W O R K E R S O F A L L C O U N T R I E S, U N I T E !

From Marx to Mao 
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C O N T E N T S 
Page 
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIII 
REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION ON THE POLITICAL 
REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE TO 
THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.), 
July 2, 1930 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
LETTER TO COMRADE SHATUNOVSKY. . . . . . 18 
LETTERS TO COMRADE CH. . . . . . . . . . . 21 
TO COMRADE DEMYAN BEDNY. (Excerpts from a Letter) 24 
ANTI-SEMITISM. Reply to an Inquiry of the Jewish News 
Agency in the United States. . . . . . . . . . 30 
THE TASKS OF BUSINESS EXECUTIVES. Speech Delivered 
at the First All-Union Conference of Leading Personnel 
of Socialist Industry, February 4, 1931 . . . . 31 
LETTER TO COMRADE ETCHIN. . . . . . . . . 45 
GREETINGS TO THE STAFFS OF AZNEFT AND GROZNEFT 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 
TO ELEKTROZAVOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 
MAGNITOGORSK IRON AND STEEL WORKS PROJECT, 
MAGNITOGORSK . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 
TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD OF THE ALLUNION 
CENTRE OF MACHINE AND TRACTOR 
STATIONS. TO ALL MACHINE AND TRACTOR 
STATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50

CONTENTS VIII 
TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE GRAIN TRUST BOARD. 
TO ALL STATE GRAIN FARMS . . . . . . . 52 
NEW CONDITIONS‹NEW TASKS IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION. 
Speech Delivered at a Conference of Business 
Executives, June 23, 1931 . . . . . . . . 53 
I. Manpower . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 
II. Wages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 
III. The Organisation of Work . . . . . . . . 62 
IV. A Working-Class Industrial and Technical Intelligentsia 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 
V. Signs of a Change of Attitude among the Old Industrial 
and Technical Intelligentsia . . . . . 71 
VI. Business Accounting . . . . . . . . . 75 
VII. New Methods of Work, New Methods of Management 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 
TO THE WORKERS AND ADMINISTRATIVE AND 
TECHNICAL PERSONNEL OF AMO . . . . . . 83 
TO THE WORKERS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AND 
TECHNICAL PERSONNEL OF THE KHARKOV 
TRACTOR WORKS PROJECT . . . . . . . . 84 
TO THE NEWSPAPER TEKHNIKA . . . . . . . . 85 
SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF 
BOLSHEVISM. Letter to the Editorial Board of the 
Magazine ³Proletarskaya Revolutsia² . . . . . . 86 
AUTOMOBILE WORKS, NIZHNI-NOVGOROD . . . . 105 
TALK WITH THE GERMAN AUTHOR EMIL LUDWIG, 
December 13, 1931 . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 
TO THE CHIEF OF THE AUTOMOBILE WORKS PROJECT 
AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE MOLOTOV 
AUTOMOBILE WORKS, NIZHNI-NOVGOROD . . . 126

CONTENTS IX 
TO THE CHIEF OF THE HARVESTER COMBINE 
WORKS PROJECT AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE 
HARVESTER COMBINE WORKS, SARATOV. . . 127 
REPLY TO OLEKHNOVICH AND ARISTOV. With Reference 
to the Letter ³Some Questions Concerning the History 
of Bolshevism² Addressed to the Editorial Board 
of the Magazine ³Proletarskaya Revolutsia² . . . . 128 
MAGNITOGORSK IRON AND STEEL WORKS PROJECT, 
MAGNITOGORSK . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135 
REPLY TO THE LETTER OF Mr. RICHARDSON, REPRESENTATIVE 
OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS 
NEWS AGENCY . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 
THE IMPORTANCE AND TASKS OF THE COMPLAINTS 
BUREAUS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 
REPLIES TO THE QUESTIONS OF RALPH V. BARNES 
May 3, 1935 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 
KUZNETSK IRON AND STEEL WORKS PROJECT 
KUZNETSK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 
GREETINGS TO THE SEVENTH ALL-UNION CONFERENCE 
OF THE ALL-UNION LENINIST YOUNG 
COMMUNIST LEAGUE . . . . . . . . . . . 143 
CONGRATULATIONS TO MAXIM GORKY . . . . . 144 
TO THE BUILDERS OF THE DNIEPER HYDROELECTRIC 
POWER STATION . . . . . . . . 145 
GREETINGS TO LENINGRAD . . . . . . . . . 146 
LETTER TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF THE NEWSPAPER 
PRAVDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 
MR. CAMPBELL STRETCHES THE TRUTH . . . . . 148 
Record of the Talk with Mr. Campbell, January 28, 1929 150 
THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE OGPU . . . 160

CONTENTS X
JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), 
January 7-12, 1933 . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 
The Results of the First Five-Year Plan. Report Delivered 
on January 7, 1933 . . . . . . . . 163 
I. The International Significance of the Five-Year 
Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163 
II. The Fundamental Task of the Five-Year Plan 
and the Way to Its Fulfilment . . . . . . 174 
III. The Results of the Five-Year Plan in Four Years 
in the Sphere of Industry . . . . . . . . 180 
IV. The Results of the Five-Year Plan in Four Years 
in the Sphere of Agriculture . . . . . . . 191 
V. The Results of the Five-Year Plan in Four Years 
as Regards Improving the Material Conditions of 
the Workers and Peasants . . . . . . . . 199 
VI. The Results of the Five-Year Plan in Four Years 
as Regards Trade Turnover between Town and 
Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 
VII. The Results of the Five-Year Plan in Four Years 
in the Sphere of the Struggle against the Remnants 
of the Hostile Classes . . . . . . . . . 211 
VIII. General Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . 217 
Work in the Countryside. Speech Delivered on January 
11, 1933 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 220 
TO RABOTNITSA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 240 
LETTER TO COMRADE I. N. BAZHANOV . . . . . 241 
SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE FIRST ALL-UNION 
CONGRESS OF COLLECTIVE-FARM SHOCK BRIGADERS, 
February 19, 1933 . . . . . . . . . 242 
I. The Collective-Farm Path Is the Only Right Path 242 
II. Our Immediate Task‹To Make All the Collective 
Farmers Prosperous . . . . . . . . . . . 252 
III. Miscellaneous Remarks . . . . . . . . . . 257

CONTENTS XI 
GREETINGS TO THE RED ARMY ON ITS FIFTEENTH 
ANNIVERSARY. To the Revolutionary Military Council 
of the U.S.S.R. . . . . . . . . . . . . 264 
REPLY TO A LETTER FROM Mr. BARNES, March 20, 
1933 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 
TO COMRADE S. M. BUDYONNY . . . . . . . . 266 
TALK WITH COLONEL ROBINS, May 13, 1933. (Brief 
Record) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 
GREETINGS ON THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY 
OF THE ALL-UNION LENINIST YOUNG COMMUNIST 
LEAGUE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280 
TALK WITH Mr. DURANTY, CORRESPONDENT OF 
THE NEW YORK TIMES, December 25, 1933. . . 282 
REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 
ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.), January 26, 1934 . . . . . 288 
I. The Continuing Crisis of World Capitalism and the 
External Situation of the Soviet Union . . . . 288 
1. The Course of the Economic Crisis in the Capitalist 
Countries. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290 
2. The Growing Tension in the Political Situation in 
the Capitalist Countries . . . . . . . . . 297 
3. The Relations between the U.S.S.R. and the Capitalist 
States. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 306 
II. The Continuing Progress of the National Economy 
and the Internal Situation in the U.S.S.R. . . . 312 
1. The Progress of Industry . . . . . . . . . 316 
2. The Progress of Agriculture . . . . . . . . 324 
3. The Rise in the Material and Cultural Standard of 
the Working People . . . . . . . . . . 340 
4. The Progress of Trade Turnover, and Transport . . 346 
III. The Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353 
1. Questions of Ideological and Political Leadership . . 355 
2. Questions of Organisational Leadership. . . . . 372

CONTENTS XII 
TO COMRADE SHAPOSHNIKOV, CHIEF AND COMISSAR 
OF THE FRUNZE MILITARY ACADEMY 
OF THE WORKERSı AND PEASANTSı RED ARMY. 
TO COMRADE SHCHADENKO, ASSISTANT FOR 
POLITICAL WORK . . . . . . . . . . . . 389 
INSTEAD OF A REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION, January 31, 
1934 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 390 
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391 
Biographical Chronicle (July 1930-January 1934) . . . 409

PREFACE 
The thirteenth volume of the Works of J. V. Stalin 
contains writings and speeches of the period from July 
1930 to January 1934. 
During this period the Bolshevik Party, carrying 
out the policy of a sweeping offensive of socialism along 
the whole front, achieved epoch-making successes in 
the socialist transformation of the country. The Soviet 
Union became a mighty industrial power, a country 
of collective, large-scale, mechanised agriculture. 
In the ³Reply to the Discussion on the Political 
Report of the Central Committee to the Sixteenth Congress 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.),² J. V. Stalin exposes the 
double-dealing of the leaders of the Right opportunists. 
Describing the successes in the work of socialist construction, 
he points out that the U.S.S.R. has entered 
the period of socialism. Criticising the anti-Marxist, 
anti-Leninist theory of the dying away of national 
languages and their merging into one common language 
within the framework of a single state at a time when 
socialism is victorious in one country, J. V. Stalin 
substantiates the programmatic thesis that the national 
languages will merge into one common language only 
after the victory of socialism on a world scale.

PREFACE XIV
In his speeches ³The Tasks of Business Executives² 
and ³New Conditions‹New Tasks in Economic Construction,² 
J. V. Stalin shows the historical necessity 
of rapid rates of socialist industrialisation, shows 
the decisive importance of technique in the period of 
reconstruction of all branches of the national economy 
and advances the slogan: ³Bolsheviks must 
master technique.² J. V. Stalin discloses the new conditions 
of development of socialist industry and outlines 
new methods of management in the work of economic 
construction. 
In the report ³The Results of the First Five-Year 
Plan² at the joint plenum of the Central Committee 
and the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), 
J. V. Stalin shows that the fulfilment of the First Five- 
Year Plan in four years is of the utmost international 
significance. The results of the five-year plan, achieved 
at a time when the entire capitalist system was shaken 
by a world economic crisis, proved the indisputable 
superiority of the Soviet socialist system over the outof-
date capitalist system of economy. 
Speaking of the principal forces that ensured the 
victory of the five-year plan, J. V. Stalin notes first 
and foremost the activity and selflessness, the enthusiasm 
and initiative, of the vast masses of workers and 
collective farmers who, in conjunction with the engineering 
and technical personnel, displayed enormous 
energy in the promotion of socialist emulation and shockbrigade 
work. 
In defining the main tasks of the Party connected 
with the results of the five-year plan, J. V. Stalin indicates 
the special importance of safeguarding public,

PREFACE XV 
socialist property against grafters and pilferers and the 
necessity of strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat 
in every way. 
The problems of consolidating the collective-farm 
system and the tasks of Party work in the countryside 
are the theme of the speech ³Work in the Countryside² 
and of the ³Speech Delivered at the First All-Union 
Congress of Collective-Farm Shock Brigaders.² Revealing 
the new tactics of the camouflaged class enemies 
in the countryside, J. V. Stalin appeals to the Party 
organisations for greater vigilance. Summarising the 
results of collective-farm development, J. V. Stalin 
advances the slogan: Make the collective farms Bolshevik 
and the collective farmers prosperous. 
The following works by J. V. Stalin: ³Some Questions 
Concerning the History of Bolshevism²‹(letter 
to the editorial board of the magazine Proletarskaya Revolutsia) 
and ³Reply to Olekhnovich and Aristov,² deal with 
very important problems of the history of Bolshevism. 
Denouncing the Trotskyist and all other falsifiers of the 
history of the Party, J. V. Stalin calls for the study 
of the history of the Party to be put on scientific, Bolshevik 
lines, emphasising that Leninism was born, 
grew up and became strong in relentless struggle against 
opportunism of every brand. J. V. Stalin characterises 
Trotskyism as the advanced detachment of the counter-
revolutionary bourgeoisie. 
In his letter to Demyan Bedny, J. V. Stalin points 
out that some of Demyan Bednyıs skits in verse are permeated 
with unpatriotic tendencies and are an obvious 
retreat from Leninism. J. V. Stalin stresses the fact 
that the Russian working class has given mankind

PREFACE XVI 
splendid examples of struggle for freedom and for socialism. 
This fills the hearts of the Russian workers with 
a feeling of revolutionary national pride that can 
move mountains and perform miracles. J. V. Stalin 
calls upon Soviet writers to be equal to the lofty 
tasks of bards of the advanced proletariat. 
In the ³Talk with the German Author Emil Ludwig,² 
J. V. Stalin by his theoretical treatment throws light 
on the question of the role of the individual and of the 
masses of the people in history. In his replies to Ludwigıs 
questions, J. V. Stalin declares that the task to which 
he has devoted his life is the elevation of the working 
class, the strengthening of the socialist state. Everything 
that strengthens the socialist state helps to strengthen 
the entire international working class. 
In a number of talks with public figures from abroad 
J. V. Stalin characterises the foreign policy of the Soviet 
state as a consistent policy of peace and substantiates 
the possibility of peaceful co-existence and of 
establishing business connections between the U.S.S.R. 
and the capitalist countries. 
In the ³Report to the Seventeenth Party Congress on 
the Work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.),² 
J. V. Stalin sums up the great victories of socialism in 
the U.S.S.R., notes the radical changes that have taken 
place in the country since the Sixteenth Congress, the 
successes achieved in all the branches of the socialist 
national economy and culture, successes that testify to 
the complete triumph of the general line of the Party. 
J. V. Stalin stresses that the Party owes its successes 
to being guided in its work by the invincible teachings 
of Marx, Engels, Lenin. J. V. Stalin outlines the pro

PREFACE XVII 
gramme of the further work of the Party in industry, 
agriculture and other branches of the national economy, 
and in culture and science. J. V. Stalin puts forward 
the task of raising organisational leadership to the 
level of political leadership, of intensifying the ideological 
work of the Party and the struggle against the 
survivals of capitalism in the minds of people. 
J. V. Stalin analyses the course of the world economic 
crisis, which is based on the general crisis of 
capitalism; he shows that in the conditions of the general 
crisis of the capitalist system capitalism is experiencing 
a depression of a special kind, one which does not 
lead to a new upward trend and industrial boom. 
J. V. Stalin describes the growing tension in the political 
situation within the capitalist countries and in 
the relations between these countries, and the imperialistsı 
preparation for a new world war. 
Exposing the plans of the instigators of war and 
scientifically forecasting the further development of 
events, J. V. Stalin points out that war against the 
Soviet Union will be the most dangerous war for the 
imperialists, that the peoples of the U.S.S.R. will fight 
to the death to preserve the gains of the revolution, 
that the war will lead to the complete defeat of the aggressors, 
to revolution in a number of countries in Europe 
and Asia, and to the overthrow of the bourgeois-landlord 
governments in those countries. J. V. Stalin defines 
the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. as a policy of preserving 
peace. He warns that it is necessary to strengthen 
the defence capacity of the Soviet country in order 
to be ready to defend i t from attack by imperialist 
states.

PREFACE XVIII 
The following items in the thirteenth volume are 
published for the first time: J. V. Stalinıs letters to 
Comrade Shatunovsky, Comrade Ch., Demyan Bedny, 
Comrade Etchin, and Comrade I. N. Bazhanov; 
J. V. Stalinıs replies to Ralph V. Barnesıs questions 
and the reply to Mr. Barnesıs letter; the talk with 
Colonel Robins. 
Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute 
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

JULY !(#)_ JANUARY !(#$


REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION 
ON THE POLITICAL REPORT 
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
TO THE SIXTEENTH CONGRESS 
OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 1 
July 22, 1930 
Comrades, after the discussion on the Central Committeeıs 
report and after all that has happened at this 
congress in connection with the statements made by 
the former leaders of the Right opposition, little is 
left for me to say in my concluding remarks. 
I stated in my report that the Sixteenth Congress 
is one of the few congresses in the history of our Party 
at which there is no opposition of any crystallised kind, 
able to lay down its line and to counterpose it to that 
of the Party. That, as you see, is in fact precisely what 
has happened. Not only has there been no definitely 
crystallised opposition at our congress, the Sixteenth 
Congress of the Party, but there has not been even a 
small group, or even individual comrades, who have 
thought fit to come forward on the platform here and 
declare that the Party line is wrong. 
The line followed by our Party is clearly the only 
correct one, moreover its correctness, it turns out, is 
so evident and indisputable that even the former

J. V. S T A L I N 2
leaders of the Right opposition considered it necessary 
unhesitatingly to stress in their pronouncements the 
correctness of the Partyıs entire policy. 
After all that, there is of course no need to dwell 
at length on the correctness of the propositions expounded 
in the report. There is no such need because, in 
view of its evident correctness, the Partyıs line stands 
in no need of further defence at this congress. And if, 
nevertheless, I have not waived my right to reply to the 
discussion, it is because I do not think it will be superfluous 
to answer briefly some notes handed up by 
comrades to the congress Presidium, and then to say 
a few words with regard to the utterances of the former 
leaders of the Right opposition. 
A great many of the notes concern questions of 
secondary importance: why was no mention made of 
horse-breeding in the reports, and could not this be 
touched upon in the reply to the discussion? (Laughter.) 
Why did the reports not mention house-building, and 
could not something be said about it in the reply to 
the discussion? Why did the reports say nothing about 
the electrification of agriculture, and could not something 
be said about it in the reply to the discussion? 
And so on in the same strain. 
My answer to all these comrades must be that I 
could not in my report touch on all the problems of our 
national economy. And I not only could not but had 
no right to, since I have no right to invade the sphere 
of the reports which Comrades Kuibyshev and Yakovlev 
are to make to you on concrete problems of industry 
and agriculture. Indeed, if all questions were to be 
dealt with in the Central Committeeıs report, what

REPLY TO DISCUSSION AT 16TH PARTY CONGRESS 3 
should the reporters on industry, agriculture, etc., 
say in their reports? (Voices: Quite right!) 
In particular, as regards the note on the electrification 
of agriculture, I must say that its author is wrong 
on several points. He asserts that we are already ³confronted 
squarely with² the electrification of agriculture, 
that the Peopleıs Commissariat of Agriculture 
is blocking progress in this matter, that Lenin thought 
differently on the subject, etc. All that is untrue, comrades. 
It cannot be said that we are ³confronted squarely 
with² the problem of electrifying agriculture. If 
we were in fact confronted squarely with the electrification 
of agriculture we should already have ten to 
fifteen districts in which agricultural production was 
electrified. But you know very well that we have nothing 
of the kind as yet. All one can say at the present 
time about the electrification of agriculture in our country 
is that it is in the experimental stage. That is how 
Lenin regarded this matter, encouraging such experiments. 
Some comrades believe the tractor is already out 
of date, that the time has come to advance from tractors 
to the electrification of agriculture. That of course 
is a fantastic notion. Such comrades should be taken 
down a peg or two. And that is precisely what the Peopleıs 
Commissariat of Agriculture is doing with them. 
Hence the note-writerıs dissatisfaction with the Peopleıs 
Commissariat of Agriculture cannot be considered justified. 
The second batch of notes concerns the national 
question. One of them‹the most interesting, in my 
opinion‹compares the treatment of the problem of 
national languages in my report at the Sixteenth Con

J. V. S T A L I N 4
gress with the treatment of it in my speech at the University 
of the Peoples of the East in 19252 and finds 
a certain lack of clarity which needs elucidating. The 
note says: ³You objected at that time to the theory 
(Kautskyıs) of the dying away of national languages 
and the formation of a single, common language in the 
period of socialism (in one country), while now, in your 
report at the Sixteenth Congress, you state that Communists 
believe in the merging of national cultures and 
national languages into one common culture with one 
common language (in the period of the victory of socialism 
on a world scale). Is there not a lack of clarity 
here?² 
I think that there is neither lack of clarity nor the 
slightest contradiction here. In my speech in 1925 I 
objected to Kautskyıs national-chauvinist theory on 
the basis of which a victory of the proletarian revolution 
in the middle of the past century in the united 
Austro-German state was bound to lead to the merging 
of the nations into one common German nation, with 
one common German language, and to the Germanisation 
of the Czechs. I objected to this theory as being 
anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist, and in refutation of i t 
quoted facts from life in our country after the victory 
of socialism in the U.S.S.R. I still oppose this theory, 
as can be seen from my report at this Sixteenth Congress. 
I oppose it because the theory of the merging of 
all the nations of, say, the U.S.S.R. into one common 
Great-Russian nation with one common Great-Russian 
language is a national-chauvinist, anti-Leninist theory, 
which contradicts the basic thesis of Leninism that 
national differences cannot disappear in the near future,

REPLY TO DISCUSSION AT 16TH PARTY CONGRESS 5 
that they are bound to remain for a long time even 
after the victory of the proletarian revolution on a world 
scale. 
As for the more remote prospects for national cultures 
and national languages, I have always adhered 
and continue to adhere to the Leninist view that in 
the period of the victory of socialism on a world scale, 
when socialism has been consolidated and become 
the way of life, the national languages are inevitably 
bound to merge into one common language, which, of 
course, will be neither Great-Russian nor German, but 
something new. I made a definite statement on this 
also in my report at the Sixteenth Congress. 
Where, then, is the lack of clarity here and what 
is it exactly that needs elucidating? 
Evidently, the authors of the note were not quite 
clear on at least two things: 
First and foremost, they were not clear on the fact 
that in the U.S.S.R. we have already entered the period 
of socialism; moreover, despite the fact that we have 
entered this period, the nations are not only not dying 
away, but, on the contrary, are developing and flourishing. 
Have we, in actual fact, already entered the period 
of socialism? Our period is usually called the period 
of transition from capitalism to socialism. It was 
called a transition period in 1918, when Lenin, in his 
celebrated article, ³ŒLeft-Wingı Childishness and Petty- 
Bourgeois Mentality,²3 first described this period with 
its five forms of economy. It is called a transition 
period today, in 1930, when some of these forms, 
having become obsolete, are already on the way to disappearance, 
while one of them, namely, the new form

J. V. S T A L I N 6
of economy in the sphere of industry and agriculture, is 
growing and developing with unprecedented speed. 
Can it be said that these two transition periods are 
identical, are not radically different from each other? 
Obviously not. 
What did we have in the sphere of the national economy 
in 1918? A ruined industry and cigarette lighters; 
neither collective farms nor state farms on a mass scale; 
the growth of a ³new² bourgeoisie in the towns and of 
the kulaks in the countryside. 
What have we today? Socialist industry, restored 
and undergoing reconstruction, an extensive system 
of state farms and collective farms, accounting for more 
than 40 per cent of the total sown area of the U.S.S.R. 
in the spring-sown sector alone, a moribund ³new² 
bourgeoisie in the town and a moribund kulak class 
in the countryside. 
The former was a transition period and so is the 
latter. Nevertheless, they are as far apart as heaven 
and earth. And nevertheless, no one can deny that we 
are on the verge of eliminating the last important capitalist 
class, the kulak class. Clearly, we have already 
emerged from the transition period in the old sense and 
have entered the period of direct and sweeping socialist 
construction along the whole front. Clearly, we 
have already entered the period of socialism, for the 
socialist sector now controls all the economic levers 
of the entire national economy, although we are still 
far from having completely built a socialist society and 
from having abolished class distinctions. Nevertheless, 
the national languages are not only not dying away 
or merging into one common tongue, but, on the contrary,

REPLY TO DISCUSSION AT 16TH PARTY CONGRESS 7 
the national cultures and national languages are developing 
and flourishing. Is it not clear that the theory 
of the dying away of national languages and their 
merging into one common language within the framework 
of a single state in the period of sweeping socialist 
construction, in the period of socialism in one country, 
is an incorrect, anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist theory? 
Secondly, the authors of the note were not clear on 
the fact that the dying away of national languages and 
their merging into one common language is not an intrastate 
question, not a question of the victory of socialism 
in one country, but an international question, a 
question of the victory of socialism on an international 
scale. They failed to understand that the victory of 
socialism in one country must not be confused with the 
victory of socialism on an international scale. Lenin 
had good reason for saying that national differences 
will remain for a long time even after the victory of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat on an international scale. 
Besides, we must take into consideration still another 
circumstance, which affects a number of the nations 
of the U.S.S.R. There is a Ukraine which forms part of 
the U.S.S.R. But there is also another Ukraine which 
forms part of other states. There is a Byelorussia which 
forms part of the U.S.S.R. But there is also another 
Byelorussia which forms part of other states. Do you 
think that the question of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian 
languages can be settled without taking these specific 
conditions into account? 
Then take the nations of the U.S.S.R. situated along 
its southern border, from Azerbaijan to Kazakhstan 
and Buryat-Mongolia. They are all in the same posi

J. V. S T A L I N 8
tion as the Ukraine and Byelorussia. Naturally, here too 
we have to take into consideration the specific conditions 
of development of these nations. 
Is it not obvious that all these and similar questions 
that are bound up with the problem of national cultures 
and national languages cannot be settled within the 
framework of a single state, within the framework of the 
U.S.S.R.? 
That, comrades, is how matters stand with respect to 
the national question in general and the above-mentioned 
note on the national question in particular. 
Allow me to pass now to the utterances of the former 
leaders of the Right opposition. 
What does the congress demand of the former leaders 
of the Right opposition? Repentance perhaps, or selfchastisement? 
Of course not! Our Party, the congress 
of our Party, will never go to the length of requiring 
Party members to do anything that might humiliate 
them. The congress demands three things of the former 
leaders of the Right opposition: 
firstly, that they realise that there is a gulf between 
the line of the Party and the line they were advocating, 
and that the line they upheld leads objectively not to 
the victory of socialism, but to the victory of capitalism 
(voices: ³Quite right!²); 
secondly, that they brand that line as an anti-Leninist 
line and dissociate themselves from it frankly and 
honestly (voices: ³Quite right!²); 
thirdly, that they fall into step with us and, together 
with us, wage a determined struggle against all 
Right deviators. (Voices: ³Quite right!² Stormy applause.)

REPLY TO DISCUSSION AT 16TH PARTY CONGRESS 9 
That is what the congress demands of the former 
leaders of the Right opposition. 
Is there anything in these demands humiliating 
for them as people wanting to remain Bolsheviks? 
Obviously, there is nothing here that is or could 
be humiliating. Every Bolshevik, every revolutionary, 
every self-respecting Party member will realise that 
he can only stand higher and gain in the eyes of the 
Party if he frankly and honestly admits facts that are 
clear and indisputable. 
That is why I think Tomskyıs talk about people 
wanting to send him to the Gobi Desert to eat locusts 
and wild honey is on a par with the flat jokes of a provincial 
variety theatre and has nothing in common 
with the question of a revolutionaryıs self-respect. 
(Laughter. Applause.) 
It may be asked: why is the congress once again 
making these demands of the former leaders of the 
Right opposition? 
Is it not a fact that these demands were presented 
to them once before, in November 1929, at the plenum 
of the Central Committee4? Is it not a fact that they, 
the former leaders of the Right opposition, accepted 
those demands at that time, renounced their own line, 
admitting its erroneous character, recognised the correctness 
of the Party line and promised to fight, together 
with the Party, against the Right deviation? Yes, all 
that was so. What is the point then? The point is that 
they did not keep their promise, they did not fulfil 
and are not fulfilling the pledges that they gave seven 
months ago. (Voices: ³Quite right!²) Uglanov was 
quite right when he said in his speech that they had

J. V. S T A L I N 10 
not fulfilled the pledges given to the November plenum 
of the Central Committee. 
That is the source of the distrust which they are now 
encountering at the present congress. 
That is why the congress is once more presenting 
its demands to them. 
Rykov, Tomsky and Uglanov complained here that 
the congress was treating them with distrust. But whose 
fault is that? It is their own fault. One who does not 
fulfil his pledges cannot expect to be trusted. 
Did they, the former leaders of the Right opposition, 
have any opportunities, any occasions to fulfil 
their promises and turn over a new leaf? Of course they 
did. And what advantage did they take of these opportunities 
and occasions during the seven months? 
None. 
Recently Rykov attended the conference in the 
Urals.5 Consequently, he had an excellent chance to 
correct his mistakes. And what happened? Instead of 
frankly and resolutely shedding his vacillations he 
began to play tricks and manoeuvre. Naturally, the 
Urals Conference could not but rebuff him. 
Now compare Rykovıs speech at the Urals Conference 
with his speech at the Sixteenth Congress. A gulf lies 
between them. There he played tricks and manoeuvred, 
fighting the conference. Here he tries frankly and 
publicly to admit his mistakes, tries to break with the 
Right opposition and promises to support the Party 
in the struggle against deviations. Whence such a change 
and how is it to be explained? It is to be explained, 
obviously, by the precarious situation that has arisen 
in the Party for the former leaders of the Right oppo

REPLY TO DISCUSSION AT 16TH PARTY CONGRESS 11 
sition. No wonder then that the congress has gained 
this definite impression: Youıll get nothing out of these 
people unless you put the screw on them. (General laughter. 
Prolonged applause.) 
Did Uglanov have an opportunity of fulfilling the 
promise he made to the November plenum of the Central 
Committee? Yes, he did. I have in mind the non-Party 
meeting at the Moscow Electric Works which he recently 
addressed. And what happened? Instead of speaking 
there as befits a Bolshevik he began to find fault 
with the Party line. For that he was, of course, suitably 
rebuffed by the Party unit of the works. 
Now compare that speech with his statement printed 
in todayıs Pravda. A gulf lies between them. How is 
this change to be explained? Again by the precarious 
situation that has arisen around the former leaders of 
the Right opposition. Small wonder then that the congress 
has drawn a definite lesson from this: Youıll get 
nothing out of these people unless you put the screw 
on them. (General laughter. Applause.) 
Or Tomsky, for instance. Recently he was in Tiflis, 
at the Transcaucasian Conference.6 Consequently, he 
had a chance to make amends for his sins. And what 
happened? In his speech there he dealt with state farms, 
collective farms, co-operatives, the cultural revolution 
and all that sort of thing, but he did not utter a 
word about the chief thing, that is, his opportunist 
work in the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions. 
And that is called fulfilling pledges given to the Party! 
He wanted to outwit the Party, not realising that millions 
of eyes are watching every one of us and that in 
this matter you cannot outwit anybody.

J. V. S T A L I N 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
12 
Now compare his Tiflis speech with the one he delivered 
at this congress, where he directly and openly 
admitted his opportunist mistakes in leadership of the 
A.U.C.C.T.U. A gulf lies between them. How is this 
difference to be explained? Again, by the precarious 
situation that has arisen around the former leaders of 
the Right opposition. Small wonder then that the congress 
tried to exert due pressure on these comrades to 
get them to carry out their obligations. (Applause. 
General laughter throughout the hall.) 
That is the source of the distrust which the congress 
still entertains for these comrades. 
How is this more than strange conduct of the former 
leaders of the Right opposition to be explained? 
How is the fact to be explained that during the 
past period they did not make a single attempt to fulfil 
their pledges voluntarily, without pressure from 
outside? 
It is to be explained by at least two circumstances: 
Firstly, by the fact that, being still not fully convinced 
that the Party line was right, they continued to 
carry on a certain factional activity surreptitiously, 
lying low for the time being and waiting for a suitable 
occasion to come out openly once more against the Party. 
When they gathered at their factional meetings and 
discussed Party questions they would usually calculate 
in this way: let us wait until the spring; maybe the 
Party will come a cropper with the sowing, then we will 
strike, and strike hard. The spring, however, gave them 
no advantage, as the sowing proceeded successfully. 
Then they calculated afresh: let us wait until the autumn; 
maybe the Party will come a cropper with the grain

REPLY TO DISCUSSION AT 16TH PARTY CONGRESS 13 
procurements, then we will strike at the Central Committee. 
But the autumn, too, disappointed them, giving 
them nothing for their pains. And as spring and 
autumn recur every year, the former leaders of the Right 
opposition continued to bide their time, repeatedly 
pinning their hopes now on the spring and now on the 
autumn. (General laughter throughout the hall.) 
Naturally, as they kept biding their time from season 
to season in expectation of a favourable moment for 
striking at the Party, they were unable to fulfil their 
pledges. 
Lastly, the second reason. It consists in the circumstance 
that the former leaders of the Right opposition 
do not understand our Bolshevik rates of development, 
do not believe in those rates and, in general, will not 
accept anything that goes beyond the bounds of gradual 
development, beyond the bounds of allowing matters 
to take their own course. Moreover, our Bolshevik 
speeds, our new methods of development bound up 
with the period of reconstruction, the sharpening of 
the class struggle and the consequences of this sharpening 
fill them with alarm, confusion, fear and terror. 
Hence it is natural that they should shrink from everything 
connected with the most incisive slogans of our 
Party. 
They are afflicted with the same disease as that of 
Chekhovıs well-known character Belikov, teacher of Greek, 
³the man wrapped in padding.² Do you remember 
Chekhovıs story, ³The Man Wrapped in Padding²? 
That character, you may recall, always went about 
in galoshes and a padded coat, carrying an umbrella, 
in hot and in cold weather. ³Excuse me, but why do

J. V. S T A L I N 14 
you wear galoshes and a padded coat in July, in such hot 
weather?² Belikov used to be asked. ³You never can 
tell,² Belikov would reply, ³Something untoward might 
happen; a sudden frost might set in, what then?² (General 
laughter. Applause.) Everything new, everything 
that was outside the daily routine of his drab philistine 
life, he feared like the plague. If a new restaurant was 
opened, Belikov promptly took alarm: ³It may, of course, 
be a grand idea to have a restaurant, but take care, something 
untoward might happen!² If a dramatic circle 
was formed or a reading room opened, Belikov again 
fell into a panic: ³A dramatic circle, a new reading 
room‹what could they be for? Take care‹something 
untoward might happen!² (General laughter.) 
The same thing must be said about the former leaders 
of the Right opposition. Do you remember the case 
of the transfer of the technical colleges to the economic 
Peopleıs Commissariats? We wanted to transfer only 
two technical colleges to the Supreme Council of National 
Economy. A small matter, it would seem. Yet we 
encountered desperate resistance on the part of the 
Right deviators. ³Hand over two technical colleges to 
the S.C.N.E.? Why? Would i t not be better to wait 
a bit? Take care, something untoward might happen 
as a result of this scheme!² Yet today all our technical 
colleges have been transferred to economic Peopleıs 
Commissariats. And we are getting along all right. 
Or take, for example, the emergency measures against 
the kulaks. Do you remember the hysterics of the 
Right opposition leaders on that occasion? ³Emergency 
measures against the kulaks? Why? Would it not be 
better to adopt a liberal policy towards the kulaks?

REPLY TO DISCUSSION AT 16TH PARTY CONGRESS 15 
Take care, something untoward might happen as a result 
of this scheme!² Yet today we are carrying out the 
policy of eliminating the kulaks as a class, a policy 
in comparison with which the emergency measures 
against the kulaks are a mere trifle. And we are getting 
along all right. 
Or, for example, the question of the collective farms 
and state farms. ³State farms and collective farms? 
What are they for? Why hurry? Mind you, something 
might happen as a result of these state and collective 
farms.² 
And so on and so forth. 
It is this dread of the new, this inability to approach 
new problems in a new way, this apprehension 
that ³something untoward might happen,² these traits 
of the man wrapped in padding that prevent the former 
leaders of the Right opposition from merging properly 
with the Party. 
These traits of the man wrapped in padding assume 
particularly ridiculous forms with them when difficulties 
arise, when the tiniest cloud appears on the horizon. 
As soon as any difficulty or hitch occurs anywhere in 
our country they become alarmed, fearing that something 
untoward might happen. Should a cockroach 
make a rustling sound somewhere, they start back terror-
stricken even before it has had time to crawl out 
of its hole, and they begin to howl about a catastrophe, 
about the downfall of the Soviet regime. (Loud 
laughter.) 
We try to calm them, to convince them that as yet 
nothing dangerous has occurred, that after all i t is 
only a cockroach, which no one need be afraid of. But

J. V. S T A L I N 16 
it is of no avail. They keep on howling: ³What do you 
mean, a cockroach? Thatıs not a cockroach, itıs a thousand 
wild beasts! Itıs not a cockroach, but the abyss, 
the downfall of the Soviet regime.². . . And‹there 
is a regular commotion. Bukharin writes theses on the 
subject and sends them to the Central Committee, asserting 
that its policy has brought the country to ruin and 
that the Soviet regime will certainly perish, if not at 
once then in a monthıs time at most. Rykov associates 
himself with Bukharinıs theses, with the reservation, 
however, that he has a most serious point of disagreement 
with Bukharin, namely, that the Soviet regime 
will perish, in his opinion, not in a monthıs time, but 
after a month and two days. (General laughter.) Tomsky 
associates himself with Bukharin and Rykov, but protests 
against their inability to do without theses, to do 
without a document which they will have to answer for 
later on: ³How many times have I told you, Œdo as you 
please, but donıt leave any documents behind, donıt 
leave any traces!ı² (Roars of laughter throughout the 
hall. Prolonged applause.) 
True, later on, when a year has passed and every 
fool can see that the cockroach peril was not worth a 
rap, the Right deviators begin to come to and, gaining 
courage, are not averse even to boasting a little, declaring 
that they are not afraid of any cockroaches, and 
that, anyway, that particular cockroach was such a frail 
and puny specimen. (Laughter. Applause.) But that is 
after a year has passed. In the meantime‹be good enough 
to put up with these procrastinators. . . . 
These, comrades, are the circumstances which prevent 
the former leaders of the Right opposition from

REPLY TO DISCUSSION AT 16TH PARTY CONGRESS 17 
coming closer to the core of the Party leadership and 
completely merging with it. 
How can the situation be remedied here? 
There is only one way to do so: by breaking once 
and for all with their past, equipping themselves anew 
and merging completely with the Central Committee 
of our Party in its struggle for Bolshevik rates of development, 
in its struggle against the Right deviation. 
There is no other way. 
If the former leaders of the Right opposition are 
able to do this, well and good. If not, they will have 
nobody but themselves to blame. (Prolonged applause 
from the entire hall. An ovation. All rise and sing the 
³Internationale.²) 
Pravda, No. 181, 
July 3, 1930

LETTER TO COMRADE SHATUNOVSKY 
Comrade Shatunovsky, 
I do not remember your first letter (about Liebknecht). 
Your second (on criticism) I have read. Criticism, 
of course, is necessary and obligatory, but on 
one condition: that i t is not barren. Unfortunately, 
your criticism cannot be considered other than barren. 
Let me take it up point by point: 
1) It is not true that before the revolution land was 
bought only by kulaks. In point of fact both the kulaks 
and the middle peasants used to buy land. If the peasant 
households that bought land are divided according 
to social groups, a larger number of them will be found 
to belong to middle peasants than to kulaks; but if 
the quantity of land bought is taken as the criterion 
the kulaks will preponderate. In my speech,7 of course, 
I had the middle peasants in mind. 
2) The phrase about the blockheadsı retreat to 
Leninist positions is another way of expressing the idea 
that they are renouncing their errors. That, I believe, 
is clear and understandable. Your ³critical² remark 
on this score is really amusing. 
3) You are likewise wrong about the conversion 
of rye into pig food. The point I am making is not that 
rye can also be fed to pigs, but that there is a crisis of

LETTER TO COMRADE SHATUNOVSKY 19 
over-production of rye,8 which makes it unprofitable 
to enlarge the area under rye and compels the capitalists 
(for the sake of maintaining prices) to spoil rye 
by a special chemical treatment that makes it fit only 
for pig food (and unfit for human consumption). How 
could you overlook this ³trifle²? 
4) You are still more wrong in assuming that the 
decay of capitalism precludes its growth. Read Leninıs 
Imperialism9 and you will realise that the decay of capitalism 
in certain industries and countries does not preclude 
but presupposes the growth of capitalism in other 
industries and countries. How could you fail to notice 
this ³trifle² in Lenin? Criticise, if you please, but do 
so from Leninıs point of view, and from that point of 
view alone, if you want your criticism to be productive. 
5) You are likewise wrong when you describe our 
country as one of the ³colonial type.² Colonial countries 
are in the main pre-capitalist countries. Ours, 
however, is a post-capitalist country. The former have 
not reached the stage of developed capitalism. The latter 
has outgrown developed capitalism. They are two fundamentally 
different types. How can one forget this 
³trifle,² comrade critic? 
6) You are surprised that in Stalinıs view the new 
economic cadres should be technically more experienced 
than the old.10 It may be asked, why is this? Is it not 
true that in our country our old economic cadres were 
trained during the restoration period, the period when 
the old and technically backward factories were working 
to capacity, and consequently they did not afford much 
technical experience? Is it not true that in the period 
of reconstruction, when new, modern technical equip

J. V. S T A L I N 20 
ment is being introduced, the old economic cadres have 
to be retrained in the new methods, not infrequently 
giving way to new, more qualified technical cadres? 
Will you really deny that the old economic cadres, who 
were trained in working the old factories to capacity 
or restarting them, frequently prove to be quite unable 
to cope not only with the new machinery but also with 
our new tempos? 
7) I shall not touch upon the other points raised in 
your letter, which are smaller and more trivial, although 
just as fallacious. 
8) You speak of your ³devotion² to me. Perhaps 
it was just a chance phrase. Perhaps. . . . But if the 
phrase was not accidental I would advise you to discard 
the ³principle² of devotion to persons. It is not the Bolshevik 
way. Be devoted to the working class, its Party, 
its state. That is a fine and useful thing. But do not 
confuse it with devotion to persons, this vain and useless 
bauble of weak-minded intellectuals. 
With communist greetings, 
J. Stalin 
August 1930 
Published for the first time

LETTERS TO COMRADE CH. 
Comrade Ch., 
Your note is full of misunderstandings. My report 
at the Fifteenth Party Conference speaks of the ³unity 
between the interests of industrialisation (i.e., of the 
proletariat) and the interests of the main mass of the 
labouring sections of the population.² It says there that 
our method of industrialisation, i.e., the socialist method 
of industrialisation, ³leads not to the impoverishment 
of the vast masses, but to an improvement of 
their living standards, not to an aggravation of the internal 
contradictions, but to the latter being evened 
out and overcome.²11 Hence it is a matter here of the 
bond between the working class and the main mass of 
the working people, particularly the main mass of the 
peasantry. Hence it is a matter of the contradictions 
within the bond, which will be evened out and overcome 
satisfactorily as industrialisation increases, that is, as 
the strength and influence of the countryıs proletariat 
grows. 
That is the matter dealt with in my report. 
But you, having forgotten all this, argue about the 
contradictions between the proletariat and the kulaks, 
that is contradictions that lie outside the scope of the

J. V. S T A L I N 22 
bond and will grow and become more acute until we eliminate 
the kulaks as a class. 
It follows that you have confused two different 
things. You have confused the contradictions between 
the proletariat and the main mass of the working people 
with the contradictions between the proletariat and the 
kulaks. 
Is that clear? I think it is. 
With communist greetings, 
J. Stalin 
November 1930 
Comrade Ch., 
1. In your first letter you played with the word ³contradictions² 
and lumped together contradictions outside 
the bond (that is contradictions between the proletarian 
dictatorship and the capitalist elements of the country) 
and those within the bond (that is contradictions between 
the proletariat and the main mass of the peasantry). 
You could have avoided this, for a Marxist 
impermissible, game if you had taken the trouble to 
understand the basic causes of the disputes between the 
Party and the Trotskyists. The Trotskyists told us: 
a) You will not cope with the contradictions between 
the middle peasants and the working class; they are 
bound to fall out and the bond will be abolished unless 
a victorious world revolution renders timely assistance;

TO COMRADE DEMYAN BEDNY 23 
b) You will not overcome the capitalist elements, 
you will not completely build socialism by your own 
efforts and a Thermidor will be inevitable unless a 
victorious world revolution renders timely assistance. 
On both these questions the Trotskyists, as we know, 
were defeated. But you had no desire to reflect on our 
disputes with the Trotskyists. In my reply I was therefore 
compelled to expose your playing with the word 
³contradictions² and said that it was impermissible to 
lump together two series of dissimilar contradictions. 
And what was your reply to this? 
2. Instead of honestly acknowledging your mistake, 
you ³diplomatically² evaded the question and passed 
on from playing with the word ³contradictions² to 
playing with the words ³inner contradictions,² lumping 
together contradictions within the bond and contradictions 
within the country, contradictions between the 
proletarian dictatorship and capitalism. That is, you 
are ³imperceptibly² repeating your former mistake, 
with a mere change in its form. I shall not conceal the 
fact that lumping together two dissimilar contradictions 
and ³diplomatically² slurring over this question is a 
very characteristic feature of the Trotskyist-Zinovievist 
way of thinking. I did not think that you were infected 
with this disease. Now I have to think about this as well. 
As I cannot tell what further play you will indulge 
in and am terribly overburdened with current affairs 
so that I have no time left for play, I must bid you farewell, 
Comrade Ch. 
J. Stalin 
December 7, 1930 
Published for the first time

TO COMRADE DEMYAN BEDNY 
(Excerpts from a Letter) 
Your letter of December 8 received. You evidently 
want my answer. Well, here it is. 
First of all, about some of your small and trifling 
phrases and insinuations. If these ugly ³trifles² were 
an accidental element, one could ignore them. But 
they are so numerous and ³pour forth² in such a lively 
spate that they set the tone of your entire letter. And 
as everyone knows, it is the tone that makes the music. 
In your estimation the decision of the C.C. is a 
³noose,² a sign that ³the hour of my (that is, your) doom 
has struck.² Why, on what grounds? What shall one 
call a Communist who, instead of reflecting on the essence 
of a C.C. decision and rectifying his mistakes, 
treats it as a ³noose²?. . . 
Dozens of times the C.C. praised you when praise 
was due. And dozens of times the C.C. shielded you 
(not without stretching things somewhat!) from the 
attacks of particular groups or members of our Party. 
Dozens of poets and writers have been rebuked by the 
C.C. when they made mistakes. All this you considered 
normal and understandable. But when the C.C. found 
itself compelled to criticise your mistakes you suddenly 
started to fume and shout about a ³noose.² On what 
grounds? Has the C.C. perhaps no right to criticise your

TO COMRADE DEMYAN BEDNY 25 
mistakes? Is the C.C. decision perhaps not binding on 
you? Is your poetry perhaps above all criticism? Do 
you not find that you have caught a certain unpleasant 
disease called ³conceit²? A little more modesty, Comrade 
Demyan. . . . 
What is the essence of your mistakes? The fact that 
your criticism of shortcomings in the manner and conditions 
of life in the U.S.S.R.‹an essential, imperative 
subject of criticism‹which at first you carried out 
with considerable accuracy and skill, carried you away 
so that it began to turn in your works into slander of 
the U.S.S.R., of its past and present. Such are your ³Get 
Down from the Oven² and ³Without Mercy.² Such is 
your ³Pererva,² which I read today at Comrade Molotovıs 
suggestion. 
You say that Comrade Molotov praised your skit 
³Get Down from the Oven.² I t i s very possible. I 
praised it perhaps no less than Comrade Molotov did, for 
it (as well as other skits) contains a number of splendid 
passages that hit the nail on the head. But there is a 
fly in the ointment which spoils the whole picture and 
turns it into a veritable ³Pererva.² Thatıs the point, 
and thatıs what sets the tone in these skits. 
Judge for yourself. 
The whole world now admits that the centre of the 
revolutionary movement has shifted from Western Europe 
to Russia. The revolutionaries of all countries look with 
hope to the U.S.S.R. as the centre of the liberation 
struggle of the working people throughout the world 
and recognise it as their only Motherland. In all countries 
the revolutionary workers unanimously applaud 
the Soviet working class, and first and foremost the

J. V. S T A L I N 26 
Russian working class, the vanguard of the Soviet workers, 
as their recognised leader that is carrying out the most 
revolutionary and active policy ever dreamed of by the 
proletarians of other countries. The leaders of the revolutionary 
workers in all countries are eagerly studying 
the highly instructive history of Russiaıs working class, 
its past and the past of Russia, knowing that besides 
reactionary Russia there existed also revolutionary Russia, 
the Russia of the Radishchevs and Chernyshevskys, 
the Zhelyabovs and Ulyanovs, the Khalturins and Alexeyevs. 
All this fills (cannot but fill!) the hearts of 
the Russian workers with a feeling of revolutionary national 
pride that can move mountains and perform 
miracles. 
And you? Instead of grasping the meaning of this 
process, one of the greatest in the history of the revolution, 
and of being equal to the lofty tasks of a bard 
of the advanced proletariat‹you retired to a quiet spot 
in the country and, after getting into a muddle between 
most tedious quotations from the works of Karamzin 
and no less tedious maxims from the Domostroi,* began 
to shout from the house-tops that in the past Russia 
was an abomination of desolation, that present-day 
Russia is one solid ³Pererva,² that ³laziness² and a 
desire ³to lie on the oven-couch² are well-nigh national 
traits of the Russians in general and hence also of the 
Russian workers, who after achieving the October Revolution 
did not, of course, cease to be Russians. And 
* Domostroi, a memorial of Russian literature of the 16th 
century‹a code of social, religious, and particularly family 
conduct. It has come to be a synonym for a conservative and 
uncultured mode of life.‹Tr.

TO COMRADE DEMYAN BEDNY 27 
this you call Bolshevik criticism! No, highly esteemed 
Comrade Demyan, this is not Bolshevik criticism but 
slander of our people, a discrediting of the U.S.S.R., a 
discrediting of the proletariat of the U.S.S.R., a discrediting 
of the Russian proletariat. 
And after that you want the C.C. to keep silent! 
What do you take our C.C. for? 
And you want me to keep silent on the ground that 
you, it appears, cherish a ³biographical tenderness² for 
me! How naïve you are and how little you know the 
Bolsheviks. . . . 
Perhaps, being a ³literate person,² you will not 
refuse to listen to the following words of Leninıs: 
³Is the sense of national pride alien to us, Great-Russian 
class-conscious proletarians? Of course not! We love our language 
and our country, we are working most of all to raise her 
labouring masses ( i . e . , nine-tenths of her population) to the 
level of the politically conscious life of democrats and Socialists. 
It pains us more than anything else to see and feel the outrage, 
oppression and humiliation inflicted on our splendid country 
by the tsarist hangmen, the nobility and the capitalists. We are 
proud of the fact that these outrages have roused resistance in 
our midst, the midst of the Great Russians; that from this midst 
came Radishchev, the Decembrists and the revolutionary commoners 
of the seventies; that the Great-Russian working class 
in 1905 created a mighty, revolutionary party of the masses; 
that at the same time the Great-Russian muzhik was becoming 
a democrat, began to overthrow the priest and the landlord. 
We remember that half a century ago the Great-Russian democrat 
Chernyshevsky, who devoted his life to the cause of the revolution, 
said: ŒA miserable nation, a nation of slaves, from top to 
bottom‹all slaves.ı The avowed and unavowed Great-Russian 
slaves (slaves of the tsarist monarchy) do not like to recall these 
words. Yet, in our opinion, these were words of genuine love of

J. V. S T A L I N 28 
country, love saddened owing to the absence of a revolutionary 
spirit among the masses of the Great-Russian people. That spirit 
was absent at that time. There is little of it now; but it already 
exists. We are filled with a sense of national pride because the 
Great-Russian nation, too, has created a revolutionary class, it 
too has proved that it is capable of giving mankind splendid examples 
of struggle for freedom and for socialism, and not only great 
pogroms, rows of gallows, dungeons, great famines and great 
servility towards priests, tsars, landlords and capitalists² (see 
Lenin, The National Pride of the Great Russians).12 
That is how Lenin, the greatest internationalist in 
the world, could speak of the national pride of the Great 
Russians. 
And he spoke thus because he knew that 
³The interests (not in the servile sense) of the national pride 
of the Great Russians coincide with the socialist interests of the 
Great-Russian (and all other) proletarians² (ibid.).13 
There you have i t , Leninıs clear and bold ³programme.² 
This ³programme² is fully comprehensible and natural 
to revolutionaries intimately linked with their 
working class, their people. 
It is not comprehensible and not natural to political 
degenerates of the Lelevich type, who are not and cannot 
be linked with their working class, their people. 
Can this revolutionary ³programme² of Lenin be 
reconciled with that unhealthy tendency displayed in 
your latest skits? 
Unfortunately, it cannot, and that is because they 
have nothing in common. 
That is the point at issue and that is what you refuse 
to understand.

TO COMRADE DEMYAN BEDNY 29 
Therefore, you must at all costs turn back to the old, 
Leninist road. 
That is the crux of the matter, and not the inane 
lamentations of a frightened intellectual who goes around 
in a blue funk talking about how they want to ³isolate² 
Demyan, that Demyan ³wonıt be printed any more,² 
and so on. 
J. Stalin 
December 12, 1930 
Published for the first time

ANTI-SEMITISM 
Reply to an Inquiry 
of the Jewish News Agency in the United States 
In answer to your inquiry: 
National and racial chauvinism is a vestige of the 
misanthropic customs characteristic of the period of 
cannibalism. Anti-semitism, as an extreme form of racial 
chauvinism, is the most dangerous vestige of cannibalism. 
Anti-semitism is of advantage to the exploiters as 
a lightning conductor that deflects the blows aimed by 
the working people at capitalism. Anti-semitism is dangerous 
for the working people as being a false path that 
leads them off the right road and lands them in the 
jungle. Hence Communists, as consistent internationalists, 
cannot but be irreconcilable, sworn enemies of 
anti-semitism. 
In the U.S.S.R. anti-semitism is punishable with 
the utmost severity of the law as a phenomenon deeply 
hostile to the Soviet system. Under U.S.S.R. law active 
anti-semites are liable to the death penalty. 
J. Stalin 
January 12, 1931 
First published 
in the newspaper Pravda, No. 329, 
November 30, 1936

THE TASKS OF BUSINESS EXECUTIVES 
Speech Delivered at the First All-Union Conference 
of Leading Personnel of Socialist Industry14 
February 4, 1931 
Comrades, the deliberations of your conference are 
drawing to a close. You are now about to adopt resolutions. 
I have no doubt that they will be adopted unanimously. 
In these resolutions‹I am somewhat familiar 
with them‹you approve the control figures of industry 
for 1931 and pledge yourselves to fulfil them. 
A Bolshevikıs word is his bond. Bolsheviks are in 
the habit of fulfilling promises made by them. But 
what does the pledge to fulfil the control figures for 
1931 mean? It means ensuring a total increase of industrial 
output by 45 per cent. And that is a very big task. 
More than that. Such a pledge means that you not only 
pledge yourselves to fulfil our five-year plan in four 
years‹that matter has already been settled, and no 
more resolutions on it are needed‹it means that you 
promise to fulfil it in three years in all the basic, decisive 
branches of industry. 
It is good that the conference gives a promise to 
fulfil the plan for 1931, to fulfil the five-year plan in 
three years. But we have been taught by ³bitter experience.² 
We know that promises are not always kept. 
In the beginning of 1930, too, a promise was given to 
fulfil the plan for the year. At that time it was necessary 
to increase the output of our industries by 31 to

J. V. S T A L I N 32 
32 per cent. But that promise was not kept to the 
full. Actually, the increase in industrial output during 
1930 amounted to 25 per cent. We must ask: Will not 
the same thing occur again this year? The managers 
and leading personnel of our industries now promise 
to increase industrial output in 1931 by 45 per cent. 
But what guarantee is there that this promise will be 
kept? 
What is needed in order to fulfil the control figures, 
to achieve a 45 per cent increase in output, to secure 
the fulfilment of the five-year plan not in four, but, as 
regards the basic and decisive branches of industry, 
in three years? 
Two fundamental conditions are needed for this. 
Firstly, real or, as we term it, ³objective² possibilities.
Secondly, the willingness and ability to direct our 
enterprises in such a way as to realise these possibilities. 
Did we have the ³objective² possibilities last year 
for completely fulfilling the plan? Yes, we had. Incontestable 
facts testify to this. These facts show that in 
March and April of last year industry achieved an increase 
of 31 per cent in output compared with the previous 
year. Why then, it will be asked, did we fail to fulfil 
the plan for the whole year? What prevented it? 
What was lacking? The ability to make use of the existing 
possibilities was lacking. The ability to manage the 
factories, mills and mines properly was lacking. 
We had the first condition: the ³objective² possibilities 
for fulfilling the plan. But we did not have in 
sufficient degree the second condition: the ability to 
manage production. And precisely because we lacked

THE TASKS OF BUSINESS EXECUTIVES 33 
the ability to manage the factories, the plan was not 
fulfilled. Instead of a 31-32 per cent increase we had 
one of only 25 per cent. 
Of course, a 25 per cent increase is a big thing. Not 
a single capitalist country increased its production in 
1930, or is increasing production now. In all capitalist 
countries without exception a sharp decline in production 
is taking place. Under such circumstances a 25 per 
cent increase is a big step forward. But we could have 
achieved more. We had all the necessary ³objective² 
conditions for this. 
And so, what guarantee is there that what happened 
last year will not be repeated this year, that the plan 
will be fulfilled, that we shall use the existing possibilities 
in the way that they should be used, that your 
promise will not to some extent remain a promise on 
paper? 
In the history of states and countries, in the history 
of armies, there have been cases when there was 
every possibility for success and victory, but these possibilities 
were wasted because the leaders failed to notice 
them, did not know how to take advantage of them, 
and the armies suffered defeat. 
Have we all the possibilities that are needed to fulfil 
the control figures for 1931? 
Yes, we have such possibilities. 
What are these possibilities? What is needed in order 
that these possibilities should really exist? 
First of all, adequate natural resources in the country: 
iron ore, coal, oil, grain, cotton. Have we these 
resources? Yes, we have. We have them in larger quantities 
than any other country. Take the Urals, for

J. V. S T A L I N 34 
example, which provide a combination of resources not to 
be found in any other country. Ore, coal, oil, grain‹ 
what is there not in the Urals? We have everything in 
our country, except, perhaps, rubber. But within a 
year or two we shall have our own rubber as well As 
far as natural resources are concerned we are fully provided. 
We have even more than necessary. 
What else is needed? 
A government desirous and capable of utilising these 
immense natural resources for the benefit of the people. 
Have we such a government? We have. True, our work 
in utilising natural resources does not always proceed 
without friction among our leading personnel. For instance, 
last year the Soviet Government had to conduct 
a certain amount of struggle over the question of creating 
a second coal and metallurgical base, without which 
we cannot develop further. But we have already overcome 
these obstacles and shall soon have this base. 
What else is needed? 
That this government should enjoy the support of 
the vast masses of workers and peasants. Does our government 
enjoy such support? Yes, it does. You will 
find no other government in the world that enjoys such 
support from the workers and peasants as does the Soviet 
government. There is no need for me to refer to the 
growth of socialist emulation, the spread of shock-brigade 
work, the campaign and struggle for counter-plans. All 
these facts, which vividly demonstrate the support that 
the vast masses give the Soviet Government, are well 
known. 
What else is needed in order to fulfil and overfulfil 
the control figures for 1931?

THE TASKS OF BUSINESS EXECUTIVES 35 
A system that is free from the incurable diseases of 
capitalism and has great advantages over capitalism. 
Crises, unemployment, waste, destitution among the 
masses‹such are the incurable diseases of capitalism. 
Our system does not suffer from these diseases because 
power is in our hands, in the hands of the working class; 
because we are conducting a planned economy, systematically 
accumulating resources and properly distributing 
them among the different branches of the national 
economy. We are free from the incurable diseases 
of capitalism. That is what distinguishes us from capitalism; 
that is what constitutes our decisive superiority 
over capitalism. 
Notice the way in which the capitalists are trying 
to escape from the economic crisis. They are reducing 
the workersı wages as much as possible. They are reducing 
the prices of raw materials as much as possible. 
But they do not want to reduce the prices of food and 
industrial commodities for mass consumption to any important 
extent. This means that they want to escape 
from the crisis at the expense of the principal consumers, 
at the expense of the workers and peasants, at the 
expense of the working people. The capitalists are cutting 
the ground from under their own feet. And instead of 
overcoming the crisis they are aggravating it; new conditions 
are accumulating which lead to a new, even more 
severe crisis. 
Our superiority lies in the fact that we have no 
crises of overproduction, we have not and never will have 
millions of unemployed, we have no anarchy in production, 
for we are conducting a planned economy. But 
that is not all. We are a land of the most concentrated

J. V. S T A L I N 36 
industry. This means that we can build our industry on 
the basis of the best technique and thereby secure an 
unprecedented productivity of labour, an unprecedented 
rate of accumulation. Our weakness in the past was that 
this industry was based upon scattered and small peasant 
farming. That was so in the past; it is no longer 
so now. Soon, perhaps within a year, we shall become 
the country of the largest-scale agriculture in the world. 
This year, the state farms and collective farms‹and 
these are forms of large-scale farming‹have already supplied 
half of all our marketable grain. And that means 
that our system, the Soviet system, affords us opportunities 
of rapid progress of which not a single bourgeois 
country can dream. 
What else is needed in order to advance with giant 
strides? 
A party sufficiently solid and united to direct the 
efforts of all the best members of the working class to 
one point, and sufficiently experienced to be unafraid 
of difficulties and to pursue systematically a correct, revolutionary, 
Bolshevik policy. Have we such a party? 
Yes, we have. Is its policy correct? Yes, it is, for it is 
yielding important successes. This is now admitted not 
only by the friends but also by the enemies of the working 
class. See how all the well-known ³honourable² gentlemen, 
Fish in America, Churchill in Britain, Poincaré 
in France, fume and rave against our Party. Why do 
they fume and rave? Because the policy of our Party is 
correct, because it is yielding success after success. 
There, comrades, you have all those objective possibilities 
which assist us in realising the control figures 
for 1931, which help us to fulfil the five-year plan in

THE TASKS OF BUSINESS EXECUTIVES 37 
four years, and in the key industries even in three 
years. 
Thus we have the first condition for fulfilment of 
the plan‹the ³objective² possibilities. 
Have we the second condition, the ability to use 
these possibilities? 
In other words, are our factories, mills and mines 
properly managed? Is everything in order in this respect? 
Unfortunately, not everything is in order here. And, 
as Bolsheviks, we must say this plainly and frankly. 
What does management of production mean? There 
are people among us who do not always have a Bolshevik 
approach to the question of the management of our 
factories. There are many people among us who think that 
management is synonymous with signing papers and 
orders. This is sad, but true. At times one cannot help 
recalling Shchedrinıs Pompadours. Do you remember 
how Madame Pompadour taught the young Pompadour: 
³Donıt bother your head with science, donıt go into matters, 
let others do that, it is not your business‹your 
business is to sign papers.² It must be admitted to our 
shame that even among us Bolsheviks there are not a 
few who carry out management by signing papers. But 
as for going into matters, mastering technique, becoming 
master of the business‹why, that is out of the 
question. 
How is it that we Bolsheviks, who have made three 
revolutions, who emerged victorious from the bitter 
civil war, who have solved the tremendous task of building 
a modern industry, who have swung the peasantry on 
to the path of socialism‹how is it that in the matter of 
the management of production we bow to a slip of paper?

J. V. S T A L I N 38 
The reason is that it is easier to sign papers than to 
manage production. And so, many economic executives 
are taking this line of least resistance. We, too, in the 
centre, are also to blame. About ten years ago a slogan 
was issued: ³Since Communists do not yet properly understand 
the technique of production, since they have 
yet to learn the art of management, let the old technicians 
and engineers‹the experts‹carry on production, 
and you, Communists, do not interfere with the technique 
of the business; but, while not interfering, study technique, 
study the art of management tirelessly, in order later 
on, together with the experts who are loyal to us, to 
become true managers of production, true masters of 
the business.² Such was the slogan. But what actually 
happened? The second part of this formula was cast aside, 
for it is harder to study than to sign papers; and the first 
part of the formula was vulgarised: non-interference was 
interpreted to mean refraining from studying the technique 
of production. The result has been nonsense, harmful 
and dangerous nonsense, which the sooner we discard 
the better. 
Life itself has more than once warned us that all was 
not well in this field. The Shakhty affair15 was the first 
grave warning. The Shakhty affair showed that the Party 
organisations and the trade unions lacked revolutionary 
vigilance. It showed that our economic executives were 
disgracefully backward in technical knowledge; that 
some of the old engineers and technicians, working without 
supervision, rather easily go over to wrecking activities, 
especially as they are constantly being besieged 
by ³offers² from our enemies abroad. 
The second warning was the ³Industrial Party² trial.16

THE TASKS OF BUSINESS EXECUTIVES 39 
Of course, the underlying cause of wrecking activities 
is the class struggle. Of course, the class enemy furiously 
resists the socialist offensive. This alone, however, 
is not an adequate explanation for the luxuriant growth 
of wrecking activities. 
How is it that wrecking activities assumed such wide 
dimensions? Who is to blame for this? We are to blame. 
Had we handled the business of managing production 
differently, had we started much earlier to learn the 
technique of the business, to master technique, had we 
more frequently and efficiently intervened in the management 
of production, the wreckers would not have succeeded 
in doing so much damage. 
We must ourselves become experts, masters of the 
business; we must turn to technical science‹such was 
the lesson life itself was teaching us. But neither the first 
warning nor even the second brought about the necessary 
change. It is time, high time that we turned towards 
technique. It is time to discard the old slogan, the obsolete 
slogan of non-interference in technique, and ourselves 
become specialists, experts, complete masters of 
our economic affairs. 
It is frequently asked: Why have we not one-man 
management? We do not have it and we shall not get it 
until we have mastered technique. Until there are among 
us Bolsheviks a sufficient number of people thoroughly 
familiar with technique, economy and finance, we shall 
not have real one-man management. You can write as 
many resolutions as you please, take as many vows as 
you please, but, unless you master the technique, economy 
and finance of the mill, factory or mine, nothing 
will come of it, there will be no one-man management.

J. V. S T A L I N 40 
Hence, the task is for us to master technique ourselves, 
to become masters of the business ourselves. This 
is the sole guarantee that our plans will be carried out in 
full, and that one-man management will be established. 
This, of course, is no easy matter; but it can certainly 
be accomplished. Science, technical experience, knowledge, 
are all things that can be acquired. We may not 
have them today, but tomorrow we shall. The main thing 
is to have the passionate Bolshevik desire to master 
technique, to master the science of production. Everything 
can be achieved, everything can be overcome, if 
there is a passionate desire for it. 
It is sometimes asked whether it is not possible to 
slow down the tempo somewhat, to put a check on the 
movement. No, comrades, it is not possible! The tempo 
must not be reduced! On the contrary, we must increase 
it as much as is within our powers and possibilities. 
This is dictated to us by our obligations to the workers 
and peasants of the U.S.S.R. This is dictated to us by 
our obligations to the working class of the whole world. 
To slacken the tempo would mean falling behind. 
And those who fall behind get beaten. But we do not want 
to be beaten. No, we refuse to be beaten! One feature of 
the history of old Russia was the continual beatings she 
suffered because of her backwardness. She was beaten 
by the Mongol khans. She was beaten by the Turkish 
beys. She was beaten by the Swedish feudal lords. She 
was beaten by the Polish and Lithuanian gentry. She was 
beaten by the British and French capitalists. She was 
beaten by the Japanese barons. All beat her‹because 
of her backwardness, because of her military backwardness, 
cultural backwardness, political backwardness, industrial

THE TASKS OF BUSINESS EXECUTIVES 41 
backwardness, agricultural backwardness. They beat her 
because i t was profitable and could be done with 
impunity. You remember the words of the pre-revolutionary 
poet: ³You are poor and abundant, mighty and 
impotent, Mother Russia.²17 Those gentlemen were quite 
familiar with the verses of the old poet. They beat her, 
saying: ³You are abundant,² so one can enrich oneself at 
your expense. They beat her, saying: ³You are poor and 
impotent,² so you can be beaten and plundered with impunity. 
Such is the law of the exploiters‹to beat the backward 
and the weak. It is the jungle law of capitalism. 
You are backward, you are weak‹therefore you are wrong; 
hence you can be beaten and enslaved. You are mighty 
‹therefore you are right; hence we must be wary of you. 
That is why we must no longer lag behind. 
In the past we had no fatherland, nor could we have 
had one. But now that we have overthrown capitalism and 
power is in our hands, in the hands of the people, we have 
a fatherland, and we will uphold its independence. Do 
you want our socialist fatherland to be beaten and to lose 
its independence? If you do not want this, you must put 
an end to its backwardness in the shortest possible time 
and develop a genuine Bolshevik tempo in building up its 
socialist economy. There is no other way. That is why 
Lenin said on the eve of the October Revolution: ³Either 
perish, or overtake and outstrip the advanced capitalist 
countries.² 
We are fifty or a hundred years behind the advanced 
countries. We must make good this distance in ten years. 
Either we do it, or we shall go under. 
That is what our obligations to the workers and 
peasants of the U.S.S.R. dictate to us.

J. V. S T A L I N 42 
But we have yet other, more serious and more important, 
obligations. They are our obligations to the 
world proletariat. They coincide with our obligations to 
the workers and peasants of the U.S.S.R. But we place 
them higher. The working class of the U.S.S.R. is part 
of the world working class. We achieved victory not 
solely through the efforts of the working class of the 
U.S.S.R., but also thanks to the support of the working 
class of the world. Without this support we would have 
been torn to pieces long ago. It is said that our country 
is the shock brigade of the proletariat of all countries. 
That is well said. But is imposes very serious obligations 
upon us. Why does the international proletariat support 
us? How did we merit this support? By the fact that we 
were the first to hurl ourselves into the battle against 
capitalism, we were the first to establish working-class 
state power, we were the first to begin building socialism. 
By the fact that we were engaged on a cause which, if successful, 
will transform the whole world and free the entire working 
class. But what is needed for success? The elimination 
of our backwardness, the development of a high Bolshevik 
tempo of construction. We must march forward in 
such a way that the working class of the whole world, 
looking at us, may say: There you have my advanced 
detachment, my shock brigade, my working-class state 
power, my fatherland; they are engaged on their cause, 
our cause, and they are working well; let us support 
them against the capitalists and promote the cause of 
the world revolution. Must we not justify the hopes 
of the worldıs working class, must we not fulfil our obligations 
to them? Yes, we must if we do not want to utterly 
disgrace ourselves.

THE TASKS OF BUSINESS EXECUTIVES 43 
Such are our obligations, internal and international. 
As you see, they dictate to us a Bolshevik tempo of 
development. 
I will not say that we have accomplished nothing in 
regard to management of production during these years. 
In fact, we have accomplished a good deal. We have 
doubled our industrial output compared with the pre-war 
level. We have created the largest-scale agricultural 
production in the world. But we could have accomplished 
still more if we had tried during this period really to 
master production, the technique of production, the financial 
and economic side of it. 
In ten years at most we must make good the distance 
that separates us from the advanced capitalist countries. 
We have all the ³objective² possibilities for this. The 
only thing lacking is the ability to make proper use of 
these possibilities. And that depends on us. Only on us! 
It is time we learned to make use of these possibilities. It 
is time to put an end to the rotten line of non-interference 
in production. It is time to adopt a new line, one corresponding 
to the present period‹the line of interfering in 
everything. If you are a factory manager‹interfere in all 
the affairs of the factory, look into everything, let nothing 
escape you, learn and learn again. Bolsheviks must 
master technique. It is time Bolsheviks themselves became 
experts. In the period of reconstruction, technique 
decides everything. And an economic executive who does 
not want to study technique, who does not want to master 
technique, is a joke and not an executive. 
It is said that it is hard to master technique. That 
is not true! There are no fortresses that Bolsheviks cannot 
capture. We have solved a number of most difficult prob

J. V. S T A L I N 44 
lems. We have overthrown capitalism. We have assumed 
power. We have built up a huge socialist industry. We 
have transferred the middle peasants on to the path of 
socialism. We have already accomplished what is most 
important from the point of view of construction. What 
remains to be done is not so much: to study technique, to 
master science. And when we have done that we shall 
develop a tempo of which we dare not even dream at 
present. 
And we shall do it if we really want to. 
Pravda, No. 35, 
February 5, 1931

LETTER TO COMRADE ETCHIN 
Comrade Etchin, 
I was unable (for lack of time!) to read your pamphlet 
but I can reply briefly to your four questions. 
1) ³Inner-Party contradictions.² Ever since Engelsıs 
day the proposition that the development of proletarian 
parties takes place through the overcoming of internal 
Party contradictions has been axiomatic. These contradictions 
find expression in overt or covert disagreements. 
Ossovsky has nothing to do with the matter here, since he 
wrongly considered our Party, for instance, to be a bloc 
of two antagonistic classes, as the representative of these 
classes, whereas our Party (like the other sections of 
the Comintern) is in actual fact the representative of 
one class, namely, the working class. And, after all, we 
are concerned with the Communist Parties, each of which 
is the representative of one (the proletarian) class. 
2) Leninism. There can be no doubt that Leninism 
is the most Left (without quotation marks) trend in the 
world labour movement. The labour movement contains 
all kinds of trends, from the feudal-monarchist (such as 
³the League of the Russian People²) and the openly capitalist 
trend (such as the Cadets) to the covertly-bourgeois 
trend (Social-Democrats, particularly the ³Left² Social- 
Democrats, Anarchists, Anarcho-Syndicalists) and the

J. V. S T A L I N 46 
ultra-Left ³communist² trend. The most Left of these, 
and the only consistently revolutionary trend, is 
Leninism. 
3) The roots of the ³Left² and Right deviations. Their 
roots are common in the sense that they both reflect the 
pressure of classes alien to us. Their forms and means 
of struggle against the Party differ in accordance with 
the differences in the social strata which they, i.e., the 
deviations, represent. 
4) The struggle on two fronts. There is nothing to 
explain here. I fail to understand why Comrade Kantor 
disagrees with you. 
With communist greetings, 
J. Stalin 
February 27, 1931 
Published for the first time

GREETINGS TO THE STAFFS 
OF AZNEFT AND GROZNEFT 
I congratulate the workers and the administrative 
and technical personnel of the State Association of the 
Azerbaijanian Oil Industry and of the State Association 
of the Grozny Oil and Gas Industry on the fulfilment of 
the five-year plan in two and a half years. Congratulations 
on your victory, comrades! 
Long live the workers of the U.S.S.R., who have broken 
the chains of capitalism and become the masters 
of their country! 
Long live Soviet Power! Long live the Party of the 
Bolsheviks! 
J. Stalin 
March 31, 1931 
Pravda, No. 90, 
April 1, 1931

TO ELEKTROZAVOD 
Ardent greetings to the workers and the administrative 
and technical personnel of Elektrozavod, who have 
fulfilled the five-year plan in two and a half years. 
Forward to further victories! 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 92, 
April 3, 1931

MAGNITOGORSK IRON AND STEEL 
WORKS PROJECT, MAGNITOGORSK 
I congratulate the Magnitogorsk workers and executive 
staff on their first important victory.18 
Forward, comrades, to new victories! 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 136, 
May 19, 1931 

TO THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BOARD 
OF THE ALL-UNION CENTRE 
OF MACHINE AND TRACTOR STATIONS. 
TO ALL MACHINE AND TRACTOR 
STATIONS 
Fraternal greetings to the working men and working 
women, to the technicians and specialists and the entire 
executive staff of the machine and tractor stations on 
the occasion of the pre-schedule fulfilment of the plan for 
sowing 18,000,000 hectares. 
Congratulations on your victory, comrades! 
Last year about 2,000,000 hectares of collectivefarm 
fields were sown by machine and tractor stations. 
This year‹more than 18,000,000 hectares. Last year the 
machine and tractor stations served 2,347 collective farms. 
This year‹46,514 collective farms. From the wooden 
plough to the tractor‹such is the path travelled by the 
peasant farms of our country. Let everyone know that the 
working class of the Soviet Union is firmly and confidently 
promoting the technical re-equipment of its ally, 
the labouring peasantry! 
Let us hope that the machine and tractor stations 
will not rest content with the results achieved, but will, 
by way of a counter-plan, increase the 18,000,000 hectares 
of sown area assigned in the plan (and already fulfilled) 
to 20,000,000 hectares.

TO ALL MACHINE AND TRACTORS STATIONS 51 
Let us hope that the machine and tractor stations will 
not stop at this, but will confidently tackle their next 
tasks: to prepare about 5,000,000 hectares of fallow land, 
successfully carry out the harvesting campaign, do about 
15,000,000 hectares of autumn ploughing, raise the winter-
crop area to 8,000,000 hectares, organise a further 
thousand machine and tractor stations and thus establish 
the basis for serving the overwhelming majority of collective 
farms next year. 
Let everybody know that the Soviet Union is being 
transformed from a country of small-peasant economy and 
backward agricultural technique into a country of largescale, 
collective economy with the most modern agricultural 
technique! 
Forward, comrades, to new victories! 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 145, 
May 28, 1931

TO THE CHAIRMAN 
OF THE GRAIN TRUST BOARD. 
TO ALL STATE GRAIN FARMS 
Fraternal greetings to the leading force of the new 
Soviet agriculture, to the socialist standard-bearer of 
the new technique and the new methods of organising 
agriculture, to the system of state grain farms, its working 
men and working women, its technicians and specialists, 
its leaders and instructors! 
Do not rest content with having fulfilled the sowing 
plan. You can and must overfulfil this plan, for you have 
every possibility required for doing so. 
Bring into line your lagging detachments in Siberia 
and especially in the Far East, render the utmost assistance 
to the collective farms, get the preparations for the 
harvest under way‹the chief immediate task of the state 
grain farms‹and achieve new successes. 
Forward to new victories! 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 147, 
May 30, 1931

NEW CONDITIONS ‹ NEW TASKS 
IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION 
Speech Delivered 
at a Conference of Business Executives19 
June 23, 1931 
Comrades, the materials presented to this conference 
show that as regards the fulfilment of the plan our industry 
presents a rather motley picture. There are branches 
of industry that have increased their output during 
the past five months 40 to 50 per cent compared with last 
year. Other branches have increased their output not more 
than 20 to 30 per cent. Lastly, there are certain branches 
that show a very small increase, some 6 to 10 per cent 
and sometimes even less. Among the latter we must include 
coal mining and the iron and steel industry. The 
picture, as you see, is a motley one. 
How is this diversity to be explained? Why are certain 
branches of industry lagging behind? Why is it that 
certain branches of industry show an increase of only 20 
to 25 per cent, while coal mining and the iron and steel 
industry show an even smaller increase and are trailing 
behind other branches? 
The reason is that lately the conditions of development 
of industry have radically changed; new conditions 
demanding new methods of management have arisen; 
but some of our economic executives, instead of changing 
their methods of work, are continuing in the old way. The

J. V. S T A L I N 54 
point, therefore, is that the new conditions of development 
of industry require new methods of work; but some 
of our economic executives do not understand this and do 
not see that they must now adopt new methods of management. 
That is the reason why certain branches of our industry 
are lagging behind. 
What are these new conditions of development of our 
industry? How did they arise? 
There are at least six such new conditions. 
Let us examine them. 
I 
MANPOWER 
First of all, there is the question of the supply 
of manpower for our factories. Formerly, the workers 
usually came of their own accord to the factories and 
mills‹to some extent, therefore, things proceeded automatically 
in this sphere. And this happened because there 
was unemployment, there was differentiation in the countryside, 
there was poverty and fear of starvation, which 
drove people from the country to the town. You remember 
the formula: ³The flight of the peasant from the country 
to the town²? What compelled the peasant to flee from 
the country to the town? The fear of starvation, unemployment, 
the fact that the village was like a stepmother 
to him, and he was ready to flee from his village to 
the devil himself, if only he could find some sort of 
work.

NEW CONDITIONS ‹ NEW TASKS IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION 55 
Such, or nearly such, was the state of affairs in the 
recent past. 
Can it be said that the same conditions prevail now? 
No, it cannot. On the contrary, conditions have now radically 
changed. And because conditions have changed 
we no longer have an automatic influx of manpower. 
What, in point of fact, has changed during this period? 
Firstly, we have done away with unemployment‹ 
consequently, we have abolished the force that exercised 
pressure upon the ³labour market.² Secondly, we have 
radically undermined differentiation in the countryside 
‹consequently, we have overcome the mass poverty there, 
which drove the peasant from the country to the town. 
Lastly, we have supplied the countryside with tens of 
thousands of tractors and agricultural machines, we have 
smashed the kulak, we have organised collective farms 
and have given the peasants the opportunity to live and 
work like human beings. Now the countryside cannot any 
longer be termed a stepmother to the peasant. And precisely 
because it can no longer be termed a stepmother, the 
peasant has begun to settle down in the countryside; 
we no longer have ³the flight of the peasant from the 
country to the town,² nor an automatic influx of manpower. 
As you see, we now have an entirely new situation 
and new conditions in regard to the supply of manpower 
for our factories. 
What follows from that? 
It follows, firstly, that we must no longer count on 
an automatic influx of manpower. This means that 
we must pass from the ³policy² of letting things proceed 
automatically to the policy of organised recruiting of

J. V. S T A L I N 56 
workers for industry. But there is only one way of achieving 
this‹that of contracts of economic organisations with 
collective farms and collective farmers. As you know, 
certain economic organisations and collective farms have 
already adopted this method; and experience has shown 
that this practice yields important advantages both for 
the collective farms and for the industrial enterprises. 
It follows, secondly, that we must pass immediately 
to mechanisation of the heavier processes of labour and 
develop this to the utmost (timber industry, building 
industry, coal mining, loading and unloading, transport, 
iron and steel industry, etc.). This, of course, does not 
mean that we must abandon manual labour. On the contrary, 
manual labour will continue to play a very important 
part in production for a long time to come. But 
it does mean that mechanisation of labour processes is 
for us the new and decisive force, without which neither 
our tempo nor the new scale of production can be maintained. 
There are still quite a number of our economic executives 
who ³do not believe² either in mechanisation or in 
contracts with collective farms. These are the very executives 
who fail to understand the new situation, who do 
not want to work in the new way and sigh for the ³good 
old times² when manpower ³came of its own accord² 
to the enterprises. Needless to say, such economic executives 
are as remote from the new tasks in economic construction, 
which are imposed by the new conditions, as 
the sky from the earth. Apparently they think that the 
difficulties in regard to manpower are accidental 
and that the shortage of manpower will disappear 
automatically, so to speak. That is a delusion, comrades.

NEW CONDITIONS ‹ NEW TASKS IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION 57 
The difficulties in regard to manpower cannot disappear 
of themselves. They can disappear only as the result 
of our own efforts. 
Hence the task is to recruit manpower in an organised 
way, by means of contracts with the collective 
farms, and to mechanise labour. 
That is how matters stand with regard to the first new 
condition of development of our industry. 
Let us pass to the second condition. 
II 
WAGES 
I have just spoken about the organised recruiting of 
workers for our factories. But recruiting workers is not 
all that has to be done. In order to ensure manpower 
for our enterprises we must see to it that the workers 
are stably connected with their factories and make the 
composition of the labour force in the factories more or 
less constant. It scarcely needs proof that without a 
constant labour force who have more or less mastered the 
technique of production and have become accustomed 
to the new machinery it will be impossible to make any 
headway, impossible to fulfil the production plans. 
Unless this is achieved, we shall have to keep on training 
new workers and to spend half the time on training them 
instead of making use of this time for production. But 
what is actually happening now? Can it be said that the 
composition of the labour force at our factories is more 
or less constant? Unfortunately, this cannot be said. On 
the contrary, we still have a so-called fluidity of manpower 
at our factories. More than that, in a number of

J. V. S T A L I N 58 
factories the fluidity of manpower, far from disappearing, 
is increasing and becoming more marked. At any rate, 
you will find few factories where the personnel does not 
change at least to the extent of 30 to 40 per cent of the 
total in the course of half a year, or even in one quarter. 
Formerly, during the period of restoration of our 
industry, when its technical equipment was not very 
complex and the scale of production not very large, it 
was more or less possible to ³tolerate² this so-called fluidity 
of manpower. Now it is another matter. Now the 
situation is radically different. Now, in the period of 
intensive reconstruction, when the scale of production 
has become gigantic and technical equipment has become 
extremely complex, the fluidity of manpower has become 
a scourge of production and is disorganising our 
factories. To ³tolerate² the fluidity of manpower now 
would mean disintegrating our industry, destroying the 
possibility of fulfilling production plans and ruining any 
chance of improving the quality of the output. 
What is the cause of the fluidity of manpower? 
The cause is the wrong structure of wages, the wrong 
wage scales, the ³Leftist² practice of wage equalisation. 
In a number of factories wage scales are drawn up in 
such a way as to practically wipe out the difference between 
skilled and unskilled labour, between heavy and 
light work. The consequence of wage equalisation is that 
the unskilled worker lacks the incentive to become 
a skilled worker and is thus deprived of the prospect of 
advancement; as a result he feels himself a ³visitor² in 
the factory, working only temporarily so as to ³earn a 
little money² and then go off to ³try his luck² in some 
other place. The consequence of wage equalisation is

NEW CONDITIONS ‹ NEW TASKS IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION 59 
that the skilled worker is obliged to go from factory to 
factory until he finds one where his skill is properly 
appreciated. 
Hence, the ³general² drift from factory to factory; 
hence, the fluidity of manpower. 
In order to put an end to this evil we must abolish 
wage equalisation and discard the old wage scales. In 
order to put an end to this evil we must draw up wage scales 
that will take into account the difference between skilled 
and unskilled labour, between heavy and light work. 
We cannot tolerate a situation where a rolling-mill worker 
in the iron and steel industry earns no more than a 
sweeper. We cannot tolerate a situation where a locomotive 
driver earns only as much as a copying clerk. Marx 
and Lenin said that the difference between skilled and 
unskilled labour would exist even under socialism, even 
after classes had been abolished; that only under communism 
would this difference disappear and that, consequently, 
even under socialism ³wages² must be paid 
according to work performed and not according to needs. 
But the equalitarians among our economic executives 
and trade-union officials do not agree with this and believe 
that under our Soviet system this difference has already 
disappeared. Who is right, Marx and Lenin or the 
equalitarians? It must be assumed that it is Marx and 
Lenin who are right. But it follows from this that whoever 
draws up wage scales on the ³principle² of wage 
equalisation, without taking into account the difference 
between skilled and unskilled labour, breaks with Marxism, 
breaks with Leninism. 
In every branch of industry, in every factory, in every 
shop, there is a leading group of more or less skilled

J. V. S T A L I N 60 
workers who first and foremost must be retained if we 
really want to ensure a constant labour force in the 
factories. These leading groups of workers are the principal 
link in production. By retaining them in the 
factory, in the shop, we can retain the whole labour 
force and radically prevent the fluidity of manpower. 
But how can we retain them in the factories? 
We can retain them only by promoting them to higher 
positions, by raising the level of their wages, by introducing 
a system of wages that will give the worker his 
due according to qualification. 
And what does promoting them to higher positions 
and raising their wage level mean, what can it lead to 
as far as unskilled workers are concerned? It means, apart 
from everything else, opening up prospects for the unskilled 
worker and giving him an incentive to rise higher, to 
rise to the category of a skilled worker. You know yourselves 
that we now need hundreds of thousands and even 
millions of skilled workers. But in order to build up cadres 
of skilled workers, we must provide an incentive for 
the unskilled workers, provide for them a prospect of 
advancement, of rising to a higher position. And the more 
boldly we adopt this course the better, for this is the principal 
means of putting an end to the fluidity of manpower. 
To economise in this matter would be criminal, 
it would be going against the interests of our socialist 
industry. 
But that is not all. 
In order to retain the workers in the factories we 
must still further improve the supply of goods and the 
housing conditions of the workers. It cannot be denied 
that a good deal has been done during the last few years in

NEW CONDITIONS ‹ NEW TASKS IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION 61 
the sphere of housing construction and supplies for the 
workers. But what has been done is altogether inadequate 
compared with the rapidly growing requirements 
of the workers. It will not do to plead that there were 
fewer houses before than there are now and that therefore 
we can be content with the results achieved. Nor will 
it do to plead that workersı supplies were far worse before 
than they are now and therefore we can be satisfied 
with the present situation. Only those who are rotten 
to the core can content themselves with references to 
the past. We must proceed, not from the past, but from 
the growing requirements of the workers at the present 
time. We must realise that the conditions of life of the workers 
have radically changed in our country. The worker today 
is not what he was previously. The worker today, 
our Soviet worker, wants to have all his material and 
cultural needs satisfied: in respect of food, housing conditions, 
cultural and all sorts of other requirements. He 
has a right to this, and it is our duty to secure these conditions 
for him. True, our worker does not suffer from 
unemployment; he is free from the yoke of capitalism; 
he is no longer a slave, but the master of his job. But this 
is not enough. He demands that all his material and cultural 
requirements be met, and it is our duty to fulfil 
this demand of his. Do not forget that we ourselves are 
now making certain demands on the worker‹we demand 
from him labour discipline, intense effort, emulation, 
shock-brigade work. Do not forget that the vast majority 
of workers have accepted these demands of the 
Soviet Government with great enthusiasm and are 
fulfilling them heroically. Do not be surprised, therefore, 
if, while fulfilling the demands of the Soviet

J. V. S T A L I N 62 
Government, the workers in their turn demand that the 
Soviet Government should fulfil its obligations in regard 
to further improving their material and cultural condition. 
Hence, the task is to put an end to the fluidity of 
manpower, to do away with wage equalisation, to organise 
wages properly and to improve the living conditions of the 
workers. 
That is how matters stand with regard to the second 
new condition of development of our industry. 
Let us pass to the third condition. 
III 
THE ORGANISATION OF WORK 
I have said that it is necessary to put an end to the 
fluidity of manpower, to retain the workers in the 
factories. But retaining the workers in the factories 
is not all; the matter does not end there. It is not enough 
to put an end to the fluidity of manpower. We must 
provide the workers with such working conditions as will 
enable them to work efficiently, to increase productivity 
and to improve the quality of the products. Consequently, 
we must so organise work in the factories as to bring about 
an increase in labour productivity from month to month, 
from quarter to quarter. 
Can it be said that the present organisation of work 
in our factories meets the modern requirements of 
production? Unfortunately, this cannot be said. At all 
events, we s t i l l have a number of factories where 
work is organised abominably, where instead of order 
and co-ordination of work there is disorder and mud

NEW CONDITIONS ‹ NEW TASKS IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION 63 
dle, where instead of responsibility for the work there 
is absolute irresponsibility, lack of personal responsibility. 
What is meant by lack of personal responsibility? 
It is the absence of any responsibility for work that is 
entrusted to one, the absence of responsibility for machinery 
and tools. Naturally, when there is no personal 
responsibility there can be no question of any important 
increase in the productivity of labour, of any improvement 
in the quality of production, of the exercise of care 
in handling machinery and tools. You know what lack 
of personal responsibility led to on the railways. It is 
leading to the same result in industry. We have abolished 
the system under which there was lack of personal responsibility 
on the railways and have thus improved their 
work. We must do the same in industry in order to raise 
its work to a higher level. 
Formerly, we could ³manage² somehow or other with 
the bad organisation of work that goes naturally with 
lack of personal responsibility, with no worker being 
responsible for a particular concrete job. Now it is another 
matter. Now the situation is completely different. 
With the present vast scale of production and the existence 
of giant enterprises, lack of personal responsibility 
has become a scourge of industry that is jeopardising 
all our achievements in the factories in the sphere of 
production and organisation. 
What enabled lack of personal responsibility to become 
the rule in a number of our factories? It entered the 
factories as the illegitimate companion of the uninterrupted 
working-week. It would be wrong to assert that 
the uninterrupted working week necessarily leads to

J. V. S T A L I N 64 
lack of personal responsibility in production. If work is 
properly organised, if each person is made responsible for 
a definite job, if definite groups of workers are assigned 
to machines, if the shifts are properly organised so that 
they are equal in quality and skill‹given such conditions, 
the uninterrupted working-week leads to a tremendous 
increase in labour productivity, to an improvement 
in quality of work and to eliminating lack of personal 
responsibility. Such is the case on the railways, for example, 
where the uninterrupted working-week is now in 
force, but where there is no longer lack of personal responsibility. 
Can it be said that the position in regard to the 
uninterrupted working-week is equally satisfactory in 
industrial enterprises? Unfortunately, this can not be 
said. The fact of the matter is that a number of our factories 
adopted the uninterrupted working-week too hastily, 
without preparing suitable conditions for it, without 
properly organising shifts more or less equal in quality 
and skill, without making each worker responsible for 
a particular concrete job. The result is that the uninterrupted 
working-week, left to itself, has given rise to lack 
of personal responsibility. The result is that in a number 
of factories we have the uninterrupted working-week on 
paper, in words, and lack of personal responsibility not 
on paper, but in actual operation. The result is that there 
is no sense of responsibility for the job, machinery is handled 
carelessly, large numbers of machine tools break down, 
and there is no incentive for increasing the productivity 
of labour. It is not for nothing that the workers say: 
³We could raise the productivity of labour and improve 
matters; but who is going to appreciate it when nobody 
is responsible for anything?²

NEW CONDITIONS ‹ NEW TASKS IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION 65 
It follows from this that some of our comrades were 
a little hasty in introducing the uninterrupted workingweek, 
and in their hurry distorted it and transformed it 
into a system of lack of personal responsibility. 
There are two ways of putting an end to this situation 
and of doing away with lack of personal responsibility. 
Either change the method of carrying out the uninterrupted 
working week so that it does not result in lack 
of personal responsibility, as was done on the railways. 
Or, where the conditions do not favour this, abandon 
the nominal uninterrupted working week, temporarily 
adopt the interrupted, six-day week, as was recently 
done in the Stalingrad Tractor Works, and prepare the 
conditions so as to return, should the need arise, to a real, 
not nominal, uninterrupted working-week; to return 
eventually to the uninterrupted working-week, but not 
to lack of personal responsibility. 
There is no other way. 
There can be no doubt that our economic executives 
understand all this very well. But they keep silent. Why? 
Because, evidently, they fear the truth. But since when 
have Bolsheviks begun to fear the truth? Is it not true 
that in a number of factories the uninterrupted working-
week has resulted in lack of personal responsibility 
and has thus been distorted to an extreme degree? The 
question is: Who wants such an uninterrupted workingweek? 
Who dares assert that the preservation of this 
nominal and distorted uninterrupted working-week is 
more important than the proper organisation of work, 
than increased productivity of labour, than a genuine 
uninterrupted working-week, than the interests of our 
socialist industry? Is it not clear that the sooner we bury

J. V. S T A L I N 66 
the nominal uninterrupted working-week the sooner shall 
we achieve a proper organisation of work? 
Some comrades think that we can do away with the 
lack of personal responsibility by means of incantations 
and high sounding speeches. At any rate, I know a number 
of economic executives who in their fight against 
lack of personal responsibility confine themselves to 
speaking at meetings now and again, hurling curses at 
the lack of personal responsibility, apparently believing 
that after such speeches lack of personal responsibility 
is bound to disappear automatically, so to speak. They 
are grievously mistaken if they think that lack of personal 
responsibility can be done away with by speeches and 
incantations. No, comrades, lack of personal responsibility 
will never disappear of itself. We alone can and must 
put an end to it; for it is you and I who are at the helm 
and it is you and I who are answerable for everything, 
including lack of personal responsibility. I think that 
it would be far better if our economic executives, instead 
of making speeches and incantations, spent a month or 
two at some mine or factory, studied all details and 
³trifles² relating to the organisation of work, actually 
put an end there to lack of personal responsibility and 
then applied the experience gained at this enterprise to 
other enterprises. That would be far better. That would 
be really fighting against lack of personal responsibility, 
fighting for the proper, Bolshevik organisation of 
work, for the proper distribution of forces in our enterprises. 
Hence, the task is to put an end to lack of personal 
responsibility, to improve the organisation of work and to 
secure the proper distribution of forces in our enterprises.

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
67 
That is how matters stand with regard to the third 
new condition of development of our industry. 
Let us pass to the fourth condition. 
IV 
A WORKING-CLASS INDUSTRIAL 
AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA 
The situation has also changed in regard to the 
administrative staff of industry in general, and in regard 
to the engineering and technical personnel in particular. 
Formerly, the situation was that the main source of 
supply for all our industry was the coal and metallurgical 
base in the Ukraine. The Ukraine supplied metal 
to all our industrial regions: both to the South and to 
Moscow and Leningrad. It also supplied coal to the principal 
enterprises in the U.S.S.R. I leave out the Urals 
because the relative importance of the entire Urals was 
very small compared with the Donets Basin. Accordingly, 
we had three main centres for training an administrative 
staff for industry: the South, the Moscow district 
and the Leningrad district. Naturally, under those conditions 
we could somehow manage with the very small 
engineering and technical forces that were all that our 
country could have at its disposal at that time. 
That was the position in the recent past. 
But the situation is now quite different. Now it is 
obvious, I think, that with the present rate of development 
and gigantic scale of production we are already 
unable to make do with the Ukrainian coal and metallurgical 
base alone. As you know, the supply of Ukrainian 
NEW CONDITIONS ‹ NEW TASKS IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION

J. V. S T A L I N 68 
coal and metal is already in adequate, in spite of the 
increase in their output. As you know, we have been obliged, 
as a result of this, to create a new coal and metallurgical 
base in the East‹the Urals-Kuznetsk Basin. 
As you know, our work to create this base has been not 
without success. But that is not enough. We must, further, 
create a metallurgical industry in Siberia itself 
to satisfy its own growing requirements. And we are already 
creating it. Besides this, we must create a new 
base for non-ferrous metals in Kazakhstan and Turkestan. 
Finally, we must develop extensive railway construction. 
That is dictated by the interests of the U.S.S.R. as a 
whole‹by the interests of the border republics as well 
as of the centre. 
But it follows from this that we can no longer make 
do with the very small engineering, technical and administrative 
forces of industry with which we managed formerly. 
It follows that the old centres for training engineering 
and technical forces are no longer adequate, 
that we must create a whole network of new centres‹in 
the Urals, in Siberia and in Central Asia. We must now 
ensure the supply of three times, five times the number 
of engineering, technical and administrative forces for 
industry if we really intend to carry out the programme 
of the socialist industrialisation of the U.S.S.R. 
But we do not need just any kind of administrative, 
engineering and technical forces. We need such administrative, 
engineering and technical forces as are capable 
of understanding the policy of the working class of our 
country, capable of assimilating that policy and ready 
to carry i t out conscientiously. And what does this 
mean? It means that our country has entered a phase of

NEW CONDITIONS ‹ NEW TASKS IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION 69 
development in which the working class must create its 
own industrial and technical intelligentsia, one that is 
capable of upholding the interests of the working class 
in production as the interests of the ruling class. 
No ruling class has managed without its own intelligentsia. 
There are no grounds for believing that the 
working class of the U.S.S.R. can manage without its 
own industrial and technical intelligentsia. 
The Soviet Government has taken this circumstance 
into account and has opened wide the doors of all the 
higher educational institutions in every branch of national 
economy to members of the working class and labouring 
peasantry. You know that tens of thousands of 
working-class and peasant youths are now studying in 
higher educational institutions. Whereas formerly, under 
capitalism, the higher educational institutions were the 
monopoly of the scions of the rich‹today, under the 
Soviet system, the working-class and peasant youth 
predominate there. There is no doubt that our educational 
institutions will soon be turning out thousands of new 
technicians and engineers, new leaders for our industries. 
But that is only one aspect of the matter. The other 
aspect is that the industrial and technical intelligentsia 
of the working class will be recruited not only from those 
who have had higher education, but also from practical 
workers in our factories, from the skilled workers, from 
the working-class cultural forces in the mills, factories 
and mines. The initiators of emulation, the leaders of 
shock brigades, those who in practice inspire labour 
enthusiasm, the organisers of operations in the various 
sectors of our work of construction‹such is the new 
stratum of the working class that, together with the

J. V. S T A L I N 70 
comrades who have had higher education, must form the 
core of the intelligentsia of the working class, the core 
of the administrative staff of our industry. The task 
is to see that these ³rank-and-file² comrades who show 
initiative are not pushed aside, to promote them boldly 
to responsible positions, to give them the opportunity 
to display their organising abilities and the opportunity 
to supplement their knowledge, to create suitable conditions 
for their work, not stinting money for this purpose. 
Among these comrades there are not a few non-Party 
people. But that should not prevent us from boldly promoting 
them to leading positions. On the contrary, it 
is particularly these non-Party comrades who must receive 
our special attention, who must be promoted to 
responsible positions so that they may see for themselves 
that the Party appreciates capable and gifted workers. 
Some comrades think that only Party members may 
be placed in leading positions in the mills and factories. 
That is the reason why they not infrequently push aside 
non-Party comrades who possess ability and initiative 
and put Party members at the top instead, although they 
may be less capable and show no initiative. Needless to 
say, there is nothing more stupid and reactionary than 
such a ³policy,² if one may call it such. It scarcely needs 
proof that such a ³policy² can only discredit the Party 
and repel non-Party workers from it. Our policy does not 
by any means lie in converting the Party into an exclusive 
caste. Our policy is to ensure that there is an atmosphere 
of ³mutual confidence,² of ³mutual control² (Lenin), 
among Party and non-Party workers. One of the reasons 
why our Party is strong among the working class is that 
it pursues this policy.

NEW CONDITIONS ‹ NEW TASKS IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION 71 
Hence, the task is to see to it that the working class 
of the U.S.S.R. has its own industrial and technical intelligentsia. 
That is how matters stand with regard to the fourth 
new condition of development of our industry. 
Let us pass to the fifth condition. 
V 
SIGNS OF A CHANGE OF ATTITUDE 
AMONG THE OLD INDUSTRIAL 
AND TECHNICAL INTELLIGENTSIA 
The question of our attitude towards the old, bourgeois 
industrial and technical intelligentsia is also presented 
in a new light. 
About two years ago the situation was that the more 
highly skilled section of the old technical intelligentsia 
was infected with the disease of wrecking. More than 
that, at that time wrecking was a sort of fashionable activity. 
Some engaged in wrecking, others shielded the 
wreckers, others again washed their hands of what was 
going on and remained neutral, while still others vacillated 
between the Soviet regime and the wreckers. Of 
course, the majority of the old technical intelligentsia 
continued to work more or less loyally. But we are not 
speaking here of the majority, but of the most highly 
skilled section of the technical intelligentsia. 
What gave rise to the wrecking movement? What 
fostered it? The intensification of the class struggle in 
the U.S.S.R., the Soviet Governmentıs policy of offensive 
against the capitalist elements in town and country, 
the resistance of these elements to the policy of the Soviet

J. V. S T A L I N 72 
Government, the complexity of the international situation 
and the difficulties of collective-farm and state-farm 
development. While the activities of the militant 
section of the wreckers were augmented by the interventionist 
intrigues of the imperialists in the capitalist 
countries and by the grain difficulties within 
our country, the vacillations of the other section of the 
old technical intelligentsia towards the active wreckers 
were encouraged by utterances that were in fashion among 
the Trotskyite-Menshevik windbags to the effect that 
³nothing will come of the collective farms and state farms 
anyway,² that ³the Soviet power is degenerating anyway 
and is bound to collapse very soon,² that ³the Bolsheviks 
by their policy are themselves facilitating intervention,² 
etc., etc. Besides, if even certain old Bolsheviks 
among the Right deviators could not resist the ³epidemic² 
and swung away from the Party at that time, it is not 
surprising that a certain section of the old technical intelligentsia 
who had never had any inkling of Bolshevism 
should, with the help of God, also vacillate. 
Naturally, under such circumstances, the Soviet Government 
could pursue only one policy towards the old 
technical intelligentsia‹the policy of smashing the active 
wreckers, differentiating the neutrals and enlisting those 
who were loyal. 
That was a year or two ago. 
Can we say that the situation is exactly the same 
now? No, we cannot. On the contrary, an entirely new 
situation has arisen. To begin with, there is the fact 
that we have routed and are successfully overcoming the 
capitalist elements in town and country. Of course, this 
cannot evoke joy among the old intelligentsia. Very prob

NEW CONDITIONS ‹ NEW TASKS IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION 73 
ably they still express sympathy for their defeated 
friends. But sympathisers, still less those who are neutral 
or vacillating, are not in the habit of voluntarily agreeing 
to share the fate of their more active friends when the 
latter have suffered severe and irreparable defeat. 
Further, we have overcome the grain difficulties, 
and not only have we overcome them but we are now exporting 
a larger quantity of grain than has ever been 
exported since the existence of the Soviet power. Consequently, 
this ³argument² of the vacillators also falls to 
the ground. 
Furthermore, even the blind can now see that as regards 
the front of collective-farm and state-farm development 
we have gained a definite victory and achieved tremendous 
successes. 
Consequently, the chief weapon in the ³arsenal² of the 
old intelligentsia has gone by the board. As for the 
bourgeois intelligentsiaıs hopes of intervention, it must 
be admitted that, for the time being at least, they have 
proved to be a house built on sand; Indeed, for six years 
intervention has been promised, but not a single attempt 
at intervention has been made. The time has come to recognise 
that our sapient bourgeois intelligentsia has 
simply been led by the nose. That is apart from the fact 
that the conduct of the active wreckers at the famous 
trial in Moscow was bound to discredit, and actually did 
discredit, the idea of wrecking. 
Naturally, these new circumstances could not but influence 
our old technical intelligentsia. The new situation 
was bound to give rise, and did actually give rise, 
to new sentiments among the old technical intelligentsia. 
This, in fact, explains why there are definite signs of a

J. V. S T A L I N 74 
change of attitude in favour of the Soviet regime on the 
part of a certain section of this intelligentsia that 
formerly sympathised with the wreckers. The fact that 
not only this stratum of the old intelligentsia, but even 
definite wreckers of yesterday, a considerable number 
of them, are beginning in many factories and mills 
to work hand in hand with the working class‹this fact 
shows without a doubt that a change of attitude among 
the old technical intelligentsia has already begun. This, 
of course, does not mean that there are no longer any 
wreckers in the country. No, it does not mean that. 
Wreckers exist and will continue to exist as long as we 
have classes and as long as capitalist encirclement exists. 
But it does mean that, since a large section of the old technical 
intelligentsia who formerly sympathised, in one way 
or another, with the wreckers have now made a turn to 
the side of the Soviet regime, the active wreckers have 
become few in number, are isolated and will have to go 
deeply under ground for the time being. 
But it follows from this that we must change our 
policy towards the old technical intelligentsia accordingly. 
Whereas during the height of the wrecking activities 
our attitude towards the old technical intelligentsia 
was mainly expressed by the policy of routing them, 
now, when these intellectuals are turning to the side 
of the Soviet regime, our attitude towards them must 
be expressed mainly by the policy of enlisting them and 
showing solicitude for them. It would be wrong and undialectical 
to continue our former policy under the new, 
changed conditions. It would be stupid and unwise 
to regard practically every expert and engineer of the 
old school as an undetected criminal and wrecker. We

NEW CONDITIONS ‹ NEW TASKS IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION 75 
have always regarded and still regard ³expert-baiting² 
as a harmful and disgraceful phenomenon. 
Hence, the task is to change our attitude towards 
the engineers and technicians of the old school, to show 
them greater attention and solicitude, to enlist their cooperation 
more boldly. 
That is how matters stand with regard to the fifth 
new condition of development of our industry. 
Let us pass to the last condition. 
VI 
BUSINESS ACCOUNTING 
The picture would be incomplete if I did not deal 
with one more new condition. I refer to the sources of 
capital accumulation for industry, for the national economy; 
I refer to the need for increasing the rate of accumulation. 
What is the new and special feature of the development 
of our industry from the point of view of accumulation? 
It is that the old sources of accumulation are already 
beginning to be inadequate for the further expansion 
of industry; that it is necessary, therefore, to seek 
new sources of accumulation and to reinforce the old 
sources if we really want to maintain and develop the 
Bolshevik tempo of industrialisation. 
We know from the history of the capitalist countries 
that not a single young state that desired to raise its 
industry to a higher level was able to dispense with external 
aid in the form of long-term credits or loans. For 
this reason the capitalists in the Western countries 
point-blank refused credits or loans to our country, in

J. V. S T A L I N 76 
the belief that the lack of credits and loans would certainly 
prevent the industrialisation of our country. But 
the capitalists were mistaken. They failed to take into account 
the fact that our country, unlike the capitalist 
countries, possesses certain special sources of accumulation 
sufficient to restore and further develop our industry. 
And indeed, not only have we restored our industry, 
not only have we restored our agriculture and transport, 
but we have already managed to set going the tremendous 
work of reconstructing heavy industry, agriculture and 
transport. Of course, this work has cost us many thousand 
million rubles. Where did we get these thousands 
of millions from? From light industry, from agriculture 
and from budget accumulations. This is how we managed 
until recently. 
But the situation is entirely different now. Whereas 
previously the old sources of capital accumulation were 
sufficient for the reconstruction of industry and transport, 
now they are obviously becoming inadequate. Now 
it is not a question of reconstructing our old industries. 
It is a question of creating new, technically well-equipped 
industries in the Urals, in Siberia, in Kazakhstan. 
It is a question of creating new, large scale farming in 
the grain, livestock and raw material regions of the 
U.S.S.R. It is a question of creating a new network of 
railways connecting the East and West of the U.S.S.R. 
Naturally, the old sources of accumulation cannot suffice 
for this gigantic task. 
But that is not all. To it must be added the fact 
that owing to inefficient management the principles of 
business accounting are grossly violated in a large number 
of our factories and business organisations. It is a

NEW CONDITIONS ‹ NEW TASKS IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION 77 
fact that a number of enterprises and business organisations 
have long ceased to keep proper accounts, to calculate, 
to draw up sound balance-sheets of income and 
expenditure. It is a fact that in a number of enterprises 
and business organisations such concepts as ³regime of 
economy,² ³cutting down unproductive expenditure,² 
³rationalisation of production² have long gone out of 
fashion. Evidently they assume that the State Bank ³will 
advance the necessary money anyway.² It is a fact that 
production costs in a number of enterprises have recently 
begun to increase. They were given the assignment of 
reducing costs by 10 per cent and more, but instead they 
are increasing them. Yet what does a reduction in the 
cost of production mean? You know that reducing the 
cost of production by one per cent means an accumulation 
in industry of 150,000,000 to 200,000,000 rubles. 
Obviously, to raise the cost of production under such circumstances 
means to deprive industry and the entire 
national economy of hundreds of millions of rubles. 
From all this it follows that it is no longer possible 
to rely solely on light industry, on budget accumulations 
and on revenue from agriculture. Light industry 
is a bountiful source of accumulation, and there is every 
prospect of its continuing to expand; but it is not an 
unlimited source. Agriculture is a no less bountiful 
source of accumulation, but now, during the period of 
its reconstruction, agriculture itself requires financial 
aid from the state. As for budget accumulations, you 
know yourselves that they cannot and must not be unlimited. 
What, then, remains? There remains heavy industry. 
Consequently, we must see to it that heavy industry 
‹and above all its machine-building section‹also pro

J. V. S T A L I N 78 
vide accumulations. Consequently, while reinforcing and 
expanding the old sources of accumulation, we must see 
to it that heavy industry‹and above all machine-building‹
also provide accumulations. 
That is the way out. 
And what is needed for this? We must put an end 
to inefficiency, mobilise the internal resources of industry, 
introduce and reinforce business accounting in 
all our enterprises, systematically reduce production 
costs and increase internal accumulations in every branch 
of industry without exception. 
That is the way out. 
Hence, the task is to introduce and reinforce business 
accounting, to increase accumulation within industry. 
VII 
NEW METHODS OF WORK, 
NEW METHODS OF MANAGEMENT 
Such, comrades, are the new conditions of development 
of our industry. 
The significance of these new conditions is that they 
are creating a new situation for industry, one which demands 
new methods of work and new methods of management. 
Hence: 
a) It follows, therefore, that we can no longer count, 
as of old, on an automatic influx of manpower. In order 
to secure manpower for our industries it must be recruited 
in an organised manner, and labour must be 
mechanised. To believe that we can do without mechanisation, 
in view of our tempo of work and scale of produc

NEW CONDITIONS ‹ NEW TASKS IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION 79 
tion, is like believing that the sea can be emptied with 
a spoon. 
b) It follows, further, that we cannot any longer 
tolerate the fluidity of manpower in industry. In order 
to do away with this evil, we must organise wages in a 
new way and see to it that the composition of the labour 
force in the factories is more or less constant. 
c) It follows, further, that we cannot any longer 
tolerate lack of personal responsibility in industry. In 
order to do away with this evil, work must be organised 
in a new way, and the forces must be so distributed 
that every group of workers i s responsible for its 
work, for the machinery, and for the quality of the 
work. 
d) It follows, further, that we can no longer manage, 
as of old, with the very small force of old engineers and 
technicians that we inherited from bourgeois Russia. 
In order to increase the present rate and scale of production, 
we must ensure that the working class has its own 
industrial and technical intelligentsia. 
e) It follows, further, that we can no longer, as of 
old, lump together all the experts, engineers and technicians 
of the old school. In order to take into account 
the changed situation we must change our policy and display 
the utmost solicitude for those experts, engineers 
and technicians of the old school who are definitely turning 
to the side of the working class. 
f) It follows, lastly, that we can no longer, as of 
old, manage with the old sources of accumulation. In 
order to ensure the further expansion of industry and agriculture 
we must tap new sources of accumulation; 
we must put an end to inefficiency, introduce business

J. V. S T A L I N 80 
accounting, reduce production costs and increase accumulation 
within industry. 
Such are the new conditions of development of industry, 
which demand new methods of work and new methods 
of management in economic construction. 
What is needed in order to ensure management along 
new lines? 
First of all, our economic executives must understand 
the new situation; they must study concretely the new 
conditions of development of industry and reform their 
methods of work to meet the requirements of the new 
situation. 
Further, our economic executives must direct their 
enterprises not ³in general,² not ³in the abstract,² but 
concretely, specifically; they must approach every question 
not from the standpoint of general phrases, but in 
a strictly business-like manner; they must not confine 
themselves to formal written instructions or general 
phrases and slogans, but study the technique of the business 
and enter into details, into ³trifles,² for it is out 
of ³trifles² that great things are now being built. 
Further, our present unwieldy combines, which sometimes 
consist of as many as 100 to 200 enterprises, must 
each be immediately split up into several combines. Obviously, 
the chairman of a combine who has to deal with 
a hundred or more factories cannot really know those 
factories, their potentialities and their work. Obviously, 
if he does not know those factories he is not in a position 
to direct them. Hence, to enable the chairman of 
a combine to study the factories thoroughly, and direct 
them, he must be relieved of some of the factories; the 
combine must be split up into several smaller ones, and

NEW CONDITIONS ‹ NEW TASKS IN ECONOMIC CONSTRUCTION 81 
the combine headquarters must be brought into closer 
contact with the factories. 
Further, our combines must substitute one-man management 
for board management. The position at 
present is that there are from 10 to 15 persons on 
the board of a combine, drawing up documents and carrying 
on discussions. We cannot go on managing in this way, comrades. 
We must put a stop to paper ³management² and 
switch to genuine, business like, Bolshevik work. Let 
one chairman and several vice-chairmen remain at the 
head of a combine. That will be quite enough for its 
management. The other members of the board 
should be sent to the factories and mills. That will be far 
more useful, both for the work and for themselves. 
Further, the chairmen and vice-chairmen of combines 
must pay more frequent visits to the factories, stay and 
work there for longer periods, acquaint themselves more 
closely with the personnel in the factories and not only 
teach the local people, but also learn from them. To think 
that you can now direct by sitting in an office, far away 
from the factories, is a delusion. In order to direct the 
factories you must come into more frequent contact with 
the staffs in those factories, maintain live contact with 
them. 
Finally, a word or two about our production plan 
for 1931. There are certain near-Party philistines who 
assert that our production programme is unrealistic, 
that it cannot be fulfilled. They are somewhat like Shchedrinıs 
³sapient gudgeons² who are always ready to spread 
³a vacuum of ineptitude² around themselves. Is 
our production programme realistic or not? Most certainly, 
it is. It is realistic if only because all the condi

J. V. S T A L I N 82 
tions necessary for its fulfilment are available. It is realistic 
if only because its fulfilment now depends solely 
on ourselves, on our ability and willingness to take advantage 
of the vast opportunities at our disposal. How else 
can we explain the fact that a whole number of enterprises 
and industries have already overfulfilled their 
plans? That means that other enterprises and industries, 
too, can fulfil and overfulfil their plans. 
It would be foolish to think that the production plan 
is a mere enumeration of figures and assignments. Actually, 
the production plan is the living and practical 
activity of millions of people. The reality of our production 
plan lies in the millions of working people who 
are creating a new life. The reality of our programme 
lies in living people, you and I, our will to work, our 
readiness to work in the new way, our determination to 
fulfil the plan. Have we that determination? Yes, we 
have. Well then, our production programme can and 
must be fulfilled. (Prolonged applause.) 
Pravda, No. 183, 
July 5, 1931

TO THE WORKERS 
AND ADMINISTRATIVE AND TECHNICAL 
PERSONNEL OF AMO20 
The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) marks 
with great satisfaction the victory won by the workers 
and the administrative and technical personnel of the 
AMO Automobile Works. Where the Russian capitalists 
could only build automobile workshops with a backward 
technique, a low productivity of labour and barbarous 
methods of exploitation, there has arisen a powerful 
giant plant capable of producing 25,000 motor lorries 
and employing all the achievements of modern technology. 
Your victory is the victory of all the working people 
in our country. The C.C. of the C.P.S.U.(B.) expresses 
its firm conviction that this first great victory 
of yours will be followed by others: by mastery of the 
worksı new technical equipment, steady fulfilment of 
the production programme, lowering of production costs 
and high quality of output. 
Ardent Bolshevik greetings to all the builders of 
the AMO Works, the first giant automobile works in the 
U.S.S.R. 
Secretary of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 271, 
October 1, 1931

TO THE WORKERS 
AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE 
AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL 
OF THE KHARKOV TRACTOR WORKS 
PROJECT 
The working people of our country, the millions of 
collective farmers and the Party have followed the 
course of construction of the Kharkov Tractor Works with 
the greatest attention. The Kharkov Tractor Works is 
a steel bastion of the collectivisation of agriculture in 
the Ukraine; its builders are the vanguard leading the 
millions of Ukrainian peasants along the road to socialism. 
The construction of the Kharkov Tractor Works, 
which joins our family of tractor works, will go down 
in the history of our countryıs socialist industry as a 
model of genuine Bolshevik tempos. The C.C. of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) expresses its conviction that the workers 
and the engineering and technical personnel will overcome 
the difficulties of the young enterprise, will utilise 
the experience of the Stalingrad Works and succeed 
in fulfilling the militant programme for 1932. 
Ardent Bolshevik greetings to the builders of the 
second giant tractor works in the U.S.S.R.! 
Secretary of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 271, 
October 1, 1931

TO THE NEWSPAPER TEKHNIKA21 
I greet the appearance of the first Bolshevik technical 
newspaper. 
The newspaper Tekhnika must become a powerful 
instrument of the broad masses of workers, business executives 
and engineering and technical personnel for mastering 
technique. It must help the Party to forge further 
hundreds of thousands of technicians and engineers 
from people of the working class‹fighters for Bolshevik 
tempos. 
I wish the newspaper every success. 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 280, 
October 10, 1931

SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING 
THE HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM 
Letter to the Editorial Board of the Magazine 
³Proletarskaya Revolutsia² 
Dear Comrades, 
I emphatically protest against the publication in 
the magazine Proletarskaya Revolutsia22 (No. 6, 1930) of 
Slutskyıs anti-Party and semi-Trotskyist article, ³The 
Bolsheviks on German Social-Democracy in the Period 
of Its Pre-War Crisis,² as an article for discussion. 
Slutsky asserts that Lenin (the Bolsheviks) underestimated 
the danger of Centrism in German Social-Democracy 
and in pre-war Social-Democracy in general; 
that is, he underestimated the danger of camouflaged 
opportunism, the danger of conciliation towards opportunism. 
In other words, according to Slutsky, Lenin (the 
Bolsheviks) did not wage an irreconcilable struggle 
against opportunism, for, in essence, underestimation of 
Centrism is tantamount to refraining from a thoroughgoing 
struggle against opportunism. It follows, therefore, 
that in the period before the war Lenin was not yet a 
real Bolshevik; that it was only in the period of the imperialist 
war, or even at the close of the war, that Lenin 
became a real Bolshevik. 
Such is the tale Slutsky tells in his article. And 
you, instead of branding this new-found ³historian² as 
a slanderer and falsifier, enter into discussion with him,

SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM 87 
provide him with a forum. I cannot refrain from protesting 
against the publication of Slutskyıs article in your 
magazine as an article for discussion, for the question 
of Leninıs Bolshevism, the question whether Lenin did 
or did not wage an irreconcilable struggle, based on principle, 
against Centrism as a certain form of opportunism, 
the question whether Lenin was or was not a real Bolshevik, 
cannot be made into a subject of discussion. 
In your statement entitled ³From the Editorial 
Board,² sent to the Central Committee on October 20, you 
admit that the editorial board made a mistake in publishing 
Slutskyıs article as a discussion article. That is 
all to the good, of course, despite the fact that the statement 
of the editorial board is very belated. But in 
your statement you commit a fresh mistake by declaring 
that ³the editorial board consider it to be politically 
extremely urgent and necessary that the entire complex 
of problems pertaining to the relations between the 
Bolsheviks and the pre-war Second International be 
further analysed in the pages of Proletarskaya Revolutsia.² 
That means that you intend once again to draw people 
into a discussion on questions which are axioms of Bolshevism. 
It means that you are again thinking of converting 
the subject of Leninıs Bolshevism from an axiom 
into a problem requiring ³further analysis.² Why? On 
what grounds? 
Everyone knows that Leninism was born, grew up 
and became strong in relentless struggle against opportunism 
of every brand, including Centrism in the West 
(Kautsky) and Centrism in our country (Trotsky, etc.). 
This cannot be denied even by the downright enemies 
of Bolshevism, It is an axiom. But you are dragging us

J. V. S T A L I N 88 
back by trying to turn an axiom into a problem requiring 
³further analysis.² Why? On what grounds? Perhaps 
through ignorance of the history of Bolshevism? Perhaps 
for the sake of a rotten liberalism, so that the Slutskys 
and other disciples of Trotsky may not be able to say that 
they are being gagged? A rather strange sort of liberalism, 
this, exercised at the expense of the vital interests 
of Bolshevism. . . . 
What, exactly, is there in Slutskyıs article that 
the editorial board regard as worthy of discussion? 
1) Slutsky asserts that Lenin (the Bolsheviks) did 
not pursue a line directed towards a rupture, towards a 
split with the opportunists in German Social-Democracy, 
with the opportunists in the Second International of 
the pre-war period. You want to open a discussion on 
this Trotskyist thesis of Slutskyıs. But what is there to 
discuss? Is it not obvious that Slutsky is simply slandering 
Lenin, slandering the Bolsheviks? Slander must 
be branded as such and not made the subject of discussion. 
Every Bolshevik, if he really is a Bolshevik, knows 
that long before the war, approximately since 1903-04, when 
the Bolshevik group in Russia took shape and when the 
Lefts in German Social-Democracy first raised their voice, 
Lenin pursued a line directed towards a rupture, towards 
a split with the opportunists both here, in the Russian 
Social-Democratic Party, and over there, in the Second 
International, particularly in the German Social-Democratic 
Party. 
Every Bolshevik knows that it was for that very reason 
that even at that time (1903-05) in the ranks of the 
opportunists of the Second International the Bolshe

SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM 89 
viks won for themselves honourable fame as being ³splitters² 
and ³disrupters.² But what could Lenin do, what 
could the Bolsheviks do, if the Left Social-Democrats 
in the Second International, and above all in the German 
Social-Democratic Party, were a weak and powerless 
group, a group without organisational shape, ideologically 
ill-equipped and afraid even to pronounce the 
word ³rupture,² ³split²? It cannot be demanded that 
Lenin, the Bolsheviks, should have, from inside Russia, 
done the work of the Lefts for them and brought about 
a split in the parties of the West. 
That is apart from the fact that organisational and ideological 
weakness was a characteristic feature of the Left 
Social-Democrats not only in the period prior to the war. 
As is well known, the Lefts retained this negative feature 
in the post-war period as well. Everyone knows the appraisal 
of the German Left Social-Democrats given by Lenin 
in his famous article, ³On Juniusıs Pamphlet,²* published 
in October 1916‹that is, more than two years after the 
beginning of the war‹in which Lenin, criticising a 
number of very serious political mistakes committed by 
the Left Social-Democrats in Germany, speaks of ³the 
weakness of a l l German Lefts, who are entangled on 
all sides in the vile net of Kautskyist hypocrisy, pedantry, 
Œfriendshipı for the opportunists²; in which he says that 
³Junius has not yet freed himself completely from the 
Œenvironmentı of the German, even Left Social-Democrats, 
who are afraid of a split, are afraid to voice revolutionary 
slogans to the full.²23 
* Junius was the pen name of Rosa Luxemburg, leader of 
the Lefts in the Social-Democratic Party of Germany.

J. V. S T A L I N 90 
Of all the groups in the Second International, the 
Russian Bolsheviks were at that time the only one 
which, by its organisational experience and ideological 
equipment, was capable of undertaking anything 
serious in the sense of a direct rupture, of a split with 
its own opportunists in its own Russian Social-Democratic 
Party. Now, if the Slutskys attempted, not even 
to prove, but simply to assume that Lenin and the Russian 
Bolsheviks did not exert all their efforts to organise 
a split with the opportunists (Plekhanov, Martov, Dan) 
and to oust the Centrists (Trotsky and other adherents 
of the August bloc), then one could argue about Leninıs 
Bolshevism, about the Bolsheviksı Bolshevism. But the 
whole point is that the Slutskys dare not even hint at 
such a wild assumption. They dare not, for they are aware 
that the universally known facts concerning the resolute 
policy of rupture with the opportunists of all 
brands pursued by the Russian Bolsheviks (1904-12) cry 
out against such an assumption. They dare not, for they 
know that they would be pilloried the very next day. 
But the question arises: Could the Russian Bolsheviks 
bring about a split with their opportunists and Centrist 
conciliators long before the imperialist war (1904- 
12) without at the same time pursuing a line directed 
towards a rupture, towards a split with the opportunists 
and Centrists of the Second International? Who can doubt 
that the Russian Bolsheviks regarded their policy towards 
the opportunists and Centrists as a model for the policy 
of the Lefts in the West? Who can doubt that the Russian 
Bolsheviks did all they could to push the Left Social-
Democrats in the West, particularly the Lefts in the 
German Social-Democratic Party, towards a rupture,

SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM 91 
towards a split with their own opportunists and Centrists? 
It was not the fault of Lenin and of the Russian Bolsheviks 
that the Left Social-Democrats in the West proved 
to be too immature to follow in the footsteps of the Russian 
Bolsheviks. 
2) Slutsky reproaches Lenin and the Bolsheviks for 
not supporting the German Left Social-Democrat resolutely 
and wholeheartedly, for supporting them only 
with important reservations, for allowing factional considerations 
to hinder them from giving all-out support 
to the Lefts. You want to discuss this fraudulent and 
utterly false reproach. But what is there indeed to discuss? 
Is it not obvious that Slutsky is manoeuvring and 
trying, by means of a false reproach against Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks, to cover up the real gaps in the position of 
the Lefts in Germany? Is it not obvious that the Bolsheviks 
could not support the Lefts in Germany, who time 
and again wavered between Bolshevism and Menshevism, 
without important reservations, without seriously 
criticising their mistakes, and that to act otherwise 
would have been a betrayal of the working class and its 
revolution? Fraudulent manoeuvres must be branded as 
such and not made a subject of discussion. 
Yes, the Bolsheviks supported the Left Social-Democrats 
in Germany only with certain important reservations, 
criticising their semi-Menshevik mistakes. But for 
this they ought to be applauded, not reproached. 
Are there people who doubt this? 
Let us turn to the most generally known facts of 
history. 
a) In 1903, serious differences arose between the 
Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks in Russia on the question

J. V. S T A L I N 92 
of Party membership. By their formula on Party membership 
the Bolsheviks wanted to set up an organisational 
barrier against the influx of non-proletarian elements 
into the Party. The danger of such an influx was very 
real at that time in view of the bourgeois-democratic 
character of the Russian revolution. The Russian Mensheviks 
advocated the opposite position, which threw 
the doors of the Party wide open to non-proletarian elements. 
In view of the importance of the questions of the 
Russian revolution for the world revolutionary movement, 
the West-European Social-Democrats decided to intervene. 
The Left Social-Democrats in Germany, Parvus 
and Rosa Luxemburg, then the leaders of the Lefts, 
also intervened. And what happened? Both declared 
for the Mensheviks and against the Bolsheviks. They 
accused the Bolsheviks of having ultra-centralist and 
Blanquist tendencies. Subsequently, these vulgar and 
philistine epithets were seized upon by the Mensheviks 
and spread far and wide. 
b) In 1905, differences developed between the Bolsheviks 
and the Mensheviks in Russia on the question 
of the character of the Russian revolution. The Bolsheviks 
advocated an alliance between the working class 
and the peasantry under the hegemony of the proletariat. 
The Bolsheviks asserted that the objective must 
be a revolutionary-democratic dictatorship of the proletariat 
and peasantry for the purpose of passing immediately 
from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to 
the socialist revolution, with the support of the rural 
poor secured. The Mensheviks in Russia rejected the idea 
of the hegemony of the proletariat in the bourgeoisdemocratic 
revolution; instead of the policy of an alli

SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM 93 
ance between the working class and the peasantry they 
preferred theı policy of an agreement with the liberal 
bourgeoisie, and they declared that the revolutionarydemocratic 
dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry 
was a reactionary Blanquist scheme that ran counter 
to the development of the bourgeois revolution. What 
was the attitude of the German Left Social-Democrats, 
of Parvus and Rosa Luxemburg, to this controversy? 
They invented a utopian and semi-Menshevik scheme 
of permanent revolution (a distorted representation of 
the Marxist scheme of revolution), which was permeated 
through and through with the Menshevik repudiation 
of the policy of alliance between the working class 
and peasantry, and they counterposed this scheme to 
the Bolshevik scheme of the revolutionary-democratic 
dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. Subsequently, 
this semi-Menshevik scheme of permanent 
revolution was seized upon by Trotsky (in part by 
Martov) and turned into a weapon of struggle against 
Leninism. 
c) In the period before the war, one of the most urgent 
questions that came to the fore in the parties of 
the Second International was the national and colonial 
question, the question of the oppressed nations and colonies, 
the question of the liberation of the oppressed 
nations and colonies, the question of the paths to be 
followed in the struggle against imperialism, the question 
of the paths to the overthrow of imperialism. In 
the interests of developing the proletarian revolution 
and encircling imperialism, the Bolsheviks proposed the 
policy of supporting the liberation movement of the oppressed 
nations and colonies on the basis of the self

J. V. S T A L I N 94 
determination of nations, and developed the scheme of a 
united front between the proletarian revolution in the 
advanced countries and the revolutionary-liberation 
movement of the peoples of the colonies and oppressed 
countries. The opportunists of all countries, the socialchauvinists 
and social-imperialists of all countries hastened 
to take up arms against the Bolsheviks on this account. 
The Bolsheviks were baited like mad dogs. What 
position did the Left Social-Democrats in the West 
adopt at that time? They developed a semi-Menshevik 
theory of imperialism, rejected the principle of selfdetermination 
of nations in its Marxist sense (including 
secession and formation of independent states), rejected 
the thesis that the liberation movement in the colonies 
and oppressed countries is of great revolutionary 
importance, rejected the thesis that a united front between 
the proletarian revolution and the movement for 
national liberation is possible, and counterposed all 
this semi-Menshevik hotchpotch, which is nothing but 
an underestimation of the national and colonial question, 
to the Marxist scheme of the Bolsheviks. It is well 
known that this semi-Menshevik hotchpotch was subsequently 
seized upon by Trotsky, who used it as a 
weapon in the struggle against Leninism. 
Such are the universally known mistakes committed 
by the Left Social-Democrats in Germany. 
I need not speak of the other mistakes of the German 
Lefts, mistakes which were severely criticised in 
various articles by Lenin. 
Nor need I speak of the mistakes they committed in 
appraising the policy of the Bolsheviks in the period 
of the October Revolution.

SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM 95 
What do these mistakes of the German Lefts taken 
from the history of the pre-war period indicate, if not 
that the Left Social-Democrats, despite their Leftism, 
had not yet rid themselves of Menshevik lumber? 
Of course, the record of the Lefts in Germany does 
not consist only of serious mistakes. They also have 
great and important revolutionary deeds to their credit. 
I have in mind a number of their services and revolutionary 
actions in relation to questions of internal policy 
and, in particular, of the electoral struggle, questions 
of the struggle inside and outside parliament, the general 
strike, war, the Revolution of 1905 in Russia, etc. 
That is why the Bolsheviks reckoned with them as Lefts, 
supported them and urged them forward. But it does 
not and cannot obliterate the fact that at the same time 
the Left Social-Democrats in Germany did commit a 
number of very serious political and theoretical mistakes; 
that they had not yet rid themselves of the Menshevik 
burden and therefore were in need of severe criticism 
by the Bolsheviks. 
Now judge for yourselves whether Lenin and the Bolsheviks 
could have supported the Left Social-Democrats 
in the West without serious reservations, without severely 
criticising their mistakes, and whether it would not 
have been a betrayal of the interests of the working class, 
a betrayal of the interests of the revolution, a betrayal 
of communism, to act otherwise? 
Is it not obvious that in reproaching Lenin and the 
Bolsheviks for something for which he should have applauded 
them if he were a Bolshevik, Slutsky fully exposes 
himself as a semi-Menshevik, as a camouflaged Trotskyist?

J. V. S T A L I N 96 
Slutsky assumes that in their appraisal of the Lefts 
in the West, Lenin and the Bolsheviks were guided by 
their own factional considerations and that, consequently, 
the Russian Bolsheviks sacrificed the great cause of the 
international revolution to the interests of their faction. 
It scarcely needs proof that there can be nothing more 
base and disgusting than such an assumption. There can 
be nothing more base, for even the basest of Mensheviks 
are beginning to understand that the Russian revolution 
is not a private cause of the Russians; that, on the contrary, 
it is the cause of the working class of the whole 
world, the cause of the world proletarian revolution. 
There can be nothing more disgusting, for even the professional 
slanderers in the Second International are beginning 
to understand that the consistent and thoroughly 
revolutionary internationalism of the Bolsheviks is a 
model of proletarian internationalism for the workers 
of all countries. 
Yes, the Russian Bolsheviks did put in the forefront 
the fundamental questions of the Russian revolution, 
such questions as those of the Party, of the attitude of 
Marxists towards the bourgeois-democratic revolution, 
of the alliance between the working class and the peasantry, 
of the hegemony of the proletariat, of the struggle 
inside and outside parliament, of the general strike, 
of the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution 
into a socialist revolution, of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, of imperialism, of the self-determination 
of nations, of the liberation movement of the oppressed 
nations and colonies, of the policy of support for this 
movement, etc. They advanced these questions as the 
touchstone by which they tested the revolutionary stamina

SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM 97 
of the Left Social-Democrats in the West. Had they, 
the right to do so? Yes, they had. They not only had the 
right, but it was their duty to do so. It was their duty 
to do so because all these questions were also fundamental 
questions of the world revolution, to whose aims the 
Bolsheviks subordinated their policy and their tactics. 
It was their duty to do so because only through such questions 
could they really test the revolutionary character 
of the various groups in the Second International. The 
question arises: Where is there here any ³factionalism²- 
of the Russian Bolsheviks and what have ³factional² 
considerations to do with this? 
As far back as 1902 Lenin wrote in his pamphlet What 
Is To Be Done? that ³history has now confronted us with 
an immediate task which is the m o s t r e v o I u t i o na 
r y of all the i m m e d i a t e tasks that confront the 
proletariat of any country,² that ³the fulfilment of this 
task, the destruction of the most powerful bulwark, not 
only of European, but also (it may now be said) of Asiatic 
reaction, would make the Russian proletariat the vanguard of 
the international revolutionary proletariat.²24 Thirty years 
have elapsed since that pamphlet, What Is To Be Done?, 
appeared. No one will dare deny that the events during 
this period have brilliantly confirmed Leninıs words. 
But does it not follow from this that the Russian revolution 
was (and remains) the nodal point of the world 
revolution, that the fundamental questions of the 
Russian revolution were at the same time (and are 
now) the fundamental questions of the world revolution? 
Is it not obvious that only through these fundamental 
questions was it possible to make a real test of the rev

J. V. S T A L I N 98 
olutionary character of the Left Social-Democrats in 
the West? 
Is it not obvious that people who regard these questions 
as ³factional² questions fully expose themselves as 
base and degenerate elements? 
3) Slutsky asserts that so far there has not been found 
a sufficient number of official documents testifying to 
Leninıs (the Bolsheviksı) determined and relentless struggle 
against Centrism. He employs this bureaucratic thesis 
as an irrefutable argument in favour of the proposition 
that Lenin (the Bolsheviks) underestimated the danger 
of Centrism in the Second International. And you are 
ready to discuss this nonsense, this rascally chicanery. 
But what is there indeed to discuss? Is it not obvious anyway 
that by his talk about documents Slutsky is trying 
to cover up the wretchedness and falsity of his so-called 
conception? 
Slutsky considers the Party documents now available 
to be inadequate. Why? On what grounds? Are not 
the universally known documents relating to the 
Second International, as well as those relating to the 
inner-Party struggle in Russian Social-Democracy, 
sufficient to demonstrate with full clarity the revolutionary 
relentlessness of Lenin and the Bolsheviks in their 
struggle against the opportunists and Centrists? Is Slutsky 
at all familiar with these documents? What more 
documents does he need? 
Let us assume that, in addition to the documents 
already known, a mass of other documents were found, 
containing, say, resolutions of the Bolsheviks once again 
urging the necessity of wiping out Centrism. Would that 
mean that the mere existence of written documents is

SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM 99 
sufficient to demonstrate the real revolutionary character 
and the real relentlessness of the Bolsheviksı attitude 
towards Centrism? Who, except hopeless bureaucrats, 
can rely on written documents alone? Who, except archive 
rats, does not understand that a party and its leaders 
must be tested primarily by their deeds and not 
merely by their declarations? History knows not a few Socialists 
who readily signed all sorts of revolutionary resolutions, 
just for the sake of satisfying importunate 
critics. But that does not mean that they carried out these 
resolutions. Furthermore, history knows not a few Socialists 
who, foaming at the mouth, called upon the workersı 
parties of other countries to perform the most revolutionary 
actions imaginable. But that does not mean 
that they did not in their own party, or in their own 
country, shrink from fighting their own opportunists, 
their own bourgeoisie. Is not this why Lenin taught 
us to test revolutionary parties, trends and leaders, 
not by their declarations and resolutions, but by their 
deeds? 
Is it not obvious that if Slutsky really wanted to 
test the relentlessness of Lenin and the Bolsheviks towards 
Centrism, he should have taken as the basis of 
his article, not individual documents and two or three 
personal letters, but a test of the Bolsheviks by their 
deeds, their history, their actions? Did we not have opportunists 
and Centrists in the Russian Social-Democratic 
Party? Did not the Bolsheviks wage a determined 
and relentless struggle against all these trends? Were 
not these trends both ideologically and organisationally 
connected with the opportunists and Centrists in the West? 
Did not the Bolsheviks smash the opportunists and Cen

J. V. S T A L I N 100 
trists as no other Left group did anywhere else in the 
world? How can anyone say after all this that Lenin 
and the Bolsheviks underestimated the danger of 
Centrism? Why did Slutsky ignore these facts, which 
are of decisive importance in characterising the Bolsheviks? 
Why did he not resort to the most reliable 
method of testing Lenin and the Bolsheviks: by their 
deeds, by their actions? Why did he prefer the less reliable 
method of rummaging among casually selected 
papers? 
Because recourse to the more reliable method of 
testing the Bolsheviks by their deeds would have instantaneously 
upset Slutskyıs whole conception. 
Because a test of the Bolsheviks by their deeds 
would have shown that the Bolsheviks are the only 
revolutionary organisation in the world which has completely 
smashed the opportunists and Centrists and 
driven them out of the Party. 
Because recourse to the real deeds and the real history 
of the Bolsheviks would have shown that Slutskyıs 
teachers, the Trotskyists, were the principal and basic 
group which fostered Centrism in Russia, and for this 
purpose created a special organisation, the August bloc, 
as a hotbed of Centrism. 
Because a test of the Bolsheviks by their deeds would 
have exposed Slutsky once and for all as a falsifier of 
the history of our Party, who is trying to cover up the 
Centrism of pre-war Trotskyism by slanderously accusing 
Lenin and the Bolsheviks of having underestimated 
the danger of Centrism. 
That, comrade editors, is how matters stand with 
Slutsky and his article.

SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM 101 
As you see, the editorial board made a mistake in 
permitting a discussion with a falsifier of the history 
of our Party. 
What could have impelled the editorial board to take 
this wrong road? 
I think that they were impelled to take that road 
by rotten liberalism, which has spread to some extent 
among a section of the Bolsheviks. Some Bolsheviks 
think that Trotskyism is a faction of communism‹one 
which makes mistakes, it is true, which does many foolish 
things, is sometimes even anti-Soviet, but which, 
nevertheless, is a faction of communism. Hence a certain 
liberalism in the attitude towards the Trotskyists 
and Trotskyist-minded people. It scarcely needs 
proof that such a view of Trotskyism is deeply mistaken 
and harmful. As a matter of fact, Trotskyism has 
long since ceased to be a faction of communism. 
As a matter of fact, Trotskyism is the advanced 
detachment of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie, 
which i s fighting against communism, against the 
Soviet regime, against the building of socialism in the 
U.S.S.R. 
Who gave the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie an 
ideological weapon against Bolshevism in the shape of 
the thesis that building socialism in our country is impossible, 
that the degeneration of the Bolsheviks is 
inevitable, etc.? Trotskyism gave it that weapon. It 
is no accident that in their efforts to prove the inevitability 
of the struggle against the Soviet regime all the 
anti-Soviet groups in the U.S.S.R. have been referring 
to the well-known Trotskyist thesis that building socialism 
in our country is impossible, that the degener

J. V. S T A L I N 102 
ation of the Soviet regime is inevitable, that a return 
to capitalism is probable. 
Who gave the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie in 
the U.S.S.R. a tactical weapon in the shape of attempts 
at open actions against the Soviet regime? The Trotskyists, 
who tried to organise anti-Soviet demonstrations 
in Moscow and Leningrad on November 7, 1927, gave it 
that weapon. It is a fact that the anti-Soviet actions of 
the Trotskyists raised the spirits of the bourgeoisie and 
let loose the wrecking activities of the bourgeois experts. 
Who gave the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie an organisational 
weapon in the form of attempts at setting up 
underground anti-Soviet organisations? The Trotskyists, 
who organised their own anti-Bolshevik illegal group, 
gave it that weapon. It is a fact that the underground 
anti-Soviet work of the Trotskyists helped the anti-Soviet 
groups in the U.S.S.R. to assume an organised form. 
Trotskyism is the advanced detachment of the counter-
revolutionary bourgeoisie. 
That is why liberalism in the attitude towards Trotskyism, 
even though the latter is shattered and camouflaged, 
is blockheadedness bordering on crime, on 
treason to the working class. 
That is why the attempts of certain ³writers² and 
³historians² to smuggle disguised Trotskyist rubbish 
into our literature must meet with a determined rebuff 
from Bolsheviks. 
That is why we cannot permit a literary discussion 
with the Trotskyist smugglers. 
It seems to me that ³historians² and ³writers² of 
the Trotskyist smuggler category are for the present 
trying to carry out their smuggling work along two lines.

SOME QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE HISTORY OF BOLSHEVISM 103 
Firstly, they are trying to prove that in the period 
before the war Lenin underestimated the danger of Centrism, 
thereby leaving the inexperienced reader to surmise 
that, in consequence, Lenin was not yet a real revolutionary 
at that time; that he became one only after 
the war, after he had ³re-equipped² himself with Trotskyıs 
assistance. Slutsky may be regarded as a typical 
representative of this type of smuggler. 
We have seen above that Slutsky and Co. are not 
worth making much fuss about. 
Secondly, they are trying to prove that in the period 
prior to the war Lenin did not realise the necessity 
of the growing over of the bourgeois-democratic revolution 
into a socialist revolution, thereby leaving the 
inexperienced reader to surmise that, in consequence, 
Lenin at that time was not yet a real Bolshevik; that 
he realised the necessity of this growing over only 
after the war, after he had ³re-equipped² himself with 
Trotskyıs assistance. Volosevich, author of A Course 
in the History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), may be regarded as 
a typical representative of this type of smuggler. 
True, as far back as 1905 Lenin wrote that ³from 
the democratic revolution we shall at once, and just to 
the extent of our strength, the strength of the class-conscious 
and organised proletariat, begin to pass to the socialist revolution,² 
that ³we stand for uninterrupted revolution,² 
that ³we shall not stop halfway.²25 True, a very large 
number of facts and documents of a similar nature 
could be found in the works of Lenin. But what do the 
Voloseviches care about the facts of Leninıs life and 
work? The Voloseviches write in order, by decking themselves 
out in Bolshevik colours, to smuggle in their anti

J. V. S T A L I N 104 
Leninist contraband, to utter lies about the Bolsheviks 
and to falsify the history of the Bolshevik Party. 
As you see, the Voloseviches are worthy of the 
Slutskys. 
Such are the ³highways and byways² of the Trotskyist 
smugglers. 
You yourselves should realise that it is not the business 
of the editorial board of Proletarskaya Revolutsia 
to facilitate the smuggling activities of such ³historians² 
by providing them with a forum for discussion. 
The task of the editorial board is, in my opinion, 
to raise the questions concerning the history of Bolshevism 
to the proper level, to put the study of the history 
of our Party on scientific, Bolshevik lines, and to concentrate 
attention against the Trotskyist and all other 
falsifiers of the history of our Party, systematically 
tearing off their masks. 
That is all the more necessary since even some of 
our historians‹I am speaking of historians without 
quotation marks, of Bolshevik historians of our Party‹ 
are not free from mistakes which bring grist to the mill 
of the Slutskys and Voloseviches. In this respect, even 
Comrade Yaroslavsky is not, unfortunately, an exception; 
his books on the history of the C.P.S.U.(B.), despite 
all their merits, contain a number of errors in matters 
of principle and history. 
With communist greetings, 
J. Stalin 
The magazine Proletarskaya Revolutsia, 
No. 6 (113), 1931

AUTOMOBILE WORKS, 
NIZHNI-NOVGOROD 
Ardent greetings to the workers and the administrative 
and technical personnel of the construction project 
on the occasion of the successful completion of the 
building work for the factory. 
Congratulations on your victory, comrades! 
We wish you further success in your work of assembling, 
setting in working order and inaugurating this 
giant plant. We do not doubt that you will be able 
to surmount all difficulties and will fulfil with honour 
your duty to the country. 
J. Stalin, V. Molotov 
Pravda, No. 305, 
November 4, 1931

TALK WITH THE GERMAN AUTHOR 
EMIL LUDWIG 
December 13, 1931 
Ludwig: I am extremely obliged to you for having 
found it possible to receive me. For over twenty years 
I have been studying the lives and deeds of outstanding 
historical personages. I believe I am a good judge of 
people, but on the other hand I know nothing about social-
economic conditions. 
Stalin: You are being modest. 
Ludwig: No, that is really so, and for that very reason 
I shall put questions that may seem strange to you. 
Today, here in the Kremlin, I saw some relics of Peter 
the Great and the first question I should like to ask you 
is this: Do you think a parallel can be drawn between 
yourself and Peter the Great? Do you consider yourself 
a continuer of the work of Peter the Great? 
Stalin: In no way whatever. Historical parallels 
are always risky. There is no sense in this one. 
Ludwig: But after all, Peter the Great did a great 
deal to develop his country, to bring western culture to 
Russia. 
Stalin: Yes, of course, Peter the Great did much 
to elevate the landlord class and develop the nascent 
merchant class. He did very much indeed to create and

TALK WITH THE GERMAN AUTHOR EMIL LUDWIG 107 
consolidate the national state of the landlords and merchants. 
It must be said also that the elevation of the 
landlord class, the assistance to the nascent merchant 
class and the consolidation of the national state of these 
classes took place at the cost of the peasant serfs, who 
were bled white. 
As for myself, I am just a pupil of Leninıs, and the 
aim of my life is to be a worthy pupil of his. 
The task to which I have devoted my life is the elevation 
of a different class‹the working class. That 
task is not the consolidation of some ³national² state, 
but of a socialist state, and that means an international 
state; and everything that strengthens that state helps 
to strengthen the entire international working class. If 
every step I take in my endeavour to elevate the working 
class and strengthen the socialist state of this class were 
not directed towards strengthening and improving the 
position of the working class, I should consider my life 
purposeless. 
So you see your parallel does not fit. 
As regards Lenin and Peter the Great, the latter 
was but a drop in the sea, whereas Lenin was a whole 
ocean. 
Ludwig: Marxism denies that the individual plays an 
outstanding role in history. Do you not see a contradiction 
between the materialist conception of history and 
the fact that, after all, you admit the outstanding role 
played by historical personages? 
Stalin: No, there is no contradiction here. Marxism 
does not at all deny the role played by outstanding 
individuals or that history is made by people. In Marxıs 
The Poverty of Philosophy26 and in other works of his you

J. V. S T A L I N 108 
will find it stated that it is people who make history. 
But, of course, people do not make history according to 
the promptings of their imagination or as some fancy 
strikes them. Every new generation encounters definite 
conditions already existing, ready-made when that 
generation was born. And great people are worth anything 
at all only to the extent that they are able correctly 
to understand these conditions, to understand how to 
change them. If they fail to understand these conditions 
and want to alter them according to the promptings 
of their imagination, they will land themselves in the 
situation of Don Quixote. Thus it is precisely Marxıs 
view that people must not be counterposed to conditions. 
It is people who make history, but they do so only 
to the extent that they correctly understand the conditions 
that they have found ready-made, and only to the 
extent that they understand how to change those conditions. 
That, at least, is how we Russian Bolsheviks 
understand Marx. And we have been studying Marx 
for a good many years. 
Ludwig: Some thirty years ago, when I was at the 
university, many German professors who considered themselves 
adherents of the materialist conception of history 
taught us that Marxism denies the role of heroes, the 
role of heroic personalities in history. 
Stalin: They were vulgarisers of Marxism. Marxism 
has never denied the role of heroes. On the contrary, it 
admits that they play a considerable role, but with the 
reservations I have just made. 
Ludwig: Sixteen chairs are placed around the table 
at which we are seated. Abroad people know, on the one 
hand, that the U.S.S.R. is a country in which everything

TALK WITH THE GERMAN AUTHOR EMIL LUDWIG 109 
must be decided collectively, but they know, on the other 
hand, that everything is decided by individual persons. 
Who really does decide? 
Stalin: No, individual persons cannot decide. Decisions 
of individuals are always, or nearly always, 
one-sided decisions. In every collegium, in every collective 
body, there are people whose opinion must be 
reckoned with. In every collegium, in every collective 
body, there are people who may express wrong opinions. 
From the experience of three revolutions we know that 
out of every 100 decisions taken by individual persons 
without being tested and corrected collectively, approximately 
90 are one-sided. 
In our leading body, the Central Committee of our 
Party, which directs all our Soviet and Party organisations, 
there are about 70 members. Among these 70 members 
of the Central Committee are our best industrial 
leaders, our best co-operative leaders, our best managers 
of supplies, our best military men, our best propagandists 
and agitators, our best experts on state farms, on 
collective farms, on individual peasant farms, our best 
experts on the nations constituting the Soviet Union 
and on national policy. In this areopagus is concentrated 
the wisdom of our Party. Each has an opportunity 
of correcting anyoneıs individual opinion or proposal. 
Each has an opportunity of contributing his experience. 
If this were not the case, if decisions were taken by individual 
persons, there would be very serious mistakes 
in our work. But since each has an opportunity of correcting 
the mistakes of individual persons, and since 
we pay heed to such corrections, we arrive at decisions 
that are more or less correct.

J. V. S T A L I N 110 
Ludwig: You have had decades of experience of illegal 
work. You have had to transport illegally arms, 
literature, and so forth. Do you not think that the enemies 
of the Soviet regime might learn from your experience 
and fight the Soviet regime with the same methods? 
Stalin: That, of course, is quite possible. 
Ludwig: Is that not the reason for the severity and 
ruthlessness of your government in fighting its enemies? 
Stalin: No, that is not the chief reason. One could 
quote certain examples from history. When the Bolsheviks 
came to power they at first treated their enemies 
mildly. The Mensheviks continued to exist legally and 
publish their newspaper. The Socialist-Revolutionaries 
also continued to exist legally and had their newspaper. 
Even the Cadets continued to publish their newspaper. 
When General Krasnov organised his counter-revolutionary 
campaign against Leningrad and fell into our 
hands, we could at least have kept him prisoner, 
according to the rules of war. Indeed, we ought to 
have shot him. But we released him on his ³word of honour.² 
And what happened? It soon became clear that 
such mildness only helped to undermine the strength of 
the Soviet Government. We made a mistake in displaying 
such mildness towards enemies of the working class. To 
have persisted in that mistake would have been a crime 
against the working class and a betrayal of its interests. 
That soon became quite apparent. Very soon it became 
evident that the milder our attitude towards our enemies, 
the greater their resistance. Before long the Right Socialist-
Revolutionaries‹Gotz and others‹and the Right 
Mensheviks were organising in Leningrad a counterrevolutionary 
action of the military cadets, as a result

TALK WITH THE GERMAN AUTHOR EMIL LUDWIG 111 
of which many of our revolutionary sailors perished. 
This very Krasnov, whom we had released on his ³word 
of honour,² organised the whiteguard Cossacks. He 
joined forces with Mamontov and for two years waged 
an armed struggle against the Soviet Government. Very 
soon it turned out that behind the whiteguard generals 
stood the agents of the western capitalist states‹France, 
Britain, America‹and also Japan. We became convinced 
that we had made a mistake in displaying mildness. 
We learnt from experience that the only way to deal 
with such enemies is to apply the most ruthless policy 
of suppression to them. 
Ludwig: It seems to me that a considerable part of 
the population of the Soviet Union stands in fear and 
trepidation of the Soviet power, and that the stability 
of the latter rests to a certain extent on that sense of 
fear. I should like to know what state of mind is produced 
in you personally by the realisation that it is necessary 
to inspire fear in the interests of strengthening the 
regime. After all, when you associate with your comrades, 
your friends, you adopt quite different methods 
than those of inspiring fear. Yet the population is being 
inspired with fear. 
Stalin: You are mistaken. Incidentally, your mistake 
is that of many people. Do you really believe that we 
could have retained power and have had the backing 
of the vast masses for 14 years by methods of intimidation 
and terrorisation? No, that is impossible. The tsarist 
government excelled all others in knowing how to 
intimidate. It had long and vast experience in that sphere. 
The European bourgeoisie, particularly the French, 
gave tsarism every assistance in this matter and taught

J. V. S T A L I N 112 
it to terrorise the people. Yet, in spite of that experience 
and in spite of the help of the European bourgeoisie, 
the policy of intimidation led to the downfall of 
tsarism. 
Ludwig: But the Romanovs held on for 300 years. 
Stalin: Yes, but how many revolts and uprisings there 
were during those 300 years! There was the uprising of 
Stepan Razin, the uprising of Yemelyan Pugachov, the 
uprising of the Decembrists, the revolution of 1905, 
the revolution of February 1917, and the October Revolution. 
That is apart from the fact that the presentday 
conditions of political and cultural life in the country 
are radically different from those of the old regime, 
when the ignorance, lack of culture, submissiveness 
and political downtroddenness of the masses enabled the 
³rulers² of that time to remain in power for a more or 
less prolonged period. 
As regards the people, the workers and peasants of 
the U.S.S.R., they are not at all so tame, so submissive 
and intimidated as you imagine. There are many people 
in Europe whose ideas about the people of the U.S.S.R. 
are old-fashioned: they think that the people living in 
Russia are, firstly, submissive and, secondly, lazy. 
That is an antiquated and radically wrong notion. It 
arose in Europe in those days when the Russian landlords 
began to flock to Paris, where they squandered the loot 
they had amassed and spent their days in idleness. These 
were indeed spineless and worthless people. That 
gave rise to conclusions about ³Russian laziness.² But 
this cannot in the least apply to the Russian workers 
and peasants, who earned and still earn their living 
by their own labour. It is indeed strange to consider

TALK WITH THE GERMAN AUTHOR EMIL LUDWIG 113 
the Russian peasants and workers submissive and lazy 
when in a brief period of time they made three revolutions, 
smashed tsarism and the bourgeoisie, and are 
now triumphantly building socialism. 
Just now you asked me whether everything in our 
country was decided by one person. Never under any 
circumstances would our workers now tolerate power in 
the hands of one person. With us personages of the greatest 
authority are reduced to nonentities, become mere 
ciphers, as soon as the masses of the workers lose confidence 
in them, as soon as they lose contact with the masses 
of the workers. Plekhanov used to enjoy exceptionally 
great prestige. And what happened? As soon as he began 
to stumble politically the workers forgot him. They forsook 
him and forgot him. Another instance: Trotsky. 
His prestige too was great, although, of course, it was 
nothing like Plekhanovıs. What happened? As soon as 
he drifted away from the workers they forgot him. 
Ludwig: Entirely forgot him? 
Stalin: They remember him sometimes‹but with 
bitterness. 
Ludwig: All of them with bitterness? 
Stalin: As far as our workers are concerned, they 
remember Trotsky with bitterness, with exasperation, 
with hatred. 
There is, of course, a certain small section of the population 
that really does stand in fear of the Soviet power, 
and fights against it. I have in mind the remnants of 
the moribund classes, which are being eliminated, and 
primarily that insignificant part of the peasantry, the 
kulaks. But here it is a matter not merely of a policy 
of intimidating these groups, a policy that really does

J. V. S T A L I N 114 
exist. Everybody knows that in this case we Bolsheviks 
do not confine ourselves to intimidation but go further, 
aiming at the elimination of this bourgeois stratum. 
But if you take the labouring population of the 
U.S.S.R., the workers and the labouring peasants, who 
represent not less than 90 per cent of the population, 
you will find that they are in favour of Soviet power 
and that the vast majority of them actively support 
the Soviet regime. They support the Soviet system because 
that system serves the fundamental interests of 
the workers and peasants. 
That, and not a policy of so-called intimidation, 
is the basis of the Soviet Governmentıs stability. 
Ludwig: I am very grateful to you for that answer. 
I beg you to forgive me if I ask you a question that may 
appear to you a strange one. Your biography contains 
instances of what may be called acts of ³highway robbery.² 
Were you ever interested in the personality of Stepan 
Razin? What is your attitude towards him as an ³ideological 
highwayman²? 
Stalin: We Bolsheviks have always taken an interest 
in such historical personalities as Bolotnikov, Razin, 
Pugachov, and so on. We regard the deeds of these 
individuals as a reflection of the spontaneous indignation 
of the oppressed classes, of the spontaneous rebellion 
of the peasantry against feudal oppression. The 
study of the history of these first attempts at such revolt 
on the part of the peasantry has always been of interest 
to us. But, of course, no analogy can be drawn 
here between them and the Bolsheviks. Sporadic peasant 
uprisings, even when not of the ³highway robber² and 
unorganised type, as in the case of Stepan Razin, cannot

TALK WITH THE GERMAN AUTHOR EMIL LUDWIG 115 
lead to anything of importance. Peasant uprisings can 
be successful only if they are combined with uprisings 
of the workers and if they are led by the workers. Only 
a combined uprising headed by the working class can 
achieve its aim. 
Moreover, it must never be forgotten that Razin and 
Pugachov were tsarists: they came out against the landlords, 
but were in favour of a ³good tsar.² That indeed 
was their slogan. 
As you see, it is impossible to draw an analogy here 
with the Bolsheviks. 
Ludwig: Allow me to put a few questions to you concerning 
your biography. When I went to see Masaryk 
he told me he was conscious of being a Socialist when 
only six years old. What made you a Socialist and when 
was that? 
Stalin: I cannot assert that I was already drawn to 
socialism at the age of six. Not even at the age of ten 
or twelve. I joined the revolutionary movement when 
fifteen years old, when I became connected with underground 
groups of Russian Marxists then living in 
Transcaucasia. These groups exerted great influence on 
me and instilled in me a taste for underground Marxist 
literature. 
Ludwig: What impelled you to become an oppositionist? 
Was it, perhaps, bad treatment by your parents? 
Stalin: No. My parents were uneducated, but they 
did not treat me badly by any means. But it was a different 
matter at the Orthodox theological seminary 
which I was then attending. In protest against the 
outrageous regime and the jesuitical methods prevalent 
at the seminary, I was ready to become, and actually

J. V. S T A L I N 116 
did become, a revolutionary, a believer in Marxism as 
a really revolutionary teaching. 
Ludwig: But do you not admit that the Jesuits have 
good points? 
Stalin: Yes, they are systematic and persevering in 
working to achieve sordid ends. But their principal 
method is spying, prying, worming their way into peopleıs 
souls and outraging their feelings. What good can 
there be in that? For instance, the spying in the hostel. 
At nine oıclock the bell rings for morning tea, we go 
to the dining-room, and when we return to our rooms 
we find that meantime a search has been made and all 
our chests have been ransacked. . . . What good point 
can there be in that? 
Ludwig: I notice that in the Soviet Union everything 
American is held in very high esteem, I might even 
speak of a worship of everything American, that is, of 
the Land of the Dollar, the most out-and-out capitalist 
country. This sentiment exists also in your working 
class, and applies not only to tractors and automobiles, 
but also to Americans in general. How do you explain 
that? 
Stalin: You exaggerate. We have no especially high 
esteem for everything American. But we do respect the 
efficiency that the Americans display in everything‹in 
industry, in technology, in literature and in life. We never 
forget that the U.S.A. is a capitalist country. But 
among the Americans there are many people who are 
mentally and physically healthy, who are healthy in 
their whole approach to work, to the job on hand. That 
efficiency, that simplicity, strikes a responsive chord 
in our hearts. Despite the fact that America is a highly

TALK WITH THE GERMAN AUTHOR EMIL LUDWIG 117 
developed capitalist country, the habits prevailing in 
its industry, the practices existing in productive processes, 
have an element of democracy about them, which 
cannot be said of the old European capitalist countries, 
where the haughty spirit of the feudal aristocracy is 
still alive. 
Ludwig: You do not even suspect how right you are. 
Stalin: Maybe I do; who can tell? 
In spite of the fact that feudalism as a social order 
was demolished long ago in Europe, considerable relics 
survive in manner of life and customs. There are still 
technicians, specialists, scientists and writers who have 
sprung from the feudal environment and who carry aristocratic 
habits into industry, technology, science and 
literature. Feudal traditions have not been entirely 
demolished. 
That cannot be said of America, which is a country 
of ³free colonists,² without landlords and without aristocrats. 
Hence the sound and comparatively simple habits 
in American productive life. Our business executives 
of working-class origin who have visited America at 
once noted this trait. They relate, not without a certain 
agreeable surprise, that on a production job in America 
it is difficult to distinguish an engineer from a worker 
by outward appearance. That pleases them, of course. 
But matters are quite different in Europe. 
But if we are going to speak of our liking for a particular 
nation, or rather, for the majority of its citizens, 
then of course we must not fail to mention our liking 
for the Germans. Our liking for the Americans cannot 
be compared to that! 
Ludwig: Why precisely the German nation?

J. V. S T A L I N 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
118 
Stalin: If only for the reason that it gave the world 
such men as Marx and Engels. It suffices to state the 
fact as such. 
Ludwig: It has recently been noticed that certain 
German politicians are seriously afraid that the traditional 
policy of friendship between the U.S.S.R. and Germany 
will be pushed into the background. These fears 
have arisen in connection with the negotiations between 
the U.S.S.R. and Poland. Should the recognition 
of Polandıs present frontiers by the U.S.S.R. become 
a fact as a result of these negotiations it would spell 
bitter disappointment for the entire German people, 
who have hitherto believed that the U.S.S.R. is fighting 
the Versailles system and has no intention of recognising 
it. 
Stalin: I know that a certain dissatisfaction and 
alarm may be noticed among some German statesmen 
on the grounds that the Soviet Union, in its negotiations 
or in some treaty with Poland, may take some step 
that would imply on the part of the Soviet Union a sanction, 
a guarantee, for Polandıs possessions and frontiers. 
In my opinion such fears are mistaken. We have always 
declared our readiness to conclude a non-aggression 
pact with any state. We have already concluded 
such pacts with a number of countries. We have openly 
declared our readiness to sign such a pact with Poland, 
too. When we declare that we are ready to sign a pact 
of non-aggression with Poland, this is not mere rhetoric. 
It means that we really want to sign such a pact. 
We are politicians of a special brand, if you like. There 
are politicians who make a promise or statement one 
day, and on the next either forget all about it or deny

TALK WITH THE GERMAN AUTHOR EMIL LUDWIG 119 
what they stated, and do so without even blushing. We 
cannot act in that way. Whatever we do abroad inevitably 
becomes known inside our country, becomes known 
to all the workers and peasants. If we said one thing 
and did another, we should forfeit our prestige among 
the masses of the people. As soon as the Poles declared 
that they were ready to negotiate a non-aggression pact 
with us, we naturally agreed and opened negotiations. 
What, from the Germansı point of view, is the most 
dangerous thing that could happen? A change for the 
worse in our relations with them? But there is no basis 
whatever for that. We, exactly like the Poles, must declare 
in the pact that we will not use force or resort 
to aggression in order to change the frontiers of Poland 
or the U.S.S.R., or violate their independence. Just as 
we make such a promise to the Poles, so they make the 
same promise to us. Without such a clause, namely, 
that we do not intend to go to war for the purpose of 
violating the independence or integrity of the frontiers 
of our respective states, no pact can be concluded. Without 
that a pact is out of the question. That is the most 
that we can do. 
Is this recognition of the Versailles system?27 No. Or 
is it, perhaps, a guaranteeing of frontiers? No. We never 
have been guarantors of Poland and never shall become 
such, just as Poland has not been and will not be 
a guarantor of our frontiers. Our friendly relations 
with Germany will continue as hitherto. That is my 
firm conviction. 
Therefore, the fears you speak of are wholly without 
foundation. They have arisen on the basis of rumours 
spread by some Poles and Frenchmen. They will disap

J. V. S T A L I N 120 
pear when we publish the pact, if Poland signs it. Everyone 
will then see that it contains nothing against 
Germany. 
Ludwig: I am very thankful to you for that statement. 
Allow me to ask you the following question: You 
speak of ³wage equalisation,² giving the term a distinctly 
ironical shade of meaning in relation to general 
equalisation. But, surely, general equalisation is a socialist 
ideal. 
Stalin: The kind of socialism under which everybody 
would get the same pay, an equal quantity of meat and 
an equal quantity of bread, would wear the same clothes 
and receive the same goods in the same quantities‹such 
a socialism is unknown to Marxism. 
All that Marxism says is that until classes have 
been finally abolished and until labour has been transformed 
from a means of subsistence into the prime want 
of man, into voluntary labour for society, people will 
be paid for their labour according to the work performed. 
³From each according to his ability, to each according 
to his work.² Such is the Marxist formula of socialism, 
i.e., the formula of the first stage of communism, the 
first stage of communist society. 
Only at the higher stage of communism, only in its 
higher phase, will each one, working according to his 
ability, be recompensed for his work according to his 
needs. ³From each according to his ability, to each 
according to his needs.² 
It is quite clear that peopleıs needs vary and will 
continue to vary under socialism. Socialism has never 
denied that people differ in their tastes, and in the 
quantity and quality of their needs. Read how Marx

TALK WITH THE GERMAN AUTHOR EMIL LUDWIG 121 
criticised Stirner28 for his leaning towards equalitarianism; 
read Marxıs criticism of the Gotha Programme 
of 187529; read the subsequent works of Marx, Engels 
and Lenin, and you will see how sharply they attack 
equalitarianism. Equalitarianism owes its origin to the 
individual peasant type of mentality, the psychology of 
share and share alike, the psychology of primitive peasant 
³communism.² Equalitarianism has nothing in 
common with Marxist socialism. Only people who are 
unacquainted with Marxism can have the primitive notion 
that the Russian Bolsheviks want to pool all wealth 
and then share it out equally. That is the notion of 
people who have nothing in common with Marxism. 
That is how such people as the primitive ³Communists² 
of the time of Cromwell and the French Revolution pictured 
communism to themselves. But Marxism and the 
Russian Bolsheviks have nothing in common with such 
equalitarian ³Communists.² 
Ludwig: You are smoking a cigarette. Where is your 
legendary pipe, Mr. Stalin? You once said that words 
and legends pass, but deeds remain. Now believe me, 
there are millions of people abroad who do not know 
about some of your words and deeds, but who do know 
about your legendary pipe. 
Stalin: I left my pipe at home. 
Ludwig: I shall now ask you a question that may 
astonish you greatly. 
Stalin: We Russian Bolsheviks have long ceased to 
be astonished at anything. 
Ludwig: Yes, and we in Germany too. 
Stalin: Yes, you in Germany will soon stop being 
astonished.

J. V. S T A L I N 122 
Ludwig:: My question is the following: You have 
often incurred risks and dangers. You have been persecuted. 
You have taken part in battles. A number of your 
close friends have perished. You have survived. How 
do you explain that? And do you believe in fate? 
Stalin: No, I do not. Bolsheviks, Marxists, do not 
believe in ³fate.² The very concept of fate, of ³Schicksal,² 
is a prejudice, an absurdity, a relic of mythology, 
like the mythology of the ancient Greeks, for whom 
a goddess of fate controlled the destinies of men. 
Ludwig:: That is to say that the fact that you did 
not perish is an accident? 
Stalin: There are internal and external causes, the 
combined effect of which was that I did not perish. 
But entirely independent of that, somebody else could 
have been in my place, for somebody had to occupy it. 
³Fate² is something not governed by natural law, something 
mystical. I do not believe in mysticism. Of course, 
there were reasons why danger left me unscathed. But 
there could have been a number of other fortuitous circumstances, 
of other causes, which could have led to a directly 
opposite result. So-called fate has nothing to do with it. 
Ludwig: Lenin passed many years in exile abroad. 
You had occasion to be abroad for only a very short 
time. Do you consider that this has handicapped you? 
Who do you believe were of greater benefit to the revolution‹
those revolutionaries who lived in exile abroad 
and thus had the opportunity of making a thorough 
study of Europe, but on the other hand were cut off 
from direct contact with the people; or those revolutionaries 
who carried on their work here, knew the moods 
of the people, but on the other hand knew little of Europe?

TALK WITH THE GERMAN AUTHOR EMIL LUDWIG 123 
Stalin: Lenin must be excluded from this comparison. 
Very few of those who remained in Russia were as 
intimately connected with the actual state of affairs 
there and with the labour movement within the country 
as Lenin was, although he was a long time abroad. 
Whenever I went to see him abroad‹in 1906, 1907, 
1912 and 191330‹I saw piles of letters he had received 
from practical Party workers in Russia, and he was always 
better informed than those who stayed in Russia. He 
always considered his stay abroad to be a burden to him. 
There are many more comrades in our Party and its 
leadership who remained in Russia, who did not go 
abroad, than there are former exiles, and they, of course, 
were able to be of greater benefit to the revolution than 
those who were in exile abroad. Actually few former 
exiles are left in our Party. They may add up to about 
one or two hundred out of the two million members of the 
Party. Of the seventy members of the Central Committee 
scarcely more than three or four lived in exile abroad. 
As far as knowledge of Europe, a study of Europe, 
is concerned, those who wished to make such a study 
had, of course, more opportunities of doing so while 
living there. In that respect those of us who did not 
live long abroad lost something. But living abroad is 
not at all a decisive factor in making a study of European 
economics, technique, the cadres of the labour 
movement and literature of every description, whether 
belles lettres or scientific. Other things being equal, 
it is of course easier to study Europe on the spot. But 
the disadvantage of those who have not lived in Europe 
is not of much importance. On the contrary, I know 
many comrades who were abroad twenty years, lived

J. V. S T A L I N 124 
somewhere in Charlottenburg or in the Latin Quarter, 
spent years in cafés drinking beer, and who yet did not 
manage to acquire a knowledge of Europe and failed to 
understand it. 
Ludwig: Do you not think that among the Germans 
as a nation love of order is more highly developed than 
love of freedom? 
Stalin: There was a time when people in Germany 
did indeed show great respect for the law. In 1907, 
when I happened to spend two or three months in Berlin, 
we Russian Bolsheviks often used to laugh at some 
of our German friends on account of their respect for 
the law. There was, for example, a story in circulation 
about an occasion when the Berlin Social-Democratic 
Executive fixed a definite day and hour for a demonstration 
that was to be attended by the members of all the 
suburban organisations. A group of about 200 from one 
of the suburbs arrived in the city punctually at the hour 
appointed, but failed to appear at the demonstration, 
the reason being that they had waited two hours on the 
station platform because the ticket collector at the exit 
had failed to make his appearance and there had been 
nobody to give their tickets to. It used to be said in 
jest that it took a Russian comrade to show the Germans 
a simple way out of their fix: to leave the platform 
without giving up their tickets. . . . 
But is there anything like that in Germany now? 
Is there respect for the law in Germany today? What 
about the National Socialists, who one would think ought 
to be the first to stand guard over bourgeois legality? 
Do they not break the law, wreck workersı clubs and 
assassinate workers with impunity?

TALK WITH THE GERMAN AUTHOR EMIL LUDWIG 125 
I make no mention of the workers, who, it seems to 
me, long ago lost all respect for bourgeois legality. 
Yes, the Germans have changed quite a bit lately. 
Ludwig: Under what conditions is i t possible to 
unite the working class finally and completely under 
the leadership of one party? Why is such a uniting of 
the working class possible only after the proletarian revolution, 
as the Communists maintain? 
Stalin: Such a uniting of the working class around 
the Communist Party is most easily accomplished as 
the result of a victorious proletarian revolution. But it 
will undoubtedly be achieved in the main even before 
the revolution. 
Ludwig: Does ambition stimulate or hinder a great 
historical figure in his activities? 
Stalin: The part played by ambition differs under 
different conditions. Ambition may be a stimulus or a 
hindrance to the activities of a great historical figure. 
It all depends on circumstances. More often than not it 
is a hindrance. 
Ludwig: Is the October Revolution in any sense the 
continuation and culmination of the Great French Revolution? 
Stalin: The October Revolution is neither the continuation 
nor the culmination of the Great French Revolution. 
The purpose of the French Revolution was to 
abolish feudalism in order to establish capitalism. The 
purpose of the October Revolution, however, is to abolish 
capitalism in order to establish socialism. 
Bolshevik, No. 8, 
April 30, 1932

TO THE CHIEF 
OF THE AUTOMOBILE WORKS PROJECT 
AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE MOLOTOV 
AUTOMOBILE WORKS, NIZHNI-NOVGOROD 
Greetings to the working men and working women, 
and to the administrative, political and technical chiefs 
of the works on the occasion of the completion of the 
building and inauguration of the Giant Automobile Works! 
Hearty congratulations to the men and women shock 
brigaders of the Automobile Works Project, who bore 
the brunt of the construction work! 
Our thanks to the foreign workers, technicians and 
engineers who rendered assistance to the working class 
of the Soviet Union in building, assembling and inaugurating 
the works! 
Congratulations on your victory, comrades! 
Let us hope that the Automobile Works will succeed 
in swiftly and completely overcoming the difficulties 
of mastering and developing the process of production, 
the difficulties of fulfilling the production programme. 
Let us hope that the Automobile Works will soon 
be able to supply the country with thousands and scores 
of thousands of cars and lorries, which are as essential 
to our national economy as air and water. 
Forward to new victories! 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 2, 
January 2, 1932

TO THE CHIEF 
OF THE HARVESTER COMBINE WORKS 
PROJECT AND THE DIRECTOR 
OF THE HARVESTER COMBINE WORKS, 
SARATOV 
Greetings to the working men and working women 
and the entire executive personnel of the works! 
Hearty congratulations to the active of the works 
and, first and foremost, to the men and women shock 
brigaders, on the successful completion of the building 
and inauguration of the works! 
Comrades, the country needs harvester combines as 
much as it needs tractors and automobiles. I have no 
doubt that you will succeed in completely fulfilling the 
production programme of the works. 
Forward to new victories! 
J. Stalin 
January 4, 1932 
Pravda, No. 5, 
January 5, 1932

REPLY TO OLEKHNOVICH AND ARISTOV 
With Reference to the Letter ³Some Questions Concerning 
the History of Bolshevism² Addressed to the Editorial 
Board of the Magazine ³Proletarskaya Revolutsia² 
To Comrade Olekhnovich 
I received your letter. I am late in replying owing 
to pressure of work. 
I cannot possibly agree with you, Comrade Olekhnovich, 
and the reason is as follows. 
1. It is not true that ³Trotskyism was never a faction 
of communism.² Since the Trotskyists broke organisationally‹
even if temporarily‹with Menshevism, put 
aside‹even if temporarily‹their anti-Bolshevik views, 
were admitted to the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (Bolsheviks) and the Comintern and submitted 
to the decisions of these bodies, Trotskyism was undoubtedly 
a part, a faction, of communism. 
Trotskyism was a faction of communism both in the 
broad sense of the word, i.e., as a part of the world communist 
movement while retaining its individuality as 
a group, and in the narrow sense of the word, i.e., as a 
more or less organised faction within the C.P.S.U.(B.), 
fighting for influence in the Party. It would be ridiculous 
to deny the generally known facts about the Trotskyists 
as a faction of the C.P.S.U.(B.) that are record

REPLY TO OLEKHNOVICH AND ARISTOV 129 
ed in resolutions of C.P.S.U.(B.) congresses and conferences. 
The C.P.S.U.(B.) does not tolerate factions and cannot 
agree to legalise them? Yes, that is so; it does not 
tolerate them and cannot agree to legalise them. But 
this does not mean that the Trotskyists did not really 
constitute a faction. Precisely because the Trotskyists 
actually did have a faction of their own, which they 
fought to have legalised, precisely for this reason‹ 
among others‹they were later on thrown out of the 
Party. 
You are trying to score a point in reply by an attempt 
to draw a distinction between Trotskyism and 
the Trotskyists, on the supposition that what applies 
to Trotskyism cannot apply to the Trotskyists. In other 
words, you mean to say that Trotskyism was never a 
faction of communism, but that Trotsky and the Trotskyists 
were a faction of communism. That is scholasticism 
and self-deception, Comrade Olekhnovich! There 
can be no Trotskyism without exponents of it, i.e., without 
Trotskyists, just as there can be no Trotskyists 
without Trotskyism‹maybe veiled and put aside, but 
nevertheless Trotskyism‹otherwise they would cease 
to be Trotskyists. 
What was the characteristic feature of the Trotskyists 
when they were a faction of communism? It was 
that they ³permanently² wavered between Bolshevism 
and Menshevism, these vacillations reaching a 
climax at each turn made by the Party and the Comintern 
and finding vent in a factional struggle against the 
Party. What does this mean? It means that the Trotskyists 
were not real Bolsheviks, although they were in the

J. V. S T A L I N 130 
Party and submitted to its decisions, that they could 
not be called real Mensheviks either, although they frequently 
wavered to the side of Menshevism. It was this 
wavering that formed the basis of the inner-Party struggle 
between the Leninists and the Trotskyists during 
the period when the latter were in our Party (1917-27). 
And the basis of this wavering of the Trotskyists lay 
in the fact that although they put aside their anti-Bolshevik 
views and thus entered the Party, they nevertheless 
did not renounce these views. As a result these views 
made themselves felt with particular strength at each 
turn made by the Party and the Comintern. 
You evidently do not agree with this interpretation 
of the question of Trotskyism. But in that event you 
are bound to arrive at one of two incorrect conclusions. 
Either you must conclude that when they entered the 
Party Trotsky and the Trotskyists made a clean sweep 
of their views and turned into real Bolsheviks, which 
is incorrect, for on that assumption it becomes impossible 
to understand and explain the continuous inner- 
Party struggle of the Trotskyists against the Party which 
fills the entire period of their stay in the Party. Or you 
must conclude that Trotskyism (the Trotskyists) ³was 
all the time a faction of Menshevism,² which again is 
incorrect, as Lenin and Lenin's Party would have committed 
a mistake in principle had they admitted Mensheviks 
into the Communist Party even for one minute. 
2. It is not true that Trotskyism ³was all the time 
a faction of Menshevism, one variety of bourgeois 
agency in the working-class movement,² just as it is 
incorrect on your part to attempt to draw distinction between 
³the attitude of the Party to Trotskyism as the

REPLY TO OLEKHNOVICH AND ARISTOV 131 
theory and practice of a bourgeois agency in the working-
class movement² and the ³attitude of the Party at a 
definite historical period to Trotsky and the Trotskyists.² 
In the first place, as I stated above, you are making 
a mistake, a scholastic mistake, by artificially separating 
Trotskyism from the Trotskyists and, conversely, 
the Trotskyists from Trotskyism. The history of our 
Party tells us that such a separation, in so far as some 
section or other of the Party did make it, was 
always and entirely to the advantage of Trotskyism, 
making it easier for the latter to cover up its traces when 
launching attacks against the Party. I may tell you 
confidentially that you are performing a very great service 
to Trotsky and the Trotskyist smugglers by introducing 
into our general political practice the method of 
artificially separating the question of Trotskyism from 
the question of the Trotskyists. 
In the second place, having made this mistake you 
are compelled to make another that follows from the first, 
namely the assumption that ³at a definite historical 
period² the Party regarded Trotsky and the Trotskyists 
as real Bolsheviks. But this assumption is quite wrong 
and altogether incompatible with the historical facts of 
the inner-Party struggle between the Trotskyists and 
the Leninists. How are we to explain in that case the 
unceasing struggle between the Party and the Trotskyists 
throughout the period in which they were in the 
Party? Are you not supposing that it was a squabble and 
not a fight based on principle? 
So you see that your ³correction² to my ³letter to the 
editorial board of Proletarskaya Revolutsia² leads to an 
absurdity

J. V. S T A L I N 132 
As a matter of fact Trotskyism was a faction of 
Menshevism until the Trotskyists entered our Party; it 
became temporarily a faction of communism after the 
Trotskyists entered our Party, and it became once more 
a faction of Menshevism after the Trotskyists were 
driven out of our Party. ³The dog returned to his vomit.²
Hence: 
a) it cannot be asserted that ³at a definite historical 
period² the Party considered Trotsky and the 
Trotskyists real Bolsheviks, for such a supposition 
would flatly contradict the facts of the history of our 
Party during the period 1917-27; 
b) i t cannot be considered that Trotskyism (the 
Trotskyists) ³was all the time a faction of Menshevism,² 
for such a supposition would lead to the conclusion 
that in 1917-27 our Party was a bloc between the Bolsheviks 
and the Mensheviks and not a monolithic Bolshevik 
party, which is quite wrong and at variance 
with the fundamentals of Bolshevism; 
c) the question of Trotskyism cannot be artificially 
separated from the question of the Trotskyists without 
one running the risk of becoming involuntarily an instrument 
of Trotskyist machinations. 
What conclusion then remains? This one thing: to 
agree that ³at a definite historical period² Trotskyism 
was a faction of communism, a faction which wavered 
between Bolshevism and Menshevism. 
J. Stalin 
January 15, 1932

REPLY TO OLEKHNOVICH AND ARISTOV 133 
To Comrade Aristov 
You are under a misapprehension, Comrade Aristov. 
There is no contradiction between the article ³The 
October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian 
Communists²31 (1924) and the ³Letter to the Editorial 
Board of Proletarskaya Revolutsia² (1931). These two 
documents concern different aspects of the question, 
and this has seemed to you to be a ³contradiction.² 
But there is no ³contradiction² here. 
The article ³The October Revolution² states that 
in 1905 it was not Rosa Luxemburg, but Parvus and 
Trotsky who advanced the theory of ³permanent² revolution 
against Lenin. This fully corresponds to historical 
fact. It was Parvus who in 1905 came to Russia 
and edited a special newspaper in which he actively 
came out in favour of ³permanent² revolution against 
Leninıs ³conception,² it was Parvus and then, after 
and together with him, Trotsky‹it was this pair that 
at the time bombarded Leninıs plan of revolution, 
counterposing to it the theory of ³permanent² revolution. 
As for Rosa Luxemburg, she kept behind the scenes 
in those days, abstained from active struggle against 
Lenin in this matter, evidently preferring not to become 
involved as yet in the struggle. 
In the polemic against Radek contained in the article 
³The October Revolution and the Tactics of the 
Russian Communists,² I focussed attention on Parvus 
because when Radek spoke about the year 1905 and ³permanent² 
revolution, he purposely kept silent about 
Parvus. He kept silent about Parvus because after

J. V. S T A L I N 134 
1905 Parvus had become an odious figure. He became 
a millionaire and turned into a direct agent of the German 
imperialists. Radek was averse to having the theory 
of ³permanent² revolution linked up with the obnoxious 
name of Parvus; he wanted to dodge the facts of 
history. But I stepped in and frustrated Radekıs manoeuvre 
by establishing the historical truth and giving 
Parvus his due. 
That is how the matter stands with regard to the 
article ³The October Revolution and the Tactics of 
the Russian Communists.² 
As for the ³Letter to the Editorial Board of Proletarskaya 
Revolutsia,² that treats of another aspect of 
the question, namely, the fact that the theory of ³permanent² 
revolution was invented by Rosa Luxemburg 
and Parvus. This, too, corresponds to historical fact. 
It was not Trotsky but Rosa Luxemburg and Parvus 
who invented the theory of ³permanent² revolution. 
It was not Rosa Luxemburg but Parvus and Trotsky 
who in 1905 advanced the theory of ³permanent² revolution 
and actively fought for it against Lenin. 
Subsequently Rosa Luxemburg, too, began to fight 
actively against the Leninist plan of revolution. But 
that was after 1905. 
J. Stalin 
January 25, 1932 
Bolshevik, No. 16 
August 30, 1932

MAGNITOGORSK IRON AND STEEL 
WORKS PROJECT, MAGNITOGORSK 
Telegraphic news has been received of the completion 
of the inauguration period and full operation of 
the first giant blast furnace in the U.S.S.R., producing 
daily over a thousand tons of foundry pig iron, equivalent 
to a daily output of about twelve hundred tons 
of pig iron for conversion into steel. 
I congratulate the workers and the administrative 
and technical personnel of the Magnitogorsk Iron and 
Steel Works on their successful fulfilment of the first 
part of the worksı programme. 
I congratulate them on mastering the technique of 
this unique gigantic blast furnace, the first in Europe. 
Greetings to the men and women shock brigaders 
of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works, who under 
the adverse conditions of winter fought and overcame 
the difficulties of inaugurating the blast furnace and 
putting it into full operation and who are readily taking 
upon themselves the brunt of the work of building 
the plant! 
I have no doubt that the Magnitogorsk workers 
will likewise successfully fulfil the main part of the 
1932 programme, will build three more blast furnaces, 
open-hearth furnaces and rolling machinery, and will 
thus fulfil with honour their duty to their country. 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 89, 
March 30, 1932

REPLY TO THE LETTER 
OF Mr. RICHARDSON,32 REPRESENTATIVE 
OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS 
NEWS AGENCY 
To Mr. Richardson 
This is not the first time that false rumours that 
I am ill are circulating in the bourgeois press. Obviously, 
there are people to whose interest it is that I should 
fall ill seriously and for a long time, if not worse. Perhaps 
it is not very tactful of me, but unfortunately I 
have no data capable of gratifying these gentlemen. 
Sad though it may be, nothing will avail against facts, 
viz., that I am in perfect health. As for Mr. Zondeck, 
he can attend to the health of other comrades, which 
is why he has been invited to come to the U.S.S.R. 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 93, 
April 3, 1932

THE IMPORTANCE AND TASKS 
OF THE COMPLAINTS BUREAUS 
The work of the Complaints Bureaus33 is of tremendous 
importance in the struggle to remove shortcomings 
in our Party, Soviet, economic, trade-union and Komsomol 
apparatuses, in improving our administrative 
apparatus. 
Lenin said that without an apparatus we should have 
perished long ago, and that without a systematic, stubborn 
struggle to improve the apparatus we should certainly 
perish. This means that resolute and systematic 
struggle against conservatism, bureaucracy and red 
tape in our apparatus is an essential task of the Party, 
the working class and all the working people of our 
country. 
The tremendous importance of the Complaints Bureaus 
consists in their being a serious means of carrying 
out Leninıs behest concerning the struggle to improve 
the apparatus. 
It is indisputable that the Complaints Bureaus have 
considerable achievements to their credit in this field. 
The task is to consolidate the results attained and to 
achieve decisive successes in this matter. There can be

J. V. S T A L I N 138 
no doubt that if the Complaints Bureaus rally around 
them all the more active sections of the workers and 
collective farmers, drawing them into the work of administering 
the state and attentively heeding the voice 
of the working people both within and without the 
Party, these decisive successes will be won. 
Let us hope that the five-day review of the work 
of the Complaints Bureaus will serve as a stimulus for 
further expansion of their work along the line indicated 
by our teacher Lenin. 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 97, 
April 7, 1932

REPLIES TO THE QUESTIONS 
OF RALPH V. BARNES 
May 3, 1932 
1st Question: Certain circles in America are intensely 
discussing at the present time the possibility of 
sending to Moscow an unofficial American trade representative, 
accompanied by a staff of specialists, for promoting 
the establishment of closer trade connections 
between the United States and the U.S.S.R. What would 
be the attitude of the Soviet Government to such a 
proposal? 
Stalin: In general, the U.S.S.R. gladly receives 
trade representatives and specialists of countries which 
maintain normal relations with it. As regards the U.S.A., 
I believe the Soviet Government would look favourably 
upon such an undertaking. 
2nd Question: If certain of the obstacles existing 
on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean to an expansion 
of Soviet-American trade were removed, what would 
be the approximate volume of orders that the U.S.S.R. 
would be in a position to place in the United States? 
Stalin: It is difficult to name a figure in advance 
without the risk of making a mistake. In any event 
the growing requirements of the U.S.S.R. and the vast 
possibilities of the industry of the U.S.A. fully warrant

J. V. S T A L I N 140 
the belief that the volume of orders would increase several 
times over. 
3rd Question: Certain responsible circles in the U.S.A. 
are under the quite definite impression that obvious similarity 
has been revealed in the reaction of the Soviet 
and the American Governments to events in the Far 
East during the last seven months, and that in general 
as a consequence of this the divergence in policy between 
the Soviets and America has become less than hitherto. 
What is your opinion in this regard? 
Stalin: It is impossible to say anything definite, since 
unfortunately it is very difficult to grasp the essentials 
of the Far Eastern policy of the U.S.A. As far as 
the Soviet Union is concerned, it has adhered, and will 
continue to adhere, to a firm policy of maintaining peace 
both with Japan and with Manchuria and China as a 
whole. 
4th Question: There is a great difference between 
your country and mine, but there is also obvious similarity. 
Each occupies a vast territory in which there are 
no such obstacles to trade as tariff barriers. Stupid traditions, 
of course, interfere less with economic activity 
in the U.S.S.R. and the United States than in other 
first-rate powers. The process of industrialisation in 
the U.S.S.R. is more like the same process in the United 
States than that in other West-European Powers. In my 
preceding question I already indicated that in some cases 
policy in Moscow and Washington is not so much at 
variance as might have been expected. Lastly, there is 
undoubtedly a deep friendly feeling between the American 
and Soviet peoples despite all the obvious difference 
between them. In view of these facts, would it not be

REPLIES TO THE QUESTIONS OF RALPH V. BARNES 141 
possible to inspire the conviction in the minds of both 
peoples that no armed clash between the two countries 
should ever under any circumstances be allowed to occur? 
Stalin: There can be nothing easier than to convince 
the peoples of both countries of the harm and criminal 
character of mutual extermination. But, unfortunately, 
questions of war and peace are not always decided by the 
peoples. I have no doubt that the masses of the people 
of the U.S.A. did not want war with the peoples of the 
U.S.S.R. in 1918-19. This, however, did not prevent 
the U.S.A. Government from attacking the U.S.S.R. 
in 1918 (in conjunction with Japan, Britain and 
France) and from continuing its military intervention 
against the U.S.S.R. right up to 1919. As for the 
U.S.S.R., proof is hardly required to show that what 
its peoples as well as its government want is that ³no 
armed clash between the two countries should ever under 
any circumstances² be able to occur. 
5th Question: Contradictory reports have been spread 
in America concerning the real nature of the Second 
Five-Year Plan. Is it true that between January 1, 1933, 
and the end of 1937 the daily needs of the Soviet population 
will be satisfied to a greater extent than hitherto? 
In other words, will light industry really develop to a 
greater extent than before? 
Stalin: Yes, light industry will develop to a much 
greater extent than before. 
Published for the first time

KUZNETSK IRON AND STEEL WORKS 
PROJECT, KUZNETSK 
Greetings to the men and women shock brigaders, 
the technical personnel and the entire executive staff 
of the Kuznetsk Works, who have achieved a high output 
of pig iron at Blast Furnace No. 1 and who have displayed 
Bolshevik tempo in mastering the most modern 
technology. 
I am confident that the personnel of the Kuznetsk Iron 
and Steel Works Project will improve on the successes they 
have achieved, operate Blast Furnace No. 2 with no less 
success, complete the building of the open-hearth furnaces 
and the rolling mill within the next few months and 
will also complete and put into operation this 
third and fourth blast furnaces. 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 97, 
May 24, 1932

GREETING TO THE SEVENTH 
ALL-UNION CONFERENCE 
OF THE ALL-UNION LENINIST 
YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE34 
Greetings to the Leninist Young Communist League 
fighters, to the delegates, young men and women, of the 
Leagueıs Seventh All-Union Conference! 
I wish you success in the communist education and 
organisation of the vast masses of the working-class and 
peasant youth! 
Hold high the banner of Leninist internationalism, work 
for peace and friendship among the peoples, strengthen 
the defence of our country against capitalist invasion, 
shatter the old world of slavery and exploitation, build 
and consolidate the new world of emancipated labour and 
communism, learn in all your work to combine powerful 
revolutionary enthusiasm with the sustained efficiency 
of Bolshevik builders, be worthy sons and daughters of 
our mother, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union! 
Long live the Y.C.L. generation! 
J. Stalin 
July 8, 1932 
Pravda, No. 188, 
July 9, 1932

CONGRATULATIONS TO MAXIM GORKY35 
Dear Alexei Maximovich, 
I congratulate you from the bottom of my heart and 
firmly clasp your hand. I wish you many years of life 
and labour, to the joy of all the working people and the 
terror of the enemies of the working class. 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 266, 
September 25, 1932

TO THE BUILDERS OF THE DNIEPER 
HYDRO-ELECTRIC POWER STATION 
Unfortunately I shall be unable to comply with your 
request to attend the inauguration of the Dnieper Power 
Station as my work makes it impossible for me to leave 
Moscow. 
Hearty greetings and congratulations to the workers 
and the executive personnel of the Dnieper Power Station 
on the successful completion of this great historic work 
of construction. 
I firmly shake the hands of the Dnieper Power 
Station shock brigaders, the glorious heroes of socialist 
construction. 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 281, 
October 10, 1932

GREETINGS TO LENINGRAD 
Greetings to Bolshevik Leningrad, the cradle of 
Soviet power, on the fifteenth anniversary of the birth 
of the power of the Soviets! 
Long live the Leningrad workers, the first to raise 
the banner of the October uprising against capitalism, 
who smashed the power of the capitalists and established 
the power of the workers and peasants‹the dictatorship 
of the proletariat! 
Forward to new victories, comrades of Leningrad! 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 309, 
November 7, 1932

LETTER TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD 
OF THE NEWSPAPER PRAVDA 
My sincere thanks to the organisations, institutions, 
comrades and friends who have expressed their condolences 
on the occasion of the passing away of my beloved 
friend and comrade, Nadezhda Sergeyevna Alliluyeva- 
Stalina. 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 318, 
November 18, 1932

MR. CAMPBELL STRETCHES THE TRUTH 
A book in English entitled Russia‹Market or Menace?, 
written by Mr. Campbell, a well-known figure in 
the agricultural world, who had visited the U.S.S.R., 
recently made its appearance in America. In this book 
Mr. Campbell, among other things, gives an account 
of what he calls an ³interview² with Stalin that took 
place in Moscow in January 1929. This ³interview² 
is remarkable for the fact that its every sentence is either 
pure fiction or a sensational piece of trickery 
with the aim of gaining publicity for the book and its 
author. 
It will not be amiss, in my opinion, to say a few 
words in order to expose these fictitious statements. 
Mr. Campbell is obviously drawing on his imagination 
when he says that his talk with Stalin, which began 
at 1 p.m., ³lasted until well after dark, in fact, 
until dawn.² Actually, the talk did not last more 
than two hours. Mr. Campbellıs imagination is truly 
American. 
Mr. Campbell is stretching the truth when he asserts 
that Stalin ³took my hand in both of his and 
said: Œwe can be friends.ı² As a matter of fact, 
nothing of the kind happened or could have happened.

MR. CAMPBELL STRETCHES THE TRUTH 149 
Mr. Campbell cannot but know that Stalin has no need 
of ³friends² of the Campbell type. 
Mr. Campbell again stretches the truth when he 
says that on sending him a record of the talk, I added 
the postscript: ³Keep this record, it may be a very historical 
document some day.² As a matter of fact the 
record was sent to Mr. Campbell by the translator Yarotsky 
without any postscript at all. Mr. Campbellıs 
desire to make capital out of Stalin obviously betrays 
him. 
Mr. Campbell still further stretches the truth when he 
puts such words into the mouth of Stalin as that ³under 
Trotsky there had been an attempt to spread communism 
throughout the world; that this was the primary cause 
of the break between himself [i.e., Stalin] and Trotsky; 
that Trotsky believed in universal communism, while 
he [Stalin] worked to confine his efforts to his own 
country.² Only people who have deserted to the camp of 
the Kautskys and the Welses can believe such stuff 
and nonsense, in which the facts are turned upsidedown. 
As a matter of fact, the talk with Campbell had 
no bearing on the Trotsky question and Trotskyıs name 
was not mentioned at all in the course of it. 
And so on in the same strain. . . . 
Mr. Campbell mentioned in his book the record of 
his talk with Stalin but he did not find it necessary 
to publish it in his book. Why? Was it not because 
publication of the record would have upset Mr. Campbellıs 
plan to utilise the sensational fables about the 
³interview² with Stalin in order to gain publicity 
for Campbellıs book among the American philistines?

J. V. S T A L I N 150 
I think the best punishment for the lying Mr., 
Campbell would be to publish the record of the talk 
between Mr. Campbell and Stalin. This would be the 
surest means of exposing his lies and establishing the 
facts. 
J. Stalin 
November 23, 1932 
RECORD OF THE TALK WITH MR. CAMPBELL 
January 28, 1929 
After an exchange of preliminary phrases Mr. Campbell 
explained his desire to pay a visit to Comrade Stalin. 
He pointed out that although he was in the U.S.S.R. 
in a private capacity, he had, before leaving the United 
States, seen Coolidge and also Hoover, the newly elected 
President, and received their full approval of his trip 
to Russia. His stay here showed him the amazing activity 
of the nation that has remained an enigma to the whole 
world. He particularly liked the projects for the development 
of agriculture. He knew of the existence of many 
wrong notions about Russia, but had himself been in the 
Kremlin, for instance, and had seen the work being done 
to preserve memorials of art and in general to raise the 
level of cultural life. He was particularly struck by the 
solicitude for working men and working women. It 
seemed to him an interesting coincidence that before 
his departure from the United States he was invited 
by the President, and saw Coolidgeıs son and wife 
while yesterday he was the guest of Mikhail Kalinin,

MR. CAMPBELL STRETCHES THE TRUTH 151 
President of the U.S.S.R., who impressed him tremendously. 
Comrade Stalin: With regard to our plans of agricultural 
and industrial development, as well as our concern 
for the development of cultural life, we are still at the 
very beginning of our work. In the building up of industry 
we have done very little as yet. Still less has 
been done in carrying out the plans for agricultural reconstruction. 
We must not forget that our country was 
exceedingly backward and that this backwardness is 
still a great handicap. 
The difference between the former and the new leading 
figures in Russia consists, among other things, in 
the fact that the old ones considered the countryıs backwardness 
one of its good points, regarding it as a ³national 
characteristic,² a matter for ³national pride,² whereas 
the new people, the Soviet people, combat it as an evil that 
must be rooted out. Herein lies the guarantee of our 
success. 
We know that we are not free from mistakes. But we 
do not fear criticism, are not afraid to face the difficulties 
and admit our mistakes. We shall accept correct 
criticism and welcome it. We watch developments in the 
U.S.A., for that country ranks high in science and technology. 
We would like scientific and technical people 
in America to be our teachers in the sphere of technique, 
and we their pupils. 
Every period in the development of a nation is marked 
by a passion of its own. In Russia we now witness a 
passion for construction. This is her preponderating feature 
today. This explains the construction fever that we 
are experiencing at present. It is reminiscent of the pe

J. V. S T A L I N 152 
riod that the U.S.A. went through after the Civil War.36 
This affords a basis and an opportunity for technical, industrial 
and commercial co-operation with the U.S.A. 
I do not know what still needs to be done to secure contact 
with American industry. Could you not explain 
what now prevents such a rapprochement from being 
realised, if it is established that such contact would be 
advantageous to both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A.? 
Mr. Campbell: I am certain that there is a striking 
similarity between the U.S.A. and Russia in point of 
size, resources and independence. Mr. Stalinıs reference 
to the Civil War period is correct. After the Civil War 
extraordinary expansion was witnessed. The people in 
the U.S.A. are interested in Russia. I am sure that Russia 
is too big a country not to be a big factor in world relations. 
The people at the head of the Russian Government 
have grand opportunities to accomplish great things. 
All that is needed for this is clarity of judgment and the 
ability to be fair at all times. 
I see the advantage of proper business contact and 
I am maintaining close connection with the government, 
although I am a private citizen. I am carrying on this 
conversation as a private person. Once I have been asked 
what hinders contact between the U.S.A. and Russia 
I want to answer with the utmost frankness and courage, 
with due respect for Mr. Stalin and without giving offence. 
He is very objective-minded and this allows me 
to converse with him as man to man for the benefit of 
both countries and absolutely confidentially. If we could 
have official recognition everybody would be anxious 
to get here to do business on a credit or other basis, as 
is being done everywhere. A reason why American firms

MR. CAMPBELL STRETCHES THE TRUTH 153 
hesitate to do business and grant long-term credits is 
the fact that our Washington Government does not recognise 
your Government. 
The main reason for this, however, is not simply 
failure in the matter of recognition. The main reason, 
we assume (and this may be taken as certain), is that 
representatives of your Government in our country are 
trying all the time to sow discontent and spread the ideas 
of Soviet power. 
We have in our country what is called the ³Monroe 
Doctrine,² which signifies that we do not want to interfere 
in the affairs of any other country in the world, 
that we confine ourselves strictly to our own affairs. 
For that reason we do not want any country whatever‹ 
Britain, France, Germany, Russia or any other‹to interfere 
in our private affairs. 
Russia is so vast a country that she can by herself 
fulfil everything that her whole people decide to do. 
Russia has resources of her own of every kind, and although 
it will take more time the Russians in the long 
run will be able to develop their resources independently. 
It gives us pleasure to feel that in many respects 
we are an ideal for the Russian people, and I believe 
we can be very useful to that people, particularly in 
economising time. Since we have solved many economic 
problems and our methods are copied by many countries 
besides Russia, such enterprises as the building of state 
farms imply a strengthening of trade connections, and 
in the final analysis trade connections will be followed 
by diplomatic recognition on some equitable basis. 
The only way for nations, as for individuals, is to speak

J. V. S T A L I N 154 
out frankly without discourtesy, and then the time will 
soon come for some kind of agreement. The better our 
upbringing the greater our conviction that more can be 
achieved by reason than by any other means. Great nations 
can differ in opinion without straining relations 
and great men can come to an arrangement on major problems. 
They usually wind up their negotiations with a definite 
agreement in which they meet each other halfway, 
no matter how far apart their initial positions 
were. 
Comrade Stalin: I realise that diplomatic recognition 
involves difficulties for the U.S.A. at the present 
moment. Soviet Government representatives have been 
subjected to abuse by the American press so much and so 
often that an abrupt change is difficult. Personally I 
do not consider diplomatic recognition decisive at the 
moment. What is important is a development of trade 
connections on the basis of mutual advantage. Trade relations 
need to be normalised and if this matter is put 
on some legal footing it would be a first and very important 
step towards diplomatic recognition. The question 
of diplomatic recognition will find its own solution when 
both sides realise that diplomatic relations are advantageous. 
The chief basis is trade relations and their normalisation, 
which will lead to the establishment of definite 
legal norms. 
The natural resources of our country are, of course, 
rich and varied. They are richer and more varied than is 
officially known, and our research expeditions are constantly 
finding new resources in our extensive country. 
But this is only one aspect of our potentialities. The 
other aspect is the fact that our peasants and workers

MR. CAMPBELL STRETCHES THE TRUTH 155 
are now rid of their former burden, the landlords and 
capitalists. Formerly the landlords and capitalists used 
to squander unproductively what today remains within 
the country and increases its internal purchasing power. 
The increase in demand is such that our industry, in 
spite of its rapid expansion, cannot catch up with it. 
The demand is prodigious, both for personal and productive 
consumption. This is the second aspect of our unlimited 
potentialities. 
Both the one and the other give rise to an important 
basis for commercial and industrial contact with the 
U.S.A. as well as other developed countries. 
The question as to which state is to apply its forces 
to these resources and potentialities of our country is 
the object of a complicated struggle among them. Unfortunately 
the U.S.A. still stands quite aloof from this 
struggle. 
On all sides the Germans are shouting that the position 
of the Soviet Government is unstable and that 
therefore one ought not to grant any considerable credits 
to Soviet economic organisations. At the same time 
they try to monopolise trade relations with the U.S.S.R. 
by granting it credits. 
As you know, one group of British businessmen is 
also carrying on a fierce anti-Soviet campaign. At the 
same time this very group and also the McKenna group 
are endeavouring to organise credits for the U.S.S.R. 
The press has already reported that in February a delegation 
of British industrialists and bankers will come 
to the U.S.S.R. They intend to submit to the Soviet 
Government an extensive plan for trade relations and a 
loan.

J. V. S T A L I N 156 
How are we to explain this duplicity of the German 
and British businessmen? It is to be explained by their 
desire to monopolise trade relations with the U.S.S.R., 
frightening the U.S.A. away and pushing it aside. 
At the same time, it is clear to me that the U.S.A. 
has better grounds for extensive business connections 
with the U.S.S.R. than any other country. And this is 
not only because the U.S.A. is rich both in technical 
equipment and capital, but also because in no other 
country are our business people given such a cordial and 
hospitable welcome as in the U.S.A. 
As regards propaganda, I must state most emphatically 
that no representative of the Soviet Government has 
the right to interfere, either directly or indirectly, in 
the internal affairs of the country in which he happens 
to be. In this respect the most strict and definite instructions 
have been given to all our personnel employed 
in Soviet institutions in the U.S.A. I am certain that 
Bron and the members of his staff do not have the slightest 
connection with propaganda in any form whatsoever. 
Should any of our employees violate these strict directives 
as regards non-interference he would immediately 
be recalled and punished. Naturally we cannot answer 
for the actions of persons not known and not subordinate 
to us. But we can assume responsibility as regards interference 
by persons employed in our institutions 
abroad, and we can give the maximum guarantees on 
that score. 
Mr. Campbell: May I tell that to Mr. Hoover? 
Comrade Stalin: Of course. 
Mr. Campbell: We do not know who those people 
are that sow discontent. But there are such people. The

MR. CAMPBELL STRETCHES THE TRUTH 157 
police find them and their literature. I know Bron and 
am convinced that he is an honest, straightforward gentleman, 
who does business honestly. But there is somebody. 
Comrade Stalin: It is possible that propaganda in 
favour of Soviets is being carried on in the U.S.A. by 
members of the American Communist Party. But that 
party is legal in the U.S.A., i t legally participates 
in Presidential elections and nominates i t s candidates 
for President, and it is quite clear that we cannot 
be interfering in your internal affairs in this case 
either. 
Mr. Campbell: I have no further questions. But yes, 
I have. When I return to the United States businessmen 
will ask me whether it is safe to do business with the 
U.S.S.R. Engineering concerns in particular will be interested 
in the possibility of granting long-term credits. 
Can I answer in the affirmative? Can I obtain information 
on the measures now being taken by the Soviet Government 
to guarantee credit transactions; is there any special 
tax or other specific source of revenue set aside 
for this purpose? 
Comrade Stalin: I would prefer not to sing the praises 
of my country. But now that the question has been 
put I must reply as follows: There has not been a single 
instance of the Soviet Government or a Soviet economic 
institution failing to make payment correctly and on 
time on credits, whether short-term or long-term. Inquiries 
could be made in Germany on how we meet payments 
to the Germans on their credit of three hundred millions. 
Where do we get the means to effect payment? Mr. Campbell 
knows that money does not drop from the sky. Our

J. V. S T A L I N 158 
agriculture, industry, trade, timber, oil, gold, platinum, 
etc.‹such is the source of our payments. Therein lies 
the guarantee of our payments. I do not want Mr. Campbell 
to take my word for it. He can check my statements 
in Germany, for example. He will find that not 
once was payment postponed, although at times we 
actually had to pay such unheard-of interest rates as 
15-20%. 
As far as special guarantees are concerned, I believe 
there is no need to speak of this seriously in the case 
of the U.S.S.R. 
Mr. Campbell: Of course not. 
Comrade Stalin: Perhaps it would not be amiss to 
tell you, strictly confidentially, about the loan, not 
credit but loan, offered by a group of British bankers‹ 
that of Balfour and Kingsley. 
Mr. Campbell: May I tell Hoover about this? 
Comrade Stalin: Of course, but donıt give it to the 
press. This group of bankers are making the following 
proposal: 
They calculate that our debts to Britain amount 
approximately to £400,000,000. 
It is proposed that they be consolidated at 25%. 
That means £100,000.000 instead of £400,000,000. 
Simultaneously a loan of £100,000,000 is proposed. 
Thus our indebtedness will amount to £200,000,000 
to be paid in instalments over a period of several decades. 
In return we are to give preference to the British engineering 
industry. This does not mean that we shall 
have to place our orders in Britain alone, but the British 
must be given preference.

MR. CAMPBELL STRETCHES THE TRUTH 159 
Mr. Campbell, in expressing his thanks for the interview, 
says that Comrade Stalin has impressed him as 
a fair, well-informed and straightforward man. He is 
very glad to have had the opportunity of speaking 
with Comrade Stalin and considers the interview 
historic. 
Comrade Stalin thanks Mr. Campbell for the talk. 
Bolshevik, No. 22, 
November 30, 1932

THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY 
OF THE OGPU 
Greetings to the officials and troops of the OGPU, 
who are honestly and courageously fulfilling their duty 
to the working class and the peasantry of the Soviet 
Union! 
I wish them success in the difficult task of eradicating 
the enemies of the dictatorship of the proletariat! 
Long live the OGPU, the bared sword of the working 
class! 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 350, 
December 20, 1932

JOINT PLENUM OF THE C.C. AND C.C.C., 
C.P.S.U.(B.) 37 
January 7-12, 1933 
Pravda, Nos. 10 and 17, 
January 10 and 17, 1933


THE RESULTS 
OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 
Report Delivered on January 7, 1933 
I 
THE INTERNATIONAL SIGNIFICANCE 
OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN 
Comrades, when the five-year plan was published, people 
hardly anticipated that it could be of tremendous 
international significance. On the contrary, many thought 
that the five-year plan was a private affair of the 
Soviet Union‹an important and serious affair, but nevertheless 
a private, national affair of the Soviet Union. 
History has shown, however, that the international 
significance of the five-year plan is immeasurable. History 
has shown that the five-year plan is not the private 
affair of the Soviet Union, but the concern of the whole 
international proletariat. 
Long before the five-year plan appeared on the scene, 
in the period when we were finishing our struggle against 
the interventionists and were going over to the work 
of economic construction‹even in that period Lenin 
said that our economic construction was of profound international 
significance; that every step forward taken 
by the Soviet Government along the path of economic 
construction was finding a powerful response among the 
most varied strata in capitalist countries and dividing

J. V. S T A L I N 164 
people into two camps‹the camp of the supporters of 
the proletarian revolution and the camp of its opponents. 
Lenin said at that time: 
³At the present time we are exercising our main influence on 
the international revolution by our economic policy. All eyes 
are turned on the Soviet Russian Republic, the eyes of all toilers 
in all countries of the world without exception and without exaggeration. 
This we have achieved. . . . That is the field to which 
the struggle has been transferred on a world-wide scale. If we 
solve this problem, we shall have won on an international scale 
surely and finally. That is why questions of economic construction 
assume absolutely exceptional significance for us. On this 
front we must win victory by slow, gradual‹it cannot be fast‹ 
but steady progress upward and forward² (see Vol . XXVI, 
pp. 410-1138). 
This was said at the time when we were bringing to a 
close the war against the interventionists, when we were 
passing from the military struggle against capitalism 
to the struggle on the economic front, to the period of 
economic development. 
Many years have elapsed since then, and every step 
taken by the Soviet Government in the sphere of economic 
development, every year, every quarter, has brilliantly 
confirmed Comrade Leninıs words. 
But the most brilliant confirmation of the correctness 
of Leninıs words has been provided by our five-year plan 
of construction, by the emergence of this plan, its development 
and its fulfilment. Indeed, it seems that no step 
taken along the path of economic development in our 
country has met with such a response among the most 
varied strata in the capitalist countries of Europe, America 
and Asia as the question of the five-year plan, its 
development and its fulfilment.

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 165 
At first the bourgeoisie and its press greeted the 
five-year plan with ridicule. ³Fantasy,² ³delirium,² 
³utopia²‹that is how they dubbed our five-year plan 
at that time. 
Later on, when it began to be evident that the fulfilment 
of the five-year plan was producing real results, 
they began to sound the alarm, asserting that the fiveyear 
plan was threatening the existence of the capitalist 
countries, that its fulfilment would lead to the flooding 
of European markets with goods, to intensified dumping 
and the increase of unemployment. 
Still later, when this trick used against the Soviet 
regime also failed to produce the expected results, a series 
of voyages to the U.S.S.R. was undertaken by representatives 
of all sorts of firms, organs of the press, societies 
of various kinds, etc., for the purpose of seeing 
with their own eyes what was actually going on in the 
U.S.S.R. I am not referring here to the workersı delegations, 
which, from the very first appearance of the fiveyear 
plan, have expressed their admiration of the undertakings 
and successes of the Soviet regime and manifested 
their readiness to support the working class of the 
U.S.S.R. 
From that time a cleavage began in so-called public 
opinion, in the bourgeois press, in all kinds of bourgeois 
societies, etc. Some maintained that the fiveyear 
plan had utterly failed and that the Bolsheviks 
were on the verge of collapse. Others, on the contrary, 
declared that although the Bolsheviks were bad 
people, their five-year plan was nevertheless going 
well and in all probability they would achieve their 
object.

J. V. S T A L I N 166 
It will not be superfluous, perhaps, to quote the 
opinions of various bourgeois press organs. 
Take, for example, an American newspaper, The New 
York Times.39 At the end of November 1932 this newspaper 
wrote: 
³A five-year industrial plan which sets out to defy the sense 
of proportion, which drives towards an objective Œregardless of 
cost,ı as Moscow has often proudly boasted, is really not a plan. 
It is a gamble.² 
So it seems that the five-year plan is not even a plan, 
but a sheer gamble. 
And here is the opinion of a British bourgeois newspaper, 
The Daily Telegraph,40 expressed at the end of 
November 1932: 
³As a practical test of Œplanned economicsı the scheme has 
quite clearly failed.² 
The opinion of The New York Times in November 1932: 
³The collectivisation campaign is of course a ghastly 
failure. It has brought Russia to the verge of famine.² 
The opinion of a bourgeois newspaper in Poland, 
Gazeta Polska,41 in the summer of 1932: 
³The situation seems to show that in its policy of collectivising 
the countryside the government of the Soviets has reached 
an impasse.² 
The opinion of a British bourgeois newspaper, The 
Financial Times,42 in November 1932: 
³Stalin and his party, as the outcome of their policy, find 
themselves faced with the breakdown of the five-year plan system 
and frustration of the aims it was expected to achieve.²

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 167 
The opinion of the Italian magazine Politica43: 
³It would be absurd to think that nothing has been created 
in four yearsı work by a nation consisting of a hundred and sixty 
million, in four years of super-human economic and political effort 
on the part of a regime of such strength as the Bolshevik regime 
represents. On the contrary, a great deal has been done. . . . 
Nevertheless, the catastrophe is evident‹it is a fact obvious to 
all. Friends and enemies, Bolsheviks and anti-Bolsheviks, oppositionists 
on the Right and on the Left are convinced of this.² 
Finally, the opinion of the American bourgeois magazine 
Current History44: 
³A survey of the existing posture of affairs in Russia, therefore, 
leads to the conclusion that the five-year programme has 
failed both in terms of its announced statistical objectives and 
more fundamentally in terms of certain of its underlying social 
principles.² 
Such are the opinions of one section of the bourgeois 
press. 
It is hardly worth while to criticise those who gave 
utterance to these opinions. I think it is not worth while. 
It is not worth while because these ³die-hards² belong 
to the species of mediaeval fossils to whom facts mean 
nothing, and who will persist in their opinion no matter 
how our five-year plan is fulfilled. 
Let us turn to the opinions of other press organs 
belonging to the same bourgeois camp. 
Here is the opinion of a well-known bourgeois newspaper 
in France, Le Temps,45 expressed in January 1932: 
³The U.S.S.R. has won the first round, having industrialised 
herself without the aid of foreign capital.² 
The opinion of Le Temps again, expressed in the summer 
of 1932:

J. V. S T A L I N 168 
³Communism is completing the process of reconstruction 
with enormous speed, whereas the capitalist system permits only 
of progress at a slow pace. . . . In France, where the land is infinitely 
divided up among individual property owners, it is impossible 
to mechanise agriculture; the Soviets, however, by industrialising 
agriculture, have solved the problem. . . . In the 
contest with us the Bolsheviks have proved the victors.² 
The opinion of a British bourgeois magazine, The 
Round Table46: 
³The development achieved under the five-year plan is astounding. 
The tractor plants of Kharkov and Stalingrad, the AMO 
automobile factory in Moscow, the automobile plant in Nizhni- 
Novgorod, the Dnieprostroi hydro-electric project, the mammoth 
steel plants at Magnitogorsk and Kuznetsk, the network of machine 
shops and chemical plants in the Urals‹which bid fair to become 
Russiaıs Ruhr‹these and other industrial achievements all over 
the country show that, whatever the shortcomings and difficulties, 
Russian industry, like a well-watered plant, keeps on 
gaining colour, size and strength. . . . She has laid the foundations 
for future development . . . and has strengthened prodigiously 
her fighting capacity.² 
The opinion of the British bourgeois newspaper, The 
Financial Times: 
³The progress made in machine construction cannot be doubted, 
and the celebrations of it in the press and on the platform, 
glowing as they are, are not unwarranted. It must be remembered 
that Russia, of course, produced machines and tools, but 
only of the simplest kind. True, the importation of machines 
and tools is actually increasing in absolute figures; but the proportion 
of imported machines to those of native production 
is steadily diminishing. Russia is producing today all the 
machinery essential to her metallurgical and electrical industries; 
has succeeded in creating her own automobile industry; has 
established her own tool-making industry from small precision 
instruments to the heaviest presses; and in the matter of agricultural 
machinery is independent of foreign imports. At the same

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 169 
time, the Soviet Government is taking measures to prevent the 
retardation of production in the output of such basic industries 
as iron and coal endangering the fulfilment of the plan in four 
years. The one thing certain is that the enormous plants now 
being established guarantee a very considerable increase in the 
output of the heavy industries.² 
The opinion of an Austrian bourgeois newspaper, Die 
Neue Freie Presse,47 expressed in the beginning of 1932: 
³We may curse Bolshevism, but we must understand i t . 
The five-year plan is a new huge quantity which must be taken 
into account in every economic calculation.² 
The opinion of a British capitalist, Gibson Jarvie, 
the president of the United Dominion Trust, expressed 
in October 1932: 
³Now I want it clearly understood that I am neither Communist 
nor Bolshevist, I am definitely a capitalist and an individualist. 
. . . Russia is forging ahead while all too many of our 
factories and shipyards lie idle and approximately 3,000,000 
of our people despairingly seek work. Jokes have been made about 
the five-year plan, and its failure has been predicted. You can 
take it as beyond question, that under the five-year plan much more 
has been accomplished than was ever really anticipated. . . . 
In a l l these industrial towns which I visited, a new city is 
growing up, a city on a definite plan with wide streets in the 
process of being beautified by trees and grass plots, houses of 
the most modern type, schools, hospitals, workersı clubs and the 
inevitable crèche or nursery, where the children of working mothers 
are cared for. . . . Donıt underrate the Russians or their plans and 
donıt make the mistake of believing that the Soviet Government 
must crash. . . . Russia today i s a country with a soul and 
an ideal. Russia i s a country of amazing activity. I believe 
that the Russian objective is sound. . . . And perhaps most im

J. V. S T A L I N 170 
portant of all, all these youngsters and these workers in Russia 
have one thing which i s too sadly lacking in the capitalist 
countries today, and that is‹hope!² 
The opinion of the American bourgeois magazine, 
The Nation,48 expressed in November 1932: 
³The four years of the five-year plan have witnessed 
truly remarkable developments. Russia is working with wartime 
intensity on the positive task of building the physical and 
social moulds of a new life. The face of the country is being changed 
literally beyond recognition . . . . This is true of Moscow, with 
hundreds of streets and squares paved, with new suburbs, new 
buildings, and a cordon of new factories on its outskirts, and it 
is true of smaller and less important cities. New towns have sprung 
out of the steppe, the wilderness, and the desert‹not just a few 
towns, but at least 50 of them with populations of from 50,000 
to 250,000‹all in the last four years, each constructed round an 
enterprise for the development of some natural resource. Hundreds 
of new district power stations and a handful of Œgiantsı 
like Dnieprostroi are gradually putting reality into Leninıs formula: 
ŒElectricity plus Soviets equals Socialism. . . .ı The Soviet 
Union now engages in the large-scale manufacture of an 
endless variety of articles which Russia never before produced‹ 
tractors, combines, high-grade steels, synthetic rubber, ball 
bearings, high-power diesel motors, 50,000-kilowatt turbines, 
telephone-exchange equipment, electrical mining machinery, 
aeroplanes, automobiles, lorries, bicycles, and several hundred 
types of new machines. . . . For the f i r s t time Russia 
i s mining aluminium, magnesium, apatite, iodine, potash, 
and many other valuable minerals. The guiding landmark 
on the Soviet countryside i s no longer the dome of 
a church but the grain elevator and the silo. Collectives are 
building piggeries, barns, and houses. Electricity is penetrating 
the village, and radio and newspaper have conquered it. Workers 
are learning to operate the worldıs most modern machines; 
peasant boys make and use agricultural machinery bigger 
and more complicated than ever America has seen. Russia is

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 171 
becoming Œmachine minded,ı Russia is passing quickly from the 
age of wood into an age of iron, steel, concrete and motors.² 
The opinion of a British ³Left²-reformist magazine, 
Forward,49 expressed in September 1932: 
³Nobody can fail to notice the enormous amount of building 
work that is going on. New factories, new picture-houses, new 
schools, new clubs, new big blocks of tenements, everywhere 
new buildings, many completed, others with scaffolding. 
It is difficult to convey to the mind of the British reader 
exactly what has been done, and what is being done. It 
has to be seen to be believed. Our own wartime efforts are 
flea-bites to what has been done in Russia. Americans admit 
that even in the greatest rush days in the West there could have 
been nothing like the feverish building activity that is going 
on in Russia today. One sees so many changes in the Russian 
scene after two years that one gives up trying to imagine what 
Russia will be like in another 10 years. . . . So dismiss from 
your heads the fantastic scare stories of the British press 
that lies so persistently, so contemptibly about Russia, and 
all the half truths and misconceptions that are circulated 
by the dilettante intelligentsia that look at Russia patronisingly 
through middle-class spectacles without having 
the slightest understanding of what is going on. . . . Russia 
is building up a new society on what are, generally speaking, 
fundamentally sound lines. To do this i t is taking risks, i t is 
working enthusiastically with an energy that has never been seen 
in the world before, it has tremendous difficulties inseparable 
from this attempt to build up socialism in a vast, undeveloped 
country isolated from the rest of the world. But the impression 
I have, after seeing it again after two years, is that of a nation 
making solid progress, planning, creating, constructing in a way 
that is striking challenge to the hostile capitalist world.² 
Such are the discordant voices and the cleavage in 
the camp of bourgeois circles, of whom some stand for 
the annihilation of the U.S.S.R. with its allegedly bank

J. V. S T A L I N 172 
rupt five-year plan, while others, apparently, stand for 
commercial co-operation with the U.S.S.R., obviously 
calculating that they can obtain some advantage for 
themselves out of the success of the five-year plan. 
The question of the attitude of the working class 
in capitalist countries towards the five-year plan, towards 
the successes of socialist construction in the 
U.S.S.R., is in a category by itself. It may be sufficient 
to quote here the opinion of just one of the numerous 
workersı delegations that come to the U.S.S.R. every 
year, for example, that of a Belgian workersı delegation. 
The opinion of this delegation is typical of that of all 
workersı delegations without exception, whether they 
be British or French, German or American, or delegations 
of other countries. Here it is: 
³We are struck with admiration at the tremendous amount 
of construction that we have witnessed during our travels. In 
Moscow, as well as in Makeyevka, Gorlovka, Kharkov, an 
Leningrad, we could see for ourselves with what enthusiasm the 
work is carried on there. All the machines are the most up-todate 
models. The factories are clean, well ventilated and well 
l i t . We saw how medical assistance and hygienic conditions 
are provided for the workers in the U.S.S.R. The workersı 
houses are built near the factories. Schools and crèches 
are organised in the workersı towns, and the children are 
surrounded with every care. We could see the difference between 
the old and the newly constructed factories, between the 
old and the new houses. All that we have seen has given us a clear 
idea of the tremendous strength of the working people who are 
building a new society under the leadership of the Communist 
Party. In the U.S.S.R. we have observed a great cultural revival, 
while in other countries there is decadence in all spheres, and 
unemployment reigns. We were able to see the frightful difficulties 
the working people of the Soviet Union encounter on their

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
173 
path. We can therefore appreciate all the more the pride with 
which they point to their victories. We are convinced that they 
will overcome all obstacles.² 
There you have the international significance of 
the five-year plan. It was enough for us to carry on construction 
work for a matter of two or three years, it 
was enough for us to show the first successes of the fiveyear 
plan, for the whole world to be split into two camps 
‹the camp of those who never tire of snarling at us, 
and the camp of those who are amazed at the successes 
of the five-year plan, apart from the fact that we have 
all over the world our own camp, which is growing stronger‹
the camp of the working class in the capitalist 
countries, which rejoices at the successes of the working 
class in the U.S.S.R. and is prepared to support it, to 
the alarm of the bourgeoisie of the whole world. 
What does this mean? 
It means that there can be no doubt about the international 
significance of the five-year plan, about the 
international significance of its successes and achievements. 
It means that the capitalist countries are pregnant 
with the proletarian revolution, and that precisely because 
they are pregnant with the proletarian revolution, 
the bourgeoisie would like to find in a failure of the fiveyear 
plan a fresh argument against revolution; whereas 
the proletariat, on the other hand, is striving to find, 
and indeed does find, in the successes of the five-year 
plan a fresh argument in favour of revolution and against 
the bourgeoisie of the whole world. 
The successes of the five-year plan are mobilising 
the revolutionary forces of the working class of all 
THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN

J. V. S T A L I N 174 
countries against capitalism‹such is the indisputable 
fact. 
There can be no doubt that the international revolutionary 
significance of the five-year plan is really immeasurable. 
All the more attention, therefore, must we devote 
to the question of the five-year plan, of the content of 
the five-year plan, of the fundamental tasks of the fiveyear 
plan. 
All the more carefully, therefore, must we analyse 
the results of the five-year plan, the results of the carrying 
out and fulfilment of the five-year plan. 
II 
THE FUNDAMENTAL TASK OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN 
AND THE WAY TO ITS FULFILMENT 
We pass to the question of the essence of the five-year 
plan. 
What is the five-year plan? 
What was the fundamental task of the five-year plan? 
The fundamental task of the five-year plan was to 
transfer our country, with its backward, and in part 
medieval, technology, on to the lines of new, modern 
technology. 
The fundamental task of the five-year plan was to 
convert the U.S.S.R. from an agrarian and weak country, 
dependent upon the caprices of the capitalist countries, 
into an industrial and powerful country, fully self-reliant 
and independent of the caprices of world capitalism. 
The fundamental task of the five-year plan was, in 
converting the U.S.S.R. into an industrial country, to

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 175 
completely oust the capitalist elements, to widen the front 
of socialist forms of economy, and to create the economic 
basis for the abolition of classes in the U.S.S.R., for 
the building of a socialist society. 
The fundamental task of the five-year plan was to 
create in our country an industry that would be capable 
of re-equipping and reorganising, not only industry as 
a whole, but also transport and agriculture‹on the basis 
of socialism. 
The fundamental task of the five-year plan was to 
transfer small and scattered agriculture on to the lines 
of large-scale collective farming, so as to ensure the economic 
basis of socialism in the countryside and thus to 
eliminate the possibility of the restoration of capitalism 
in the U.S.S.R. 
Finally, the task of the five-year plan was to create 
all the necessary technical and economic prerequisites 
for increasing to the utmost the defence capacity of the 
country, enabling it to organise determined resistance 
to any attempt at military intervention from abroad, to 
any attempt at military attack from abroad. 
What dictated this fundamental task of the five-year 
plan; what were the grounds for it? 
The necessity of putting an end to the technical 
and economic backwardness of the Soviet Union, which 
doomed it to an unenviable existence; the necessity 
of creating in the country the prerequisites that would 
enable it not only to overtake but in time to outstrip, 
technically and economically, the advanced capitalist 
countries. 
Consideration of the fact that the Soviet regime 
could not maintain itself for long on the basis of a back

J. V. S T A L I N 176 
ward industry; that only a modern large-scale industry, 
one not merely not inferior to but capable in time of surpassing 
the industries of the capitalist countries, can serve 
as a real and reliable foundation for the Soviet regime. 
Consideration of the fact that the Soviet regime could 
not for long rest upon two opposite foundations: on largescale 
socialist industry, which destroys the capitalist 
elements, and on small, individual peasant farming, which 
engenders capitalist elements. 
Consideration of the fact that until agriculture was 
placed on the basis of large-scale production, until the 
small peasant farms were united into large collective 
farms, the danger of the restoration of capitalism in 
the U.S.S.R. was the most real of all possible dangers. 
Lenin said: 
³The result of the revolution has been that the p o l i t ic 
a l system of Russia has in a few months caught up with that 
of the advanced countries. 
³But that is not enough. The war is inexorable; it puts the 
alternative with ruthless severity: either perish, or overtake 
and outstrip the advanced countries e c o n o m i c a l l y a s 
w e l l. . . . Perish or drive full steam ahead. That is the alternative 
with which history has confronted us² (see Vol . XXI, 
p. 19150). 
Lenin said: 
³As long as we live in a small-peasant country, there is a 
surer economic basis for capitalism in Russia than for communism. 
This must be borne in mind. Anyone who has carefully 
observed life in the countryside, as compared with life in the 
towns, knows that we have not torn out the roots of capitalism 
and have not undermined the foundation, the basis of the 
internal enemy. The latter depends on small-scale production, 
and there is only one way of undermining it, namely, to place the

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 177 
economy of the country, including agriculture, on a new technical 
basis, the technical basis of modern large-scale production. . . . 
Only when the country has been electrified, only when our industry, 
our agriculture, our transport system have been placed 
upon the technical basis of modern large-scale industry, shall 
we achieve final victory² (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 46-4751). 
These propositions formed the basis of those considerations 
of the Party that led to the drawing up of 
the five-year plan and to determining its fundamental 
task. 
That is how matters stand with regard to the fundamental 
task of the five-year plan. 
But the execution of such a gigantic plan cannot 
be started haphazardly, just anyhow. In order to carry out 
such a plan it is necessary first of all to find its main 
link; for only after finding and grasping this main link 
could a pull be exerted on all the other links of the plan. 
What was the main link in the five-year plan? 
The main link in the five-year plan was heavy industry, 
with machine building as its core. For only heavy 
industry is capable of reconstructing both industry as a 
whole, transport and agriculture, and of putting them 
on their feet. It was necessary to begin the fulfilment 
of the five-year plan with heavy industry. Consequently, 
the restoration of heavy industry had to be made the 
basis of the fulfilment of the five-year plan. 
We have Leninıs directives on this subject also: 
³The salvation of Russia lies not only in a good harvest on 
the peasant farms‹that is not enough; and not only in the good 
condition of light industry, which provides the peasantry with 
consumer goods‹that, too, is not enough; we also need heavy 
industry. . . . Unless we save heavy industry, unless we restore

J. V. S T A L I N 178 
it, we shall not be able to build up any industry; and without 
it we shall be doomed altogether as an independent country. . . . 
Heavy industry needs state subsidies. If we do not provide them, 
then we are doomed as a civilised state‹let alone as a socialist 
state² (see Vol. XXVII, p. 34952). 
But the restoration and development of heavy industry, 
particularly in such a backward and poor country 
as ours was at the beginning of the five-year plan period, 
is an extremely difficult task; for, as is well known, 
heavy industry calls for enormous financial expenditure 
and the existence of a certain minimum of experienced 
technical forces, without which, generally speaking, the 
restoration of heavy industry is impossible. Did the 
Party know this, and did it take this into account? Yes, 
it did. Not only did the Party know this, but it announced 
it for all to hear. The Party knew how heavy industry 
had been built in Britain, Germany and America. 
It knew that in those countries heavy industry had been 
built either with the aid of big loans, or by plundering 
other countries, or by both methods simultaneously. 
The Party knew that those paths were closed to our country. 
What, then, did it count on? It counted on our countryıs 
own resources. It counted on the fact that, with a 
Soviet government at the helm, and the land, industry, 
transport, the banks and trade nationalised, we could 
pursue a regime of the strictest economy in order to accumulate 
sufficient resources for the restoration and development 
of heavy industry. The Party declared frankly 
that this would call for serious sacrifices, and that 
it was our duty openly and consciously to make these 
sacrifices if we wanted to achieve our goal. The Party 
counted on carrying through this task with the aid of

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 179 
the internal resources of our country‹without enslaving 
credits and loans from abroad. 
Here is what Lenin said on this score: 
³We must strive to build up a state in which the workers 
retain their leadership of the peasants, in which they retain the 
confidence of the peasants, and, by exercising the greatest economy, 
remove every trace of extravagance from our social relations. 
³We must bring our state apparatus to the utmost degree 
of economy. We must remove from it all traces of extravagance, 
of which so much has been left over from tsarist Russia, from 
its bureaucratic and capitalist apparatus. 
³Wi l l not this be a reign of peasant narrow-mindedness? 
³No. If we see to it that the working class retains the leadership 
of the peasantry, we shall be able, by exercising the greatest 
possible economy in the economic life of our state, to use 
every kopek we save to develop our large-scale machine industry, 
to develop electrification, the hydraulic extraction of peat, to 
finish the construction of Volkhovstroi, etc. 
³In this, and this alone, lies our hope. Only when we have 
done this will we, speaking figuratively, be able to change horses, 
to change from the peasant, muzhik, horse of poverty, from the 
horse of economy adapted to a ruined peasant country, to the 
horse which the proletariat is seeking and cannot but seek‹the 
horse of large-scale machine industry, of electrification, of Volkhovstroi, 
etc.² (see Vol. XXVII, p. 41753). 
To change from the muzhik horse of poverty to the 
horse of large-scale machine industry‹such was the aim 
of the Party in drawing up the five-year plan and striving 
for its fulfilment. 
To establish a regime of the strictest economy and 
to accumulate the resources necessary for financing the 
industrialisation of our country‹such was the path that 
had to be taken in order to succeed in creating heavy 
industry and in carrying out the five-year plan.

J. V. S T A L I N 180
A bold task? A difficult path? But our Party is 
called a Leninist party precisely because it has no right 
to fear difficulties. 
More than that. The Partyıs confidence in the feasibility 
of the five-year plan and its faith in the forces 
of the working class were so strong that the Party found 
it possible to undertake the fulfilment of this difficult 
task not in five years, as was provided for in the fiveyear 
plan, but in four years, or, strictly speaking, in four 
years and three months, if the special quarter be added. 
That is what gave rise to the famous slogan, ³The 
Five-Year Plan in Four Years.² 
And what happened? 
Subsequent facts have shown that the Party was 
right. 
The facts have shown that without this boldness 
and confidence in the forces of the working class, the 
Party could not have achieved the victory of which we 
are now so justly proud. 
III 
THE RESULTS 
OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS 
IN THE SPHERE OF INDUSTRY 
Let us pass now to the results of the fulfilment of the 
five-year plan. 
What are the results of the five-year plan in four 
years in the sphere of industry? 
Have we achieved victories in this sphere? 
Yes, we have. And not only that, but we have accomplished 
more than we ourselves expected, more than

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 181 
the ardent minds in our Party could have expected. 
That is not denied now even by our enemies, and certainly 
our friends cannot deny it. 
We did not have an iron and steel industry, the basis 
for the industrialisation of the country. Now we have 
one.
We did not have a tractor industry. Now we have 
one.
We did not have an automobile industry. Now we 
have one. 
We did not have a machine-tool industry. Now we 
have one. 
We did not have a big and modern chemical industry. 
Now we have one. 
We did not have a real and big industry for the production 
of modern agricultural machinery. Now we have 
one.
We did not have an aircraft industry. Now we have 
one.
In output of electric power we were last on the list. 
Now we rank among the first. 
In output of oil products and coal we were last on 
the list. Now we rank among the first. 
We had only one coal and metallurgical base‹in the 
Ukraine‹and it was with difficulty that we made do 
with that. We have not only succeeded in improving 
this base, but have created a new coal and metallurgical 
base‹in the East‹which is the pride of our 
country. 
We had only one centre of the textile industry‹in 
the North of our country. As a result of our efforts 
we shall have in the very near future two new centres

J. V. S T A L I N 182 
of the textile industry‹in Central Asia and Western 
Siberia. 
And we have not only created these new great industries, 
but have created them on a scale and in dimensions 
that eclipse the scale and dimensions of European industry.
And as a result of all this the capitalist elements 
have been completely and irrevocably ousted from industry, 
and socialist industry has become the sole form 
of industry in the U.S.S.R. 
And as a result of all this our country has been converted 
from an agrarian into an industrial country; for the 
proportion of industrial output, as compared with agricultural 
output, has risen from 48 per cent of the total 
in the beginning of the five-year plan period (1928) 
to 70 per cent at the end of the fourth year of the fiveyear 
plan period (1932). 
And as a result of all this we have succeeded by the 
end of the fourth year of the five-year plan period in 
fulfilling the total programme of industrial output, 
which was drawn up for five years, to the extent of 93.7 
per cent, thereby raising the volume of industrial output 
to more than three times the pre-war output, and to more 
than double the level of 1928. As for the programme 
of output for heavy industry, we have fulfilled the fiveyear 
plan by 108 per cent. 
It is true that we are 6 per cent short of fulfilling 
the total programme of the five-year plan. But that is 
due to the fact that in view of the refusal of neighbouring 
countries to sign pacts of non-aggression with us, 
and of the complications that arose in the Far East,54 
we were obliged, for the purpose of strengthening our

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 183 
defence, hastily to switch a number of factories to 
the production of modern defensive means. And owing 
to the necessity of going through a certain period of preparation, 
this switch resulted in these factories suspending 
production for four months, which could not but affect 
the fulfilment of the total programme of output for 
1932, as fixed in the five-year plan. As a result of this 
operation we have completely filled the gaps with regard 
to the defence capacity of the country. But this was 
bound to affect adversely the fulfilment of the programme 
of output provided for in the five-year plan. It is beyond 
any doubt that, but for this incidental circumstance, we 
would almost certainly not only have fulfilled, but even 
overfulfilled the total production figures of the fiveyear 
plan. 
Finally, as a result of all this the Soviet Union has 
been converted from a weak country, unprepared for 
defence, into a country mighty in defence, a country 
prepared for every contingency, a country capable of 
producing on a mass scale all modern means of defence 
and of equipping its army with them in the event of an 
attack from abroad. 
Such, in general terms, are the results of the fiveyear 
plan in four years in the sphere of industry. 
Now, after all this, judge for yourselves what worth 
there is in the talk in the bourgeois press about 
the ³failure² of the five-year plan in the sphere of industry. 
And what is the position in regard to growth of 
industrial output in the capitalist countries, which are 
now passing through a severe crisis? 
Here are the generally known official figures.

J. V. S T A L I N 184 
Whereas by the end of 1932 the volume of industrial 
output in the U.S.S.R. rose to 334 per cent of the prewar 
output, the volume of industrial output in the U.S.A. 
dropped during this same period to 84 per cent of the 
pre-war level, in Britain to 75 per cent, in Germany to 
62 per cent. 
Whereas by the end of 1932 the volume of industrial 
output in the U.S.S.R. rose to 219 per cent of the 1928 
output, the volume of industrial output in the U.S.A. 
dropped during this same period to 56 per cent, in Britain 
to 80 per cent, in Germany to 55 per cent, in Poland 
to 54 per cent. 
What do these figures show if not that the capitalist 
system of industry has failed to stand the test in competition 
with the Soviet system, that the Soviet system 
of industry has all the advantages over the capitalist 
system. 
We are told: This is all very well; many new factories 
have been built, and the foundations for industrialisation 
have been laid; but it would have been far better 
to have renounced the policy of industrialisation, the 
policy of expanding the production of means of production, 
or at least to have relegated it to the background, 
so as to produce more cotton fabrics, shoes, clothing and 
other goods for mass consumption. 
It is true that the output of goods for mass consumption 
was less than the amount required, and this creates certain 
difficulties. But, then, we must realise and take into 
account where such a policy of relegating the task of 
industrialisation to the background would have led us. 
Of course, out of the 1,500 million rubles in foreign currency 
that we spent during this period on equipment

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 185 
for our heavy industries, we could have set aside a half 
for importing cotton, hides, wool, rubber, etc. Then 
we would now have more cotton fabrics, shoes and clothing. 
But we would not have a tractor industry or an automobile 
industry; we would not have any thing like a big 
iron and steel industry; we would not have metal for 
the manufacture of machinery‹and we would remain 
unarmed while encircled by capitalist countries armed 
with modern technique. 
We would have deprived ourselves of the possibility 
of supplying agriculture with tractors and agricultural 
machinery‹consequently, we would be without 
bread. 
We would have deprived ourselves of the possibility 
of achieving victory over the capitalist elements in our 
country‹consequently, we would have raised immeasurably 
the chances of the restoration of capitalism. 
We would not have all the modern means of defence 
without which it is impossible for a country to be politically 
independent, without which a country becomes a 
target for military attacks of foreign enemies. Our position 
would be more or less analogous to the present position 
of China, which has no heavy industry and no war industry 
of its own and which is being molested by anyone 
who cares to do so. 
In short, in that case we would have military 
intervention; not pacts of non-aggression, but war, dangerous 
and fatal war, a sanguinary and unequal war; 
for in such a war we would be almost unarmed in the face 
of an enemy having all the modern means of attack at 
his disposal. 
This is how it works out, comrades.

J. V. S T A L I N 186 
It is obvious that no self-respecting government and 
no self-respecting party could adopt such a fatal point 
of view. 
And it is precisely because the Party rejected this 
anti-revolutionary line‹it is precisely for that reason 
that it achieved a decisive victory in the fulfilment of 
the five-year plan in the sphere of industry. 
In carrying out the five-year plan and organising 
victory in the sphere of industrial development the Party 
pursued the policy of accelerating the development of 
industry to the utmost. The Party, as it were, spurred 
the country on and hastened its progress. 
Was the Party right in pursuing the policy of accelerating 
development to the utmost? 
Yes, it was absolutely right. 
It was necessary to urge forward a country which 
was a hundred years behindhand and which was faced 
with mortal danger because of its backwardness. Only 
in this way was it possible to enable the country quickly 
to re-equip itself on the basis of modern technique and 
to emerge on to the high road at last. 
Furthermore, we could not know just when the imperialists 
would attack the U.S.S.R. and interrupt our 
work of construction; but that they might attack us at any 
moment, taking advantage of the technical and economic 
weakness of our country‹of that there could be no doubt. 
That is why the Party was obliged to spur the country on, 
so as not to lose time, so as to make the utmost use of 
the respite and to create in the U.S.S.R. the basis of industrialisation 
which is the foundation of its might. The Party 
could not afford to wait and manoeuvre; it had to pursue 
the policy of accelerating development to the utmost.

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 187 
Finally, the Party had to put an end, in the shortest 
possible space of time, to the weakness of the country 
in the sphere of defence. The conditions prevailing at 
the time, the growth of armaments in the capitalist 
countries, the collapse of the idea of disarmament, the 
hatred of the international bourgeoisie for the U.S.S.R. 
‹all this impelled the Party to accelerate the work of 
strengthening the defence capacity of the country, the 
basis of its independence. 
But did the Party have a real possibility of implementing 
the policy of accelerating development to the utmost? 
Yes, it did. It had this possibility, not only because 
it succeeded in good time in rousing the country 
to make rapid progress, but above all because in the work 
of extensive new construction it could rely on the old or 
renovated factories and plants which the workers and 
engineering and technical personnel had already mastered, 
and which, therefore, enabled us to achieve the utmost 
acceleration of development. 
That was the basis for the rapid advance of new 
construction, for the enthusiasm displayed in the extensive 
construction work, for the rise of heroes and shock 
brigaders on construction jobs, for the tempestuous rates of 
development in our country in the period of the First 
Five-Year Plan. 
Can it be said that exactly the same policy of accelerating 
development to the utmost must be pursued in the 
period of the Second Five-Year Plan? 
No, it cannot. 
Firstly, as a result of the successful fulfilment of 
the five-year plan, we have, in the main, already achieved 
its principal object‹to place industry, transport, and

J. V. S T A L I N 188 
agriculture on a new, modern, technical basis. Is there 
really any need, after this, to spur the country on and 
urge it forward? Obviously, this is no longer necessary. 
Secondly, as a result of the successful fulfilment 
of the five-year plan, we have already succeeded in raising 
the defence capacity of the country to the proper level. 
Is there really any need, after this, to spur the country 
on and urge it forward? Obviously, this is no longer 
necessary. 
Finally, as a result of the successful fulfilment of 
the five-year plan, we have been able to build scores 
and hundreds of big new factories and works, provided 
with new, complex technical equipment. This means that 
in the period of the Second Five-Year Plan the bulk 
of industrial output will be provided not by the old 
factories, whose equipment has already been mastered, 
as was the case during the period of the First Five-Year 
Plan, but by the new factories, whose equipment has not 
yet been mastered, but has still to be mastered. But 
the mastering of the new enterprises and new equipment 
presents much greater difficulties than the utilisation 
of old, or renovated factories and plants whose equipment 
has already been mastered. It requires more time, 
needed for raising the skill of the workers and engineering 
and technical personnel and for acquiring the new 
habits in order to make full use of the new equipment. Is it 
not clear after all this that, even if we desired to, we 
could not in the period of the Second Five-Year Plan, 
particularly during the first two or three years, pursue 
a policy of accelerating development to the utmost? 
That is why I think that in the second five-year 
plan period we shall have to adopt less speedy rates of

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 189 
increase in industrial output. In the period of the First 
Five-Year Plan the average annual increase in industrial 
output was 22 per cent. I think that in the Second Five- 
Year Plan we will have to adopt a 13-14 per cent average 
annual increase in industrial output as a minimum. For 
capitalist countries such a rate of increase in industrial 
output is an unattainable ideal. And not only such a 
rate of increase in industrial output‹even a 5 per cent 
average annual increase in industrial output is now 
an unattainable ideal for them. But, then, they are capitalist 
countries. The Soviet country, with the Soviet 
system of economy, is altogether different. Under our 
economic system we are fully able to obtain, and we must 
obtain, a 13-14 per cent annual increase of production 
as a minimum. 
In the period of the First Five-Year Plan we succeeded 
in organising enthusiasm and zeal for new 
construction, and achieved decisive successes. That is 
very good. But now that is not enough. Now we must 
supplement that with enthusiasm and zeal for mastering 
the new factories and the new technical equipment, 
with a substantial rise in the productivity of labour, 
with a substantial reduction of production costs. 
This is the chief thing at present. 
For only on this basis shall we be able, say, in the 
latter half of the Second Five-Year Plan period, to make 
a fresh powerful spurt both in the work of construction 
and in increasing industrial output. 
Finally, a few words about the rates of development 
and percentages of annual increase of output. Our executives 
in industry pay little attention to this question. 
And yet it is a very interesting one. What is the

J. V. S T A L I N 190 
nature of the percentage increases of output, what lies 
hidden behind each per cent of increase? Let us take, 
for example, the year 1925, the period of restoration. 
The annual increase in output was then 66 per cent. 
Gross industrial output amounted to 7,700 million rubles. 
The increase of 66 per cent at that time represented, in 
absolute figures, a little over 3,000 million rubles. 
Hence, each per cent of increase was then equal to 
45,000,000 rubles. Now let us take the year 1928. In 
that year the increase was 26 per cent, i.e., about a third 
of that in 1925 as far as percentages are concerned. Gross 
industrial output in 1928 amounted to 15,500 million 
rubles. The total increase for the year amounted, in 
absolute figures, to 3,280 million rubles. Hence, each 
per cent of increase was then equal to 126,000,000 rubles, 
i.e., it was almost three times as much as in 1925, when 
we had a 66 per cent increase. Finally, let us take 1931. 
In that year the increase was 22 per cent, i.e., a third of 
that in 1925. Gross industrial output in 1931 amounted 
to 30,800 million rubles. The total increase, in absolute 
figures, amounted to a little over 5,600 million rubles. 
Hence, every per cent of increase represented more than 
250,000,000 rubles, i.e., six times as much as in 1925, 
when we had a 66 per cent increase, and twice as much 
as in 1928, when we had an increase of a little over 26 
per cent. 
What does all this show? It shows that in studying 
the rate of increase of output we must not confine our 
examination to the total percentage of increase‹we 
must also take into account what lies behind each per 
cent of increase and what is the total amount of the annual 
increase of output. For 1933, for example, we are provid

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 191 
ing for a 16 per cent increase, i.e., a quarter of that 
of 1925. But this does not mean that the actual increase 
of output in 1933 will also be a quarter of that of 1925, 
In 1925 the increase of output in absolute figures was 
a little over 3,000 million rubles and each per cent was 
equal to 45,000,000 rubles. There is no reason to doubt 
that a 16 per cent increase of output in 1933 will amount, 
in absolute figures, to not less than 5,000 million rubles, 
i.e., almost twice as much as in 1925, and each per cent 
of increase will be equal to at least 320,000,000-340,000,000 
rubles, i.e., will represent at least seven times as much 
as each per cent of increase represented in 1925. 
That is how it works out, comrades, if we examine 
the question of the rates and percentages of increase in 
concrete terms. 
That is how matters stand with regard to the results of 
the five-year plan in four years in the sphere of industry. 
IV 
THE RESULTS 
OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS 
IN THE SPHERE OF AGRICULTURE 
Let us pass to the question of the results of the fiveyear 
plan in four years in the sphere of agriculture. 
The five-year plan in the sphere of agriculture was 
a five-year plan of collectivisation. What did the Party 
proceed from in carrying out collectivisation? 
The Party proceeded from the fact that in order 
to consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat and 
build a socialist society it was necessary, in addition 
to industrialisation, to pass from small, individual peasant 
farming to large-scale collective agriculture equipped

J. V. S T A L I N 192 
with tractors and modern agricultural machinery, 
as the only firm basis for the Soviet regime in the countryside. 
The Party proceeded from the fact that without 
collectivisation it would be impossible to lead our country 
on to the high road of building the economic foundations 
of socialism, impossible to free the vast masses 
of the labouring peasantry from poverty and ignorance. 
Lenin said: 
³Small-scale farming provides no escape from poverty² (see 
Vol. XXIV, p. 54055). 
Lenin said: 
³If we continue as of old on our small farms, even as free 
citizens on free land, we shall still be faced with inevitable ruin² 
(see Vol. XX, p. 41756). 
Lenin said: 
³Only with the help of common, artel, co-operative labour 
can we escape from the impasse into which the imperialist war 
has landed us² (see Vol. XXIV, p. 53757). 
Lenin said: 
³We must pass to common cultivation in large model farms. 
Otherwise there will be no escaping from the dislocation, from 
the truly desperate situation in which Russia finds itself² (see 
Vol. XX, p. 41858). 
Proceeding from this, Lenin arrived at the following 
fundamental conclusion: 
³Only if we succeed in practice in showing the peasants the 
advantages of common, collective, co-operative, artel cultivation 
of the soil, only if we succeed in helping the peasant by means of 
co-operative, artel farming, will the working class, which holds

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 193 
state power in its hands, actually prove to the peasant the correctness 
of its policy and actually secure the real and durable 
following of the vast masses of the peasantry² (see Vol. XXIV, 
p. 57959). 
It was from these propositions of Leninıs that the 
Party proceeded in carrying out the programme of collectivising 
agriculture, the programme of the fiveyear 
plan in the sphere of agriculture. 
In this connection, the task of the five-year plan 
in the sphere of agriculture was to unite the scattered 
and small, individual peasant farms, which lacked the 
possibility of using tractors and modern agricultural 
machinery, into large collective farms, equipped with all 
the modern implements of highly developed agriculture, 
and to cover unoccupied land with model state farms. 
The task of the five-year plan in the sphere of agriculture 
was to convert the U.S.S.R. from a small-peasant 
and backward country into one of large-scale agriculture 
organised on the basis of collective labour and 
providing the maximum output for the market. 
What has the Party achieved in carrying out the 
programme of the five-year plan in four years in the 
sphere of agriculture? Has it fulfilled this programme, 
or has it failed? 
The Party has succeeded in the course of some three 
years in organising more than 200,000 collective farms 
and about 5,000 state farms devoted to grain growing 
and livestock raising, and at the same time it has succeeded 
during four years in expanding the crop area by 
21,000,000 hectares. 
The Party has succeeded in getting more than 60 per 
cent of the peasant farms to unite into collective farms,

J. V. S T A L I N 194 
embracing more than 70 per cent of all the land cultivated 
by peasants; this means that we have fulfilled the fiveyear 
plan three times over. 
The Party has succeeded in making possible its 
procurement of 1,200 to 1,400 million poods of 
marketable grain annually, instead of the 500,000,000- 
600,000,000 poods that were procured in the period when 
individual peasant farming predominated. 
The Party has succeeded in routing the kulaks as 
a class, although they have not yet been dealt the final 
blow; the labouring peasants have been emancipated 
from kulak bondage and exploitation, and the Soviet 
regime has been given a firm economic basis in the countryside, 
the basis of collective farming. 
The Party has succeeded in converting the U.S.S.R. 
from a country of small-peasant farming into a country 
of the largest-scale agriculture in the world. 
Such in general are the results of the five-year plan 
in four years in the sphere of agriculture. 
Now, after all this, judge for yourselves what worth 
there is in the talk in the bourgeois press about the 
³collapse² of collectivisation, about the ³failure² of 
the five-year plan in the sphere of agriculture. 
And what is the position of agriculture in the capitalist 
countries, which are now passing through a severe 
agricultural crisis? 
Here are the generally known official data. 
In the principal grain-producing countries the crop 
area has been reduced by 8-10 per cent. The area under 
cotton in the United States has been reduced by 15 per 
cent; the area under sugar-beet in Germany and Czechoslovakia 
has been reduced by 22-30 per cent; the area

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 195 
under flax in Lithuania and Latvia has been reduced 
by 25-30 per cent. 
According to the figures of the United States Department 
of Agriculture, the value of the gross output of 
agriculture in the U.S.A. dropped from $11,000 million 
in 1929 to $5,000 million in 1932. The value of the 
gross output of grain in that country dropped from 
$1,288 million in 1929 to $391,000,000 in 1932. 
The value of the cotton crop in that country dropped 
from $1,389 million in 1929 to $397,000,000 in 
1932. 
Do not all these facts testify to the superiority of 
the Soviet system of agriculture over the capitalist 
system? Do not these facts go to show that collective 
farms are a more efficient form of farming than individual 
and capitalist farms? 
It is said that collective farms and state farms do 
not always yield a profit, that they eat up an enormous 
amount of funds, that there is no sense in maintaining 
such enterprises, that it would be more expedient to 
dissolve them, leaving only those that do yield a profit. 
But only people who understand nothing about national 
economy, about economics, can say such things. 
A few years ago more than half of our textile mills did 
not yield a profit. Some of our comrades suggested at 
the time that we should close down these mills. What 
would have happened had we followed their advice? 
We would have committed an enormous crime against 
the country, against the working class; for by doing 
that we would have ruined our rising industry. What 
did we do at that time? We persevered for a little more 
than a year, and finally succeeded in making the whole

J. V. S T A L I N 196 
of our textile industry yield a profit. And what about 
our automobile plant at Gorky? It does not yield a profi 
t as yet either. Would you, perhaps, have us close 
it down? Or our iron and steel industry, which does not 
yield a profit as yet either? Shall we close that down, 
too, comrades? If one looks in that light on profitableness, 
then we ought to develop to the utmost only a few 
industries, those which are the most profitable, as, 
for example, confectionery, flour milling, perfumery, 
knitted goods, toy-making, etc. Of course, I am not 
opposed to developing these industries. On the contrary, 
they must be developed, for they, too, are needed for 
the population. But, in the first place, they cannot 
be developed without equipment and fuel, which are 
provided by heavy industry. In the second place, it 
is impossible to make them the basis of industrialisation. 
That is the point, comrades. 
We cannot look on profitableness from the hucksterıs 
point of view, from the point of view of the immediate 
present. We must approach it from the point of view 
of the national economy as a whole, over a period of 
several years. Only such a point of view can be called 
a truly Leninist, a truly Marxist one. And this point 
of view is imperative not only in regard to industry, 
but also, and to an even greater extent, in regard to the 
collective farms and state farms. Just think: in a matter 
of three years we have created more than 200,000 collective 
farms and about 5,000 state farms, i.e., we have 
created entirely new large enterprises which have the 
same importance for agriculture as large mills and 
factories for industry. Name another country which 
has managed in the course of three years to create, not

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 197 
205,000 new large enterprises, but even 25,000. You 
will not be able to do so; for there is no such country, 
and there has never been one. But we have created 
205,000 new enterprises in agriculture. It appears, however, 
that there are people who demand that these 
enterprises should immediately become profitable, and 
if they do not become so immediately, they should be 
destroyed and dissolved. Is it not clear that these very 
strange people are envious of the laurels of Herostratus? 
In saying that the collective farms and state farms 
do not yield a profit, I by no means want to suggest 
that none of them yield a profit. Nothing of the kind! 
Everyone knows that even now we have a number 
of collective farms and state farms that are highly profitable. 
We have thousands of collective farms and 
scores of state farms which are fully profitable even 
now. These collective farms and state farms are the 
pride of our Party, the pride of the Soviet regime. 
Of course, not all collective farms and state farms are 
alike. Some collective farms and state farms are old, 
some are new, and some are very young. These last 
are still weak economic organisms, which have not yet 
fully taken shape. They are passing through approximately 
the same period of organisational development 
that our factories and plants passed through in 1920-21. 
Naturally, the majority of these cannot yield a profit 
yet. But there cannot be the slightest doubt that they 
will begin to yield a profit in the course of the next 
two or three years, just as our factories and mills began 
to do so after 1921. To refuse them assistance and support 
on the grounds that at the present moment not all 
of them yield a profit would be committing a grave

J. V. S T A L I N 198 
crime against the working class and the peasantry. 
Only enemies of the people and counter-revolutionaries 
can raise a question of the collective farms and state 
farms being unnecessary. 
In fulfilling the five-year plan for agriculture, the 
Party carried through collectivisation at an accelerated 
tempo. Was the Party right in pursuing the policy 
of an accelerated tempo of collectivisation? Yes, it was 
absolutely right, even though certain excesses were 
committed in the process. In pursuing the policy of 
eliminating the kulaks as a class, and in destroying 
the kulak nests, the Party could not stop halfway. 
It had to carry this work to completion. 
That is the first point. 
Secondly, having tractors and agricultural machinery 
at its disposal, on the one hand, and taking advantage 
of the absence of private property in land (the 
nationalisation of the land!), on the other, the Party 
had every opportunity of accelerating the collectivisation 
of agriculture. And, indeed, it has achieved tremendous 
successes in this sphere; for it has fulfilled 
the programme of the five-year plan of collectivisation 
three times over. 
Does that mean that we must pursue the policy 
of an accelerated tempo of collectivisation in the period 
of the Second Five-Year Plan as well? No, it does not 
mean that. The point is that, in the main, we have already 
completed the collectivisation of the principal 
regions of the U.S.S.R. Hence, we have done more in 
this sphere than could have been expected. And we 
have not only, in the main, completed collectivisation. 
We have succeeded in getting the overwhelming major

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 199 
ity of the peasantry to regard collective farming as 
the most acceptable form of farming. This is a tremendous 
victory, comrades. Is it worth while, after this, 
being in a hurry to accelerate the tempo of collectivisation? 
Clearly, it is not. 
Now it is no longer a question of accelerating the 
tempo of collectivisation. Still less is it a question as 
to whether the collective farms should exist or not‹ 
that question has already been answered in the affirmative. 
The collective farms have come to stay, and 
the road back to the old, individual farming is closed 
for ever. The task now is to strengthen the collective 
farms organisationally, to expel sabotaging elements 
from them, to recruit real, tried, Bolshevik cadres for 
the collective farms, and to make them really Bolshevik 
collective farms. 
That is now the chief thing. 
That is how matters stand with regard to the fiveyear 
plan in four years in the sphere of agriculture. 
V 
THE RESULTS 
OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS 
AS REGARDS IMPROVING THE MATERIAL CONDITIONS 
OF THE WORKERS AND PEASANTS 
I have spoken of our successes in industry and agriculture, 
of the progress of industry and agriculture in 
the U.S.S.R. What are the results of these successes 
from the standpoint of improving the material conditions 
of the workers and peasants? What are the main 
results of our successes in the sphere of industry and

J. V. S T A L I N 200 
agriculture as regards radical improvement of the material 
conditions of the working people? 
Firstly, the fact that unemployment has been abolished 
and that among the workers uncertainty about 
the future has been done away with. 
Secondly, the fact that almost all the poor peasants 
have been drawn into collective-farm development; 
that, on this basis, the differentiation of the peasantry 
into kulaks and poor peasants has been stopped; and 
that, as a result, impoverishment and pauperism in the 
countryside have been done away with. 
These are tremendous achievements, comrades, achievements 
of which not a single bourgeois state, even the 
most ³democratic,² can dream. 
In our country, in the U.S.S.R., the workers have 
long for gotten unemployment. Some three years ago 
we had about 1,500,000 unemployed. It is already two 
years now since unemployment was completely abolished. 
And in these two years the workers have already 
forgotten about unemployment, about its burden and 
its horrors. Look at the capitalist countries: what horrors 
result there from unemployment! There are now 
no less than 30,000,000 to 40,000,000 unemployed in 
those countries. Who are these people? Usually it is 
said of them that they are ³down and out.² 
Every day they try to get work, seek work, are prepared 
to accept almost any conditions of work, but 
they are not given work, because they are ³superfluous.² 
And this is taking place at a time when vast quantities 
of goods and produce are being wasted to satisfy the 
caprices of the favourites of fortune, the scions of the 
capitalists and landlords.

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 201 
The unemployed are refused food because they have 
no money with which to pay for it; they are refused 
shelter be cause they have no money with which to 
pay rent. How and where do they live? They live on 
the miserable crumbs from the rich manıs table; by 
raking refuse bins, where they find decayed scraps of 
food; they live in the slums of big cities, and more often 
in hovels outside the towns, hastily put up by the unemployed 
out of packing cases and the bark of trees. But 
this is not all. It is not only the unemployed who suffer 
as a result of unemployment. The employed workers, 
too, suffer as a result of it. They suffer because the presence 
of a large number of unemployed makes their position 
in industry insecure, makes them uncertain about 
their future. Today they are employed, but they are 
not sure that when they wake up tomorrow they will 
not find themselves discharged. 
One of the principal achievements of the five-year 
plan in four years is that we have abolished unemployment 
and have saved the workers of the U.S.S.R. from 
its horrors. 
The same thing must be said of the peasants. They, 
too, have forgotten about the differentiation of the peasants 
into kulaks and poor peasants, about the exploitation 
of the poor peasants by the kulaks, about the 
ruin which every year caused hundreds of thousands 
and millions of poor peasants to become destitute. Three 
or four years ago the poor peasants constituted not 
less than 30 per cent of the total peasant population 
in our country. They numbered about 20,000,000. And 
still earlier, in the period before the October Revolution, 
the poor peasants constituted not less than 60 per

J. V. S T A L I N 202 
cent of the peasant population. Who were the poor 
peasants? They were people who usually lacked either 
seed, or horses, or implements, or all of these, for carrying 
on their husbandry. The poor peasants were people 
who lived in a state of semi-starvation and, as a 
rule, were in bondage to the kulaks‹and in the old 
days, both to the kulaks and to the landlords. Not at 
all long ago more than 2,000,000 poor peasants used 
to go south‹to the North Caucasus and the Ukraine‹ 
every year to hire themselves out to the kulaks‹and 
still earlier, to the kulaks and landlords. Still larger 
numbers used to come every year to the factory gates 
and swell the ranks of the unemployed. And it was 
not only the poor peasants who found themselves in 
this unenviable position. A good half of the middle peasants 
lived in the same state of poverty and privation 
as the poor peasants. All that is already forgotten by 
the peasants. 
What has the five-year plan in four years given the 
poor peasants and the lower strata of the middle peasants? 
It has undermined and smashed the kulaks as 
a class, liberating the poor peasants and a good half of 
the middle peasants from kulak bondage. It has brought 
them into the collective farms and placed them in a 
secure position. It has thus eliminated the possibility 
of the differentiation of the peasantry into exploiters‹ 
kulaks‹and exploited‹poor peasants, and abolished 
destitution in the countryside. It has raised the poor 
peasants and the lower strata of the middle peasants 
to a position of security in the collective farms, and 
has there by put a stop to the process of ruination and 
impoverishment of the peasantry. Now it no longer

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 203 
happens in our country that millions of peasants leave 
their homes every year to seek work in distant areas. 
In order to attract a peasant to go to work outside his 
own collective farm it is now necessary to sign a contract 
with the collective farm and, in addition, to pay 
the collective farmer his railway fare. Now it no longer 
happens in our country that hundreds of thousands and 
millions of peasants are ruined and hang around the 
gates of factories and mills. That is what used to happen; 
but that was long ago. Now the peasant is in a position 
of security, a member of a collective farm which has at 
its disposal tractors, agricultural machinery, seed funds, 
reserve funds, etc., etc. 
That is what the five-year plan has given to the poor 
peasants and to the lower strata of the middle peasants. 
That is the essence of the principal achievements 
of the five-year plan in improving the material conditions 
of the workers and peasants. 
As a result of these principal achievements in improving 
the material conditions of the workers and 
peasants, we have brought about during the period 
of the First Five-Year Plan: 
a) a doubling of the number of workers and other 
employees in large-scale industry compared with 1928, 
which represents an overfulfilment of the five-year 
plan by 57 per cent; 
b) an increase in the national income‹hence, an 
increase in the incomes of the workers and peasants‹ 
to 45,100 million rubles in 1932, which represents an 
increase of 85 per cent over 1928; 
c) an increase in the average annual wages of workers 
and other employees in large-scale industry by

J. V. S T A L I N 204 
67 per cent compared with 1928, which represents 
an overfulfilment of the five-year plan by 18 per 
cent; 
d) an increase in the social insurance fund by 292 per 
cent compared with 1928 (4,120 million rubles in 1932, 
as against 1,050 million rubles in 1928), which represents 
an overfulfilment of the five-year plan by 111 
per cent; 
e) an increase in public catering facilities, now 
covering more than 70 per cent of the workers employed 
in the decisive industries, which represents an overfulfilment 
of the five-year plan by 500 per cent. 
Of course, we have not yet reached the point where 
we can fully satisfy the material requirements of the 
workers and peasants, and it is hardly likely that we 
shall reach it within the next few years. But we have 
unquestionably attained a position where the material 
conditions of the workers and peasants are improving 
from year to year. The only ones who can have any 
doubts on this score are the sworn enemies of the Soviet 
regime, or, perhaps, certain representatives of the bourgeois 
press, including some of the Moscow correspondents 
of that press, who hardly know any more about 
the economy of nations and the condition of the working 
people than, say, the Emperor of Abyssinia knows 
about higher mathematics. 
And what is the position in regard to the material 
conditions of the workers and peasants in capitalist 
countries? 
Here are the official figures. 
The number of unemployed in the capitalist countries 
has increased catastrophically. In the United

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 205 
States, according to official figures, the number of employed 
workers in the manufacturing industries alone 
dropped from 8,500,000 in 1928 to 5,500,000 in 1932; 
and according to the figures of the American Federation 
of Labour, the number of unemployed in the 
United States, in all industries, at the end of 1932, was 
11,000,000. In Britain, according to official figures, 
the number of unemployed increased from 1,290,000 
in 1928 to 2,800,000 in 1932. In Germany, according 
to official figures, the number of unemployed increased 
from 1,376,000 in 1928 to 5,500,000 in 1932. This is 
the picture that is observed in all the capitalist countries. 
Moreover, official statistics as a rule minimise 
the number of unemployed, the total number of whom 
in the capitalist countries ranges from 35,000,000 to 
40,000,000. 
The wages of the workers are being systematically 
reduced. According to official figures, average monthly 
wages in the United States have been reduced by 35 per 
cent compared with 1928. In Britain wages have been 
reduced by 15 per cent in the same period, and in Germany 
by as much as 50 per cent. According to the estimates 
of the American Federation of Labour, the American 
workers lost more than $35,000 million as a result 
of wage cuts in 1930-31. 
The workersı insurance funds in Britain and Germany, 
small as they were, have been considerably diminished. 
In the United States and in France unemployment 
insurance does not exist, or hardly exists 
at all, and, as a consequence, the number of homeless 
workers and waifs is growing enormously, particularly 
in the United States.

J. V. S T A L I N 206 
The position is no better as regards the condition 
of the masses of the peasantry in the capitalist countries, 
where the agricultural crisis is utterly undermining 
peasant farming and is forcing millions of 
ruined peasants and farmers to go begging. 
Such are the results of the five-year plan in four 
years in regard to improving the material conditions of 
the working people of the U.S.S.R. 
VI 
THE RESULTS OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN 
IN FOUR YEARS AS REGARDS TRADE TURNOVER 
BETWEEN TOWN AND COUNTRY 
Let us pass now to the question of the results of the 
five-year plan in four years in regard to the growth 
of trade turnover between town and country. 
The tremendous growth of the output of industry 
and agriculture, the growth of the marketable surplus 
both in industry and in agriculture, and, finally, the 
growth of the requirements of the workers and peasants‹
all this could not but lead, and indeed has led, 
to a revival and expansion of trade turnover between 
town and country. 
The bond based on production is the fundamental 
form of the bond between town and country. But the 
bond based on production is not enough by itself. It 
must be supplemented by the bond based on trade in 
order that the ties between town and country may be 
durable and unseverable. This can be achieved only 
by developing Soviet trade. It would be wrong to think 
that Soviet trade can be developed only along one channel, 
for example, the co-operative societies. In order

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 207 
to develop Soviet trade all channels must be used: the 
network of co-operatives, the state trading network, 
and collective-farm trade. 
Some comrades think that the development of Soviet 
trade, and particularly the development of collective-
farm trade, is a reversion to the first stage of NEP. 
That is absolutely wrong. 
There is a fundamental difference between Soviet 
trade, including collective-farm trade, and the trade 
carried on in the first stage of NEP. 
In the first stage of NEP we permitted a revival of 
capitalism, permitted private trade, permitted the 
³activities² of private traders, capitalists, speculators. 
That was more or less free trade, restricted only by 
the regulating role of the state. At that time the private 
capitalist sector had a fairly large place in the 
trade turnover of the country. That is apart from the 
fact that we did not then have the developed industry 
that we have now, nor did we have collective farms 
and state farms working according to plan and placing 
at the disposal of the state huge reserves of agricultural 
produce and urban manufactures. 
Can i t be said that this is the position now? Of 
course not. 
In the first place, Soviet trade cannot be put on 
a par with trade in the first stage of NEP, even though 
the latter was regulated by the state. While trade in 
the first stage of NEP permitted a revival of capitalism 
and the functioning of the private capitalist sector 
in trade turnover, Soviet trade proceeds from the negation, 
the absence, of both the one and the other. What 
is Soviet trade? Soviet trade is trade without capital

J. V. S T A L I N 208 
ists, big or small; it is trade without speculators, big 
or small. It is a special type of trade, which has never 
existed in history before, and which is practised only 
by us, the Bolsheviks, under the conditions of Soviet 
development. 
Secondly, we now have a fairly widely developed 
state industry and a whole system of collective farms 
and state farms, which provide the state with huge 
reserves of agricultural and manufactured goods for 
the development of Soviet trade. This did not exist, 
and could not have existed, under the conditions of the 
first stage of NEP. 
Thirdly, we have succeeded in the recent period in 
completely expelling private traders, merchants and 
middlemen of all kinds from the sphere of trade. Of 
course, this does not mean that private traders and 
profiteers may not, in accordance with the law of atavism, 
reappear in the sphere of trade and take advantage 
of the most favourable field for them in this respect, 
namely, collective-farm trade. Moreover, collective farmers 
themselves are sometimes not averse to engaging 
in speculation, which does not do them honour, of 
course. But to combat these unhealthy activities we have 
the recently issued Soviet law on measures for the prevention 
of speculation and the punishment of speculators.
60 You know, of course, that this law does not 
err on the side of leniency. You will understand, of 
course, that such a law did not exist, and could not 
have existed, under the conditions of the first stage 
of NEP. 
Thus you see that anyone who in spite of these facts 
talks of a reversion to the trade of the first stage of

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 209 
NEP, shows that he understands nothing, absolutely 
nothing, about our Soviet economy. 
We are told that it is impossible to develop trade, 
even if it is Soviet trade, without a sound money system 
and a sound currency; that we must first of all achieve 
the recovery of our money system and our Soviet currency, 
which, it is alleged, is worthless. That is what 
the economists in capitalist countries tell us. I think 
that those worthy economists understand no more about 
political economy than, say, the Archbishop of Canterbury 
understands about anti-religious propaganda. 
How can it be asserted that our Soviet currency is worthless? 
Is it not a fact that with this currency we built 
Magnitostroi, Dnieprostroi, Kuznetskstroi, the Stalingrad 
and Kharkov tractor works, the Gorky and Moscow 
automobile works, hundreds of thousands of collective 
farms, and thousands of state farms? Do those gentlemen 
think that all these enterprises have been built 
out of straw or clay, and not out of real materials, having 
a definite value? What is it that ensures the stability 
of Soviet currency‹if we have in mind, of course, 
the organised market, which is of decisive importance 
in our trade turnover, and not the unorganised market, 
which is only of subordinate importance? Of course, 
it is not the gold reserve alone. The stability of Soviet 
currency is ensured, first of all, by the vast quantity 
of goods held by the state and put into commodity 
circulation at stable prices. What economist can deny 
that such a guarantee, which exists only in the U.S.S.R., 
is a more real guarantee of the stability of the currency 
than any gold reserve? Will the economists in capitalist 
countries ever understand that they are hopelessly

J. V. S T A L I N 210 
muddled in their theory of a gold reserve as the ³sole² 
guarantee of the stability of the currency? 
That is the position in regard to the questions concerning 
the growth of Soviet trade. 
What have we achieved as a result of carrying out 
the five-year plan as regards the expansion of Soviet 
trade? 
As a result of the five-year plan we have: 
a) an increase in the output of light industry to 
187 per cent of the output in 1928; 
b) an increase in retail co-operative and state trade 
turnover, which, calculated in prices of 1932, now 
amounts to 39,600 million rubles, i.e., an increase in 
the volume of goods in retail trade to 175 per cent of 
the 1928 figure; 
c) an increase of the state and co-operative network 
by 158,000 shops and stores over the 1929 figure; 
d) the continually increasing development of collective 
farm trade and purchases of agricultural produce 
by various state and co-operative organisations. 
Such are the facts. 
An altogether different picture is presented by the 
condition of internal trade in the capitalist countries, 
where the crisis has resulted in a catastrophic drop in 
trade, in the mass closing down of enterprises and the 
ruin of small and medium shopkeepers, in the bankruptcy 
of large trading firms, and the overstocking of trading 
enterprises while the purchasing power of the masses 
of the working people continues to decline. 
Such are the results of the five-year plan in four 
years as regards the development of trade turnover.

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 211 
VII 
THE RESULTS 
OF THE FIVE-YEAR PLAN IN FOUR YEARS 
IN THE SPHERE OF THE STRUGGLE 
AGAINST THE REMNANTS OF THE HOSTILE CLASSES 
As a result of the fulfilment of the five-year plan 
in regard to industry, agriculture and trade, we have 
established the principle of socialism in all spheres of 
the national economy and have expelled the capitalist 
elements from them. 
What should this have led to in relation to the capitalist 
elements; and what has it actually led to? 
It has led to this: the last remnants of the moribund 
classes‹the private manufacturers and their servitors, 
the private traders and their henchmen, the former 
nobles and priests the kulaks and kulak agents, the 
former Whiteguard officers and police officials, policemen 
and gendarmes, all sorts of bourgeois intellectuals 
of a chauvinist type, and all other anti-Soviet 
elements‹have been thrown out of their groove. 
Thrown out of their groove, and scattered over the 
whole face of the U.S.S.R., these ³have-beens² have 
wormed their way into our plants and factories, into 
our government offices and trading organisations, into 
our railway and water transport enterprises, and, principally, 
into the collective farms and state farms. 
They have crept into these places and taken cover there, 
donning the mask of ³workers² and ³peasants,² and 
some of them have even managed to worm their way 
into the Party. 
What did they carry with them into these places? 
Of course, they carried with them a feeling of hatred

J. V. S T A L I N 212 
towards the Soviet regime, a feeling of burning enmity 
towards the new forms of economy, life and culture. 
These gentlemen are no longer able to launch a frontal 
attack against the Soviet regime. They and their 
classes made such attacks several times, but they were 
routed and dispersed. Hence, the only thing left them 
is to do mischief and harm to the workers, to the collective 
farmers, to the Soviet regime and to the Party. 
And they are doing as much mischief as they can, acting 
on the sly. They set fire to warehouses and wreck machinery. 
They organise sabotage. They organise wrecking 
activities in the collective farms and state farms, and 
some of them, including certain professors, go to such 
lengths in their passion for wrecking as to inject 
plague and anthrax germs into the cattle on the collective 
farms and state farms, help to spread meningitis 
among horses, etc. 
But that is not the main thing. The main thing in 
the ³work² of these ³have-beens² is that they organise 
mass theft and plundering of state property, co-operative 
property and collective-farm property. Theft 
and plundering in the factories and plants, theft and 
plundering of railway freight, theft and plundering 
in warehouses and trading enterprises‹particularly 
theft and plundering in the state farms and collective 
farms‹such is the main form of the ³work² of these 
³have-beens.² Their class instinct, as i t were, tells 
them that the basis of Soviet economy is public property, 
and that it is precisely this basis that must be 
shaken in order to injure the Soviet regime‹and they 
try indeed to shake the foundations of public ownership, 
by organising mass theft and plundering.

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 213 
In order to organise plundering they play on the 
private property habits and survivals among the collective 
farmers, the individual farmers of yesterday 
who are now members of collective farms. You, as 
Marxists, should know that in its development manıs 
consciousness lags behind his actual position. The position 
of the members of collective farms is that they are 
no longer individual farmers, but collectivists; but 
their consciousness is as yet still the old one‹that of 
private property owners. And so, the ³have-beens² from 
the ranks of the exploiting classes play on the privateproperty 
habits of the collective farmers in order to 
organise the plundering of public wealth and thus shake 
the foundation of the Soviet system, viz., public property. 
Many of our comrades look complacently upon such 
phenomena and fail to understand the meaning and 
significance of this mass theft and plundering. They 
remain blind to these facts and take the view that ³there 
is nothing particular in it.² But these comrades are 
profoundly mistaken. The basis of our system is public 
property, just as private property is the basis of 
capitalism. If the capitalists proclaimed private property 
sacred and inviolable when they were consolidating 
the capitalist system, all the more reason why 
we Communists should proclaim public property sacred 
and in violable in order to consolidate the new socialist 
forms of economy in all spheres of production and 
trade. To permit theft and plundering of public property‹
no matter whether it is state property or co-operative 
or collective-farm property‹and to ignore such 
counter-revolutionary outrages means to aid and abet

J. V. S T A L I N 214 
the undermining of the Soviet system, which rests on 
public property as its basis. It was on these grounds 
that our Soviet Government passed the recent law 
for the protection of public property.61 This enactment 
is the basis of revolutionary law at the present time. 
And it is the prime duty of every Communist, of every 
worker, and of every collective farmer strictly to carry 
out this law. 
It is said that revolutionary law at the present time 
does not differ in any way from revolutionary law in 
the first period of NEP, that revolutionary law at the 
present time is a reversion to revolutionary law of the 
first period of NEP. That is absolutely wrong. The 
sharp edge of revolutionary law in the first period of NEP 
was directed mainly against the excesses of war communism, 
against ³illegal² confiscation and imposts. 
It guaranteed the security of the property of the private 
owner, of the individual peasant and of the capitalist, 
provided they strictly observed the Soviet laws. 
The position in regard to revolutionary law at the present 
time is entirely different. The sharp edge of revolutionary 
law at the present time is directed, not against 
the excesses of war communism, which have long 
ceased to exist, but against thieves and wreckers in 
public economy, against rowdies and pilferers of public 
property. The main concern of revolutionary law at 
the present time is, consequently, the protection of 
public property, and not something else. 
That is why it is one of the fundamental tasks of 
the Party to fight to protect public property, to fight 
with all the measures and all the means placed at our 
command by our Soviet laws.

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 215 
A strong and powerful dictatorship of the proletariat‹
that is what we need now in order to scatter to 
the winds the last remnants of the dying classes and to 
frustrate their thieving designs. 
Some comrades have interpreted the thesis about 
the abolition of classes, the creation of a classless society, 
and the withering away of the state as a justification 
of laziness and complacency, a justification of the 
counter-revolutionary theory of the extinction of the class 
struggle and the weakening of the state power. Needless 
to say, such people can not have anything in common 
with our Party. They are either degenerates or doubledealers, 
and must be driven out of the Party. The abolition 
of classes is not achieved by the extinction of the 
class struggle, but by its intensification. The state 
will wither away, not as a result of weakening the state 
power, but as a result of strengthening it to the utmost, 
which is necessary for finally crushing the remnants 
of the dying classes and for organising defence against 
the capitalist encirclement that is far from having 
been done away with as yet, and will not soon be done 
away with. 
As a result of fulfilling the five-year plan we have 
succeeded in finally ejecting the last remnants of the 
hostile classes from their positions in production; we have 
routed the kulaks and have prepared the ground for 
their elimination. Such are the results of the five-year 
plan in the sphere of the struggle against the last detachments 
of the bourgeoisie. But that is not enough. 
The task is to eject these ³have-beens² from our own 
enterprises and institutions and make them harmless 
for good and all.

J. V. S T A L I N 216 
It cannot be said that these ³have-beens² can alter 
anything in the present position of the U.S.S.R. by 
their wrecking and thieving machinations. They are 
too weak and impotent to withstand the measures adopted 
by the Soviet Government. But if our comrades do 
not arm themselves with revolutionary vigilance and 
do not actually put an end to the smug, philistine attitude 
towards cases of theft and plundering of public property, 
these ³have-beens² may do considerable mischief. 
We must bear in mind that the growth of the power 
of the Soviet state will intensify the resistance of the 
last remnants of the dying classes. It is precisely because 
they are dying and their days are numbered that 
they will go on from one form of attack to another, 
sharper form, appealing to the backward sections of 
the population and mobilising them against the Soviet 
regime. There is no mischief and slander which these 
³have-beens² will not resort to against the Soviet regime 
and around which they will not try to rally the 
backward elements. This may provide the soil for a 
revival of the activities of the defeated groups of the 
old counter-revolutionary parties: the Socialist-Revolutionaries, 
the Mensheviks, and the bourgeois nationalists 
of the central and border regions, it may also 
provide the soil for a revival of the activities of the 
fragments of counter-revolutionary elements among the 
Trotskyites and Right deviators. Of course, there is 
nothing terrible in this. But we must bear all this in 
mind if we want to have done with these elements 
quickly and without particular sacrifice. 
That is why revolutionary vigilance is the quality 
that Bolsheviks especially need at the present time.

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 217 
VIII 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
Such are the main results of the implementation of 
the five-year plan as regards industry and agriculture, 
as regards improving the conditions of life of the working 
people and developing trade turnover, as regards 
consolidating the Soviet regime and developing the 
class struggle against the remnants and survivals of 
the dying classes. 
Such are the successes and gains of the Soviet regime 
during the past four years. 
I t would be a mistake to think that since these 
successes have been attained everything is as it should 
be. Of course, not everything with us is yet as it should 
be. There are plenty of shortcomings and mistakes in 
our work. Inefficiency and confusion are still to be 
met with in our practical work. Unfortunately, I cannot 
now stop to deal with shortcomings and mistakes, as 
the limits of the report I was instructed to make do 
not give me sufficient scope for this. But that is not 
the point just now. The point is that, notwithstanding 
shortcomings and mistakes, the existence of which none 
of us denies, we have achieved such important successes 
as to evoke admiration among the working class all 
over the world, we have achieved a victory that is 
truly of world-wide historic significance. 
What could and actually did play the chief part 
in bringing it about that, despite mistakes and shortcomings, 
the Party has nevertheless achieved decisive 
successes in carrying out the five-year plan in four 
years?

J. V. S T A L I N 218 
What are the main forces that have ensured us this 
historic victory in spite of everything? 
They are, first and foremost, the activity and devotion, 
the enthusiasm and initiative of the vast masses 
of the workers and collective farmers, who, together 
with the engineering and technical forces, displayed 
colossal energy in developing socialist emulation and 
shock-brigade work. There can be no doubt that without 
this we could not have achieved our goal, we could not 
have advanced a single step. 
Secondly, the firm leadership of the Party and of the 
Government, who urged the masses forward and overcame 
all difficulties in the way to the goal. 
And, lastly, the special merits and advantages of 
the Soviet system of economy, which has within it 
the colossal potentialities necessary for overcoming 
difficulties. 
Such are the three main forces that determined the 
historic victory of the U.S.S.R. 
General conclusions: 
1. The results of the five-year plan have refuted the 
assertion of the bourgeois and Social-Democratic leaders 
that the five-year plan was a fantasy, delirium, 
an unrealisable dream. The results of the five-year plan 
show that the five-year plan has already been fulfilled. 
2. The results of the five-year plan have shattered 
the well-known bourgeois ³article of faith² that the 
working class is incapable of building something new, 
that it is capable only of destroying the old. The results 
of the five-year plan have shown that the working class 
is just as well able to build the new as to destroy the 
old.

THE RESULTS OF THE FIRST FIVE-YEAR PLAN 219 
3. The results of the five-year plan have shattered 
the thesis of the Social-Democrats that it is impossible 
to build socialism in one country taken separately. 
The results of the five-year plan have shown that it 
is quite possible to build a socialist society in one 
country; for the economic foundations of such a society 
have already been laid in the U.S.S.R. 
4. The results of the five-year plan have refuted the 
assertion of bourgeois economists that the capitalist 
system of economy is the best of all systems, that 
every other system of economy is unstable and incapable 
of standing the test of the difficulties of economic development. 
The results of the five-year plan have shown 
that the capitalist system of economy is bankrupt and 
unstable; that it has outlived its day and must give 
way to another, a higher, Soviet, socialist system of 
economy; that the only system of economy that has no 
fear of crises and is able to overcome the difficulties 
which capitalism cannot solve, is the Soviet system 
of economy. 
5. Finally, the results of the five-year plan have 
shown that the Communist Party is invincible, if it 
knows its goal, and if it is not afraid of difficulties. 
(Stormy and prolonged applause, increasing to an ovation. 
All rise to greet Comrade Stalin.)

WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 
Speech Delivered on January 11, 1933 
Comrades, I think that the previous speakers have correctly 
described the state of Party work in the countryside, 
its defects and its merits‹particularly its defects. 
Nevertheless, it seems to me that they have failed to 
mention the most important thing about the defects 
of our work in the countryside; they have not disclosed 
the roots of these defects. And yet this aspect is of the 
greatest interest to us. Permit me, therefore, to express 
my opinion on the defects of our work in the countryside, 
to express it with all the straightforwardness characteristic 
of the Bolsheviks. 
What was the main defect in our work in the countryside 
during the past year, 1932? 
The main defect was that our grain procurements 
in 1932 were accompanied by greater difficulties than 
in the previous year, in 1931. 
This was by no means due to the bad state of the 
harvest; for in 1932 our harvest was not worse, but better 
than in the preceding year. No one can deny that the 
total amount of grain harvested in 1932 was larger than 
in 1931, when the drought in five of the principal areas 
of the north-eastern part of the U.S.S.R. considerably 
reduced the countryıs grain output. Of course, in 1932, 
too, we suffered certain losses of crops, as a consequence

WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 221 
of unfavourable climatic conditions in the Kuban and 
Terek regions, and also in certain districts of the Ukraine. 
But there cannot be any doubt that these losses do not 
amount to half those we suffered in 1931 as a result of 
the drought in the north-eastern areas of the U.S.S.R. 
Hence, in 1932 we had more grain in the country than 
in 1931. And yet, despite this circumstance, our grain 
procurements were accompanied by greater difficulties 
in 1932 than in the previous year. 
What was the matter? What are the reasons for 
this defect in our work? How is this disparity to be 
explained? 
1) It is to be explained, in the first place, by the fact 
that our comrades in the localities, our Party workers 
in the countryside, failed to take into account the new 
situation created in the countryside by the authorisation 
of collective-farm trade in grain. And precisely 
because they failed to take the new situation into consideration, 
precisely for that reason, they were unable 
to reorganise their work along new lines to fit in with 
the new situation. So long as there was no collectivefarm 
trade in grain, so long as there were not two prices 
for grain‹the state price and the market price‹the 
situation in the countryside took one form. When collective-
farm trade in grain was authorised, the situation 
was bound to change sharply, because the authorisation 
of collective-farm trade implies the legalisation 
of a market price for grain higher than the established 
state price. There is no need to prove that this circumstance 
was bound to give rise among the peasants to 
a certain reluctance to deliver their grain to the state. 
The peasant calculated as follows: ³Collective-farm

J. V. S T A L I N 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
222 
trade in grain has been authorised; market prices have 
been legalised; in the market I can obtain more for 
a given quantity of grain than if I deliver it to the state‹ 
hence, if I am not a fool, I must hold on to my grain, 
deliver less to the state, leave more grain for collectivefarm 
trade, and in this way get more for the same quantity 
of grain sold.² 
It is the simplest and most natural logic! 
But the unfortunate thing is that our Party workers 
in the countryside, at all events many of them, failed to 
understand this simple and natural thing. In order to 
prevent disruption of the Soviet Governmentıs assignments, 
the Communists in this new situation should 
have done everything to increase and speed up grain 
procurements from the very first days of the harvest, 
as early as July 1932. That was what the situation demanded. 
But what did they actually do? Instead of 
speeding up grain procurements, they began to speed 
up the formation of all sorts of funds in the collective 
farms, thus encouraging the grain producers in their 
reluctance to fulfil their obligations to the state. Failing 
to understand the new situation, they began to 
fear, not that the reluctance of the peasants to deliver 
grain might impede grain procurements, but that it 
would not occur to the peasants to withhold some of 
the grain in order, later on, to place it on the market 
by way of collective farm trade, and that perchance they 
would go ahead and deliver all their grain to the elevators. 
In other words, our Communists in the countryside, 
the majority of them at all events, grasped only the 
positive aspect of collective-farm trade; they under

WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 223 
stood and assimilated its positive aspect, but absolutely 
failed to understand and assimilate the negative aspects 
of collective-farm trade‹they failed to understand 
that the negative aspects of collective farm trade could 
cause great harm to the state if they, i.e., the Communists, 
did not begin to speed up the grain procurement 
campaign to the utmost from the very first days of the 
harvest. 
And this mistake was committed not only by Party 
workers in the collective farms. It was committed also 
by directors of state farms, who criminally held up 
grain that ought to have been delivered to the state 
and began to sell it on the side at a higher price. 
Did the Council of Peopleıs Commissars and the 
Central Committee take into consideration the new 
situation that had arisen as a result of collective-farm 
trade in grain when they issued their decision on the 
development of collective-farm trade?62 Yes, they did 
take it into consideration. In that decision it is plainly 
stated that collective-farm trade in grain may begin 
only after the plan for grain procurements has been wholly 
and entirely fulfilled, and after the seed has been stored. 
It is plainly stated in the decision that only after grain 
procurements have been completed and the seed stored‹ 
approximately by January 15, 1933‹that only after 
these conditions have been fulfilled may collectivefarm 
trade in grain begin. By this decision the Council 
of Peopleıs Commissars and the Central Committee said, 
as it were, to our officials in the countryside: Do not 
allow your attention to be overshadowed by worries 
about all sorts of funds and reserves; do not be diverted 
from the main task; develop the grain-procurement

J. V. S T A L I N 224 
campaign from the very first days of the harvest, and 
speed it up; for the first commandment is‹fulfil the 
plan for grain procurements; the second commandment 
is‹get the seed stored; and only after these conditions 
have been fulfilled may collective-farm trade in grain 
be begun and developed. 
Perhaps the Political Bureau of the Central Committee 
and the Council of Peopleıs Commissars made 
a mistake in not emphasising this aspect of the matter 
strongly enough and in not warning our officials in the 
countryside loudly enough about the dangers latent 
in collective-farm trade. But there can be no doubt 
whatever that they did warn against these dangers, 
and uttered the warning sufficiently clearly. It must 
be admitted that the Central Committee and the Council 
of Peopleıs Commissars somewhat overestimated 
the Leninist training and insight of our officials in the 
localities, not only officials in the districts, but also 
in a number of regions. 
Perhaps collective-farm trade in grain should not 
have been authorised? Perhaps it was a mistake, particularly 
if we bear in mind that collective-farm trade 
has not only positive aspects, but also certain negative 
aspects? 
No, it was not a mistake. No revolutionary measure 
can be guaranteed against having certain negative aspects 
if it is incorrectly carried out. The same must 
be said of collective farm trade in grain. Collectivefarm 
trade is necessary and advantageous both to the 
countryside and to the town, both to the working class 
and to the peasantry. And precisely because it is advantageous 
it had to be introduced.

WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 225 
What considerations were the Council of Peopleıs 
Commissars and the Central Committee guided by when 
they introduced collective-farm trade in grain? 
First of all, by the consideration that this would 
widen the basis of trade turnover between town and 
country, and thus improve the supply of agricultural 
produce to the workers and of urban manufactures to 
the peasants. There can be no doubt that state and cooperative 
trade alone are not sufficient. These channels 
of trade turnover had to be supplemented by a new channel‹
collective-farm trade. And we have supplemented 
them by introducing collective-farm trade. 
Further, they were guided by the consideration that 
collective-farm trade in grain would give the collective 
farmers an additional source of income and strengthen 
their economic position. 
Finally, they were guided by the consideration that 
the introduction of collective-farm trade would give 
the peasants a fresh stimulus for improving the work 
of the collective farms as regards both sowing and harvesting. 
As you know, all these considerations of the Council 
of Peopleıs Commissars and the Central Committee have 
been fully confirmed by the recent facts about the life 
of the collective farms. The accelerated process of consolidation 
of the collective farms, the cessation of withdrawals 
from the collective farms, the growing eagerness 
of individual peasants to join the collective farms, 
the tendency of the collective farmers to show greater 
discrimination in accepting new members‹all this and 
much of a like character shows beyond a doubt that 
collective-farm trade not only has not weakened, but,

J. V. S T A L I N 226 
on the contrary, has strengthened and consolidated the 
position of the collective farms. 
Hence, the defects in our work in the countryside 
are not to be explained by collective-farm trade, but 
by the fact that it is not always properly conducted, by 
inability to take the new situation into account, by inability 
to reorganise our ranks to cope with the new 
situation created by the authorisation of collectivefarm 
trade in grain. 
2) The second reason for the defects in our work in 
the countryside is that our comrades in the localities‹ 
and not only those comrades‹have failed to understand 
the change that has taken place in the conditions of 
our work in the countryside as a result of the predominant 
position acquired by the collective farms in the 
principal grain-growing areas. We all rejoice at the fact 
that the collective form of farming has become the predominant 
form in our grain areas. But not all of us realise 
that this circumstance does not diminish but increases 
our cares and responsibilities in regard to the 
development of agriculture. Many think that once we 
have achieved, say, 70 or 80 per cent collectivisation 
in a given district, or in a given region, we have got 
all we need, and can now let things take their natural 
course, let them proceed automatically, on the assumption 
that collectivisation will do its work itself and 
will itself raise agriculture to a higher level. But this 
is a profound delusion, comrades. As a matter of fact, 
the transition to collective farming as the predominant 
form of farming does not diminish but increases our 
cares in regard to agriculture, does not diminish but 
increases the leading role of the Communists in raising

WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 227 
agriculture to a higher level. Letting things take their 
own course is now more dangerous than ever for the development 
of agriculture. Letting things take their 
own course may now ruin everything. 
As long as the individual peasant predominated in 
the countryside the Party could confine its intervention 
in the development of agriculture to certain acts of 
assistance, advice or warning. At that time the individual 
peasant had to take care of his farm himself; 
for he had no one upon whom to throw the responsibility 
for his farm, which was merely his own personal 
farm, and he had no one to rely upon except himself. 
At that time the individual peasant himself had to 
take care of the sowing and harvesting, and all the processes 
of agricultural labour in general, if he did not 
want to be left without bread and fall a victim to starvation. 
With the transition to collective farming the 
situation has changed materially. The collective farm 
is not the enterprise of any one individual. In fact, the 
collective farmers now say: ³The collective farm is 
mine and not mine; it belongs to me, but it also belongs 
to Ivan, Philip, Mikhail and the other members of the 
collective farm; the collective farm is common property.² 
Now, he, the collective farmer‹the individual 
peasant of yesterday, who is the collectivist of today‹ 
can shift the responsibility to and rely upon other members 
of the collective farm, knowing that the collective 
farm will not leave him without bread. That is why the 
collective farmer now has fewer cares than when he was 
on his individual farm; for the cares and responsibility 
for the enterprise are now shared by all the collective 
farmers.

J. V. S T A L I N 228 
What, then, follows from this? It follows from this that 
the prime responsibility for conducting the farm has now 
been transferred from the individual peasants to the 
leadership of the collective farm, to the leading group of 
the collective farm. Now it is not to themselves that the 
peasants put the demand for care for the farm and its rational 
management, but to the leadership of the collective 
farm; or, more correctly, not so much to themselves 
as to the leadership of the collective farm. And what 
does this mean? It means that the Party can no longer 
confine itself to individual acts of intervention in the 
process of agricultural development. It must now take 
over the direction of the collective farms, assume responsibility 
for the work, and help the collective farmers 
to develop their farms on the basis of science and technology. 
But that is not all. A collective farm is a large enterprise. 
And a large enterprise cannot be managed without 
a plan. A large agricultural enterprise embracing hundreds 
and sometimes thousands of households can be 
run only on the basis of planned management. Without 
that it is bound to go to rack and ruin. There you have 
yet another new condition arising from the collectivefarm 
system and radically different from the conditions 
under which individual small farms are run. Can we 
leave the conduct of such an enterprise to the so-called 
natural course of things, to allow it to proceed automatically? 
Clearly, we cannot. To conduct such an enterprise, 
the collective farm must have a certain minimum 
number of people with at least some education, people 
who are capable of planning the business and running 
it in an organised manner. Naturally, without system

WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 229 
atic intervention on the part of the Soviet Government 
in the work of collective-farm development, without 
its systematic aid, such an enterprise cannot be 
put into proper shape. 
And what follows from this? It follows from this that 
the collective-farm system does not diminish but increases 
the cares and responsibility of the Party and of 
the Government in regard to the development of agriculture. 
It follows from this that if the Party desires to 
direct the collective-farm movement, it must enter into 
all the details of collective-farm life and collectivefarm 
management. It follows from this that the Party 
must not diminish but multiply its contacts with the 
collective farms; that it must know all that is going 
on in the collective farms, in order to render them timely 
aid and to avert the dangers that threaten them. 
But what do we see in actual practice? In actual 
practice we see that quite a number of district and regional 
Party organisations are divorced from the life 
of the collective farms and from their requirements. 
People sit in offices, where they complacently indulge 
in pen-pushing, and fail to see that the development of 
the collective farms is going on independently of bureaucratic 
offices. In some cases this divorce from the collective-
farms has gone so far that certain members of 
territorial Party organisations have learned of what 
was going on in the collective farms in their regions, 
not from the respective district organisations, but 
from members of the Central Committee in Moscow. 
That is sad but true, comrades. The transition from 
individual farming to collective farming should have 
led to stronger Communist leadership in the country

J. V. S T A L I N 230 
side. In fact, however, it has led in a number of cases 
to Communists resting on their laurels, to their boasting 
of high percentages of collectivisation, while leaving 
things to proceed automatically, letting them take 
their natural course. The problem of planned leadership 
of collective farms should have led to an intensification 
of Communist leadership in the collective farms. In 
fact, however, what has happened in a number of cases 
is that the Communists have been quite out of it, and the 
collective farms have been run by former White officers, 
former Petlyura-ists, and enemies of the workers and 
peasants generally. 
That is the position in regard to the second reason 
for the defects in our work in the countryside. 
3) The third reason for the defects in our work in 
the countryside is that many of our comrades overestimated 
the collective farms as a new form of economy, 
overestimated them and converted them into an icon. 
They decided that since we have collective farms, which 
represent a socialist form of economy, we have everything; 
that this is sufficient to ensure the proper management 
of these farms, the proper planning of collective 
farming, and the conversion of the collective farms into 
exemplary socialist enterprises. They failed to understand 
that in their organisational structure the collective 
farms are still weak and need considerable assistance 
from the Party both in the way of providing them with 
tried Bolshevik cadres, and in the way of guidance in 
their day-to-day affairs. But that is not all, and not 
even the main thing. The main defect is that many of 
our comrades overestimated the strength and possibilities 
of the collective farms as a new form of organi

WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 231 
sation of agriculture. They failed to understand that, 
in spite of being a socialist form of economy, the collective 
farms by themselves are yet far from being guaranteed 
against all sorts of dangers and against the 
penetration of all sorts of counter-revolutionary elements 
into their leadership; that they are not guaranteed 
against the possibility that under certain circumstances 
anti-Soviet elements may use the collective 
farms for their own ends. 
The collective farm is a socialist form of economic 
organisation, just as the Soviets are a socialist form 
of political organisation. Both collective farms and Soviets 
are a tremendous achievement of our revolution, 
a tremendous achievement of the working class. But 
collective farms and Soviets are only a form of organisation‹
a socialist form, it is true, but only a form of 
organisation for all that. Everything depends upon the 
content that is put into this form. 
We know of cases when Soviets of Workersı and 
Soldiersı Deputies for a certain time supported the counter-
revolution against the revolution. That was the case 
in our country, in the U.S.S.R., in July 1917, for example, 
when the Soviets were led by the Mensheviks and 
the Socialist-Revolutionaries, and when the Soviets 
shielded the counter-revolution against the revolution. 
That was the case in Germany at the end of 1918, when 
the Soviets were led by the Social-Democrats, and when 
they shielded the counter-revolution against the revolution. 
Hence, it is not only a matter of Soviets as 
a form of organisation, even though that form is a great 
revolutionary achievement in itself. It is primarily 
a matter of the content of the work of the Soviets; it

J. V. S T A L I N 232 
is a matter of the character of the work of the Soviets; 
it is a matter of who leads the Soviets‹revolutionaries 
or counter-revolutionaries. That, indeed, explains the 
fact that counter-revolutionaries are not always opposed 
to Soviets. It is well known, for example, that during 
the Kronstadt mutiny63 Milyukov, the leader of the 
Russian counter-revolution, came out in favour of Soviets, 
but without Communists. ³Soviets without Communists²‹
that was the slogan Milyukov, the leader of 
the Russian counter-revolution, advanced at that time. 
The counter-revolutionaries understood that it is not 
merely a matter of the Soviets as such, but, primarily, 
a matter of who is to lead them. 
The same must be said of the collective farms. Collective 
farms, as a socialist form of economic organisation, 
may perform miracles of economic construction 
if they are headed by real revolutionaries, Bolsheviks, 
Communists. On the other hand, collective farms may 
for a certain period become a shield for all sorts of counter-
revolutionary acts if these collective farms are run 
by Socialist-Revolutionaries and Mensheviks, Petlyura 
officers and other Whiteguards, former Denikinites and 
Kolchakites. Moreover, it must be borne in mind that 
the collective farms, as a form of organisation, not 
only are not guaranteed against the penetration of anti- 
Soviet elements, but, at first, even provide certain facilities 
which enable counter-revolutionaries to take advantage 
of them temporarily. As long as the peasants 
were engaged in individual farming they were scattered 
and separated from one another, and therefore the counter-
revolutionary tendencies of anti-Soviet elements 
among the peasantry could not be very effective. The

WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 233 
situation is altogether different once the peasants have 
adopted collective farming. In the collective farms the 
peasants have a ready-made form of mass organisation. 
Therefore, the penetration of anti-Soviet elements into 
the collective farms and their anti-Soviet activities 
may be much more effective. We must assume that the 
anti-Soviet elements take all this into account. We 
know that a section of the counter-revolutionaries, for 
example, in the North Caucasus, themselves strive to 
create something in the nature of collective farms, using 
them as a legal cover for their underground organisations. 
We know also that the anti-Soviet elements in 
a number of districts, where they have not yet been 
exposed and crushed, readily join the collective farms, 
and even praise them to the skies, in order to create 
within them nests of counter-revolutionary activity. We 
know also that a section of the anti-Soviet elements are 
themselves now coming out in favour of collective farms, 
but on condition that there are no Communists in the 
collective farms. ³Collective farms without Communists²‹
that is the slogan that is now being put forward 
among anti-Soviet elements. Hence, it is not only 
a matter of the collective farms themselves as a socialist 
form of organisation; it is primarily a matter of the 
content that is put into this form; i t is primarily a 
matter of who stands at the head of the collective farms 
and who leads them. 
From the point of view of Leninism, collective farms, 
like the Soviets, taken as a form of organisation, are 
a weapon, and only a weapon. Under certain conditions 
this weapon can be turned against the revolution. It 
can be turned against counter-revolution. It can serve

J. V. S T A L I N 234 
the working class and peasantry. Under certain conditions 
it can serve the enemies of the working class and 
peasantry. It all depends upon who wields this weapon 
and against whom it is directed. 
The enemies of the workers and peasants, guided 
by their class instinct, are beginning to understand this. 
Unfortunately, some of our Communists still fail to 
understand it. 
And it is precisely because some of our Communists 
have not understood this simple thing that we now 
have a situation where a number of collective farms 
are managed by well-camouflaged anti-Soviet elements, 
who organise wrecking and sabotage in them. 
4) The fourth reason for the defects in our work in 
the countryside is the inability of a number of our comrades 
in the localities to reorganise the front of the 
struggle against the kulaks; their failure to understand 
that the face of the class enemy has changed of late, 
that the tactics of the class enemy in the countryside 
have changed, and that we must change our tactics accordingly 
if we are to achieve success. The enemy understands 
the changed situation, understands the strength 
and the might of the new system in the countryside; 
and because he understands this, he has reorganised 
his ranks, has changed his tactics‹has passed from 
frontal attacks against the collective farms to activities 
conducted on the sly. But we have failed to understand 
this; we have overlooked the new situation and 
continue to seek the class enemy where he is no longer 
to be found; we continue to apply the old tactics of a 
simplified struggle against the kulaks at a time when 
these tactics have long since become obsolete.

WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 235 
People look for the class enemy outside the collective 
farms; they look for persons with ferocious visages, 
with enormous teeth and thick necks, and with sawnoff 
shotguns in their hands. They look for kulaks like 
those depicted on our posters. But such kulaks have 
long ceased to exist on the surface. The present-day 
kulaks and kulak agents, the present-day anti-Soviet 
elements in the countryside are in the main ³quiet,² 
³smooth-spoken,² almost ³saintly² people. There is no 
need to look for them far from the collective farms; 
they are inside the collective farms, occupying posts as 
storekeepers, managers, accountants, secretaries, etc. 
They will never say, ³Down with the collective farms!² 
They are ³in favour² of collective farms. But inside 
the collective farms they carry on sabotage and wrecking 
work that certainly does the collective farms no good. 
They will never say, ³Down with grain procurements!² 
They are ³in favour² of grain procurements. They 
³only² resort to demagogy and demand that the collective 
farm should reserve a fund for the needs of livestock-
raising three times as large as that actually required; 
that the collective farm should set aside an insurance 
fund three times as large as that actually required; that 
the collective farm should provide from six to ten pounds 
of bread per working member per day for public catering, 
etc. Of course, after such ³funds² have been formed and 
such grants for public catering made, after such rascally 
demagogy, the economic strength of the collective farms 
is bound to be undermined, and there is little left for 
grain procurements. 
In order to see through such a cunning enemy and 
not to succumb to demagogy, one must possess revolu

J. V. S T A L I N 236 
tionary vigilance; one must possess the ability to tear 
the mask from the face of the enemy and reveal to the 
collective farmers his real counter-revolutionary features. 
But have we many Communists in the countryside 
who possess these qualities? Not infrequently Communists 
not only fail to expose these class enemies, but, 
on the contrary, they themselves yield to their rascally 
demagogy and follow in their wake. 
Failing to notice the class enemy in his new mask, 
and being unable to expose his rascally machinations, 
certain of our comrades not infrequently soothe themselves 
with the idea that the kulaks no longer exist; 
that the anti-Soviet elements in the countryside have 
already been destroyed as a result of the policy of eliminating 
the kulaks as a class; and that in view of this 
we can now reconcile ourselves to the existence of ³neutral² 
collective farms, which are neither Bolshevik nor 
anti-Soviet but which are bound to come over to the 
side of the Soviet Government spontaneously, as it 
were. But that is a profound delusion, comrades. The 
kulaks have been defeated, but they are far from having 
been crushed yet. More than that, they will not be 
crushed very soon if the Communists go round gaping in 
smug contentment, in the belief that the kulaks will 
themselves walk into their graves, in the process of their 
spontaneous development, so to speak. As for ³neutral² 
collective farms, there is not, and there cannot be, 
any such thing. ³Neutral² collective farms are a fantasy 
conjured up by people who have eyes but do not 
see. Where there is such an acute class struggle as is 
now going on in our Soviet country there is no room 
for ³neutral² collective farms; under such circum

WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 237 
stances, collective farms can be either Bolshevik or anti- 
Soviet. And if certain collective farms are not being 
led by us, that means that they are being led by 
anti-Soviet elements. There can be no doubt about 
that. 
5) Finally, there is one other reason for the defects 
in our work in the countryside. This consists in underestimating 
the role and responsibility of Communists 
in the work of collective-farm development, in underestimating 
the role and responsibility of Communists in 
the matter of grain procurements. In speaking of the 
difficulties of grain procurement, Communists usually 
throw the responsibility upon the peasants, claiming 
that the peasants are to blame for everything. But that 
is absolutely untrue, and certainly unjust. The peasants 
are not to blame at all. If we are to speak of responsibility 
and blame, then the responsibility falls wholly 
upon the Communists, and we Communists alone are 
to blame for all this. 
There is not, nor has there ever been, in the world 
such a powerful and authoritative government as our 
Soviet Government. There is not, nor has there ever 
been, in the world such a powerful and authoritative 
party as our Communist Party. No one prevents us, 
nor can anyone prevent us, from managing the affairs 
of the collective farms in the way that is required by 
the interests of the collective farms, the interests of the 
state. And if we do not always succeed in managing the 
affairs of the collective farms in the way that Leninism 
requires; if, not infrequently, we commit gross, unpardonable 
mistakes with regard to grain procurements, 
say‹then we, and we alone, are to blame.

J. V. S T A L I N 238 
We are to blame for not having perceived the negative 
aspects of collective-farm trade in grain, and for 
having committed a number of gross mistakes. 
We are to blame for the fact that a number of our 
Party organisations have become divorced from the collective 
farms, have been resting on their laurels and 
allowing things to take their own course. 
We are to blame for the fact that a number of our 
comrades still overestimate the collective farms as a 
form of mass organisation, and fail to understand that 
it is not so much a matter of the form as of taking the 
leadership of the collective farms into our own hands 
and expelling the anti-Soviet elements from the leadership 
of the collective farms. 
We are to blame for not having perceived the new 
situation and for not having appreciated the new tactics 
of the class enemy, who is carrying on his activities on 
the sly. 
One may ask: What have the peasants to do with it? 
I know of whole groups of collective farms which 
are developing and flourishing, which punctually carry 
out the assignments of the state and are becoming economically 
stronger day by day. On the other hand, I know 
also of collective farms, situated in the neighbourhood 
of the first-mentioned, which, in spite of having the same 
harvest yields and objective conditions as these, are 
nevertheless wilting and in a state of decay. What is 
the reason for this? The reason is that the first group of 
collective farms are led by real Communists, while the 
second group are led by drifters‹with Party membership 
cards in their pockets, it is true, but drifters all 
the same.

WORK IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 239 
One may ask: What have the peasants to do with it? 
The result of underestimating the role and responsibility 
of Communists is that, not infrequently, the 
reason for the defects in our work in the countryside is 
not sought where it should be sought, and because of 
this the defects remain unremoved. 
The reason for the difficulties of grain procurement 
must be sought not among the peasants, but among 
ourselves, in our own ranks. For we are at the helm; 
we have the resources of the state at our disposal; it is 
our mission to lead the collective farms; and we must bear 
the whole responsibility for the work in the countryside. 
These are the main reasons for the defects of our 
work in the countryside. 
It may be thought that I have drawn too gloomy a 
picture; that all our work in the countryside consists 
exclusively of defects. That, of course, is not true. As 
a matter of fact, alongside these defects, our work in 
the countryside shows a number of important and decisive 
achievements. But, as I said at the beginning of 
my speech, I did not set out to describe our achievements; 
I set out to speak only about the defects of our 
work in the countryside. 
Can these defects be remedied? Yes, unquestionably, 
they can. Shall we remedy them in the near future? 
Yes, unquestionably, we shall. There cannot be the slightest 
doubt about that. 
I think that the Political Departments of the machine 
and tractor stations and of the state farms represent 
one of the decisive means by which these defects can 
be removed in the shortest time. (Stormy and prolonged 
applause.)

TO RABOTNITSA64 
Ardent greetings to Rabotnitsa on the tenth anniversary 
of its existence. I wish it every success in training 
the masses of proletarian women in the spirit of the struggle 
for the complete triumph of socialism, in the spirit 
of carrying out the great behests of our teacher Lenin. 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 25, 
January 26, 1933

LETTER TO COMRADE I. N. BAZHANOV 
Dear Comrade I. N. Bazhanov, 
I have received your letter ceding me your second 
Order as a reward for my work. 
I thank you very much for your warm words and comradely 
present. I know what you are depriving yourself 
of in my favour and appreciate your sentiments. 
Nevertheless, I cannot accept your second Order. 
I cannot and must not accept it, not only because it can 
belong only to you, as you alone have earned it, but 
also because I have been amply rewarded as it is by 
the attention and respect of the comrades and, consequently, 
have no right to rob you. 
Orders were instituted not for those who are well 
known as it is, but mainly for heroic people who are 
little known and who need to be made known to all. 
Besides, I must tell you that I already have two 
Orders. That is more than one needs, I assure you. 
I apologise for the delay in replying. 
With communist greetings, 
J. Stalin 
P.S. I am returning the Order to where it belongs. 
J. Stalin 
February 16, 1933 
Published for the first time

SPEECH DELIVERED 
AT THE FIRST ALL-UNION CONGRESS 
OF COLLECTIVE-FARM SHOCK BRIGADERS65 
February 19, 1933 
Comrade collective farmers, men and women! I did 
not intend to speak at your congress. I did not intend 
to because the previous speakers have said all that had 
to be said‹and have said it well and to the point. Is 
it worth while to speak after that? But as you insist, 
and the power is in your hands (prolonged applause), 
I must submit. 
I shall say a few words on various questions. 
I 
THE COLLECTIVE-FARM PATH 
IS THE ONLY RIGHT PATH 
First question. Is the path which the collective-farm 
peasantry has taken the right path, is the path of collective 
farming the right one? 
That is not an idle question. You shock brigaders of 
the collective farms evidently have no doubt that the 
collective farms are on the right path. Possibly, for 
that reason, the question will seem superfluous to you. 
But not all peasants think as you do. There are still 
not a few among the peasants, even among the collec

SPEECH AT THE FIRST CONGRESS OF SHOCK BRIGADERS 243 
tive farmers, who have doubts as to whether the collective-
farm path is the right one. And there is nothing 
surprising about it. 
Indeed, for hundreds of years people have lived in 
the old way, have followed the old path, have bent 
their backs to the kulaks and landlords, to the usurers 
and speculators. It cannot be said that that old, capitalist 
path was approved by the peasants. But that old 
path was a beaten path, the customary path, and no one 
had actually proved that it was possible to live in a different 
way, in a better way. The more so as in all bourgeois 
countries people are still living in the old way. . . . 
And suddenly the Bolsheviks break in on this old stagnant 
life, break in like a storm and say: It is time to 
abandon the old path, it is time to begin living in a 
new way, in the collective-farm way; it is time to begin 
living not as everyone lives in bourgeois countries, but in 
a new way, co-operatively. But what is this new life‹ 
who can tell? May it not turn out to be worse than the 
old life? At all events, the new path is not the customary 
path, it is not a beaten path, not yet a fully explored 
path. Would it not be better to keep to the old path? 
Would it not be better to wait a little before embarking 
on the new, collective-farm path? Is it worth while 
to take the risk? 
These are the doubts that are now troubling one 
section of the labouring peasantry. 
Ought we not to dispel these doubts? Ought we not 
to bring these doubts out into the light of day and show 
what they are worth? Clearly, we ought to. 
Hence, the question I have just put cannot be described 
as an idle one.

J. V. S T A L I N 244 
And so, is the path which the collective-farm peasantry 
has taken the right one? 
Some comrades think that the transition to the new 
path, to the collective-farm path, started in our country 
three years ago. This is only partly true. Of course, the 
development of collective farms on a mass scale started 
in our country three years ago. The transition, as we 
know, was marked by the routing of the kulaks and by 
a movement among the vast masses of the poor and 
middle peasantry to join the collective farms. All that 
is true. But in order to start this mass transition to the 
collective farms, certain preliminary conditions had 
to be available, without which, generally speaking, 
the mass collective-farm movement would have been 
inconceivable. 
First of all, we had to have the Soviet power, which 
has helped and continues to help the peasantry to take 
the collective-farm path: 
Secondly, it was necessary to drive out the landlords 
and the capitalists, to take the factories and the 
land away from them and declare these the property 
of the people. 
Thirdly, it was necessary to curb the kulaks and to 
take machines and tractors away from them. 
Fourthly, it was necessary to declare that the machines 
and tractors could be used only by the poor and 
middle peasants united in collective farms. 
Finally, it was necessary to industrialise the country, 
to set up a new tractor industry, to build new factories 
for the manufacture of agricultural machinery, 
in order to supply tractors and machines in abundance 
to the collective-farm peasantry.

SPEECH AT THE FIRST CONGRESS OF SHOCK BRIGADERS 245 
Without these preliminary conditions there could 
have been no question of the mass transition to the collective-
farm path that started three years ago. 
Hence, in order to adopt the collective-farm path 
it was necessary first of all to accomplish the October 
Revolution, to overthrow the capitalists and landlords, 
to take the land and factories away from them and to 
set up a new industry. 
It was with the October Revolution that the transition 
to the new path, to the collective-farm path, started. 
This transition developed with fresh force only three 
years ago because it was not until then that the economic 
results of the October Revolution made themselves 
fully felt, it was not until then that success was achieved 
in pushing forward the industrialisation of the country. 
The history of nations knows not a few revolutions. 
But those revolutions differ from the October Revolution 
in that all of them were one-sided revolutions. One 
form of exploitation of the working people was replaced 
by another form of exploitation, but exploitation itself 
remained. One set of exploiters and oppressors was replaced 
by another set of exploiters and oppressors, but 
exploiters and oppressors, as such, remained. Only the 
October Revolution set itself the aim of abolishing all 
exploitation and of eliminating all exploiters and oppressors. 
The revolution of the slaves eliminated the slaveowners 
and abolished the form of exploitation of 
the toilers as slaves. But in their place it set up the serf owners 
and the form of exploitation of the toilers as serfs. One 
set of exploiters was replaced by another set of exploiters. 
Under the slave system the ³law² permitted the

J. V. S T A L I N 246 
slave-owner to kill his slaves. Under serfdom the ³law² 
permitted the serf owner ³only² to sell his serfs. 
The revolution of the peasant-serfs eliminated the 
serf owners and abolished the serf form of exploitation. 
But in their place it set up the capitalists and landlords, 
the capitalist and landlord form of exploitation of the 
toilers. One set of exploiters was replaced by another 
set of exploiters. Under the serf system the ³law² permitted 
the sale of serfs. Under the capitalist system 
the ³law² permits ³only² of the toilers being doomed 
to unemployment and destitution, to ruin and death 
from starvation. 
It was only our Soviet revolution, only our October 
Revolution that dealt with the question, not of substituting 
one set of exploiters for another, not of substituting 
one form of exploitation for another, but of eradicating 
all exploitation, of eradicating all exploiters, all 
the rich and oppressors, old and new. (Prolonged applause.) 
That is why the October Revolution was a preliminary 
condition and a necessary prerequisite for the 
peasantsı transition to the new, collective-farm path. 
Did the peasants act rightly in supporting the October 
Revolution? Yes, they did. They acted rightly, 
because the October Revolution helped them to shake 
off the yoke of the landlords and capitalists, the usurers 
and kulaks, the merchants and speculators. 
But that is only one side of the question. It is all 
very well to drive out the oppressors, to drive out the 
landlords and capitalists, to curb the kulaks and speculators. 
But that is not enough. In order to become entirely 
free from the old fetters it is not enough merely 
to rout the exploiters; it is necessary also to build a

SPEECH AT THE FIRST CONGRESS OF SHOCK BRIGADERS 247 
new life‹to build a life that will enable the labouring 
peasants to improve their material conditions and culture 
and make continuous progress from day to day and 
year to year. In order to achieve this, a new system must 
be set up in the countryside, the collective-farm system. 
That is the other side of the question. 
What is the difference between the old system and 
the new, collective-farm system? 
Under the old system the peasants worked singly, 
following the ancient methods of their forefathers and 
using antiquated implements of labour; they worked 
for the landlords and capitalists, the kulaks and speculators; 
they worked and lived half-starved while they 
enriched others. Under the new, collective-farm system 
the peasants work in common, cooperatively, with the 
help of modern implements‹tractors and agricultural 
machinery; they work for themselves and their collective 
farms; they live without capitalists and landlords, without 
kulaks and speculators; they work with the object of 
raising their standard of welfare and culture from day to 
day. Over there, under the old system, the government is a 
bourgeois government, and it supports the rich against 
the labouring peasantry. Here, under the new, collectivefarm 
system, the government is a workersı and peasantsı 
government, and it supports the workers and peasants 
against all the rich of whatever kind. The old system 
leads to capitalism. The new system leads to socialism. 
There you have the two paths, the capitalist path and 
the socialist path: the path forward‹to socialism, and 
the path backward‹to capitalism. 
There are people who think that some sort of third 
path could be followed. This unknown third path is most

J. V. S T A L I N 248 
eagerly clutched at by some wavering comrades who 
are not yet convinced that the collective-farm path is 
the right one. They want us to return to the old system, 
to return to individual farming, but without capitalists 
and landlords. Moreover, they ³only² want us to permit 
the existence of the kulaks and other small capitalists 
as a legitimate phenomenon of our economic 
system. Actually, this i s not a third path, but the 
second path‹the path to capitalism. For what does 
i t mean to return to individual farming and to restore 
the kulaks? It means restoring kulak bondage, 
restoring the exploitation of the peasantry by the kulaks 
and giving the kulaks power. But is it possible to 
restore the kulaks and at the same time to preserve 
the Soviet power? No, it is not possible. The restoration 
of the kulaks is bound to lead to the creation of 
a kulak power and to the liquidation of the Soviet 
power‹hence, i t is bound to lead to the formation 
of a bourgeois government. And the formation of a 
bourgeois government is bound to lead in i t s turn 
to the restoration of the landlords and capitalists, to 
the restoration of capitalism. The so-called third path 
is actually the second path, the path leading back 
to capitalism. Ask the peasants whether they want to 
restore kulak bondage, to return to capitalism, to destroy 
the Soviet power and restore power to the landlords 
and capitalists. Just ask them, and you will 
find out which path the majority of the labouring 
peasants regard as the only right path. 
Hence, there are only two paths: either forward 
and uphill‹to the new, collective-farm system; or backward 
and down hill‹to the old kulak-capitalist system.

SPEECH AT THE FIRST CONGRESS OF SHOCK BRIGADERS 249 
There is no third path. 
The labouring peasants did right to reject the capitalist 
path and take the path of collective-farm development. 
It is said that the collective-farm path is the right 
path, but a difficult one. That is only partly true. 
Of course, there are difficulties on this path. A good 
life cannot be obtained with out effort. But the point is 
that the main difficulties are over, and those difficulties 
which now confront you are not worth talking 
about seriously. At all events, compared with the difficulties 
which the workers experienced 10-15 years ago, 
your present difficulties, comrade collective farmers, 
seem mere childıs play. Your speakers here have praised 
the workers of Leningrad, Moscow, Kharkov, and the 
Donbas. They said that these workers have achievements 
to their credit and that you, collective farmers, 
have far fewer achievements. It seems to me that even 
a certain comradely envy was apparent in the remarks 
of your speakers, as if to say: How good it would be 
if we collective-farm peasants had the same achievements 
as you workers of Leningrad, Moscow, the Donbas, 
and Kharkov. . . . 
That is all very well. But do you know what these 
achievements cost the workers of Leningrad and Moscow; 
what privations they had to endure in order finally to 
attain these achievements? I could relate to you some 
facts from the life of the workers in 1918, when for whole 
weeks not a piece of bread, let alone meat or other food, 
was distributed to the workers. The best times were considered 
to be the days on which we were able to distribute 
to the workers in Leningrad and Moscow one-eighth

J. V. S T A L I N 250 
of a pound of black bread each, and even that was half 
bran. And that lasted not merely a month or six months, 
but for two whole years. But the workers bore it and did 
not lose heart; for they knew that better times would 
come and that they would achieve decisive successes. 
Well‹you see that the workers were not mistaken. Just 
compare your difficulties and privations with the difficulties 
and privations which the workers have endured, 
and you will see that they are not even worth talking 
about seriously. 
What is needed to push forward the collective-farm 
movement and extend collective-farm development to 
the utmost? 
What is needed, in the first place, is that the collective 
farms should have land fully secured to them 
and suitable for cultivation. Do you have that? Yes, 
you do. It is well known that the best lands have been 
transferred to the collective farms and have been durably 
secured to them. Hence, the collective farmers can cultivate 
and improve their land as they please without any 
fear that it will be taken from them and given to somebody 
else. 
What is needed, secondly, is that the collective 
farmers should have at their disposal tractors and machines. 
Do you have them? Yes, you do. Everyone 
knows that our tractor works and agricultural machinery 
works produce primarily and mainly for the collective 
farms, supplying them with all modern implements. 
What is needed, finally, is that the government 
should support the collective-farm peasants to the utmost 
both with men and money, and that it should prevent 
the last remnants of the hostile classes from disrupt

SPEECH AT THE FIRST CONGRESS OF SHOCK BRIGADERS 251 
ing the collective farms. Have you such a government? 
Yes, you have. It is called the Workersı and Peasantsı 
Soviet Government. Name another country where 
the government supports, not the capitalists and landlords, 
not the kulaks and other rich, but the labouring 
peasants. There is not, nor has there ever been, another 
country like this in the world. Only here, in the Land 
of Soviets, does a government exist which stands solidly 
for the workers and collective-farm peasants, for all 
the working people of town and country, against all the 
rich and the exploiters. (Prolonged applause.) 
Hence, you have all that is needed to extend collective-
farm development and to free yourself entirely 
from the old fetters. 
Of you only one thing is demanded‹and that is to 
work conscientiously; to distribute collective-farm incomes 
according to the amount of work done; to take 
care of collective farm property, to take care of the tractors 
and machines; to see to it that the horses are well 
looked after; to fulfil the assignments of your workersı 
and peasantsı state; to consolidate the collective farms 
and to expel from the collective farms the kulaks and 
kulak agents who have wormed their way into them. 
You will surely agree with me that to overcome these 
difficulties, i.e., to work conscientiously and to take 
good care of collective-farm property, is not so very 
difficult. The more so that you are now working, not 
for the rich and not for exploiters, but for yourselves, 
for your own collective farms. 
As you see, the collective-farm path, the path of 
socialism, is the only right path for the labouring peasants.

J. V. S T A L I N 252 
II 
OUR IMMEDIATE TASK‹TO MAKE 
ALL THE COLLECTIVE FARMERS PROSPEROUS 
Second question. What have we achieved on the new 
path, on our collective-farm path, and what do we expect 
to achieve within the next two or three years? 
Socialism is a good thing. A happy, socialist life 
is unquestionably a good thing. But all that is a matter 
of the future. The main question now is not what we shall 
achieve in the future. The main question is: What have 
we already achieved at present? The peasantry has taken 
the collective-farm path. That is very good. But what has 
it achieved on this path? What tangible results have we 
achieved by following the collective-farm path? 
One of our achievements is that we have helped the 
vast masses of the poor peasants to join the collective 
farms. One of our achievements is that by joining the 
collective farms, where they have at their disposal the 
best land and the finest instruments of production, the 
vast masses of the poor peasants have risen to the level 
of middle peasants. One of our achievements is that the 
vast masses of the poor peasants, who formerly lived in 
semi-starvation, have now, in the collective farms, become 
middle peasants, have attained material security. 
One of our achievements is that we have put a stop to 
the differentiation of the peasants into poor peasants 
and kulaks; that we have routed the kulaks and have 
helped the poor peasants to become masters of their own 
labour in the collective farms, to become middle peasants. 
What was the situation before the expansion of collective-
farm development about four years ago? The

SPEECH AT THE FIRST CONGRESS OF SHOCK BRIGADERS 253 
kulaks were growing rich and were on the upgrade. The 
poor peasants were becoming poorer, were sinking into 
ruin and falling into bondage to the kulaks. The middle 
peasants were trying to climb up to the kulaks, but they 
were continually tumbling down and swelling the ranks 
of the poor peasants, to the amusement of the kulaks. 
It is not difficult to see that the only ones to profit by 
this scramble were the kulaks, and perhaps, here and 
there, some of the well-to-do peasants. Out of every hundred 
households in the countryside you could count four 
to five kulak households, eight or ten well-to-do peasant 
households, forty-five to fifty middle-peasant households, 
and some thirty-five poor-peasant households. Hence, 
at the lowest estimate, thirty-five per cent of all the 
peasant households were poor-peasant households, compelled 
to bear the yoke of kulak bondage. That is apart 
from the economically weaker strata of the middle peasants, 
comprising more than half of the middle peasantry, 
whose condition differed little from that of the poor 
peasants and who were directly dependent upon the 
kulaks. 
By the expansion of collective-farm development we 
have succeeded in abolishing this scramble and injustice; 
we have smashed the yoke of kulak bondage, brought 
this vast mass of poor peasants into the collective 
farms, given them a secure existence there, and raised 
them to the level of middle peasants, able to make 
use of the collective-farm land, the privileges granted 
to collective farms, tractors and agricultural machinery. 
And what does that mean? It means that not 
less than 20,000,000 of the peasant population, not less

J. V. S T A L I N 254 
than 20,000,000 poor peasants have been rescued from 
destitution and ruin, have been rescued from kulak bondage, 
and have attained material security thanks to the 
collective farms. 
This is a great achievement, comrades. It is an achievement 
such as has never been known in the world 
before, such as no other state in the world has yet 
made. 
There you have the practical, tangible results of 
collective-farm development, the results of the fact that 
the peasants have taken the collective-farm path. 
But this is only our first step, our first achievement 
on the path of collective-farm development. 
It would be wrong to think that we must stop at this 
first step, at this first achievement. No, comrades, we 
cannot stop at this achievement. In order to advance 
further and definitively consolidate the collective farms 
we must take a second step, we must secure a new achievement. 
What is this second step? It is to raise the collective 
farmers, both the former poor peasants and the 
former middle peasants, to a still higher level. It is to 
make all the collective farmers prosperous. Yes, comrades, 
prosperous. (Prolonged applause.) 
Thanks to the collective farms we have succeeded in 
raising the poor peasants to the level of the middle peasants. 
That is very good. But it is not enough. We must 
now succeed in taking another step forward, and help 
all the collective farmers‹both the former poor peasants 
and the former middle peasants‹to rise to the 
level of prosperous peasants. This can be achieved, 
and we must achieve it at all costs. (Prolonged applause.)

SPEECH AT THE FIRST CONGRESS OF SHOCK BRIGADERS 255 
We now have all that is needed to achieve this aim. 
At present our machines and tractors are badly utilised. 
Our land is not well cultivated. We need only make 
better use of the machines and tractors, we need only 
improve the cultivation of the land, to increase the quantity 
of our produce two-fold and three-fold. And this 
will be quite sufficient to convert all our collective 
farmers into prosperous tillers of collective-farm 
fields. 
What was the position previously as regards the prosperous 
peasants? In order to become prosperous a peasant 
had to wrong his neighbours; he had to exploit 
them; to sell to them dear and buy from them cheap; 
to hire some labourers and thoroughly exploit them; to accumulate 
some capital and then, having strengthened his 
position, to creep into the ranks of the kulaks. This, 
indeed, explains why formerly, under individual farming, 
the prosperous peasants aroused suspicion and hatred 
among the poor and middle peasants. Now the position 
is different. And the conditions are now different, too. 
For collective farmers to become prosperous it is not at 
all necessary now that they wrong or exploit their neighbours. 
And besides, it is not easy to exploit anybody 
now; for private ownership of land and the renting of 
land no longer exist in our country, the machines and 
tractors belong to the state, and people who own capital 
are not in fashion in the collective farms. There was 
such a fashion in the past, but it is gone for ever. Only 
one thing is now needed for the collective farmers to 
become prosperous, namely, to work in the collective 
farms conscientiously, to make proper use of the tractors 
and machines, to make proper use of the draught cattle,

J. V. S T A L I N 256 
to cultivate the land properly and to take care of the collective-
farm property. 
Sometimes it is said: If we are living under socialism, 
why do we have to toil? We toiled before and we are toiling 
now; is it not time we left off toiling? Such talk 
is fundamentally wrong, comrades. It is the philosophy 
of loafers and not of honest working people. Socialism 
does not in the least repudiate work. On the contrary, 
socialism is based on work. Socialism and work are inseparable 
from each other. 
Lenin, our great teacher, said: ³He who does not 
work, neither shall he eat.² What does this mean? 
Against whom are Leninıs words directed? Against the 
exploiters, against those who do not work themselves, 
but compel others to work for them, and get rich at the 
expense of others. And against whom else? Against 
those who loaf and want to live at the expense of others. 
Socialism demands, not loafing, but that all should work 
conscientiously; that they should work, not for others, not 
for the rich and the exploiters, but for themselves, for the 
community. And if we work conscientiously, work for ourselves, 
for our collective farms, then we shall succeed in 
a matter of two or three years in raising all the collective 
farmers, both the former poor peasants and the former 
middle peasants, to the level of prosperous peasants, 
to the level of people enjoying an abundance of produce 
and leading a fully cultured life. 
That is our immediate task. We can achieve it, and 
we must achieve it at all costs. (Prolonged applause.)

SPEECH AT THE FIRST CONGRESS OF SHOCK BRIGADERS 257 
III 
MISCELLANEOUS REMARKS 
And now permit me to make a few miscellaneous remarks. 
First of all about our Party members in the countryside. 
There are Party members among you, but still more 
of you are non-Party people. It is very good that more 
non-Party people than Party members are present at this 
congress, because it is precisely the non-Party people 
that we must enlist for our work first of all. There are 
Communists who approach the non-Party collective farmers 
in a Bolshevik manner. But there are also those 
who plume themselves on being Party members and keep 
non-Party people at a distance. That is bad and harmful. 
The strength of the Bolsheviks, the strength of the Communists 
lies in the fact that they are able to rally millions 
of active non-Party people around our Party. We 
Bolsheviks would never have achieved the successes we 
have now achieved had we not been able to win for the 
Party the confidence of millions of non-Party workers 
and peasants. And what is needed for this? What is needed 
is for the Party members not to isolate themselves from 
the non-Party people, for the Party members not to withdraw 
into their Party shell, not to plume themselves on 
being Party members, but to heed the voice of the non- 
Party people, not only to teach the non-Party people, 
but also to learn from them. 
It must not be forgotten that Party members do not 
drop from the skies. We must remember that all Party 
members were at some time non-Party people. Today a 
man does not belong to the Party; tomorrow he will

J. V. S T A L I N 258 
become a Party member. What is there to get conceited 
about? Among us old Bolsheviks there are not a few 
who have been working in the Party for 20 or 30 years. 
But there was a time when we, too, were non-Party people. 
What would have happened to us 20 or 30 years 
ago if the Party members at that time had domineered 
over us and had not let us come close to the Party? Perhaps 
we would then have been kept away from the Party 
for a number of years. Yet we old Bolsheviks are not 
people of the least account in the world, comrades. 
(Laughter, prolonged applause.) 
That is why our Party members, the present young 
Party members who sometimes turn up their noses at 
non-Party people, should remember all this, should 
remember that it is not conceit but modesty that is the 
adornment of the Bolshevik. 
Now a few words about the women, the women collective 
farmers. The question of women in the collective farms 
i s a big question, comrades. I know that many of 
you underestimate the women and even laugh at them. 
But that is a mistake, comrades, a serious mistake. 
The point is not only that women constitute half the 
population. Primarily, the point is that the collectivefarm 
movement has advanced a number of remarkable 
and capable women to leading positions. Look at this 
congress, at the delegates, and you will realise that 
women have long ago ceased to be backward and 
have come into the front ranks. The women in the collective 
farms are a great force. To keep this force down 
would be criminal. It is our duty to bring the women 
in the collective farms forward and to make use of this 
force.

SPEECH AT THE FIRST CONGRESS OF SHOCK BRIGADERS 259 
Of course, not so long ago, the Soviet Government 
had a slight misunderstanding with the women collective 
farmers. That was over the cow. But now this business 
about the cow has been settled, and the misunderstanding 
has been removed. (Prolonged applause.) We have 
achieved a position where the majority of the collectivefarm 
households already have a cow each. Another year 
or two will pass and there will not be a single collective 
farmer without his own cow. We Bolsheviks will see to 
it that every one of our collective farmers has a cow. 
(Prolonged applause.) 
As for the women collective farmers themselves, they 
must remember the power and significance of the collective 
farms for women; they must remember that only 
in the collective farm do they have the opportunity of 
being on an equal footing with men. Without collective 
farms‹inequality; in collective farms‹equal rights. 
Let our comrades, the women collective farmers, 
remember this and let them cherish the collectivefarm 
system as the apple of their eye. (Prolonged applause.) 
A few words about the members of the Young Communist 
League, young men and women, in the collective 
farms. The youth are our future, our hope, comrades. 
The youth have to take our place, the place of the old 
people. They have to carry our banner to final victory. 
Among the peasants there are not a few old people, borne 
down by the burden of the past, burdened with the habits 
and the recollections of the old life. Naturally, they are 
not always able to keep pace with the Party, to keep 
pace with the Soviet system. Our youth are different. 
They are free from the burden of the past, and it is easi

J. V. S T A L I N 260 
est for them to assimilate Leninıs behests. And precisely 
because it is easiest for the youth to assimilate Leninıs 
behests it is their mission to give a helping hand to 
the laggards and waverers. True, they lack knowledge. 
But knowledge is a thing that can be acquired. They may 
not have it today, but they will have it tomorrow. Hence, 
the task is to study and study again the principles of 
Leninism. Comrade members of the Young Communist 
League! Learn the principles of Bolshevism and lead the 
waverers forward! Talk less and work more, and your 
success will be assured. (Applause.) 
A few words about the individual peasants. Little 
has been said here about the individual peasants. But 
that does not mean that they no longer exist. No, it does 
not mean that. Individual peasants do exist, and we must 
not leave them out of our calculations; for they are our 
collective farmers of tomorrow. I know that one section 
of the individual peasants has become utterly corrupt 
and has taken to speculating. That, no doubt, explains 
why the collective farmers accept individual peasants 
into the collective farms with great circumspection, and 
sometimes do not accept them at all. This, of course, is 
quite right, and there cannot be any objection to it. But 
there is another, larger section of individual peasants, 
who have not taken to speculating and who earn their 
bread by honest labour. These individual peasants, perhaps, 
would not be averse to joining the collective farms. 
But they are hindered in this, on the one hand, by their 
hesitation as to whether the collective-farm path is the 
right path; and, on the other hand, by the bitter feelings 
now existing amongst the collective farmers against the 
individual peasants.

SPEECH AT THE FIRST CONGRESS OF SHOCK BRIGADERS 261 
Of course, we must understand the feelings of the 
collective farmers and appreciate their situation. During 
the past years they have suffered not a few insults and 
jeers at the hands of the individual peasants. But insults 
and jeers must not be allowed to have decisive importance 
here. He is a bad leader who cannot forget an offence, 
and who puts his own feelings above the interests of the 
collective-farm cause. If you want to be leaders, you 
must be able to forget the insults to which you were 
subjected by certain individual peasants. Two years ago 
I received a letter from a peasant woman, a widow, living 
in the Volga region. She complained that the collective 
farm refused to accept her as a member, and she 
asked for my support. I made inquiries at the collective 
farm. I received a reply from the collective farm stating 
that they could not accept her because she had insulted 
a collective-farm meeting. Now, what was it all about? It 
seems that at a meeting of peasants at which the collective 
farmers called upon the individual peasants to join the 
collective farm, this very widow, in reply to this appeal, 
had lifted up her skirt and said‹Here, take your collective 
farm! (Laughter.) Undoubtedly she had behaved badly 
and had insulted the meeting. But should her application 
to join the collective farm be rejected if, a year 
later, she sincerely repented and admitted her error? I 
think that her application should not be rejected. That 
is what I wrote to the collective farm. The widow was 
accepted into the collective farm. And what happened? 
It turns out that she is now working in the collective 
farm, not in the last, but in the front ranks. (Applause.) 
There you have another example, showing that 
leaders, if they want to be true leaders, must be able

J. V. S T A L I N 262 
to forget an offence if the interests of the cause demand 
it. 
The same thing must be said about individual peasants 
generally. I am not opposed to the exercise of 
circumspection in accepting people into the collective 
farms. But I am against barring the path to the collective 
farms to all individual peasants without discrimination. 
That is not our policy, not the Bolshevik policy. 
The collective farmers must not forget that not long ago 
they themselves were individual peasants. 
Finally, a few words about the letter written by the 
collective farmers of Bezenchuk.66 This letter has been 
published, and you must have read it. It is unquestionably 
a good letter. It shows that among our collective 
farmers there are not a few experienced and intelligent 
organisers and agitators in the cause of collective farming, 
who are the pride of our country. But this letter contains 
one incorrect passage with which we cannot possibly 
agree. The point is that the Bezenchuk comrades describe 
their work in the collective farm as modest and all 
but insignificant work, whereas they describe the efforts 
of orators and leaders, who sometimes make speeches of 
inordinate length, as great and creative work. Can we 
agree with that? No, comrades, we cannot possibly agree 
with it. The Bezenchuk comrades have made a mistake 
here. Perhaps they made the mistake out of modesty. 
But the mistake does not cease to be a mistake for all 
that. The times have passed when leaders were regarded 
as the only makers of history, while the workers and 
peasants were not taken into account. The destinies of 
nations and of states are now determined, not only by 
leaders, but primarily and mainly by the vast masses of

SPEECH AT THE FIRST CONGRESS OF SHOCK BRIGADERS 263 
the working people. The workers and the peasants, who 
without fuss and noise are building factories and mills, 
constructing mines and railways, building collective 
farms and state farms, creating all the values of life, 
feeding and clothing the whole world‹they are the real 
heroes and the creators of the new life. Apparently, our 
Bezenchuk comrades have forgotten this. It is not good 
when people overrate their strength and begin to be conceited 
about the services they have rendered. That leads 
to boasting, and boasting is not a good thing. But it is 
still worse when people begin to underrate their strength 
and fail to see that their ³modest² and ³insignificant² 
work is really great and creative work that decides the 
fate of history. 
I would like the Bezenchuk comrades to approve this 
slight amendment of mine to their letter. 
With that, let us conclude, comrades. 
(Loud and prolonged applause, increasing to an ovation. 
All rise and greet Comrade Stalin. Loud cheers. Shouts: 
³Long live Comrade Stalin, hurrah!² ³Long live the 
advanced collective farmer!² ³Long live our leader, 
Comrade Stalin!²) 
Pravda, No. 53, 
February 23, 1933

GREETINGS TO THE RED ARMY ON ITS 
FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY 
To the Revolutionary Military Council of the U.S.S.R. 
Greetings to the men, commanders and political personnel 
of the Workersı and Peasantsı Red Army! 
Created under the leadership of Lenin, the Red Army 
covered itself with undying glory in the great battles of 
the Civil War, in which it drove out the interventionists 
from the U.S.S.R. and upheld the cause of socialism 
in our country. 
The Red Army is today a bulwark of peace and the 
peaceful labour of the workers and peasants, the vigilant 
guardian of the frontiers of the Soviet Union. 
The workers of our country, who have victoriously 
completed the five-year plan in four years, are equipping 
the Red Army with new instruments of defence. 
Your job, comrades, is to learn to handle those instruments 
to perfection and to do your duty to your country, 
should our enemies try to attack it. 
Hold high the banner of Lenin, the banner of struggle 
for communism! 
Long live the heroic Red Army, i t s leaders, its 
Revolutionary Military Council! 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 53, 
February 23, 1933

REPLY TO A LETTER FROM Mr. BARNES 
March 20, 1933 
Dear Mr. Barnes, 
Your fears as to the safety of American citizens in the 
U.S.S.R. are quite groundless. 
The U.S.S.R. is one of the few countries in the world 
where a display of national hatred or an unfriendly 
attitude towards foreigners as such is punishable by 
law. There has never been, nor could there be, a case of 
any one becoming an object of persecution in the U.S.S.R. 
on account of his national origin. That is particularly 
true with regard to foreign specialists in the U.S.S.R., 
including American specialists, whose work in my opinion 
deserves our thanks. 
As for the few British employees of Metro-Vickers,67 
legal action was taken against them not as Britishers 
but as persons who, our investigating authorities assert, 
have violated laws of the U.S.S.R. Was not legal action 
taken similarly against Russians? I do not know what 
bearing this case can have on American citizens. 
Ready to be of service to you,
J. Stalin 
Published for the first time

TO COMRADE S. M. BUDYONNY 
Ardent Bolshevik greetings on his fiftieth birthday 
to Comrade Budyonny‹comrade-in-arms in the Civil 
War, organiser and commander of the glorious Red Cavalry, 
Red Army leader of the, highest talent from the ranks 
of the revolutionary peasantry! 
I firmly clasp your hand, dear Semyon Mikhailovich. 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 115, 
April 26, 1933

TALK WITH COLONEL ROBINS 
May 13, 1933 
(Brief Record) 
Stalin: What can I do for you? 
Robins: I consider it a great honour to have an opportunity 
of paying you a visit. 
Stalin: There is nothing particular in that. You 
are exaggerating. 
Robins (smiles): What is most interesting to me is 
that throughout Russia I have found the names Lenin- 
Stalin, Lenin-Stalin, Lenin-Stalin, linked together. 
Stalin: That, too, is an exaggeration. How can I be 
compared to Lenin? 
Robins (smiles): Would it also be an exaggeration 
to say that all this time the oldest government in the 
world has been the government of Soviet Russia‹the 
Council of Peopleıs Commissars? 
Stalin: That, to be sure, is not exaggerated. 
Robins: The interesting and important point is that 
this government has not taken a reactionary direction 
in its work and that it is the government set up by Lenin 
that has proved strong. It resists all hostile lines. 
Stalin: That is true. 
Robins: At the May Day demonstration Russiaıs development 
during the past fifteen years impressed itself

J. V. S T A L I N 268 
upon me with particular clarity and sharpness, for I 
witnessed the May Day demonstration in 1918, and now 
in 1933. 
Stalin: We have managed to do a few things in recent 
years. But fifteen years is a long period of time. 
Robins: Still, in the life of a country it is a short period 
for such great progress as Soviet Russia has achieved 
during this time. 
Stalin: We might have done more, but we did not 
manage to. 
Robins: It is interesting to compare the underlying 
motives, the basic lines followed in the two demonstrations. 
The 1918 demonstration was addressed to the outside 
world, to the proletariat of the whole world, to the 
international proletariat, and was a call to revolution. 
Now the motive was different. Now men, women and the 
youth went to the demonstration to proclaim: This is the 
country we are building, this is the land we shall defend 
with all our strength! 
Stalin: At that time the demonstration was agitational, 
but now it is a summing up. 
Robins: You probably know that during these fifteen 
years I have interested myself in establishing rational 
relations between our two countries, and have 
endeavoured to dispel the existing hostile attitude of 
the ruling circles in America. 
Stalin: I knew of this in 1918 from what Lenin had 
said, and afterwards on the basis of facts. Yes, I know it. 
Robins: I have come here in the capacity of a purely 
private citizen and speak only for myself. The chief 
aim of my visit is to ascertain the prospects of establishing 
relations, to ascertain the actual facts concerning

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
269 
the ability to work and the creative, inventive capacity 
of the Russian workers. Anti-Soviet propaganda has it 
that the Russian worker is lazy, does not know how to 
work, and ruins the machines he handles; that such a 
country has no future. I want to counteract this propaganda 
not merely with words, but armed with the facts. 
The second question of interest to me in this connection 
is the situation in agriculture. It is being asserted 
that industrialisation has played havoc with agriculture, 
that the peasants have stopped sowing, have 
stopped gathering in the grain. Every year it is asserted 
that this year Russia is sure to die of famine. I should 
like to learn the facts about agriculture in order to 
refute these assertions. I expect to see the areas where 
new kinds of crops have been sown this year for the 
first time. What interests me in particular is the development 
of the principal grain crops of the Soviet Union. 
The third question that interests me is public education, 
the development of children and the youth, their 
upbringing; how far public education has developed 
in the fields of art and literature, as regards what is 
called creative genius, inventive capacity. In America two 
types of creativeness are recognised‹one is the creativeness 
of the study and the other is broad, life-inspired 
creativeness, manifestations of the creative spirit in 
life. I am interested in knowing how children and young 
people are developing. I hope to see in real life how they 
study, how they are brought up and how they develop. 
On the first and third questions I have already obtained 
some valuable information and count on getting 
additional data. On the second question, concerning 
the development of agriculture, I expect to be able to 
TALK WITH COLONEL ROBINS

J. V. S T A L I N 270 
discover the real facts during my trip to Magnitogorsk and 
from there to Rostov, Kharkov and back. I expect to 
have a look at collective farms and see how the archaic 
strip system of cultivation is being eliminated and largescale 
agriculture developed. 
Stalin: Do you want my opinion? 
Robins: Yes, I would like to have it. 
Stalin: The notion that the Soviet worker is by 
nature incapable of coping with machines and breaks them 
is quite wrong. 
On this score I must say that no such thing is happening 
here as occurred in Western Europe and America, 
where workers deliberately smashed machines because 
these deprived them of their crust of bread. Our workers 
have no such attitude to machinery, because in our country 
machines are being introduced on a mass scale in 
conditions where there is no unemployment, because 
the machines do not deprive the workers of their livelihood, 
as with you, but make their work easier. 
As far as inability to work, the lack of culture of 
our workers is concerned, it is true that we have few 
trained workers and they do not cope with machinery 
as well as workers in Europe or America do. But with us 
this is a temporary phenomenon. If, for example, one 
were to investigate where throughout history the workers 
learned to master new technical equipment quickest‹in 
Europe, America, or Russia during the last five years‹ 
I think it will be found that the workers learned quicker 
in Russia, in spite of the low level of culture. The mastery 
of the production of wheeled tractors in the West 
took several years, although, of course, technology was 
well developed there. Mastery of this matter in our coun

TALK WITH COLONEL ROBINS 271 
try was quicker. For example, in Stalingrad and Kharkov 
the production of tractors was mastered in some 
12-14 months. At the present time, the Stalingrad Tractor 
Works is not only working to estimated capacity, 
not only turns out 144 tractors per day, but sometimes 
even 160, that is, it works above its planned capacity. 
I am taking this as an example. Our tractor industry is 
new, it did not exist before. The same thing is true of 
our aircraft industry‹a new, delicate business, also 
swiftly mastered. The automobile industry is in a similar 
position from the view-point of rapidity of mastery. 
The same applies to machine-tool building. 
In my opinion, this rapid mastery of the production 
of machines is to be explained not by the special ability 
of the Russian workers but by the fact that in our country 
the production of, say, aircraft and engines for them, 
of tractors, automobiles and machine tools is considered 
not the private affair of individuals, but an affair of 
the state. In the West the workers produce to get wages, 
and are not concerned about anything else. With us production 
is regarded as a public matter, a state matter, it 
is regarded as a matter of honour. That is why new technique 
is mastered so quickly in our country. 
In general, I consider it impossible to assume that 
the workers of any particular nation are incapable of 
mastering new technique. If we look at the matter from 
the racial point of view, then in the United States, for 
instance, the Negroes are considered ³bottom category 
men,² yet they master technique no worse than the 
whites. The question of the mastery of technique by the 
workers of a particular nation is not a biological question, 
not a question of heredity, but a question of time:

J. V. S T A L I N 272 
today they have not mastered it, tomorrow they will learn 
and master it. Everyone, including the Bushman, can 
master technique, provided he is helped. 
Robins: The ambition, the desire to master, is also 
required. 
Stalin: Of course. The Russian workers have more 
than enough desire and ambition. They consider the 
mastery of new technique a matter of honour. 
Robins: I have already sensed this in your factories 
where I have seen that socialist emulation has resulted 
in the creation of a new kind of ardour, a new sort of 
ambition that money could never buy, because the workers 
expect to get for their work something better and 
greater than money can procure. 
Stalin: That is true. It is a matter of honour. 
Robins: I shall take with me to America diagrams 
showing the development of the workersı inventiveness 
and their creative proposals, which improve production 
and effect considerable savings in production. I have 
seen the portraits of quite a few such worker-inventors 
who have done very much for the Soviet Union in the 
way of improving production and achieving economies. 
Stalin: Our country has produced a comparatively 
large number of such workers. They are very capable 
people. 
Robins: I have been in all your big Moscow factories‹ 
the AMO Automobile Works, the Ball Bearing Works, 
the Freser Works and others‹and everywhere I came 
across organisations for promoting workersı inventiveness. 
The toolroom in a number of these factories impressed 
me particularly. As these toolrooms provide their 
factories with highly valuable tools the workers there

TALK WITH COLONEL ROBINS 273 
exert all their faculties to the utmost, give full play to 
their creative initiative and achieve striking results. 
Stalin: In spite of that, we have many shortcomings 
as well. We have few skilled workers, while a great many 
are required. Our technical personnel is also small. 
Each year their number grows, and still there are fewer 
of them than we need. The Americans have been of 
great help to us. That must be admitted. They have 
helped more effectively than others and more boldly than 
others. Our thanks to them for that. 
Robins: I have witnessed an internationalism in 
your enterprises which produced a very strong impression 
on me. Your factory managements are ready to adopt 
the technical achievements of any country‹France, America, 
Britain or Germany‹without any prejudice against 
these countries. And it seems to me that it is just this internationalism 
that will make it possible to combine in 
one machine all the advantages possessed by the machines 
of other countries and thus create more perfect machines. 
Stalin: That will happen. 
On the second question, about industrialisation allegedly 
ruining agriculture, that notion is also wrong. 
Far from ruining agriculture in our country, industrialisation 
is saving it, and saving our peasants. A few 
years ago we had a greatly disunited, small and very 
small, peasant economy. With the increasing division 
of the land, the peasant allotments shrank so much that 
there was no room to keep a hen. Add to this the primitive 
farming equipment, such as wooden ploughs and 
emaciated horses, which were incapable of turning up 
not only virgin soil, but even the ordinary, rather hard, 
soil, and you will have a picture of the deterioration

J. V. S T A L I N 274 
of agriculture. Three or four years ago there were about 
7,000,000 wooden ploughs in the U.S.S.R. The only 
choice left for the peasants was this: either to lie down 
and die or to adopt a new form of land tenure and cultivate 
the land with machines. This indeed explains 
why the Soviet Governmentıs call to the peasants issued 
about that time‹to unite their tiny plots of land into 
large tracts and accept from the government tractors, 
harvesters and threshers for working these tracts, for 
gathering and threshing the harvest‹found a very lively 
response among the peasants. They naturally seized on 
the proposal of the Soviet Government, began to unite 
their plots of land into large fields, accepted the tractors 
and other machines and thus emerged on the broad highway 
of making agriculture large scale, the new road of 
the radical improvement of agriculture. 
It follows that industrialisation, as a result of which 
the peasants receive tractors and other machines, has 
saved the peasants, has saved agriculture. 
The process of uniting small peasant farms by whole 
villages into large farms we call collectivisation, and 
the united large farms themselves‹collective farms. 
The absence in our country of private property in land, 
the nationalisation of the land, makes collectivisation 
much easier. The land is transferred to the collective 
farms for their use in perpetuity and, owing to the absence 
of private property in land, no land can be bought 
or sold here. All this considerably facilitates the formation 
and development of collective farms. 
I do not mean to say that all this, i.e., collectivisation 
and the rest, is proceeding smoothly with us. There 
are difficulties, of course, and they are not small ones.

TALK WITH COLONEL ROBINS 275 
Collectivisation, like every great new undertaking, has 
not only friends, but also enemies. Nevertheless, the 
overwhelming majority of the peasants are in favour of collectivisation, 
and the number of its opponents is becoming 
smaller and smaller. 
Robins: Every advance involves certain outlays, and 
this we take into account and include in our calculations. 
Stalin: In spite of these difficulties, however, one 
thing is clear‹and I have not the slightest doubt on this 
score: nineteen-twentieths of the peasantry have recognised, 
and most of the peasants accept the fact with great 
joy, that the collectivisation of agriculture has become an 
irreversible fact. So then this has already been achieved. 
The predominant form of agriculture in our country now 
is the collective farm. Take the grain sowing or harvesting 
figures, the figures for grain production, and you 
will see that at the present time the individual peasants 
provide something like 10-15 per cent of the total gross 
output of grain. The rest comes from the collective farms. 
Robins: I am interested in the question whether it 
is true that last yearıs crop was gathered in unsatisfactorily, 
that at the present time the sowing campaign 
is proceeding satisfactorily, while last year the harvesting 
proceeded unsatisfactorily. 
Stalin: Last year the harvesting was less satisfactory 
than the year before. 
Robins: I have read your statements, and I believe 
they warrant the conclusion that this year the harvesting 
will be more successful. 
Stalin: It will most probably proceed much better. 
Robins: I think you appreciate no less than I do the 
tremendous achievement embodied in your successful

J. V. S T A L I N 276 
industrialisation of agriculture, a thing which no other 
country has been able to do. In all capitalist countries 
agriculture is undergoing a deep crisis and is in need of 
industrialisation. The capitalist countries manage somehow 
or other to cope with industrial production, but not 
one of them can cope with agriculture. The great achievement 
of the Soviet Union is that it has set about the solution 
of this problem and is successfully coping with it. 
Stalin: Yes, that is a fact. 
Such are our achievements and shortcomings in the 
sphere of agriculture. 
Now the third question‹about the education of 
children and of the youth as a whole. Ours is a fine youth, 
full of the joy of life. Our state differs from all others in 
that it does not stint the means for providing proper care 
of children and for giving the youth a good upbringing. 
Robins: In America it is believed that in your country 
the child is restricted in its development within 
definite, rigid bounds and that these bounds leave no 
freedom for the development of the creative spirit and 
freedom of the mind. Do you not think that freedom for 
the development of the creative spirit, freedom to express 
what is in one, is of extremely great importance? 
Stalin: First, concerning restrictions‹this is not true. 
The second is true. Undoubtedly a child cannot develop 
its faculties under a regime of isolation and strict regimentation, 
without the necessary freedom and encouragement 
of initiative. As regards the youth, all roads are 
open to it in our country and it can freely perfect itself. 
In our country children are not beaten and are very 
seldom punished. They are given the opportunity of 
choosing what they like, of pursuing a path of their own

TALK WITH COLONEL ROBINS 277 
choice. I believe that nowhere is there such care for the 
child, for its upbringing and development, as among 
us in the Soviet Union. 
Robins: Can one consider that, as a result of the 
new generation being emancipated from the burden of 
want, being emancipated from the terror of economic 
conditions, this emancipation is bound to lead to a new 
flourishing of creative energy, to the blossoming of a new 
art, to a new advance of culture and art, which was formerly 
hampered by all these shackles? 
Stalin: That is undoubtedly true. 
Robins: I am not a Communist and do not understand 
very much about communism, but I should like America 
to participate in, to have the opportunity of associating 
itself with, the development that is taking place here in 
Soviet Russia, and I should like Americans to get this 
opportunity by means of recognition, by granting credits, 
by means of establishing normal relations between the 
two countries, for example, in the Far East, so as to 
safeguard the great and daring undertaking which is in 
process in your country, so that it may be brought to 
a successful conclusion. 
Stalin (with a smile): I thank you for your good 
wishes. 
Robins: One of my closest friends is Senator Borah, 
who has been the staunchest friend of the Soviet Union 
and has been fighting for its recognition among the leaders 
of the American Government. 
Stalin: That is so; he is doing much to promote the 
establishment of normal relations between our two countries. 
But so far, unfortunately, he has not met with 
success.

J. V. S T A L I N 278 
Robins: I am convinced that the true facts are now 
having a much greater effect than at any time during 
the past fifteen years in favour of establishing normal 
relations between our two countries. 
Stalin: Quite true. But there is one circumstance 
that hinders it. Britain, I believe, hinders it (smiles). 
Robins: That is undoubtedly so. Still, the situation 
forces us to act above all in our own interests, and the 
conflict between our own interests and the course towards 
which other countries are driving us is impelling 
America, at the present time more than at any other, 
to establish such reciprocal relations. We are interested 
in the development of American exports. The only big 
market with great possibilities that have not been adequately 
utilised hitherto by anybody is the Russian market. 
American businessmen, if they wanted to, could 
grant long-term credits. They are interested in tranquillity 
in the Far East, and nothing could promote this 
more than the establishment of normal relations with the 
Soviet Union. In this respect, Mr. Litvinovıs Geneva 
declaration on the definition of an aggressor country 
follows entirely the line of the Briand-Kellogg Pact, 
which has played an important role in the matter of 
peace. Stabilisation of reciprocal economic relations 
throughout the world is in the interest of America, and 
we fully realise that normal reciprocal economic relations 
cannot be attained while the Soviet Union is outside 
the general economic system. 
Stalin: All that is true. 
Robins: I was and I remain an incorrigible optimist. 
I believed in the leaders of the Bolshevik revolution as 
long as fifteen years ago. They were then depicted as

TALK WITH COLONEL ROBINS 279 
agents of German imperialism; Lenin, in particular, was 
considered a German agent. But I considered and still 
consider Lenin a very great man, one of the greatest 
leaders in all world history. 
I hope that the information I have received at first 
hand may help towards carrying out the plan of rapprochement 
and co-operation between our two countries 
about which I have spoken. 
Stalin (smiling): I hope it will! 
Robins (smiles): If you had expressed yourself in 
the American manner you would have said: ³More power 
to your elbow.² He is not sure of having much strength 
left in his elbow. 
Stalin: May be. 
Robins: I think there is nothing greater and more 
magnificent than to participate in the making of a new 
world, to participate in what we are now engaged in. 
Participation in the creation and building of a new world 
is something of paramount significance not only now, but 
thousands of years hence. 
Stalin: All the same this matter presents great difficulties 
(smiles). 
Robins (smiles): I am very grateful to you for the 
attention you have given me. 
Stalin: And I thank you for having remembered the 
Soviet Union after an absence of fifteen years and for paying 
it another visit. (Both smile. Robins bows.) 
Published for the first time

GREETINGS 
ON THE FIFTEENTH ANNIVERSARY 
OF THE ALL-UNION LENINIST YOUNG 
COMMUNIST LEAGUE 
Friendly greetings on its fifteenth anniversary to 
the Leninist workersı and peasantsı Young Communist 
League, the organiser of our glorious revolutionary youth! 
I wish it success in training our youth in the spirit 
of Leninism, in training our youth in the spirit of uncompromising 
struggle against the enemies of the working 
class, and of the utmost strengthening of international 
fraternal ties between the working people of all 
languages and races in the world. 
The young men and women shock brigaders of the 
Y.C.L. have covered themselves with glory during the 
period of the building of new factories and mills, mines, 
railways, state farms and collective farms. Let us hope 
that the young men and women shock brigaders of the 
Y.C.L. will display still greater valour and initiative 
in mastering new technique in all branches of the national 
economy, in enhancing the defence capacity of our 
country, in strengthening our army, our navy, our air 
force. 
During the fifteen years of its existence the Leninist 
Y.C.L. has boldly carried onwards the great banner

GREETINGS ON THE 15TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE A.U.L.Y.C.L. 281 
of Lenin, rallying around it millions of young workers 
and peasants, millions of young working women and peasant 
women. Let us hope that the Leninist Y.C.L. will 
continue to hold high the banner of Lenin and will carry 
it with honour to the victorious finish of our great struggle, 
to the complete victory of socialism. 
Long live the Leninist Young Communist League! 
Long live the Central Committee of the Leninist 
Young Communist League! 
J. Stalin 
October 28, 1933 
Pravda, No. 299, 
October 29, 1933

TALK WITH Mr. DURANTY, 
CORRESPONDENT OF THE NEW YORK TIMES 
December 25, 1933 
Duranty: Would you agree to send a message to 
the American people through The New York Times? 
Stalin: No. Kalinin has already sent one,68 and I 
cannot interfere in what is his prerogative. 
If it is a question of relations between the U.S.A. 
and the U.S.S.R., I am, of course, satisfied with their 
renewal, as being an act of tremendous significance: 
politically, because it increases the chances of preserving 
peace; economically, because it removes extraneous 
elements and makes it possible for our two countries to 
discuss questions of interest to them on a business basis; 
lastly, i t opens up the way to mutual co-operation. 
Duranty: What in your opinion will be the possible 
volume of Soviet-American trade? 
Stalin: What Litvinov said at the London economic 
conference69 still holds good. We are the biggest market 
in the world and are ready to order and pay for a large 
quantity of goods. But we need favourable credit terms 
and, moreover, must be sure that we shall be able to pay. 
We cannot import without exports, because we do not

TALK WITH MR. DURANTY, CORRESPONDENT OF NEW YORK TIMES 283 
want to place orders without being sure of our ability 
to pay on time. 
Everybody is surprised that we are paying and are 
able to pay. I know that just now it is not the fashion 
to pay back credits. But we do. Other governments have 
stopped payment, but the U.S.S.R. has not and will 
not do so. Many believed we were unable to pay, that we 
lacked the wherewithal to pay, but we have shown them 
that we can pay and they have had to acknowledge this. 
Duranty: What about gold-mining in the U.S.S.R.? 
Stalin: We have many auriferous districts and they 
are being rapidly developed. Our output is already 
double that of tsarist times and now amounts 
to over a hundred million rubles a year. We have improved 
our prospecting methods, particularly during the 
last two years, and have discovered large deposits. But 
our industries are still young‹not only the gold industry 
but also industries concerned with pig iron, steel, copper 
and all metallurgy‹and for the time being our young 
industries are not in a position to give proper assistance 
to the gold industry. Our rates of development are rapid 
but the volume of output is not yet large. We could quadruple 
gold production within a short period if we had 
more dredges and other machinery. 
Duranty: What is the total Soviet indebtedness on 
foreign credits? 
Stalin: A little over 450,000,000 rubles. During 
the last few years we have paid back large sums‹two 
years ago we owed 1,400 millions on credit accounts. 
We have paid back all this and we shall be paying back, 
in the period to the end of 1934 or the beginning of 1935, 
at the due dates.

J. V. S T A L I N 284 
Duranty: Granted there is no longer any doubt about 
Soviet willingness to pay, but how about Soviet ability 
to pay? 
Stalin: With us there is no difference between the 
first and the second, because we assume no obligations 
that we cannot discharge. Look at our economic relations 
with Germany. Germany declared a moratorium on 
a considerable portion of her foreign debts and we could 
have taken advantage of the German precedent and acted 
in the same way towards her. But we are not doing so. 
And, incidentally, we are now not so dependent on German 
industry as before. We ourselves can manufacture 
the equipment we need. 
Duranty: What do you think of America? I heard you 
had a lengthy talk with Bullitt. What is your opinion of 
him? Do you consider, as you did three years ago, that 
our crisis, as you told me at the time, is not the last 
crisis of capitalism? 
Stalin: Bullitt made a good impression on me and my 
comrades. I had never met him before but had heard 
much about him from Lenin, who also liked him. What 
I like about him is that he does not talk like the ordinary 
diplomat‹he is a straightforward man and says what 
he thinks. In general he produced a very good impression 
here. 
Roosevelt, by all accounts, is a determined and courageous 
politician. There is a philosophical system, 
solipsism, which holds that the external world does not 
exist and the only thing that does exist is oneıs own 
self. It long seemed that the American Government subscribed 
to this system and did not believe in the existence 
of the U.S.S.R. But Roosevelt evidently is not a

TALK WITH MR. DURANTY, CORRESPONDENT OF NEW YORK TIMES 285 
supporter of this strange theory. He is a realist and knows 
that reality is as he sees it. 
As for the economic crisis, it really is not the last. 
The crisis, of course, disrupted all business but lately, 
it seems, business is beginning to recover. It is possible 
that the lowest point of the economic decline has already 
been passed. I do not think that the 1929 boom level 
will be attained, but a transition from crisis to depression 
and to a certain revival of business in the near 
future‹true, with certain fluctuations upwards and downwards‹
is not only not precluded but maybe even probable. 
Duranty: And what about Japan? 
Stalin: We should like to maintain good relations 
with Japan, but unfortunately this does not depend on 
us alone. If a sensible policy gains the upper hand in 
Japan, our two countries can live in friendship. But we 
are afraid that the bellicose elements may push a sensible 
policy into the background. That is where the real danger 
lies and we are compelled to prepare against it. No 
nation can have any respect for its government if the 
latter sees the danger of an attack and does not take measures 
of self-defence. In my opinion Japan would be acting 
unwisely should she attack the U.S.S.R. Her economic 
condition is not particularly good, she has weak 
spots such as Korea, Manchuria and China, and besides 
she can hardly count on obtaining support from other 
countries in this adventure. Unfortunately, good military 
specialists are not always good economists and 
they can not always distinguish between the force of 
arms and the force of economic laws. 
Duranty: And what about Britain?

J. V. S T A L I N 286 
Stalin: I think a trade agreement will be signed with 
Britain and economic relations will develop, inasmuch 
as the Conservative Party is bound to realise that it 
stands to gain nothing by putting obstacles in the way 
of trade with the U.S.S.R. But I doubt whether under 
present conditions the two countries will be able to derive 
such great advantages from trade as one might suppose. 
Duranty: What do you think of the reform of the 
League of Nations as proposed by the Italians? 
Stalin: We have received no proposals on that score 
from Italy, although our representative did discuss the 
matter with the Italians. 
Duranty: Is your attitude towards the League of 
Nations always exclusively negative? 
Stalin: No, not always and not under all circumstances. 
You perhaps do not fully understand our point of 
view. In spite of Germanyıs and Japanıs withdrawal 
from the League of Nations‹or possibly just because 
of it‹the League may become a certain factor in retarding 
the outbreak of hostilities or in preventing them 
altogether. If that is so, if the League can prove to be 
something of an obstacle that would make war at least 
somewhat more difficult and peace to some extent easier, 
then we shall not be against the League. Yes, if such is 
the course of historical events, the possibility is not 
excluded that we shall support the League of Nations 
despite its colossal shortcomings. 
Duranty: What is now the U.S.S.R.ıs most important 
problem of internal policy? 
Stalin: The development of trade between town and 
country and the improvement of all forms of transport,

TALK WITH MR. DURANTY, CORRESPONDENT OF NEW YORK TIMES 287 
particularly railways. Solving these problems is not 
easy, but is easier than the problems that we have already 
solved, and I am confident that we shall solve 
them. The problem of industry is solved. The problem 
of agriculture, that of the peasants and the collective 
farms‹the most difficult of all‹may also be considered 
already solved. Now we have to solve the problem of 
trade and transport. 
Pravda, No. 4, 
January 4, 1934

REPORT 
TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 
ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)70 
January 26, 1934 
I 
THE CONTINUING CRISIS OF WORLD CAPITALISM 
AND THE EXTERNAL SITUATION 
OF THE SOVIET UNION 
Comrades, more than three years have passed since 
the Sixteenth Congress. That is not a very long period. 
But it has been fuller in content than any other period. 
I do not think that any period in the last decade has 
been so rich in events as this one. 
In the economic sphere these years have been years 
of continuing world economic crisis. The crisis has affected 
not only industry, but also agriculture as a whole. 
The crisis has raged not only in the sphere of production 
and trade; it has also extended to the sphere of credit 
and money circulation, and has completely upset the established 
credit and currency relations among countries. 
While formerly people here and there still disputed 
whether there was a world economic crisis or not, now 
they no longer do so, for the existence of the crisis and 
its devastating effects are only too obvious. Now the con

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 289 
troversy centres around another question: Is there a way 
out of the crisis or not; and if there is, then what is to 
be done? 
In the political sphere these years have been years 
of further tension both in the relations between the capitalist 
countries and in the relations within them. Japanıs 
war against China and the occupation of Manchuria, 
which have strained relations in the Far East; the victory 
of fascism in Germany and the triumph of the idea of 
revenge, which have strained relations in Europe; the 
withdrawal of Japan and Germany from the League of 
Nations, which has given a new impetus to the growth 
of armaments and to the preparations for an imperialist 
war; the defeat of fascism in Spain,71 which is one more 
indication that a revolutionary crisis is maturing and 
that fascism is far from being long-lived‹such are the 
most important events of the period under review. It 
is not surprising that bourgeois pacifism is breathing its 
last and that the trend towards disarmament is openly 
and definitely giving way to a trend towards armament 
and rearmament. 
Amid the surging waves of economic perturbations 
and military-political catastrophes, the U.S.S.R. stands 
out like a rock, continuing its work of socialist construction 
and its fight to preserve peace. Whereas in the 
capitalist countries the economic crisis is still raging, 
in the U.S.S.R. the advance continues both in industry 
and in agriculture. Whereas in the capitalist countries 
feverish preparations are in progress for a new war for 
a new redivision of the world and of spheres of influence, 
the U.S.S.R. is continuing its systematic and persistent 
struggle against the menace of war and for peace; and it

J. V. S T A L I N 290 
cannot be said that the efforts of the U.S.S.R. in this 
direction have had no success. 
Such is the general picture of the international situation 
at the present moment. 
Let us pass to an examination of the principal data 
on the economic and political situation in the capitalist 
countries. 
1. THE COURSE OF THE ECONOMIC CRISIS 
IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES 
The present economic crisis in the capitalist countries 
differs from all analogous crises, among other things, 
in that it is the longest and most protracted crisis. Formerly 
crises would come to an end in a year or two; the 
present crisis, however, is now in its fifth year, devastating 
the economy of the capitalist countries year after 
year and draining it of the fat accumulated in previous 
years. It is not surprising that this is the most severe of 
all the crises that have taken place. 
How is this unprecedentedly protracted character 
of the present industrial crisis to be explained? 
It is to be explained, first of all, by the fact that 
the industrial crisis has affected every capitalist country 
without exception, which has made it difficult for 
some countries to manoeuvre at the expense of others. 
Secondly, it is to be explained by the fact that the 
industrial crisis has become interwoven with the agrarian 
crisis which has affected all the agrarian and semi-agrarian 
countries without exception, which could not but 
make the industrial crisis more complicated and more 
profound.

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 291 
Thirdly, it is to be explained by the fact that the 
agrarian crisis has grown more acute in this period, and 
has affected all branches of agriculture, including livestock 
farming; that it has brought about a retrogression 
of agriculture, a reversion from machines to hand labour, 
a substitution of horses for tractors, a sharp reduction 
in the use of artificial fertilisers, and in some cases a 
complete abandonment of them‹all of which has caused 
the industrial crisis to become still more protracted. 
Fourthly, it is to be explained by the fact that the 
monopolist cartels which dominate industry strive to 
maintain high commodity prices, a circumstance which 
makes the crisis particularly painful and hinders the 
absorption of commodity stocks. 
Lastly‹and this is the chief thing‹it is to be explained 
by the fact that the industrial crisis broke out 
in the conditions of the general crisis of capitalism, when 
capitalism no longer has, nor can have, either in the 
major countries or in the colonial and dependent countries, 
the strength and stability it had before the war and the 
October Revolution; when industry in the capitalist 
countries has acquired, as a heritage from the imperialist 
war, chronic under-capacity operation of plants and 
armies of millions of unemployed, of which it is no longer 
able to rid itself. 
Such are the circumstances that have given rise to 
the extremely protracted character of the present industrial 
crisis. 
It is these circumstances also that explain the fact 
that the crisis has not been confined to the sphere of production 
and trade, but has also affected the credit system, 
foreign exchange, the debt settlements, etc., and has

J. V. S T A L I N 292 
broken down the traditionally established relations both 
between countries and between social groups in the various 
countries. 
An important part was played by the fall in commodity 
prices. In spite of the resistance of the monopolist 
cartels, the fall in prices increased with elemental force, 
affecting primarily and mainly the commodities of the 
unorganised commodity owners‹peasants, artisans, small 
capitalists‹and only gradually and to a smaller degree 
those of the organised commodity owners‹the capitalists 
united in cartels. The fall in prices made the position 
of debtors (manufacturers, artisans, peasants, etc.) 
intolerable, while, on the other hand, it placed creditors 
in an unprecedentedly privileged position. Such a situation 
was bound to lead, and actually did lead to the 
mass bankruptcy of firms and of individual capitalists. 
As a result, tens of thousands of joint-stock companies 
have failed in the United States, Germany, Britain and 
France during the past three years. The bankruptcy of 
joint-stock companies was followed by a depreciation 
of currency, which slightly alleviated the position of 
debtors. The depreciation of currency was followed by 
the non-payment of debts, both foreign and internal, 
legalised by the state. The collapse of such banks as the 
Darmstadt and Dresden banks in Germany and the 
Kreditanstalt in Austria, and of concerns like Kreugerıs 
in Sweden, the Insull corporation in the United States, 
etc. is well known to all. 
Naturally, these phenomena, which shook the foundations 
of the credit system, were bound to be followed, 
and actually were followed, by the cessation of payments 
on credits and foreign loans, the cessation of payments

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 293 
on inter-Allied debts the cessation of export of capital, 
a further decline in foreign trade, a further decline in the 
export of commodities, an intensification of the struggle 
for foreign markets, trade war between countries, and‹ 
dumping. Yes, comrades, dumping. I am not referring 
to the alleged Soviet dumping, about which only very 
recently certain honourable members of honourable parliaments 
in Europe and America were shouting themselves 
hoarse. I am referring to the real dumping that 
is now being practised by almost all ³civilised² states, 
and about which these gallant and honourable members 
of parliaments maintain a prudent silence. 
Naturally, also, these destructive phenomena accompanying 
the industrial crisis, which took place outside 
the sphere of production, could not but in their turn 
influence the course of the industrial crisis, aggravating 
it and complicating the situation still further. 
Such is the general picture of the course of the industrial 
crisis. 
Here are a few figures, taken from official data, that 
illustrate the course of the industrial crisis during the 
period under review. 
Volume of Industrial Output 
(Per cent of 1929) 
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
U.S.S.R. . . . . . . . . 100 129.7 161.9 184.7 201.6 
U.S.A. . . . . . . . . . 100 80.7 68.1 53.8 64.9 
Britain . . . . . . . . . 100 92.4 83.8 83.8 86.1 
Germany . . . . . . . . 100 88.3 71.7 59.8 66.8 
France . . . . . . . . . 100 100.7 89.2 69.1 77.4

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 294 
As you see, this table speaks for itself. 
While industry in the principal capitalist countries 
declined from year to year, compared with 1929, and 
began to recover somewhat only in 1933‹although still 
far from reaching the level of 1929‹industry in the 
U.S.S.R. grew from year to year, experiencing an uninterrupted 
rise. 
While industry in the principal capitalist countries 
at the end of 1933 shows on the average a reduction of 25 
per cent and more in volume of output compared with 
1929, industrial output in the U.S.S.R. has more than 
doubled during this period, i.e., it has increased more than 
100 per cent. (Applause.) 
Judging by this table, it may seem that of these four 
capitalist countries Britain is in the most favourable 
position. But that is not quite true. If we compare industry 
in these countries with its pre-war level we get 
a somewhat different picture. 
Here is the corresponding table: 
Volume of Industrial Output 
(Per cent of pre-war level) 
1913 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
U.S.S.R. . . . . . . 100 194.3 252.1 314.7 359.0 391.9 
U.S.A. . . . . . . . 100 170.2 137.3 115.9 91.4 110.2 
Britain . . . . . . . 100 99.1 91.5 83.0 82.5 85.2 
Germany . . . . . . 100 113.0 99.8 81.0 67.6 75.4 
France . . . . . . . 100 139.0 140.0 124.0 96.1 107.6 
As you see, industry in Britain and Germany has not 
yet reached the pre-war level, while the United States

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 295 
and France have exceeded it by several per cent, and the 
U.S.S.R. has raised, increased its industrial output during 
this period by more than 290 per cent over the prewar 
level. (Applause.) 
But there is still another conclusion to be drawn from 
these tables. 
While industry in the principal capitalist countries 
declined steadily after 1930, and particularly after 1931, 
and reached its lowest point in 1932, in 1933 it began 
to recover and pick up somewhat. If we take the monthly 
returns for 1932 and 1933 we find still further confirmation 
of this conclusion; for they show that, despite 
fluctuations of output in the course of 1933, industry in 
these countries revealed no tendency to fall to the lowest 
point reached in the summer of 1932. 
What does this mean? 
It means that, apparently, industry in the principal 
capitalist countries had already reached the lowest point 
of decline and did not return to it in the course of 1933. 
Some people are inclined to ascribe this phenomenon 
exclusively to the influence of artificial factors, such 
as the war-inflation boom. There can be no doubt that the 
war-inflation boom plays no small part in it. This is particularly 
true in regard to Japan, where this artificial 
factor is the principal and decisive force stimulating 
a certain revival in some industries, mainly war industries. 
But it would be a gross mistake to explain everything 
by the war-inflation boom. Such an explanation 
would be incorrect, if only for the reason that the changes 
in industry which I have described are observed, not 
in separate and chance areas, but in all, or nearly all, 
the industrial countries, including the countries with a

J. V. S T A L I N 296 
stable currency. Apparently, in addition to the warinflation 
boom, the internal economic forces of capitalism 
are also operating here. 
Capitalism has succeeded in somewhat alleviating 
the position of industry at the expense of the workers, by 
heightening their exploitation through increased intensity 
of labour; at the expense of the farmers, by pursuing 
a policy of paying the lowest prices for the products of 
their labour, for foodstuffs and, partly, raw materials; 
and at the expense of the peasants in the colonies and 
economically weak countries, by still further forcing down 
prices for the products of their labour, principally for 
raw materials, and also for foodstuffs. 
Does this mean that we are witnessing a transition 
from a crisis to an ordinary depression, to be followed by 
a new upswing and flourishing of industry? No, it does 
not. At any rate, at the present time there is no evidence, 
direct or indirect, to indicate the approach of an upswing 
of industry in the capitalist countries. More than that, 
judging by all things, there can be no such evidence, at 
least in the near future. There can be no such evidence, 
because all the unfavourable conditions which prevent 
industry in the capitalist countries from making any 
considerable advance continue to operate. I have in mind 
the continuing general crisis of capitalism, in the circumstances 
of which the economic crisis is proceeding; the 
chronic under-capacity operation of the enterprises; 
chronic mass unemployment; the interweaving of the 
industrial crisis with an agricultural crisis; the absence 
of tendencies towards a more or less serious renewal of 
fixed capital, which usually heralds the approach of 
a boom, etc., etc.

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 297 
Evidently, what we are witnessing is a transition 
from the lowest point of decline of industry, from the 
lowest point of the industrial crisis, to a depression‹not 
an ordinary depression, but a depression of a special kind, 
which does not lead to a new upswing and flourishing of 
industry, but which, on the other hand, does not force 
industry back to the lowest point of decline. 
2. THE GROWING TENSION IN THE POLITICAL 
SITUATION IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES 
A result of the protracted economic crisis has been 
an unprecedented increase in the tension of the political 
situation in the capitalist countries, both within those 
countries and in their mutual relations. 
The intensified struggle for foreign markets, the 
abolition of the last vestiges of free trade, the prohibitive 
tariffs, the trade war, the foreign currency war, 
dumping, and many other analogous measures which 
demonstrate extreme nationalism in economic policy 
have strained to the utmost the relations among the various 
countries, have created the basis for military conflicts, 
and have put war on the order of the day as a 
means for a new redivision of the world and of spheres of 
influence in favour of the stronger states. 
Japanıs war against China, the occupation of Manchuria, 
Japanıs withdrawal from the League of Nations, 
and her advance in North China, have made the situation 
still more tense. The intensified struggle for the Pacific 
and the growth of naval armaments in Japan, the United 
States, Britain and France are results of this increased 
tension.

J. V. S T A L I N 298 
Germanyıs withdrawal from the League of Nations 
and the spectre of revanchism have further added to the 
tension and have given a fresh impetus to the growth of 
armaments in Europe. 
It is not surprising that bourgeois pacifism is now 
dragging out a miserable existence, and that idle talk of 
disarmament is giving way to ³business-like² talk about 
armament and rearmament. 
Once again, as in 1914, the parties of bellicose imperialism, 
the parties of war and revanchism are coming 
to the foreground. 
Quite clearly things are heading for a new war. 
The internal situation of the capitalist countries, 
in view of the operation of these same factors, is becoming 
still more tense. Four years of industrial crisis have 
exhausted the working class and reduced it to despair. 
Four years of agricultural crisis have utterly ruined the 
poorer strata of the peasantry, not only in the principal 
capitalist countries, but also‹and particularly‹in the 
dependent and colonial countries. It is a fact that, 
notwithstanding all kinds of statistical trickery designed 
to minimise unemployment, the number of unemployed, 
according to the official figures of bourgeois institutions, 
reaches 3,000,000 in Britain, 5,000,000 in Germany 
and 10,000,000 in the United States, not to mention the 
other European countries. Add to this the more than ten 
million partially unemployed; add the vast masses of 
ruined peasants‹and you will get an approximate picture 
of the poverty and despair of the labouring masses. 
The masses of the people have not yet reached the stage 
when they are ready to storm capitalism; but the idea 
of storming it is maturing in the minds of the masses‹

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 299 
of that there can hardly be any doubt. This is eloquently 
testified to by such facts as, say, the Spanish revolution 
which overthrew the fascist regime, and the expansion 
of the Soviet districts in China, which the united counter-
revolution of the Chinese and foreign bourgeoisie 
is unable to stop. 
This, indeed, explains why the ruling classes in the 
capitalist countries are so zealously destroying or nullifying 
the last vestiges of parliamentarism and bourgeois 
democracy which might be used by the working class in 
its struggle against the oppressors, why they are driving 
the Communist Parties underground and resorting to openly 
terrorist methods of maintaining their dictatorship. 
Chauvinism and preparation of war as the main elements 
of foreign policy; repression of the working class 
and terrorism in the sphere of home policy as a necessary 
means for strengthening the rear of future war fronts‹ 
that is what is now particularly engaging the minds of 
contemporary imperialist politicians. 
It is not surprising that fascism has now become the 
most fashionable commodity among war-mongering bourgeois 
politicians. I am referring not only to fascism in 
general, but, primarily, to fascism of the German type, 
which is wrongly called national-socialism‹wrongly because 
the most searching examination will fail to reveal 
even an atom of socialism in it. 
In this connection the victory of fascism in Germany 
must be regarded not only as a symptom of the weakness 
of the working class and a result of the betrayals of the 
working class by Social-Democracy, which paved the 
way for fascism; it must also be regarded as a sign of 
the weakness of the bourgeoisie, a sign that the bourgeoi

J. V. S T A L I N 300 
sie is no longer able to rule by the old methods of parliamentarism 
and bourgeois democracy, and, as a consequence, 
is compelled in its home policy to resort to terrorist 
methods of rule‹as a sign that it is no longer able 
to find a way out of the present situation on the basis 
of a peaceful foreign policy, and, as a consequence, is 
compelled to resort to a policy of war. 
Such is the situation. 
As you see, things are heading towards a new imperialist 
war as a way out of the present situation. 
Of course, there are no grounds for assuming that war 
can provide a real way out. On the contrary, it is bound 
to confuse the situation still more. More than that, it is 
sure to unleash revolution and jeopardise the very existence 
of capitalism in a number of countries, as happened 
in the course of the first imperialist war. And if, in 
spite of the experience of the first imperialist war, the 
bourgeois politicians clutch at war as a drowning man 
clutches at a straw, that shows that they have got into a 
hopeless muddle, have landed in an impasse, and are 
ready to rush headlong into the abyss. 
It is worth while, therefore, briefly to examine the 
plans for the organisation of war which are now being 
hatched in the circles of bourgeois politicians. 
Some think that war should be organised against 
one of the great powers. They think of inflicting a crushing 
defeat upon that power and of improving their 
affairs at its expense. Let us assume that they organise 
such a war. What may be the result of that? 
As is well known, during the first imperialist war it 
was also intended to destroy one of the great powers, viz., 
Germany, and to profit at its expense. But what was

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 301 
the upshot of this? They did not destroy Germany; but 
they sowed in Germany such a hatred of the victors, 
and created such a rich soil for revenge, that even to 
this day they have not been able to clear up the revolting 
mess they made, and will not, perhaps, be able to 
do so for some time. On the other hand, the result they 
obtained was the smashing of capitalism in Russia, the 
victory of the proletarian revolution in Russia, and‹ 
of course‹the Soviet Union. What guarantee is there that 
a second imperialist war will produce ³better² results 
for them than the first? Would it not be more correct to 
assume that the opposite will be the case? 
Others think that war should be organised against a 
country that is weak in the military sense, but represents 
an extensive market‹for example, against China, 
which, it is claimed, cannot even be described as a state 
in the strict sense of the word, but is merely ³unorganised 
territory² which needs to be seized by strong states. 
They evidently want to divide it up completely and 
improve their affairs at its expense. Let us assume that 
they organise such a war. What may be the result of that? 
It is well known that at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century Italy and Germany were regarded in the 
same light as China is today, i.e., they were considered 
³unorganised territories² and not states, and they were 
subjugated. But what was the result of that? As is well 
known, it resulted in wars for independence waged by 
Germany and Italy, and the union of these countries into 
independent states. It resulted in increased hatred for 
the oppressors in the hearts of the peoples of these countries, 
the effects of which have not been removed to this 
day and will not, perhaps, be removed for some time.

J. V. S T A L I N 302 
The question arises: What guarantee is there that the 
same thing will not result from a war of the imperialists 
against China? 
Still others think that war should be organised by 
a ³superior race,² say, the German ³race,² against an 
³inferior race,² primarily against the Slavs; that only such 
a war can provide a way out of the situation, for it is 
the mission of the ³superior race² to render the ³inferior 
race² fruitful and to rule over it. Let us assume that 
this queer theory, which is as far removed from science 
as the sky from the earth, let us assume that this queer 
theory is put into practice. What may be the result of that? 
It is well known that ancient Rome looked upon the 
ancestors of the present-day Germans and French in the 
same way as the representatives of the ³superior race² 
now look upon the Slav races. It is well known that ancient 
Rome treated them as an ³inferior race,² as ³barbarians,² 
destined to live in eternal subordination to the 
³superior race,² to ³great Rome², and, between ourselves 
be it said, ancient Rome had some grounds for this, 
which cannot be said of the representatives of the ³superior 
race² of today. (Thunderous applause.) But what 
was the upshot of this? The upshot was that the non- 
Romans, i.e., all the ³barbarians,² united against the 
common enemy and brought Rome down with a crash. 
The question arises: What guarantee is there that the 
claims of the representatives of the ³superior race² of 
today will not lead to the same lamentable results? What 
guarantee is there that the fascist literary politicians 
in Berlin will be more fortunate than the old and 
experienced conquerors in Rome? Would it not be more 
correct to assume that the opposite will be the case?

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 303 
Finally, there are others who think that war should 
be organised against the U.S.S.R. Their plan is to defeat 
the U.S.S.R., divide up its territory, and profit at 
its expense. It would be a mistake to believe that it is 
only certain military circles in Japan who think in this 
way. We know that similar plans are being hatched in 
the circles of the political leaders of certain states in 
Europe. Let us assume that these gentlemen pass from 
words to deeds. What may be the result of that? 
There can hardly be any doubt that such a war would 
be the most dangerous war for the bourgeoisie. It would 
be the most dangerous war, not only because the peoples 
of the U.S.S.R. would fight to the death to preserve 
the gains of the revolution; it would be the most dangerous 
war for the bourgeoisie for the added reason that 
it would be waged not only at the fronts, but also in the 
enemyıs rear. The bourgeoisie need have no doubt that 
the numerous friends of the working class of the U.S.S.R. 
in Europe and Asia will endeavour to strike a blow in 
the rear at their oppressors who have launched a criminal 
war against the fatherland of the working class of all 
countries. And let not Messieurs the bourgeoisie blame 
us if some of the governments near and dear to them, 
which today rule happily ³by the grace of God,² are 
missing on the morrow after such a war. (Thunderous 
applause.) 
There has already been one such war against the 
U.S.S.R., if you remember, 15 years ago. As is well 
known, the universally esteemed Churchill clothed that 
war in a poetic formula‹³the campaign of fourteen 
states.² You remember, of course, that that war rallied all 
the working people of our country into one united camp

J. V. S T A L I N 304 
of self-sacrificing warriors, who with their lives defended 
their workersı and peasantsı motherland against the foreign 
foe. You know how it ended. It ended in the ejection 
of the invaders from our country and the formation of 
revolutionary Councils of Action72 in Europe. It can hardly 
be doubted that a second war against the U.S.S.R. 
will lead to the complete defeat of the aggressors, to 
revolution in a number of countries in Europe and in 
Asia, and to the destruction of the bourgeois-landlord 
governments in those countries. 
Such are the war plans of the perplexed bourgeois 
politicians. 
As you see, they are not distinguished either for their 
brains or for their valour. (Applause.) 
But while the bourgeoisie chooses the path of war, 
the working class in the capitalist countries, brought 
to despair by four years of crisis and unemployment, 
is beginning to take the path of revolution. This means 
that a revolutionary crisis is maturing and will continue 
to mature. And the more the bourgeoisie becomes entangled 
in its war schemes, the more frequently it resorts to 
terrorist methods of fighting against the working class 
and the labouring peasantry, the more rapidly will the 
revolutionary crisis develop. 
Some comrades think that, once there is a revolutionary 
crisis, the bourgeoisie is bound to get into a hopeless 
position, that its end is therefore a foregone conclusion, 
that the victory of the revolution is thus assured, and that 
all they have to do is to wait for the fall of the bourgeoisie 
and to draw up victorious resolutions. That is a profound 
mistake. The victory of the revolution never comes 
of itself. It must be prepared for and won. And only a

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 305 
strong proletarian revolutionary party can prepare for 
and win victory. Moments occur when the situation is 
revolutionary, when the rule of the bourgeoisie is shaken 
to its very foundations, and yet the victory of the revolution 
does not come, because there is no revolutionary 
party of the proletariat with sufficient strength and 
prestige to lead the masses and to take power. It would 
be unwise to believe that such ³cases² cannot occur. 
It is worth while in this connection to recall Leninıs 
prophetic words on revolutionary crisis, uttered at the 
Second Congress of the Communist International73: 
³We have now come to the question of the revolutionary crisis 
as the basis of our revolutionary action. And here we must 
first of all note two widespread errors. On the one hand, the bourgeois 
economists depict this crisis as mere Œunrest,ı as the English 
so elegantly express it. On the other hand, revolutionaries sometimes 
try to prove that the crisis is absolutely hopeless. That is a 
mistake. There is no such thing as an absolutely hopeless situation. 
The bourgeoisie behaves like an arrogant plunderer who has 
lost his head; i t commits folly after folly, making the situation 
more acute and hastening its own doom. All this is true. But 
it cannot be Œprovedı that there is absolutely no chance of its 
gulling some minority of the exploited with some kind of minor 
concessions, or of suppressing some movement or uprising of 
some section or another of the oppressed and exploited. To try 
to Œproveı beforehand that a situation is Œabsolutelyı hopeless 
would be sheer pedantry, or juggling with concepts and catchwords. 
In this and similar questions the only real Œproofı is practice. The 
bourgeois system all over the world is experiencing a most profound 
revolutionary crisis. The revolutionary parties must now 
Œproveı by their practical actions that they are sufficiently intelligent 
and organised, are sufficiently in contact with the exploited 
masses, are sufficiently determined and skilful, to utilise this 
crisis for a successful and victorious revolution² (Lenin, Vol. XXV, 
pp. 340-4174).

J. V. S T A L I N 306 
3. THE RELATIONS BETWEEN THE U.S.S.R. 
AND THE CAPITALIST STATES 
It is easy to understand how difficult it has been for 
the U.S.S.R. to pursue its peace policy in this atmosphere 
poisoned with the miasma of war schemes. 
In the midst of this eve-of-war frenzy which has affected 
a number of countries, the U.S.S.R. during these years 
has stood firmly and unshakably by its position of peace: 
fighting against the menace of war; fighting to preserve 
peace; meeting half-way those countries which in one way 
or another stand for the preservation of peace; exposing 
and tearing the masks from those who are preparing for 
and provoking war. 
What did the U.S.S.R. rely on in this difficult and 
complicated struggle for peace? 
a) On its growing economic and political might. 
b) On the moral support of the vast masses of the 
working class of all countries, who are vitally interested 
in the preservation of peace. 
c) On the prudence of those countries which for one 
motive or another are not interested in disturbing the 
peace, and which want to develop trade relations with 
such a punctual client as the U.S.S.R. 
d) Finally‹on our glorious army, which stands ready 
to defend our country against assaults from without. 
It was on this basis that we began our campaign for 
the conclusion with neighbouring states of pacts of nonaggression 
and of pacts defining aggression. You know 
that this campaign has been successful. As you know, 
pacts of non-aggression have been concluded not only 
with the majority of our neighbours in the West and in 
the South, including Finland and Poland, but also with

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 307 
such countries as France and Italy; and pacts defining aggression 
have been concluded with those same neighbouring 
states, including the Little Entente.75 
On the same basis the friendship between the U.S.S.R. 
and Turkey has been consolidated; relations between the 
U.S.S.R. and Italy have improved and have indisputably 
become satisfactory; relations with France, Poland 
and other Baltic states have improved; relations have been 
restored with the U.S.A., China, etc. 
Of the many facts reflecting the successes of the 
peace policy of the U.S.S.R. two facts of indisputably 
material significance should be noted and singled 
out.
1) I have in mind, firstly, the change for the better 
that has taken place recently in the relations between 
the U.S.S.R. and Poland and between the U.S.S.R. and 
France. In the past, as you know, our relations with Poland 
were not at all good. Representatives of our state 
were assassinated in Poland. Poland regarded itself 
as the barrier of the Western states against the U.S.S.R. 
All the various imperialists counted on Poland as their 
advanced detachment in the event of a military attack 
on the U.S.S.R. The relations between the U.S.S.R. and 
France were no better. We need only recall the facts relating 
to the trial of the Ramzin group of wreckers in 
Moscow to bring to mind a picture of the relations between 
the U.S.S.R. and France. But now those undesirable 
relations are gradually beginning to disappear. They are 
giving way to other relations, which can only be called 
relations of rapprochement. 
The point is not merely that we have concluded pacts 
of non-aggression with these countries, although the pacts

J. V. S T A L I N 308 
in themselves are of very great importance. The point 
is, primarily, that the atmosphere of mutual distrust 
is beginning to be dissipated. This does not mean, 
of course, that the incipient process of rapprochement 
can be regarded as sufficiently stable and as guaranteeing 
ultimate success. Surprises and zigzags in 
policy, for example in Poland, where anti-Soviet 
sentiments are still strong, can as yet by no means be 
regarded as out of the question. But the change for the 
better in our relations, irrespective of its results in 
the future, is a fact worthy of being noted and emphasised 
as a factor in the advancement of the cause of 
peace. 
What is the cause of this change? What stimulates 
it? 
Primarily, the growth of the strength and might of 
the U.S.S.R. 
In our times it is not the custom to take any account 
of the weak‹only the strong are taken into account. 
Furthermore, there have been some changes in the policy 
of Germany which reflect the growth of revanchist and 
imperialist sentiments in Germany. 
In this connection some German politicians say that 
the U.S.S.R. has now taken an orientation towards France 
and Poland; that from an opponent of the Versailles 
Treaty it has become a supporter of it, and that this change 
is to be explained by the establishment of the fascist 
regime in Germany. That is not true. Of course, we are 
far from being enthusiastic about the fascist regime in 
Germany. But it is not a question of fascism here, if only 
for the reason that fascism in Italy, for example, has 
not prevented the U.S.S.R. from establishing the best rela

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 309 
tions with that country. Nor is it a question of any alleged 
change in our attitude towards the Versailles 
Treaty. It is not for us, who have experienced the shame of 
the Brest Peace, to sing the praises of the Versailles 
Treaty. We merely do not agree to the world being flung into 
the abyss of a new war on account of that treaty. The 
same must be said of the alleged new orientation taken 
by the U.S.S.R. We never had any orientation towards 
Germany, nor have we any orientation towards Poland 
and France. Our orientation in the past and our orientation 
at the present time is towards the U.S.S.R., and 
towards the U.S.S.R. alone. (Stormy applause.) And if 
the interests of the U.S.S.R. demand rapprochement 
with one country or another which is not interested in 
disturbing peace, we adopt this course without hesitation. 
No, that is not the point. The point is that Germanyıs 
policy has changed. The point is that even before the 
present German politicians came to power, and particularly 
after they came to power, a contest began in Germany 
between two political lines: between the old policy, 
which was reflected in the treaties between the U.S.S.R. 
and Germany, and the ³new² policy, which, in the main, recalls 
the policy of the former German Kaiser, who at one 
time occupied the Ukraine and marched against Leningrad, 
after converting the Baltic countries into a place 
dıarmes for this march; and this ³new² policy is obviously 
gaining the upper hand over the old policy. The 
fact that the advocates of the ³new² policy are gaining 
supremacy in all things, while the supporters of the old 
policy are in disfavour, cannot be regarded as an accident. 
Nor can the well-known statement made by Hugenberg

J. V. S T A L I N 310 
in London, and the equally well-known declarations 
of Rosenberg, who directs the foreign policy of the ruling 
party in Germany, be regarded as accidents. That 
is the point, comrades. 
2) I have in mind, secondly, the restoration of normal 
relations between the U.S.S.R. and the United States 
of America. There cannot be any doubt that this act 
is of very great significance for the whole system of international 
relations. The point is not only that it improves 
the chances of preserving peace, improves the relations between 
the two countries, strengthens trade connections 
between them and creates a basis for mutual collaboration. 
The point is that it forms a landmark between the old 
position, when in various countries the U.S.A. was regarded 
as the bulwark for all sorts of anti-Soviet trends, 
and the new position, when that bulwark has been voluntarily 
removed, to the mutual advantage of both countries. 
Such are the two main facts which reflect the successes 
of the Soviet policy of peace. 
It would be wrong, however, to think that everything 
went smoothly in the period under review. No, not 
everything went smoothly, by a long way. 
Recall, say, the pressure that was brought to bear 
upon us by Britain, the embargo on our exports, the attempt 
to interfere in our internal affairs and to use this 
as a probe‹to test our power of resistance. True, nothing 
came of this attempt, and later the embargo was lifted; 
but the unpleasant after effect of these sallies still makes 
itself felt in everything connected with the relations between 
Britain and the U.S.S.R., including the negotiations 
for a commercial treaty. And these sallies

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 311 
against the U.S.S.R. must not be regarded as accidental. 
It is well known that a certain section of the British 
Conservatives cannot live without such sallies. 
And precisely because they are not accidental we must 
reckon that in the future, too, sallies will be made 
against the U.S.S.R., all sorts of menaces will be created, 
attempts will be undertaken to damage the U.S.S.R., 
etc.
Nor must we lose sight of the relations between the 
U.S.S.R. and Japan, which stand in need of considerable 
improvement. Japanıs refusal to conclude a pact of 
non-aggression, of which Japan stands in no less need 
than the U.S.S.R., once again emphasises the fact that 
all is not well in the sphere of our relations. The same 
must be said of the rupture of negotiations concerning 
the Chinese-Eastern Railway, due to no fault of the 
U.S.S.R.; and also of the outrageous actions of the Japanese 
agents on the Chinese-Eastern Railway, the illegal 
arrests of Soviet employees on the Chinese-Eastern 
Railway, etc. That is apart from the fact that one section 
of the military in Japan, with the obvious approval 
of another section of the military, is openly advocating 
in the press the necessity for a war against the U.S.S.R. 
and the seizure of the Maritime Region; while the Japanese 
Government, instead of calling these instigators 
of war to order, pretends that the matter is no concern 
of its. It is not difficult to understand that such circumstances 
cannot but create an atmosphere of uneasiness 
and uncertainty. Of course, we shall persistently continue 
to pursue a policy of peace and strive for an improvement 
in our relations with Japan, because we want to improve 
these relations. But it does not depend entirely upon

J. V. S T A L I N 312 
us. That is why we must at the same time take all 
measures to guard our country against surprises, and 
be prepared to defend it against attack. (Stormy applause.) 
As you see, alongside the successes in our peace policy 
there are also a number of unfavourable features. 
Such is the external situation of the U.S.S.R. 
Our foreign policy is clear. It is a policy of preserving 
peace and strengthening trade relations with all countries. 
The U.S.S.R. does not think of threatening anybody‹
let alone of attacking anybody. We stand for peace 
and uphold the cause of peace. But we are not afraid 
of threats and are prepared to answer the instigators 
of war blow for blow. (Stormy applause.) Those who want 
peace and seek business relations with us will always have 
our support. But those who try to attack our country will 
receive a crushing repulse to teach them in future not 
to poke their pig snouts into our Soviet garden. (Thunderous 
applause.) 
Such is our foreign policy. (Thunderous applause.) 
The task is to continue to implement this policy 
with unflagging perseverance and consistency. 
II 
THE CONTINUING PROGRESS OF THE NATIONAL 
ECONOMY AND THE INTERNAL SITUATION 
IN THE U.S.S.R. 
I pass to the question of the internal situation in 
the U.S.S.R. 
From the point of view of the internal situation in 
the U.S.S.R. the period under review presents a pic

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 313 
ture of ever increasing progress, both in the sphere 
of the national economy and in the sphere of culture. 
This progress has not been merely a simple quantitative 
accumulation of strength. This progress is remarkable 
in that it has introduced fundamental changes into 
the structure of the U.S.S.R., and has radically changed 
the face of the country. 
During this period, the U.S.S.R. has become radically 
transformed and has cast off the aspect of backwardness 
and medievalism. From an agrarian country it has 
become an industrial country. From a country of small 
individual agriculture it has become a country of collective, 
large-scale mechanised agriculture. From an ignorant, 
illiterate and uncultured country it has become‹ 
or rather it is becoming‹a literate and cultured country 
covered by a vast network of higher, secondary and elementary 
schools functioning in the languages of the nationalities 
of the U.S.S.R. 
New industries have been created: the production 
of machine tools, automobiles, tractors, chemicals, motors, 
aircraft, harvester combines, powerful turbines and 
generators, high-grade steel, ferro-alloys, synthetic rubber, 
nitrates, artificial fibre, etc., etc. (Prolonged applause.) 
During this period thousands of new, fully up-to-date 
industrial plants have been built and put into operation. 
Giants like the Dnieprostroi, Magnitostroi, Kuznetskstroi, 
Chelyabstroi, Bobriki, Uralmashstroi and 
Krammashstroi have been built. Thousands of old plants 
have been reconstructed and provided with modern technical 
equipment. New plants have been built, and industrial

J. V. S T A L I N 314 
centres created, in the national republics and in the border 
regions of the U.S.S.R.: in Byelorussia, in the 
Ukraine, in the North Caucasus, in Transcaucasia, in 
Central Asia, in Kazakhstan, in Buryat-Mongolia, in 
Tataria, in Bashkiria, in the Urals, in Eastern and Western 
Siberia, in the Far East, etc. 
More than 200,000 collective farms and 5,000 state 
farms have been organised, with new district centres and 
industrial centres serving them. 
New large towns, with large populations, have sprung 
up in what were almost uninhabited places. The old towns 
and industrial centres have grown enormously. 
The foundations have been laid for the Urals-Kuznetsk 
Combine, which unites the coking coal of Kuznetsk 
with the iron ore of the Urals. Thus, we may consider that 
the dream of a new metallurgical base in the East has 
become a reality. 
The foundations for a powerful new oil base have 
been laid in areas of the western and southern slopes 
of the Urals range‹in the Urals region, Bashkiria and 
Kazakhstan. 
It is obvious that the huge capital investments of 
the state in all branches of the national economy, amounting 
in the period under review to over 60,000 million 
rubles, have not been spent in vain, and are already beginning 
to bear fruit. 
As a result of these achievements the national income 
of the U.S.S.R. has increased from 29,000 million 
rubles in 1929 to 50,000 million in 1933; whereas during 
the same period there has been an enormous decline in 
the national income of all the capitalist countries without 
exception.

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 315 
Naturally, all these achievements and all this progress 
were bound to lead‹and actually have led‹to the 
further consolidation of the internal situation in the 
U.S.S.R. 
How was it possible for these colossal changes to 
take place in a matter of three or four years on the territory 
of a vast state with a backward technique and a 
backward culture? Was it not a miracle? It would have 
been a miracle if this development had taken place on the 
basis of capitalism and individual small farming. But it 
cannot be described as a miracle if we bear in mind that 
this development took place on the basis of expanding 
socialist construction. 
Naturally, this enormous progress could take place 
only on the basis of the successful building of socialism; 
on the basis of the socially organised work of scores of 
millions of peoples; on the basis of the advantages which 
the socialist system of economy has over the capitalist 
and individual peasant system. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that the colossal progress 
in the economy and culture of the U.S.S.R. during 
the period under review has at the same time meant the 
elimination of the capitalist elements and the relegation 
of individual peasant economy to the background. It is 
a fact that the socialist system of economy in the sphere 
of industry now constitutes 99 per cent of the total; 
and in agriculture, according to the area sown to grain 
crops, it constitutes 84.5 per cent of the total, whereas individual 
peasant economy accounts for only 15.5 per 
cent. 
I t follows, then, that capitalist economy in the 
U.S.S.R. has already been eliminated and that the indi

J. V. S T A L I N 
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TO MAO 

 
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COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
316 
vidual peasant sector in the countryside has been relegated 
to a secondary position. 
At the time when the New Economic Policy was being 
introduced, Lenin said that there were elements of five 
forms of social and economic structure in our country: 
1) patriarchal economy (largely natural economy); 2) 
small-commodity production (the majority of the peasants 
who sell grain); 3) private capitalism; 4) state capitalism; 
5) socialism.76 Lenin considered that, of all these forms, 
the socialist form must in the end gain the upper hand. 
We can now say that the first, the third and the fourth 
forms of social and economic structure no longer exist; 
the second form has been forced into a secondary position, 
while the fifth form‹the socialist form of social and 
economic structure‹now holds undivided sway and is 
the sole commanding force in the whole national economy. 
(Stormy and prolonged applause.) 
Such is the result. 
In this result is contained the basis of the stability 
of the internal situation in the U.S.S.R., the basis of the 
firmness of its front and rear positions in the circumstances 
of the capitalist encirclement. 
Let us pass to an examination of the concrete material 
relating to various questions of the economic and political 
situation in the Soviet Union. 
1. THE PROGRESS OF INDUSTRY 
Of all branches of our national economy, the one 
that has grown most rapidly is industry. During the period 
under review, i.e., beginning with 1930, our industry 
has more than doubled, namely, it has increased by

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 317 
101.6 per cent; and compared with the pre-war level 
it has grown almost four-fold, namely, by 291.9 per 
cent. 
This means that our industrialisation has been going 
ahead at full speed. 
As a result of the rapid growth of industrialisation 
the output of industry has advanced to first place in the 
gross output of the whole national economy. 
Here is the corresponding table: 
Relative Importance of Industry in the Gross Output 
of the National Economy 
(Per cent of total, in prices of 1926-27) 
1913 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
1. Industry (without 
small industry) . . 42.1 54.5 61.6 66.7 70.7 70.4 
2. Agriculture . . . . 57.9 45.5 38.4 33.3 29.3 29.6 
Total . . . 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
This means that our country has definitely and finally 
become an industrial country. 
Of decisive significance for the industrialisation of 
the country is the growth of the output of instruments 
and means of production in the total development of industry. 
The figures for the period under review show 
that this item has become predominant in the gross output 
of industry.

J. V. S T A L I N 318 
Here is the corresponding table: 
Relative Importance of the Output of the Two Main 
Branches of Large-Scale Industry 
(In prices of 1926-27) 
Gross output (in thousand million 
rubles) 
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
Total large-scale industry . 21.0 27.5 33.9 38.5 41.9 
Of which: 
Group ³A²: instruments and 
means of production . . . 10.2 14.5 18.8 22.0 24.3 
Group ³B²: consumer goods 10.8 13.0 15.1 16.5 17.6 
Relative importance (per cent of total) 
Group ³A²: instruments and 
means of production . . . 48.5 52.6 55.4 57.0 58.0 
Group ³B²: consumer goods 51.5 47.4 44.6 43.0 42.0 
Total . . . . . 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
As you see, this table requires no explanation. 
In our country, which is still young as regards technical 
development, industry has a special task to fulfil. 
It must reconstruct on a new technical basis not only itself, 
not only all branches of industry, including light industry, 
the food industry, and the timber industry; it 
must also reconstruct all forms of transport and all 
branches of agriculture. It can fulfil this task, however, only 
if the machine-building industry‹which is the main lever 
for the reconstruction of the national economy‹occupies 
a predominant place in it. The figures for the period 
under review show that our machine-building industry

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 319 
has advanced to the leading place in the total volume of 
industrial output. 
Here is the corresponding table: 
Relative Importance of Various Branches of Industry 
(Per cent of total gross output) 
U.S.S.R. 
1913 1929 1932 1933 
Coal . . . . . . . . 2.9 2.1 1.7 2.0 
Coke . . . . . . . . 0.8 0.4 0.5 0.6 
Oil (extraction) . . . . 1.9 1.8 1.5 1.4 
Oil (refining) . . . . 2.3 2.5 2.9 2.6 
Iron and steel . . . . No data 4.5 3.7 4.0 
Non-ferrous metals . . ² ² 1.5 1.3 1.2 
Machine building . . . 11.0 14.8 25.0 26.1 
Basic chemicals . . . 0.8 0.6 0.8 0.9 
Cotton textiles . . . . 18.3 15.2 7.6 7.3 
Woolen textiles . . . . 3.1 3.1 1.9 1.8 
This means that our industry is developing on a sound 
foundation, and that the key to reconstruction‹the machine 
building industry‹is entirely in our hands. All 
that is required is that we use it skilfully and rationally. 
The development of industry according to social sectors 
during the period under review present an interesting 
picture. 
Here is the corresponding table:

J. V. S T A L I N 320 
Gross Output of Large-Scale Industry 
According to Social Sectors 
(In prices of 1926-27) 
(In million rubles) 
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
Total output . . . . . . 21,025 27,477 33,903 38,464 41,968 
Of which: 
I. Socialised industry. . 20,891 27,402 No data 38,436 41,940 
Of which: 
a) State industry. . . . 19,143 24,989 ² ² 35,587 38,932 
b) Co-operative industry 1,748 2,413 ² ² 2,849 3,008 
II. Private industry . . . 134 75 ² ² 28 28 
(Per cent of total) 
Total output . . . . . 100 100 100 100 100 
Of which: 
I. Socialised industry. . 99.4 99.7 No data 99.93 99.93 
Of which: 
a) State industry. . . . 91.1 90.9 ² ² 92.52 92.76 
b) Co-operative industry 8.3 8.8 ² ² 7.41 7.17 
II. Private industry . . . 0.6 0.3 ² ² 0.07 0.07 
From this table it is evident that the capitalist elements 
in industry have already come to an end and that 
the socialist system of economy is now the sole system, 
holding a position of monopoly, in our industry. (Applause.) 
However, of all the achievements of industry in the 
period under review the most important is the fact that 
it has succeeded in this period in training and moulding 
thousands of new men and women, of new leaders of industry, 
whole strata of new engineers and technicians, 
hundreds of thousands of young skilled workers who have

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 321 
mastered the new technique and who have advanced our 
socialist industry. There can be no doubt that without 
these men and women industry could not have achieved 
the successes it has achieved, and of which it has a right 
to be proud. The figures show that in the period under 
review about 800,000 more or less skilled workers have 
graduated into industry from factory training schools, 
and over 180,000 engineers and technicians from higher 
technical educational institutions, other higher educational 
institutions and technical schools. If it is true that 
the problem of cadres is a most important problem of 
our development, then it must be admitted that our industry 
is beginning really to cope with this problem. 
Such are the principal achievements of our industry. 
It would be wrong, however, to think that industry 
has only successes to record. No, it also has its defects. 
The chief of these are: 
a) The continuing lag of the iron and steel industry; 
b) The lack of order in the non-ferrous metals industry; 
c) The underestimation of the great importance of 
developing the mining of local coal for the general fuel 
supply of the country (Moscow Region, the Caucasus, the 
Urals, Karaganda, Central Asia, Siberia, the Far 
East, the Northern Territory, etc.); 
d) The absence of proper attention to the question 
of organising a new oil centre in areas of the Urals, Bashkiria, 
and the Emba; 
e) The absence of serious concern for expanding the 
production of goods for mass consumption both in the 
light and food industries and in the timber industry; 
f) The absence of proper attention to the question 
of developing local industry;

J. V. S T A L I N 322 
g) An absolutely impermissible attitude towards the 
question of improving the quality of output; 
h) The continuing lag as regards increasing the productivity 
of labour, reducing the cost of production, and 
adopting business accounting; 
i) The fact that bad organisation of work and wages, 
lack of personal responsibility in work, and wage equalisation 
have not yet been eliminated; 
j) The fact that red-tape and bureaucratic methods 
of management in the economic Peopleıs Commissariats 
and their bodies, including the Peopleıs Commissariats 
of the light and food industries, are still far from having 
been eliminated. 
The absolute necessity for the speedy elimination 
of these defects scarcely needs any further explanation. 
As you know, the iron and steel and non-ferrous metals 
industries failed to fulfil their plan throughout the first 
five-year plan period; nor have they fulfilled the plan 
for the first year of the second five year plan period. If 
they continue to lag behind they may become a brake 
on industry and the cause of failures in its work. As 
to the creation of new centres of the coal and oil industries, 
it is not difficult to understand that unless this 
urgent task is fulfilled both industry and transport may 
run aground. The question of goods for mass consumption 
and of developing local industry, as well as the questions 
of improving the quality of output, of increasing the productivity 
of labour, of reducing production costs, and 
of adopting business accounting also need no further explanation. 
As for the bad organisation of work and wages, 
and red-tape and bureaucratic methods of management, 
the case of the Donbas and of the enterprises of the light

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 323 
and food industries has shown that this dangerous disease 
is to be found in all branches of industry and hinders 
their development. If it is not eliminated, industry will 
be in a bad way. 
Our immediate tasks are: 
1) To maintain the present leading role of machine 
building in the system of industry. 
2) To eliminate the lag of the iron and steel industry. 
3) To put the non-ferrous metals industries in 
order. 
4) To develop to the utmost the mining of local coal 
in all the areas already known; to develop new coalfields 
(for example, in the Bureya district in the Far East), 
and to convert the Kuzbas into a second Donbas. (Prolonged 
applause.) 
5) Seriously to set about organising a centre of the 
oil industry in the areas of the western and southern 
slopes of the Urals range. 
6) To expand the production of goods for mass consumption 
by all the economic Peopleıs Commissariats. 
7) To develop local Soviet industry; to give it the 
opportunity of displaying initiative in the production 
of goods for mass consumption and to give it all possible 
assistance in the way of raw materials and funds. 
8) To improve the quality of the goods produced; to 
stop turning out incomplete sets of goods, and to punish 
all those comrades, irrespective of their post, who violate 
or evade Soviet laws concerning the quality and 
completeness of sets of goods. 
9) To secure a systematic increase in the productivity 
of labour, a reduction in production costs, and the 
adoption of business accounting.

J. V. S T A L I N 324 
10) To put an end to lack of personal responsibility 
in work and to wage equalisation. 
11) To eliminate red-tape and bureaucratic methods 
of management in all the departments of the economic 
Commissariats, and to check systematically the fulfilment 
of the decisions and instructions of the directing 
centres by the subordinate bodies. 
2. THE PROGRESS OF AGRICULTURE 
Development in the sphere of agriculture has proceeded 
somewhat differently. In the period under review 
progress in the main branches of agriculture proceeded 
many times more slowly than in industry, but nevertheless 
more rapidly than in the period when individual 
farming predominated. In live stock farming, however, 
there was even a reverse process‹a decline in the number 
of livestock, and it was only in 1933, and then only 
in pig breeding, that signs of progress were observed. 
Evidently, the enormous difficulties of uniting the 
scattered small peasant farms into collective farms, the 
difficult task of creating a large number of big grain and livestock 
farms, starting almost from nothing, and, in general, 
the period of reorganisation, when individual agriculture was 
being remodelled and transferred to the new, collectivefarm 
basis, which required much time and considerable 
outlay‹all these factors inevitably predetermined both 
the slow rate of progress of agriculture, and the relatively 
long period of decline in the number of livestock. 
In point of fact, in agriculture the period under review 
was not so much one of rapid progress and power

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 325 
ful upswing as one during which the conditions were created 
for such a progress and upswing in the near future. 
If we take the figures for the increase in the area 
under all crops, and separately the figures for industrial 
crops, we get the following picture of the development 
of agriculture during the period under review. 
Area under All Crops in the U.S.S.R. 
(In million hectares) 
1913 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
Total crop area . . . 105.0 118.0 127.2 136.3 134.4 129.7 
Of which: 
a) Grain crops . . 94.4 96.0 101.8 104.4 99.7 101.5 
b) Industrial crops . 4.5 8.8 10.5 14.0 14.9 12.0 
c) Vegetables and 
melons . . . . 3.8 7.6 8.0 9.1 9.2 8.6 
d) Fodder crops . . 2.1 5.0 6.5 8.8 10.6 7.3 
Area under Industrial Crops in the U.S.S.R. 
(In million hectares) 
1913 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
Cotton . . . . . . . 0.69 1.06 1.58 2.14 2.17 2.05 
Flax (long fibre) . . 1.02 1.63 1.75 2.39 2.51 2.40 
Sugar-beet. . . . . . 0.65 0.77 1.04 1.39 1.54 1.21 
Oil seeds . . . . . . 2.00 5.20 5.22 7.55 7.98 5.79 
These tables reflect the two main lines in agriculture: 
1) The line of the greatest possible expansion of crop 
areas in the period when the reorganisation of agriculture 
was at its height, when collective farms were being formed

J. V. S T A L I N 326 
in tens of thousands and were driving the kulaks from 
the land, seizing the vacated land and taking charge of it. 
2) The line of refraining from wholesale expansion 
of crop areas; the line of passing from wholesale expansion 
of crop areas to improved cultivation of the land, to the 
introduction of proper rotation of crops and fallow, to 
an increase of the harvest yield and, if shown to be 
necessary in practice, to a temporary reduction of crop areas. 
As you know, the second line‹the only correct line 
in agriculture‹was proclaimed in 1932, when the period of 
reorganisation in agriculture was drawing to a close and 
the question of increasing the harvest yield became one of 
the fundamental questions of the progress of agriculture. 
But the data on the growth of the crop areas cannot be 
regarded as a fully adequate indication of the development 
of agriculture. It sometimes happens that while the 
crop area increases, output does not increase, or even declines, 
because cultivation of the soil has deteriorated, and 
the yield per hectare has fallen. In view of this, data on 
crop areas must be supplemented by data on gross output. 
Here is the corresponding table: 
Gross Output of Grain and Industrial 
Crops in the U.S.S.R. 
(In million centners) 
1913 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
Grain crops . . . . . 801.0 717.4 835.4 694.8 698.7 898.0 
Raw cotton . . . . . 7.4 8.6 11.1 12.9 12.7 13.2 
Flax fibre . . . . . 3.3 3.6 4.4 5.5 5.0 5.6 
Sugar-beet. . . . . . 109.0 62.5 140.2 120.5 65.6 90.0 
Oil seeds . . . . . . 21.5 35.8 36.2 51.0 45.5 46.0

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 327 
It can be seen from this table that the years in which 
the reorganisation of agriculture was at its height, viz., 
1931 and 1932, were the years of the greatest decrease 
in the output of grain crops. 
It follows, further, from this table that in the flax 
and cotton areas, where the reorganisation of agriculture 
proceeded at a slower pace, flax and cotton 
hardly suffered, and progressed more or less evenly 
and steadily, while maintaining a high level of development. 
Thirdly, it follows from this table that whereas there was 
only a slight fluctuation in the output of oil seeds, and 
a high level of development was maintained as compared 
with the pre-war level, in the sugar-beet districts, 
where the reorganisation of agriculture proceeded at the 
most rapid rate, sugar beet farming, which was the 
last to enter the period of reorganisation, suffered 
its greatest decline in the last year of reorganisation, 
viz., in 1932, when output dropped below the pre-war 
level. 
Lastly, it follows from this table that 1933, the first 
year after the completion of the reorganisation period, 
marks a turning-point in the development of grain and 
industrial crops. 
This means that from now on grain crops, in the first 
place, and then industrial crops, will firmly and surely 
achieve a mighty advance. 
The branch of agriculture that suffered most in the 
reorganisation period was livestock farming. 
Here is the corresponding table:

J. V. S T A L I N 328 
Livestock in the U.S.S.R. 
(Million head) 
1916 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
a) Horses . . . . . . 35.1 34.0 30.2 26.2 19.6 16.6 
b) Large cattle . . . 58.9 68.1 52.5 47.9 40.7 38.6 
c) Sheep and goats . . 115.2 147.2 108.8 77.7 52.1 50.6 
d) Pigs . . . . . . . 20.3 20.9 13.6 14.4 11.6 12.2 
It can be seen from this table that in the period under 
review there was not an improvement, but a continual 
decline in the quantity of livestock in the country 
as compared with the pre-war level. It is obvious that 
this table reflects, on the one hand, the fact that livestock 
farming was most of all dominated by big kulak 
elements, and, on the other hand, the intense kulak agitation 
for the slaughter of livestock, which found favourable 
soil in the years of reorganisation. 
Furthermore, i t follows from this table that the 
decline in the number of livestock began in the very first 
year of reorganisation (1930) and continued right up to 
1933. The decline was greatest in the first three years; 
while in 1933, the first year after the termination of the 
period of reorganisation, when the grain crops began to 
make progress, the decline in the number of livestock 
reached a minimum. 
Lastly, it follows from this table that the reverse process 
has already commenced in pig breeding, and that 
in 1933 signs of direct progress were already seen. 
This means that the year 1934 can and must mark a 
turning point towards progress in all branches of livestock 
farming.

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 329 
How did the collectivisation of peasant farms develop 
in the period under review? 
Here is the corresponding table: 
Collectivisation 
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
Number of collective farms 
(thousands) . . . . . . . 57.0 85.9 211.1 211.05 224.5 
Number of households in 
collective farms (millions) 1.0 6.0 13.0 14.9 15.2 
Per cent of peasant farms 
collectivised . . . . . . 3.9 23.6 52.7 61.5 65.0 
And what was the development as regards the areas 
under grain crops according to sectors? 
Here is the corresponding table: 
Area under Grain Crops According to Sectors 
(In million hectares) 
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
1. State farms . . 1.5 2.9 8.1 9.3 10.8 10.6 
2. Collective farms 3.4 29.7 61.0 69.1 75.0 73.9 
3. Individual peasant 
farms . . . 91.1 69.2 35.3 21.3 15.7 15.5 
Total grain crop 
area in the 
U.S.S.R. . . . 96.0 101.8 104.4 99.7 101.5 100.0 
What do these tables show? 
They show that the period of reorganisation in agriculture, 
during which the number of collective farms and 
Sectors 
Per cent 
of total 
area in 1913

J. V. S T A L I N 330 
the number of their members increased at a tempestuous 
pace, is now ended, that it was already ended in 
1932. 
Hence, the further process of collectivisation is a 
process of the gradual absorption and re-education of the 
remaining individual peasant farms and farmers by the 
collective farms. 
This means that the collective farms have triumphed 
completely and irrevocably. (Stormy and prolonged applause.) 
They show also that the state farms and collective 
farms together control 84.5 per cent of the total area under 
grain in the U.S.S.R. 
This means that the collective farms and state farms 
together have become a force which determines the fate 
of the whole of agriculture and of all its branches. 
The tables further show that the 65 per cent of peasant 
farms united in collective farms control 73.9 per 
cent of the total area under grain crops, whereas all the 
individual peasant farms that remain, representing 35 
per cent of the entire peasant population, control only 
15.5 per cent of the total area under grain crops. 
If we add to this fact that in 1933 the various deliveries 
to the state made by the collective farms amounted 
to more than 1,000 million poods of grain, while the 
individual peasants, who fulfilled their plan 100 per 
cent, delivered only about 130,000,000 poods; whereas 
in 1929-30 the individual peasants delivered to the state 
about 780,000,000 poods, and the collective farms not 
more than 120,000,000 poods‹then it becomes absolutely 
clear that during the period under review the collective 
farms and the individual peasants have complete

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 331 
ly exchanged roles: the collective farms during this 
period have become the predominant force in agriculture, 
whereas the individual peasants have become a secondary 
force and are compelled to subordinate and adapt 
themselves to the collective-farm system. 
It must be admitted that the labouring peasantry, 
our Soviet peasantry, has completely and irrevocably 
taken its stand under the Red banner of socialism. (Prolonged 
applause.) 
Let the Socialist-Revolutionary, Menshevik, and 
bourgeois Trotskyite gossips chatter about the peasantry 
being counter-revolutionary by nature, about its mission 
to restore capitalism in the U.S.S.R., about its inability 
to serve as the ally of the working class in building 
socialism, and about the impossibility of building 
socialism in the U.S.S.R. The facts show that these gentlemen 
slander the U.S.S.R. and the Soviet peasantry. 
The facts show that our Soviet peasantry has quit the 
shores of capitalism for good and is going forward, in alliance 
with the working class, to socialism. The facts show 
that we have already laid the foundations of a socialist 
society in the U.S.S.R., and it only remains for us to 
erect the superstructures‹a task which undoubtedly 
is much easier than that of laying the foundations of 
a socialist society. 
The increase in crop area and in output is not the 
only thing, however, that reflects the strength of the 
collective farms and state farms. Their strength is reflected 
also in the increase in the number of tractors 
at their disposal, in their increasing use of machinery. 
There is no doubt that in this respect our collective farms 
and state farms have gone a long way forward.

J. V. S T A L I N 332 
Here is the corresponding table: 
Number of Tractors Employed in Agriculture in the U.S.S.R. 
(Allowance made for depreciation) 
Number of tractors Capacity in thousands 
in thousands of horse-power 
1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 
Total number 
of tractors 
34.9 72.1 125.3 148.5 204.1 391.4 1,003.5 1,850.0 2,225.0 3,100.0 
Of which: 
a) In machine 
and 
tractor stations 
. . . 2.4 31.1 63.3 74.8 122.3 23.9 372.5 848.0 1,077.0 1,872.0 
b) In state 
farms of all 
systems . . 9.7 27.7 51.5 64.0 81.8 123.4 483.1 892.0 1,043.0 1,318.0 
Thus, we have 204,000 tractors with a total of 
3,100,000 H.P. working for the collective farms and state 
farms. This force, as you see, is not a small one; it 
is a force capable of pulling up all the roots of capitalism 
in the countryside; it is a force twice as great as the number 
of tractors that Lenin once mentioned as a remote 
prospect.77 
As regards the number of agricultural machines in 
the machine and tractor stations and in the state farms 
under the Peopleıs Commissariat of State Farms, figures 
are given in the following tables:

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 333 
In Machine and Tractor Stations 
1930 1931 1932 1933 
Harvester combines 
(thousands) . . . . 7 (units) 0.1 2.2 11.5 
Internal combustion and 
steam engines (thousands) 
. . . . . . . 0.1 4.9 6.2 17.6 
Complex and semi-complex 
threshers (thousands) 
. . . . . . . 2.9 27.8 37.0 50.0 
Electric threshing installations 
. . . . . 168 268 551 1,283 
MTS repair shops . . . 104 770 1,220 1,933 
Motor lorries (thousands) 
. . . . . . . 0.2 1.0 6.0 13.5 
Passenger motor-cars 
(units) . . . . . . . 17 191 245 2,800 
In State Farms Controlled 
by the Peopleıs Commissariat of State Farms 
1930 1931 1932 1933 
Harvester combines 
(thousands) . . . . 1.7 6.3 11.9 13.5 
Internal combustion 
and steam engines 
(thousands) . . . . . 0.3 0.7 1.2 2.5 
Complex and semicomplex 
threshers 
(thousands) . . . . 1.4 4.2 7.1 8.0 
Electric installations . . 42 112 164 222 
Repair shops: 
a) For capital repairs 72 133 208 302 
b) For medium repairs 75 160 215 476 
c) For running repairs 205 310 578 1,166 
Motor lorries (thousands) 
. . . . . . . 2.1 3.7 6.2 10.9 
Passenger motor-cars 
(units) . . . . . . . 118 385 625 1,890

J. V. S T A L I N 334 
I do not think that these figures require any explanation. 
Of no little importance for the progress of agriculture 
was also the formation of the Political Departments 
of the machine and tractor stations and state farms and 
the sending of skilled personnel into agriculture. Everybody 
admits now that the personnel of the Political 
Departments played a tremendous role in improving the 
work of the collective farms and state farms. You know 
that during the period under review the Central Committee 
of the Party sent more than 23,000 Communists to the 
countryside to reinforce the cadres in agriculture. More 
than 3,000 of them were sent to work in the land organs, 
more than 2,000 to state farms, more than 13,000 to the 
Political Departments of the machine and tractor stations, 
and over 5,000 to the Political Departments of the state 
farms. 
The same must be said about the provision of new 
engineering, technical and agronomic forces for the collective 
farms and state farms. As you know, more than 
111,000 workers of this category were sent into agriculture 
during the period under review. 
During the period under review, over 1,900,000 tractor 
drivers, harvester-combine drivers and operators, 
and automobile drivers were trained and sent to work in 
the system under the Peopleıs Commissariat of Agriculture 
alone. 
During the same period more than 1,600,000 chairmen 
and members of management boards of collective 
farms, brigade leaders for field work, brigade leaders 
for livestock raising, and book-keepers were trained or 
received additional training.

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 335 
This, of course, is not enough for our agriculture. 
But still, it is something. 
As you see, the state has done everything possible 
to facilitate the work of the organs of the Peopleıs 
Commissariat of Agriculture and of the Peopleıs Commissariat 
of State Farms in guiding collective-farm and statefarm 
development. 
Can it be said that these possibilities have been properly 
used? 
Unfortunately, it cannot. 
To begin with, these Peopleıs Commissariats are 
more infected than others with the disease of red tape. 
Decisions are made, but not a thought is given to checking 
their fulfilment, to calling to order those who disobey 
the instructions and orders of the leading bodies, 
and to promoting honest and conscientious workers. 
One would think that the existence of a huge number 
of tractors and machines would impose upon the land 
organs the obligation to keep these valuable machines 
in good order, to see to their timely repair, to employ 
them more or less efficiently. What is being done by them 
in this respect? Unfortunately, very little. The maitenance 
of tractors and machines is unsatisfactory. Repairs 
are also unsatisfactory, because even to this day 
there is a refusal to understand that the basis of repairs 
is running and medium repairs, and not capital repairs. 
As for the utilisation of tractors and machines, the unsatisfactory 
position in this respect is so clear and well 
known that it needs no proof. 
One of the immediate tasks in agriculture is to introduce 
proper rotation of crops and to secure the extension 
of clean fallow and the improvement of seeds in all

J. V. S T A L I N 336 
branches of agriculture. What is being done in this respect? 
Unfortunately, very little as yet. The state of affairs 
in regard to grain and cotton seed is so muddled that 
it will take a long time to put straight. 
One of the effective means of increasing the yield of 
industrial crops is to supply them with fertilisers. What 
is being done in this respect? Very little as yet. Fertilisers 
are available, but the organs of the Peopleıs 
Commissariat of Agriculture fail to get them; and when 
they do get them they do not see to it that they are delivered 
on time to the places where they are required and 
that they are utilised properly. 
In regard to the state farms, it must be said that they 
still fail to cope with their tasks. I do not in the least underestimate 
the great revolutionising role of our state farms. 
But if we compare the enormous sums the state has invested 
in the state farms with the actual results they have 
achieved to date, we find an enormous discrepancy to the 
disadvantage of the state farms. The principal reason for 
the discrepancy is the fact that our state grain farms are 
too unwieldy; the directors cannot manage such huge 
farms. The state farms themselves are too specialised, 
they have no rotation of crops and fallow land; they do 
not include sectors for livestock raising. Evidently, 
it will be necessary to split up the state farms and do away 
with their excessive specialisation. One might think 
that it was the Peopleıs Commissariat of State Farms that 
raised this question opportunely and succeeded in solving 
i t . But that is not so. The question was raised 
and settled on the initiative of people who were not connected 
in any way with the Peopleıs Commissariat of State 
Farms.

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 337 
Finally, there is the question of livestock farming. 
I have already reported on the serious situation with regard 
to livestock. One might think that our land organs 
would display feverish activity in an effort to put 
an end to the crisis of livestock farming, that they would 
sound the alarm, mobilise their personnel and tackle the 
problem of livestock farming. Unfortunately, nothing 
of the kind has happened, or is happening. Not only have 
they failed to sound the alarm about the serious livestock 
situation, but, on the contrary, they try to gloss 
over the question, and sometimes in their reports 
even try to conceal from the public opinion of the 
country the actual situation of livestock farming, 
which is absolutely impermissible for Bolsheviks. To 
hope, after this, that the land organs will be 
able to put livestock farming on to the right road 
and raise it to the proper level would be building on 
sand. The whole Party, all our workers, Party and 
non-Party, must take this matter in hand, bearing in 
mind that the livestock problem today is of the 
same prime importance as the grain problem‹now successfully 
solved‹was yesterday. There is no need 
to prove that our Soviet people, who have overcome 
many a serious obstacle in the path to the goal, will be 
able to overcome this obstacle as well. (Thunderous 
applause.) 
Such is a brief and far from complete enumeration of 
the defects which must be removed, and of the tasks 
which must be fulfilled in the immediate future. 
But the matter does not end with these tasks. There 
are other tasks in agriculture, concerning which a few 
words must be said.

J. V. S T A L I N 338 
First of all, we must bear in mind that the old division 
of our regions into industrial regions and agrarian 
regions has now become obsolete. We no longer have any 
exclusively agrarian regions that would supply grain, 
meat and vegetables to the industrial regions; just as we 
no longer have any exclusively industrial regions that 
would expect to obtain all necessary produce from outside, 
from other regions. Development is leading to 
the point where all our regions will be more or less industrial, 
and they will become increasingly so as this development 
proceeds. This means that the Ukraine, the North 
Caucasus, the Central Black Earth region, and other 
formerly agrarian areas can no longer supply the industrial 
centres with as much produce as they supplied in the 
past, because they have to feed their own towns and their 
own workers, the number of which will be increasing. 
But from this it follows that every region must develop 
its own agricultural base, so as to have its own supply 
of vegetables, potatoes, butter and milk, and, to some 
extent, grain and meat, if it does not want to get into 
difficulties. You know that this is quite practicable and 
is already being done. 
The task is to pursue this line to the end at all costs. 
Further, we should note the fact that the familiar division 
of our regions into consuming regions and producing regions 
is also beginning to lose its hard and fast character. 
This year such ³consuming² regions as the Moscow 
and Gorky regions delivered nearly 80,000,000 poods 
of grain to the state. This, of course, is no small item. 
In the so-called consuming zone there are about 5,000,000 
hectares of virgin soil, covered with scrub. It is well known 
that the climate in this zone is not bad; precipitation is

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 339 
ample, and droughts unknown. If this land were cleared 
of scrub and a number of organisational measures were 
undertaken, it would be possible to obtain a vast area 
for grain crops, which with the usually high yield in 
these localities could supply no less market grain than is 
now supplied by the Lower or Middle Volga. This would 
be a great help for the industrial centres in the north. 
Evidently, the task is to develop large tracts under 
grain crops in the areas of the consuming zone. 
Finally, there is the question of combating drought 
in the Trans-Volga area. Afforestation and the planting 
of forest shelter belts in the eastern districts of the Trans- 
Volga area is of tremendous importance. As you know, 
this work is already taking place, although it cannot be 
said that it is being carried on with sufficient intensity. As 
regards the irrigation of the Trans-Volga area‹the 
most important thing in combating drought‹we must 
not allow this matter to be indefinitely postponed. It 
is true that this work has been held up some what by certain 
external circumstances which cause considerable 
forces and funds to be diverted to other purposes. But now 
there is no longer any reason why it should be further postponed. 
We cannot do without a large and absolutely 
stable grain base on the Volga, one which will be independent 
of the vagaries of the weather and will provide 
annually about 200,000,000 of marketable grain. 
This is absolutely necessary, in view of the growth of the 
towns on the Volga, on the one hand, and of the possibility 
of all sorts of complications in the sphere of 
international relations, on the other. 
The task is to set to work seriously to organise the 
irrigation of the Trans-Volga area. (Applause.)

J. V. S T A L I N 340 
3. THE RISE IN THE MATERIAL AND CULTURAL 
STANDARD OF THE WORKING PEOPLE 
We have thus depicted the situation of our industry 
and agriculture, their development during the period under 
review and their state at the present moment. 
To sum up, we have: 
a) A mighty advance in production both in industry 
and in the main branches of agriculture. 
b) The final victory, on the basis of this advance, 
of the socialist system of economy over the capitalist 
system both in industry and in agriculture; the socialist 
system has become the sole system in the whole of the 
national economy, and the capitalist elements have been 
ousted from all spheres of the national economy. 
c) The final abandonment of small-commodity individual 
farming by the overwhelming majority of the 
peasants; their uniting in collective farms on the basis 
of collective labour and collective ownership of the means 
of production; the complete victory of collective farming 
over small-commodity individual farming. 
d) An ever-increasing process of expansion of the 
collective farms through the absorption of individual 
peasant farms, which are thus diminishing in number 
month by month and are, in fact, being converted into an 
auxiliary force for the collective farms and state farms. 
Naturally, this historic victory over the exploiters 
could not but lead to a radical improvement in the 
material standard of the working people and in their conditions 
of life generally. 
The elimination of the parasitic classes has led to 
the disappearance of the exploitation of man by man.

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 341 
The labour of the worker and the peasant is freed from 
exploitation. The incomes which the exploiters used to 
squeeze out of the labour of the people now remain in 
the hands of the working people and are used partly for 
the expansion of production and the enlistment of new 
detachments of working people in production, and partly 
for directly increasing the incomes of the workers and 
peasants. 
Unemployment, that scourge of the working class, 
has disappeared. In the bourgeois countries millions of 
unemployed suffer want and privation owing to lack 
of work, whereas in our country there are no longer any 
workers who have no work and no earnings. 
With the disappearance of kulak bondage, poverty in 
the countryside has disappeared. Every peasant, whether 
a collective farmer or an individual farmer, now has 
the opportunity of living a human existence, provided 
only that he wants to work conscientiously and not to be 
a loafer, a tramp, or a despoiler of collective-farm property. 
The abolition of exploitation, the abolition of unemployment 
in the towns, and the abolition of poverty in 
the countryside are historic achievements in the material 
condition of the working people that are beyond even the 
dreams of the workers and peasants even in the most 
³democratic² of the bourgeois countries. 
The very appearance of our large towns and industrial 
centres has changed. An inevitable feature of the big 
towns in bourgeois countries is the slums, the so-called 
working-class districts on the outskirts of the towns‹a 
heap of dark, damp and dilapidated dwellings, mostly 
of the basement type, where usually the poor live in

J. V. S T A L I N 342 
filth and curse their fate. The revolution in the U.S.S.R. 
has meant the disappearance of such slums. They have 
been replaced by blocks of bright and well-built workersı 
houses; in many cases the working-class districts of our 
towns present a better appearance than the centre of the 
town. 
The appearance of the countryside has changed even 
more. The old type of village, with the church in the 
most prominent place, with the best houses‹those of 
the police officer, the priest, and the kulaks‹in the foreground, 
and the dilapidated huts of the peasants in the 
background, is beginning to disappear. Its place is being 
taken by the new type of village, with its public farm 
buildings, with its clubs, radio, cinemas, schools, libraries 
and crèches; with its tractors, harvester combines, 
threshing machines and automobiles. The former important 
personages of the village, the kulak-exploiter, the bloodsucking 
usurer, the merchant-speculator, the ³little father² 
police officer, have disappeared. Now, the prominent 
personages are the leading people of the collective farms 
and state farms, of the schools and clubs, the senior tractor 
and combine drivers, the brigade leaders in field 
work and livestock raising, and the best men and women 
shock brigaders on the collective-farm fields. 
The antithesis between town and country is disappearing. 
The peasants are ceasing to regard the town 
as the centre of their exploitation. The economic and cultural 
bond between town and country is becoming stronger. 
The country now receives assistance from the town 
and from urban industry in the shape of tractors, agricultural 
machinery, automobiles, workers, and funds. 
And the countryside itself now has its own industry, in

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 343 
the shape of the machine and tractor stations, repair 
shops, all sorts of industrial undertakings of the collective 
farms, small electric power stations, etc. The cultural 
gulf between town and country is being bridged. 
Such are the principal achievements of the working 
people in the sphere of improving their material conditions, 
their everyday life, and their cultural standard. 
On the basis of these achievements we have the following 
to record for the period under review: 
a) An increase in the national income from 35,000 
million rubles in 1930 to 50,000 million rubles in 1933. 
In view of the fact that the income of the capitalist elements, 
including concessionaires, at the present time constitutes 
less than one half of one per cent of the total national 
income, almost the whole of the national income is 
distributed among the workers and other employees, the 
labouring peasants, the co-operatives, and the state. 
b) An increase in the population of the Soviet Union 
from 160,500,000 at the end of 1930 to 168,000,000 at 
the end of 1933. 
c) An increase in the number of workers and other 
employees from 14,530,000 in 1930 to 21,883,000 in 1933. 
The number of manual workers increased during this period 
from 9,489,000 to 13,797,000; the number of workers 
employed in large-scale industry, including transport, 
increased from 5,079,000 to 6,882,000; the number of 
agricultural workers increased from 1,426,000 to 
2,519,000, and the number of workers and other employees 
engaged in trade increased from 814,000 to 1,497,000. 
d) An increase in the total of the wages paid to workers 
and other employees from 13,597 million rubles in 
1930 to 34,280 million rubles in 1933.

J. V. S T A L I N 344 
e) An increase in the average annual wages of industrial 
workers from 991 rubles in 1930 to 1,519 rubles in 
1933. 
f) An increase in the social insurance fund for workers 
and other employees from 1,810 million rubles in 
1930 to 4,610 million rubles in 1933. 
g) The adoption of a seven-hour working day in all 
surface industries. 
h) State aid to the peasants by the organisation of 
2,860 machine and tractor stations, involving an investment 
of 2,000 million rubles. 
i) State aid to the peasants in the form of credits 
to the collective farms amounting to 1,600 million rubles. 
j) State aid to the peasants in the form of seed and 
food loans amounting in the period under review to 
262 million poods of grain. 
k) State aid to the economically weaker peasants in 
the shape of relief from taxation and insurance payments 
amounting to 370 million rubles. 
As regards the cultural development of the country, 
we have the following to record for the period under 
review: 
a) The introduction of universal compulsory elementary 
education throughout the U.S.S.R., and an 
increase in literacy among the population from 67 
per cent at the end of 1930 to 90 per cent at the end of 
1933. 
b) An increase in the number of pupils and students 
at schools of all grades from 14,358,000 in 1929 to 
26,419,000 in 1933, including an increase from 11,697,000 
to 19,163,000 in the number receiving elementary education, 
from 2,453,000 to 6,674,000 in the number receiv

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 345 
ing secondary education, and from 207,000 to 491,000 
in the number receiving higher education. 
c) An increase in the number of children receiving 
pre-school education from 838,000 in 1929 to 5,917,000 
in 1933. 
d) An increase in the number of higher educational 
institutions, general and special, from 91 in 1914 to 
600 in 1933. 
e) An increase in the number of scientific research 
institutes from 400 in 1929 to 840 in 1933. 
f) An increase in the number of clubs and similar institutions 
from 32,000 in 1929 to 54,000 in 1933. 
g) An increase in the number of cinemas, cinema 
installations in clubs, and mobile cinemas, from 9,800 
in 1929 to 29,200 in 1933. 
h) An increase in the circulation of newspapers from 
12,500,000 in 1929 to 36,500,000 in 1933. 
Perhaps it will not be amiss to point out that the 
proportion of workers among the students in our higher 
educational institutions is 51.4 per cent of the total, 
and that of labouring peasants 16.5 per cent; whereas 
in Germany, for instance, the proportion of workers 
among the students in higher educational institutions 
in 1932-33 was only 3.2 per cent of the total, and that 
of small peasants only 2.4 per cent. 
We must note as a gratifying fact and as an indication 
of the progress of culture in the countryside, the 
increased activity of the women collective farmers in 
social and organisational work. We know, for example, 
that about 6,000 women collective farmers are 
chairmen of collective farms, more than 60,000 are members 
of management boards of collective farms, 28,000

J. V. S T A L I N 346 
are brigade leaders, 100,000 are team organisers, 9,000 
are managers of collective-farm marketable livestock 
sectors, and 7,000 are tractor drivers. 
Needless to say, these figures are incomplete; but 
even these figures quite clearly show the great progress 
of culture in the countryside. This fact, comrades, 
is of tremendous significance. It is of tremendous 
significance because women form half the population 
of our country; they constitute a huge army of workers; 
and they are called upon to bring up our children, our 
future generation, that is to say, our future. That is 
why we must not permit this huge army of working 
people to remain in darkness and ignorance! That is 
why we must welcome the growing social activity of 
the working women and their promotion to leading posts 
as an indubitable sign of the growth of our culture. 
(Prolonged applause.) 
Finally, I must point out one more fact, but of a 
negative character. I have in mind the intolerable fact 
that our pedagogical and medical faculties are still 
being neglected. This is a great defect bordering 
on violation of the interests of the state. This defect 
must be remedied without fail, and the sooner the 
better. 
4. THE PROGRESS OF TRADE TURNOVER 
AND TRANSPORT 
Thus we have: 
a) An increase in the output of industry, including 
goods for mass consumption. 
b) An increase in the output of agriculture.

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 347 
c) A growth in the requirements and the demand 
for produce and manufactured goods on the part of the 
masses of the working people of town and country. 
What more is needed to co-ordinate these conditions 
and to ensure that the entire mass of consumers receives 
the necessary goods and produce? 
Some comrades think that these conditions alone 
are sufficient for the economic life of the country to go 
full steam ahead. That is a profound delusion. We can 
imagine a situation in which all these conditions exist; 
yet if the goods do not reach the consumers, economic 
life‹far from going full steam ahead‹will, on the contrary, 
be dislocated and disorganised to its foundations. 
It is high time we realised that in the last analysis goods 
are produced not for the sake of producing them, but 
for consumption. Cases have occurred where we have 
had quite a quantity of goods and produce, but they 
have not only not reached the consumers, they have 
continued for years to wander in the bureaucratic backwaters 
of our so-called commodity-distribution network, 
at a distance from the consumers. Naturally, under 
these circumstances industry and agriculture lost all 
stimulus to increase production; the commodity-distribution 
network became overstocked, while the workers 
and peasants had to go without these goods and produce. 
The result was a dislocation of the economic life of the 
country, despite the existence of the goods and produce. 
If the economic life of the country is to go full steam 
ahead, and industry and agriculture are to have a stimulus 
for further in creasing their output, one more 
condition is necessary, namely, well-developed trade 
turnover between town and country, between the various

J. V. S T A L I N 348 
districts and regions of the country, between the various 
branches of the national economy. The country must be 
covered with a vast network of wholesale distribution bases, 
shops and stores. There must be a ceaseless flow of goods 
through these bases, shops and stores from the producer 
to the consumer. The state trading system, the co-operative 
trading system, the local industries, the collective 
farms, and the individual peasants must be drawn 
into this work. 
This is what we call fully developed Soviet trade, 
trade without capitalists, trade without speculators. 
As you see, the expansion of Soviet trade is a very 
urgent problem, which must be solved or further progress 
will be rendered impossible. 
And yet, in spite of the fact that this truth is perfectly 
obvious, in the period under review the Party 
has had to over come a number of obstacles to the expansion 
of Soviet trade which could briefly be described 
as the result of an aberration of the brain among a section 
of Communists on questions of the necessity and 
importance of Soviet trade. 
To begin with, there is still among a section of 
Communists a supercilious, disdainful attitude towards 
trade in general, and towards Soviet trade in particular. 
These Communists, so-called, look upon Soviet trade as 
a matter of secondary importance, not worth bothering 
about, and those engaged in trade as being quite hopeless. 
Evidently, these people do not realise that their 
supercilious attitude towards Soviet trade is not an 
expression of Bolshevik views, but rather of the views 
of impoverished aristocrats who are full of ambition but 
lack ammunition. (Applause.) These people do not real

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 349 
ise that Soviet trade is our own, Bolshevik work, and 
that those employed in trade, including those behind 
the counter‹if only they work conscientiously‹are doing 
our revolutionary, Bolshevik work. (Applause.) It goes 
without saying that the Party had to give those Communists, 
so-called, a slight dressing down and throw their 
aristocratic prejudices on the rubbish heap. (Prolonged 
applause.) 
Further, we had to overcome prejudices of another 
kind. I have in mind the Leftist chatter current among 
a section of our functionaries to the effect that Soviet 
trade is a superseded stage; that it is necessary to organise 
the direct exchange of products; that money will 
soon be abolished, because it has become mere tokens; 
that it is unnecessary to develop trade, since the direct 
exchange of products is knocking at the door. It must 
be observed that this Leftist petty-bourgeois chatter, 
which plays into the hands of the capitalist elements 
who are striving to sabotage the expansion of Soviet 
trade, is current not only among a section of our ³Red 
professors,² but also among certain of our trading personnel. 
Of course, it is ridiculous and funny to hear 
these people, who are incapable of organising the very 
simple business of Soviet trade, chatter about their 
readiness to organise the more complicated and difficult 
business of a direct exchange of products. But Don 
Quixotes are called Don Quixotes precisely because 
they lack the most elementary sense of reality. These 
people, who are as far removed from Marxism as the sky 
from the earth, evidently do not realise that we shall 
use money for a long time to come, right up to the time 
when the first stage of communism, i.e., the socialist

J. V. S T A L I N 350 
stage of development, has been completed. They do not 
realise that money is the instrument of bourgeois economy 
which the Soviet Government has taken over and adapted 
to the interests of socialism for the purpose of expanding 
Soviet trade to the utmost, and so preparing 
the conditions necessary for the direct exchange of products. 
They do not realise that the direct exchange of 
products can replace, and be the result of, only a perfectly 
organised system of Soviet trade, of which we have 
not a trace as yet, and shall not have for some time. 
Naturally, in trying to organise developed Soviet trade, 
our Party found it necessary to give a dressing down to 
these ³Left² freaks as well, and to scatter their pettybourgeois 
chatter to the winds. 
Further, we had to overcome among the people in 
charge of trade the unhealthy habit of distributing goods 
mechanically; we had to put a stop to their indifference 
to the demand for a greater range of goods and to the 
requirements of the consumers; we had to put an end 
to the mechanical consignment of goods, to lack of personal 
responsibility in trade. For this purpose, regional 
and inter-district wholesale distribution bases 
and tens of thousands of new shops and booths were 
opened. 
Further, we had to put an end to the monopoly position 
of the co-operatives in the market. In this connection 
we instructed all the Peopleıs Commissariats to 
start trade in the goods manufactured by the industries 
under their control; and the Peopleıs Commissariat of 
Supplies was instructed to develop an extensive open 
trade in agricultural produce. This has led, on the one 
hand, to an improvement in co-operative trade through

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 351 
emulation, and, on the other hand, to a drop in market 
prices and to sounder conditions in the market. 
A wide network of dining-rooms was established 
which provide food at reduced prices (³public catering²). 
Workersı Supply Departments were set up in the factories, 
and all those who had no connection with the 
factory were taken off the supply list; in the factories 
under the control of the Peopleıs Commissariat of Heavy 
Industry alone, no less than 500,000 such persons had 
to be removed from the list. 
We have organised a single centralised bank for short 
term credit‹the State Bank, with its 2,200 district 
branches capable of financing trade operations. 
As a result of these measures we have the following 
to record for the period under review: 
a) An increase in the number of shops and trading 
booths from 184,662 in 1930 to 277,974 in 1933. 
b) A newly created network of regional wholesale 
distribution bases, numbering 1,011, and inter-district 
wholesale distribution bases, numbering 864. 
c) A newly created network of Workersı Supply Departments, 
numbering 1,600. 
d) An increase in the network of shops for non-rationed 
sale of bread, which now exist in 330 towns. 
e) An increase in the number of public dining-rooms, 
which at the present time cater for 19,800,000 consumers. 
f) An increase in state and co-operative trade turnover, 
including public dining-rooms, from 18,900 million 
rubles in 1930 to 49,000 million rubles in 1933. 
It would be a mistake, however, to think that all 
this expansion of Soviet trade is sufficient to satisfy

J. V. S T A L I N 352 
the requirements of our economy. On the contrary, it 
is now becoming clearer than ever that the present state 
of trade turnover cannot satisfy our requirements. Hence, 
the task is to develop Soviet trade still further, to 
draw local industry into this work, to increase collective-
farm and peasant trade, and to achieve new and 
decisive successes in the sphere of increasing Soviet 
trade. 
It must be pointed out, however, that we cannot 
restrict ourselves merely to the expansion of Soviet 
trade. While the development of our economy depends 
upon the development of the trade turnover, upon the 
development of Soviet trade, the development of Soviet 
trade, in its turn, depends upon the development of 
our transport, both rail and water transport, and motor 
transport. It may happen that goods are available, that 
all the possibilities exist for expanding trade turnover, 
but transport cannot keep up with the development of 
trade turnover and refuses to carry the freight. As you 
know, this happens rather often. Hence, transport is 
the weak spot which may be a stumbling-block, and indeed 
is perhaps already beginning to be a stumblingblock 
to the whole of our economy and, above all, to 
our trade turnover. 
It is true that railway transport has increased its 
freight turnover from 133,900 million ton-kilometres in 
1930 to 172,000 million ton-kilometres in 1933. But 
that is too little, far too little for us, for our economy. 
Water transport has increased its freight turnover 
from 45,600 million ton-kilometres in 1930 to 59,900 
million ton-kilometres in 1933. But that is too little, 
far too little for our economy.

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 353 
I say nothing of motor transport, in which the number 
of automobiles (lorries and passenger cars) has increased 
from 8,800 in 1913 to 117,800 at the end of 
1933. That is so little for our national economy that one 
is ashamed even to mention it. 
There can be no doubt that all these forms of transport 
could work much better if the transport system 
did not suffer from the well-known disease called redtape 
methods of management. Hence, besides the need 
to help transport by providing personnel and means, 
our task is to root out the red-tape attitude in the administration 
departments of the transport system and to 
make them more efficient. 
Comrades, we have succeeded in solving correctly 
the main problems of industry, which is now standing 
firmly on its feet. We have also succeeded in solving 
correctly the main problems of agriculture, and we can 
say quite definitely that agriculture also is now standing 
firmly on its feet. But we are in danger of losing 
all these achievements if our trade turnover begins to 
be defective and if transport becomes a fetter on our 
feet. Hence, the task of expanding trade turnover and of 
decisively improving transport is an immediate and urgent 
problem which must be solved or we cannot go forward. 
III 
THE PARTY 
I pass to the question of the Party. 
The present congress is taking place under the flag 
of the complete victory of Leninism, under the flag of

J. V. S T A L I N 354 
the liquidation of the remnants of the anti-Leninist 
groups. 
The anti-Leninist group of Trotskyites has been 
smashed and scattered. Its organisers are now to be 
found in the backyards of the bourgeois parties abroad. 
The anti-Leninist group of the Right deviators has 
been smashed and scattered. Its organisers have long 
ago renounced their views and are now trying in every 
way to expiate the sins they committed against the 
Party. 
The groups of nationalist deviators have been 
smashed and scattered. Their organisers have either completely 
merged with the interventionist émigrés, or else 
they have recanted. 
The majority of the adherents to these anti-revolutionary 
groups had to admit that the line of the Party 
was correct and they have capitulated to the Party. 
At the Fifteenth Party Congress78 it was still necessary 
to prove that the Party line was correct and to 
wage a struggle against certain anti-Leninist groups; 
and at the Sixteenth Party Congress we had to deal the 
final blow to the last adherents of these groups. At 
this congress, however, there is nothing to prove and, 
it seems, no one to fight. Everyone sees that the line 
of the Party has triumphed. (Thunderous applause.) 
The policy of industrialising the country has triumphed. 
Its results are obvious to everyone. What 
arguments can be advanced against this fact? 
The policy of eliminating the kulaks and of complete 
collectivisation has triumphed. Its results are also 
obvious to every one. What arguments can be advanced 
against this fact?

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 355 
The experience of our country has shown that it is 
fully possible for socialism to achieve victory in one 
country taken separately. What arguments can be advanced 
against this fact? 
It is evident that all these successes, and primarily 
the victory of the five-year plan, have utterly demoralised 
and smashed all the various anti-Leninist groups. 
It must be admitted that the Party today is united 
as it has never been before. (Stormy and prolonged applause.) 
1. QUESTIONS OF IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL 
LEADERSHIP 
Does this mean, however, that the fight is ended, and 
that the offensive of socialism is to be discontinued as 
superfluous? 
No, it does not. 
Does it mean that all is well in our Party, that there 
will be no more deviations in the Party, and that, therefore, 
we may now rest on our laurels? 
No, it does not. 
We have smashed the enemies of the Party, the opportunists 
of all shades, the nationalist deviators of all 
kinds. But remnants of their ideology still live in the 
minds of individual members of the Party, and not infrequently 
they find expression. The Party must not be 
regarded as something isolated from the people who 
surround it. It lives and works in its environment. It 
is not surprising that at times unhealthy moods penetrate 
into the Party from outside. And the ground for such 
moods undoubtedly exists in our country, if only for

J. V. S T A L I N 356 
the reason that there still exist in town and country 
certain intermediary strata of the population who constitute 
a medium which breeds such moods. 
The Seventeenth Conference of our Party79 declared 
that one of the fundamental political tasks in fulfilling 
the Second Five-Year Plan is ³to overcome the survivals 
of capitalism in economic life and in the minds of 
people.² That is an absolutely correct idea. But can we 
say that we have already overcome all the survivals 
of capitalism in economic life? No, we cannot say that. 
Still less can we say that we have overcome the survivals 
of capitalism in the minds of people. We cannot 
say that, not only because in development the minds of 
people lag behind their economic position, but also 
because the capitalist encirclement still exists, which 
endeavours to revive and sustain the survivals of capitalism 
in the economic life and in the minds of the people 
of the U.S.S.R., and against which we Bolsheviks must 
always keep our powder dry. 
Naturally, these survivals cannot but be a favourable 
ground for a revival of the ideology of the defeated anti- 
Leninist groups in the minds of individual members 
of our Party. Add to this the not very high theoretical 
level of the majority of our Party members, the inadequate 
ideological work of the Party bodies, and the fact 
that our Party functionaries are overburdened with purely 
practical work, which deprives them of the opportunity 
of augmenting their theoretical knowledge, and 
you will understand the origin of the confusion on a 
number of questions of Leninism that exists in the minds 
of individual Party members, a confusion which not 
infrequently penetrates into our press and helps to re

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 357 
vive the survivals of the ideology of the defeated anti- 
Leninist groups. 
That is why we cannot say that the fight is ended 
and that there is no longer any need for the policy of 
the socialist offensive. 
It would be possible to take a number of questions 
of Leninism and demonstrate by means of them how 
tenaciously the survivals of the ideology of the defeated 
anti-Leninist groups continue to exist in the minds 
of certain Party members. 
Take, for example, the question of building a classless 
socialist society. The Seventeenth Party Conference 
declared that we are advancing towards the formation 
of a classless socialist society. Naturally, a classless 
society cannot come of its own accord, as it were. It 
has to be achieved and built by the efforts of all the 
working people, by strengthening the organs of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, by intensifying the class 
struggle, by abolishing classes, by eliminating the remnants 
of the capitalist classes, and in battles with enemies, 
both internal and external. 
The point is clear, one would think. 
And yet, who does not know that the enunciation 
of this clear and elementary thesis of Leninism has given 
rise to not a little confusion in the minds of a section 
of Party members and to unhealthy sentiments 
among them? The thesis that we are advancing towards 
a classless society‹put forward as a slogan‹was interpreted 
by them to mean a spontaneous process. And they 
began to reason in this way: If it is a classless society, 
then we can relax the class struggle, we can relax the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, and get rid of the state

J. V. S T A L I N 358 
altogether, since it is fated to wither away soon in any 
case. And they fell into a state of foolish rapture, in 
the expectation that soon there would be no classes, 
and therefore no class struggle, and therefore no cares 
and worries, and therefore it is possible to lay down oneıs 
arms and go to bed‹to sleep in expectation of the advent 
of a classless society. (General laughter.) 
There can be no doubt that this confusion of mind 
and these sentiments are exactly like the well-known 
views of the Right deviators, who believed that the old 
must automatically grow into the new, and that one 
fine day we shall wake up and find ourselves in a socialist 
society. 
As you see, remnants of the ideology of the defeated 
anti-Leninist groups are capable of revival, and are far 
from having lost their vitality. 
Naturally, if this confusion of views and these non- 
Bolshevik sentiments obtained a hold over the majority 
of our Party, the Party would find itself demobilised 
and disarmed. 
Let us take, further, the question of the agricultural 
artel and the agricultural commune. Everybody admits 
now that under present conditions the artel is the 
only correct form of the collective-farm movement. And 
that is quite understandable: a) the artel correctly combines 
the personal, everyday interests of the collective 
farmers with their public interests; b) the artel successfully 
adapts personal, everyday interests to public interests, 
and thereby helps to educate the individual 
peasants of yesterday in the spirit of collectivism. 
Unlike the artel, where only the means of production 
are socialised, the communes, until recently, socialised

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 359 
not only the means of production, but also everyday 
life of every member of the commune; that is to say, 
the members of a commune, unlike the members of an 
artel, did not individually own poultry, small livestock, 
a cow, grain, or household land. This means that in the 
commune the personal, everyday interests of the members 
have not so much been taken into account and combined 
with the public interests as they have been eclipsed 
by the latter in the interests of petty-bourgeois equalisation. 
It is clear that this is the weakest side of the 
commune. This indeed explains why communes are not 
widespread, why there are but a few score of them in 
existence. For the same reason the communes, in order 
to maintain their existence and save themselves from 
going to pieces, have been compelled to abandon the 
system of socialising everyday life; they are beginning 
to work on the basis of the workday unit, and have 
begun to distribute grain among their members, to permit 
their members to own poultry, small livestock, a 
cow, etc. But from this it follows that, in fact, the commune 
has gone over to the position of the artel. And there 
is nothing bad in that, because it is necessary in the interests 
of the sound development of the mass collectivefarm 
movement. 
This does not mean, of course, that the commune is 
not needed at all, and that it no longer represents a higher 
form of the collective-farm movement. No, the commune 
is needed, and it is, of course, a higher form of 
the collective-farm movement. This applies, however, 
not to the present commune, which arose on the basis 
of undeveloped technique and of a shortage of produce, 
and which is itself going over to the position of the

J. V. S T A L I N 360 
artel; it applies to the commune of the future, which will 
arise on the basis of a more developed technique and of 
an abundance of produce. The present agricultural 
commune arose on the basis of an underdeveloped 
technique and a shortage of produce. This indeed explains 
why it practised equalisation and took little account 
of the personal, everyday interests of its members, 
as a result of which it is now being compelled to go over 
to the position of the artel, in which the personal and 
public interests of the collective farmers are rationally 
combined. The future communes will arise out of developed 
and prosperous artels. The future agricultural 
commune will arise when the fields and farms of the 
artel have an abundance of grain, cattle, poultry, vegetables, 
and all other produce; when the artels have mechanised 
laundries, modern kitchens and dining-rooms, 
mechanised bakeries, etc.; when the collective farmer 
sees that it is more to his advantage to get meat and 
milk from the collective farmıs meat and dairy department 
than to keep his own cow and small livestock; 
when the woman collective farmer sees that it is more 
to her advantage to take her meals in the dining-room, 
to get her bread from the public bakery, and to have her 
linen washed in the public laundry, than to do all these 
things herself. The future commune will arise on the 
basis of a more developed technique and of a more developed 
artel, on the basis of an abundance of products. 
When will that be? Not soon, of course. But it will take 
place. It would be criminal artificially to accelerate the 
process of transition from the artel to the future commune. 
That would confuse the whole issue, and would facilitate 
the work of our enemies. The transition from

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 361 
the artel to the future commune must proceed gradually, 
to the extent that all the collective farmers become convinced 
that such a transition is necessary. 
That is how matters stand with regard to the question 
of the artel and the commune. 
One would think that this was clear and almost 
elementary. 
And yet there is a fair amount of confusion on this 
question among a section of Party members. There are 
those who think that by declaring the artel to be the 
fundamental form of the collective-farm movement the 
Party has drifted away from socialism, has retreated 
from the commune, from the higher form of the collective-
farm movement, to a lower form. Why, one may ask? 
Because, it is suggested, there is no equality in the artel, 
since differences in the requirements and in the personal, 
everyday life of the members of the artel are preserved; 
whereas in the commune there is equality, because 
the requirements and the personal, everyday life 
of its members have been made equal. But, firstly, 
we no longer have any communes in which there is levelling, 
equalisation of requirements and personal, everyday 
life. Practice has shown that the communes would 
certainly have been doomed had they not abandoned 
equalisation and had they not in fact gone over to the 
position of artels. Consequently, there is no point in 
referring to what no longer exists. Secondly, every 
Leninist knows, if he is a real Leninist, that equalisation 
in the sphere of requirements and personal, 
everyday life is a reactionary petty-bourgeois absurdity 
worthy of some primitive sect of ascetics, but not of 
a socialist society organised on Marxist lines; for we

J. V. S T A L I N 362 
cannot expect all people to have the same requirements 
and tastes, and all people to mould their personal, everyday 
life on the same model. And, finally, are not 
differences in requirements and in personal, everyday 
life still preserved among the workers? Does that mean 
that workers are more remote from socialism than members 
of agricultural communes? 
These people evidently think that socialism calls 
for equalisation, for levelling the requirements and 
personal, everyday life of the members of society. Needless 
to say, such an assumption has nothing in common 
with Marxism, with Leninism. By equality Marxism 
means, not equalisation of personal requirements and 
everyday life, but the abolition of classes, i.e., a) the 
equal emancipation of all working people from exploitation 
after the capitalists have been overthrown and 
expropriated; b) the equal abolition for all of private 
property in the means of production after they have 
been converted into the property of the whole of society; 
c) the equal duty of all to work according to their 
ability, and the equal right of all working people to 
receive in return for this according to the work performed 
(socialist society); d) the equal duty of all to work 
according to their ability, and the equal right of all 
working people to receive in return for this according 
to their needs (communist society). Moreover, Marxism 
proceeds from the assumption that peopleıs tastes 
and requirements are not, and cannot be, identical 
and equal in regard to quality or quantity, whether 
in the period of socialism or in the period of communism. 
There you have the Marxist conception of equality.

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 363 
Marxism has never recognised, and does not recognise, 
any other equality. 
To draw from this the conclusion that socialism calls 
for equalisation, for the levelling of the requirements 
of the members of society, for the levelling of their 
tastes and of their personal, everyday life‹that according 
to the Marxist plan all should wear the same clothes 
and eat the same dishes in the same quantity‹is to utter 
vulgarities and to slander Marxism. 
It is time i t was understood that Marxism is an 
enemy of equalisation. Already in the Manifesto of the 
Communist Party Marx and Engels scourged primitive 
utopian socialism and termed it reactionary because it 
preached ³universal asceticism and social levelling in 
its crudest form.²80 In his Anti-Dühring Engels devoted 
a whole chapter to a withering criticism of the ³radical 
equalitarian socialism² put forward by Dühring in opposition 
to Marxist socialism. 
³. . . The real content of the proletarian demand for equality,² 
said Engels, ³is the demand for the abolition of classes. Any demand 
for equality which goes beyond that, of necessity passes into absurdity.²
81 
Lenin said the same thing: 
³Engels was a thousand times right when he wrote that to 
conceive equality as meaning anything beyond the abolition of 
classes is a very stupid and absurd prejudice. Bourgeois professors 
have tried to make use of the concept of equality to accuse us of 
wanting to make all men equal to one another. They have tried 
to accuse the Socialists of this absurdity, which they themselves 
invented. But in their ignorance they did not know that the Socialists‹
and precisely the founders of modern scientific socialism, 
Marx and Engels‹said: Equality is an empty phrase unless

J. V. S T A L I N 364 
equality is understood to mean the abolition of classes. We want to 
abolish classes, and in this respect we stand for equality. But the 
claim that we want to make all men equal to one another is an 
empty phrase and a stupid invention of intellectuals² (Leninıs 
speech ³On Deceiving the People with Slogans About Liberty and 
Equality,² Works, Vol. XXIV, pp. 293-9482). 
Clear, one would think. 
Bourgeois writers are fond of depicting Marxist socialism 
in the shape of the old tsarist barracks, where 
everything is subordinated to the ³principle² of equalisation. 
But Marxists cannot be held responsible for the 
ignorance and stupidity of bourgeois writers. 
There can be no doubt that this confusion in the 
minds of some Party members concerning Marxist socialism, 
and their infatuation with the equalitarian tendencies 
of agricultural communes, are exactly like the 
petty-bourgeois views of our Leftist blockheads, who at 
one time idealised the agricultural communes to such 
an extent that they even tried to set up communes in 
mills and factories, where skilled and unskilled workers, 
each working at his trade, had to pool their 
wages in a common fund, which was then shared out 
equally. You know what harm these infantile equalitarian 
exercises of the ³Left² blockheads caused our 
industry. 
As you see, the remnants of the ideology of the defeated 
anti-Party groups display rather considerable 
tenacity. 
It is obvious that if these Leftist views were to 
triumph in the Party, the Party would cease to be 
Marxist, and the collective-farm movement would be 
utterly disorganised.

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 365 
Or take, for example, the slogan ³Make all the collective 
farmers prosperous.² This slogan applies not only 
to collective farmers; it applies still more to the workers, 
for we want to make all the workers prosperous‹ 
people leading a prosperous and fully cultured life. 
One would think that the point was clear. There was 
no point in overthrowing capitalism in October 1917 
and building socialism all these years if we are not 
going to secure a life of plenty for our people. Socialism 
does not mean poverty and privation, but the abolition 
of poverty and privation; it means the organisation of 
a prosperous and cultured life for all members of society. 
And yet, this clear and essentially elementary slogan 
has caused a good deal of perplexity, confusion and 
muddle among a section of our Party members. Is not 
this slogan, they ask, a reversion to the old slogan 
³Enrich yourselves,² that was rejected by the Party? 
If everyone becomes prosperous, they go on to say, and 
the poor cease to exist, upon whom then are we 
Bolsheviks to rely in our work? How shall we work 
without the poor? 
This may sound funny, but the existence of such 
naïve and anti-Leninist views among a section of Party 
members is an undoubted fact, which we must take into 
account. 
Evidently, these people do not understand that a 
wide gulf lies between the slogan ³Enrich yourselves² 
and the slogan ³Make all the collective farmers prosperous.² 
In the first place, only individual persons or groups can 
enrich themselves; whereas the slogan concerning a prosperous 
life applies not to individual persons or groups, 
but to all collective farmers. Secondly, individual

J. V. S T A L I N 366 
persons or groups enrich themselves for the purpose 
of subordinating other people to themselves and exploiting 
them; whereas the slogan concerning a prosperous 
life for all the collective farmers‹with the means of 
production in the collective farms socialised‹precludes 
all possibility of the exploitation of some persons by 
others. Thirdly, the slogan ³Enrich yourselves² was issued 
in the period when the New Economic Policy was 
in its initial stage, when capitalism was being partly 
restored, when the kulak was a power, when individual 
peasant farming predominated in the country and collective 
farming was in a rudimentary state; whereas the 
slogan ³Make all the collective farmers prosperous² was issued 
in the last stage of NEP, when the capitalist elements 
in industry had been abolished, the kulaks in 
the countryside crushed, individual peasant farming 
forced into the background and the collective farms had 
become the predominant form of agriculture. This is 
apart from the fact that the slogan ³Make all the collective 
farmers prosperous² was issued not in isolation, but inseparably 
bound up with the slogan ³Make the collective 
farms Bolshevik.² 
Is it not clear that in point of fact the slogan ³Enrich 
yourselves² was a call to restore capitalism, whereas 
the slogan ³Make all the collective farmers prosperous² is 
a call to deal the final blow to the last remnants of capitalism 
by increasing the economic power of the collective 
farms and by transforming all collective farmers 
into prosperous working people? (Voices: ³Quite right!²) 
Is it not clear that there is not, and cannot be, anything 
in common between these two slogans? (Voices: 
³Quite right!²)

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 367 
As for the argument that Bolshevik work and socialism 
are inconceivable without the existence of the 
poor, it is so stupid that it is embarrassing even to talk 
about it. Leninists rely upon the poor when there exist 
both capitalist elements and the poor who are exploited 
by the capitalists. But when the capitalist elements 
have been crushed and the poor have been emancipated 
from exploitation, the task of Leninists is not to perpetuate 
and preserve poverty and the poor‹the conditions 
for whose existence have already been eliminated‹ 
but to abolish poverty and to raise the poor to a life of 
prosperity. It would be absurd to think that socialism 
can be built on the basis of poverty and privation, on 
the basis of reducing personal requirements and lowering 
the standard of living to the level of the poor, who themselves, 
moreover, refuse to remain poor any longer and 
are pushing their way upward to a prosperous life. Who 
wants this sort of socialism, so-called? It would not be 
socialism, but a caricature of socialism. Socialism can 
be built only on the basis of a vigorous growth of the productive 
forces of society; on the basis of an abundance 
of produce and goods; on the basis of the prosperity of 
the working people, on the basis of a vigorous growth 
of culture. For socialism, Marxist socialism, means not 
the reduction of individual requirements, but their development 
to the utmost, to full bloom; not the restriction 
of these requirements or a refusal to satisfy them, 
but the full and all-round satisfaction of all the requirements 
of culturally developed working people. 
There can be no doubt that this confusion in the 
views of certain members of the Party concerning the 
poor and prosperity is a reflection of the views of our

J. V. S T A L I N 368 
Leftist blockheads, who idealise the poor as the eternal 
bulwark of Bolshevism under all conditions, and who 
regard the collective farms as an arena of fierce class 
struggle. 
As you see, here too, on this question, the remnants 
of the ideology of the defeated anti-Party groups have 
not yet lost their tenacious hold on life. 
It is obvious that had such blockheaded views triumphed 
in our Party, the collective farms would not 
have achieved the successes they have gained during 
the past two years, and would have disintegrated in a 
very short time. 
Or take, for example, the national question. Here, 
too, in the sphere of the national question, just as in 
the sphere of other questions, there is in the views of 
a section of the Party a confusion which creates a certain 
danger. I have spoken of the tenacity of the survivals 
of capitalism. It should be observed that the survivals 
of capitalism in peopleıs minds are much more 
tenacious in the sphere of the national question than in 
any other sphere. They are more tenacious because they 
are able to disguise themselves well in national costume. 
Many think that Skrypnikıs fall from grace was an individual 
case, an exception to the rule. This is not true. The fall 
from grace of Skrypnik and his group in the Ukraine is not 
an exception. Similar aberrations are observed among 
certain comrades in other national republics as well. 
What is the deviation towards nationalism‹regardless 
whether it is a matter of the deviation towards 
Great-Russian nationalism or the deviation towards 
local nationalism? The deviation towards nationalism is 
the adaptation of the internationalist policy of the

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 369 
working class to the nationalist policy of the bourgeoisie. 
The deviation towards nationalism reflects the attempts 
of ³oneıs own,² ³national² bourgeoisie to undermine 
the Soviet system and to restore capitalism. The 
source of both these deviations, as you see, is the same. 
It is a departure from Leninist internationalism. If you 
want to keep both deviations under fire, then aim primarily 
against this source, against those who depart 
from internationalism‹regardless whether it is a matter 
of the deviation towards local nationalism or the deviation 
towards Great-Russian nationalism. (Stormy applause.) 
There is a controversy as to which deviation represents 
the chief danger: the deviation towards Great- 
Russian nationalism, or the deviation towards local 
nationalism. Under present conditions, this is a formal 
and, therefore, a pointless controversy. It would be 
foolish to attempt to give ready-made recipes suitable 
for all times and for all conditions as regards the chief 
and the lesser danger. Such recipes do not exist. The 
chief danger is the deviation against which we have 
ceased to fight, thereby allowing it to grow into a danger 
to the state. (Prolonged applause.) 
In the Ukraine, only very recently, the deviation 
towards Ukrainian nationalism did not represent the 
chief danger; but when the fight against it ceased and 
it was allowed to grow to such an extent that it linked up 
with the interventionists, this deviation became the 
chief danger. The question as to which is the chief danger 
in the sphere of the national question is determined 
not by futile, formal controversies, but by a Marxist 
analysis of the situation at the given moment, and by

J. V. S T A L I N 370 
a study of the mistakes that have been committed in 
this sphere. 
The same should be said of the Right and ³Left² deviations 
in the sphere of general policy. Here, too, as 
in other spheres, there is no little confusion in the views 
of certain members of our Party. Sometimes, while fighting 
against the Right deviation, they turn away from 
the ³Left² deviation and relax the fight against it, on 
the assumption that it is not dangerous, or hardly dangerous. 
This is a grave and dangerous error. It is a concession 
to the ³Left² deviation which is impermissible 
for a member of the Party. It is all the more impermissible 
for the reason that of late the ³Lefts² have completely 
slid over to the position of the Rights, so that 
there is no longer any essential difference between them. 
We have always said that the ³Lefts² are in fact 
Rights who mask their Rightness by Left phrases. Now 
the ³Lefts² themselves confirm the correctness of our 
statement. Take last yearıs issues of the Trotskyist 
Bulletin. What do Messieurs the Trotskyists demand, 
what do they write about, in what does their ³Left² programme 
find expression? They demand: the dissolution of 
the state farms, on the grounds that they do not pay; 
the dissolution of the majority of the collective farms, 
on the grounds that they are fictitious; the abandonment 
of the policy of eliminating the kulaks; reversion to the 
policy of concessions, and the leasing to concessionaires 
of a number of our industrial enterprises, on the grounds 
that they do not pay. 
There you have the programme of these contemptible 
cowards and capitulators‹their counter-revolutionary 
programme of restoring capitalism in the U.S.S.R.!

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 371 
What difference is there between this programme and 
that of the extreme Rights? Clearly, there is none. It 
follows that the ³Lefts² have openly associated themselves 
with the counter-revolutionary programme of 
the Rights in order to enter into a bloc with them and 
to wage a joint struggle against the Party. 
How can it be said after this that the ³Lefts² are 
not dangerous, or hardly dangerous? Is it not clear that 
those who talk such rubbish bring grist to the mill of 
the sworn enemies of Leninism? 
As you see, here too, in the sphere of deviations 
from the line of the Party‹regardless of whether we 
are dealing with deviations on general policy or with 
deviations on the national question‹the survivals of 
capitalism in peopleıs minds, including the minds of 
certain members of our Party, are quite tenacious. 
There you have some of the serious and urgent problems 
of our ideological and political work on which there is 
lack of clarity, confusion, and even direct departure from 
Leninism in certain strata of the Party. Nor are these 
the only questions which could serve to demonstrate the 
confusion in the views of certain members of the Party. 
After this, can it be said that all is well in the Party? 
Clearly, it cannot. 
Our tasks in the sphere of ideological and political 
work are: 
1) To raise the theoretical level of the Party to the 
proper height. 
2) To intensify ideological work in all the organisations 
of the Party. 
3) To carry on unceasing propaganda of Leninism 
in the ranks of the Party.

J. V. S T A L I N 372 
4) To train the Party organisations and the non- 
Party active which surrounds them in the spirit of Leninist 
internationalism. 
5) Not to gloss over, but boldly to criticise the deviations 
of certain comrades from Marxism-Leninism. 
6) Systematically to expose the ideology and the remnants 
of the ideology of trends that are hostile to Leninism. 
2. QUESTIONS OF ORGANISATIONAL LEADERSHIP 
I have spoken of our successes. I have spoken of 
the victory of the Party line in the sphere of the national 
economy and of culture, and also in the sphere 
of overcoming anti-Leninist groups in the Party. I have 
spoken of the historic significance of our victory. But 
this does not mean that we have achieved victory everywhere 
and in all things, and that all questions have already 
been settled. Such successes and such victories 
do not occur in real life. We still have plenty of unsolved 
problems and defects of all sorts. Ahead of us is a 
host of problems demanding solution. But it does undoubtedly 
mean that the greater part of the urgent and 
immediate problems has already been successfully solved, 
and in this sense the very great victory of our Party is 
beyond doubt. 
But here the question arises: How was this victory 
brought about, how was it actually achieved, as the result 
of what fight, as the result of what efforts? 
Some people think that it is sufficient to draw up 
a correct Party line, proclaim it for all to hear, state 
it in the form of general theses and resolutions, and 
have it voted for unanimously, for victory to come of

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 373 
itself, automatically, as it were. That, of course, is 
wrong. It is a gross delusion. Only incorrigible bureaucrats 
and red-tapists can think so. As a matter of fact, 
these successes and victories did not come automatically, 
but as the result of a fierce struggle for the application 
of the Party line. Victory never comes of itself‹ 
it is usually won by effort. Good resolutions and declarations 
in favour of the general line of the Party are only 
a beginning; they merely express the desire for victory, 
but not the victory itself. After the correct line has 
been laid down, after a correct solution of the problem 
has been found, success depends on how the work is 
organised; on the organisation of the struggle for carrying 
out the Party line; on the proper selection of personnel; 
on checking upon the fulfilment of the decisions of the 
leading bodies. Other wise the correct line of the Party 
and the correct solutions are in danger of being seriously 
prejudiced. More than that, after the correct political 
line has been laid down, organisational work 
decides everything, including the fate of the political 
line itself, its success or failure. 
As a matter of fact, victory was achieved and won 
by a systematic and fierce struggle against all sorts of 
difficulties in the way of carrying out the Party line; 
by overcoming these difficulties; by mobilising the Party 
and the working class for the task of overcoming the 
difficulties; by organising the struggle to overcome the 
difficulties; by removing inefficient executives and 
choosing better ones, capable of waging the struggle 
against difficulties. 
What are these difficulties; and where do they lie? 
They are difficulties of our organisational work,

J. V. S T A L I N 374 
difficulties of our organisational leadership. They lie 
in ourselves, in our leading people, in our organisations, 
in the apparatus of our Party, Soviet, economic, 
trade-union, Young Communist League and all other 
organisations. 
We must realise that the strength and prestige of 
our Party and Soviet, economic and all other organisations, 
and of their leaders, have grown to an unprecedented 
degree. And precisely because their strength and 
prestige have grown to an unprecedented degree, it 
is their work that now determines everything, or nearly 
everything. There can be no justification for references 
to so-called objective conditions. Now that the correctness 
of the Partyıs political line has been confirmed 
by the experience of a number of years, and that there 
is no longer any doubt as to the readiness of the workers 
and peasants to support this line, the part played 
by so-called objective conditions has been reduced to a 
minimum; whereas the part played by our organisations 
and their leaders has become decisive, exceptional. 
What does this mean? It means that from now on ninetenths 
of the responsibility for the failures and defects 
in our work rest, not on ³objective² conditions, but on 
ourselves, and on ourselves alone. 
We have in our Party more than 2,000,000 members 
and candidate members. In the Young Communist League 
we have more than 4,000,000 members and candidate 
members. We have over 3,000,000 worker and peasant 
correspondents. The Society for the Promotion of Air 
and Chemical Defence has more than 12,000,000 
members. The trade unions have a membership of over 
17,000,000. It is to these organisations that we are in

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375 
debted for our successes. And if, in spite of the existence 
of such organisations and of such possibilities, which 
facilitate the achievement of successes, we still have 
quite a number of shortcomings in our work and not a 
few failures, then it is only we ourselves, our organisational 
work, our bad organisational leadership, that are 
to blame for this. 
Bureaucracy and red tape in the administrative apparatus; 
idle chatter about ³leadership in general² instead 
of real and concrete leadership; the functional 
structure of our organisations and lack of individual 
responsibility; lack of personal responsibility in work, 
and wage equalisation; the absence of a systematic 
check on the fulfilment of decisions; fear of self-criticism‹
these are the sources of our difficulties; this is 
where our difficulties now lie. 
It would be naïve to think that these difficulties 
can be overcome by means of resolutions and decisions. 
The bureaucrats and red-tapists have long been past 
masters in the art of demonstrating their loyalty to 
Party and Government decisions in words, and pigeonholing 
them in deed. In order to overcome these difficulties 
it was necessary to put an end to the disparity between 
our organisational work and the requirements of 
the political line of the Party; it was necessary to raise 
the level of organisational leadership in all spheres of 
the national economy to the level of political leadership; 
it was necessary to see to it that our organisational 
work ensured the practical realisation of the political 
slogans and decisions of the Party. 
In order to overcome these difficulties and achieve 
success it was necessary to organise the struggle to 
REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS

J. V. S T A L I N 376 
eliminate them; it was necessary to draw the masses of 
the workers and peasants into this struggle; it was necessary 
to mobilise the Party itself; it was necessary to 
purge the Party and the economic organisations of unreliable, 
unstable and degenerate elements. 
What was needed for this? 
We had to organise: 
1) Full development of self-criticism and exposure 
of shortcomings in our work. 
2) The mobilisation of the Party, Soviet, economic, 
trade union, and Young Communist League organisations 
for the struggle against difficulties. 
3) The mobilisation of the masses of the workers and 
peasants to fight for the application of the slogans and 
decisions of the Party and of the Government. 
4) Full development of emulation and shock-brigade 
work among the working people. 
5) A wide network of Political Departments of machine 
and tractor stations and state farms and the bringing 
of the Party and Soviet leadership closer to the 
villages. 
6) The subdivision of the Peopleıs Commissariats, 
chief boards, and trusts, and the bringing of economic 
leadership closer to the enterprises. 
7) The abolition of lack of personal responsibility 
in work and the elimination of wage equalisation. 
8) The elimination of the ³functional system,² the 
extension of individual responsibility, and a policy aiming 
at the abolition of collegium management. 
9) Stronger checking on the fulfilment of decisions, 
and a policy aiming at the reorganisation of the

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 379 
power, but who are incapable of leadership, incapable 
of organising anything. Last year I had a conversation 
with one such comrade, a very respected comrade, 
but an incorrigible windbag, capable of drowning 
any live undertaking in a flood of talk. Here is the conversation: 
I: How are you getting on with the sowing? 
He: With the sowing, Comrade Stalin? We have 
mobilised ourselves. (Laughter.) 
I: Well, and what then? 
He: We have put the question squarely. (Laughter.) 
I: And what next? 
He: There is a turn, Comrade Stalin; soon there will 
be a turn. (Laughter.) 
I: But still? 
He: We can see an indication of some improvement. 
(Laughter.) 
I: But still, how are you getting on with the sowing?
He: So far, Comrade Stalin, we have not made any 
headway with the sowing. (General laughter.) 
There you have the portrait of the windbag. They 
have mobilised themselves, they have put the question 
squarely, they have a turn and some improvement, but 
things remain as they were. 
This is exactly how a Ukrainian worker recently 
described the state of a certain organisation when he 
was asked whether that organisation had any definite 
line: ³Well,² he said, ³as to a line . . . they have a 
line all right, but they donıt seem to be doing any work.² 
(General laughter.) Evidently that organisation also 
has its honest windbags.

J. V. S T A L I N 378 
Besides the incorrigible bureaucrats and red-tapists, 
as to whose removal there are no differences of 
opinion among us, there are two other types of executive 
who retard our work, hinder our work, and hold up 
our advance. 
One of these types of executive consists of people 
who rendered certain services in the past, people who 
have become big-wigs, who consider that Party decisions 
and Soviet laws are not written for them, but for 
fools. These are the people who do not consider it their 
duty to fulfil the decisions of the Party and of the Government, 
and who thus destroy the foundations of 
Party and state discipline. What do they count upon 
when they violate Party decisions and Soviet laws? 
They presume that the Soviet Government will not venture 
to touch them, because of their past services. These 
overconceited big-wigs think that they are irreplaceable, 
and that they can violate the decisions of the leading 
bodies with impunity. What is to be done with executives 
of this kind? They must unhesitatingly be removed 
from their leading posts, irrespective of past services. 
(Voices: ³Quite right!²) They must be demoted to lower 
positions and this must be announced in the press. 
(Voices: ³Quite right!²) This is essential in order to 
bring those conceited big-wig bureaucrats down a peg 
or two, and to put them in their proper place. This is 
essential in order to strengthen Party and Soviet discipline 
in the whole of our work. (Voices: ³Quite right!² 
Applause.) 
And now about the second type of executive. I 
have in mind the windbags, I would say honest windbags 
(laughter), people who are honest and loyal to the Soviet

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 379 
power, but who are incapable of leadership, incapable 
of organising anything. Last year I had a conversation 
with one such comrade, a very respected comrade, 
but an incorrigible windbag, capable of drowning 
any live undertaking in a flood of talk. Here is the conversation: 
I: How are you getting on with the sowing? 
He: With the sowing, Comrade Stalin? We have 
mobilised ourselves. (Laughter.) 
I: Well, and what then? 
He: We have put the question squarely. (Laughter.) 
I: And what next? 
He: There is a turn, Comrade Stalin; soon there will 
be a turn. (Laughter.) 
I: But still? 
He: We can see an indication of some improvement. 
(Laughter.) 
I: But still, how are you getting on with the sowing?
He: So far, Comrade Stalin, we have not made any 
headway with the sowing. (General laughter.) 
There you have the portrait of the windbag. They 
have mobilised themselves, they have put the question 
squarely, they have a turn and some improvement, but 
things remain as they were. 
This is exactly how a Ukrainian worker recently 
described the state of a certain organisation when he 
was asked whether that organisation had any definite 
line: ³Well,² he said, ³as to a line . . . they have a 
line all right, but they donıt seem to be doing any work.² 
(General laughter.) Evidently that organisation also 
has its honest windbags.

J. V. S T A L I N 380 
And when such windbags are dismissed from their 
posts and are given jobs far removed from operative 
work, they shrug their shoulders in perplexity and ask: 
³Why have we been dismissed? Did we not do all that 
was necessary to get the work done? Did we not organise 
a rally of shock brigaders? Did we not proclaim the slogans 
of the Party and of the Government at the conference 
of shock brigaders? Did we not elect the whole 
of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee to the 
Honorary Presidium? (General laughter.) Did we not 
send greetings to Comrade Stalin‹what more do you 
want of us?² (General laughter.) 
What is to be done with these incorrigible windbags? 
Why, if they were allowed to remain on operative work 
they are capable of drowning every live undertaking in 
a flood of watery and endless speeches. Obviously, they 
must be removed from leading posts and given work 
other than operative work. There is no place for windbags 
on operative work. (Voices: ³Quite right!² Applause.) 
I have already briefly reported how the Central 
Committee handled the selection of personnel for the 
Soviet and economic organisations, and how it strengthened 
the checking on the fulfilment of decisions. Comrade 
Kaganovich will deal with this in greater detail in his 
report on the third item of the congress agenda. 
I should like to say a few words, however, about 
further work in connection with increased checking on 
the fulfilment of decisions. 
The proper organisation of checking on the fulfilment 
of decisions is of decisive importance in the fight against 
bureaucracy and red tape. Are the decisions of the leading 
bodies carried out, or are they pigeon-holed by

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 381 
bureaucrats and red-tapists? Are they carried out properly, 
or are they distorted? Is the apparatus working conscientiously 
and in a Bolshevik manner, or is it working to 
no purpose? These things can be promptly found out 
only by a well-organised check on the fulfilment of decisions. 
A well-organised check on the fulfilment of decisions 
is the searchlight which helps to reveal how the 
apparatus is functioning at any moment and to bring 
bureaucrats and red-tapists into the light of day. We can 
say with certainty that nine-tenths of our defects and failures 
are due to the lack of a properly organised check 
on the fulfilment of decisions. There can be no doubt 
that with such a check on fulfilment, defects and failures 
would certainly have been averted. 
But if checking on fulfilment is to achieve its purpose, 
two conditions at least are required: firstly, that fulfilment 
is checked systematically and not spasmodically; 
secondly, that the work of checking on fulfilment in all 
sections of the Party, Soviet and economic organisations 
is entrusted not to second rate people, but to people 
with sufficient authority, to the leaders of the organisations 
concerned. 
The proper organisation of checking on fulfilment is 
most important of all for the central leading bodies. 
The organisational structure of the Workersı and Peasantsı 
Inspection does not meet the requirements of a 
well-devised system for checking on fulfilment. Several 
years ago, when our economic work was simpler and less 
satisfactory, and when we could count on the possibility 
of inspecting the work of all the Peopleıs Commissariats 
and of all the economic organisations, the Workersı 
and Peasantsı Inspection was adequate. But now, when

J. V. S T A L I N 382 
our economic work has expanded and has become more 
complicated, and when it is no longer necessary, or possible, 
to inspect it from one centre, the Workersı and 
Peasantsı Inspection must be reorganised. What we 
need now is not an inspection, but a check on the fulfilment 
of the decisions of the centre‹what we need 
now is control over the fulfilment of the decisions of 
the centre. We now need an organisation that would 
not set itself the universal aim of inspecting everything 
and everybody, but which could concentrate all its 
attention on the work of control, on the work of checking 
on fulfilment of the decisions of the central bodies 
of the Soviet power. Such an organisation can be only 
a Soviet Control Commission under the Council of Peopleıs 
Commissars of the U.S.S.R., working on assignments 
of the Council of Peopleıs Commissars, and having 
representatives in the localities who are independent 
of the local bodies. And in order that this organisation 
may have sufficient authority and be able, if necessary, 
to take proceedings against any responsible executive, 
candidates for the Soviet Control Commission must be 
nominated by the Party congress and endorsed by the 
Council of Peopleıs Commissars and the Central Executive 
Committee of the U.S.S.R. I think that only 
such an organisation could strengthen Soviet control 
and Soviet discipline. 
As for the Central Control Commission, it is well 
known that it was set up primarily and mainly for the 
purpose of averting a split in the Party. You know 
that at one time there really was a danger of a split. 
You know that the Central Control Commission and its 
organisations succeeded in averting the danger of a

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 383 
split. Now there is no longer any danger of a split. But, 
on the other hand, we are urgently in need of an organisation 
that could concentrate its attention mainly on 
checking the fulfilment of the decisions of the Party 
and of its Central Committee. Such an organisation can 
be only a Party Control Commission under the Central 
Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), working on assignments 
of the Party and its Central Committee and having representatives 
in the localities who are independent of 
the local organisations. Naturally, such a responsible 
organisation must have great authority. In order that 
it may have sufficient authority and be able to take proceedings 
against any responsible executive who has committed 
an offence, including members of the Central Committee, 
the right to elect or dismiss the members of this 
commission must be vested only in the supreme organ of 
the Party, viz., the Party congress. There can be no doubt 
that such an organisation will be quite capable of ensuring 
control over the fulfilment of the decisions of the central 
organs of the Party and of strengthening Party discipline. 
That is how matters stand with regard to questions 
of organisational leadership. 
Our tasks in the sphere of organisational work are: 
1) To continue to adapt organisational work to the 
requirements of the political line of the Party. 
2) To raise organisational leadership to the level 
of political leadership. 
3) To secure that organisational leadership fully 
ensures the implementation of the political slogans and 
decisions of the Party. 
* 
* 
*

J. V. S T A L I N 384 
I am coming to the end of my report, comrades. 
What conclusions must be drawn from it? 
Everybody now admits that our successes are great 
and extraordinary. In a relatively short space of time 
our country has been transferred on to the lines of industrialisation 
and collectivisation. The First Five-Year 
Plan has been successfully carried out. This arouses a 
feeling of pride among our workers and increases their 
self-confidence. 
That is very good, of course. But successes sometimes 
have their seamy side. They sometimes give rise to certain 
dangers, which, if allowed to develop, may wreck 
the whole work. There is, for example, the danger that 
some of our comrades may become dizzy with successes. 
There have been such cases among us, as you know. 
There is the danger that certain of our comrades, having 
become intoxicated with success, will get swelled 
heads and begin to lull themselves with boastful songs, 
such as: ³Itıs a walkover,² ³We can knock anybody 
into a cocked hat,² etc. This is not precluded by any 
means, comrades. There is nothing more dangerous than 
sentiments of this kind, for they disarm the Party and 
demobilise its ranks. If such sentiments gain the upper 
hand in our Party we may be faced with the danger of 
all our successes being wrecked. 
Of course, the First Five-Year Plan has been successfully 
carried out. That is true. But the matter does not 
and cannot end there, comrades. Before us is the Second 
Five-Year Plan, which we must also carry out, 
and successfully too. You know that plans are carried 
out in the course of a struggle against difficulties, in 
the process of overcoming difficulties. That means that

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 385 
there will be difficulties and there will be a struggle 
against them. Comrades Molotov and Kuibyshev will 
report to you on the Second Five-Year Plan. From their 
reports you will see what great difficulties we shall 
have to overcome in order to carry out this great plan. 
This means that we must not lull the Party, but sharpen 
its vigilance; we must not lull it to sleep, but keep it 
ready for action; not disarm it, but arm it; not demobilise 
it, but keep it in a state of mobilisation for the 
fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan. 
Hence, the first conclusion: We must not become 
infatuated with the successes achieved, and must not become 
conceited. 
We have achieved successes because we have had 
the correct guiding line of the Party, and because we 
have been able to organise the masses for putting this 
line into effect Needless to say, without these conditions 
we should not have achieved the successes that we 
have achieved, and of which we are justly proud. But 
it is a very rare thing for ruling parties to have a correct 
line and to be able to put it into effect. 
Look at the countries which surround us. Can you 
find many ruling parties there that have a correct line 
and are putting it into effect? Actually, there are now 
no such parties in the world; for they are all living 
without prospects, they are floundering in the chaos of 
the crisis, and see no way of getting out of the swamp. 
Our Party alone knows in what direction to steer its 
course, and it is going forward successfully. To what 
does our Party owe its superiority? To the fact that it 
is a Marxist party, a Leninist party. It owes it to the 
fact that it is guided in its work by the teaching of

J. V. S T A L I N 386 
Marx, Engels, and Lenin. There can be no doubt that as 
long as we remain true to this teaching, as long as we 
have this compass, we shall achieve successes in our 
work. 
It is said that in some countries in the West Marxism 
has already been destroyed. It is said that it has 
been destroyed by the bourgeois-nationalist trend known 
as fascism. That, of course, is nonsense. Only people 
who are ignorant of history can talk like that. Marxism 
is the scientific expression of the fundamental interests 
of the working class. To destroy Marxism, the working 
class must be destroyed. But it is impossible to destroy 
the working class. More than 80 years have passed since 
Marxism came into the arena. During this time scores 
and hundreds of bourgeois governments have tried to 
destroy Marxism. And what has happened? Bourgeois 
governments have come and gone, but Marxism has remained. 
(Stormy applause.) Moreover, Marxism has 
achieved complete victory on one-sixth of the globe; 
moreover, it has achieved victory in the very country in 
which Marxism was considered to have been utterly 
destroyed. (Stormy applause.) It cannot be regarded as an 
accident that the country in which Marxism has achieved 
complete victory is now the only country in the 
world which knows no crises and unemployment, whereas 
in all other countries, including the fascist countries, 
crisis and unemployment have been reigning for four 
years now. No, comrades, that is no accident. (Prolonged 
applause.) 
Yes, comrades, our successes are due to the fact that 
we have worked and fought under the banner of Marx, 
Engels, and Lenin.

REPORT TO THE SEVENTEENTH PARTY CONGRESS 387 
Hence, the second conclusion: We must remain 
true to the end to the great banner of Marx, Engels, Lenin. 
(Applause.) 
The working class of the U.S.S.R. is strong not only 
because it has a Leninist party that has been tried and 
tested in battle; further, it is strong not only because 
it enjoys the support of the vast masses of the labouring 
peasants; it is strong also because it is supported 
and assisted by the world proletariat. The working 
class of the U.S.S.R. is part of the world proletariat, 
its advanced detachment, and our republic is the cherished 
child of the world proletariat. There can be no 
doubt that if our working class had not had the support 
of the working class in the capitalist countries it would 
not have been able to retain power, it would not have 
secured the conditions for socialist construction, and, 
consequently, it would not have achieved the successes 
that i t has achieved. International ties between the 
working class of the U.S.S.R. and the workers of the 
capitalist countries, the fraternal alliance between 
the workers of the U.S.S.R. and the workers of all countries‹
this is one of the corner-stones of the strength and 
might of the Republic of Soviets. The workers in the 
West say that the working class of the U.S.S.R. is the 
shock brigade of the world proletariat. That is very 
good. It means that the world proletariat is prepared 
to continue rendering all the support it can to the working 
class of the U.S.S.R. But it imposes serious duties 
upon us. It means that we must prove by our work that 
we deserve the honourable title of shock brigade of the 
proletarians of all countries. It imposes upon us the 
duty of working better and fighting better for the final

J. V. S T A L I N 388 
victory of socialism in our country, for the victory of 
socialism in all countries. 
Hence, the third conclusion: We must be true to the 
end to the cause of proletarian internationalism, to the 
cause of the fraternal alliance of the proletarians of all 
countries. (Applause.) 
Such are the conclusions. 
Long live the great and invincible banner of Marx, 
Engels, and Lenin! (Stormy and prolonged applause from the 
whole hall. The congress gives Comrade Stalin an ovation. 
The ³Internationale² is sung, after which the ovation is 
resumed with renewed vigour. Shouts of ³Hurrah for 
Stalin!² ³Long live Stalin!² ³Long live the C.C. of the 
Party!²) 
Pravda, No. 27 
January 28, 1934

TO COMRADE SHAPOSHNIKOV, 
CHIEF AND COMMISSAR OF THE FRUNZE 
MILITARY ACADEMY OF THE WORKERSı 
AND PEASANTSı RED ARMY. 
TO COMRADE SHCHADENKO, 
ASSISTANT FOR POLITICAL WORK 
I congratulate the students, teaching staff and executives 
of the Red Banner Military Academy on its 
fifteenth anniversary and on the award of the Order of 
Lenin. 
I wish the Academy complete success in the training, 
so essential for the defence of our Motherland, of educated 
Bolshevik commanders, masters of the art of war. 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 18, 
January 18, 1934

INSTEAD OF A REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION 
January 31, 1934 
Comrades, the discussion at this congress has revealed 
the complete unity of the views of our Party leaders 
on, one can say, all questions of Party policy. As you 
know, no objections whatever have been raised against 
the report. Hence, it has been revealed that there is 
extraordinary ideological, political and organizational 
solidarity in the ranks of our Party. (Applause.) The 
question arises: Is there any need, after this, for a reply 
to the discussion? I do not think there is. Permit me 
therefore to refrain from making any concluding remarks. 
(A stormy ovation. All the delegates rise to their 
feet. Thunderous shouts of ³Hurrah!² A chorus of shouts: 
³Long live Stalin!² The delegates, all standing, sing the 
³Internationale,² after which the ovation is resumed. 
Shouts of ³Hurrah!² ³Long live Stalin!² ³Long live 
the C.C.!²) 
Pravda, No. 31, 
February 1, 1934

N O T E S 
1 The Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), held in Moscow, 
June 26-July 13, 1930, discussed the political and 
organisational reports of the Partyıs Central Committee; 
the reports of the Central Auditing Commission, the Central 
Control Commission and the C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation to 
the Executive Committee of the Comintern; and reports 
on the fulfilment of the five-year plan in industry, on the 
collective-farm movement and the promotion of agriculture, 
and on the tasks of the trade unions in the reconstruction 
period. The congress unanimously approved the political line 
and activities of the Central Committee of the Party and 
instructed it to continue to ensure Bolshevik rates of socialist 
construction, to achieve fulfilment of the five-year plan in four 
years, and to carry out unswervingly the sweeping socialist 
offensive along the whole front and the elimination of the kulaks 
as a class on the basis of complete collectivisation. The congress 
noted the momentous importance of the crucial change in the 
development of agriculture, thanks to which the collective-farm 
peasantry had become a real and stable support of the Soviet 
regime. The congress instructed the Partyıs Central Committee 
to continue to pursue a firm policy of peace and to strengthen the 
defence capacity of the U.S.S.R. The congress issued directives: 
that heavy industry should be developed to the utmost and a 
new, powerful coal and metallurgical base created in the 
eastern part of the country; that the work of all the mass 
organisations should be reconstructed and the role of the trade

NOTES 392 
unions in socialist construction increased; that all workers and 
the masses of the working people should be drawn into the 
socialist emulation movement. The congress completely 
exposed the Right opportunists as agents of the kulaks within 
the Party, and declared that the views of the Right opposition 
were incompatible with membership of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
The congress instructed the Party organisations to intensify 
the fight against deviations on the national question‹ 
against dominant-nation chauvinism and local nationalism 
and conciliation towards them‹and to firmly carry out the 
Leninist national policy, which ensures the broad development 
of the cultures‹national in form and socialist in content‹ 
of the peoples of the U.S.S.R. The Sixteenth Congress is 
known in the history of the Party as the congress of the 
sweeping offensive of socialism along the whole front, of the 
elimination of the kulaks as a class, and of the realisation of 
complete collectivisation. J. V. Stalin delivered the political 
report of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on June 27 (see Works, Vol. 
12, pp. 242-385), and replied to the discussion on the report on 
July 2. (For the Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.), see 
History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course, Moscow 1954, 
pp. 481-84. For the resolutions of the congress, see Resolutions 
and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and Central 
Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 553-616.) p. 1 
2 J. V. Stalin, The Political Tasks of the University of the Peoples 
of the East (see Works, Vol. 7, pp. 135-54). p. 4 
3 V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 27, pp. 291-319. p. 5 
4 The plenum of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), 
which took place on November 10-17, 1929, discussed the following 
questions: control figures for the national economy 
for 1929-30; results and further tasks of collective-farm development, 
etc. After reviewing the question of the group of 
Right deviators, the plenum declared that propaganda of the 
views of Right opportunism and of conciliation towards it

NOTES 393 
was incompatible with membership of the C.P.S.U.(B.), decided 
to expel Bukharin, as the ring-leader of the Right-wing 
capitulators, from the Political Bureau of the Central Committee 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and issued a warning to Rykov, 
Tomsky and other members of the Right opposition. (For the 
resolutions adopted by the plenum of the Central Committee 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.) see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. 
Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, 
Part II, 1953, pp. 500-43.) p. 9 
5 The Tenth Party Conference of the Urals Region took place 
in Sverdlovsk, June 3-13, 1930. It fully approved the political 
and organisational line of the C.C. of the Party. After exposing 
the Right-opportunist manoeuvres of Rykov and emphasising 
the counter-revolutionary, treacherous role of the Right deviation 
in the communist movement, the conference in its decisions 
called upon the Urals Party organisation to wage a relentless 
fight against all attempts of the Right capitulators 
to oppose the line of the Party and its Leninist Central Committee. 
p. 10 
6 This refers to the Sixth Congress of the Communist Organisations 
of Transcaucasia (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia), 
which took place in Tiflis, June 5-12, 1930. The congress fully 
approved the political and organisational line and the practical 
work of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.(B.). p. 11 
7 J. V. Stalin, Concerning Questions of Agrarian Policy in the 
U.S.S.R. Speech delivered at a Conference of Marxist Students 
of Agrarian Questions, December 27, 1929 (see Works, 
Vol. 12, pp. 147-178). p. 18 
8 J. V. Stalin, Political Report of the Central Committee to the 
Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) (see Works, Vol. 12, 
pp. 248-49). p. 19 
9 V. I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism 
(see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, pp. 173-290). p. 19

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
NOTES 394 
10 J. V. Stalin, Political Report of the Central Committee to the 
Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) (see Works, Vol. 12, 
p. 310). p. 19 
11 See J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 8, p. 300. p. 21 
12 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 21, p. 85. p. 28 
13 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 21, p. 87. p. 28 
14 The First All-Union Conference of Leading Personnel of Socialist 
Industry took place in Moscow, January 30 to February 
4, 1931. It was attended by 728 delegates, including representatives 
of industrial combines, factory directors and chiefs 
of construction works, engineers, foremen and foremost shock 
brigaders, and leaders of Party and trade-union organisations. 
The conference heard the report of G. K. Orjonikidze, 
Chairman of the Supreme Council of National Economy, entitled 
³Control Figures for 1931 and the Tasks of Economic 
Organisations.² On February 3, V. M. Molotov, Chairman 
of the Council of Peopleıs Commissars, addressed the conference 
on ³The Fundamental Premises and Fulfilment of the 
Economic Plan.² J. V. Stalin delivered a speech on ³The Tasks 
of Business Executives² on February 4 at the final sitting 
of the conference. Taking J. V. Stalinıs directives as their 
guide, the conference mapped out practical measures for the 
fulfilment of the national-economic plan for the third and 
decisive year of the first five-year plan period. The conference 
laid stress on the following as the chief tasks of business executives: 
mastery of technique, improvement of the quality 
of leadership in industry, consistent application of the principle 
of one-man management, introduction of business accounting 
and struggle for increased labour productivity, lowering 
of production costs and improvement of the quality of 
output. The conference sent greetings to the Central Committee 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.). p. 31 
15 This refers to the sabotage activities of a counter-revolutionary 
organisation of bourgeois experts in Shakhty and 
other Donbas areas. This organisation was discovered in

NOTES 395 
the beginning of 1928. The Shakhty case was examined 
at a special session of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. 
in Moscow from May 18 to July 5, 1928. (For the Shakhty 
affair, see J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 11, pp. 38, 57-68, also 
History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course, Moscow 1954, 
p. 454.) p. 38 
16 The trial of the counter-revolutionary organisation of wreckers 
and spies known as the ³Industrial Party² took place in Moscow, 
November 25 to December 7, 1930. The case was heard at a 
special session of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. It was 
established at the trial that the ³Industrial Party,² which 
united the counter-revolutionary elements of the top stratum 
of the old, bourgeois technical intelligentsia, was an espionage 
and military agency of international capital in the Soviet 
Union. It was linked with White emigres‹former big capitalists 
of tsarist Russia‹and acted under the direct instructions 
of the French general staff, preparing for military intervention 
by the imperialists and armed overthrow of the Soviet- 
Government. The foreign imperialists supplied the wreckers 
with directives and funds for carrying on espionage and sabotage 
in various branches of the national economy of the 
U.S.S.R. p. 38 
17 From N. A. Nekrasovıs poem, ³Who Lives Well in Russia?² 
(See N. A. Nekrasov, Selected Works, Russ. ed., 1947, p. 323.) 
p. 41 
18 On May 14, 1931, the builders of the Magnitogorsk Iron and 
Steel Works informed J. V. Stalin by telegram that the Magnitnaya 
Mountain mine had been put into operation. p. 49 
19 A Conference of Business Executives was held under the 
auspices of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), June 22-23, 1931. It was 
attended by representatives of the economic organisations 
united under the Supreme Council of National Economy of 
the U.S.S.R. and by representatives of the Peopleıs Commissariat 
of Supply of the U.S.S.R. J. V. Stalin attended the conference 
on June 22 and 23, and on the latter date delivered 
his speech, ³New Conditions‹New Tasks in Economic Con

NOTES 396 
struction.² V. M. Molotov, K. Y. Voroshilov, A. A. Andreyev, 
L. M. Kaganovich, A. I. Mikoyan, N. M. Shvernik, M. I. Kalinin, 
G. K. Orjonikidze and V. V. Kuibyshev took part in 
the work of the conference. p. 53 
20 J. V. Stalin wrote these greetings on the occasion of the inauguration, 
on October 1, 1931, of the Moscow AMO Automobile 
Works, one of the countryıs giant industrial plants. At a 
general conference of the workers, engineering and technical 
personnel, and office employees, held on the day that the 
works was put into operation, the works was named after Comrade 
Stalin at the request of the workers, and is now called 
the Stalin Automobile Works. p. 83 
21 Tekhnika (Technique)‹a newspaper published every three 
days from October 1931 to 1937. Until January 1932, it was 
the organ of the Supreme Council of National Economy of 
the U.S.S.R. and subsequently the organ of the Peopleıs 
Commissariat of Heavy Industry of the U.S.S.R. J. V. Stalinıs 
greetings were published in No. 1 of the newspaper Tekhnika 
on October 10, 1931. p. 85 
22 Proletarskaya Revolutsia (Proletarian Revolution)‹a historical 
magazine published from 1921 to 1928 by the History 
of the Party Department (a commission on the history of the 
October Revolution and the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), 
subsequently the Department of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 
for studying the history of the October Revolution and the 
C.P.S.U.(B.), and from October 1928 to 1931 by the Lenin 
Institute of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). After a year ıs interval, 
the magazine was published from 1933 to 1941 by the Marx- 
Engels-Lenin Institute of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). p. 86 
23 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, pp. 305, 304. 
p. 89 
24 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 5, p. 345. p. 97 
25 V. I. Lenin, The Attitude of Social-Democracy towards the 
Peasant Movement (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 9, p. 213). 
p. 103

NOTES 397 
26 Karl Marx, Misère de la Philosophie. Réponse à la Philosophie 
de la Misère de M. Proudhon. Marx-Engels, Gesamtausgabe, 
Bd. 6, Abt. 1. p. 107 
27 The Versailles system was a system of political and economic 
relations between the capitalist countries established by Britain, 
the U.S.A. and France after the defeat of Germany and 
her allies in the world imperialist war of 1914-18. The basis 
of the system was the Versailles Peace Treaty and a number 
of other treaties connected with it, which, in particular, established 
the new frontiers of the European states. p. 119 
28 K. Marx und F. Engels, Die deutsche Ideologie. Kritik der 
neusten deutschen Philosophie in ihren Represäntanten, Feuerbach, 
B. Bauer und Stirner, und des deutschen Sozialismus in 
seinen verschiedenen Propheten. Teil I (see Marx-Engels, Gesamtausgabe, 
B. 5, S. 1-432). p. 121 
29 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, Moscow 
1955, pp. 30-60. p. 121 
30 This refers to meetings of J. V. Stalin and V. I. Lenin: in Stockholm, 
at the Fourth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (1906); in 
London, at the time of the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. 
(1907); and during J. V. Stalinıs trips abroad to Cracow and 
Vienna (1912 and 1913). p. 123 
31 See J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 6, pp. 374-420. p. 133 
32 In a letter dated March 25, 1932, addressed to J. V. Stalin, 
Mr. Richardson, representative of the Associated Press news 
agency, asked about the truth of the rumours in the foreign 
press that the Berlin physician, Zondeck, had been invited to 
Moscow to treat J. V. Stalin. p. 136 
33 The Complaints Bureau was set up in April 1919 under the 
Peopleıs Commissariat of State Control, which in 1920 was 
changed to the Peopleıs Commissariat of Workersı and Peasantsı 
Inspection. The tasks and scope of the work of the Central 
Bureau of Complaints and Applications were defined by a 
regulation dated May 4, 1919, and those of the local departments

NOTES 398 
of the Central Bureau by a regulation dated May 24, 1919, 
published over the signature of J. V. Stalin, Peopleıs Commissar 
of State Control. From the day they were formed the Central 
and local bureaus did much work in investigating and checking 
complaints and statements of working people, enlisting in 
this work an extensive active of workers and peasants. From 
February 1934 the Bureau of Complaints and Applications was 
included in the system of the Soviet Control Commission 
under the Council of Peopleıs Commissars, and from September 
1940 it has formed a department of the Peopleıs Commissariat 
(subsequently‹Ministry) of State Control of the U.S.S.R. 
J. V. Stalinıs article, ³The Importance and Tasks of the 
Complaints Bureaus² was written in connection with the all- 
Union five-day review and checking of the work of the bureaus 
carried out on April 9-14, 1932, by a decision of the Presidium 
of the Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and 
the Collegium of the Peopleıs Commissariat of Workersı and 
Peasantsı Inspection of the U.S.S.R. p. 137 
34 The Seventh All-Union Conference of the All-Union Leninist 
Young Communist League took place in Moscow, July 1-8, 1932. 
It discussed the following questions: the fourth, culminating year 
of the five-year plan period and the tasks of the Leninist Young 
Communist League (socialist emulation, shock-brigade work, 
etc.); the growth of the Y.C.L. and Young Pioneersı organisation 
and the state of political education work in the Y.C.L 
and among the Young Pioneers. J. V. Stalinıs greetings were 
read out on July 8 at the final sitting of the conference. p. 143 
35 ³Congratulations to Maxim Gorky² were written in connection 
with the celebration, on September 25, 1932, of the fortieth 
anniversary of the literary and revolutionary activity of the 
great proletarian writer, Alexei Maximovich Gorky. p. 144 
36 This refers to the Civil War between the Northern and the 
Southern states of America in 1861-65. p. 152 
37 The Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control 
Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.), which took place on 
January 7-12, 1933, discussed the following questions: the

NOTES 399 
results of the First Five-Year Plan and the national-economic 
plan for 1933‹the first year of the second five-year plan period 
(reports of Comrades Stalin, Molotov, and Kuibyshev); 
the aims and tasks of the Political Departments of the machine 
and tractor stations and state farms; inner-Party questions. 
At the sitting of the plenum on January 7, J. V. Stalin made 
a report on ³The Results of the First Five-Year Plan² and 
at the sitting on January 11 he delivered a speech on ³Work 
in the Countryside.² In its decisions the plenum emphasised 
the significance of the results of the fulfilment of the First 
Five-Year Plan in four years as the most outstanding event 
in current history. The plenum pointed out that the slogan 
of new construction in the second five-year plan period must 
be supplemented by the slogan of mastering the new undertakings 
in industry and of organisationally strengthening the 
new undertakings in agriculture. The plenum instructed all 
economic, Party and trade-union organisations to concentrate 
chief attention on the complete fulfilment of the assignments 
for raising labour productivity and lowering production costs. 
In order to consolidate politically the machine and tractor 
stations and state farms, enhance their political role and influence 
in the countryside and improve the work of the Party 
organisations in the collective farms and state farms, the 
plenum adopted a decision to organise Political Departments 
at the machine and tractor stations and state farms. The plenum 
approved the decision of the Political Bureau of the C.C. 
to conduct a purge of the Party during 1933 and to discontinue 
admission to the Party until the end of the purge. (For 
the resolutions of the joint plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C., 
C.P.S.U.(B.), see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, 
Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 
1953, pp. 717-42.) p. 161 
38 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 413. p. 164 
39 The New York Times‹a bourgeois daily newspaper, influential 
press organ of the American capitalist monopolies; associated 
with the so-called Democratic Party; published in New 
York since 1851. p. 166

NOTES 400 
40 The Daily Telegraph‹a British reactionary daily newspaper 
close to the Conservative Party leadership, published in London 
since 1855. In 1937 it merged with the Morning Post and 
since then has been issued in London and Manchester under 
the name of The Daily Telegraph and Morning Post. p. 166 
41 Gazeta Polska (Polish Gazette)‹a Polish bourgeois newspaper, 
mouthpiece of the fascist Pilsudski clique. It was issued in 
Warsaw from 1929 to 1939. p. 166 
42 The Financial Times‹a British bourgeois daily newspaper, 
organ of the industrial and financial circles of the City, published 
in London since 1888. p. 166 
43 Politica‹an Italian social and political magazine that reflected 
the views of the Italian big bourgeoisie. It began publication 
in Rome in 1918. p. 167 
44 Current History‹a magazine propagating the views of American 
bourgeois historians and ideologists of the U.S. State 
Departmentıs aggressive foreign policy. It has been published 
in New York since 1914. p. 167 
45 Le Temps (The Times)‹a French bourgeois daily newspaper, 
which since 1931 was the property of the Comité des Forges 
(the heavy industry association). It was published in Paris 
from 1861 to 1942. p. 167 
46 The Round Table‹a British bourgeois magazine dealing with 
questions of the colonial policy of the British Empire and 
international relations. Published in London since 1910, it 
expressed the views of conservative circles of the British 
bourgeoisie. p. 168 
47 Die Neue Freie Presse (New Free Press)‹an Austrian bourgeois 
newspaper, which reflected the views of the commercial and 
industrial bourgeoisie and of banking circles; was published 
in Vienna from 1864 to 1939. p. 169

NOTES 401 
48 The Nation‹an American social-political and literary magazine 
of a liberal trend, reflecting petty-bourgeois opinion. 
It has been published in New York since 1865. p. 170 
49 Forward‹a trade-unionist weekly of the ³Left²-reformist 
brand; it started publication in Glasgow (Scotland) in 1906 
p. 171 
50 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 25, p. 338. p. 176 
51 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol, 31, pp. 483-84. 
p. 177 
52 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 388-89. 
p. 178 
53 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, p. 459. p. 179 
54 At the end of 1931, imperialist Japan, which was striving 
to set up its rule in China and the Far East, invaded Manchuria 
without declaration of war. The occupation of this territory 
was accompanied by a concentration of Japanese troops 
at the frontier of the U.S.S.R. and the mobilisation of whiteguard 
spies and bandits intended for use in a war against 
the Soviet Union. The Japanese imperialists were preparing 
positions suitable for attack on the U.S.S.R., aiming at 
the seizure of the Soviet Far East and Siberia. p. 182 
55 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 30, p. 127. p. 192 
56 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, p. 465. p. 192 
57 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 30, p. 123. p. 192 
58 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 24, p. 466. p. 192 
59 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 30, pp. 173-74. 
p. 193

NOTES 402 
60 This refers to the decision of the Central Executive Committee 
and the Council of Peopleıs Commissars of the U.S.S.R. dated 
August 22, 1932, on ³The Struggle against Speculation.² The 
decision was published in Pravda, No. 233, August 23, 
1932. p. 208 
61 This refers to the decision of the Central Executive Committee 
and the Council of Peopleıs Commissars of the U.S.S.R. on 
³Protection of the Property of State Enterprises, Collective 
Farms and Co-operatives and the Consolidation of Public 
(Socialist) Property,² adopted on August 7, 1932. This decision, 
written by J. V. Stalin, states: ³The Central Executive 
Committee and Council of Peopleıs Commissars of the U.S.S.R. 
hold that public property (state, collective-farm and co-operative 
property) is the basis of the Soviet system; it is sacred 
and inviolable, and persons committing offences against public 
property must be considered enemies of the people. In view 
of this it is a prime duty of the organs of Soviet power to wage 
a determined struggle against those who steal public property.² 
The decision was published in Pravda, No. 218, August 
8, 1932. p. 214 
62 The decision of the Council of Peopleıs Commissars of the 
U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), 
dated May 6, 1932, on ³The Plan for Grain Procurements from 
the 1932 Harvest and for Development of Collective-Farm 
Trade in Grain² was published in Pravda, No. 125, May 7, 
1932. p. 223 
63 This refers to the counter-revolutionary mutiny at Kronstadt 
in March 1921. The mutiny was headed by whiteguards, who 
were connected with Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks 
and representatives of foreign states. p. 232 
64 Rabotnitsa (Working Woman)‹a magazine published by the 
Pravda Publishing House; it has been issued since January 
1923. p. 240 
65 The First All-Union Congress of Collective-Farm Shock Brigaders 
took place in Moscow on February 15-19, 1933, attend

NOTES 403 
ed by 1,513 delegates. J. V. Stalin took part in the work of 
the congress, which elected him to its honorary presidium and 
addressed greetings to him in the name of the millions of collective-
farm peasants. The congress discussed the question of 
strengthening the collective farms and the tasks of the spring 
sowing. On February 19, when the closing session was held, 
the congress was addressed by J. V. Stalin. Other speakers 
at the congress were V. M. Molotov, L. M. Kaganovich, 
M. I. Kalinin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Budyonny. In its 
appeal to all peasant collective farmers of the U.S.S.R. the 
congress called for the collective farms to be made Bolshevik 
and for the development of all-Union socialist emulation of 
the state and collective farms for a bumper harvest and exemplary 
preparation and carrying out of the spring sowing. 
p. 242 
66 This refers to a letter sent by the collective farmers of the 
area served by the Bezenchuk Machine and Tractor Station 
of the Middle-Volga territory (now Kuibyshev Region) to 
J. V. Stalin, published in Pravda, No. 28, January 29, 1933. 
p. 262 
67 Metro-Vickers‹a British electrical-engineering firm which 
had contracted with the U.S.S.R. to render technical aid to 
enterprises of the Soviet electrical industry. In March 1933, 
criminal proceedings were instituted against six Britishers, 
employees of the Moscow office of Metro-Vickers, on the charge 
of engaging in wrecking at large Soviet electric power stations. 
The investigation and the trial, which took place on April 
12-19, 1933, established that the arrested Metro-Vickers employees 
had carried on espionage in the U.S.S.R. and, with 
the assistance of a gang of criminal elements, had organised 
damage to equipment, accidents and acts of sabotage at large 
U.S.S.R. electric power-stations for the purpose of undermining 
the strength of Soviet industry and of weakening the Soviet 
state. p. 265 
68 This refers to M. I. Kalininıs radio address to the American 
people, on November 20, 1933, in connection with the establishment, 
on November 16, 1933, of diplomatic relations between 
the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. p. 282

NOTES 404 
69 A world economic conference was held in London from June 
12 to July 27, 1933. Its initiators‹Britain and other capitalist 
countries‹tried to represent i t as a sovereign remedy 
for putting an end to the economic crisis and for the ³rehabilitation² 
of capitalism. The conference was intended to discuss 
the problems of stabilising currencies, organising production 
and trade, abolishing customs barriers and establishing economic 
peace among all the capitalist countries. Expressing 
the U.S.S.R.ıs unalterable desire to further the cause of peace 
and strengthen commercial ties, the Soviet delegation at the 
conference submitted a proposal for the conclusion of an economic 
non-aggression pact and likewise declared that the Soviet 
Union was prepared to place orders abroad to the value 
of $1,000,000,000 on the basis of receiving long-term credits 
and the creation of normal conditions for Soviet exports. The 
Soviet delegationıs proposals were not supported by the conference. 
The conference revealed the complete inability of the 
capitalist world to find a way out of the economic crisis and 
the further intensification of the contradictions between the 
capitalist countries, primarily between Britain and the U.S.A. 
and between Germany and her creditors. After fruitless discussions 
the conference ended in failure, without settling a single 
one of the questions it had raised. p. 282 
70 The Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) was held in 
Moscow from January 26 to February 10, 1934. It discussed 
the report of the Central Committee, C.P.S.U.(B.), the reports 
of the Central Auditing Commission, of the Central Control 
Commission and Workersı and Peasantsı Inspection, of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) delegation in the Executive Committee of the 
Comintern, and reports on the Second Five-Year Plan and on 
organisationaI questions (Party and Soviet affairs). On 
J. V. Stalinıs report on the work of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 
the congress adopted a decision in which it wholly approved 
the political line and practical work of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 
and instructed all Party organisations to be guided in their 
work by the principles and tasks enunciated in J. V. Stalinıs 
report. The congress noted the decisive successes of socialist 
construction in the U.S.S.R. and declared that the general

NOTES 405 
line of the Party had triumphed. The Seventeenth Congress 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.) has gone down in the history of the Party 
as the Congress of Victors. On the reports of V. M. Molotov 
and V. V. Kuibyshev, the congress adopted a resolution on 
³The Second Five-Year Plan of Development of the National 
Economy of the U.S.S.R. (1933-1937)²‹a plan for the building 
of socialist society, thereby endorsing the grand programme 
for completing the technical reconstruction of the entire national 
economy, and for a still more rapid rise of the living 
and cultural standards of the workers and peasants. The congress 
emphasised that the basic political task during the second 
five-year plan period was the final elimination of capitalist 
elements and the overcoming of the survivals of capitalism 
in economic life and in the minds of people. On the report of 
L. M. Kaganovich, the congress adopted decisions on organisational 
questions (Party and Soviet affairs). The congress 
pointed out that the principal tasks of the Second Five-Year 
Plan sharply raised the question of improving the quality of 
work in all spheres, and first and foremost the quality of organisational 
and practical leadership. The congress adopted 
new Party Rules. It replaced the Central Control Commission 
and Workersı and Peasantsı Inspection by a Party Control 
Commission under the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) and a Soviet Control 
Commission under the Council of Peopleıs Commissars of the 
U.S.S.R. (On the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) see 
History of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course, Moscow 1954, pp. 496- 
503. For the resolutions and decisions of the congress, see Resolutions 
and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences and 
Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 744-87.) p. 288 
71 In 1931 the proletariat and peasantry of Spain overthrew the 
military-fascist dictatorship of General Primo de Rivera, 
which had been set up in 1923, and abolished the monarchy. 
On April 14, 1931, a republic was proclaimed in Spain. Owing, 
however, to the political weakness and organisational disunity 
of the proletariat and the treachery of the leadership of the 
Socialist party and Anarchists, the bourgeoisie and landlords 
were able to seize power, and a coalition government of 
representatives of the bourgeois parties and the Socialists was

NOTES 406 
formed. In spite of the attempts of the coalition government 
to hold back the further development of the revolution, the 
revolutionary mass battles of the workers and peasants against 
the landlords and the bourgeoisie continued. With the general 
strike and the armed struggle of the Asturian miners in October 
1934 the revolutionary movement of this period reached its 
peak. p. 289 
72 Councils of Action: Revolutionary organisations of workers 
in Britain, France and other capitalist countries that took 
part in military intervention against the Soviet Republic in 
1918-20. The Councils of Action arose under the slogan of 
³Hands off Soviet Russia!² Under the leadership of the Councils 
of Action, the workers organised strikes and demonstrations, 
and refused to load war equipment, with the aim of 
bringing about the collapse of the intervention. The Councils 
of Action were most widespread in Britain, in 1920. p. 304 
73 The Second Congress of the Communist International took 
place on July 19-August 7, 1920. It opened in Petrograd the 
subsequent sittings were held in Moscow. It was attended by 
more than 200 delegates representing working-class organisations 
from 37 countries. V. I. Lenin directed all the preparatory 
work for convening the congress. At the congress Lenin 
delivered a report on the international situation and the chief 
tasks of the Communist International, as well as other reports 
and speeches. V. I. Lenin and J. V. Stalin were elected by 
the R.C.P.(B.) delegation to sit on the Executive Committee 
of the Communist International. The Second Congress laid 
the foundations of the programme, organisational principles 
strategy and tactics of the Communist International. p. 305 
74 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 202-03. 
p. 305 
75 The Little Entente: a political alliance of Czechoslovakia, 
Rumania and Yugoslavia lasting from 1920 to 1938. It was 
under French influence and almost until the end of its existence 
it had the character of an anti-Soviet bloc. The bourgeois-
landlord ruling circles of the countries that composed

NOTES 407 
the Little Entente regarded it as a means of strengthening 
their hold on the territories they had received under the Versailles 
Peace Treaty and as a weapon of struggle against revolution 
in Central Europe. The danger of aggression by German 
fascism and the growing international prestige of the 
U.S.S.R. changed the attitude of the countries of the Little 
Entente to the Soviet Union. In 1933 the countries of the Little 
Entente along with other countries, joined with the U.S.S.R. 
in signing a convention defining aggression, the draft submitted 
by the Soviet Union being taken as the basis of this 
convention. p. 307 
76 V. I. Lenin, The Tax in Kind (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, 
pp. 309-10). p. 316 
77 V. I. Lenin, Report Delivered at the Eighth Congress of the 
R.C.P.(B.) on Work in the Countryside, March 23, 1919 
(see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, p. 190). p. 332 
78 The Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) took place in 
Moscow, December 2-19, 1927. On December 3, J. V. Stalin 
delivered the political report of the Central Committee of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) and on December 7 he replied to the discussion. 
The congress approved the political and organisational line 
of the Partyıs Central Committee and instructed it to continue 
to pursue a policy of peace and of strengthening the defence 
capacity of the U.S.S.R., to continue with unrelaxing 
tempo the socialist industrialisation of the country, to develop 
to the full the collectivisation of agriculture and to steer a 
course towards eliminating the capitalist elements from the 
national economy. In its decisions on the opposition the congress 
noted that the disagreements between the Party and the 
opposition had developed into programmatic disagreements, 
that the Trotskyist opposition had taken the path of anti- 
Soviet struggle, and declared that adherence to the Trotskyist 
opposition and the propagation of its views were incompatible 
with membership of the Bolshevik Party. The congress approved 
the decision of the joint meeting of the Central Committee 
and Central Control Commission of the C.P.S.U.(B.) of November 
14, 1927, to expel Trotsky and Zinoviev from the Party and

NOTES 408 
decided to expel from the Party all active members of the 
Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc and the whole ³Democratic Centralism² 
group. (On the Fifteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) see History 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course, Moscow 1954, pp. 
447-49. For the resolutions and decisions of the congress see 
Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, Conferences 
and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 1953, pp. 313-71.) 
p. 354 
79 The Seventeenth Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.) took place 
in Moscow, January 30-February 4, 1932. The conference was 
directed by J. V. Stalin. It discussed G. K. Orjonikidzeıs report 
on the results of industrial development in 1931 and the tasks 
for 1932, and the reports of V. M. Molotov and V. V. Kuibyshev 
on the directives for drawing up the Second Five-Year 
Plan for the development of the national economy of the 
U.S.S.R. in 1933-37. The conference noted that the decisions 
of the Party congresses on the building and completion of the 
foundations of a socialist economy and on securing economic 
independence for the U.S.S.R. had been carried out with immense 
success. The conference approved the plan for the development 
of socialist industry in 1932, which ensured the fulfilment 
of the First Five-Year Plan in four years. In its directives 
for the drawing up of the Second Five-Year Plan, the conference 
defined the chief political and economic tasks of that 
plan, pointing out that its main and decisive economic task 
was the completion of the reconstruction of the entire national 
economy on the basis of the most up-to-date technique. 
(For the resolutions of the Seventeenth Conference of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.), see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. Congresses, 
Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 
1953, pp. 679-99.) p. 356 
80 See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Vol. I, 
Moscow 1955, p. 61. p. 363 
81 See Frederick Engels, Anti-Dühring, Moscow 1954, p. 149. 
p. 363 
82 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, p. 329. p. 364

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 
(July 1930‹January 1934) 
1 9 3 0 
July 2 
July 6 
July 10 
July 12 
July 13 
August 14 
J. V. Stalin at the Sixteenth Congress of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) replies to the discussion on the Political 
Report of the C.C. of the Party. 
J. V. Stalin is present at the Dynamo Stadium 
for the sports festival held in honour of the Sixteenth 
Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
The Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
elects J. V. Stalin to the commission for the final 
editing of the resolution on the report on the 
collective-farm movement and the progress of 
agriculture. 
The Sixteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) elects 
J. V. Stalin a member of the Central Committee 
of the Party. 
The plenum of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) elects 
J. V. Stalin a member of the Political Bureau, 
the Organising Bureau and the Secretariat of the 
C.C. and appoints him General Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
On the motion of J. V. Stalin, the Central Executive 
Committee and Council of Peopleıs Commissars 
of the U.S.S.R. adopt a decision on ³Universal 
Compulsory Elementary Education.²

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 410 
August 
November 6 
November 7 
November, 
December 7 
December 9 
December 12 
December 17-21 
December 24 
J. V. Stalin writes his reply to Comrade Shatunovskyıs 
letter. 
J. V. Stalin attends the celebration meeting of 
the Moscow Soviet on the occasion of the thirteenth 
anniversary of the Great October Socialist 
Revolution. 
J. V. Stalin is present at the military parade of 
the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of 
the working people of the capital in the Red Square 
in honour of the thirteenth anniversary of the 
Great October Socialist Revolution. 
J. V. Stalin answers Comrade Ch.ıs letters. 
J. V. Stalin talks with members of the bureau of 
the C.P.S.U.(B.) unit at the Institute of Red 
Professors of Philosophy and Natural Science on 
the situation at the philosophical front and the 
tasks of the struggle on two fronts in philosophy, 
and on the need for elaborating the theoretical 
heritage of Lenin. 
J. V. Stalin writes his reply to Demyan Bednyıs 
letter. 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of the joint plenum 
of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin, by decision of the Council of Peopleıs 
Commissars of the U.S.S.R., is appointed a member 
of the Council of Labour and Defence. 
1 9 3 1 
January 4 J. V. Stalin attends the opening of the Third 
Session of the Central Executive Committee of 
the U.S.S.R., Fifth Convocation.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 411 
January 5-6 
January 8 
January 12 
January 16 
January 21 
January 23 
February 4 
February 24 
February 26- 
March 5 
February 27 
J. V. Stalin participates in the work of a conference 
held in the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) with railway 
transport personnel. 
J. V. Stalin is elected an honorary member of the 
Leningrad Soviet by the workers of the cityıs 
large enterprises. 
J. V. Stalin writes an answer to the inquiry of 
the Jewish News Agency in the U.S.A. about 
the attitude in the U.S.S.R. to anti-Semitism. 
J. V. Stalin attends the opening of the Ninth Congress 
of the All-Union Leninist Y.C.L. The congress 
elects him to its honorary presidium. 
J. V. Stalin attends the memorial meeting at the 
Bolshoi Theatre to commemorate the seventh 
anniversary of the death of V. I. Lenin. 
J. V. Stalin is elected an honorary member of 
the Moscow Soviet at meetings of the workers 
of the capitalıs large enterprises. 
J. V. Stalin delivers his speech on ³The Tasks 
of Business Executives² at the First AII-Union Conference 
of Leading Personnel of Socialist Industry. 
J. V. Stalin, at the Second Moscow Regional Congress 
of Soviets, is elected a delegate to the Fifteenth 
All-Russian and the Sixth All-Union Congresses 
of Soviets. 
J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Fifteenth 
All-Russian Congress of Soviets. 
J. V. Stalin writes his answer to Comrade Etchinıs 
letter.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 412 
March 5 
March 8-17 
March 17 
March 31 
April 3 
May 1 
May 7, 14, 23 
and 29 and 
June 4 
May 11 and 13 
J. V. Stalin, at the session of the Fifteenth All- 
Russian Congress of Soviets, is elected a member 
of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee. 
J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the Sixth 
All-Union Congress of Soviets. 
J. V. Stalin, at the session of the Sixth All-Union 
Congress of Soviets, is elected a member of the 
Union Soviet of the Central Executive Committee 
of the U.S.S.R. 
J. V. Stalin writes greetings to the workers and 
the administrative and technical personnel of the 
State Association of the Azerbaijanian Oil Industry 
and that of the Grozny Oil and Gas Industry in 
connection with their fulfilment of the five-year 
oil production plan in two and a half years. The 
greetings are published in Pravda, No. 90, April 
1, 1931. 
J. V. Stalinıs greetings to the workers and the administrative 
and technical personnel of Elektrozavod 
(Moscow) in connection with the factoryıs 
fulfilment of its five-year plan in two and a half 
years are published in Pravda, No. 92. 
J. V. Stalin is present at the May Day military 
parade of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration 
of the working people of the capital in 
the Red Square. 
J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the commission 
for the drawing up of the draft decision 
of the Political Bureau of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 
on improving and expanding Moscowıs municipal 
economy. 
J. V. Stalin takes part in a conference of personnel 
of the coal industry, held in the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B).

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 413 
May 19 
May 28 
May 30 
June 11-15 
June 22-23 
June 23 
July 23 
October 1 
J. V. Stalinıs greetings to the workers and the 
executive staff of the Magnitogorsk Iron and 
Steel Works Project on the occasion of the completion 
of the construction and the commencement of 
the exploitation of the powerful Magnitogorsk 
mine are published in Pravda, No. 136. 
J. V. Stalinıs greetings to the workers, specialists 
and executive staff of the machine and tractor 
stations on the occasion of the pre-schedule 
fulfilment of their sowing plan are published in 
Pravda, No. 145. 
J. V. Stalinıs greetings to the workers, specialists 
and executives of the state grain farms on the 
occasion of the fulfilment of the sowing plan are 
published in Pravda, No. 147. 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of the plenum of 
the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of a conference 
of business executives held under the auspices 
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin delivers his speech, New Conditions‹ 
New Tasks in Economic Construction at the conference 
of business executives held under the auspices 
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin, at a meeting of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) 
attended by co-operative officials, delivers a speech 
on questions of improving the work of the consumersı 
co-operatives and of supplies for the working 
people in big industrial centres. 
J. V. Stalinıs greetings to the staff of the AMO 
Works (Moscow) on the occasion of the completion 
of the building of the first gigantic automobile 
works in the U.S.S.R. and to the staff of

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 414 
October 10 
October 11 
October 25 
October 28-31 
End of October 
November 3 
November 6 
the Kharkov Tractor Works on the occasion of the 
pre-schedule completion of its construction are published 
in Pravda, No. 271. 
J. V. Stalinıs greetings to the newspaper Tekhnika 
on the occasion of its first appearance are published 
in Pravda, No. 280 and in Tekhnika, No. 1. 
J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and K. Y. Voroshilov 
pay a visit to A. M. Gorky, who reads them 
one of his works, a fairy-tale called ³The Girl 
and Death.² 
J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov, G. K. Orjonikidze 
and L. M. Kaganovich meet in the Kremlin shock 
brigaders of the Stalin Automobile Works (the 
former AMO), who arrived on the first lorries. 
and buses manufactured by the plant. 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of the plenum of 
the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalinıs letter to the editorial board of the 
magazine Proletarskaya Revolutsia on ³Some Questions 
Concerning the History of Bolshevism² is 
published in the magazine Bolshevik, Nos. 19-20 
and in the magazine Proletarskaya Revolutsia, 
No. 6 (113). 
J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov send a message of 
greetings to the builders of the automobile works 
in Nizhni-Novgorod on the occasion of the successful 
completion of the construction work. The greetings 
are published in Pravda, No. 305, November 
4, 1931. 
J. V. Stalin attends the celebration meeting of 
the Moscow Soviet held in the Bolshoi Theatre 
on the occasion of the fourteenth anniversary of 
the Great October Socialist Revolution.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 415 
J. V. Stalin is present at the military parade of 
the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of 
the working people of the capital in the Red 
Square in honour of the fourteenth anniversary 
of the Great October Socialist Revolution. 
J. V. Stalin, by decision of the Political Bureau 
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), is appointed a member 
of the commission for preparing the draft resolution 
of the Seventeenth Conference of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.), ³Directives for Drawing up the 
Second Five-Year Plan for the National Economy 
of the U.S.S.R. (1933-1937).² 
J. V. Stalin receives a group of Moscow writers 
and talks with them on problems of literature. 
J. V. Stalin has a talk with the German writer 
Emil Ludwig. 
J. V. Stalin attends the opening of the Second 
Session of the Central Executive Committee of 
the U.S.S.R., Sixth Convocation. 
November 7 
November 25 
December 6 
December 13 
December 22 
January 2 
January 4 
January 15 
J. V. Stalinıs greetings to the staff of the Molotov 
Automobile Works (Nizhni-Novgorod) in connection 
with the inauguration of the works are published 
in Pravda, No. 2. 
J. V. Stalin writes greetings to the workers and 
the executive staff of the Saratov Harvester Combine 
Works on the occasion of the completion of 
the construction and the inauguration of the works. 
The greetings are published in Pravda, No. 5, 
January 5, 1932. 
J. V. Stalin writes a reply to Olekhnovich with 
reference to the letter ³Some Questions Concern- 
1 9 3 2

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 416 
ing the History of Bolshevism² sent to the editorial 
board of the magazine Proletarskaya Revolutsia. 
The reply was published in the magazine 
Bolshevik, No. 16, August 30, 1932. 
J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the commission 
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) for preparing 
the draft resolution ³Directives for Drawing up 
the Second Five-Year Plan for the National Economy 
of the U.S.S.R. (1933-1937).² The resolution 
was adopted at the Seventeenth Conference of 
the C.P.S.U.(B.) and endorsed by the plenum of 
the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on February 4, 1932. 
J. V. Stalin attends the memorial meeting at the 
Bolshoi Theatre to commemorate the eighth anniversary 
of the death of V. I. Lenin. 
J. V. Stalin writes an answer to Aristov with reference 
to the letter ³Some Questions Concerning 
the History of Bolshevism² sent to the editorial 
board of the magazine Proletarskaya Revolutsia. 
The reply was published in the magazine Bolshevik, 
No. 16, August 30, 1932. 
J. V. Stalin, at a joint plenum of the Leningrad 
Regional and City Committees of the C.P.S.U.(B.), 
is elected a delegate to the Seventeenth All-Union 
Party Conference. 
J. V. Stalin, at a joint plenum of the Moscow 
Regional and City Committees of the C.P.S.U.(B.), 
is elected a delegate to the Seventeenth All-Union 
Party Conference. 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Seventeenth 
Conference of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of the plenum of the 
C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). 
Before 
January 21 
January 21 
January 25 
January 29 
January 30 
January 30- 
February 4 
February 4

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 417 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of the commission 
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on questions of the production 
of goods for mass consumption. 
J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the 
workers and the administrative and technical personnel 
of the Magnitogorsk Iron and Steel Works 
Project on the occasion of the inauguration and 
mastering the technique of the giant blast furnace, 
the first of its kind in the U.S.S.R. and 
Europe. The greetings are published in Pravda, 
No. 89, March 30, 1932. 
J. V. Stalinıs article, ³The Importance and Tasks 
of the Complaints Bureaus,² is published in Pravda, 
No. 97. 
J. V. Stalin attends the opening in the Bolshoi 
Theatre of the Ninth All-Union Congress of Trade 
Unions. The congress elects J. V. Stalin to its 
honorary presidium. 
J. V. Stalin is made a member of the commission 
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on the irrigation of 
the Trans-Volga area. 
The decision, adopted on J. V. Stalinıs initiative, 
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on the reconstruction 
of literary and art organisations and the creation 
of a single Union of Soviet Writers is published 
in Pravda, No. 114. 
J. V. Stalin is present at the May Day military 
parade of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration 
of the working people of the capital in 
the Red Square. 
J. V. Stalin together with other leaders of the 
Party and the Government receives in the Kremlin 
participants in the May Day parade. 
February 10- 
April 1 
March 29 
April 7 
April 20 
April 23 
April 2 
May 1 
May 2

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 418 
J. V. Stalin replies to questions of Ralph V. Barnes. 
J. V. Stalin, by decision of the Political Bureau 
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), is made a member of 
the commission on checking fulfilment of the decisions 
of the central bodies relating to the production 
of goods for mass consumption. 
The decision of the Council of Peopleıs Commissars, 
U.S.S.R. and the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) of May 
22, 1932, on ³The Fight against Drought and the 
Irrigation of the Trans-Volga Area,² signed by 
J. V. Stalin and V. M. Molotov, is published in 
Pravda, No. 141. 
J. V. Stalinıs greetings to the men and women 
shock brigaders, the technical personnel and the executive 
staff of the Kuznetsk Iron and Steel Works 
for having achieved high records of pig iron output 
and Bolshevik tempos in mastering the most up-todate 
technique are published in Pravda, No. 142. 
J. V. Stalin is present at the sports parade in the 
Red Square, Moscow. 
J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the 
Seventh All-Union Conference of the All-Union 
Leninist Y.C.L. The greetings are published in 
Pravda, No. 188, July 9, 1932. 
The law on ³Protection of the Property of State 
Enterprises, Collective Farms and Co-operatives 
and the Consolidation of Public (Socialist) Property,² 
written by J . V. Stalin and adopted on 
August 7 by the Central Executive Committee 
and the Council of Peopleıs Commissars of the 
U.S.S.R., is published in Pravda, No. 218. 
J. V. Stalin is present at the demonstration of 
working youth in the Red Square, Moscow, held in 
honour of the eighteenth International Youth Day. 
May 3 
May 8 
May 23 
May 24 
July 8 
August 8 
September 4

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 419 
J. V. Stalinıs greetings to A. M. Gorky on the 
occasion of the fortieth anniversary of Gorkyıs 
literary and revolutionary activity are published 
in Pravda, No. 266. 
J. V. Stalin attends the ceremonial meeting in 
the Bolshoi Theatre devoted to the fortieth anniversary 
of A. M. Gorkyıs literary and revolutionary 
activity. 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of a plenum of the 
C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and K. Y. Voroshilov 
have a talk in A. M. Gorkyıs apartment with a 
group of scientists organising a U.S.S.R. Institute 
of Experimental Medicine. 
J. V. Stalinıs greetings to the workers and managers 
of the Dnieper Hydro-Electric Power Station 
on the occasion of the successful completion of 
the construction and pre-schedule inauguration 
of the station are published in Pravda, No. 281. 
The greetings of J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and 
K. Y. Voroshilov to the participants in the Arctic 
expedition on the ice-breaker Sibiryakov, which 
crossed the Arctic Ocean in a single journey, are 
published in Pravda, No. 285. 
J. V. Stalin talks with a group of writers at 
A. M. Gorkyıs apartment. It was during this 
talk that J. V. Stalin called writers ³engineers of 
human souls.² 
J. V. Stalin attends the celebration meeting of 
the Moscow Soviet held in the Bolshoi Theatre 
on the occasion of the fifteenth anniversary of 
the Great October Socialist Revolution. 
September 25 
September 28- 
October 2 
October 7 
October 10 
October 14 
October 26 
November 6

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 420 
J. V. Stalin is present at the military parade of 
the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of 
the working people of the capital in the Red 
Square in honour of the fifteenth anniversary 
of the Great October Socialist Revolution. 
J. V. Stalinıs greetings to Leningrad on the fifteenth 
anniversary of the establishment of Soviet 
power are published in Pravda, No. 309. 
Death of N. S. Alliluyeva-Stalina, J. V. Stalinıs 
wife and close comrade. 
J. V. Stalin accompanies the bier of N. S. Alliluyeva-
Stalina to the Novodevichye cemetery. 
In a letter published in Pravda, No. 318, J. V. Stalin 
thanks the organisations, institutions, friends and 
comrades who expressed their condolences on 
the occasion of the death of N. S. Alliluyeva-Stalina. 
J. V. Stalin writes his article ³Mr. Campbell 
Stretches the Truth.² The article was published in 
the magazine Bolshevik, No. 22, November 30, 1932. 
J. V. Stalinıs greetings to the officials and troops 
of the OGPU on lhe occasion of its fifteenth anniversary 
are published in Pravda, No. 350. 
November 7 
Night of Nomember 
8 
November 11 
November 18 
November 23 
December 20 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of a joint plenum 
of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin delivers a report on ³Results of the 
First Five-Year Plan² at the joint plenum of the 
C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). 
1 9 3 3 
January 7-12 
January 7

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 421 
J. V. Stalin delivers a speech on ³Work in the 
Countryside² at the joint plenum of the C.C. and 
C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.). 
On the proposal of J. V. Stalin, the joint plenum 
of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) adopts a 
decision to organise Political Departments of the 
machine and tractor stations and state farms and 
to send 17,000 Party workers to the countryside. 
J. V. Stalin attends the memorial meeting at the 
Bolshoi Theatre to commemorate the ninth anniversary 
of the death of V. I. Lenin. 
J. V. Stalin attends the opening of the Third Session 
of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R., Sixth Convocation. 
J. V. Stalinıs greetings to the magazine Rabotnitsa 
on the occasion of its tenth anniversary are published 
in Pravda, No. 25. 
J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the All-Union 
Conference of the Leninist Young Communist 
League on the practical tasks of the Y.C.L. in 
connection with the spring sowing. 
J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the First 
All-Union Congress of Collective-Farm Shock 
Brigaders. 
J. V. Stalin writes a letter to Comrade I. N. Bazhanov. 
J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the First All- 
Union Congress of Collective-Farm Shock Brigaders 
J. V. Stalinıs greetings to the Red Army on the 
occasion of its fifteenth anniversary are published 
in Pravda, No. 53. 
January 11 
January 21 
January 23 
January 26 
February 2 
February 15-59 
February 16 
February 19 
February 23

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TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
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DISTRIBUTION 
422 BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 
J. V. Stalin attends the celebration meeting at 
the Bolshoi Theatre on the occasion of the fifteenth 
anniversary of the Red Army. 
J. V. Stalin attends at the Bolshoi Theatre the 
meeting of the C.C. and C.C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.), 
the Central Executive Committee and Council of 
Peopleıs Commissars of the U.S.S.R., the Executive 
Committee of the Comintern and the Moscow 
Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), held in commemoration 
of the fiftieth anniversary of the 
death of Karl Marx. 
J. V. Stalin writes an answer to the letter of 
Mr. Barnes. 
The greetings of J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and 
K. Y. Voroshilov to the participants in the expedition 
sent to rescue the ice-breaker Malygin are 
published in Pravda, No. 88. 
J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. Y. Voroshilov, 
and A. I. Mikoyan wire congratulations to the 
participants in the expedition of the ice-breaker 
Krassin on the occasion of the successful completion 
of its Arctic cruise and its pre-schedule fulfilment 
of the governmentıs assignment to render 
aid to the Arctic workers and population of the 
island of Novaya Zemlya. The telegram is published 
in Pravda, No. 106. 
J. V. Stalinıs greetings to Comrade S. M. Budyonny 
on his fiftieth birthday are published in 
Pravda, No. 115. 
J. V. Stalin is present at the May Day military 
parade of the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration 
of the working people of the capital in 
the Red Square. 
March 14 
March 20 
March 30 
April 17 
April 26 
May 1

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 423 
J. V. Stalin, together with other leaders of the 
Party and the Government, receives in the Kremlin 
participants in the May Day parade. 
J. V. Stalin has a talk with Colonel Robins. 
J. V. Stalin attends the final concert of the First 
All-Union Musiciansı Contest held in the Large 
Hall of the Moscow Conservatoire. 
J. V. Stalin together with other leaders of the 
Party and the Government receives in the Kremlin 
the young prize-winners of the First All-Union 
Musiciansı Contest. 
J. V. Stalin is present at the sports parade in the 
Red Square in Moscow. 
J. V. Stalin attends the funeral of Klara Zetkin 
in the Red Square in Moscow. 
J. V. Stalin, together with V. M. Molotov, K. Y. Voroshilov 
and G. K. Orjonikidze, visits the art 
exhibition ³Fifteen Years of the Workersı 
and Peasantsı Red Army.² 
J. V. Stalin takes part in the meeting of the commission 
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) on organisational 
questions of heavy industry. 
J. V. Stalin and K. Y. Voroshilov arrive in Leningrad 
and on the same day, together with S. M. Kirov, 
leave on the S.S. Anokhin for a journey 
through the White Sea-Baltic Canal. 
J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Kirov 
make a journey on the White Sea-Baltic Canal, 
acquaint themselves with its hydraulic installations 
and visit the port of Soroka, the Murmansk 
Port and Polar Bay. 
May 2 
May 13 
May 25 
May 26 
June 12 
June 22 
June 29 
July 14 
July 18 
July 18-25

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 424 
J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Kirov 
in the area of Soroka Port meet a squadron of 
warships belonging to the Northern Fleet which 
had crossed from the Baltic to the White Sea 
via the canal. 
J. V. Stalin addresses a meeting of Red Navy men 
on the tasks of the Northern Fleet. After the meeting 
J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Kirov 
visit the destroyer Uritsky and a submarine. 
J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Kirov 
arrive at Murmansk and inspect its port and Polar 
Bay. 
J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Kirov 
on their return to Leningrad inspect the port. 
The same day J. V. Stalin and K. Y. Voroshilov 
leave for Moscow. 
J. V. Stalin has a talk with aeronautical designers 
about new hydroplanes. 
J. V. Stalin talks with a group of leading personnel 
of the Stalin Automobile Works and gives 
them instructions to master the production of 
passenger cars. 
J. V. Stalin receives in the Kremlin a group of 
officials of the Moscow Soviet and talks with 
them about the improvement of road construction 
in Moscow, Moscowıs river embankments and 
the organisation of work at construction sites. 
J. V. Stalin and K. Y. Voroshilov take a trip on 
the S.S. Klara Zetkin from Gorky to Stalingrad. 
J. V. Stalin, K. Y. Voroshilov and S. M. Budyonny 
visit the Budyonny Stud Farm in the Salsk 
steppes (Rostov Region). 
July 21 
July 22 
July 25 
August 6 
August 8 
August 10 
August 20-23 
August 23-24

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 425 
J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. Y. Voroshilov 
and L. M. Kaganovich congratulate the crew of 
the stratostat U.S.S.R. on fulfilling the governmentıs 
assignment regarding the conquest and 
study of the stratosphere. The congratulations are 
published in Pravda, No. 273. 
J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. Y. Voroshilov 
and L. M. Kaganovich greet the participants in 
the Moscow‹Kara Kum‹Moscow automobile race. 
The greetings are published in Pravda, No. 273. 
J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, K. Y. Voroshilov 
and L. M. Kaganovich congratulate the Soviet 
salvage engineering experts on their success in 
raising the ice-breaker Sadko from the bottom of 
the sea in the Arctic zone. The congratulations 
are published in Pravda, No. 287. 
Stalinıs greetings to the All-Union Leninist Young 
Communist League on its fifteenth anniversary 
are published in Pravda, No. 299. 
J. V. Stalin attends the celebration meeting of 
the Moscow Soviet held in the Bolshoi Theatre 
on the occasion of the sixteenth anniversary of 
the Great October Socialist Revolution. 
J. V. Stalin is present at the military parade of 
the Moscow Garrison and the demonstration of 
the working people of the capital in the Red 
Square in honour of the sixteenth anniversary of 
the Great October Socialist Revolution. 
J. V. Stalin attends the funeral of Sen-Katayama, 
leader of the Communist Party of Japan, in the 
Red Square, Moscow. 
J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov, M. I. Kalinin, and 
L. M. Kaganovich receive a delegation of collec- 
October 3 
October 17 
October 29 
November 6 
November 7 
November 9 
November 20

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 426 
tive-farm shock brigaders from the Odessa Region 
and talk with them on questions of collectivefarm 
work. 
J. V. Stalin talks with a group of architects who 
have produced designs for the Palace of Soviets. 
J. V. Stalin and L. M. Kaganovich receive a delegation 
of collective-farm shock brigaders from 
the Dniepropetrovsk Region and talk with them 
on questions of collective-farm development 
and the supply of manufactured goods to the 
countryside. 
J. V. Stalin attends the celebration meeting in 
the Bolshoi Theatre held in honour of the fifteenth 
anniversary of the Central Aero-Hydrodynamic 
Institute (TSAGI). 
J . V. Stalin has a talk with the New York 
Times correspondent, Mr. Duranty. 
J. V. Stalin is present at the opening of the Fourth 
Session of the Central Executive Committee of 
the U.S.S.R., Sixth Convocation. 
J. V. Stalin examines and edits the theses of the 
reports of Comrades Molotov and Kuibyshev on 
³The Second Five-Year Plan of Development of the 
National Economy of the U.S.S.R. (1933-1937)² 
to the Seventeenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
The theses are published in Pravda, No. 359, 
December 30, 1933. 
November 29 
December 23 
December 25 
December 28 
Before 
December 29 
January 18 J. V. Stalinıs greetings to the students, teachers 
and executives of the Red Banner Frunze Military 
Academy of the Workersı and Peasantsı Red 
1 9 3 4

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 427 
Army in connection with the Academyıs fifteenth 
anniversary and the award to it of the Order of 
Lenin are published in Pravda, No. 18. 
J. V. Stalin attends the memorial meeting at the 
Bolshoi Theatre to commemorate the tenth anniversary 
of the death of V. I. Lenin. 
J. V. Stalin is elected a delegate to the Seventeenth 
Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) by the Leningrad 
Joint Fifth Regional and Second City Party 
Conference. 
J. V. Stalin is elected a delegate to the Seventeenth 
Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) by the Moscow Joint 
Fourth Regional and Third City Party Conference. 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Seventeenth 
Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin delivers the report on the work of the 
C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.) at the Seventeenth Party Congress. 
J. V. Stalin speaks at the Seventeenth Congress 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.): ³Instead of a Reply to the 
Discussion.² 
J. V. Stalin is present at the demonstration of 
the working people of the capital in the Red Square 
in honour of the Seventeenth Congress of 
the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
January 21 
January 23 
January 24 
January 26- 
February 10 
January 26 
January 31

Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics