalism.² 
But how did things actually turn out? They 
turned out exactly as the Bolsheviks said they would. 
Such are the facts. 
Let us now examine the data on the economic crisis 
in the capitalist countries. 
1. THE WORLD ECONOMIC CRISIS 
a) In studying the crisis, the following facts, above 
all, strike the eye: 
1. The present economic crisis is a crisis of overproduction. 
This means that more goods have been produced 
than the market can absorb. It means that more 
textiles, fuel, manufactured goods and food have been 
produced than can be purchased for cash by the bulk 
of the consumers, i.e., the masses of the people, whose 
incomes remain on a low level. Since, however, under 
capitalism, the purchasing power of the masses of the 
people remains at a minimum level, the capitalists 
keep their ³superfluous² goods, textiles, grain, etc., in

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 245 
their warehouses or even destroy them in order to bolster 
up prices; they cut down production and discharge 
their workers, and the masses of the people are compelled 
to suffer hardship because too many goods have 
been produced. 
2. The present crisis is the first post-war world economic 
crisis. It is a world crisis not only in the sense 
that it embraces all, or nearly all, the industrial countries 
in the world; even France, which is systematically 
injecting into her organism the billions of marks 
received as reparations payments from Germany, has 
been unable to avoid a certain depression, which, as all 
the data indicate, is bound to develop into a crisis. 
It is a world crisis also in the sense that the industrial 
crisis has coincided with an agricultural crisis that 
affects the production of all forms of raw materials and 
food in the chief agrarian countries of the world. 
3. The present world crisis is developing unevenly, 
notwithstanding its universal character; it affects different 
countries at different times and in different degrees. 
The industrial crisis began first of all in Poland, 
Rumania and the Balkans. It developed there throughout 
the whole of last year. Obvious symptoms of an 
incipient agricultural crisis were already visible at the 
end of 1928 in Canada, the United States, the Argentine, 
Brazil and Australia. During the whole of this 
period United States industry showed an upward trend. 
By the middle of 1929 industrial production in the 
United States had reached an almost record level. A 
break began only in the latter half of 1929, and then a 
crisis in industrial production swiftly developed, which 
threw the United States back to the level of 1927. This

J. V. S T A L I N 246 
was followed by an industrial crisis in Canada and 
Japan. Then came bankruptcies and crisis in China and 
in the colonial countries, where the crisis was aggravated 
by the drop in the price of silver, and where the 
crisis of overproduction was combined with the ruination 
of the peasant farms, which were reduced to utter exhaustion 
by feudal exploitation and unbearable taxation. 
As regards Western Europe, there the crisis began to 
gain force only at the beginning of this year, but not 
everywhere to the same degree, and even in that period 
France still showed an increase in industrial production. 
I do not think there is any need to dwell particularly 
on the statistics that demonstrate the existence of 
the crisis. Nobody now disputes the existence of the 
crisis. I shall therefore confine myself to quoting one 
small but characteristic table recently published by 
the German Institute of Economic Research. This table 
depicts the development of the mining industry and 
the chief branches of large-scale manufacturing industry 
in the United States, Britain, Germany, France, Poland 
and the U.S.S.R. since 1927; the 1928 level of production 
is taken as 100. 
Here is the table: 
Y e a r U.S.S.R U.S.A. Britain Germany France Poland 
1927 . . . . . 82.4 95.5 105.5 100.1 86.6 88.5 
1928 . . . . . 100 100 100 100 100 100 
1929 . . . . . 123.5 106.3 107.9 101.8 109.4 99.8 
1930 (first quarter) 
. . . . . 171.4 95.5 107.4 93.4 113.1 84.6

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 247 
What does this table show? 
It shows, first of all, that the United States, Germany 
and Poland are experiencing a sharply expressed 
crisis in large-scale industrial production; in the first 
quarter of 1930, in the United States, after the boom in 
the first half of 1929, the level of production dropped 
10.8 per cent compared with 1929 and sank to the level 
of 1927; in Germany, after three years of stagnation, the 
level of production dropped 8.4 per cent compared with 
last year and sank to 6.7 per cent below the level 
of 1927; in Poland, after last yearıs crisis, the level of 
production dropped 15.2 per cent compared with last 
year and sank to 3.9 per cent below the level of 1927. 
Secondly, the table shows that Britain has been 
marking time for three years, round about the 1927 
level, and is experiencing severe economic stagnation; 
in the first quarter of 1930 she even suffered a drop 
in production of 0.5 per cent compared with the previous 
year, thus entering the first phase of a crisis. 
Thirdly, the table shows that of the big capitalist 
countries only in France is there a certain growth of 
large-scale industry; but whereas the increase in 1928 
amounted to 13.4 per cent and that in 1929 to 9.4 per 
cent, the increase in the first quarter of 1930 is only 
3.7 per cent above that in 1929, thus presenting from 
year to year a picture of a descending curve of growth. 
Lastly, the table shows that of all the countries in 
the world, the U.S.S.R. is the only one in which a powerful 
upswing of large-scale industry has taken place; 
the level of production in the first quarter of 1930 was 
more than twice as high as that in 1927, and the increase 
rose from 17.6 per cent in 1928 to 23.5 per cent in 1929

J. V. S T A L I N 248 
and to 32 per cent in the first quarter of 1930, thus 
presenting from year to year a picture of an ascending 
curve of growth. 
It may be said that although such was the state of 
affairs up to the end of the first quarter of this year, 
it is not precluded that a turn for the better may have 
taken place in the second quarter of this year. The returns 
for the second quarter, however, emphatically 
refute such an assumption. They show, on the contrary, 
that the situation has become still worse in the second 
quarter. These returns show: a further drop in share 
prices on the New York Stock Exchange and a new wave 
of bankruptcies in the United States; a further decline 
in production, a reduction of wages of the workers, and 
growth of unemployment in the United States, Germany, 
Britain, Italy, Japan, South America, Poland, Czechoslovakia, 
etc.; the entry of a number of branches of industry 
in France into a state of stagnation, which, in the present 
international economic situation, is a symptom 
of incipient crisis. The number of unemployed in the 
United States is now over 6,000,000, in Germany about 
5,000,000, in Britain over 2,000,000, in Italy, South 
America and Japan a million each, in Poland, Czechoslovakia 
and Austria half a million each. This is apart 
from the further intensification of the agricultural 
crisis, which is ruining millions of farmers and labouring 
peasants. The crisis of overproduction in agriculture 
has reached such a pitch that in Brazil, in order 
to keep up prices and the profits of the bourgeoisie, 
2,000,000 bags of coffee have been thrown into the sea; 
in America maize has begun to be used for fuel instead 
of coal; in Germany, millions of poods of rye are

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 249 
being converted into pig food; and as regards cotton 
and wheat, every measure is being taken to reduce the 
crop area by 10-15 per cent. 
Such is the general picture of the developing world 
economic crisis. 
b) Now, when the destructive effects of the world 
economic crisis are spreading, sending to the bottom 
whole strata of medium and small capitalists, ruining 
entire groups of the labour aristocracy and farmers, 
and dooming vast masses of workers to starvation, 
everybody is asking: what is the cause of the crisis, 
what is at the bottom of it, how can it be combated, 
how can it be abolished? The most diverse ³theories² 
about crises are being invented. Whole schemes are 
being proposed for ³mitigating,² ³preventing,² and 
³eliminating² crises. The bourgeois oppositions are 
blaming the bourgeois governments because ³they failed 
to take all measures² to prevent the crisis. The ³Democrats² 
blame the ³Republicans² and the ³Republicans² 
blame the ³Democrats,² and all of them together blame 
the Hoover group with its ³Federal Reserve System,²37 
which failed to ³curb² the crisis. There are even 
wiseacres who ascribe the world economic crisis to 
the ³machinations of the Bolsheviks.² I have in mind 
the well-known ³industrialist² Rechberg who, properly 
speaking, little resembles an industrialist, but reminds 
one more than anything of an ³industrialist² among 
literary men and a ³literary man² among industrialists. 
(Laughter.) 
It goes without saying that none of these ³theories² 
and schemes has anything in common with science. 
I t must be admitted that the bourgeois economists

J. V. S T A L I N 250 
have proved to be utter bankrupts in face of the crisis. 
More than that, they have been found to be devoid even 
of that little sense of reality which their predecessors 
could not always be said to lack. These gentlemen forget 
that crises cannot be regarded as something fortuitous 
under the capitalist system of economy. These 
gentlemen forget that economic crises are the inevitable 
result of capitalism. These gentlemen forget that crises 
were born with the birth of the rule of capitalism. 
There have been periodical crises during more than 
a hundred years, recurring every 12, 10, 8 or less years. 
During this period bourgeois governments of all ranks 
and colours, bourgeois leaders of all levels and abilities, 
all without exception tried their strength at the 
task of ³preventing² and ³abolishing² crises. But they 
all suffered defeat. They suffered defeat because economic 
crises cannot be prevented or abolished within 
the framework of capitalism. Is it surprising that the 
present-day bourgeois leaders are also suffering defeat? 
Is it surprising that far from mitigating the crisis, far 
from easing the situation of the vast masses of the working 
people, the measures taken by the bourgeois governments 
actually lead to new outbreaks of bankruptcy, 
to new waves of unemployment, to the swallowing up 
of the less powerful capitalist combines by the more 
powerful capitalist combines? 
The basis, the cause, of economic crises of overproduction 
lies in the capitalist system of economy 
itself. The basis of the crisis lies in the contradiction 
between the social character of production and the capitalist 
form of appropriation of the results of production. 
An expression of this fundamental contradiction of cap

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 251 
italism is the contradiction between the colossal growth 
of capitalismıs potentialities of production, calculated 
to yield the maximum of capitalist profit, and the relative 
reduction of the effective demand of the vast masses 
of the working people, whose standard of living the 
capitalists always try to keep at the minimum level. 
To be successful in competition and to squeeze out the 
utmost profit, the capitalists are compelled to develop 
their technical equipment, to introduce rationalisation, 
to intensify the exploitation of the workers and to increase 
the production potentialities of their enterprises 
to the utmost limits. So as not to lag behind one another, 
all the capitalists are compelled, in one way or 
another, to take this path of furiously developing production 
potentialities. The home market and the foreign 
market, however, the purchasing power of the 
vast masses of workers and peasants who, in the last 
analysis, constitute the bulk of the purchasers, remain on 
a low level. Hence overproduction crises. Hence the 
well-known results, recurring more or less periodically, 
as a consequence of which goods remain unsold, production 
is reduced, unemployment grows and wages are cut, 
and all this still further intensifies the contradiction 
between the level of production and the level of effective 
demand. Overproduction crises are a manifestation of 
this contradiction in turbulent and destructive forms. 
If capitalism could adapt production not to the obtaining 
of the utmost profit, but to the systematic improvement 
of the material conditions of the masses of 
the people, and if it could turn profits not to the satisfaction 
of the whims of the parasitic classes, not to perfecting 
the methods of exploitation, not to the export

J. V. S T A L I N 252 
of capital, but to the systematic improvement of the 
material conditions of the workers and peasants, then 
there would be no crises. But then capitalism would 
not be capitalism. To abolish crises it is necessary to 
abolish capitalism. 
Such is the basis of economic crises of overproduction 
in general. 
We cannot, however, confine ourselves to this in 
characterising the present crisis. The present crisis cannot 
be regarded as a mere recurrence of the old crises. 
It is occurring and developing under certain new conditions, 
which must be brought out if we are to obtain a 
complete picture of the crisis. It is complicated and 
deepened by a number of special circumstances which 
must be understood if we are to obtain a clear idea of 
the present economic crisis. 
What are these special circumstances? 
These special circumstances can be reduced to the 
following characteristic facts: 
1. The crisis has most severely affected the principal 
country of capitalism, its citadel, the United States, 
in which is concentrated not less than half the total 
production and consumption of all the countries in the 
world. Obviously, this circumstance cannot but lead 
to a colossal expansion of the sphere of influence of 
the crisis, to the intensification of the crisis and to the 
accumulation of extra difficulties for world capitalism. 
2. In the course of development of the economic 
crisis, the industrial crisis in the chief capitalist countries 
did not merely coincide but became interwoven 
with the agricultural crisis in the agrarian countries, 
thereby aggravating the difficulties and predetermining

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 253 
the inevitability of a general decline in economic activity. 
Needless to say, the industrial crisis will intensify 
the agricultural crisis, and the agricultural crisis 
will prolong the industrial crisis, which cannot but lead 
to the intensification of the economic crisis as a whole. 
3. Present-day capitalism, unlike the old capitalism, 
is monopoly capitalism, and this predetermines the inevitability 
of the capitalist combines fighting to keep 
up the high monopolist prices of goods, in spite of overproduction. 
Naturally, this circumstance, which makes 
the crisis particularly painful and ruinous for the masses 
of the people who constitute the main consumers of 
goods, cannot but lead to prolonging the crisis, cannot 
but be an obstacle to resolving it. 
4. The present economic crisis is developing on the 
basis of the general crisis of capitalism, which came into 
being already in the period of the imperialist war, and 
is sapping the foundations of capitalism and has facilitated 
the advent of the economic crisis. 
What does that mean? 
It means, first of all, that the imperialist war and 
its aftermath intensified the decay of capitalism and 
upset its equilibrium, that we are now living in an epoch 
of wars and revolutions, that capitalism has already 
ceased to be the sole and all-embracing system of world 
economy, that side by side with the capitalist system 
of economy there is the socialist system, which is growing, 
thriving, stands opposed to the capitalist system 
and by its very existence demonstrates the decaying 
state of capitalism, shakes its foundations. 
It means, further, that the imperialist war and the 
victory of the revolution in the U.S.S.R. have shaken

J. V. S T A L I N 254 
the foundations of imperialism in the colonial and dependent 
countries, that the prestige of imperialism has 
already been undermined in those countries, that it is 
no longer able to lord it in those countries in the old way. 
It means, further, that during the war and after it, a 
young native capitalism appeared and grew up in the 
colonial and dependent countries, which is successfully 
competing in the markets with the old capitalist countries, 
intensifying and complicating the struggle for markets. 
I t means, lastly, that the war l e f t the majority 
of capitalist countries a burdensome heritage in the 
shape of enterprises chronically working under capacity 
and of an army of unemployed numbering millions, which 
has been transformed from a reserve into a permanent 
army of unemployed; this created for capitalism a mass 
of difficulties even before the present economic crisis, 
and must complicate matters still more during the crisis. 
Such are the circumstances which intensify and 
aggravate the world economic crisis. 
It must be admitted that the present economic crisis 
i s the gravest and most profound world economic 
crisis that has ever occurred. 
2. THE INTENSIFICATION OF THE CONTRADICTIONS 
OF CAPITALISM 
A most important result of the world economic 
crisis is that it is laying bare and intensifying the contradictions 
inherent in world capitalism. 
a) It is laying bare and intensifying the contradictions 
between the major imperialist countries, the struggle 
for markets, the struggle for raw materials, the struggle

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 255 
for the export of capital. None of the capitalist states 
is now satisfied with the old distribution of spheres of 
influence and colonies. They see that the relation of 
forces has changed and that it is necessary in accordance 
with it to redivide markets, sources of raw materials, 
spheres of influence, and so forth. The chief contradiction 
here is that between the United States and Britain. 
Both in the sphere of the export of manufactured goods 
and in the sphere of the export of capital, the struggle 
is raging chiefly between the United States and Britain. 
It is enough to read any journal dealing with economics, 
any document concerning exports of goods and capital, 
to be convinced of this. The principal arena of the struggle 
is South America, China, the colonies and dominions 
of the old imperialist states. Superiority of forces in this 
struggle‹and a definite superiority‹is on the side of the 
United States. 
After the chief contradiction come contradictions 
which, while not the chief ones, are, however, fairly important: 
between America and Japan, between Germany 
and France, between France and Italy, between Britain 
and France, and so forth. 
There can be no doubt whatever that owing to the 
developing crisis, the struggle for markets, for raw 
materials and for the export of capital will grow more 
intense month by month and day by day. 
Means of struggle: tariff policy, cheap goods, cheap 
credits, regrouping of forces and new military-political 
alliances, growth of armaments and preparation for new 
imperialist wars, and finally‹war. 
I have spoken about the crisis embracing all branches 
of production. There i s one branch, however, that

J. V. S T A L I N 256 
has not been affected by the crisis. That branch is the 
armament industry. It is growing continuously, notwithstanding 
the crisis. The bourgeois states are furiously 
arming and rearming. What for? Not for friendly 
chats, of course, but for war. And the imperialists need 
war, for it is the only means by which to redivide the 
world, to redivide markets, sources of raw materials and 
spheres for the investment of capital. 
I t is quite understandable that in this situation 
so-called pacifism is living its last days, that the League 
of Nations is rotting alive, that ³disarmament schemes² 
come to nothing, while conferences for the reduction of 
naval armaments become transformed into conferences 
for renewing and enlarging navies. 
This means that the danger of war will grow at an 
accelerated pace. 
Let the Social-Democrats chatter about pacifism, 
peace, the peaceful development of capitalism, and so 
forth. The experience of Social-Democrats being in power 
in Germany and Britain shows that for them pacifism 
is only a screen needed to conceal the preparation 
for new wars. 
b) It is laying bare and will intensify the contradictions 
between the victor countries and the vanquished 
countries. Among the latter I have in mind chiefly Germany. 
Undoubtedly, in view of the crisis and the aggravation 
of the problem of markets, increased pressure 
will be brought to bear upon Germany, which is not only 
a debtor, but also a very big exporting country. The 
peculiar relations that have developed between the 
victor countries and Germany could be depicted in the 
form of a pyramid at the apex of which America, France,

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 257 
Britain and the others are seated in lordly fashion, 
holding in their hands the Young Plan38 with the inscription: 
³Pay up!²; while underneath lies Germany, flattened 
out, exhausting herself and compelled to exert 
all her efforts to obey the order to pay thousands of 
millions in indemnities. You wish to know what this 
is? It is ³the spirit of Locarno.²39 To think that such a 
situation will have no effect upon world capitalism 
means not to understand anything in life. To think 
that the German bourgeoisie will be able to pay 20,000 
million marks within the next ten years and that the 
German proletariat, which is living under the double 
yoke of ³its own² and the ³foreign² bourgeoisie, will 
allow the German bourgeoisie to squeeze these 20,000 
million marks out of it without serious battles and convulsions, 
means to go out of oneıs mind. Let the 
German and French politicians pretend that they believe 
in this miracle. We Bolsheviks do not believe in 
miracles. 
c) It is laying bare and intensifying the contradictions 
between the imperialist states and the colonial and 
dependent countries. The growing economic crisis cannot 
but increase the pressure of the imperialists upon the 
colonies and dependent countries, which are the chief 
markets for goods and sources of raw materials. Indeed, 
this pressure is increasing to the utmost degree. 
It is a fact that the European bourgeoisie is now in a 
state of war with ³its² colonies in India, Indo-China, 
Indonesia and North Africa. It is a fact that ³independent² 
China is already virtually partitioned into 
spheres of influence, while the cliques of counterrevolutionary 
Kuomintang generals, warring among

J. V. S T A L I N 258 
themselves and ruining the Chinese people, are 
obeying the will of their masters in the imperialist 
camp. 
The mendacious story that officials of the Russian 
embassies in China are to blame for the disturbance of 
³peace and order² in China must now be regarded as 
having been utterly exposed. There have been no Russian 
embassies for a long time in either South or Central 
China. On the other hand, there are British, Japanese, 
German, American and all sorts of other embassies 
there. There have been no Russian embassies for a long 
time in either South or Central China. On the other 
hand, there are German, British and Japanese military 
advisers with the warring Chinese generals. There 
have been no Russian embassies there for a long time. 
On the other hand, there are British, American, German, 
Czechoslovak and all sorts of other guns, rifles, 
aircraft, tanks and poison gases. Well? Instead of ³peace 
and order² a most unrestrained and most devastating 
war of the generals, financed and instructed by the 
³civilised² states of Europe and America, is now raging 
in South and Central China. We get a rather piquant 
picture of the ³civilising² activities of the capitalist 
states. What we do not understand is merely: what have 
the Russian Bolsheviks to do with it? 
I t would be ridiculous to think that these outrages 
will be without consequences for the imperialists. 
The Chinese workers and peasants have already 
retaliated to them by forming Soviets and a Red Army. 
It is said that a Soviet government has already been 
set up there. I think that if this is true, there is nothing 
surprising about it. There can be no doubt that only

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 259 
Soviets can save China from utter collapse and pauperisation. 
As regards India, Indo-China, Indonesia, Africa, 
etc., the growth of the revolutionary movement in those 
countries, which at times assumes the form of a national 
war for liberation, leaves no room for doubt. Messieurs 
the bourgeois count on flooding those countries 
with blood and on relying on police bayonets, calling 
people like Gandhi to their assistance. There can be no 
doubt that police bayonets make a poor prop. Tsarism, 
in its day, also tried to rely on police bayonets, but 
everybody knows what kind of a prop they turned out 
to be. As regards assistants of the Gandhi type, tsarism 
had a whole herd of them in the shape of liberal 
compromisers of every kind, but nothing came of this 
except discomfiture. 
d) It is laying bare and intensifying the contradictions 
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat in the 
capitalist countries. The crisis has already increased 
the pressure exerted by the capitalists on the working 
class. The crisis has already given rise to another wave 
of capitalist rationalisation, to a further deterioration 
of the conditions of the working class, to increased unemployment, 
to an enlargement of the permanent army 
of unemployed, to a reduction of wages. It is not surprising 
that these circumstances are revolutionising the 
situation, intensifying the class struggle and pushing the 
workers towards new class battles. 
As a result of this, Social-Democratic illusions 
among the masses of workers are being shattered and 
dispelled. After the experience of Social-Democrats 
being in power, when they broke strikes, organised

J. V. S T A L I N 260 
lockouts and shot down workers, the false promises of 
³industrial democracy,² ³peace in industry,² and ³peaceful 
methods² of struggle sound like cruel mockery 
to the workers. Will many workers be found today capable 
of believing the false doctrines of the socialfascists? 
The well-known workersı demonstrations of 
August 1, 1929 (against the war danger) and of March 6, 
1930 (against unemployment)40 show that the best members 
of the working class have already turned away 
from the social-fascists. The economic crisis will strike 
a fresh blow at Social-Democratic illusions among the 
workers. Not many workers will be found now, after 
the bankruptcies and ruination caused by the crisis, 
who believe that it is possible for ³every worker² to 
become rich by holding shares in ³democratised² jointstock 
companies. Needless to say, the crisis will strike 
a crushing blow at all these and similar illusions. 
The desertion of the masses of the workers from the 
Social-Democrats, however, signifies a turn on their 
part towards communism. That is what is actually 
taking place. The growth of the trade-union movement 
that is associated with the Communist Party, the electoral 
successes of the Communist Parties, the wave of 
strikes in which the Communists are taking a leading 
part, the development of economic strikes into political 
protests organised by the Communists, the mass demonstrations 
of workers who sympathise with communism, 
which are meeting a lively response in the working 
class‹all this shows that the masses of the workers regard 
the Communist Party as the only party capable of 
fighting capitalism, the only party worthy of the 
workersı confidence, the only party under whose lead

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 261 
ership it is possible to enter, and worth while entering, 
the struggle for emancipation from capitalism. This 
means that the masses are turning towards communism. 
It is the guarantee that our fraternal Communist Parties 
will become big mass parties of the working class. 
All that is necessary is that the Communists should be 
capable of appraising the situation and making proper 
use of it. By developing an uncompromising struggle 
against Social-Democracy, which is capitalıs agency in 
the working class, and by reducing to dust all and sundry 
deviations from Leninism, which bring grist to the 
mill of Social-Democracy, the Communist Parties have 
shown that they are on the right road. They must definitely 
fortify themselves on this road; for only if they 
do that can they count on winning over the majority 
of the working class and successfully prepare the proletariat 
for the coming class battles. Only if they do that 
can we count on a further increase in the influence and 
prestige of the Communist International. 
Such is the state of the principal contradictions of 
world capitalism, which have become intensified to the 
utmost by the world economic crisis. 
What do all these facts show? 
That the stabilisation of capitalism is coming to 
an end. 
That the upsurge of the mass revolutionary movement 
will increase with fresh vigour. 
That in a number of countries the world economic 
crisis will grow into a political crisis. 
This means, firstly, that the bourgeoisie will seek 
a way out of the situation through further fascisation 
in the sphere of domestic policy, and will utilise all

J. V. S T A L I N 262 
the reactionary forces, including Social-Democracy, for 
this purpose. 
It means, secondly, that in the sphere of foreign 
policy the bourgeoisie will seek a way out through a new 
imperialist war. 
It means, lastly, that the proletariat, in fighting 
capitalist exploitation and the war danger, will seek a 
way out through revolution. 
3. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. 
AND THE CAPITALIST STATES 
a) I have spoken above about the contradictions 
of world capitalism. In addition to these, however, 
there is one other contradiction. I am referring to the 
contradiction between the capitalist world and the 
U.S.S.R. True, this contradiction must not be regarded 
as being of the same order as the contradiction within 
capitalism. It is a contradiction between capitalism as 
a whole and the country that is building socialism. 
This, however, does not prevent it from corroding and 
shaking the very foundations of capitalism. More than 
that, it lays bare all the contradictions of capitalism 
to the roots and gathers them into a single knot, transforming 
them into an issue of the life and death of the 
capitalist order itself. That is why, every time the contradictions 
of capitalism become acute, the bourgeoisie 
turns its gaze towards the U.S.S.R., wondering whether 
it would not be possible to solve this or that contradiction 
of capitalism, or all the contradictions together, 
at the expense of the U.S.S.R., of that Land of Soviets, 
that citadel of revolution which, by its very existence,

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 263 
is revolutionising the working class and the colonies, 
which is hindering the organisation of a new war, hindering 
a new redivision of the world, hindering the 
capitalists from lording it in its extensive home market 
which they need so much, especially now, in view of 
the economic crisis. 
Hence the tendency towards adventurist attacks on 
the U.S.S.R. and towards intervention, a tendency which 
will certainly grow owing to the development of the 
economic crisis. 
The most striking expression of this tendency at 
the present time is present-day bourgeois France, the 
birthplace of the philanthropic ³Pan-Europe² scheme,41 
the ³cradle² of the Kellogg Pact,42 the most aggressive 
and militarist of all the aggressive and militarist countries 
in the world. 
But intervention is a two-edged sword. The bourgeoisie 
knows this perfectly well. It will be all right, 
it thinks, if intervention goes off smoothly and ends in 
the defeat of the U.S.S.R. But what if it ends in the 
defeat of the capitalists? There was intervention once 
and it ended in failure. If the first intervention, when 
the Bolsheviks were weak, ended in failure, what guarantee 
is there that the second will not end in failure 
too? Everybody sees that the Bolsheviks are far stronger 
now, both economically and politically, and as 
regards preparedness for the countryıs defence. And 
what about the workers in the capitalist countries,- 
who will not permit intervention in the U.S.S.R., who 
will fight intervention and, if anything happens, may 
attack the capitalists in the rear? Would it not be better 
to proceed along the line of increasing trade

J. V. S T A L I N 264 
connections with the U.S.S.R., to which the Bolsheviks 
do not object? 
Hence the tendency towards continuing peaceful relations 
with the U.S.S.R. 
Thus, we have two sets of factors, and two different 
tendencies operating in opposite directions: 
1. The policy of disrupting economic connections 
between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist countries; 
provocative attacks upon the U.S.S.R.; open and secret 
activities in preparation for intervention against the 
U.S.S.R. These are the factors that menace the U.S.S.R.ıs 
international position. It is the operation of these factors 
that explains such facts as the rupture of relations 
with the U.S.S.R. by the British Conservative Cabinet; 
the seizure of the Chinese-Eastern Railway by the Chinese 
militarists; the financial blockade of the U.S.S.R.; 
the clerical ³crusade,² headed by the Pope, against 
the U.S.S.R.; the organisation by agents of foreign 
states of wrecking activities on the part of our specialists; 
the organisation of explosions and incendiarism, 
such as were carried out by certain employees of ³Lena 
Gold-Fields²43; attempts on the lives of representatives 
of the U.S.S.R. (Poland); finding fault with our exports 
(United States, Poland), and so forth. 
2. Sympathy towards and support of the U.S.S.R. 
on the part of the workers in capitalist countries; growth 
of the economic and political might of the U.S.S.R.; 
increase in the U.S.S.R.ıs defence capacity; the peace 
policy undeviatingly pursued by the Soviet government. 
These are the factors that strengthen the 
U.S.S.R.ıs international position. It is the operation 
of these factors that explains such facts as the success

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 265 
ful settlement of the dispute over the Chinese-Eastern 
Railway, the restoration of relations with Britain, the 
growth of economic connections with capitalist countries, 
and so forth. 
It is the conflict between these factors that determines 
the U.S.S.R.ıs external situation. 
b) It is said that the stumbling block to the improvement 
of economic relations between the U.S.S.R. 
and the bourgeois states is the question of the debts. 
I think that this is not an argument in favour of paying 
the debts, but a pretext advanced by the aggressive elements 
for interventionist propaganda. Our policy in 
this field is clear and well-grounded. On condition that 
we are granted credits, we are willing to pay a small 
part of the pre-war debts, regarding them as additional 
interest on the credits. Without this condition we cannot 
and must not pay. Is more demanded of us? On 
what grounds? Is it not well-known that these debts 
were contracted by the tsarist government, which was 
overthrown by the Revolution, and for whose obligations 
the Soviet Government can take no responsibility? 
There is talk about international law, about international 
obligations. But on the grounds of what 
international law did Messieurs the ³Allies² sever Bessarabia 
from the U.S.S.R. and hand i t over to enslavement 
under the Rumanian boyars? On the grounds 
of what international obligations did the capitalists 
and governments of France, Britain, America and 
Japan attack the U.S.S.R., invade it, and for three whole 
years plunder it and ruin its inhabitants? If this is what 
is called international law and international obligations, 
then what will you call robbery? (Laughter.

J. V. S T A L I N 266 
Applause.) Is it not obvious that by committing these 
predatory acts Messieurs the ³Allies² have deprived 
themselves of the right to appeal to international law, 
to international obligations? 
It is said, further, that the establishment of ³normal² 
relations is hindered by the propaganda conducted 
by the Russian Bolsheviks. With the object of preventing 
the pernicious effects of propaganda, Messieurs 
the bourgeois every now and again fence themselves 
off with ³cordons² and ³barbed-wire fences² and graciously 
bestow the honour of guarding these ³fences² 
upon Poland, Rumania, Finland and others. It is said 
that Germany is burning with envy because she is not 
being permitted to guard the ³cordons² and ³barbedwire 
fences.² Does it need to be proved that the chatter 
about propaganda is no argument against establishing 
³normal relations,² but a pretext for interventionist 
propaganda? How can people who do not want to appear 
ridiculous ³fence themselves off² from the ideas of 
Bolshevism if in their own country there exists favourable 
soil for these ideas? Tsarism in its time also ³fenced 
itself off² from Bolshevism, but, as is well known, 
the ³fence² proved to be useless. It proved to be useless 
because Bolshevism everywhere does not penetrate 
from outside, but grows within the country. There are 
no countries, one would think, more ³fenced-off² from 
the Russian Bolsheviks than China, India and Indo- 
China. But what do we find? Bolshevism is growing 
in those countries, and will continue to grow, in spite 
of all ³cordons,² because, evidently, there are conditions 
there that are favourable for Bolshevism. What has 
the propaganda of the Russian Bolsheviks to do with it?

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 267 
If Messieurs the capitalists could somehow ³fence themselves 
off² from the economic crisis, from mass poverty, 
from unemployment, from low wages and from the 
exploitation of labour, i t would be another matter; 
then there would be no Bolshevik movement in their 
countries. But the whole point is that every rascal tries 
to justify his weakness or impotence by pleading Russian 
Bolshevik propaganda. 
It is said, further, that another stumbling block 
is our Soviet system, collectivisation, the fight against 
the kulaks, anti-religious propaganda, the fight against 
wreckers and counter-revolutionaries among ³men 
of science,² the banishment of the Besedovskys, Solomons, 
Dmitrievskys, and other lackeys of capital. But 
this is becoming quite amusing. It appears that they 
donıt like the Soviet system. But we donıt like the 
capitalist system. (Laughter. Applause.) We donıt like 
the fact that in their countries tens of millions of unemployed 
are compelled to suffer poverty and starvation, 
while a small group of capitalists own wealth amounting 
to billions. Since, however, we have agreed not 
to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries, 
is it not obvious that it is not worth while reverting 
to this question? Collectivisation, the fight against 
the kulaks, the fight against wreckers, anti-religious 
propaganda, and so forth, are the inalienable right of 
the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R., sealed by our 
Constitution. We must and shall implement the Constitution 
of the U.S.S.R. with complete consistency. 
Naturally, therefore, whoever refuses to reckon with 
our Constitution can pass on, can go wherever he 
pleases. As for the Besedovskys, Solomons, Dmitrievskys

J. V. S T A L I N 268 
and so forth, we shall continue to throw out such people 
like defective goods that are useless and harmful for 
the Revolution. Let them be made heroes of by those 
who have a special predilection for offal. (Laughter.) 
The millstones of our Revolution grind exceedingly 
well. They take all that is useful and give it to the Soviets 
and cast aside the offal. It is said that in France, 
among the Parisian bourgeois, there is a big demand 
for these defective goods. Well, let them import them 
to their heartıs content. True, this will overburden 
somewhat the import side of Franceıs balance of trade, 
against which Messieurs the bourgeois always protest, 
but that is their business. Let us not intervene in the 
internal affairs of France. (Laughter. Applause.) 
That is how the matter stands with the ³obstacles² 
that hinder the establishment of ³normal² relations 
between the U.S.S.R. and other countries. 
It turns out that these ³obstacles² are fictitious 
³obstacles² raised as a pretext for anti-Soviet propaganda. 
Our policy is a policy of peace and of increasing 
trade connections with all countries. A result of this 
policy is an improvement in our relations with a number 
of countries and the conclusion of a number of agreements 
for trade, technical assistance, and so forth. 
Another result is the U.S.S.R.ıs adherence to the Kellogg 
Pact, the signing of the well-known protocol along 
the lines of the Kellogg Pact with Poland, Rumania, 
Lithuania, and other countries, the signing of the protocol 
on the prolongation of the treaty of friendship 
and neutrality with Turkey. And lastly, a result of 
this policy is the fact that we have succeeded in main

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 269 
taining peace, in not allowing our enemies to draw us 
into conflicts, in spite of a number of provocative acts 
and adventurist attacks on the part of the warmongers. 
We shall continue to pursue this policy of peace with 
all our might and with all the means at our disposal. 
We do not want a single foot of foreign territory; but 
of our territory we shall not surrender a single inch 
to anyone. (Applause.) 
Such is our foreign policy. 
The task is to continue this policy with all the perseverance 
characteristic of Bolsheviks. 
II 
THE INCREASING ADVANCE OF SOCIALIST 
CONSTRUCTION AND THE INTERNAL 
SITUATION IN THE U.S.S.R. 
Let us pass to the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. 
In contrast to the capitalist countries, where an 
economic crisis and growing unemployment reign, the 
internal situation in our country presents a picture of 
increasing advance of the national economy and of progressive 
diminution of unemployment. Large-scale industry 
has grown up, and the rate of its development has increased. 
Heavy industry has become firmly established. 
The socialist sector of industry has made great headway. 
A new force has arisen in agriculture‹the state farms 
and collective farms. Whereas a year or two ago we had 
a crisis in grain production, and in our grain-procurement 
operations we depended mainly on individual farming, 
now the centre of gravity has shifted to the collective 
farms and state farms, and the grain crisis can be regarded

J. V. S T A L I N 270 
as having been, in the main, solved. The main mass 
of the peasantry has definitely turned towards the collective 
farms. The resistance of the kulaks has been 
broken. The internal situation in the U.S.S.R. has been 
still further consolidated. 
Such is the general picture of the internal situation 
in the U.S.S.R. at the present time. 
Let us examine the concrete facts. 
1. THE GROWTH OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY 
AS A WHOLE 
a) In 1926-27, i.e., at the time of the Fifteenth Congress 
of the Party, the gross output of agriculture as a 
whole, including forestry, fishing, etc., amounted in 
pre-war rubles to 12,370,000,000 rubles, i.e., 106.6 per 
cent of the pre-war level. In the following year, however, 
i.e., in 1927-28, it was 107.2 per cent, in 1928-29 it was 
109.1 per cent, and this year, 1929-30, judging by the 
course of development of agriculture, it will be not less 
than 113-114 per cent of the pre-war level. 
Thus we have a steady, although relatively slow, increase 
in agricultural production as a whole. 
In 1926-27, i.e., at the time of the Fifteenth Congress 
of the Party, the gross output of industry as a whole, 
both small and large scale, including flour milling, 
amounted in pre-war rubles to 8,641,000,000 rubles, i.e., 
102.5 per cent of the pre-war level. In the following 
year, however, i.e., in 1927-28, it was 122 per cent, in 
1928-29 it was 142.5 per cent, and this year, 1929-30, 
judging by the course of industrial development, it will 
be not less than 180 per cent of the pre-war level.

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 271 
Thus we have an unprecedentedly rapid growth of 
industry as a whole. 
b) In 1926-27, i.e., at the time of the Fifteenth Congress 
of the Party, freight turnover on our entire railway 
system amounted to 81,700,000,000 ton-kilometres, i.e., 
127 per cent of the pre-war level. In the following year, 
however, i.e., in 1927-28, it was 134.2 per cent, in 
1928-29 it was 162.4 per cent, and this year, 1929-30, 
it, by all accounts, will be not less that 193 per cent of 
the pre-war level. As regards new railway construction, 
in the period under review, i.e, counting from 1927-28, 
the railway system has grown from 76,000 kilometres to 
80,000 kilometres, which is 136.7 per cent of the pre-war 
level. 
c) If we take the trade turnover (wholesale and retail) 
in the country in 1926-27 as 100 (31,000,000,000 
rubles), then the volume of trade in 1927-28 shows an 
increase to 124.6 per cent, that in 1928-29 to 160.4 per 
cent, and this year, 1929-30, the volume of trade will, 
by all accounts, reach 202 per cent, i.e., double that of 
1926-27. 
d) If we take the combined balances of all our credit 
institutions on October 1, 1927 as 100 (9,173,000,000 
rubles), then on October 1, 1928, there was an increase 
to 141 per cent, and on October 1, 1929, an increase to 
201.1 per cent, i.e., an amount double that of 1927. 
e) If the combined state budget for 1926-27 is taken 
as 100 (6,371,000,000 rubles) that for 1927-28 shows an 
increase to 125.5 per cent, that for 1928-29 an increase 
to 146.7 per cent, and that for 1929-30 to 204.4 per 
cent, i.e., double the budget for 1926-27 (12,605,000,000 
rubles).

J. V. S T A L I N 272 
f) In 1926-27, our foreign trade turnover (exports and 
imports) was 47.9 per cent of the pre-war level. In 1927-28, 
however, our foreign trade turnover rose to 56.8 per 
cent, in 1928-29 to 67.9 per cent, and in 1929-30 it, by 
all accounts, will be not less than 80 per cent of the prewar 
level. 
g) As a result, we have the following picture of the 
growth of the total national income during the period 
under review (in 1926-27 prices): in 1926-27, the national 
income, according to the data of the State Planning 
Commission, amounted to 23,127,000,000 rubles; in 
1927-28 it amounted to 25,396,000,000 rubles‹an increase 
of 9.8 per cent; in 1928-29 i t amounted to 
28,596,000,000 rubles‹an increase of 12.6 per cent; in 
1929-30 the national income ought, by all accounts, to 
amount to not less than 34,000,000,000 rubles, thus 
showing an increase for the year of 20 per cent. The 
average annual increase during the three years under 
review is, therefore, over 15 per cent. 
Bearing in mind that the average annual increase in 
the national income in countries like the United States, 
Britain and Germany amounts to no more than 3-8 per 
cent, it must be admitted that the rate of increase of the 
national income of the U.S.S.R. is truly a record one. 
2. SUCCESSES IN INDUSTRIALISATION 
Our national economy is growing not spontaneously, 
but in a definite direction, namely, in the direction 
of industrialisation; its keynote is: industrialisation, 
growth of the relative importance of industry in the 
general system of the national economy, transforma

FROM MARX 
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DISTRIBUTION 
273 
tion of our country from an agrarian into an industrial 
country. 
a) The dynamics of the relation between industry as 
a whole and agriculture as a whole from the point of view 
of the relative importance of industry in the gross output 
of the entire national economy during the period 
under review takes the following form: in pre-war times, 
industryıs share of the gross output of the national economy 
was 42.1 per cent and that of agriculture 57.9 per cent; 
in 1927-28 industryıs share was 45.2 per cent and that 
of agriculture 54.8 per cent; in 1928-29, industryıs share 
was 48.7 per cent and that of agriculture 51.3 per cent; 
in 1929-30 industryıs share ought to, by all accounts, be 
not less than 53 per cent and that of agriculture not more 
than 47 per cent. 
This means that the relative importance of industry 
is already beginning to surpass the relative importance 
of agriculture in the general system of national economy, 
and that we are on the eve of the transformation of our 
country from an agrarian into an industrial country. 
(Applause.) 
b) There is a still more marked preponderance in 
favour of industry when regarded from the viewpoint of 
its relative importance in the commodity output of the national 
economy. In 1926-27, industryıs share of the total 
commodity output of the national economy was 68.8 per 
cent and that of agriculture 31.2 per cent. In 1927-28, 
however, industryıs share was 71.2 per cent and that of 
agriculture 28.8 per cent; in 1928-29 industryıs share 
was 72.4 per cent and that of agriculture 27.6 per cent, 
and in 1929-30, industryıs share will, by all accounts, 
be 76 per cent and that of agriculture 24 per cent. 
POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.)

J. V. S T A L I N 274 
This particularly unfavourable position of agriculture 
is due, among other things, to its character as smallpeasant 
and small-commodity agriculture. Naturally, 
this situation should change to a certain extent as largescale 
agriculture develops through the state farms and 
collective farms and produces more for the market. 
c) The development of industry in general, however, 
does not give a complete picture of the rate of industrialisation. 
To obtain a complete picture we must also ascertain 
the dynamics of the relation between heavy industry 
and light industry. Hence, the most striking index 
of the growth of industrialisation must be considered to 
be the progressive growth of the relative importance 
of the output of instruments and means of production 
(heavy industry) in the total industrial output. In 1927-28, 
the share of output of instruments and means of production 
in the total output of all industry amounted to 
27.2 per cent while that of the output of consumer 
goods was 72.8 per cent. In 1928-29, however, the share 
of the output of instruments and means of production 
amounted to 28.7 per cent as against 71.3 per cent, and 
in 1929-30, the share of the output of instruments and 
means of production, will, by all accounts, already 
amount to 32.7 per cent as against 67.3 per cent. 
If, however, we take not all industry, but only that 
part which is planned by the Supreme Council of National 
Economy, and which embraces all the main branches 
of industry, the relation between the output of instruments 
and means of production and the output of consumer 
goods will present a still more favourable picture, 
namely: in 1927-28, the share of the output of instruments 
and means of production amounted to 42.7 per

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 275 
cent as against 57.3 per cent; in 1928-29‹44.6 per cent 
as against 55.4 per cent, and in 1929-30, it will, by all 
accounts, amount to not less than 48 per cent as against 
52 per cent for the output of consumer goods. 
The keynote of the development of our national economy 
is industrialisation, the strengthening and development 
of our own heavy industry. 
This means that we have already established and are 
further developing our heavy industry, the basis of our 
economic independence 
3. THE KEY POSITION OF SOCIALIST 
INDUSTRY AND ITS RATE OF GROWTH 
The keynote of the development of our national economy 
is industrialisation. But we do not need just any 
kind of industrialisation. We need the kind of industrialisation 
that will ensure the growing preponderance of 
the socialist forms of industry over the small-commodity 
and, still more, over the capitalist forms of industry. 
The characteristic feature of our industrialisation is that 
it is socialist industrialisation, an industrialisation which 
guarantees the victory of the socialised sector of industry 
over the private sector, over the small-commodity and 
capitalist sector. 
Here are some data on the growth of capital investments 
and of gross output according to sectors: 
a) Taking the growth of capital investments i n in - 
dustry according to sectors, we get the following picture. 
Socialised sector: in 1926-27‹1,270,000,000 rubles; in 
1927-28‹1,614,000,000 rubles; in 1928-29‹2,046,000,000 
rubles; in 1929-30‹4,275,000,000 rubles. Private and

J. V. S T A L I N 276 
capitalist sector: in 1926-27‹63,000,000 rubles; in 
1927-28‹64,000,000 rubles; in 1928-29‹56,000,000 rubles; 
in 1929-30‹51,000,000 rubles. 
This means, firstly, that during this period capital 
investments in the socialised sector of industry have more 
than trebled (335 per cent). 
It means, secondly, that during this period capital 
investments in the private and capitalist sector have been 
reduced by one-fifth (81 per cent). 
The private and capitalist sector is living on its old 
capital and is moving towards its doom. 
b) Taking the growth of gross output of industry according 
to sectors we get the following picture. Socialised 
sector: in 1926-27‹11,999,000,000 rubles; in 1927-28‹ 
15,389,000,000 rubles, in 1928-29‹18,903,000,000 rubles; 
in 1929-30‹24,740,000,000 rubles. Private and capitalist 
sector: in 1926-27‹4,043,000,000 rubles; in 1927-28‹ 
3,704,000,000 rubles; in 1928-29‹3,389,000,000 rubles; 
in 1929-30‹3,310,000,000 rubles. 
This means, firstly, that during the three years, 
the gross output of the socialised sector of industry more 
than doubled (206.2 per cent). 
It means, secondly, that in the same period the gross 
industrial output of the private and capitalist sector was 
reduced by nearly one-fifth (81.9 per cent). 
If, however, we take the output not of all industry, 
but only of large-scale (statistically registered) industry 
and examine it according to sectors, we get the following 
picture of the relation between the socialised and private 
sectors. Relative importance of the socialised sector in 
the output of the countryıs large-scale industry: 1926-27 
97.7 per cent; 1927-28‹98.6 per cent; 1928-29‹99.1

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 277 
per cent; 1929-30‹99.3 per cent. Relative importance 
of the private sector in the output of the countryıs largescale 
industry: 1926-27‹2.3 per cent; 1927-28‹1.4 per 
cent; 1928-29‹0.9 per cent; 1929-30‹0.7 per cent. 
As you see, the capitalist elements in large-scale 
industry have already gone to the bottom. 
Clearly, the question ³who will beat whom,² the 
question whether socialism will defeat the capitalist elements 
in industry, or whether the latter will defeat socialism, 
has already been settled in favour of the socialist 
forms of industry. Settled finally and irrevocably. 
(Applause.) 
c) Particularly interesting are the data on the rate of 
development during the period under review of state industry 
that is planned by the Supreme Council of National Economy. 
If the 1926-27 gross output of socialist industry 
planned by the Supreme Council of National Economy 
is taken as 100, the 1927-28 gross output of that industry 
shows a rise to 127.4 per cent, that of 1928-29 to 158.6 
per cent and that of 1929-30 will show a rise to 209.8 per 
cent. 
This means that socialist industry planned by the 
Supreme Council of National Economy, comprising all 
the main branches of industry and the whole of heavy 
industry, has more than doubled during the three years. 
It cannot but be admitted that no other country in 
the world can show such a terrific rate of development 
of its large-scale industry. 
This circumstance gives us grounds for speaking of the 
five-year plan in four years. 
d) Some comrades are sceptical about the slogan 
³the five-year plan in four years.² Only very recently one

J. V. S T A L I N 278 
section of comrades regarded our five-year plan, which 
was endorsed by the Fifth Congress of Soviets,44 as fantastic; 
not to mention the bourgeois writers whose eyes 
pop out of their heads at the very words ³five-year plan.² 
But what is the actual situation if we consider the fulfilment 
of the five-year plan during the first two years? What 
does checking the fulfilment of the optimal variant of 
the five-year plan tell us? It tells us not only that we 
can carry out the five-year plan in four years, it also 
tells us that in a number of branches of industry we can 
carry it out in three and even in two-and-a-half years. 
This may sound incredible to the sceptics in the opportunist 
camp, but it is a fact which it would be foolish 
and ridiculous to deny. 
Judge for yourselves. 
According to the five-year plan, the output of the 
oil industry in 1932-33 was to amount to 977,000,000 
rubles. Actually, its output already in 1929-30 amounts 
to 809,000,000 rubles, i.e., 83 per cent of the amount 
fixed in the five-year plan for 1932-33. Thus, we are fulfilling 
the five-year plan for the oil industry in a matter 
of two-and-a-half years. 
The output of the peat industry in 1932-33, according 
to the five-year plan, was to amount to 122,000,000 
rubles. Actually, in 1929-30 already its output amounts 
to over 115,000,000 rubles, i.e., 96 per cent of the output 
fixed in the five-year plan for 1932-33. Thus, we 
are fulfilling the five-year plan for the peat industry in 
two-and-a-half years, if not sooner. 
According to the five-year plan, the output of the 
general machine-building industry in 1932-33 was to amount 
to 2,058,000,000 rubles. Actually, in 1929-30 already

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 279 
its output amounts to 1,458,000,000 rubles, i.e., 70 per 
cent of the output fixed in the five-year plan for 1932-33. 
Thus, we are fulfilling the five-year plan for the general 
machine-building industry in two-and-a-half to three 
years. 
According to the five-year plan, the output of the 
agricultural machine-building industry in 1932-33 was 
to amount to 610,000,000 rubles. Actually, in 1929-30 
already its output amounts to 400,000,000 rubles, i.e., 
over 60 per cent of the amount fixed in the five-year plan 
for 1932-33. Thus, we are fulfilling the five-year plan for 
the agricultural machine-building industry in three years, 
if not sooner. 
According to the five-year plan, the output of the 
electro-technical industry in 1932-33 was to amount to 
896,000,000 rubles. Actually, in 1929-30 already it amounts 
to 503,000,000 rubles, i.e., over 56 per cent of the 
amount fixed in the five-year plan for 1932-33. Thus, we 
are fulfilling the five-year plan for the electro-technical 
industry in three years. 
Such are the unprecedented rates of development of 
our socialist industries. 
We are going forward at an accelerated pace, technically 
and economically overtaking the advanced capitalist 
countries. 
e) This does not mean, of course, that we have already 
overtaken them as regards size of output, 
that our industry has already reached the level of the 
development of industry in the advanced capitalist countries. 
No, this is far from being the case. The rate 
of industrial development must not be confused with 
the level of industrial development. Many people in our

J. V. S T A L I N 280 
country confuse the two and believe that since we have 
achieved an unprecedented rate of industrial development 
we have thereby reached the level of industrial development 
of the advanced capitalist countries. But that is 
radically wrong. 
Take, for example, the production of electricity, 
in regard to which our rate of development is very high. 
From 1924 to 1929 we achieved an increase in the output 
of electricity to nearly 600 per cent of the 1924 figure, 
whereas in the same period the output of electricity in 
the United States increased only to 181 per cent, in 
Canada to 218 per cent, in Germany to 241 per cent and 
in Italy to 222 per cent. As you see, our rate is truly unprecedented 
and exceeds that of all other states. But 
if we take the level of development of electricity production 
in those countries, in 1929, for example, and compare 
it with the level of development in the U.S.S.R., we 
shall get a picture that is far from comforting for the 
U.S.S.R. Notwithstanding the unprecedented rate of 
development of electricity production in the U.S.S.R., 
in 1929 output amounted to only 6,465,000,000 kilowatthours, 
whereas that of the United States amounted to 
126,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours, Canada 17,628,000,000 
kilowatt-hours, Germany 33,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours, 
and Italy 10,850,000,000 kilowatt-hours. 
The difference, as you see, is colossal. 
It follows, then, that as regards level of development 
we are behind all these states. 
Or take, for example, our output of pig-iron. If our 
output of pig-iron for 1926-27 is taken as 100 (2,900,000 
tons), the output for the three years from 1927-28 to 
1929-30 shows an increase to almost double, to 190 per

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 281 
cent (5,500,000 tons). The rate of development, as you 
see, is fairly high. But if we look at it from the point 
of view of the level of development of pig-iron production 
in our country and compare the size of the output in the 
U.S.S.R. with that in the advanced capitalist countries, 
the result is not very comforting. To begin with, we are 
reaching and shall exceed the pre-war level of pig-iron 
production only this year, 1929-30. This alone drives 
us to the inexorable conclusion that unless we still further 
accelerate the development of our metallurgical 
industry we run the risk of jeopardising our entire industrial 
production. As regards the level of development 
of the pig-iron industry in our country and in the West, 
we have the following picture: the output of pig-iron 
in 1929 in the United States amounted to 42,300,000 
tons; in Germany‹13,400,000 tons; in France‹10,450,000 
tons; in Great Britain‹7,700,000 tons; but in the 
U.S.S.R. the output of pig-iron at the end of 1929-30 
will amount to only 5,500,000 tons. 
No small difference, as you see. 
It follows, therefore, that as regards level of development 
of pig-iron production we are behind all these 
countries. 
What does all this show? 
It shows that: 
1) the rate of development of industry must not be 
confused with its level of development; 
2) we are damnably behind the advanced capitalist 
countries as regards level of development of industry; 
3) only the further acceleration of the development 
of our industry will enable us to overtake and outstrip

J. V. S T A L I N 282 
the advanced capitalist countries technically and economically; 
4) people who talk about the necessity of reducing the 
rate of development of our industry are enemies of socialism, 
agents of our class enemies. (Applause.) 
4. AGRICULTURE AND THE GRAIN PROBLEM 
Above I spoke about the state of agriculture as a 
whole, including forestry, fishing, etc., without dividing 
agriculture into its main branches. If we separate 
agriculture as a whole into its main branches, such as, 
for example, grain production, livestock farming and the 
production of industrial crops, the situation, according 
to the data of the State Planning Commission and the 
Peopleıs Commissariat of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R. is 
seen to be as follows: 
a) If the grain crop area in 1913 is taken as 100, we 
get the following picture of the change of the grain crop 
area from year to year: 1926-27‹96.9 per cent; 1927-28‹ 
94.7 per cent; 1928-29‹98.2 per cent; and this year, 
1929-30, the crop area will, by all accounts, be 105.1 per 
cent of the pre-war level. 
Noticeable is the drop in the grain crop area in 
1927-28. This drop is to be explained not by a retrogression 
of grain farming such as the ignoramuses in the Right opportunist 
camp have been chattering about, but by the failure 
of the winter crop on an area of 7,700,000 hectares 
(20 per cent of the winter crop area in the U.S.S.R.). 
If, further, the gross output of grain in 1913 is taken 
as 100, we get the following picture: 1927‹91.9 per cent; 
1928‹90.8 per cent; 1929‹94.4 per cent, and in 1930

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 283 
we shall, by all accounts, reach 110 per cent of the prewar 
standard. 
Noticeable here, too, is the drop in the gross output 
of grain in 1928 due to the failure of the winter crop 
in the Ukraine and the North Caucasus. 
As regards the marketable part of the gross output 
of grain (grain sold outside the rural districts), we have 
a still more instructive picture. If the marketable part 
of the grain output of 1913 is taken as 100, then the marketable 
output in 1927 is found to be 37 per cent; in 
1928‹36.8 per cent, in 1929‹58 per cent, and this year, 
1930, it will, by all accounts, amount to not less than 
73 per cent of the pre-war level. 
Thus, it follows that, as regards grain crop area and 
gross grain output, we are reaching the pre-war level and 
slightly exceeding it only this year, 1930. 
It follows, further, that, as regards the marketable 
part of the grain output, we are still far from having 
reached the pre-war standard and shall remain below it 
this year too by about 25 per cent. 
That is the basis of our grain difficulties, which 
became particularly acute in 1928. 
That, too, is the basis of the grain problem. 
b) The picture is approximately the same, but with 
more alarming figures, in the sphere of livestock 
farming. 
If the number of head of livestock of all kinds in 
1916 is taken as 100, we get the following picture for 
the respective years. In 1927 the number of horses amounted 
to 88.9 per cent of the pre-war level; large horned 
cattle‹114.3 per cent; sheep and goats‹119.3 per cent; 
pigs‹111.3 per cent. In 1928, horses‹94.6 per cent;

J. V. S T A L I N 284 
large horned cattle‹118.5 per cent; sheep and goats‹ 
126 per cent; pigs‹126.1 per cent. In 1929, horses‹ 
96.9 per cent; large horned cattle‹115.6 per cent; sheep 
and goats‹127.8 per cent; pigs‹103 per cent. In 1930, 
horses‹88.6 per cent; large horned cattle‹89.1 per cent; 
sheep and goats‹87.1 per cent; pigs‹60.1 per cent of 
the 1916 standard. 
As you see, if we take the figures for the last year 
into consideration, we have obvious signs of the beginning 
of a decline in livestock farming. 
The picture is still less comforting from the standpoint 
of the marketable output of livestock farming, particularly 
as regards meat and pork fat. If we take the 
gross output of meat and pork fat for each year as 100 
the marketable output of these two items will be: in 
1926‹33.4 per cent; in 1927‹32.9 per cent; in 1928‹30.4 
per cent; in 1929‹29.2 per cent. 
Thus, we have obvious signs of the instability and 
economic unreliability of small livestock farming which 
produces little for the market. 
It follows that instead of exceeding the 1916 standard 
in livestock farming we have in the past year obvious 
signs of a drop below this standard. 
Thus, after the grain problem, which we are already 
solving in the main successfully, we are faced with the 
meat problem, the acuteness of which is already making 
itself felt, and which is still awaiting solution. 
c) A different picture is revealed by the development 
of industrial crops, which provide the raw materials for 
our light industry. If the industrial crop area in 1913 
is taken as 100, we have the following: cotton, in 1927 
‹107.1 per cent; in 1928‹131.4 per cent; in 1929‹151.4

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 285 
per cent; in 1930‹217 per cent of the pre-war level. 
Flax, in 1927‹86.6 per cent; in 1928‹95.7 per cent; 
in 1929‹112.9 per cent; in 1930‹125 per cent of the 
pre-war level. Sugar-beet, in 1927‹106.6 per cent; in 
1928‹124.2 per cent; in 1929‹125.8 per cent; in 1930 
‹169 per cent of the pre-war level. Oil crops, in 1927 
‹179.4 per cent; in 1928‹230.9 per cent; in 1929‹ 
219.7 per cent; in 1930‹no less than 260 per cent of 
the pre-war level. 
The same, in the main, favourable picture is presented 
by the gross output of industrial crops. If the 
gross output in 1913 is taken as 100, we get the following: 
cotton, in 1928‹110.5 per cent; in 1929‹119 per 
cent; in 1930 we shall have, by all accounts, 182.8 per 
cent of the pre-war level. Flax, in 1928‹71.6 per cent; 
in 1929‹81.5 per cent; in 1930 we shall have, by all 
accounts, 101.3 per cent of the pre-war level. Sugarbeet, 
in 1928‹93 per cent; in 1929‹58 per cent, in 1930 
we shall have, by a l l accounts, 139:4 per cent of 
the pre-war level. Oil crops, in 1928‹161.9 per cent; 
in 1929‹149.8 per cent; in 1930 we shall have, by all 
accounts, 220 per cent of the pre-war level. 
As regards industrial crops, we thus have a more 
favourable picture, if we leave out of account the 1929 
beet crop, which was damaged by moths. 
Incidentally, here too, in the sphere of industrial 
crops, serious fluctuations and signs of instability are 
possible and probable in the future in view of the predominance 
of small farming, similar to the fluctuations 
and signs of instability that are demonstrated by the 
figures for flax and oil crops, which come least under 
the influence of the collective farms and state farms.

J. V. S T A L I N 286
We are thus faced with the following problems in 
agriculture: 
1) the problem of strengthening the position of industrial 
crops by supplying the districts concerned with 
sufficient quantities of cheap grain produce; 
2) the problem of raising the level of livestock farming 
and of solving the meat question by supplying the 
districts concerned with sufficient quantities of cheap 
grain produce and fodder; 
3) the problem of finally solving the question of 
grain farming as the chief question in agriculture at the 
present moment. 
It follows that the grain problem is the main link 
in the system of agriculture and the key to the solution 
of all the other problems in agriculture. 
It follows that the solution of the grain problem 
is the first in order of a number of problems in agriculture. 
But solving the grain problem, and so putting agriculture 
on the road to really big progress, means completely 
doing away with the backwardness of agriculture; 
it means equipping it with tractors and agricultural machines, 
supplying it with new cadres of scientific workers, 
raising the productivity of labour, and increasing 
the output for the market. Unless these conditions are 
fulfilled, it is impossible even to dream of solving the 
grain problem. 
Is it possible to fulfil all these conditions on the 
basis of small, individual peasant farming? No, it is impossible. 
It is impossible because small-peasant farming 
is unable to accept and master new technical equipment, 
it is unable to raise productivity of labour to a suf

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 287 
ficient degree, it is unable to increase the marketable 
output of agriculture to a sufficient degree. There is only 
one way to do this, namely, by developing large-scale 
agriculture, by establishing large farms with modern technical 
equipment. 
The Soviet country cannot, however, take the line 
of organising large capitalist farms. It can and must 
take only the line of organising large farms of a socialist 
type, equipped with modern machines. Our state 
farms and collective farms are precisely farms of this type. 
Hence the task of establishing state farms and uniting 
the small, individual peasant farms into large collective 
farms, as being the only way to solve the problem 
of agriculture in general, and the grain problem in particular. 
That is the line the Party took in its everyday practical 
work after the Fifteenth Congress, especially after the 
serious grain difficulties that arose in the beginning 
of 1928. 
It should be noted that our Party raised this fundamental 
problem as a practical task already at the Fifteenth 
Congress, when we were not yet experiencing 
serious grain difficulties. In the resolution of the Fifteenth 
Congress on ³Work in the Countryside² it is 
plainly said: 
³In the present period, the task of uniting and transforming 
the small, individual peasant farms into large collective farms 
must be made the Partyıs principal task in the countryside.²45 
Perhaps it will not be superfluous also to quote the 
relevant passage from the Central Committeeıs report 
to the Fifteenth Congress in which the problem of doing

J. V. S T A L I N 288 
away with the backwardness of agriculture on the basis 
of collectivisation was just as sharply and definitely 
raised. Here is what was stated there: 
³What is the way out? The way out is to turn the small and 
scattered peasant farms into large united farms based on cultivation 
of the land in common, to go over to collective cultivation 
of the land on the basis of a new and higher technique. 
³The way out is to unite the small and dwarf peasant farms 
gradually but surely, not by pressure, but by example and persuasion, 
into large farms based on common, co-operative, collective 
cultivation of the land with the use of agricultural machines 
and tractors and scientific methods of intensive agriculture. 
³There is no other way out.²46 
5. THE TURN OF THE PEASANTRY TOWARDS SOCIALISM 
AND THE RATE OF DEVELOPMENT OF STATE FARMS 
AND COLLECTIVE FARMS 
The turn of the peasantry towards collectivisation 
did not begin all at once. Moreover, it could not begin 
all at once. True, the Party proclaimed the slogan of 
collectivisation already at the Fifteenth Congress; but 
the proclamation of a slogan is not enough to cause the 
peasantry to turn en masse towards socialism. At least 
one more circumstance is needed for this, namely, that 
the masses of the peasantry themselves should be convinced 
that the slogan proclaimed is a correct one and 
that they should accept it as their own. Therefore, this 
turn was prepared gradually. 
It was prepared by the whole course of our development, 
by the whole course of development of our industry, 
and above all by the development of the industry that 
supplies machines and tractors for agriculture. It was 
prepared by the policy of resolutely fighting the kulaks

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 289 
and by the course of our grain procurements in the new 
forms that they assumed in 1928 and 1929, which placed 
kulak farming under the control of the poor- and middlepeasant 
masses. It was prepared by the development of 
the agricultural co-operatives, which train the individualist 
peasant in collective methods. It was prepared by the 
network of collective farms, in which the peasantry verified 
the advantages of collective forms of farming over 
individual farming. Lastly, it was prepared by the network 
of state farms, spread over the whole of the U.S.S.R. 
and equipped with modern machines, which enabled 
the peasants to convince themselves of the potency and 
superiority of modern machines. 
It would be a mistake to regard our state farms only 
as sources of grain supplies. Actually, the state farms, 
with their modern machines, with the assistance they 
render the peasants in their vicinity, and the unprecedented 
scope of their farming were the leading force that 
facilitated the turn of the peasant masses and brought 
them on to the path of collectivisation. 
There you have the basis on which arose that mass 
collective-farm movement of millions of poor and middle 
peasants which began in the latter half of 1929, and 
which ushered in a period of great change in the life of 
our country. 
What measures did the Central Committee take so as 
to meet this movement fully equipped and to lead it? 
The measures taken by the Central Committee were 
along three lines: the line of organising and financing 
state farms; the line of organising and financing collective 
farms; and lastly, the line of organising the manufacture 
of tractors and agricultural machinery and of

J. V. S T A L I N 290 
supplying the countryside with them through machine 
and tractor stations, through tractor columns, and so 
forth. 
a) As early as 1928, the Political Bureau of the Central 
Committee adopted a decision to organise new state 
farms in the course of three or four years, calculating 
that by the end of this period these state farms could 
provide not less than 100,000,000 poods of marketable 
grain. Later, this decision was endorsed by a plenum of 
the Central Committee. The Grain Trust was organised 
and entrusted with the task of carrying out this decision. 
Parallel with this, a decision was adopted to strengthen 
the old state farms and to enlarge their crop area. The 
State Farm Centre was organised and entrusted with the 
task of carrying out this decision. 
I cannot help mentioning that these decisions met 
with a hostile reception from the opportunist section of 
our Party. There was talk about the money invested in 
the state farms being money ³thrown away.² There was 
also criticism from men of ³science,² supported by the 
opportunist elements in the Party, to the effect that it 
was impossible and senseless to organise large state 
farms. The Central Committee, however, continued to 
pursue its line and pursued it to the end in spite of everything. 
In 1927-28, the sum of 65,700,000 rubles (not counting 
short-term credits for working capital) was assigned for 
financing the state farms. In 1928-29, the sum of 185,800,000 
rubles was assigned. Lastly, this year 856,200,000 rubles 
have been assigned. During the period under review, 
18,000 tractors with a total of 350,000 h.p. were placed at 
the disposal of the state farms.

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 291 
What are the results of these measures? 
In 1928-29, the crop area of the Grain Trust amounted 
to 150,000 hectares, in 1929-30 to 1,060,000 hectares, in 
1930-31 it will amount to 4,500,000 hectares, in 1931-32 
to 9,000,000 hectares, and in 1932-33, i.e., towards the 
end of the five-year plan period, to 14,000,000 hectares. 
In 1928-29 the crop area of the State Farm Centre amounted 
to 430,000 hectares, in 1929-30 to 860,000 hectares, 
in 1930-31 it will amount to 1,800,000 hectares, in 
1931-32 to 2,000,000 hectares, and in 1932-33 to 2,500,000 
hectares. In 1928-29, the crop area of the Association of 
Ukrainian State Farms amounted to 170,000 hectares, in 
1929-30 to 280,000 hectares, in 1930-31 it will amount to 
500,000 hectares and in 1932-33 to 720,000 hectares. In 
1928-29, the crop area of the Sugar Union (grain crop) 
amounted to 780,000 hectares, in 1929-30 to 820,000 hectares, 
in 1930-31 it will amount to 860,000 hectares, in 
1931-32 to 980,000 hectares, and in 1932-33 to 990,000 
hectares. 
This means, firstly, that at the end of the five-year 
plan period the grain crop area of the Grain Trust alone 
will be as large as that of the whole of the Argentine 
today. (Applause.) 
It means, secondly, that at the end of the five-year 
plan period, the grain crop area of all the state farms 
together will be 1,000,000 hectares larger than that of 
the whole of Canada today. (Applause.) 
As regards the gross and marketable grain output of 
the state farms, we have the following picture of the 
change year by year: in 1927-28, the gross output of all 
the state farms amounted to 9,500,000 centners, of which 
marketable grain amounted to 6,400,000 centners; in

J. V. S T A L I N 292 
1928-29‹12,800,000 centners, of which marketable grain 
amounted to 7,900,000 centners; in 1929-30, we shall 
have, according to all accounts, 28,200,000 centners, 
of which marketable grain will amount to 18,000,000 
centners (108,000,000 poods); in 1930-31 we shall have 
71,700,000 centners, of which marketable grain will 
amount to 61,000,000 centners (370,000,000 poods), and 
so on and so forth. 
Such are the existing and anticipated results of our 
Partyıs state-farm policy. 
According to the decision of the Political Bureau of 
the Central Committee of April 1928 on the organisation 
of new state farms, we ought to receive from the new state 
farms not less than 100,000,000 poods of marketable 
grain in 1931-32. Actually, it turns out that in 1931-32 we 
shall already have from the new state farms alone more 
than 200,000,000 poods. That means the programme will 
have been fulfilled twice over. 
It follows that the people who ridiculed the decision 
of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee 
fiercely ridiculed themselves. 
According to the five-year plan endorsed by the 
Congress of Soviets, by the end of the five-year plan 
period the state farms controlled by all organisations 
were to have a total crop area of 5,000,000 hectares. Actually, 
this year the crop area of the state farms already 
amounts to 3,800,000 hectares, and next year, i.e., in the 
third year of the five-year period, their crop area will 
amount to 8,000,000 hectares. 
This means that we shall fulfil and overfulfil the 
five-year programme of state-farm development in three 
years.

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 293 
According to the five-year plan, by the end of the 
five-year period the gross grain output of the state farms 
was to amount to 54,300,000 centners. Actually, this year 
the gross grain output of the state farms already amounts 
to 28,200,000 centners, and next year it will amount to 
71,700,000 centners. 
This means that as regards gross grain output we 
shall fulfil and overfulfil the five-year plan in three 
years. 
The five-year plan in three years! 
Let the bourgeois scribes and their opportunist 
echoers chatter now about it being impossible to fulfil and 
overfulfil the five-year plan of state-farm development in 
three years. 
b) As regards collective-farm development, we have an 
even more favourable picture. 
As early as July 1928, a plenum of the Central Committee 
adopted the following decision on collective-farm 
development: 
³Undeviatingly to carry out the task set by the Fifteenth 
Congress Œto unite and transform the small, individual peasant 
farms into large collective farms,ı as voluntary associations organised 
on the basis of modern technology and representing a higher form 
of grain farming both as regards the socialist transformation 
of agriculture and as regards ensuring a radical increase in its 
productivity and marketable output² (see resolution of the 
July plenum of the Central committee on ³Grain-Procurement 
Policy in Connection With the General Economic Situation,² 
1928).47 
Later, this decision was endorsed in the resolutions 
of the Sixteenth Conference of the Party and in the special 
resolution of the November plenum of the Central

J. V. S T A L I N 294 
Committee, 1929, on the collective-farm movement.48 
In the latter half of 1929, when the radical turn of the 
peasants towards the collective farms had become evident 
and when the mass of the middle peasants were 
joining the collective farms, the Political Bureau of the 
Central Committee adopted the special decision of January 
5, 1930 on ³The Rate of Collectivisation and State 
Measures to Assist Collective-Farm Development.² 
In this resolution, the Central Committee: 
1) placed on record the existence of a mass turn of 
the peasantry towards the collective farms and the possibility 
of overfulfilling the five-year plan of collectivefarm 
development in the spring of 1930; 
2) placed on record the existence of the material and 
other conditions necessary for replacing kulak production 
by collective-farm production and, in view of this, proclaimed 
the necessity of passing from the policy of restricting 
the kulaks to the policy of eliminating the 
kulaks as a class; 
3) laid down the prospect that already in the spring 
of 1930 the crop area cultivated on a socialised basis 
would considerably exceed 30,000,000 hectares; 
4) divided the U.S.S.R. into three groups of districts 
and fixed for each of them approximate dates for the 
completion, in the main, of collectivisation; 
5) revised the land settlement method in favour of the 
collective farms and the forms of financing agriculture, 
assigning for the collective farms in 1929-30 credits 
amounting to not less than 500,000,000 rubles; 
6) defined the artel form of the collective-farm movement 
as the main link in the collective-farm system at the 
present time;

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 295 
7) rebuffed the opportunist elements in the Party who 
were trying to retard the collective-farm movement on 
the plea of a shortage of machines and tractors; 
8) lastly, warned Party workers against possible 
excesses in the collective-farm movement, and against the 
danger of decreeing collective-farm development from 
above, a danger that would involve the threat of playing at 
collectivisation taking the place of a genuine and mass 
collective-farm movement. 
It must be observed that this decision of the Central 
Committee met with a more than unfriendly reception 
from the opportunist elements in our Party. There was 
talk and whispering about the Central Committee indulging 
in fantasies, about it ³squandering² the peopleıs 
money on ³non-existent² collective farms. The Rightwing 
elements rubbed their hands in gleeful anticipation 
of ³certain² failure. The Central Committee, however, 
steadfastly pursued its line and pursued it to the end in 
spite of everything, in spite of the philistine sniggering 
of the Rights, and in spite of the excesses and dizziness 
of the ³Lefts.² 
In 1927-28, the sum of 76,000,000 rubles was assigned 
for financing the collective farms, in 1928-29‹170,000,000 
rubles, and, lastly, this year 473,000,000 rubles have 
been assigned. In addition, 65,000,000 rubles have been 
assigned for the collectivisation fund. Privileges have 
been accorded the collective farms which have increased 
their financial resources by 200,000,000 rubles. 
The collective farms have been supplied with confiscated 
kulak farm property to the value of over 400,000,000 
rubles. There has been supplied for use on collectivefarm 
fields not less than 30,000 tractors of a total of

J. V. S T A L I N 296 
400,000 h.p., not counting the 7,000 tractors of the 
Tractor Centre which serve the collective farms and the 
assistance in the way of tractors rendered the collective 
farms by the state farms. This year the collective farms 
have been granted seed loans and seed assistance amounting 
to 10,000,000 centners of grain (61,000,000 poods). 
Lastly, direct organisational assistance has been rendered 
the collective farms in the setting up of machine 
and horse stations to a number exceeding 7,000, in which 
the total number of horses available for use is not less 
than 1,300,000. 
What are the results of these measures? 
The crop area of the collective farms in 1927 amounted 
to 800,000 hectares, in 1928‹1,400,000 hectares, 
in 1929‹4,300,000 hectares, in 1930‹not less than 
36,000,000 hectares, counting both spring and winter 
crops. 
This means, firstly, that in three years the crop 
area of the collective farms has grown more than fortyfold. 
(Applause.) 
It means, secondly, that our collective farms now 
have a crop area as large as that of France and Italy put 
together. (Applause.) 
As regards gross grain output and the part available 
for the market, we have the following picture. In 1927 
we had from the collective farms 4,900,000 centners, of 
which marketable grain amounted to 2,000,000 centners; 
in 1928‹8,400,000 centners, of which 3,600,000 centners 
was marketable grain; in 1929‹29,100,000 centners, of 
which 12,700,000 centners was marketable grain; in 1930 
we shall have, according to all accounts, 256,000,000 centners 
(1,550,000,000 poods), of which marketable grain

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 297 
will amount to not less than 82,000,000 centners (over 
500,000,000 poods). 
It must be admitted that not a single branch of our 
industry, which, in general, is developing at quite a 
rapid rate, has shown such an unprecedented rate of progress 
as our collective-farm development. 
What do all these figures show? 
They show, first of all, that during three years the 
gross grain output of the collective farms has increased 
more than fifty-fold, and its marketable part more than 
forty-fold. 
They show, secondly, that the possibility exists 
of our receiving from the collective farms this year more 
than half of the total marketable grain output of the 
country. 
They show, thirdly, that henceforth, the fate of our 
agriculture and of its main problems will be determined 
not by the individual peasant farms, but by the collective 
farms and state farms. 
They show, fourthly, that the process of eliminating 
the kulaks as a class in our country is going full 
steam ahead. 
They show, lastly, that such economic changes have 
already taken place in the country as give us full grounds 
for asserting that we have succeeded in turning the countryside 
to the new path, to the path of collectivisation, 
thereby ensuring the successful building of socialism 
not only in the towns, but also in the countryside. 
In its decision of January 5, 1930, the Political 
Bureau of the Central Committee laid down for the spring 
of 1930 a programme of 30,000,000 hectares of collective-
farm crop area cultivated on a socialised basis.

J. V. S T A L I N 298 
Actually, we already have 36,000,000 hectares. Thus 
the Central Committeeıs programme has been overfulfilled. 
It follows that the people who ridiculed the Central 
Committeeıs decision fiercely ridiculed themselves. Nor 
have the opportunist chatterboxes in our Party derived 
any benefit either from the petty-bourgeois elemental 
forces or from the excesses in the collective-farm movement. 
According to the five-year plan, by the end of the 
five-year period we were to have a collective-farm 
crop area of 20,600,000 hectares. Actually, we have already 
this year a collective-farm crop area of 36,000,000 
hectares. 
This means that already in two years we shall have 
overfulfilled the five-year plan of collective-farm development 
by over fifty per cent. (Applause.) 
According to the five-year plan, by the end of the 
five-year period we were to have a gross grain output 
from the collective farms amounting to 190,500,000 centners. 
Actually, already this year we shall have a gross 
grain output from the collective farms amounting to 
256,000,000 centners. 
This means that already in two years we shall have 
overfulfilled the five-year programme of collective-farm 
grain output by over 30 per cent. 
The five-year plan in two years! (Applause.) 
Let the opportunist gossips chatter now about it 
being impossible to fulfil and overfulfil the five-year plan 
of collective-farm development in two years.

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 299 
6. THE IMPROVEMENT IN THE MATERIAL 
AND CULTURAL CONDITIONS OF THE WORKERS 
AND PEASANTS 
It follows, therefore, that the progressive growth 
of the socialist sector in the sphere of industry and in 
the sphere of agriculture is a fact about which there cannot 
be the slightest doubt. 
What can this signify from the point of view of the 
material conditions of the working people? 
It signifies that, thereby, the foundations have already 
been laid for a radical improvement in the material 
and cultural conditions of the workers and peasants. 
Why? How? 
Because, firstly, the growth of the socialist sector 
signifies, above all, a diminution of the exploiting elements 
in town and country, a decline in their relative 
importance in the national economy. And this means 
that the workersı and peasantsı share of the national 
income must inevitably increase owing to the reduction 
of the share of the exploiting classes. 
Because, secondly, with the growth of the socialised 
(socialist) sector, the share of the national income that 
has hitherto gone to feed the exploiting classes and 
their hangers-on, is bound henceforth to remain in production, 
to be used for the expansion of production, for 
building new factories and mills, for improving the conditions 
of life of the working people. And this means 
that the working class is bound to grow in numbers and 
strength, and unemployment to diminish and disappear. 
Because, lastly, the growth of the socialised sector, 
inasmuch as it leads to an improvement in the material 
conditions of the working class, signifies a progressive

J. V. S T A L I N 300 
increase in the capacity of the home market, an increase 
in the demand for manufactured goods on the 
part of the workers and peasants. And this means that 
the growth of the home market will outstrip the growth 
of industry and push it forward towards continuous 
expansion. 
All these and similar circumstances are leading to 
a steady improvement in the material and cultural conditions 
of the workers and peasants. 
a) Let us begin with the numerical growth of the working 
class and the diminution of unemployment. 
In 1926-27, the number of wage-workers (not including 
unemployed) was 10,990,000. In 1927-28, however, 
we had 11,456,000, in 1928-29‹11,997,000 and in 1929-30, 
we shall, by all accounts, have not less than 13,129,000. 
Of these, manual workers (including agricultural labourers 
and seasonal workers) numbered in 1926-27‹7,069,000, 
in 1927-28‹7,404,000, in 1928-29‹7,758,000, in 
1929-30‹8,533,000. Of these, workers employed in largescale 
industry (not including office employees) numbered 
in 1926-27‹2,439,000, in 1927-28‹2,632,000, in 
1928-29‹2,858,000, in 1929-30‹3,029,0.00. 
Thus, we have a picture of the progressive numerical 
growth of the working class; and whereas the number of 
wage-workers has increased 19.5 per cent during the three 
years and the number of manual workers 20.7 per cent, 
the number of industrial workers has increased 24.2 per 
cent. 
Let us pass to the question of unemployment. It must 
be said that in this sphere considerable confusion reigns 
both at the Peopleıs Commissariat of Labour and at 
the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions.

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 301 
On the one hand, according to the data of these institutions 
we have about a million unemployed, of whom, 
those to any degree skilled constitute only 14.3 per cent, 
while about 73 per cent are those engaged in so-called 
intellectual labour and unskilled workers; the vast majority 
of the latter are women and young persons not connected 
with industrial production. 
On the other hand, according to the same data, we 
are suffering from a frightful shortage of skilled labour, 
the labour exchanges are unable to meet about 80 per 
cent of the demands for labour by our factories and 
thus we are obliged hurriedly, literally as we go along, 
to train absolutely unskilled people and make skilled 
workers out of them in order to satisfy at least the minimum 
requirements of our factories. 
Just try to find your way out of this confusion. It 
is clear, at all events, that these unemployed do not constitute 
a reserve and still less a permanent army of unemployed 
workers of our industry. Well? Even according 
to the data of the Peopleıs Commissariat of Labour it 
appears that in the recent period the number of unemployed 
has diminished compared with last year by over 
700,000. This means that by May 1, this year, the number 
of unemployed had dropped by over 42 per cent. 
There you have another result of the growth of the 
socialist sector of our national economy. 
b) We get a still more striking result when we examine 
the matter from the point of view of the distribution 
of the national income according to classes. The 
question of the distribution of the national income according 
to classes is a fundamental one from the point 
of view of the material and cultural conditions of the

J. V. S T A L I N 302 
workers and peasants. It is not for nothing that the bourgeois 
economists of Germany, Britain and the United 
States try to confuse this question for the benefit of 
the bourgeoisie by publishing, every now and again, 
their ³absolutely objective² investigations on this subject.
According to data of the German Statistical Board, 
in 1929 the share of wages in Germanyıs national income 
was 70 per cent, and the share of the bourgeoisie was 
30 per cent. According to data of the Federal Trade Commission 
and the National Bureau of Economic Research, 
the workersı share of the national income of the 
United States in 1923 amounted to over 54 per cent and 
the capitalistsı share to over 45 per cent. Lastly, according 
to data of the economists Bowley and Stamp, the 
share of the working class in Britainıs national income 
in 1924 amounted to a little less than 50 per cent and 
the capitalistsı share to a little over 50 per cent. 
Naturally, the results of these investigations cannot 
be taken on trust. This is because, apart from faults 
of a purely economic order, these investigations have also 
another kind of fault, the object of which is partly to 
conceal the incomes of the capitalists and to minimise 
them, and partly to inflate and exaggerate the incomes 
of the working class by including in it officials who receive 
huge salaries. And this is apart from the fact that 
these investigations often do not take into account the 
incomes of farmers and of rural capitalists in general. 
Comrade Varga has subjected these statistics to a 
critical analysis. Here is the result that he obtained. 
It appears that the share of the workers and of the working 
people generally in town and country, who do not ex

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 303 
ploit the labour of others, was in Germany 55 per cent of 
the national income, in the United States‹54 per cent, 
in Britain‹45 per cent; whereas the capitalistsı share 
in Germany was 45 per cent, in the United States‹46 per 
cent, and in Britain‹55 per cent. 
That is how the matter stands in the biggest capitalist 
countries. 
How does it stand in the U.S.S.R.? 
Here are the data of the State Planning Commission. 
It appears that: 
a) The share of the workers and working peasants, 
who do not exploit the labour of others, constituted in 
our country, in 1927-28, 75.2 per cent of the total national 
income (including the share of urban and rural 
wage-workers‹33.3 per cent); in 1928-29 it was 76.5 
per cent (including the share of urban and rural wageworkers‹
33.2 per cent); in 1929-30 it was 77.1 per cent 
(including the share of urban and rural wage-workers‹ 
33.5 per cent). 
b) The share of the kulaks and urban capitalists was 
in 1927-28‹8.1 per cent; in 1928-29‹6.5 per cent; in 
1929-30‹1.8 per cent. 
c) The share of handicraftsmen, the majority of whom 
are working people, was in 1927-28‹6.5 per cent; in 
1928-29‹5.4 per cent; in 1929-30‹4.4 per cent. 
d) The share of the state sector, the income of which 
is the income of the working class and of the working people 
generally, was in 1927-28‹8.4 per cent; in 1928-29 
‹10 per cent; in 1929-30‹15.2 per cent. 
e) Lastly, the share of the so-called miscellaneous 
(meaning pensions) was in 1927-28‹1.8 per cent; in 
1928-29‹1.6 per cent; in 1929-30‹1.5 per cent.

J. V. S T A L I N 304 
Thus, it follows that, whereas in the advanced capitalist 
countries the share of the exploiting classes in the 
national income is about 50 per cent and even more, 
here, in the U.S.S.R., the share of the exploiting classes 
in the national income is not more than 2 per cent. 
This, properly speaking, explains the striking fact 
that in the United States in 1922, according to the American 
bourgeois writer Denny ³one per cent of estate 
holders owned 59 per cent of the total wealth,² and in 
Britain, in 1920-21, according to the same Denny, ³less 
than two per cent of the owners held 64 per cent of the 
total wealth² (see Dennyıs book America Conquers Britain). 
Can such things happen in our country, in the U.S.S.R., 
in the Land of Soviets? Obviously, they cannot. There 
have long been no ³owners² of this kind in the U.S.S.R., 
nor can there be any. 
But if in the U.S.S.R., in 1929-30, only about two per 
cent of the national income falls to the share of the exploiting 
classes, what happens to the rest, the bulk of 
the national income? 
Obviously, it remains in the hands of the workers 
and working peasants. 
There you have the source of the strength and prestige 
of the Soviet regime among the vast masses of the 
working class and peasantry. 
There you have the basis of the systematic improvement 
in the material welfare of the workers and peasants 
of the U.S.S.R. 
f) In the light of these decisive facts, one can quite 
understand the systematic increase in the real wages 
of the workers, the increase in the workersı social insurance 
budget, the increased assistance to poor- and middle

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 305 
peasant farms, the increased assignments for workersı 
housing, for the improvement of the workersı living 
conditions and for mother and child care, and, as a 
consequence, the progressive growth of the population of 
the U.S.S.R. and the decline in mortality, particularly 
in infant mortality. 
It is known, for example, that the real wages of the 
workers, including social insurance and allocations from 
profits to the fund for improvement of the workersı 
living conditions, have risen to 167 per cent of the prewar 
level. During the past three years, the workersı 
social insurance budget alone has grown from 980,000,000 
rubles in 1927-28 to 1,400,000,000 rubles in 1929-30. 
The amount spent on mother and child care during the 
past three years (1927-28‹1929-30) was 494,000,000 
rubles. The amount spent on pre-school education (kindergartens, 
playgrounds, etc.) during the same period was 
204,000,000 rubles. The amount spent on workersı housing 
was 1,880,000,000 rubles. 
This does not mean, of course, that everything necessary 
for an important increase in real wages has already 
been done, that real wages could not have been raised 
to a higher level. If this has not been done, it is because 
of the bureaucracy in our supply organisations in general, 
and primarily and particularly because of the bureaucracy 
in the consumersı co-operatives. According to the 
data of the State Planning Commission, in 1929-30 the 
socialised sector of internal trade embraced over 99 per 
cent of wholesale trade and over 89 per cent of retail 
trade. This means that the co-operatives are systematically 
ousting the private sector and are becoming the 
monopolists in the sphere of trade. That, of course, is

J. V. S T A L I N 306 
good. What is bad, however, is that in a number of cases 
this monopoly operates to the detriment of the consumers. 
It appears, that in spite of the almost monopolist 
position they occupy in trade, the co-operatives prefer 
to supply the workers with more ³paying² goods, which 
yield bigger profits (haberdashery, etc.), and avoid 
supplying them with less ³paying,² although more essential, 
goods for the workers (agricultural produce). 
As a result, the workers are obliged to satisfy about 25 
per cent of their requirements for agricultural produce in 
the private market, paying higher prices. That is apart 
from the fact that the co-operative apparatus is concerned 
most of all with its balance and is therefore reluctant 
to reduce retail prices in spite of the categorical instructions 
of the leading centres. It follows, therefore, that in 
this case the co-operatives function not as a socialist sector, 
but as a peculiar sector that is infected with a sort 
of Nepman spirit. The question is, does anyone need cooperatives 
of this sort, and what benefit do the workers 
derive from their monopoly if they do not carry out the 
function of seriously raising the workersı real wages? 
If, in spite of this, real wages in our country are 
steadily rising from year to year, it means that our social 
system, our system of distribution of the national 
income, and our entire wages policy, are such that they 
are able to neutralise and make up for all defects arising 
from the co-operatives. 
If to this circumstance we add a number of other 
factors, such as the increase in the role of public catering, 
lower rents for workers, the vast number of stipends 
paid to workers and workersı children, cultural services, 
and so forth, we may boldly say that the percent

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 307 
age increase of workersı wages is much greater than is 
indicated in the statistics of some of our institutions. 
All this taken together, plus the introduction of 
the seven-hour day for over 830,000 industrial workers 
(33.5 per cent), plus the introduction of the five-day 
week for over a million and a half industrial workers 
(63.4 per cent), plus the extensive network of rest homes, 
sanatoria and health resorts for workers, to which more 
than 1,700,000 workers have gone during the past three 
years‹all this creates conditions of work and life for 
the working class that enable us to rear a new generation 
of workers who are healthy and vigorous, who are 
capable of raising the might of the Soviet country 
to the proper level and of protecting it with their lives 
from attacks by its enemies. (Applause.) 
As regards assistance to the peasants, both individual 
and collective-farm peasants, and bearing in mind 
also assistance to poor peasants, this in the past three 
years (1927-28‹1929-30) has amounted to a sum of not 
less than 4,000,000,000 rubles, provided in the shape of 
credits and assignments from the state budget. As is 
known, assistance in the shape of seeds alone has been 
granted the peasants during the past three years to the 
amount of not less than 154,000,000 poods. 
It is not surprising that the workers and peasants 
in our country are living fairly well on the whole, that 
general mortality has dropped 36 per cent, and infant mortality 
42.5 per cent, below the pre-war level, while the 
annual increase in population in our country is about 
three million. (Applause.) 
As regards the cultural conditions of the workers and 
peasants, in this sphere too we have some achievements,

J. V. S T A L I N 308 
which, however, cannot under any circumstances 
satisfy us, as they are still small. Leaving out of account 
workersı clubs of all kinds, village reading rooms, libraries 
and abolition of illiteracy classes, which this year 
are being attended by 10,500,000 persons, the situation 
as regards cultural and educational matters is as follows. 
This year elementary schools are being attended by 
11,638,000 pupils; secondary schools‹1,945,000; industrial 
and technical, transport and agricultural 
schools and classes for training workers of ordinary skill‹ 
333,100; secondary technical and equivalent trade schools 
‹238,700; colleges, general and technical‹190,400. 
All this has enabled us to raise literacy in the U.S.S.R. 
to 62.6 per cent of the population, compared with 33 
per cent in pre-war times. 
The chief thing now is to pass to universal, compulsory 
elementary education. I say the ³chief² thing, because 
this would be a decisive step in the cultural revolution. 
And it is high time we took this step, for we now 
possess all that is needed to organise compulsory, universal 
elementary education in all areas of the U.S.S.R. 
Until now we have been obliged to ³exercise economy in 
all things, even in schools² in order to ³save, to restore 
heavy industry² (Lenin). During the recent period, however, 
we have already restored heavy industry and are developing 
it further. Hence, the time has arrived when we must 
set about fully achieving universal, compulsory elementary 
education. 
I think that the congress will do the right thing if it 
adopts a definite and absolutely categorical decision on 
this matter. (Applause.)

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 309 
7. DIFFICULTIES OF GROWTH, THE CLASS 
STRUGGLE AND THE OFFENSIVE OF SOCIALISM 
ALONG THE WHOLE FRONT 
I have spoken about our achievements in developing 
our national economy. I have spoken about our achievements 
in industry, in agriculture, in reconstructing the 
whole of our national economy on the basis of socialism. 
Lastly, I have spoken about our achievements in improving 
the material conditions of the workers and peasants. 
It would be a mistake, however, to think that we 
achieved all this ³easily and quietly,² automatically, 
so to speak, without exceptional effort and exertion of 
willpower, without struggle and turmoil. Such achievements 
do not come about automatically. In fact, we 
achieved all this in a resolute struggle against difficulties, 
in a serious and prolonged struggle to surmount difficulties. 
Everybody among us talks about difficulties, but 
not everybody realises the character of these difficulties. 
And yet the problem of difficulties is of serious 
importance for us. 
What are the characteristic features of our difficulties, 
what hostile forces are hidden behind them, and 
how are we surmounting them? 
a) When characterising our difficulties we must 
bear in mind at least the following circumstances. 
First of all, we must take into account the circumstance 
that our present difficulties are difficulties of 
the reconstruction period. What does this mean? It means 
that they differ fundamentally from the difficulties of 
the restoration period of our economy. Whereas in the 
restoration period it was a matter of keeping the old

J. V. S T A L I N 310 
factories running and assisting agriculture on its old 
basis, today it is a matter of fundamentally rebuilding, 
reconstructing both industry and agriculture, altering their 
technical basis and providing them with modern technical 
equipment. It means that we are faced with the task of 
reconstructing the entire technical basis of our national 
economy. And this calls for new, more substantial investments 
in the national economy, for new and more experienced 
cadres, capable of mastering the new technology 
and of developing it further. 
Secondly, we must bear in mind the circumstance 
that in our country the reconstruction of the national 
economy is not limited to rebuilding its technical basis, 
but that, on the contrary, parallel with this, it calls 
for the reconstruction of social-economic relationships. 
Here I have in mind, mainly, agriculture. In industry, 
which is already united and socialised, technical reconstruction 
already has, in the main, a ready-made socialeconomic 
basis. Here, the task of reconstruction is to 
accelerate the process of ousting the capitalist elements 
from industry. The matter is not so simple in agriculture. 
The reconstruction of the technical basis of agriculture 
pursues, of course, the same aims. The specific 
feature of agriculture in our country, however, is that 
small-peasant farming still predominates in it, that small 
farming is unable to master the new technology and that, 
in view of this, the reconstruction of the technical basis 
of agriculture is impossible without simultaneously reconstructing 
the old social-economic order, without uniting 
the small individual farms into large, collective 
farms, without tearing out the roots of capitalism in 
agriculture.

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 311 
Naturally, these circumstances cannot but complicate 
our difficulties, cannot but complicate our work in surmounting 
these difficulties. 
Thirdly, we must bear in mind the circumstance that 
our work for the socialist reconstruction of the national 
economy, since it breaks up the economic connections 
of capitalism and turns all the forces of the old world 
upside down, cannot but rouse the desperate resistance 
of these forces. Such is the case, as you know. The malicious 
wrecking activities of the top stratum of the bourgeois 
intelligentsia in all branches of our industry, the 
brutal struggle of the kulaks against collective forms of 
farming in the countryside, the sabotage of the Soviet 
governmentıs measures by bureaucratic elements in the 
state apparatus, who are agents of our class enemy‹such, 
so far, are the chief forms of the resistance of the moribund 
classes in our country. Obviously, these circumstances 
cannot facilitate our work of reconstructing the national 
economy. 
Fourthly, we must bear in mind the circumstance that 
the resistance of the moribund classes in our country is 
not taking place in isolation from the outside world, but 
is receiving the support of the capitalist encirclement. 
Capitalist encirclement must not be regarded simply as 
a geographical concept. Capitalist encirclement means 
that the U.S.S.R. is surrounded by hostile class forces, 
which are ready to support our class enemies within the 
U.S.S.R. morally, materially, by means of a financial 
blockade and, if the opportunity offers, by military intervention. 
It has been proved that the wrecking activities 
of our specialists, the anti-Soviet activities of 
the kulaks, and the incendiarism and explosions at our

J. V. S T A L I N 312 
factories and installations are subsidised and inspired 
from abroad. The imperialist world is not interested 
in the U.S.S.R. standing up firmly and becoming able 
to overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist countries. 
Hence, the assistance it renders the forces of 
the old world in the U.S.S.R. Naturally, this circumstance, 
too, cannot serve to facilitate our work of reconstruction. 
The characterisation of our difficulties will not be 
complete, however, if we fail to bear in mind one other 
circumstance. I am referring to the special character 
of our difficulties. I am referring to the fact that our 
difficulties are not difficulties of decline, or of stagnation, 
but difficulties of growth, difficulties of ascent, difficulties 
of progress. This means that our difficulties differ 
fundamentally from those encountered by the capitalist 
countries. When people in the United States talk about 
difficulties they have in mind difficulties due to decline, 
for America is now going through a crisis, i.e., economic 
decline. When people in Britain talk about difficulties 
they have in mind difficulties due to stagnation, for 
Britain, for a number of years already, has been experiencing 
stagnation, i.e., cessation of progress. When 
we speak about our difficulties, however, we have in 
mind not decline and not stagnation in development, 
but the growth of our forces, the upswing of our forces, 
the progress of our economy. How many points shall 
we move further forward by a given date? What per cent 
more goods shall we produce? How many million more 
hectares shall we sow? How many months earlier shall we 
erect a factory, a mill, a railway?‹such are the questions 
that we have in mind when we speak of difficulties. Conse

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 313 
quently, our difficulties, unlike those encountered by, say, 
America or Britain, are difficulties of growth, difficulties 
of progress. 
What does this signify? It signifies that our difficulties 
are such as contain within themselves the possibility 
of surmounting them. It signifies that the distinguishing 
feature of our difficulties is that they themselves 
give us the basis for surmounting them. 
What follows from all this? 
It follows from this, first of all, that our difficulties 
are not difficulties due to minor and accidental 
³derangements,² but difficulties arising from the class 
struggle. 
It follows from this, secondly, that behind our difficulties 
are hidden our class enemies, that these difficulties 
are complicated by the desperate resistance of the 
moribund classes in our country, by the support that these 
classes receive from abroad, by the existence of bureaucratic 
elements in our own institutions, by the existence 
of unsureness and conservatism among certain sections of 
our Party. 
It follows from this, thirdly, that to surmount the 
difficulties it is necessary, first of all, to repulse the 
attacks of the capitalist elements, to crush their resistance 
and thereby clear the way for rapid progress. 
It follows from this, lastly, that the very character 
of our difficulties, being difficulties of growth, creates the 
possibilities that we need for crushing our class enemies. 
There is only one means, however, of taking advantage 
of these possibilities and of converting them into 
reality, of crushing the resistance of our class enemies 
and surmounting the difficulties, and that is to organise

J. V. S T A L I N 314 
an offensive against the capitalist elements along the 
whole front and to isolate the opportunist elements in 
our own ranks, who are hindering the offensive, who 
are rushing in panic from one side to another and sowing 
doubt in the Party about the possibility of victory. 
(Applause.) 
There are no other means. 
Only people who have lost their heads can seek a way 
out in Bukharinıs childish formula about the capitalist 
elements peacefully growing into socialism. In our country 
development has not proceeded and is not proceeding 
according to Bukharinıs formula. Development has proceeded, 
and is proceeding, according to Leninıs formula 
³who will beat whom.² Either we vanquish and crush 
them, the exploiters, or they will vanquish and crush us, 
the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R.‹that is how 
the question stands, comrades. 
Thus, the organisation of the offensive of socialism 
along the whole front‹that is the task that arose before 
us in developing our work of reconstructing the entire 
national economy. 
That is precisely how the Party interpreted its mission 
in organising the offensive against the capitalist 
elements in our country. 
b) But is an offensive, and an offensive along the whole 
front at that, permissible at all under the conditions 
of NEP? 
Some think that an offensive is incompatible with 
NEP, that NEP is essentially a retreat, that, since the 
retreat has ended, NEP must be abolished. That is nonsense, 
of course. It is nonsense that emanates either from 
the Trotskyists, who have never understood anything

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 315 
about Leninism and who think of ³abolishing² NEP 
³in a trice,² or from the Right opportunists, who have 
also never understood anything about Leninism and think 
that by chattering about ³the threat to abolish NEP² 
they can manage to secure the abandonment of the offensive. 
If NEP was nothing but a retreat, Lenin would 
not have said at the Eleventh Congress of the Party, when 
we were implementing NEP with the utmost consistency, 
that ³the retreat has ended.² When Lenin said 
that the retreat had ended, did he not also say that we 
were thinking of carrying out NEP ³in earnest and for 
a long time²? It is sufficient to put this question to understand 
the utter absurdity of the talk about NEP 
being incompatible with an offensive. In point of fact, 
NEP does not merely presuppose a retreat and permission 
for the revival of private trade, permission for the 
revival of capitalism while ensuring the regulating role 
of the state (the initial stage of NEP). In point of fact, 
NEP also presupposes, at a certain stage of development, 
the offensive of socialism against the capitalist elements, 
the restriction of the field of activity of private trade, 
the relative and absolute diminution of capitalism, the 
increasing preponderance of the socialised sector over 
the non-socialised sector, the victory of socialism over 
capitalism (the present stage of NEP). NEP was introduced 
to ensure the victory of socialism over the capitalist 
elements. In passing to the offensive along the whole 
front, we do not yet abolish NEP, for private trade and 
the capitalist elements still remain, ³free² trade still 
remains‹but we are certainly abolishing the initial stage 
of NEP, while developing its next stage, the present 
stage, which is the last stage of NEP.

J. V. S T A L I N 316 
Here is what Lenin said in 1922, a year after NEP 
was introduced: 
³We are now retreating, going back as it were; but we are 
doing this in order, by retreating first, afterwards to take a run and 
make a more powerful leap forward. It was on this condition alone 
that we retreated in pursuing our New Economic Policy. We do 
not yet know where and how we must now regroup, adapt and 
reorganise our forces in order to start a most persistent advance 
after our retreat. In order to carry out all these operations in proper 
order we must, as the says, measure not ten times, 
but a hundred times before we decide² (Vol. XXVII, pp. 361-62). 
Clear, one would think. 
But the question is: has the time already arrived 
to pass to the offensive, is the moment ripe for an offensive? 
Lenin said in another passage in the same year, 1922, 
that it was necessary to: 
³Link up with the peasant masses, with the rank-and-file 
toiling peasants, and begin to move forward immeasurably, infinitely, 
more slowly than we imagined, but in such a way that 
the entire mass will actually move forward with us² . . . that 
³if we do that we shall in time get such an acceleration of progress 
as we cannot dream of now² (Vol. XXVII, pp. 231-32). 
And so the same question arises: has the time already 
arrived for such an acceleration of progress, for speeding 
up the rate of our development? Did we choose the right 
moment in passing to the decisive offensive along the 
whole front in the latter half of 1929? 
To this question the Party has already given a clear 
and definite answer. 
Yes, that moment had already arrived. 
Yes, the Party chose the right moment to pass to the 
offensive along the whole front.

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 317 
This is proved by the growing activity of the working 
class and by the unprecedented growth of the Partyıs 
prestige among the vast masses of the working people. 
It is proved by the growing activity of the masses of 
the poor and middle peasants, and by the radical turn 
of these masses towards collective-farm development. 
It is proved by our achievements both in the development 
of industry and in the development of state farms 
and collective farms. 
It is proved by the fact that we are now in a position 
not only to replace kulak production by collectivefarm 
and state-farm production, but to exceed the former 
several times over. 
It is proved by the fact that we have already succeeded, 
in the main, in solving the grain problem and in 
accumulating definite grain reserves, by shifting the 
centre of the production of marketable grain from the 
sphere of individual production to that of collectivefarm 
and state-farm production. 
There you have the proof that the Party chose the 
right moment to pass to the offensive along the whole 
front and to proclaim the slogan of eliminating the kulaks 
as a class. 
What would have happened had we heeded the Right 
opportunists of Bukharinıs group, had we refrained from 
launching the offensive, had we slowed down the rate 
of development of industry, had we retarded the development 
of collective farms and state farms and had we based 
ourselves on individual peasant farming? 
We should certainly have wrecked our industry, we 
should have ruined the socialist reconstruction of agriculture, 
we should have been left without bread and have

J. V. S T A L I N 318 
cleared the way for the predominance of the kulaks. We 
should have been as badly off as before. 
What would have happened had we heeded the ³Left² 
opportunists of the Trotsky-Zinoviev group and launched 
the offensive in 1926-27, when we had no possibility of 
replacing kulak production by collective-farm and statefarm 
production? 
We should certainly have met with failure in this 
matter, we should have demonstrated our weakness, we 
should have strengthened the position of the kulaks and 
of the capitalist elements generally, we should have 
pushed the middle peasants into the embrace of the kulaks, 
we should have disrupted our socialist development 
and have been left without bread. We should have been 
as badly off as before. 
The results would have been the same. 
It is not for nothing that our workers say: ³When 
you go to the Œleftı you arrive on the right.² (Applause.) 
Some comrades think that the chief thing in the offensive 
of socialism is measures of repression, that if 
there is no increase of measures of repression there is no 
offensive. 
Is that true? Of course, it is not true. 
Measures of repression in the sphere of socialist construction 
are a necessary element of the offensive, but 
they are an auxiliary, not the chief element. The chief 
thing in the offensive of socialism under our present conditions 
is to speed up the rate of development of our industry, 
to speed up the rate of state-farm and collectivefarm 
development, to speed up the rate of the economic 
ousting of the capitalist elements in town and country, 
to mobilise the masses around socialist construction, to

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 319 
mobilise the masses against capitalism. You may arrest 
and deport tens and hundreds of thousands of kulaks, 
but if you do not at the same time do all that is necessary 
to speed up the development of the new forms of farming, 
to replace the old, capitalist forms of farming by the 
new forms, to undermine and abolish the production 
sources of the economic existence and development of 
the capitalist elements in the countryside‹the kulaks 
will, nevertheless, revive and grow. 
Others think that the offensive of socialism means 
advancing headlong, without proper preparation, without 
regrouping forces in the course of the offensive, without 
consolidating captured positions, without utilising 
reserves to develop successes, and that if signs have appeared 
of, say, an exodus of a section of the peasants 
from the collective farms it means that there is 
already the ³ebb of the revolution,² the decline of the 
movement, the cessation of the offensive. 
Is that true? Of course, it is not true. 
Firstly, no offensive, even the most successful, can 
proceed without some breaches or incursions on individual 
sectors of the front. To argue, on these grounds, that 
the offensive has stopped, or has failed, means not to understand 
the essence of an offensive. 
Secondly, there has never been, nor can there be, a 
successful offensive without regrouping forces in the 
course of the offensive itself, without consolidating captured 
positions, without utilising reserves for developing 
success and for carrying the offensive through to 
the end. Where there is a headlong advance, i.e., without 
observing these conditions, the offensive must inevitably 
peter out and fail. A headlong advance means

J. V. S T A L I N 320 
death to the offensive. This is proved by the wealth of 
experience of our Civil War. 
Thirdly, how can an analogy be drawn between the 
³ebb of the revolution,² which usually takes place on 
the basis of a decline of the movement, and the withdrawal 
of a section of the peasantry from the collective 
farms, which took place against a background of the continuing 
upswing of the movement, against a background 
of the continuing upswing of the whole of our socialist 
development, both industrial and collective-farm, against 
a background of the continuing upswing of our revolution? 
What can there be in common between these two 
totally different phenomena? 
c) What is the essence of the Bolshevik offensive under 
our present conditions? 
The essence of the Bolshevik offensive lies, first 
and foremost, in mobilising the class vigilance and revolutionary 
activity of the masses against the capitalist 
elements in our country; in mobilising the creative 
initiative and independent activity of the masses against 
bureaucracy in our institutions and organisations, which 
keeps concealed the colossal reserves latent in the depths 
of our system and prevents them from being used; in 
organising emulation and labour enthusiasm among the 
masses for raising the productivity of labour, for developing 
socialist construction. 
The essence of the Bolshevik offensive lies, secondly, 
in organising the reconstruction of the entire practical 
work of the trade-union, co-operative, Soviet and all 
other mass organisations to fit the requirements of the 
reconstruction period; in creating in them a core of the 
most active and revolutionary functionaries, pushing aside

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 321 
and isolating the opportunist, trade-unionist, bureaucratic 
elements; in expelling from them the alien and degenerate 
elements and promoting new cadres from the 
rank and file. 
The essence of the Bolshevik offensive lies, further, 
in mobilising the maximum funds for financing our 
industry, for financing our state farms and collective 
farms, in appointing the best people in our Party for 
developing all this work. 
The essence of the Bolshevik offensive lies, lastly, 
in mobilising the Party itself for organising the whole 
offensive; in strengthening and giving a sharp edge to 
the Party organisations, expelling elements of bureaucracy 
and degeneration from them; in isolating and thrusting 
aside those that express Right or ³Left² deviations 
from the Leninist line and bringing to the fore genuine, 
staunch Leninists. 
Such are the principles of the Bolshevik offensive at 
the present time. 
How has the Party carried out this plan of the offensive? 
You know that the Party has carried out this plan 
with the utmost consistency. 
Matters started by the Party developing wide selfcriticism, 
concentrating the attention of the masses upon 
shortcomings in our work of construction, upon shortcomings 
in our organisations and institutions. The need 
for intensifying self-criticism was proclaimed already at 
the Fifteenth Congress. The Shakhty affair and the wrecking 
activities in various branches of industry, which revealed 
the absence of revolutionary vigilance in some 
of the Party organisations, on the one hand, and the

J. V. S T A L I N 322 
struggle against the kulaks and the defects revealed in 
our rural organisations, on the other hand, gave a further 
impetus to self-criticism. In its appeal of June 2, 1928,49 
the Central Committee gave final shape to the campaign 
for self-criticism, calling upon all the forces of the Party 
and the working class to develop self-criticism ³from 
top to bottom and from the bottom up,² ³irrespective 
of persons.² Dissociating itself from the Trotskyist ³criticism² 
emanating from the other side of the barricade 
and aiming at discrediting and weakening the Soviet 
regime, the Party proclaimed the task of self-criticism to 
be the ruthless exposure of shortcomings in our work 
for the purpose of improving our work of construction 
and strengthening the Soviet regime. As is known, the 
Partyıs appeal met with a most lively response among 
the masses of the working class and peasantry. 
Further, the Party organised a wide campaign for 
the struggle against bureaucracy and issued the slogan of 
purging the Party, trade-union, co-operative and Soviet 
organisations of alien and bureaucratised elements. A 
sequel to this campaign was the well-known decision of 
the Central Committee and Central Control Commission 
of March 16, 1930, concerning the promotion of workers 
to posts in the state apparatus and the organisation of 
mass workersı control of the Soviet apparatus (patronage 
by factories).50 As is known, this campaign evoked tremendous 
enthusiasm and activity among the masses of 
the workers. The result of this campaign has been an immense 
increase in the Partyıs prestige among the masses 
of the working people, an increase in the confidence of 
the working class in the Party, the influx into the Party 
of further hundreds of thousands of workers, and the

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 323 
resolutions passed by workers expressing the desire to 
join the Party in whole shops and factories. Lastly, a 
result of this campaign has been that our organisations 
have got rid of a number of conservative and bureaucratic 
elements, and the All-Union Central Council of Trade 
Unions has got rid of the old, opportunist leadership. 
Further, the Party organised wide socialist emulation 
and mass labour enthusiasm in the factories and mills. 
The appeal of the Sixteenth Party Conference concerning 
emulation started the ball rolling. The shock brigades 
are pushing it on further. The Leninist Young Communist 
League and the working-class youth which it guides are 
crowning the cause of emulation and shock-brigade work 
with decisive successes. It must be admitted that our 
revolutionary youth have played an exceptional role 
in this matter. There can be no doubt now that one of 
the most important, if not the most important, factor in 
our work of construction at the present time is socialist 
emulation among factories and mills, the interchange 
of challenges of hundreds of thousands of workers on the 
results achieved in emulation, the wide development of 
shock-brigade work. 
Only the blind fail to see that a tremendous change 
has taken place in the mentality of the masses and in 
their attitude to work, a change which has radically 
altered the appearance of our mills and factories. Not 
so long ago voices were still heard among us saying that 
emulation and shock-brigade work were ³artificial inventions,² 
and ³unsound.² Today, these ³sages² do not 
even provoke ridicule, they are regarded simply as ³sages² 
who have outlived their time. The cause of emulation 
and shock-brigade work is now a cause that has been won

J. V. S T A L I N 324 
and consolidated. It is a fact that over two million of 
our workers are engaged in emulation, and that not less 
than a million workers belong to shock brigades. 
The most remarkable feature of emulation is the 
radical revolution it brings about in peopleıs views of 
labour, for it transforms labour from a degrading and 
heavy burden, as it was considered before, into a matter 
of honour, a matter of glory, a matter of valour and heroism. 
There is not, nor can there be, anything of the sort 
in capitalist countries. There, among the capitalists, the 
most desirable thing, deserving of public approval, is 
to be a bondholder, to live on interest, not to have to 
work, which is regarded as a contemptible occupation. 
Here, in the U.S.S.R., on the contrary, what is becoming 
the most desirable thing, deserving of public approval, 
is the possibility of being a hero of labour, the possibility 
of being a hero in shock-brigade work, surrounded 
with an aureole of esteem among millions of working 
people. 
A no less remarkable feature of emulation is the fact 
that it is beginning to spread also in the countryside, 
having already spread to our state farms and collective 
farms. Everybody is aware of the numerous cases of genuine 
labour enthusiasm being displayed by the vast masses 
of state-farm workers and collective farmers. 
Who could have dreamed of such successes in emulation 
and shock-brigade work a couple of years ago? 
Further, the Party mobilised the countryıs financial 
resources for the purpose of developing state farms and 
collective farms, supplied the state farms with the best 
organisers, sent 25,000 front-rank workers to assist the 
collective farms, promoted the best people among the

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 325 
collective-farm peasants to leading posts in the collective 
farms and organised a network of training classes for 
collective farmers, thereby laying the foundation for the 
training of staunch and tried cadres for the collectivefarm 
movement 
Lastly, the Party re-formed its own ranks in battle 
order, re-equipped the press, organised the struggle on 
two fronts, routed the remnants of Trotskyism, utterly 
defeated the Right deviators, isolated the conciliators, 
and thereby ensured the unity of its ranks on the basis 
of the Leninist line, which is essential for a successful 
offensive, and properly led this offensive, pulling up and 
putting in their place both the gradualists of the camp 
of the Rights and the ³Left² distorters in regard to the 
collective-farm movement. 
Such are the principal measures that the Party carried 
out in conducting the offensive along the whole 
front. 
Everybody knows that this offensive has been crowned 
with success in all spheres of our work. 
That is why we have succeeded in surmounting a 
whole number of difficulties of the period of reconstruction 
of our national economy. 
That is why we are succeeding in surmounting the 
greatest difficulty in our development, the difficulty 
of turning the main mass of the peasantry towards socialism. 
Foreigners sometimes ask about the internal situation 
in the U.S.S.R. But can there be any doubt that the 
internal situation in the U.S.S.R. is firm and unshakable? 
Look at the capitalist countries, at the growing 
crisis and unemployment in those countries, at the

J. V. S T A L I N 326 
strikes and lockouts, at the anti-government demonstrations‹
what comparison can there be between the internal 
situation in those countries and the internal situation 
in the U.S.S.R.? 
It must be admitted that the Soviet regime is now 
the most stable of all the regimes in the world. (Applause.) 
8. THE CAPITALIST OR THE SOCIALIST 
SYSTEM OF ECONOMY 
Thus, we have the picture of the internal situation 
in the U.S.S.R. 
We also have the picture of the internal situation in 
the chief capitalist countries. 
The question involuntarily arises: What is the result 
if we place the two pictures side by side and compare 
them? 
This question is all the more interesting for the reason 
that the bourgeois leaders in all countries and the 
bourgeois press of all degrees and ranks, from the arrant 
capitalist to the Menshevik-Trotskyist, are all shouting 
with one accord about the ³prosperity² of the capitalist 
countries, about the ³doom² of the U.S.S.R., about 
the ³financial and economic bankruptcy² of the U.S.S.R., 
and so forth. 
And so, what is the result of the analysis of the situation 
in our country, the U.S.S.R., and over there, 
in the capitalist countries? 
Let us note the main, generally known facts. 
Over there, in the capitalist countries, there is economic 
crisis and a decline in production, both in industry 
and in agriculture.

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 327 
Here, in the U.S.S.R., there is an economic upswing 
and rising production in all spheres of the national 
economy. 
Over there, in the capitalist countries, there is deterioration 
of the material conditions of the working 
people, reduction of wages and increasing unemployment. 
Here, in the U.S.S.R., there is improvement in the 
material conditions of the working people, rising wages 
and diminishing unemployment. 
Over there, in the capitalist countries, there are 
increasing strikes and demonstrations, which lead to the 
loss of millions of work-days. 
Here, in the U.S.S.R., there are no strikes, but rising 
labour enthusiasm among the workers and peasants, 
by which our social system gains millions of additional 
work-days. 
Over there, in the capitalist countries, there is increasing 
tension in the internal situation and growth of 
the revolutionary working-class movement against the 
capitalist regime. 
Here, in the U.S.S.R., there is consolidation of the 
internal situation and the vast masses of the working class 
are united around the Soviet regime. 
Over there, in the capitalist countries, there is growing 
acuteness of the national question and growth of the 
national-liberation movement in India, Indo-China, Indonesia, 
in the Philippines, etc., developing into national 
war. 
Here, in the U.S.S.R., the foundations of national 
fraternity have been strengthened, peace among the nations 
is ensured and the vast masses of the people in the 
U.S.S.R. are united around the Soviet regime.

J. V. S T A L I N 328 
Over there, in the capitalist countries, there is confusion 
and the prospect of further deterioration of 
the situation. 
Here, in the U.S.S.R., there is confidence in our 
strength and the prospect of further improvement in the 
situation. 
They chatter about the ³doom² of the U.S.S.R., 
about the ³prosperity² of the capitalist countries, and so 
forth. Would it not be more correct to speak about the 
inevitable doom of those who have so ³unexpectedly² 
fallen into the maelstrom of economic crisis and to this 
day are unable to extricate themselves from the slough 
of despond? 
What are the causes of such a grave collapse over 
there, in the capitalist countries, and of the important 
successes here, in the U.S.S.R.? 
It is said that the state of the national economy 
depends in a large measure upon the abundance or 
dearth of capital. That, of course, is true! But can the crisis 
in the capitalist countries and the upswing in the 
U.S.S.R. be explained by abundance of capital here and 
a dearth of capital over there? No, of course not. Everybody 
knows that there is much less capital in the U.S.S.R. 
than there is in the capitalist countries. If matters were 
decided in the present instance by the state of accumulation, 
there would be a crisis here and a boom in the capitalist 
countries. 
It is said that the state of economy depends in a 
large measure on the technical and organising experience 
of the economic cadres. That, of course, is true. But can 
the crisis in the capitalist countries and the upswing in 
the U.S.S.R. be explained by the dearth of technical

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 329 
cadres over there and to an abundance of them here? No, 
of course not! Everybody knows that there are far more 
technically experienced cadres in the capitalist countries 
than there are here, in the U.S.S.R. We have never concealed, 
and do not intend to conceal, that in the sphere 
of technology we are the pupils of the Germans, the 
British, the French, the Italians, and, first and foremost, 
of the Americans. No, matters are not decided 
by the abundance or dearth of technically experienced 
cadres, although the problem of cadres is of great 
importance for the development of the national economy. 
Perhaps the answer to the riddle is that the cultural 
level is higher in our country than in the capitalist 
countries? Again, no. Everybody knows that the general 
cultural level of the masses is lower in our country 
than in the United States, Britain or Germany. No, it 
is not a matter of the cultural level of the masses, although 
this is of enormous importance for the development 
of the national economy. 
Perhaps the cause lies in the personal qualities of 
the leaders of the capitalist countries? Again, no. Crises 
were born together with the advent of the rule of 
capitalism. For over a hundred years already there have 
been periodical economic crises of capitalism, recurring 
every 12, 10, 8 or fewer years. All the capitalist parties, 
all the more or less prominent capitalist leaders, 
from the greatest ³genuises² to the greatest mediocrities, 
have tried their hand at ³preventing² or ³abolishing² 
crises. But they have all suffered defeat. Is it 
surprising that Hoover and his group have also suffered 
defeat? No, it is not a matter of the capitalist leaders

J. V. S T A L I N 330 
or parties, although both the capitalist leaders and parties 
are of no little importance in this matter. 
What is the cause, then? 
What is the cause of the fact that the U.S.S.R., despite 
its cultural backwardness, despite the dearth of 
capital, despite the dearth of technically experienced 
economic cadres, is in a state of increasing economic 
upswing and has achieved decisive successes on the front 
of economic construction, whereas the advanced capitalist 
countries, despite their abundance of capital, their 
abundance of technical cadres and their higher cultural 
level, are in a state of growing economic crisis and in 
the sphere of economic development are suffering defeat 
after defeat? 
The cause lies in the difference in the economic systems 
here and in the capitalist countries. 
The cause lies in the bankruptcy of the capitalist 
system of economy. 
The cause lies in the advantages of the Soviet system 
of economy over the capitalist system. 
What is the Soviet system of economy? 
The Soviet system of economy means that: 
1) the power of the class of capitalists and landlords 
has been overthrown and replaced by the power of 
the working class and labouring peasantry; 
2) the instruments and means of production, the land, 
factories, mills, etc., have been taken from the capitalists 
and transferred to the ownership of the working 
class and the labouring masses of the peasantry; 
3) the development of production is subordinated not 
to the principle of competition and of ensuring capitalist 
profit, but to the principle of planned guidance and

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 331 
of systematically raising the material and cultural level of 
the working people; 
4) the distribution of the national income takes 
place not with a view to enriching the exploiting classes 
and their numerous parasitical hangers-on, but with a 
view to ensuring the systematic improvement of the material 
conditions of the workers and peasants and the expansion 
of socialist production in town and country; 
5) the systematic improvement in the material conditions 
of the working people and the continuous increase 
in their requirements (purchasing power), being a constantly 
increasing source of the expansion of production, 
guarantees the working people against crises of overproduction, 
growth of unemployment and poverty; 
6) the working class and the labouring peasantry are 
the masters of the country, working not for the benefit of 
capitalists, but for their own benefit, the benefit of the 
working people. 
What is the capitalist system of economy? 
The capitalist system of economy means that: 
1) power in the country is in the hands of the capitalists; 
2) the instruments and means of production are concentrated 
in the hands of the exploiters; 
3) production is subordinated not to the principle 
of improving the material conditions of the masses of the 
working people, but to the principle of ensuring high 
capitalist profit; 
4) the distribution of the national income takes 
place not with a view to improving the material conditions 
of the working people, but with a view to ensuring 
the maximum profits for the exploiters;

J. V. S T A L I N 332 
5) capitalist rationalisation and the rapid growth 
of production, the object of which is to ensure high 
profits for the capitalists, encounters an obstacle in 
the shape of the poverty-stricken conditions and the 
decline in the material security of the vast masses of the 
working people, who are not always able to satisfy their 
needs even within the limits of the extreme minimum, 
which inevitably creates the basis for unavoidable crises 
of overproduction, growth of unemployment, mass 
poverty; 
6) the working class and the labouring peasantry 
are exploited, they work not for their own benefit, but 
for the benefit of an alien class, the exploiting class. 
Such are the advantages of the Soviet system of economy 
over the capitalist system. 
Such are the advantages of the socialist organisation 
of economy over the capitalist organisation. 
That is why here, in the U.S.S.R., we have an increasing 
economic upswing, whereas in the capitalist countries 
there is growing economic crisis. 
That is why here, in the U.S.S.R., the increase of mass 
consumption (purchasing power) continuously outstrips 
the growth of production and pushes it forward, whereas 
over there, in the capitalist countries, on the contrary, 
the increase of mass consumption (purchasing power) never 
keeps pace with the growth of production and continuously 
lags behind it, thus dooming industry to crises 
from time to time. 
That is why over there, in the capitalist countries, 
it is considered quite a normal thing during crises to 
destroy ³superfluous² goods and to burn ³superfluous² 
agricultural produce in order to bolster up prices and

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 333 
ensure high profits, whereas here, in the U.S.S.R., anybody 
guilty of such crimes would be sent to a lunatic 
asylum. (Applause.) 
That is why over there, in the capitalist countries, 
the workers go on strike and demonstrate, organising 
a revolutionary struggle against the existing capitalist 
regime, whereas here, in the U.S.S.R., we have the picture 
of great labour emulation among millions of workers 
and peasants who are ready to defend the Soviet 
regime with their lives. 
That is the cause of the stability and security of 
the internal situation in the U.S.S.R. and of the instability 
and insecurity of the internal situation in the 
capitalist countries. 
It must be admitted that a system of economy that 
does not know what to do with its ³superfluous² goods 
and is obliged to burn them at a time when want and 
unemployment, hunger and ruin reign among the 
masses‹such a system of economy pronounces its own 
death sentence. 
The recent years have been a period of practical 
test, an examination period of the two opposite systems 
of economy, the Soviet and capitalist. During these 
years we have heard more than enough prophesies of 
the ³doom,² of the ³downfall² of the Soviet system. 
There has been even more talk and singing about the 
³prosperity² of capitalism. And what has happened? 
These years have proved once again that the capitalist 
system of economy is a bankrupt system, and that the 
Soviet system of economy possesses advantages of which 
not a single bourgeois state, even the most ³democratic,² 
most ³popular,² etc., dares to dream.

J. V. S T A L I N 334 
In his speech at the conference of the R.C.P.(B.) 
in May 1921, Lenin said: 
³At the present time we are exercising our main influence 
on the international revolution by our economic policy. All eyes 
are turned on the Soviet Russian Republic, the eyes of all toilers 
in all countries of the world without exception and without 
exaggeration. This we have achieved. The capitalists cannot hush 
up, conceal, anything, that is why they most of all seize upon 
our economic mistakes and our weakness. That is the field to 
which the struggle has been transferred on a world-wide scale. 
If we solve this problem, we shall have won on an international 
scale surely and finally² (Vol. XXVI, pp. 410-11). 
It must be admitted that our Party is successfully 
carrying out the task set by Lenin. 
9. THE NEXT TASKS 
a) General 
1) First of all there is the problem of the proper 
distribution of industry throughout the U.S.S.R. However 
much we may develop our national economy, we 
cannot avoid the question of how properly to distribute 
industry, which is the leading branch of the national 
economy. The situation at present is that our industry, 
like the whole of our national economy, rests, in the 
main, on the coal and metallurgical base in the Ukraine. 
Naturally, without such a base, the industrialisation 
of the country is inconceivable. Well, the Ukraine fuel 
and metallurgical base serves us as such a base. 
But can this one base satisfy in future the south, 
the central part of the U.S.S.R., the north, the northeast, 
the Far East and Turkestan? All the facts go to

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 335 
show that it cannot. The new feature of the development 
of our national economy is, among other things, that 
this base has already become inadequate for us. The 
new feature is that, while continuing to develop this 
base to the utmost, we must begin immediately to create 
a second coal and metallurgical base. This base must 
be the Urals-Kuznetsk Combine, the combination of 
Kuznetsk coking coal with the ore of the Urals. (Applause.) 
The construction of the automobile works in Nizhni-Novgorod, 
the tractor works in Chelyabinsk, the machine-building 
works in Sverdlovsk, the harvester-combine works 
in Saratov and Novosibirsk; the existence of the growing 
non-ferrous metal industry in Siberia and Kazakhstan, 
which calls for the creation of a network of repair 
shops and a number of major metallurgical factories 
in the east; and, lastly, the decision to erect textile mills 
in Novosibirsk and Turkestan‹all this imperatively 
demands that we should proceed immediately to create 
a second coal and metallurgical base in the Urals. 
You know that the Central Committee of our Party 
expressed itself precisely in this spirit in its resolution 
on the Urals Metal Trust.51 
2) Further, there is the problem of the proper distribution 
of the basic branches of agriculture throughout 
the U.S.S.R., the problem of our regions specialising in 
particular agricultural crops and branches of agriculture. 
Naturally, with small-peasant farming real specialisation 
is impossible. It is impossible because small farming 
being unstable and lacking the necessary reserves, 
each farm is obliged to grow all kinds of crops so that 
in the event of one crop failing it can keep going with 
the others. Naturally, too, it is impossible to organise

J. V. S T A L I N 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
336 
specialisation unless the state possesses certain reserves 
of grain. Now that we have passed over to large-scale 
farming and ensured that the state possesses reserves of 
grain, we can and must set ourselves the task of properly 
organising specialisation according to crops and 
branches of agriculture. The starting point for this is the 
complete solution of the grain problem. I say ³starting 
point,² because unless the grain problem is solved, 
unless a large network of granaries is set up in the livestock, 
cotton, sugar-beet, flax and tobacco districts, it 
will be impossible to promote livestock farming and industrial 
crop cultivation, it will be impossible to organise 
the specialisation of our regions according to crops 
and branches of agriculture. 
The task is to take advantage of the possibilities 
that have opened up and to push this matter forward. 
3) Next comes the problem of cadres both for industry 
and for agriculture. Everybody is aware of the lack 
of technical experience of our economic cadres, of our 
specialists, technicians and business executives. The 
matter is complicated by the fact that a section of the 
specialists, having connections with former owners and 
prompted from abroad, was found to be at the head ofthe 
wrecking activities. The matter is still more complicated 
by the fact that a number of our communist business 
executives failed to display revolutionary vigilance 
and in many cases proved to be under the ideological 
influence of the wrecker elements. Yet, we are faced with 
the colossal task of reconstructing the whole of our 
national economy, for which a large number of new cadres 
capable of mastering the new technology is needed.

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 337 
In view of this, the problem of cadres has become a truly 
vital problem for us. 
This problem is being solved by measures along the 
following lines: 
1) resolute struggle against wreckers; 
2) maximum care and consideration for the vast majority 
of specialists and technicians who have dissociated 
themselves from the wreckers (I have in mind not 
windbags and poseurs of the Ustryalov type, but the 
genuine scientific workers who are working honestly, hand 
in hand with the working class); 
3) the organisation of technical aid from abroad; 
4) sending our business executives abroad to study 
and generally to acquire technical experience; 
5) transferring technical colleges to the respective 
economic organisations with a view to training quickly 
a sufficient number of technicians and specialists from 
people of working-class and peasant origin. 
The task is to develop work for the realisation of 
these measures. 
4) The problem of combating bureaucracy. The danger 
of bureaucracy lies, first of all, in that it keeps concealed 
the colossal reserves latent in the depths of our system 
and prevents them from being utilised, in that it strives 
to nullify the creative initiative of the masses, ties it 
hand and foot with red tape and reduces every new undertaking 
by the Party to petty and useless trivialities. 
The danger of bureaucracy lies, secondly, in that it 
does not tolerate the checking of fulfilment and strives 
to convert the basic directives of the leading organisations 
into mere sheets of paper divorced from life. It is 
not only, and not so much, the old bureaucrats stranded

J. V. S T A L I N 338 
in our institutions who constitute this danger; i t is 
also, and particularly, the new bureaucrats, the Soviet 
bureaucrats; and the ³Communist² bureaucrats are by 
no means the least among them. I have in mind those 
³Communists² who try to substitute bureaucratic orders 
and ³decrees,² in the potency of which they believe 
as in a fetish, for the creative initiative and independent 
activity of the vast masses of the working class and 
peasantry. 
The task is to smash bureaucracy in our institutions 
and organisations, to get rid of bureaucratic ³habits² 
and ³customs² and to clear the way for utilising the 
reserves of our social system, for developing the creative 
initiative and independent activity of the masses. 
That is not an easy task. It cannot be carried out 
³in a trice.² But it must be carried out at all costs if 
we really want to transform our country on the basis 
of socialism. 
In the struggle against bureaucracy, the Party is 
working along four lines: that of developing selfcriticism, 
that of organising the checking of fulfilment, 
that of purging the apparatus and, lastly, that of promoting 
from below to posts in the apparatus devoted 
workers from those of working-class origin. 
The task is to exert every effort to carry out all these 
measures. 
5) The problem of increasing the productivity of labour. 
If there is not a systematic increase in the productivity 
of labour both in industry and agriculture we shall 
not be able to carry out the tasks of reconstruction, we 
shall not only fail to overtake and outstrip the advanced 
capitalist countries, but we shall not even be able to

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 339 
maintain our independent existence. Hence, the problem 
of increasing the productivity of labour is of prime 
importance for us. 
The Partyıs measures for solving this problem are 
along three lines: that of systematically improving the 
material conditions of the working people, that of implanting 
comradely labour discipline in industrial and 
agricultural enterprises, and lastly, that of organising 
socialist emulation and shock-brigade work. All this is 
based on improved technology and the rational organisation 
of labour. 
The task is to further develop the mass campaign for 
carrying out these measures. 
6) The problem of supplies. This includes the questions 
of adequate supplies of necessary produce for the 
working people in town and country, of adapting the 
co-operative apparatus to the needs of the workers and 
peasants, of systematically raising the real wages of 
the workers, of reducing prices of manufactured goods 
and agricultural produce. I have already spoken about 
the shortcomings of the consumersı co-operatives. These 
shortcomings must be eliminated and we must see to 
it that the policy of reducing prices is carried out. As 
regards the inadequate supply of goods (the ³goods shortage²), 
we are now in a position to enlarge the raw materials 
base of light industry and increase the output of 
urban consumer goods. The bread supply can be regarded 
as already assured. The situation is more difficult 
as regards the supply of meat, dairy produce and vegetables. 
Unfortunately, this difficulty cannot be removed 
within a few months. To overcome it will require at 
least a year. In a yearıs time, thanks primarily to the

J. V. S T A L I N 340 
organisation of state farms and collective farms for this 
purpose, we shall be in a position to ensure full supplies 
of meat, dairy produce and vegetables. And what does 
controlling the supply of these products mean when we 
already have grain reserves, textiles, increased housing 
construction for workers and cheap municipal services? 
It means controlling all the principal factors that determine 
the workerıs budget and his real wages. It means 
guaranteeing the rapid rise of workersı real wages surely 
and finally. 
The task is to develop the work of all our organisations 
in this direction. 
7) The problem of credits and currency. The rational 
organisation of credit and correct manoeuvring with 
our financial reserves are of great importance for the 
development of the national economy. The Partyıs 
measures for solving this problem are along two lines: 
that of concentrating all short-term credit operations 
in the State Bank, and that of organising non-cash settlement 
of accounts in the socialised sector. This, firstly, 
transforms the State Bank into a nation-wide apparatus 
for keeping account of the production and distributionof 
goods; and, secondly, it withdraws a large amount of 
currency from circulation. There cannot be the slightest 
doubt that these measures will introduce (are already introducing) 
order in the entire credit system and strengthen 
our chervonets. 
8) The problem of reserves. It has already been stated 
several times, and there is no need to repeat it, that a 
state in general, and our state in particular, cannot do 
without reserves. We have some reserves of grain, goods 
and foreign currency. During this period our comrades

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 341 
have been able to feel the beneficial effects of these reserves. 
But ³some² reserves is not enough. We need 
bigger reserves in every direction. 
Hence, the task is to accumulate reserves. 
b) Industry 
1) The chief problem is to force the development of 
the iron and steel industry. You must bear in mind that 
we have reached and are exceeding the pre-war level 
of pig-iron output only this year, in 1929-30. This is a 
serious threat to the whole of our national economy. 
To remove this threat we must force the development of 
the iron and steel industry. By the end of the five-year 
period we must reach an output not of 10,000,000 tons 
as is laid down in the five-year plan, but of 15- 
17 million tons. We must achieve this aim at all costs 
if we want really to develop the work of industrialising 
our country. 
Bolsheviks must show that they are able to cope 
with this task. 
That does not mean, of course, that we must abandon 
light industry. No, it does not mean that. Until now 
we have been economising in all things, including light 
industry, in order to restore heavy industry. But we have 
already restored heavy industry. Now it only needs to 
be developed further. Now we can turn to light industry 
and push it forward at an accelerated pace. One of the 
new features in the development of our industry is that 
we are now in a position to develop both heavy and 
light industry at an accelerated pace. The overfulfilment 
of the cotton, flax and sugar-beet crop plans this

J. V. S T A L I N 342 
year, and the solution of the problem of kendyr and 
artificial silk, all this shows that we are in a position 
really to push forward light industry. 
2) The problem of rationalisation, reducing production 
costs and improving the quality of production. We can 
no longer tolerate defects in the sphere of rationalisation, 
non-fulfilment of the plan to reduce production 
costs and the outrageous quality of the goods turned out 
by a number of our enterprises. These gaps and defects 
are harmfully affecting the whole of our national economy 
and hindering it from making further progress. It is 
time, high time, that this disgraceful stain was removed. 
Bolsheviks must show that they are able to cope with 
this task. 
3) The problem of one-man management. Infringements 
in the sphere of introducing one-man management 
in the factories are also becoming intolerable. Time and 
again the workers complain: ³There is nobody in control 
in the factory,² ³confusion reigns at work.² We can 
no longer allow our factories to be converted from organisms 
of production into parliaments. Our Party and 
trade-union organisations must at last understand that 
unless we ensure one-man management and establish 
strict responsibility for the way the work proceeds we 
shall not be able to cope with the task of reconstructing 
industry. 
c) Agriculture 
1) The problem of livestock farming and industrial 
crops. Now that we have, in the main, solved the grain 
problem, we can set about solving simultaneously both 
the livestock farming problem, which is a vital one at

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 343 
the present time, and the industrial crops problem. 
In solving these problems we must proceed along the 
same lines as we did in solving the grain problem. That 
is to say, by organising state farms and collective farms, 
which are the strong points for our policy, we must 
gradually transform the technical and economic basis 
of present-day small-peasant livestock farming and industrial 
crops growing. The Livestock Trust, the Sheep 
Trust, the Pig Trust and the Dairy Trust, plus livestock 
collective farms, and the existing state farms and collective 
farms which grow industrial crops‹such are our 
points of departure for solving the problems that face us. 
2) The problem of further promoting the development 
of state farms and collective farms. It is scarcely necessary 
to dwell at length on the point that for us this is the 
primary problem of the whole of our development in 
the countryside. Now, even the blind can see that the 
peasants have made a tremendous, a radical turn from 
the old to the new, from kulak bondage to free collective-
farm life. There is no going back to the old. The 
kulaks are doomed and will be eliminated. Only one 
path remains, the collective-farm path. And the collective-
farm path is no longer for us an unknown and 
unexplored path. It has been explored and tried in a 
thousand ways by the peasant masses themselves. It 
has been explored and appraised as a new path that 
leads the peasants to emancipation from kulak bondage, 
from want and ignorance. That is the basis of our achievements. 
How will the new movement in the countryside develop 
further? In the forefront will be the state farms 
as the backbone of the reorganisation of the old way of

J. V. S T A L I N 344 
life in the countryside. They will be followed by the 
numerous collective farms, as the strong points of the 
new movement in the countryside. The combined 
work of these two systems will create the conditions for 
the complete collectivisation of all the regions in the 
U.S.S.R. 
One of the most remarkable achievements of the 
collective-farm movement is that it has already brought 
to the forefront thousands of organisers and tens of thousands 
of agitators in favour of collective farms from among 
the peasants themselves. Not we alone, the skilled Bolsheviks, 
but the collective-farm peasants themselves, 
tens of thousands of peasant organisers of collective 
farms and agitators in favour of them will now carry 
forward the banner of collectivisation. And the peasant 
agitators are splendid agitators for the collective-farm 
movement, for they will find arguments in favour of 
collective farms, intelligible and acceptable to the rest 
of the peasant masses, of which we skilled Bolsheviks 
cannot even dream. 
Here and there voices are heard saying that we must 
abandon the policy of complete collectivisation. We 
have information that there are advocates of this ³idea² 
even in our Party. That can be said, however, only by 
people who, voluntarily or involuntarily, have joined 
forces with the enemies of communism. The method of 
complete collectivisation is that essential method without 
which it will be impossible to carry out the fiveyear 
plan for the collectivisation of all the regions of 
the U.S.S.R. How can it be abandoned without betraying 
communism, without betraying the interests of the 
working class and peasantry?

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 345 
This does not mean, of course, that everything will 
go ³smoothly² and ³normally² for us in the collectivefarm 
movement. There will still be vacillation within 
the collective farms. There will still be flows and ebbs. 
But this cannot and must not daunt the builders of the 
collective-farm movement. Still less can it serve as a 
serious obstacle to the powerful development of the 
collective-farm movement. A sound movement, such as our 
collective-farm movement undoubtedly is, will achieve 
its goal in spite of everything, in spite of individual 
obstacles and difficulties. 
The task is to train the forces and to arrange for the 
further development of the collective-farm movement. 
3) The problem of bringing the apparatus as close 
as possible to the districts and villages. There can be no 
doubt that we would have been unable to cope with the 
enormous task of reconstructing agriculture and of developing 
the collective-farm movement had we not carried 
out redelimitation of administrative areas. The enlargement 
of the volosts and their transformation into districts, 
the abolition of gubernias and their transformation 
into smaller units (okrugs), and lastly, the 
formation of regions as direct strong points of the 
Central Committee‹such are the general features of 
this redelimitation. Its object is to bring the Party 
and Soviet and the economic and co-operative 
apparatus closer to the districts and villages in order 
to make possible the timely solution of the vexed questions 
of agriculture, of its upswing, of its reconstruction. 
In this sense, I repeat, the redelimitation of administrative 
areas has been of immense benefit to the 
whole of our development.

J. V. S T A L I N 346 
But has everything been done to bring the apparatus 
really and effectively closer to the districts and villages? 
No, not everything. The centre of gravity of collective-
farm development has now shifted to the district 
organisations. They are the centres on which converge 
all the threads of collective-farm development and of 
all other economic work in the countryside, as regards 
both co-operatives and Soviets, credits and procurements. 
Are the district organisations adequately supplied with 
the workers they need, and must have, to cope with all 
these diverse tasks? There can be no doubt that they 
are extremely inadequately staffed. What is the way out? 
What must be done to correct this defect and to supply 
the district organisations with a sufficient number of 
the workers required for all branches of our work? At 
least two things must be done: 
1) abolish the okrugs (applause), which are becoming 
an unnecessary barrier between the region and 
the districts, and use the released okrug personnel to 
strengthen the district organisations; 
2) link the district organisations directly with the 
region (Territorial Committee, national Central Committee). 
That will complete the redelimitation of administrative 
areas, complete the process of bringing the apparatus 
closer to the districts and villages. 
There was applause here at the prospect of abolishing 
the okrugs. Of course, the okrugs must be abolished. 
It would be a mistake, however, to think that this gives 
us the right to decry the okrugs, as some comrades do 
in the columns of Pravda. It must not be forgotten that 
the okrugs have shouldered the burden of tremendous

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 347 
work, and in their time played a great historical role. 
(Applause.) 
I also think that it would be a mistake to display 
too much haste in abolishing the okrugs. The Central 
Committee has adopted a decision to abolish the okrugs.
52 It is not at all of the opinion, however, that this 
must be done immediately. Obviously, the necessary 
preparatory work must be carried out before the okrugs 
are abolished. 
d) Transport 
Lastly, the transport problem. There is no need to 
dwell at length on the enormous importance of transport 
for the whole of the national economy. And not 
only for the national economy. As you know, transport 
is of the utmost importance also for the defence of the 
country. In spite of the enormous importance of transport, 
however, the transport system, the reconstruction 
of this system, still lags behind the general rate of development. 
Does it need to be proved that in such a situation 
we run the risk of transport becoming a ³bottleneck² 
in the national economy, capable of retarding our 
progress? Is it not time to put an end to this situation? 
Matters are particularly bad as regards river transport. 
It is a fact that the Volga steamship service has 
barely reached 60 per cent, and the Dnieper steamship 
service 40 per cent, of the pre-war level. Sixty and forty 
per cent of the pre-war level‹this is all that river transport 
can enter in its record of ³achievements.² A big 
³achievement² to be sure! Is it not time to put an end 
to this disgrace? (Voices: ³It is.²)

J. V. S T A L I N 348 
The task is to tackle the transport problem, at last, 
in the Bolshevik manner and to get ahead with it 
* 
* 
* 
Such are the Partyıs next tasks. 
What is needed to carry out these tasks? 
Primarily and chiefly, what is needed is to continue 
the sweeping offensive against the capitalist elements 
along the whole front and to carry it through to 
the end. 
That is the centre and basis of our policy at the 
present time. (Applause.) 
III 
THE PARTY 
I pass to the question of the Party. 
I have spoken about the advantages of the Soviet 
system of economy over the capitalist system. I have 
spoken about the colossal possibilities that our social 
system affords us in fighting for the complete victory 
of socialism. I said that without these possibilities, 
without utilising them, we could not have achieved the 
successes gained by us in the past period. 
But the question arises: has the Party been able to 
make proper use of the possibilities afforded us by the 
Soviet system; has it not kept these possibilities concealed, 
thereby preventing the working class from fully 
developing its revolutionary might; has it been able 
to squeeze out of these possibilities all that could be 
squeezed out of them for the purpose of promoting 
socialist construction along the whole front?

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 349 
The Soviet system provides colossal possibilities 
for the complete victory of socialism. But possibility 
is not actuality. To transform possibility into actuality 
a number of conditions are needed, among which the 
Partyıs line and the correct carrying out of this line 
play by no means the least role. 
Some examples. 
The Right opportunists assert that NEP guarantees 
us the victory of socialism; therefore, there is no need 
to worry about the rate of industrialisation, about developing 
state farms and collective farms, and so forth, 
because the arrival of victory is assured in any case, 
automatically, so to speak. That, of course, is wrong 
and absurd. To speak like that means denying the Partyıs 
role in the building of socialism, denying the Partyıs 
responsibility for the-work of building socialism. 
Lenin by no means said that NEP guarantees us the victory 
of socialism. Lenin merely said that ³economically 
and politically, NEP fully ensures us the possibility of 
laying the foundation of a socialist economy.²53 But 
possibility is not yet actuality. To convert possibility into 
actuality we must first of all cast aside the opportunist 
theory of things going of their own accord, we must rebuild 
(reconstruct) our national economy and conduct 
a determined offensive against the capitalist elements 
in town and country. 
The Right opportunists assert, further, that there 
are no grounds inherent in our social system for a split 
between the working class and the peasantry‹consequently 
we need not worry about establishing a correct 
policy in regard to the social groups in the countryside, 
because the kulaks will grow into socialism in any case,

J. V. S T A L I N 350 
and the alliance of the workers and peasants will be guaranteed 
automatically, so to speak. That, too, is wrong 
and absurd. Such a thing can be said only by people who 
fail to understand that the policy of the Party, and especially 
because it is a party that is in power, is the 
chief factor that determines the fate of the alliance of 
the workers and peasants. Lenin by no means considered 
that the danger of a split between the working class 
and the peasantry was out of the question. Lenin said 
that ³the grounds for such a split are not necessarily 
inherent in our social system,² but ³if serious class disagreements 
arise between these classes, a split will be 
inevitable.² 
In view of this, Lenin considered that: 
³The chief task of our Central Committee and Central Control 
Commission, as well as of our Party as a whole, is to watch 
very closely for the circumstances that may cause a split and to 
forestall them; for, in the last resort, the fate of our Republic 
will depend on whether the masses of the peasants march with 
the working class and keep true to the alliance with it, or whether 
they permit the ŒNepmen,ı i.e., the new bourgeoisie, to drive 
a wedge between them and the workers, to split them off from the 
workers.²54 
Consequently, a split between the working class and 
the peasantry is not precluded, but it is not at all inevitable, 
for inherent in our social system is the possibility 
of preventing such a split and of strengthening 
the alliance of the working class and peasantry. What 
is needed to convert this possibility into actuality? To 
convert the possibility of preventing a split into actuality 
we must first of all bury the opportunist theory of 
things going of their own accord, tear out the roots

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 351 
of capitalism by organising collective farms and state 
farms, and pass from the policy of restricting the exploiting 
tendencies of the kulaks to the policy of eliminating 
the kulaks as a class. 
It follows, therefore, that a strict distinction must 
be drawn between the possibilities inherent in our social 
system and the utilisation of these possibilities, the 
conversion of these possibilities into actuality. 
It follows that cases are quite conceivable when 
the possibilities of victory exist, but the Party does 
not see them, or is incapable of utilising them properly, 
with the result that instead of victory there may come 
defeat. 
And so the same question arises: Has the Party been 
able to make proper use of the possibilities and advantages 
afforded us by the Soviet system? Has it done everything 
to convert these possibilities into actuality and thus 
guarantee the maximum success for our work of construction? 
In other words: Has the Party and its Central Committee 
correctly guided the building of socialism in the 
past period? 
What is needed for correct leadership by the Party 
under our present conditions? 
For correct leadership by the Party it is necessary, 
apart from everything else, that the Party should have 
a correct line; that the masses should understand that 
the Partyıs line is correct and should actively support 
it; that the Party should not confine itself to drawing up 
a general line, but should day by day guide the 
carrying out of this line; that the Party should wage a determined 
struggle against deviations from the general

J. V. S T A L I N 352 
line and against conciliation towards such deviations; 
that in the struggle against deviations the Party should 
forge the unity of its ranks and iron discipline. 
What has the Party and its Central Committee done 
to fulfil these conditions? 
1. QUESTIONS OF THE GUIDANCE OF SOCIALIST 
CONSTRUCTION 
a) The Partyıs principal line at the present moment 
is transition from the offensive of socialism on separate 
sectors of the economic front to an offensive along the 
whole front both in industry and in agriculture. 
The Fourteenth Congress was mainly the congress 
of industrialisation. 
The Fifteenth Congress was mainly the congress of 
collectivisation. 
This was the preparation for the general offensive. 
As distinct from the past stages, the period before the 
Sixteenth Congress was a period of the general offensive 
of socialism along the whole front, a period of intensified 
socialist construction both in industry and in agriculture. 
The Sixteenth Congress of the Party is the congress 
of the sweeping offensive of socialism along the whole 
front, of the elimination of the kulaks as a class, and 
of the realisation of complete collectivisation. 
There you have in a few words the essence of our 
Partyıs general line. 
Is this line correct? 
Yes, it is correct. The facts show that our Partyıs 
general line is the only correct line. (Applause.) 
This is proved by our successes and achievements on 
the front of socialist construction. It was not and cannot

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 353 
be the case that the decisive victory won by the Party on 
the front of socialist construction in town and country 
during the past period was the result of an incorrect policy. 
Only a correct general line could give us such a victory. 
It is proved by the frenzied howl against our Partyıs 
policy raised lately by our class enemies, the capitalists 
and their press, the Pope and bishops of all kinds, the 
Social-Democrats and the ³Russian² Mensheviks of the 
Abramovich and Dan type. The capitalists and their 
lackeys are abusing our Party‹that is a sign that our 
Partyıs general line is correct. (Applause.) 
It is proved by the fate of Trotskyism, with which 
everybody is now familiar. The gentlemen in the Trotsky 
camp chattered about the ³degeneration² of the Soviet 
regime, about ³Thermidor,² about the ³inevitable victory² 
of Trotskyism, and so forth. But, actually, what 
happened? What happened was the collapse, the end of 
Trotskyism. One section of the Trotskyists, as is known, 
broke away from Trotskyism and in numerous declarations 
of its representatives admitted that the Party was 
right, and acknowledged the counter-revolutionary character 
of Trotskyism. Another section of the Trotskyists 
really degenerated into typical petty-bourgeois counterrevolutionaries, 
and actually became an information 
bureau of the capitalist press on matters concerning the 
C.P.S.U.(B.). But the Soviet regime, which was to have 
³degenerated² (or ³had already degenerated²), continues 
to thrive and to build socialism, successfully breaking 
the backbone of the capitalist elements in our country 
and their petty-bourgeois yes-men. 
It is proved by the fate of the Right deviators, with 
which everybody is now familiar. They chattered and

J. V. S T A L I N 354 
howled about the Party line being ³fatal,² about the 
³probable catastrophe² in the U.S.S.R., about the necessity 
of ³saving² the country from the Party and its 
leadership, and so forth. But what actually happened? 
What actually happened was that the Party achieved 
gigantic successes on all the fronts of socialist construction, 
whereas the group of Right deviators, who wanted 
to ³save² the country but who later admitted that they 
were wrong, are now left high and dry. 
It is proved by the growing revolutionary activity 
of the working class and peasantry, by the active support 
for the Partyıs policy by the vast masses of the working 
people, and lastly, by that unprecedented labour enthusiasm 
of the workers and peasant collective farmers, 
the immensity of which astonishes both the friends and 
the enemies of our country. That is apart from such signs 
of the growth of confidence in the Party as the applications 
from workers to join the Party in whole shops 
and factories, the growth of the Party membership between 
the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Congresses by over 
600,000, and the 200,000 new members who joined the 
Party in the first quarter of this year alone. What does 
all this show if not that the vast masses of the working 
people realise that our Partyıs policy is correct and are 
ready to support it? 
It must be admitted that these facts would not have 
existed if our Partyıs general line had not been the only 
correct one. 
b) But the Party cannot confine itself to drawing 
up a general line. It must also, from day to day, keep 
check on how the general line is being carried out in 
practice. It must guide the carrying out of the general

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 355 
line, improving and perfecting the adopted plans of 
economic development in the course of the work, and 
correcting and preventing mistakes. 
How has the Central Committee of our Party performed 
this work? 
The Central Committeeıs work in this sphere has proceeded 
mainly along the line of amending and giving 
precision to the five-year plan by accelerating tempo 
and shortening time schedules, along the line of checking 
the economic organisationsı fulfilment of the assignments 
laid down. 
Here are a few of the principal decisions adopted 
by the Central Committee amending the five-year plan 
in the direction of speeding up the rate of development 
and shortening time schedules of fulfilment. 
In the iron and steel industry: the five-year plan 
provides for the output of pig-iron to be brought up to 
10,000,000 tons in the last year of the five-year period; 
the Central Committeeıs decision, however, found that 
this level is not sufficient, and laid it down that in the 
last year of the five-year period the output of pig-iron 
must be brought up to 17,000,000 tons. 
Tractor construction: the five-year plan provides for 
the output of tractors to be brought up to 55,000 in the 
last year of the five-year period; the Central Committeeıs 
decision, however, found that this target is not sufficient, 
and laid it down that the output of tractors in 
the last year of the five-year period must be brought 
up to 170,000. 
The same must be said about automobile construction, 
where, instead of an output of 100,000 cars (lorries 
and passenger cars) in the last year of the five-year

J. V. S T A L I N 356 
period as provided for in the five-year plan, it was decided 
to bring it up to 200,000. 
The same applies to non-ferrous metallurgy, where 
the five-year plan estimates were raised by more than 
100 per cent; and to agricultural machine-building, where 
the five-year plan estimates were also raised by over 100 
per cent. 
That is apart from harvester-combine building, for 
which no provision at all was made in the five-year plan, 
and the output of which must be brought up to at least 
40,000 in the last year of the five-year period. 
State-farm development: the five-year plan provides 
for the expansion of the crop area to be brought up 
to 5,000,000 hectares by the end of the five-year period; 
the Central Committeeıs decision, however, found that 
this level was not sufficient and laid it down that by 
the end of the five-year period the state-farm crop area 
must be brought up to 18,000,000 hectares. 
Collective-farm development: the five-year plan provides 
for the expansion of the crop area to be brought 
up to 20,000,000 hectares by the end of the five-year 
period; the Central Committeeıs decision, however, found 
that this level was obviously not sufficient (it has already 
been exceeded this year) and laid it down that by the 
end of the five-year period the collectivisation of the 
U.S.S.R. should, in the main, be completed, and by that 
time the collective-farm crop area should cover ninetenths 
of the crop area of the U.S.S.R. now cultivated 
by individual farmers. (Applause.) 
And so on and so forth. 
Such, in general, is the picture of the way the Central 
Committee is guiding the carrying out of the Par

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 357 
tyıs general line, the planning of socialist construction. 
It may be said that in altering the estimates of the 
five-year plan so radically the Central Committee is 
violating the principle of planning and is discrediting 
the planning organisations. But only hopeless bureaucrats 
can talk like that. For us Bolsheviks, the five-year plan 
is not something fixed once and for all. For us the fiveyear 
plan, like every other, is merely a plan adopted 
as a first approximation, which has to be made more 
precise, altered and perfected in conformity with the 
experience gained in the localities, with the experience 
gained in carrying out the plan. No five-year plan 
can take into account all the possibilities latent 
in the depths of our system and which reveal themselves 
only in the course of the work, in the course of 
carrying out the plan in the factory and mill, in the collective 
farm and state farm, in the district, and so forth. 
Only bureaucrats can think that the work of planning 
ends with the drafting of a plan. The drafting of a plan 
is only the beginning of planning. Real guidance in planning 
develops only after the plan has been drafted, after 
it has been tested in the localities, in the course of 
carrying it out, correcting it and making it more precise. 
That is why the Central Committee and the Central 
Control Commission, jointly with the planning bodies 
of the Republic, deemed it necessary to correct and improve 
the five-year plan on the basis of experience, in 
the direction of speeding up the rate of development and 
shortening time schedules of fulfilment. 
Here is what Lenin said about the principle of planning 
and guidance in planning at the Eighth Congress

J. V. S T A L I N 358 
of Soviets, when the ten-year plan of the GOELRO55 
was being discussed: 
³Our Party programme cannot remain merely a Party programme. 
It must become the programme of our economic work 
of construction, otherwise it is useless even as a Party programme. 
It must be supplemented by a second Party programme, by a plan 
for the restoration of our entire national economy and for raising 
it to the level of modern technology. . . . We must come to the 
point of adopting a certain plan; of course, this will be a plan 
adopted only as a first approximation. This Party programme will 
not be as unalterable as our actual Party programme, which can 
be altered only at Party congresses. No, this programme will 
be improved, worked out, perfected and altered every day, in 
every workshop, in every volost. . . . Watching the experience 
of science and practice, the people of the localities must undeviatingly 
strive to get the plan carried out earlier than had been provided 
for, in order that the masses may see that the long period 
that separates us from the complete restoration of industry can 
be shortened by experience. This depends upon us. Let us in every 
workshop, in every railway depot, in every sphere, improve our 
economy, and then we shall reduce the period. And we are already 
reducing it² (Vol. XXVI, pp. 45, 46, 43). 
As you see, the Central Committee has followed the 
path indicated by Lenin, altering and improving the 
five-year plan, shortening time schedules and speeding 
up the rate of development. 
On what possibilities did the Central Committee 
rely when speeding up the rate of development and shortening 
the time schedules for carrying out the five-year 
plan? On the reserves latent in the depths of our system and 
revealed only in the course of the work, on the possibilities 
afforded us by the reconstruction period. The 
Central Committee is of the opinion that the reconstruction 
of the technical basis of industry and agriculture

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 359 
under the socialist organisation of production creates such 
possibilities of accelerating tempo as no capitalist country 
can dream of. 
These circumstances alone can explain the fact that 
during the past three years our socialist industry has 
more than doubled its output and that the output of 
this industry in 1930-31 should be 47 per cent above 
that of the current year, while the volume of this increase 
alone will be equal to the volume of output of the entire 
pre-war large-scale industry. 
These circumstances alone can explain the fact that 
the five-year plan of state-farm development is being 
overfulfilled in three years, while that of collectivefarm 
development has already been overfulfilled in two 
years. 
There is a theory according to which high rates of 
development are possible only in the restoration period 
and that with the transition to the reconstruction period 
the rate of development must diminish sharply year by 
year. This theory is called the theory of the ³descending 
curve.² It is a theory for justifying our backwardness. 
It has nothing in common with Marxism, with Leninism. 
It is a bourgeois theory, designed to perpetuate the 
backwardness of our country. Of the people who 
have had, or have, connection with our Party, only the 
Trotskyists and Right deviators uphold and preach this 
theory. 
There exists an opinion that the Trotskyists are 
superindustrialists. But this opinion is only partly correct. 
It is correct only insofar as it applies to the end 
of the restoration period, when the Trotskyists did, indeed, 
develop superindustrialist fantasies. As regards

J. V. S T A L I N 360 
the reconstruction period, however, the Trotskyists, on 
the question of tempo, are the most extreme minimalists 
and the most wretched capitulators. (Laughter. Applause.) 
In their platforms and declarations the Trotskyists 
gave no figures concerning tempo, they confined themselves 
to general chatter about tempo. But there is one 
document in which the Trotskyists did depict in figures 
their understanding of the rate of development of state 
industry. I am referring to the memorandum of the 
³Special Conference on the Restoration of Fixed Capital² 
of state industry (OSVOK) drawn up on the principles 
of Trotskyism. It will be interesting briefly to analyse 
this document, which dates back to 1925-26. It will be 
interesting to do so, because it fully reflects the Trotskyist 
scheme of the descending curve. 
According to this document, it was proposed to invest 
in state industry 1,543,000,000 rubles in 1926-27; 
1,490,000,000 rubles in 1927-28; 1,320,000,000 rubles in 
1928-29; 1,060,000,000 rubles in 1929-30 (at 1926-27 
prices). 
Such is the picture of the descending Trotskyist curve. 
But how much did we actually invest? Actually we 
invested in state industry 1,065,000,000 rubles in 1926- 
27; 1,304,000,000 rubles in 1927-28, 1,819,000,000 rubles 
in 1928-29; 4,775,000,000 rubles in 1929-30 (at 1926-27 
prices). 
Such is the picture of the ascending Bolshevik curve. 
According to this document, the output of state industry 
was to increase by 31.6 per cent in 1926-27, by 
22.9 per cent in 1927-28; by 15.5 per cent in 1928-29; 
by 15 per cent in 1929-30. 
Such is the picture of the descending Trotskyist curve.

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 361 
But what actually happened? Actually, the increase 
in the output of state industry was 19.7 per cent in 
1926-27; 26.3 per cent in 1927-28; 24.3 per cent in 
1928-29; 32 per cent in 1929-30, and in 1930-31 the 
increase will amount to 47 per cent. 
Such is the picture of the ascending Bolshevik curve. 
As you know, Trotsky specially advocates this defeatist 
theory of the descending curve in his pamphlet 
Towards Socialism or Capitalism? He plainly says there 
that since ³before the war, the expansion of industry 
consisted, in the main, in the construction of new factories,² 
whereas ³in our times expansion, to a much larger 
degree, consists in utilising the old factories and in 
keeping the old equipment running,² therefore, it ³naturally 
follows that with the completion of the restoration 
process the coefficient of growth must considerably diminish,² 
and so he proposes that ³during the next few 
years the coefficient of industrial growth be raised not 
only to twice, but to three times the pre-war 6 per cent, 
and perhaps even higher.² 
Thus, three times six per cent annual increase of 
industry. How much does that amount to? Only to an 
increase of 18 per cent per annum. Hence, 18 per cent 
annual increase in the output of state industry is, in 
the opinion of the Trotskyists, the highest limit that 
can be reached in planning to accelerate development 
in the reconstruction period, to be striven for as the ideal. 
Compare this pettifogging sagacity of the Trotskyists 
with the actual increase in output that we have had 
during the last three years (1927-28‹26.3 per cent, 
1928-29‹24.3 per cent, 1929-30‹32 per cent); compare 
this defeatist philosophy of the Trotskyists with the

J. V. S T A L I N 362 
estimates in the control figures of the State Planning 
Commission for 1930-31 of a 47 per cent increase, which 
exceeds the highest rate of increase of output in the 
restoration period, and you will realise how utterly reactionary 
is the Trotskyist theory of the ³descending 
curve,² the utter lack of faith of the Trotskyists in the 
possibilities of the reconstruction period. 
That is why the Trotskyists are now singing about 
the ³excessive² Bolshevik rates of industrial and collective-
farm development. 
That is why the Trotskyists cannot now be distinguished 
from our Right deviators. 
Naturally, if we had not shattered the Trotskyist- 
Right-deviation theory of the ³descending curve,² we 
should not have been able either to develop real planning 
or to accelerate tempo and shorten time schedules 
of development. In order to guide the carrying out of 
the Partyıs general line, to correct and improve the fiveyear 
plan of development, to accelerate tempo and to prevent 
mistakes in the work of construction, it was necessary 
first of all to shatter and liquidate the reactionary 
theory of the ³descending curve.² 
That is what the Central Committee did, as I have 
already said.
2. QUESTIONS OF THE GUIDANCE 
OF INNER-PARTY AFFAIRS 
It may be thought that the work of guiding socialist 
construction, the work of carrying out the Partyıs general 
line, has proceeded in our Party calmly and smoothly, 
without struggle or tense effort of will. But that is

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 363 
not so, comrades. Actually, this work has proceeded 
amid a struggle against inner-Party difficulties, amid 
a struggle against all sorts of deviations from Leninism 
both as regards general policy and as regards the national 
question. Our Party does not live and operate 
in a vacuum. It lives and operates in the thick of life 
and is subjected to the influence of the surrounding 
environment. And our environment, as you know, consists 
of different classes and social groups. We have 
launched a sweeping offensive against the capitalist 
elements, we have pushed our socialist industry far 
forward, we have widely developed the formation of 
state farms and collective farms. Events like these, 
however, cannot but affect the exploiting classes. These 
events are usually accompanied by the ruin of the moribund 
classes, by the ruin of the kulaks in the countryside, 
by the restriction of the field of activity of the pettybourgeois 
strata in the towns. Naturally, a l l this 
cannot but intensify the class struggle, the resistance 
of the moribund classes to the Soviet governmentıs policy. 
It would be ridiculous to think that the resistance 
of these classes will not find reflection in some way 
or other in the ranks of our Party. And it does indeed 
find reflection in the Party. All the various deviations 
from the Leninist line in the ranks of our Party are a 
reflection of the resistance of the moribund classes. 
Is it possible to wage a successful struggle against 
class enemies without at the same time combating deviations 
in our Party, without overcoming these deviations? 
No, it is not. That is because it is impossible 
to develop a real struggle against class enemies while 
having their agents in our rear, while leaving in our

J. V. S T A L I N 364 
rear people who have no faith in our cause, and who 
strive in every way to hinder our progress. 
Hence an uncompromising struggle against deviations 
from the Leninist line is an immediate task of the Party. 
Why is the Right deviation the chief danger in the 
Party at the present time? Because it reflects the kulak 
danger; and at the present moment, the moment of the 
sweeping offensive and the tearing out of the roots of 
capitalism, the kulak danger is the chief danger in the 
country. 
What did the Central Committee have to do to overcome 
the Right deviation, to deliver the finishing stroke 
to the ³Left² deviation and clear the way for rallying 
the Party to the utmost around the Leninist line? 
a) It had, first of all, to put an end to the remnants 
of Trotskyism in the Party, to the survivals of the Trotskyist 
theory. We had long ago routed the Trotskyist 
group as an opposition, and had expelled it. The Trotskyist 
group is now an anti-proletarian and anti-Soviet 
counter-revolutionary group, which is zealously informing 
the bourgeoisie about the affairs of our Party. But 
the remnants of the Trotskyist theory, the survivals of 
Trotskyism, have not yet been completely swept out of 
the Party. Hence, the first thing to be done was to put 
an end to these survivals. 
That is the essence of Trotskyism? 
The essence of Trotskyism is, first of all, denial 
of the possibility of completely building socialism in 
the U.S.S.R. by the efforts of the working class and 
peasantry of our country. What does this mean? It 
means that if a victorious world revolution does not 
come to our aid in the near future, we shall have to sur

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 365 
render to the bourgeoisie and clear the way for a bourgeois-
democratic republic. Consequently, we have here the 
bourgeois denial of the possibility of completely building 
socialism in our country, disguised by ³revolution 
ary² phrases about the victory of the world revolution. 
Is it possible, while holding such views, to rouse 
the labour enthusiasm of the vast masses of the working 
class, to rouse them for socialist emulation, for mass 
shock-brigade work, for a sweeping offensive against 
the capitalist elements? Obviously not. It would be foolish 
to think that our working class, which has made 
three revolutions, will display labour enthusiasm and 
engage in mass shock-brigade work in order to manure 
the soil for capitalism. Our working class is displaying 
labour enthusiasm not for the sake of capitalism, but 
in order to bury capitalism once and for all and to build 
socialism in the U.S.S.R. Take from it its confidence in 
the possibility of building socialism, and you will completely 
destroy the basis for emulation, for labour enthusiasm, 
for shock-brigade work. 
Hence the conclusion: in order to rouse labour enthusiasm 
and emulation among the working class and to 
organise a sweeping offensive, it was necessary, first of 
all, to bury the bourgeois theory of Trotskyism that it is 
impossible to build socialism in our country. 
The essence of Trotskyism is, secondly, denial of 
the possibility of drawing the main mass of the peasantry 
into the work of socialist construction in the countryside. 
What does this mean? It means that the working 
class is incapable of leading the peasantry in the work 
of transferring the individual peasant farms to collectivist 
lines, that if the victory of the world revolution

J. V. S T A L I N 366 
does not come to the aid of the working class in the near 
future, the peasantry will restore the old bourgeois 
order. Consequently, we have here the bourgeois denial 
of the capacity or possibility of the proletarian dictatorship 
to lead the peasantry to socialism, disguised by a 
mask of ³revolutionary² phrases about the victory of the 
world revolution. 
Is it possible, while holding such views, to rouse 
the peasant masses for the collective-farm movement, 
to organise a mass collective-farm movement, to organise 
the elimination of the kulaks as a class? Obviously not. 
Hence the conclusion: in order to organise a mass 
collective-farm movement of the peasantry and to eliminate 
the kulaks, it was necessary, first of all, to bury 
the bourgeois theory of Trotskyism that it is impossible 
to bring the labouring masses of the peasantry to 
socialism. 
The essence of Trotskyism is, lastly, denial of the 
necessity for iron discipline in the Party, recognition 
of freedom for factional groupings in the Party, recognition 
of the need to form a Trotskyist party. According 
to Trotskyism, the C.P.S.U.(B.) must be not a single, 
united militant party, but a collection of groups and factions, 
each with its own centre, its own discipline, its 
own press, and so forth. What does this mean? It means 
proclaiming freedom for political factions in the Party. 
It means that freedom for political groupings in the 
Party must be followed by freedom for political parties 
in the country, i.e., bourgeois democracy. Consequently, 
we have here recognition of freedom for factional groupings 
in the Party right up to permitting political parties 
in the land of the dictatorship of the proletariat, disguised

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 367 
by phrases about ³inner-party democracy,² about ³improving 
the regime² in the Party. That freedom for factional 
squabbling of groups of intellectuals is not innerparty 
democracy, that the widely-developed self-criticism 
conducted by the Party and the colossal activity of 
the mass of the Party membership is real and genuine 
inner-party democracy‹Trotskyism cannot understand. 
Is it possible, while holding such views about the 
Party, to ensure iron discipline in the Party, to ensure 
the iron unity of the Party that is essential for waging a 
successful struggle against class enemies? Obviously not. 
Hence the conclusion: in order to guarantee the iron 
unity of the Party and proletarian discipline in it, it was 
necessary, first of all, to bury the Trotskyist theory of 
organisation. 
Capitulation in practice as the content, ³Left² phrases 
and ³revolutionary² adventurist postures, as the form 
disguising and advertising the defeatist content‹such 
is the essence of Trotskyism. 
This duality of Trotskyism reflects the duality of 
the position of the urban petty bourgeoisie, which is 
being ruined, cannot tolerate the ³regime² of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat and is striving either to jump 
into socialism ³at one go² in order to avoid being ruined 
(hence adventurism and hysterics in policy), or, if this 
is impossible, to make every conceivable concession to 
capitalism (hence capitulation in policy). 
This duality of Trotskyism explains why it usually 
crowns its supposedly ³furious² attacks on the Right deviators 
by a bloc with them, as undisguised capitulators. 
And what are the ³Left² excesses that have occurred 
in the Party in connection with the collective-farm

J. V. S T A L I N 368 
movement? They represent a certain attempt, true an unconscious 
one, to revive among us the traditions of Trotskyism 
in practice, to revive the Trotskyist attitude 
towards the middle peasantry. They are the result of 
that mistake in policy which Lenin called ³over-administration.² 
This means that some of our comrades, infatuated 
by the successes of the collective-farm movement, 
began to approach the problem of collective-farm development 
not as builders, but mainly as administrators 
and, as a result, committed a number of very gross 
mistakes. 
There are people in our Party who think that the 
³Left² distorters should not have been pulled up. They 
think that our officials should not have been taken to task 
and their infatuation should not have been counteracted 
even though it led to mistakes. That is nonsense, comrades. 
Only people who are determined to swim with 
the stream, can talk like that. These are the very same 
people who can never understand the Leninist policy of 
going against the stream when the situation demands 
it, when the interests of the Party demand it. They are 
khvostists, not Leninists. The reason why the Party 
succeeded in turning whole detachments of our comrades 
on to the right road, the reason why the Party succeeded 
in rectifying mistakes and achieving successes is just 
because it resolutely went against the stream in order 
to carry out the Partyıs general line. That is Leninism 
in practice, Leninism in leadership. 
That is why I think that if we had not overcome 
the ³Left² excesses we could not have achieved the successes 
in the collective-farm movement that we have 
now achieved.

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 369 
That is how matters stand as regards the struggle 
against the survivals of Trotskyism and against the recurrence 
of them in practice. 
Matters are somewhat different as regards Right opportunism, 
which was, or is, headed by Bukharin, Rykov 
and Tomsky. 
It cannot be said that the Right deviators do not 
admit the possibility of completely building socialism 
in the U.S.S.R. No, they do admit it, and that is what 
distinguishes them from the Trotskyists. But the misfortune 
of the Right deviators is that, while formally 
admitting that it is possible to build socialism in one 
country, they refuse to recognise the ways and means 
of struggle without which it is impossible to build socialism. 
They refuse to admit that the utmost development 
of industry is the key to the transformation of 
the entire national economy on the basis of socialism. 
They refuse to admit the uncompromising class struggle 
against the capitalist elements and the sweeping offensive 
of socialism against capitalism. They fail to understand 
that all these ways and means constitute the 
system of measures without which it is impossible to 
retain the dictatorship of the proletariat and to build 
socialism in our country. They think that socialism can 
be built on the quiet, automatically, without class struggle, 
without an offensive against the capitalist elements. 
They think that the capitalist elements will either die 
out imperceptibly or grow into socialism. As, however, 
such miracles do not happen in history, it follows that 
the Right deviators are in fact slipping into the viewpoint 
of denying the possibility of completely building socialism 
in our country.

J. V. S T A L I N 370 
Nor can it be said that the Right deviators deny 
that it is possible to draw the main mass of the peasantry 
into the work of building socialism in the countryside. 
No, they admit that it is possible, and that is what distinguishes 
them from the Trotskyists. But while admitting 
it formally, they will not accept the ways and means 
without which it is impossible to draw the peasantry 
into the work of building socialism. They refuse to 
admit that state farms and collective farms are the principal 
means and the ³high road² for drawing the main 
mass of the peasantry into the work of building socialism. 
They refuse to admit that unless the policy of eliminating 
the kulaks as a class is carried out it will be 
impossible to transform the countryside on the basis of 
socialism. They think that the countryside can be transferred 
to socialist lines on the quiet, automatically, without 
class struggle, merely with the aid of supply and 
marketing co-operatives, for they are convinced that 
the kulaks themselves will grow into socialism. They 
think that the chief thing now is not a high rate of industrial 
development, and not collective farms and state 
farms, but to ³release² the elemental forces of the market, 
to ³emancipate² the market and to ³remove the 
shackles² from the individual farms, up to and including 
those of the capitalist elements in the countryside. 
As, however, the kulaks cannot grow into socialism, 
and ³emancipating² the market means arming the 
kulaks and disarming the working class, i t follows 
that the Right deviators are in fact slipping into the 
viewpoint of denying that it is possible to draw the 
main mass of the peasantry into the work of building 
socialism.

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
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371 
It is this, really, that explains why the Right deviators 
usually crown their sparring with the Trotskyists 
by backstairs negotiations with them on the subject of 
a bloc with them. 
The chief evil of Right opportunism is that it 
breaks with the Leninist conception of the class struggle 
and slips into the viewpoint of petty-bourgeois liberalism. 
There can be no doubt that the victory of the Right 
deviation in our Party would have meant completely 
disarming the working class, arming the capitalist elements 
in the countryside and increasing the chances 
of the restoration of capitalism in the U.S.S.R. 
The Right deviators do not take the stand of forming 
another party, and that is another thing that distinguishes 
them from the Trotskyists. The leaders of 
the Right deviators have openly admitted their mistakes 
and have surrendered to the Party. But it would 
be foolish to think, on these grounds, that the Right 
deviation is already buried. The strength of Right opportunism 
is not measured by this circumstance. The 
strength of Right opportunism lies in the strength of 
the petty-bourgeois elemental forces, in the strength of 
the pressure on the Party exercised by the capitalist 
elements in general, and by the kulaks in particular. 
And it is precisely because the Right deviation reflects 
the resistance of the chief elements of the moribund 
classes that the Right deviation is the principal danger 
in the Party at the present time. 
That is why the Party considered it necessary to 
wage a determined and uncompromising struggle against 
the Right deviation. 
POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.)

J. V. S T A L I N 372 
There can be no doubt that if we had not waged a 
determined struggle against the Right deviation, if we 
had not isolated its leading elements, we would not 
have succeeded in mobilising the forces of the Party 
and of the working class, in mobilising the forces of the 
poor- and middle-peasant masses, for the sweeping offensive 
of socialism, for the organisation of state farms 
and collective farms, for the restoration of our heavy 
industry, for the elimination of the kulaks as a class. 
That is how matters stand as regards the ³Left² 
and Right deviations in the Party. 
The task is to continue the uncompromising struggle 
on two fronts, against the ³Lefts,² who represent pettybourgeois 
radicalism, and against the Rights, who represent 
petty-bourgeois liberalism. 
The task is to continue the uncompromising struggle 
against those conciliatory elements in the Party who 
fail to understand, or pretend they do not understand, 
the necessity of a determined struggle on two fronts. 
b) The picture of the struggle against deviations 
in the Party will not be complete if we do not touch 
upon the deviations that exist in the Party on the national 
question. I have in mind, firstly, the deviation towards 
Great-Russian chauvinism, and secondly, the deviation 
towards local nationalism. These deviations are 
not so conspicuous and assertive as the ³Left² or the 
Right deviation. They could be called creeping deviations. 
But this does not mean that they do not exist. 
They do exist, and what is most important‹they are 
growing. There can be no doubt whatever about that. 
There can be no doubt about it, because the general 
atmosphere of more acute class struggle cannot fail to

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 373 
cause some intensification of national friction, which 
finds reflection in the Party. Therefore, the features of 
these deviations should be exposed and dragged into 
the light of day. 
What is the essence of the deviation towards Great- 
Russian chauvinism under our present conditions? 
The essence of the deviation towards Great-Russian 
chauvinism lies in the striving to ignore national differences 
in language, culture and way of life; in the striving to 
prepare for the liquidation of the national republics and 
regions; in the striving to undermine the principle of 
national equality and to discredit the Partyıs policy 
of nationalising the administrative apparatus, the press, 
the schools and other state and public organisations. 
In this connection, the deviators of this type proceed 
from the view that since, with the victory of socialism, 
the nations must merge into one and their national 
languages must be transformed into a single common 
language, the time has come to abolish national differences 
and to abandon the policy of promoting the development 
of the national cultures of the formerly oppressed 
peoples. 
In this connection, they refer to Lenin, misquoting 
him and sometimes deliberately distorting and slandering 
him. 
Lenin said that under socialism the interests of the 
nationalities will merge into a single whole‹does it 
not follow from this that it is time to put an end to the 
national republics and regions in the interests of . . . 
internationalism? Lenin said in 1913, in his controversy 
with the Bundists, that the slogan of national culture 
is a bourgeois slogan‹does it not follow from this that

J. V. S T A L I N 374 
it is time to put an end to the national cultures of the 
peoples of the U.S.S.R. in the interests of . . . internationalism? 
Lenin said that national oppression and national 
barriers are destroyed under socialism‹does it not 
follow from this that it is time to put a stop to the policy 
of taking into account the specific national features 
of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. and to go over to the 
policy of assimilation in the interests of . . . internationalism? 
And so on and so forth. 
There can be no doubt that this deviation on the 
national question, disguised, moreover, by a mask of 
internationalism and by the name of Lenin, is the most 
subtle and therefore the most dangerous species of Great- 
Russian nationalism. 
Firstly, Lenin never said that national differences must 
disappear and that national languages must merge into 
one common language within the borders of a single 
state before the victory of socialism on a world scale. On 
the contrary, Lenin said something that was the very 
opposite of this, namely, that ³national and state differences 
among peoples and countries . . . will continue 
to exist for a very, very long time even after the dictatorship 
of the proletariat has been established on 
a world scale²* (Vol. XXV, p. 227). 
How can anyone refer to Lenin and forget about 
this fundamental statement of his? 
True, Mr. Kautsky, an ex-Marxist and now a renegade 
and reformist, asserts something that is the 
* My italics.‹J. St.

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 375 
very opposite of what Lenin teaches us. Despite Lenin, 
he asserts that the victory of the proletarian revolution 
in the Austro-German federal state in the middle 
of the last century would have led to the formation 
of a single, common German language and to the Germanisation 
of the Czechs, because ³the mere force of 
unshackled intercourse, the mere force of modern culture 
of which the Germans were the vehicles, without 
any forcible Germanisation, would have converted into 
Germans the backward Czech petty bourgeois, peasants 
and proletarians who had nothing to gain from their decayed 
nationality² (see Preface to the German edition 
of Revolution and Counter-revolution). 
It goes without saying that such a ³conception² is in 
full accord with Kautskyıs social-chauvinism. It 
was these views of Kautskyıs that I combated in 1925 
in my speech at the University of the Peoples of the 
East.56 But can this anti-Marxist chatter of an arrogant 
German social-chauvinist have any positive significance 
for us Marxists, who want to remain consistent 
internationalists? 
Who is right, Kautsky or Lenin? 
If Kautsky is right, then how are we to explain the 
fact that relatively backward nationalities like the 
Byelorussians and Ukrainians, who are closer to the 
Great-Russians than the Czechs are to the Germans, 
have not become Russified as a result of the victory 
of the proletarian revolution in the U.S.S.R., but, on 
the contrary, have been regenerated and have developed 
as independent nations? How are we to explain the fact 
that nations like the Turkmenians, Kirghizians, Uzbeks, 
Tajiks (not to speak of the Georgians, Armenians,

J. V. S T A L I N 376 
Azerbaijanians, and others), in spite of their backwardness, 
far from becoming Russified as a result of 
the victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R., have, on the 
contrary, been regenerated and have developed into 
independent nations? Is it not evident that our worthy 
deviators, in their hunt after a sham internationalism, 
have fallen into the clutches of Kautskyan social-chauvinism? 
Is it not evident that in advocating a single, 
common language within the borders of a single state, 
within the borders of the U.S.S.R., they are, in essence, 
striving to restore the privileges of the formerly predominant 
language, namely, the Great-Russian language? 
What has this to do with internationalism? 
Secondly, Lenin never said that the abolition of 
national oppression and the merging of the interests 
of nationalities into one whole is tantamount to the 
abolition of national differences. We have abolished 
national oppression. We have abolished national privileges 
and have established national equality of rights. 
We have abolished state frontiers in the old sense of the 
term, frontier posts and customs barriers between 
the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. We have established 
the unity of the economic and political interests of the 
peoples of the U.S.S.R. But does this mean that we have 
thereby abolished national differences, national languages, 
culture, manner of life, etc.? Obviously it does 
not mean this. But if national differences, languages, 
culture, manner of life, etc., have remained, is it not 
evident that the demand for the abolition of the national 
republics and regions in the present historical period 
is a reactionary demand directed against the interests 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat? Do our de

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 377 
viators understand that to abolish the national republics 
and regions at the present time means depriving 
the vast masses of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. 
of the possibility of receiving education in their native 
languages, depriving them of the possibility of having 
schools, courts, administration, public and other organisations 
and institutions in their native languages, 
depriving them of the possibility of being drawn into 
the work of socialist construction? Is it not evident 
that in their hunt after a sham internationalism our 
deviators have fallen into the clutches of the reactionary 
Great-Russian chauvinists and have forgotten, completely 
forgotten, the slogan of the cultural revolution 
in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which 
applies equally to all the peoples of the U.S.S.R., 
both Great-Russian and non-Great-Russian? 
Thirdly, Lenin never said that the slogan of developing 
national culture under the conditions of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat is a reactionary slogan. On 
the contrary, Lenin always stood for helping the peoples 
of the U.S.S.R. to develop their national cultures. 
It was under the guidance of none other than Lenin 
that at the Tenth Congress of the Party, the resolution 
on the national question was drafted and adopted, in 
which it is plainly stated that: 
³The Partyıs task is to help the labouring masses of the non- 
Great-Russian peoples to catch up with Central Russia, which has 
gone in front, to help them: a) to develop and strengthen Soviet 
statehood among them in forms corresponding to the national 
conditions and manner of life of these peoples; b) to develop and 
strengthen among them courts, administrations, economic and 
government bodies functioning in their native languages and

J. V. S T A L I N 378 
staffed with local people familiar with the manner of life and mentality 
of the local inhabitants; c) to develop among them press, 
schools, theatres, clubs, and cultural and educational institutions 
in general, functioning in the native languages; d) to set up and 
develop a wide network of general-educational and trade and technical 
courses and schools, functioning in the native languages.²57 
Is it not obvious that Lenin stood wholly and entirely 
for the slogan of developing national culture 
under the conditions of the dictatorship of the proletariat? 
Is it not obvious that to deny the slogan of national 
culture under the conditions of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat means denying the necessity of raising the 
cultural level of the non-Great-Russian peoples of the 
U.S.S.R., denying the necessity of compulsory universal 
education for these peoples, means putting these 
peoples into spiritual bondage to the reactionary nationalists? 
Lenin did indeed qualify the slogan of national 
culture under the rule of the bourgeoisie as a reactionary 
slogan. But could it be otherwise? 
What is national culture under the rule of the national 
bourgeoisie? It is culture that is bourgeois in content 
and national in form, having the object of doping 
the masses with the poison of nationalism and of 
strengthening the rule of the bourgeoisie. 
What is national culture under the dictatorship of 
the proletariat? It is culture that is socialist in content 
and national in form, having the object of educating 
the masses in the spirit of socialism and internationalism. 
How is it possible to confuse these two fundamentally 
different things without breaking with Marxism?

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 379 
Is it not obvious that in combating the slogan of 
national culture under the bourgeois order, Lenin was 
striking at the bourgeois content of national culture and 
not at its national form? 
It would be foolish to suppose that Lenin regarded 
socialist culture as non-national, as not having a particular 
national form. The Bundists did at one time 
actually ascribe this nonsense to Lenin. But it is known 
from the works of Lenin that he protested sharply 
against this slander, and emphatically dissociated himself 
from this nonsense. Have our worthy deviators 
really followed in the footsteps of the Bundists? 
After all that has been said, what is left of the arguments 
of our deviators? 
Nothing, except juggling with the flag of internationalism 
and slander against Lenin. 
Those who are deviating towards Great-Russian 
chauvinism are profoundly mistaken in believing that 
the period of building socialism in the U.S.S.R. is the 
period of the collapse and abolition of national cultures. 
The very opposite is the case. In point of fact, the period 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the 
building of socialism in the U.S.S.R. is a period of the 
flowering of national cultures that are socialist in content 
and national in form; for, under the Soviet system, 
the nations themselves are not the ordinary ³modern² 
nations, but socialist nations, just as in content their 
national cultures are not the ordinary bourgeois cultures, 
but socialist cultures. 
They apparently fail to understand that national 
cultures are bound to develop with new strength with 
the introduction and firm establishment of compulsory

J. V. S T A L I N 380 
universal elementary education in the native languages. 
They fail to understand that only if the national cultures 
are developed will it be possible really to draw 
the backward nationalities into the work of socialist 
construction. 
They fail to understand that it is just this that is 
the basis of the Leninist policy of helping and promoting 
the development of the national cultures of the peoples 
of the U.S.S.R. 
It may seem strange that we who stand for the future 
merging of national cultures into one common 
(both in form and content) culture, with one common 
language, should at the same time stand for the 
flowering of national cultures at the present moment, 
in the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat. But 
there is nothing strange about i t . The national cultures 
must be allowed to develop and unfold, to reveal 
all their potentialities, in order to create the conditions 
for merging them into one common culture with one 
common language in the period of the victory of socialism 
all over the world. The flowering of cultures that 
are national in form and socialist in content under the 
dictatorship of the proletariat in one country for the 
purpose of merging them into one common socialist 
(both in form and content) culture, with one common 
language, when the proletariat is victorious all over 
the world and when socialism becomes the way of life‹ 
i t is just this that constitutes the dialectics of the 
Leninist presentation of the question of national culture. 
It may be said that such a presentation of the 
question is ³contradictory.² But is there not the same 
³contradictoriness² in our presentation of the question

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 381 
of the state? We stand for the withering away of the 
state. At the same time we stand for the strengthening 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat, which is the 
mightiest and strongest state power that has ever 
existed. The highest development of state power with the 
object of preparing the conditions for the withering away 
of state power‹such is the Marxist formula. Is this ³contradictory²? 
Yes, it is ³contradictory.² But this contradiction 
is bound up with life, and it fully reflects 
Marxıs dialectics. 
Or, for example, Leninıs presentation of the question 
of the right of nations to self-determination, including 
the right to secession. Lenin sometimes depicted 
the thesis on national self-determination in the guise of 
the simple formula: ³disunion for union.² Think of it‹ 
disunion for union. It even sounds like a paradox. And 
yet, this ³contradictory² formula reflects that living 
truth of Marxıs dialectics which enables the Bolsheviks 
to capture the most impregnable fortresses in the 
sphere of the national question. 
The same may be said about the formula relating 
to national culture: the flowering of national cultures 
(and languages) in the period of the dictatorship of the 
proletariat in one country with the object of preparing 
the conditions for their withering away and merging 
into one common socialist culture (and into one common 
language) in the period of the victory of socialism all 
over the world. 
Anyone who fails to understand this peculiar feature 
and ³contradiction² of our transition period, anyone 
who fails to understand these dialectics of the historical 
processes, is dead as far as Marxism is concerned.

J. V. S T A L I N 382 
The misfortune of our deviators is that they do 
not understand, and do not wish to understand, Marxıs 
dialectics. 
That is how matters stand as regards the deviation 
towards Great-Russian chauvinism. 
It is not difficult to understand that this deviation 
reflects the striving of the moribund classes of the formerly 
dominant Great-Russian nation to recover their 
lost privileges. 
Hence the danger of Great-Russian chauvinism as 
the chief danger in the Party in the sphere of the national 
question. 
What is the essence of the deviation towards local 
nationalism? 
The essence of the deviation towards local nationalism 
is the endeavour to isolate and segregate oneself 
within the shell of oneıs own nation, the endeavour to 
slur over class contradictions within oneıs own nation, 
the endeavour to protect oneself from Great-Russian 
chauvinism by withdrawing from the general stream 
of socialist construction, the endeavour not to see what 
draws together and unites the labouring masses of the 
nations of the U.S.S.R. and to see only what can draw 
them apart from one another. 
The deviation towards local nationalism reflects 
the discontent of the moribund classes of the formerly 
oppressed nations with the regime of the dictatorship of 
the proletariat, their striving to isolate themselves in 
their national bourgeois state and to establish their 
class rule there. 
The danger of this deviation is that it cultivates 
bourgeois nationalism, weakens the unity of the work

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 383 
ing people of the different nations of the U.S.S.R. and 
plays into the hands of the interventionists. 
Such is the essence of the deviation towards local 
nationalism. 
The Partyıs task is to wage a determined struggle 
against this deviation and to ensure the conditions 
necessary for the education of the labouring masses of 
the peoples of the U.S.S.R. in the spirit of internationalism. 
That is how matters stand with the deviations in 
our Party, with the ³Left² and Right deviations in the 
sphere of general policy, and with the deviations in 
the sphere of the national question. 
Such is our inner-Party situation. 
Now that the Party has emerged victoriously from 
the struggle for the general line, now that our Partyıs 
Leninist line is triumphant along the whole front, 
many are inclined to forget the difficulties that were 
created for us in our work by all kinds of deviators. 
More than that, to this day some philistine-minded 
comrades still think that we could have managed 
without a struggle against the deviators. Needless to 
say, those comrades are profoundly mistaken. It is 
enough to look back and recall the handiwork of 
the Trotskyists and Right deviators, it is enough to 
recall the history of the struggle against deviations 
during the past period, to understand the utter vacuity 
and futility of this party philistinism. There can 
be no doubt that i f we had not curbed the deviators 
and routed them in open struggle, we could not 
have achieved the successes of which our Party is 
now justly proud.

J. V. S T A L I N 384 
In the struggle against deviations from the Leninist 
line our Party grew and gained strength. In the 
struggle against deviations it forged the Leninist unity of 
its ranks. Nobody now denies the indisputable fact that 
the Party has never been so united around its Central 
Committee as it is now. Everybody is now obliged to 
admit that the Party is now more united and solid than 
ever before, that the Sixteenth Congress is one of the 
few congresses of our Party at which there is no longer 
a definitely formed and united opposition capable 
of counterposing its separate line to the Partyıs general 
line. 
To what is the Party indebted for this decisive achievement? 
It is indebted for this achievement to the circumstance 
that in its struggle against deviations it always 
pursued a policy based on principle, that it never sank 
to backstairs combinations or diplomatic huckstering. 
Lenin said that a policy based on principle is the 
sole correct policy. We emerged victoriously from the 
struggle against deviations because we honestly and 
consistently carried out this behest of Leninıs. (Applause.) 
* 
* 
* 
I shall now conclude, comrades. 
What is the general conclusion? 
During the past period we have achieved a number of 
decisive successes on all the fronts of socialist construction. 
We achieved these successes because we were 
able to hold aloft the great banner of Lenin. If we want

POLITICAL REPORT OF C.C. TO XVI CONGRESS OF C.P.S.U.(B.) 385 
to be victorious we must continue to hold aloft the banner 
of Lenin and keep it pure and unstained. (Applause.) 
Such is the general conclusion. 
With the banner of Lenin we triumphed in the battles 
for the October Revolution. 
With the banner of Lenin we have achieved decisive 
successes in the struggle for the victory of socialist 
construction. 
With this banner we shall triumph in the proletarian 
revolution all over the world. 
Long live Leninism! (Loud and prolonged applause. 
An ovation from the entire hall.) 
Pravda, No. 177, 
June 29, 1930

N O T E S 
1 The plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control 
Commission, C.P.S.U.(B.) held April 16-23, 1929, discussed: 
1) inner-Party affairs; 2) questions concerning the Sixteenth 
All-Union Party Conference; and 3) the purging of the Party. 
The plenum approved the resolution on inner-Party affairs 
which had been adopted by a joint meeting of the Political 
Bureau of the C.C. and the Presidium of the C.C.C. on February 
9, 1929, and in a special resolution condemned the 
Right-opportunist activities of Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky. 
The plenum approved and resolved to submit to the Sixteenth 
All-Union Party Conference the theses presented by the Political 
Bureau on a five-year plan for the development of the national 
economy, on ways and means of promoting agriculture and 
tax relief for the middle peasants, and on the results and immediate 
tasks of the fight against bureaucracy. It also decided 
to submit to the Sixteenth Party Conference theses, which 
it had approved in principle, on a purge of members and candidate 
members of the C.P.S.U.(B.). J. V. Stalin delivered a 
speech on ³The Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.)² at the 
meeting of the plenum on April 22. (For the resolutions of 
the plenum of the C.C. and the C.C.C. of the C.P.S.U.(B.), 
see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 429-47). 
p. 1

NOTES 387 
2 This refers to the sabotage activities of a counter-revolutionary 
organisation of bourgeois experts which had operated 
in Shakhty and other Donbas areas in 1923-28. p. 12 
3 The Sixth Congress of the Comintern was held in Moscow, 
July 17-September 1, 1928. It discussed a report on the activities 
of the Executive Committee of the Comintern and reports 
of the Executive Committee of the Young Communist International 
and of the International Control Commission, measures 
for combating the danger of imperialist wars, the programme 
of the Communist International, the revolutionary 
movement in the colonies and semi-colonies, the economic 
situation in the U.S.S.R. and the situation in the C.P.S.U.(B.), 
and endorsed the Rules of the Comintern. In its resolutions, 
the congress drew attention to the growth of the internal contradictions 
of capitalism, which were inevitably leading to 
a further shaking of the capitalist stabilisation and to a sharp 
accentuation of the general crisis of capitalism. The congress 
defined the tasks of the Communist International springing 
from the new conditions of the working-class struggle, and 
mobilised the Communist Parties to intensify the fight against 
the Right deviation, as the chief danger, and against conciliation 
towards it. The congress took note of the achievements 
of socialist construction in the U.S.S.R. and their importance 
in strengthening the revolutionary positions of the international 
proletariat, and called upon the working people of the 
whole world to defend the Soviet Union. J. V. Stalin took 
a leading part in the work of the congress. He was elected to 
the Presidium of the congress, to the Programme Commission 
and to the Political Commission set up to draft the theses 
on the international situation and the tasks of the Communist 
International. p. 21 
4 This refers to the plenum of the Central Committee of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.), together with members of the Central Control 
Commission and Central Auditing Commission, which was 
held November 16-24, 1928. p. 27

NOTES 388 
5 Katheder-Socialism‹a trend in bourgeois ideology, chiefly 
in bourgeois political economy, which arose in Germany in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century and later became 
widespread in Britain, America and France. Its representatives 
were bourgeois-liberal professors who used their university 
chairs (Katheder means university chair) to combat Marxism 
and the developing revolutionary working-class movement, 
to slur over the contradictions of capitalism, and to preach 
class conciliation. The Katheder-Socialists denied the class, 
exploiting character of the bourgeois state and alleged that 
the latter was capable of perfecting capitalism by means of 
social reforms. Referring to the German representatives of 
this trend, Engels wrote: ³Our Katheder-Socialists have 
never been much more, theoretically, than slightly philanthropic 
vulgar economists, and now they have sunk to the level 
of simple apologists of Bismarckıs state socialism² (K. Marx 
and F. Engels, Works, Vol. XXVII, p. 499). In Russia, the 
bourgeois-liberal reformist ideas of the Katheder-Socialists 
were preached by the legal Marxists. The Russian Mensheviks, 
the opportunist parties of the Second International and the modern 
Right-wing Socialists also went over to the position of 
Katheder-Socialism, striving to subordinate the workingclass 
movement to the interests of the bourgeoisie and preaching 
that capitalism would grow gradually and peacefully into 
socialism. p. 36 
6 This refers to the plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) held July 
4-12, 1928. p. 53 
7 Youth International (Jugend Internationale)‹a magazine, the 
organ of the International Union of Socialist Youth Organisations, 
published in Zurich from September 1915 to May 
1918. From 1919 to 1941 it was the organ of the Executive 
Committee of the Young Communist International. (In 1925- 
28, i t appeared under the title Communist Youth International.) 
p. 74 
8 See Lenin Miscellany XIV, pp. 250-59. p. 80

NOTES 389 
9 Sbornik Sotsial-Demokrata (Symposium of Sotsial Demokrat) was 
published by the C.C., R.S.D.L.P. in 1916 under the personal 
direction of V. I. Lenin. Two numbers were issued: in October 
and December 1916. p. 81 
10 At the time of the Brest Peace (1918), Bukharin and the group 
of ³Left² Communists he headed joined with Trotsky in waging 
a fierce struggle within the Party against Lenin, demanding 
the continuation of the war with the aim of exposing the 
young Soviet Republic, which s t i l l had no army, to the 
blows of German imperialism. At the trial of the anti- 
Soviet ³Right-Trotskyist bloc² in 1938, it was established 
that Bukharin and the group of ³Left² Communists headed by 
him had joined with Trotsky and the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries 
in a secret counter-revolutionary conspiracy against 
the Soviet Government with the object of torpedoing the Brest 
Peace Treaty, arresting and assassinating V. I. Lenin, J . V. Stalin 
and Y. M. Sverdlov, and establishing a government of Bukharinites, 
Trotskyists and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries. p. 106 
11 EKOSO of the R.S.F.S.R.‹Economic Council of the Council 
of Peopleıs Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. p. 108 
12 The Sixteenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.), which took 
place in Moscow, April 23-29, 1929, discussed a five-year plan 
of development of the national economy, ways and means of 
promoting agriculture and tax relief for the middle peasants, 
results and immediate tasks of the fight against bureaucracy, 
and the purge and verification of members and candidate members 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.). The first five-year plan was the chief 
question discussed by the conference. It rejected the ³minimum² 
variant of the five-year plan advocated by the Right capitulators 
and adopted an ³optimal² variant, to be obligatory 
under all circumstances. The conference condemned the Right 
deviation as representing a complete rejection of the Partyıs 
Leninist policy and an outright adoption of the position of 
the kulaks, and it called upon the Party to deliver a crushing 
blow to the Right deviation, as the chief danger at that

NOTES 390 
period, and also to conciliatory attitudes towards deviations 
from the Leninist line. V. M. Molotov reported to the conference 
on the April plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 
and on the speech delivered at that meeting by J. V. Stalin 
on ³The Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.)² (see pp. 1-113 
in this volume). The conference unanimously passed a resolution 
on ³Inner-Party Affairs² and adopted an appeal to all 
workers and labouring peasants of the Soviet Union for full 
development of socialist emulation. (For the resolutions of 
the Sixteenth Conference, see Resolutions and Decisions of 
C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee 
Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 448-99.) p. 113 
13 V. I. Lenin, ³How to Organise Emulation?² (see Works, 4th 
Russ. ed., Vol. 26, pp. 367, 368). p. 115 
14 The Special Far Eastern Army was formed in August 1929, 
during the conflict on the Chinese-Eastern Railway provoked 
by the Chinese counter-revolutionary generals and Japanese 
imperialists. Trevoga (Alarm)‹the organ of the Political 
Department, Special Far Eastern Army; it was published from 
1929. p. 142 
15 Komsomolskaya Pravda (Y.C.L. Truth)‹a daily newspaper, 
organ of the Central Committee and Moscow Committee of 
the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, which began 
publication on May 24, 1925. The article, ³Introductory 
Essay on Leninism,² was published in Komsomolskaya Pravda, 
No. 282, December 7, 1929. p. 143 
16 The All-Union Conference of Marxist Students of Agrarian 
Questions, convened by the Communist Academy of the C.E.C., 
U.S.S.R., was held December 20-27, 1929. The 302 delegates 
who attended it represented scientific research institutions, 
agricultural and economic colleges, and newspapers and magazines. 
J. V. Stalin delivered a speech ³Concerning Questions 
of Agrarian Policy in the U.S.S.R.² at the concluding plenary 
meeting on December 27. p. 147

NOTES 391 
17 See Lenin Miscellany XI, p. 368. p. 154 
18 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 7-8. p. 154 
19 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, p. 483. p. 155 
20 F. Engels, The Peasant Question in France and Germany, 1922, 
p. 66 (see also K. Marx and F. Engels, Selected Works, Vol. II, 
1955, p. 435). p. 158 
21 See J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 11, pp. 85-101. p. 163 
22 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 211-15. 
p. 173 
23 Za Rubezhom (Abroad)‹a magazine founded in 1930 by Maxim 
Gorky. From 1932 to 1938 it appeared as a magazine-newspaper. 
p. 181 
24 Krasnaya Zvezda (Red Star)‹a military and political daily 
newspaper founded in January 1924. In March 1953 it became 
the central organ of the U.S.S.R. Ministry of Defence. p. 184 
25 See Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 73-82. 
p. 185 
26 For the Sixteenth Party Conference resolution on ³Ways and 
Means of Promoting Agriculture and Tax Relief for the Middle 
Peasant,² see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, 
Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 
1953, pp. 455-69. p. 185 
27 See Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 350-68. 
p. 186 
28 For the Fifteenth Party Congress resolution on ³Directives 
for the Compilation of a Five-Year Economic Plan,² see

NOTES 392 
Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 330-49. p. 186 
29 See Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 313-21. 
p. 186 
30 Students or the Y. M. Sverdlov Communist University. p. 190 
31 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 431. p. 190 
32 V. I. Lenin, ³Valuable Admissions of Pitirim Sorokin² (see 
Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 28, p. 171). p. 190 
33 ³Rubinism² and ³mechanism²‹anti-Marxist revisionist trends 
in political economy. Rubin, a Menshevik, revised Marxıs 
teaching from an idealist bourgeois standpoint, emasculated 
its revolutionary content and criminally diverted the attention 
of economists from the study of questions of Soviet economy 
and led them into the realm of scholastic disputes and 
abstractions. ³Mechanism² distorted Marxism in philosophy and 
political economy from the vulgar mechanistic standpoint, and 
was equivalent to denying materialist dialectics and replacing 
it by the bourgeois theory of equilibrium. One of the chief 
exponents of mechanism was Bukharin, ideologist of the Right 
deviators. In the sphere of political economy, the mechanists 
denied the internal contradictions of capitalist society and the 
historically transient character of its laws of development, and 
extended the laws of capitalism to Soviet socialist society. p. 196 
34 This resolution of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) was published in 
Pravda, No. 73, March 15, 1930. (See also Resolutions and Decisions 
of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee 
Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 548-51.) p. 207 
35 For the resolution of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) of January 5, 
1930, on ³The Rate of Collectivisation and State Meas

NOTES 393 
ures to Assist Collective-Farm Development² see also 
Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 544-47. 
p. 213 
36 The Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), held in Moscow, 
June 26-July 13, 1930, discussed the political and organisational 
reports of the Partyıs Central Committee; the reports 
of the Central Auditing Commission, the Central Control Commission, 
and the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation to the Executive 
Committee of the Comintern; and reports on fulfilment of the 
five-year plan in industry, on the collective-farm movement 
and the promotion of agriculture, and on the tasks of the trade 
unions in the reconstruction period. The congress unanimously 
approved the political line and activities of the Central Committee 
and instructed it to continue to ensure Bolshevik rates 
of socialist construction, to achieve fulfilment of the five-year 
plan in four years, and to carry out unswervingly the sweeping 
socialist offensive along the whole front and the elimination 
of the kulaks as a class on the basis of complete collectivisation. 
The congress noted the momentous importance of the crucial 
change in the development of agriculture, thanks to which the 
collective-farm peasantry had become a real and stable support 
of the Soviet regime. The congress instructed the Partyıs Central 
Committee to continue to pursue a firm policy of peace 
and to strengthen the defence capacity of the U.S.S.R. The 
congress issued directives: that heavy industry should be developed 
to the utmost and a new, powerful coal and metallurgical 
base created in the eastern part of the country; that the 
work of all the mass organisations should be reconstructed and 
the role of the trade unions in socialist construction increased; 
that all workers and the masses of the working people should 
be drawn into the socialist emulation movement. The congress 
completely exposed the Right opportunists as agents of the 
kulaks within the Party, and declared that the views of the 
Right opposition were incompatible with membership of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.). The congress instructed the Party organisations to 
intensify the fight against deviations on the national question

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NOTES 394 
‹against dominant-nation chauvinism and local nationalism‹
and to firmly carry out the Leninist national policy, 
which ensures the broad development of the cultures‹national 
in form and socialist in content‹of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. 
The Sixteenth Congress is known in the history of the Party 
as the congress of the sweeping offensive of socialism along 
the whole front, of the elimination of the kulaks as a class, 
and of the realisation of complete collectivisation. J. V. Stalin 
delivered the political report of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on 
June 27, and replied to the discussion on the report on July 2. 
(For the Sixteenth Congress, of the C.P.S.U.(B.) see History 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course, Moscow 1954, pp. 481-84. For 
the decisions of the Congress, see Resolutions and Decisions of 
C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, 
Part II, 1953, pp. 553-616.) p. 242 
37 The Federal Reserve System was instituted in the U.S.A. in 
1913. Twelve Federal Reserve Banks in the major centres of 
the country co-ordinate and control all the activities of the 
American banks and are an instrument of monopoly capital. 
The System is headed by a Federal Reserve Board (re-named 
in 1933 the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System), 
the members of which are appointed by the U.S. President, 
and which is completely under the thumb of the financial 
magnates. The American bourgeois economists‹apologists 
of American capitalism‹and financial and government 
circles in the U.S.A. considered that the Federal Reserve System 
would safeguard the countryıs economy against crises. The 
attempts of President Hoover to cope with the crisis that 
broke out in 1929 with the help of the Federal Reserve System 
proved a complete failure. p. 249 
38 The Young Plan‹named after its author, the American 
banker Young‹was a plan for exacting reparations from 
Germany. It was adopted on June 7, 1929, by a committee of 
French, British, Italian, Japanese, Belgian, American and 
German experts, and was finally endorsed at the Hague Conference 
on January 20, 1930. The plan fixed total German

NOTES 395 
reparations at 113,900 million marks (in foreign currency), to 
be paid over a period of 59 years. All reparations receipts and 
payments were to be handled by the Bank for International 
Settlements, in which the U.S.A. occupied a dominant position. 
The establishment of this bank was one of the cardinal 
points of the Young Plan and was a means by which American 
monopoly capital could control the trade and currencies of 
the European countries. The plan relieved German industry 
of contributions to reparations, the whole burden of which 
was laid upon the working people. The Young Plan made it 
possible to speed up the rebuilding of Germanyıs industrial war 
potential, which the U.S. imperialists were seeking to achieve 
with a view to launching aggression against the U.S.S.R. p. 257 
39 This refers to the treaties and agreements concluded by the imperialist 
states at a conference in Locarno, Switzerland, held 
October 5-16, 1925. The Locarno agreements were designed to 
strengthen the post-war system established in Europe by the 
Treaty of Versailles, but their effect was to sharpen still more 
the contradictions between the chief imperialist countries and 
to stimulate preparation for new wars. (For the Locarno Conference, 
see J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 7, pp. 277-83.) p. 257 
40 Anti-war demonstrations and strikes on August 1, 1929 (the 
fifteenth anniversary of the outbreak of the imperialist first 
world war) and protest demonstrations on March 6, 1930, 
against the rapid growth of unemployment (as a result of the 
world economic crisis of 1929) took place in many cities and 
industrial centres of France, Germany, Britain, the U.S.A., 
Poland and other European and American countries. The protest 
movement took place wholly under the leadership of the 
Communist Parties and the Communist International. p. 260 
41 ³Pan-Europe²‹a projected bloc of European states against 
the Soviet Union suggested by the French Foreign Minister 
Briand in May 1930. Europe, united in a ³Federal Union,² 
was to constitute a single anti-Soviet front, and the executive

NOTES 396 
body of the ³Federal Union,² the ³European Committee,² 
was to be a general staff for preparing an attack on the U.S.S.R. 
Briandıs plan was also designed to establish French hegemony 
on the European continent, and therefore encountered the opposition 
of Britain, Italy and the U.S.A. Nothing came of the 
³Pan-Europe² scheme owing to the contradictions between 
the imperialist powers. p. 263 
42 This refers to the pact renouncing war signed in Paris on 
August 27, 1928, by the U.S.A., France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Poland, Italy, Japan, Czechoslovakia, Belgium and the British 
Dominions. The U.S.S.R. was not invited to take part in the 
negotiations for the conclusion of the Kellogg Pact, in order 
that the U.S.S.R. should not be included among the countries 
to which the proposed pact for renunciation of war as an instrument 
of national policy should apply. Under cover of demagogic 
talk about ³universal peace,² the sponsors of the pact 
(France, U.S.A., Britain) intended to use it as a means of isolating 
and combating the U.S.S.R. The true purposes of the 
pact were exposed by the Government of the U.S.S.R. in its 
statement of August 5, 1928. Under the pressure of public 
opinion, the American, British and French Governments were 
compelled to invite the U.S.S.R. to adhere to the pact. The 
Soviet Government did so and was one of the first to ratify 
the Kellogg Pact, inviting neighbouring states to conclude an 
agreement giving immediate effect to its provisions. Such an 
agreement was signed by the U.S.S.R., Poland, Rumania, Estonia 
and Latvia in Moscow on February 9, 1929, Turkey and 
Lithuania adhering to it later. p. 263 
43 Lena Gold-Fields‹a British company which in 1925-30 held 
a concession in the U.S.S.R. for the exploitation of gold, 
copper, iron and other deposits in Siberia. By the terms of 
the concession agreement the Lena Gold-Fields company was 
obliged to construct new mining enterprises and to reconstruct 
the plants and mines it had received on lease. In view of the 
fact that the company did not carry out its obligations and 
caused the plants, mines and other installations it had received

NOTES 397 
to fall into decay, the Soviet Government terminated the 
concession and committed to trial Lena Gold-Fields employees 
who had engaged in espionage and wrecking activities in the 
U.S.S.R. p. 264 
44 The Fifth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., which was held 
in Moscow, May 20-28, 1929, discussed the following questions: 
the report of the Government of the U.S.S.R.; the five-year 
plan of development of the national economy of the U.S.S.R.; 
the promotion of agriculture and the development of co-operation 
in the countryside. The central question at the congress 
was the discussion and adoption of the First Stalin Five-Year 
Plan. The congress approved the report of the Government of 
the U.S.S.R., endorsed the five-year plan of development 
of the national economy, outlined ways and means of promoting 
agriculture and the development of co-operatives in the 
countryside, and elected a new Central Executive Committee 
of the U.S.S.R. p. 278 
45 See Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, p. 355 
p. 287 
46 J. V. Stalin, Political Report of the Central Committee to 
the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) (see Works, Vol. 
10, pp. 312-13). p. 288 
47 See Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, p. 393. 
p. 293 
48 The plenum of the Central Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.) held November 
10-17, 1929, discussed the following questions: the 
control figures for the national economy in 1929-30; results 
and further tasks of collective-farm development; agriculture 
in the Ukraine and work in the countryside; the formation of 
a Union Peopleıs Commissariat of Agriculture of the U.S.S.R.; 
the fulfilment of the decisions of the July plenum of the C.C.

NOTES 398 
(1928) on the training of technical cadres. The plenum decided 
that propaganda of the views of Right opportunism and of 
conciliation towards it was incompatible with membership 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.), and resolved to expel Bukharin, as the 
chief exponent and leader of the Right capitulators, from the 
Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). The plenum 
noted that the Soviet Union had entered a phase of extensive 
socialist reconstruction of the countryside and development 
of large-scale socialist agriculture, and outlined a series of 
concrete measures for strengthening the collective farms and 
widely developing the collective-farm movement. (For the 
resolutions of the plenum see Resolutions and Decisions of 
C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, 
Part II, 1953, pp. 500-43.) p. 294 
49 This refers to an appeal of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) ³To All 
Party Members and to All Workers² on developing self-criticism, 
which was published in Pravda, No. 128, June 3, 1928. 
p. 322 
50 The decision of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on ³Promotion 
of Workers to Posts in the State Apparatus, and Mass 
Workersı Control from Below of the Soviet Apparatus (Patronage 
by Factories)² was published in Pravda, No. 74, 
March 16, 1930. p. 322 
51 This refers to the decision of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) of May 
15, 1930, on ³The Work of Uralmet² (a trust embracing the 
iron and steel industry of the Urals). It was published in 
Pravda, No. 135, May 18, 1930. p. 335 
52 The decision of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on ³The Abolition of 
Okrugs² was published in Pravda, No. 194, July 16, 1930. 
p. 347 
53 V. I. Lenin, Letter to V. M. Molotov on a Plan for the Political 
Report to the Eleventh Party Congress (see Works, 4th 
Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 223-24.) p. 349

NOTES 399 
54 V. I. Lenin, ³How to Reorganise the Workersı and Peasantsı 
Inspection² (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, p. 444). p. 350 
55 The Eighth Congress of Soviets of the R.S.F.S.R. was held 
December 22-29, 1920. One of the principal questions at the 
congress was the plan for the electrification of the country, 
prepared by the State Commission on the Electrification of 
Russia (GOELRO). In its decision, the congress assessed the 
electrification plan ³as the first step of a great economic undertaking.² 
In a letter to V. I. Lenin in March 1921, J. V. Stalin 
wrote about the plan for the electrification of Russia: ³During 
the last three days I have had the opportunity to read the symposium: 
ŒA Plan for the Electrification of Russia.ı. . . An excellent, 
well-compiled book. A masterly draft of a really single 
and really state economic plan, not in quotation marks. 
The only Marxist attempt in our time to place the Soviet superstructure 
of economically backward Russia on a really practical 
technical and production basis, the only possible one 
under present conditions² (see J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 5, 
p. 50). p. 358 
56 This refers to the address delivered at a meeting of students 
of the Communist University of the Toilers of the East, May 
18, 1925 (see J. V. Stalin, ³The Political Tasks of the University 
of the Peoples of the East,² Works, Vol . 7, pp. 141-42). p. 375 
57 See Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part I, 1953, p. 559. 
p. 378

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 
( April 1 9 2 9 -June 1 9 3 0 ) 
1 9 2 9 
April 16-23 
April 22 
April 23-29 
April 27 
April 29 
May 1 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of 
the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). 
At the plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., 
C.P.S.U.(B.), J . V. Stalin delivers a speech 
on ³The Right Deviation in the C.P.S.U.(B.).² 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Sixteenth 
All-Union Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
At the Sixteenth All-Union Conference of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.), J . V. Stalin i s elected to the 
commission for drafting the resolution on ways 
and means of promoting agriculture and tax 
relief for the middle peasant. 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of 
the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J . V. Stalin attends the May Day parade of 
the troops of the Moscow Garrison and the 
demonstration of the working people of the 
capital on the Red Square.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 401 
May 4 
May 6 
May 11 
May 14 
May 20-28 
May 28 
June 18 
July 9 
July 10 
J . V. Stalin has a talk with a delegation of 
Donbas miners. 
J. V. Stalin delivers a speech in the American 
Commission of the Presidium of the Executive 
Committee of the Comintern on the Right factionalists 
in the American Communist Party. 
J . V. Stalin wr i t e s the a r t i c l e , ³Emulation 
and Labour Enthusiasm of the Masses,² a foreword 
to Mikulinaıs pamphlet, Emulation of 
the Masses. The article is published in Pravda, 
No. 114, May 22. 
J. V. Stalin delivers speeches on the situation 
in the American Communist Party at a meeting 
of the Presidium of the Executive Committee of 
the Comintern. 
J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Fifth 
Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. 
At the Fifth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. 
J. V. Stalin is elected a member of the Union 
Soviet of the C.E.C., U.S.S.R. 
J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov have a talk with 
a delegation of representatives of the timber 
industry. 
J. V. Stalin writes a letter to Comrade Felix 
Kon. 
J. V. Stalin sends a congratulatory message to 
the Ukrainian Young Communist League on 
its tenth anniversary. The message is published 
in Pravda, No. 157, July 12.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 402 
July 2 
July 25 
October 30 
November 3 
November 7 
November 10-17 
November 13 
J. V. Stalin is present at exercises of a squadron 
of the Black Sea Fleet. 
J . V. Stalin pays a visit to the Cruiser ³Chervona 
Ukraina,² attends an amateur concert given 
by the crew, and makes an entry in the logbook 
of the cruiser. 
J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to 
the Special Far Eastern Army on the occasion 
of the twelfth anniversary of the Great 
October Socialist Revolution. The message is 
published in Trevoga, No. 52, and Pravda, 
No. 259, November 7. 
J . V. Stalin wr i t e s the article ³A Year of 
Great Change,² published in Pravda, No 259, 
November 7. 
J. V. Stalin attends the parade of the troops 
of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration 
of the working people of the capital on the 
Red Square on the occasion of the twelfth 
anniversary of the Great October Socialist 
Revolution. 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of 
the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). 
At a meeting of the plenum of the C.C., 
C.P.S.U.(B.), J . V. Stalin delivers a speech 
denouncing the factional activities of the leaders 
of the Bukharin opposition. 
The plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) elects 
J . V. Stalin to a commission set up for the 
final draft of the resolution on the control 
figures for the national economy in 1929-30, and 
for drafting a resolution on Bukharinıs group 
of Right deviators.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 403 
November 15 
November 29 
December 18 
December 21 
December 27 
The plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) elects 
J . V. Stalin to a commission set up to draft 
the final text of a resolution on the results 
and further tasks of collective-farm development. 
J . V. Stalin takes part in the work of the 
Second Session of the C.E.C., U.S.S.R., fifth 
convocation. 
J. V. Stalinıs article, ³A Necessary Correction,² 
is published in Pravda, No. 298. 
J. V. Stalin writes a reply to all organisations 
and comrades who sent him congratulations on 
his fiftieth birthday. The reply is published in 
Pravda, No. 302, December 22. 
J. V. Stalin delivers a speech to an All-Union 
Conference of Marxist Students of Agrarian 
Questions ³Concerning Questions of Agrarian 
Policy in the U.S.S.R.² The speech was 
published in Pravda, No. 309, December 29. 
1 9 3 0 
January 2 
January 5 
J. V. Stalinıs message of greetings to the workers 
of Stalingrad on the occasion of the tenth 
anniversary of the liberation of the city from 
the whiteguards is published in Pravda, No. 2. 
On the motion of J . V. Stalin, the C.C., 
C.P.S.U.(B.) adopts a decision on ³The Rate 
of Collectivisation and State Measures to 
Assist Collective-Farm Development.² The 
decision was published in Pravda, No 6, 
January 6.

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
404 BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 
J . V. Stalin writes a letter to A. M. Gorky. 
J . V. Stalin writes the article, ³Concerning 
the Policy of Eliminating the Kulaks as a 
Class.² The article was published in Pravda, 
No. 21, and Krasnaya Zvezda, No. 18, January 
21. 
J . V. Stalin attends a memorial meeting in 
the Bolshoi Theatre on the occasion of the sixth 
anniversary of the death of V. I. Lenin. 
J. V. Stalin writes the ³Reply to the Sverdlov 
Comrades.² It was published in Pravda, No. 40, 
February 10. 
In response to the request of numerous organisations 
and general meetings of workers, peasants 
and Red Army men, J. V. Stalin is awarded 
a second Order of the Red Banner for his 
outstanding services on the front of socialist 
construction. The resolution of the Central 
Executive Committee of the U.S.S.R. making 
the award was published in Pravda, No. 53, 
February 23. 
J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the 
First Cavalry Army on the occasion of its tenth 
anniversary. The message was published in 
Pravda, No. 53, February 23. 
J. V. Stalin writes a reply to a letter from the 
workers of the Izhevsk factory wishing them 
success in the fulfilment of their plan of production 
of munitions for the Red Army. The 
reply was published in Izhevskaya Pravda, 
No. 51, March 2. 
January 17 
January 19 
January 21 
February 9 
February 13 
February 22

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 405 
March 2 
Not later than 
March 14 
March 19 
April 3 
April 21 
April 25 
April 26 
J. V. Stalin attends a celebration meeting of 
the Moscow Soviet in the Bolshoi Theatre on the 
occasion of the twelfth anniversary of the Red 
Army and the tenth anniversary of the First 
Cavalry Army. 
J . V. Stalinıs article, ³Dizzy With Success² 
is published in Pravda, No. 60. 
J . V. Stalin works on drafting a decision of 
the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on ³The Fight Against 
Distortions of the Party Line in the Collective- 
Farm Movement.² The decision was published 
in Pravda, No. 73, March 15. 
J. V. Stalin replies to a letter of Comrade Bezymensky. 
J. V. Stalinıs article, ³Reply to Collective-Farm 
Comrades² is published in Pravda, No. 92. 
J. V. Stalin writes a message to the workers 
of the Stalin Metal Works, Leningrad, congratulating 
them on completing ahead of schedule 
the first powerful turbine to be produced in 
the U.S.S.R. The message was published in 
Leningradskaya Pravda, No. 112, April 23. 
J. V. Stalin writes a message of congratulation 
to the f i r s t graduates of the Industrial 
Academy. The message was published in 
Pravda, No. 115, April 26. 
J. V. Stalinıs message of greetings to the builders 
of the Turkestan-Siberian Railway on the 
occasion of the completion of the construction 
and the opening of through traffic is published 
in Pravda, No. 115.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 406 
May 1 
May 10 
May 27 
May 31 
June 16 
June 17 
J . V. Stalin attends the May Day military 
parade and demonstration of the working people 
of the capital on the Red Square. 
J. V. Stalinıs message of greetings to the Special 
Cavalry Brigade on the occasion of its tenth 
anniversary is published in Pravda, No. 127. 
The Krasnaya Presnya and Bauman District 
Party Conferences elect J. V. Stalin as a delegate 
to the Moscow Regional Party Conference 
and to the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J . V. Stalin replies to a letter of Comrade 
M. Rafail. 
J. V. Stalin sends a message of greetings to 
the personnel of the Rostov Agricultural Machinery 
Works congratulating them on the 
completion of the building of the works ahead 
of programme. The message i s published in 
Pravda, No. 165, June 17. 
J. V. Stalin writes a reply to a letter of greetings 
from collective farmers of the Kanevskaya 
District, Krasnodar territory. The reply i s 
published in Krasnoye Znamya (Krasnodar), 
No. 137, June 18, and in Pravda, No. 167, 
June 19. 
J. V. Stalin sends a message of greetings to 
the workers of the Stalingrad Tractor Works 
congratulating them on the completion and 
starting ahead of schedule of the first tractor 
works in the U.S.S.R. The message i s published 
in Pravda, No. 166, June 18.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 407 
June 25 
June 27 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of 
the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). The plenum approves 
the theses prepared by the Political Bureau 
for the Sixteenth Party Congress and appoints 
J . V. Stalin to make the report a t the Sixteenth 
Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on the first 
item of the agenda (political report of the 
Central Committee). 
J . V. Stalin delivers the political report of 
the Central Committee at the Sixteenth Congress 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

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