J. STALIN 
WORKS 14


W O R K E R S O F A L L C O U N T R I E S , U N I T E !

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PREFACE 
The Original Russian edition of J. Stalin's works 
as published by decision of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) 
contains thirteen volumes and covers the 
period from 1901 up to January 1934 and has been 
published in English by the Foreign Languages Publishing 
House, Moscow. 
After this time, writings of J. Stalin in the 
English language could so far only be found in numerous 
pamphlets, Congress reports, newspaper 
articles e.t.c. 
After reprinting the 13 Volume Moscow edition, 
we now present five further volumes of works of 
J. Stalin. Three volumes: (14 -16) contain a collection 
of writings, speeches, messages, orders and reports. 
One volume (17) contains war telegrams and messages 
as sent by Stalin to Churchill and Attlee, Roosevelt 
and Truman: And volume 18 will be a reprint of the 
History of the C.P.S.U.(B), short course, which has 
been written under the close supervision of J. Stalin. 
The collection of writings in the volumes 14 - 16 
should give a close insight into Stalin's politics and 
activities in the period up to his death in 1953, but 
by no means can we claim that this collection could 
be complete. At times where no material seemed to 
be available, we have included material that reflects 
Stalin's activity; as for instance in volume 14 there 
are some reports from Kolkhozine leaders to Stalin 
to show the range of problems Soviet leadership had

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to handle and solve. As well in volume 14 after Stalin's 
explanatory speech on the Draft Constitution, we have 
included the full text of the Constitution as finally 
adopted by the Supreme Soviet. 
Not included in volume 14 though, is Stalin's article 
Dialectical and Historical Materialism as it is 
to be found in the History of the C.P.S.U.(B), short 
course, (volume 18) where it was originally published. 
In assembling the material for volume 14, we have 
avoided splitting it into different parts and appendices, 
so the partially indirect material is to be found under 
its appropriate date. In researching the material we 
have made use of the 17 volume German edition of 
Stalin's works as published by the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of Germany (Marxist - 
Leninist), and also of the recent French edition of 
Stalin's works as published by "Nouveau Bureau d' 
Edition", Paris. 
THE EDITORS 
RED STAR PRESS 
MAY 1978

7 
CONTENTS 
PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
ON AN ARTICLE BY ENGELS July 19, 1934 . . . 11 
MARXISM VERSUS LIBERALISM An Interview 
with H. G. Wells, July 23, 1934 . . . . . . . . . . 21 
TALK WITH THE METAL PRODUCERS December 
26, 1934 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 
DECISIONS ON THE MANUALS OF HISTORY . . 51 
REMARKS ON A SUMMARY OF THE MANUAL 
OF THE HISTORY OF THE U.S.S.R. August 8, 
1934 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 
REMARKS ON THE SUMMARY OF THE MANUAL 
OF MODERN HISTORY August 9, 1934 . . . . . . 61 
THE DEATH OF KIROV December 1, 1934 . . . . 63 
LETTER TO COMRADE CHOUMIATSKY . . . . . 67 
ADDRESS GIVEN AT THE RECEPTION OF 
THE 1st MAY PARADE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 
ADDRESS TO THE GRADUATES FROM THE 
RED ARMY ACADEMIES Delivered in the 
Kremlin May 6, 1935 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71 
ADDRESS TO THE SOLEMN MEETING ON THE 
OPENING OF THE L. M. KAGANOVICH METRO 
May 14, 1935 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 
SPEECH DELIVERED AT A RECEPTION GIVEN 
BY LEADERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

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AND THE GOVERNMENT TO WOMEN COLLECTIVE 
FARM SHOCK WORKERS November 
10, 1935 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 
SPEECH AT THE FIRST ALL-UNION CONFERENCE 
OF STAKHANOVITES November 17, 
1935. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89 
SPEECH AT A CONFERENCE OF HARVESTERCOMBINE 
OPERATORS December 1, 1935 . . . . 111 
ADDRESS TO THE COMMISSION OF THE 
SECOND ALL-UNION CONGRESS OF KOLKHOZINES 
February 15, 1936 . . . . . . . . . . . 121 
SPEECH AT A CONFERENCE OF THE FOREMOST 
COLLECTIVE FARMERS OF TAJIKSTAN 
AND TURKMENISTAN December 4, 1935 . . . . . 123 
CONFERENCE OF THE AVANT-GARDIST MEN 
AND WOMEN OF TAJIKSTAN AND OF TURKMENISTAN 
WITH THE DIRECTORS OF THE 
PARTY AND THE STATE December 4, 1935 . . . 127 
INTERVIEW BETWEEN J. STALIN AND ROY 
HOWARD March 1, 1936 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 
TELEGRAM FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
OF THE C.P.S.U.(B) TO THE CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY 
OF SPAIN October, 1936 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 
ON THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION OF THE 
U.S.S.R. Report delivered at the Extraordinary 
Eighth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. 
November 25, 1936 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151

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CONSTITUTION (FUNDAMENTAL LAW) OF 
THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
With amendments adopted by the First, 
Second, Third, Sixth, Seventh and Eighth 
Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
Kremlin, Moscow. December 5, 1936 . . . . . . . 199 
REPORT AND SPEECH IN REPLY TO DEBATE 
AT THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
OF THE C.P.S.U.(B) March 3- 5, 1937 
DEFECTS IN PARTY WORK AND MEASURES 
FOR LIQUIDATING TROTSKYITE AND OTHER 
DOUBLE-DEALERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 241 
SPEECH IN REPLY TO DEBATE. . . . . . . . . 275 
LETTER TO THE AUTHORS OF THE MANUAL 
OF THE "HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST 
PARTY" May, 1937 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 297 
ADDRESS TO THE RECEPTION OF DIRECTORS 
AND STAKHANOVITES OF THE METAL INDUSTRY 
AND THE COAL MINING INDUSTRY 
October 29, 1937 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301 
SPEECH DELIVERED BY COMRADE J. STALIN 
AT A MEETING OF VOTERS OF THE STALIN 
ELECTORAL AREA, MOSCOW December 11, 
1937. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 305 
ON THE FINAL VICTORY OF SOCIALISM IN 
THE U.S.S.R. January 18 - February 12, 1938 . . 315 
LETTER ON PUBLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN 
DIRECTED TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
OF THE ALL-UNION COMMUNIST YOUTH 
February 16, 1938 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
*

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SPEECH DELIVERED AT A RECEPTION IN 
THE KREMLIN TO HIGHER EDUCATIONAL 
WORKERS May 17, 1938 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329 
ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE EXCLUSION 
OF KOLKHOZINES FROM THE KOLKHOZES 
Decree of the Council of People's Commissars 
of the U.S.S.R. and of the Central Committee 
of the C.P.S.U.(B) April 19, 1938 . . . . . . . . . 333 
ON THE INCORRECT DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUES 
IN THE KOLKHOZES Decree of the 
Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. 
and of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) 
April 19, 1938 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 339 
ON THE TAXES AND OTHER OBLIGATIONS 
CONCERNING INDEPENDENT OPERATORS 
Decree of the Council of People's Commissars 
of the U.S.S.R. and of the Central Committee 
of the C.P.S.U.(B) April 19, 1938 . . . . . . . . . 349 
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE OF THE WORKERS' 
AND PEASANTS' RED ARMY February 23, 
1939 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353 
REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE TO THE EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS 
OF THE C.P.S.U.(B) March 10, 1939. . . 355 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 431 
* This item was published in the United States as a pamphlet and 
carried the title Mastering Bolshevism.‹ M-L Digital Reprints

11 
ON AN ARTICLE BY ENGELS 
19 July 1934 
Comrade Adoratsky proposes to print in the next 
number of "Bolshevik", devoted to the twentieth 
anniversary of the imperialist world war, the article 
by Engels, entitled "The Foreign Policy of Russian 
Tsardom", which was first published abroad, in 1890. 
I should consider it a completely ordinary matter if 
it were proposed to print this article in a collection 
of Engels' works, or in one of the historical journals; 
but the proposal is made to print it in our fighting 
journal "Bolshevik", in the number devoted to the 
twentieth anniversary of the imperialist world war. 
This means that those who make this proposal, consider 
that the article in question can be regarded 
as an article which gives guidance, or which at least, 
is profoundly instructive for our Party workers, in 
the matter of the clarification of the problems of 
imperialism and of imperialist wars. But Engels' 
article, as is evident from its contents, is unfortunately 
lacking in these qualities, in spite of 
its merits. Moreover, it has a number of weaknesses 
of such a character that, if it were to be published 
without critical notes, it could mislead the reader. 
Therefore I consider it inexpedient to publish Engels' 
article in the next number of "Bolshevik". 
What are the weaknesses to which I have referred? 
1. Characterising the predatory policy of Russian

12 
Tsarism and correctly showing the abominable nature 
of this policy, Engels explained it not so much by 
the "need" of the military-feudal-mercantile upper 
circles of Russia for outlets to the sea, sea-ports, 
for extending foreign trade and dominating strategic 
points, as by the circumstance that there stood at 
the head of Russia's foreign policy, an all-powerful 
and very talented band of foreign adventurers, who 
succeeded everywhere and in everything, who, in wonderful 
fashion managed to overcome each and every 
obstacle in the way of their adventurist purpose, 
who deceived with astonishing cleverness, all the 
Governments of Europe, and finally brought it about 
that Russia became a most powerful state, from 
the point of military strength. Such a treatment of 
the question by Engels may seem highly improbable, 
but it is, unfortunately, a fact. Here are the relevant 
passages from Engels' article : 
"Foreign policy is unquestionably the side on which 
Tsardom is strong - very strong. Russian diplomacy 
forms, to a certain extent, a modern Order of Jesuits, 
powerful enough, if need be, to overcome even the 
whims of a Tsar, and to crush corruption within its 
own body, only to spread it the more plenteously 
abroad; an Order of Jesuits originally, and by preference, 
recruited from foreigners, Corsicans like 
Pozzo di Borgo, Germans like Nesselrode, Russo- 
Germans like Lieven, just as its founder, Catherine 
the Second, was a foreigner. 
Up to the present time, only one thoroughbred 
Russian, Gortchakov, has filled the highest post in 
this order, and his successor, Von Giers, again bears

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a foreign name. 
It is this secret order, originally recruited from 
foreign adventurers, which has raised the Russian 
Empire to its present power. With iron perseverance, 
gaze fixed resolutely on the goal, shrinking from no 
breach of faith, no treachery, no assassinations, no 
servility, lavishing bribes in all directions, made 
arrogant by no victory, discouraged by no defeat, 
stepping over the corpses of millions of soldiers and 
of, at least, one Tsar, this band, unscrupulous as 
talented, has done more than all the Russian armies 
to extend the frontiers of Russia from the Dnieper 
and Dvina, to beyond the Vistula, to the Pruth, the 
Danube and the Black Sea; from the Don and Volga 
beyond the Caucasus, and to the sources of the Oxus 
and Jaxartes; to make Russia great, powerful and 
dreaded, and to open for her, the road to the sovereignty 
of the world." 
One might suppose that in Russia's external history, 
it was diplomacy that achieved everything, 
while Tsars, feudalists, merchants, and other social 
groups did nothing, or almost nothing. 
One might suppose that, if at the head of Russia's 
foreign policy, there had stood, not foreign adventurers 
like Nesselrode or Von Giers, but Russian 
adventurers like Gortchakov and others, the foreign 
policy of Russia would have taken a different direction. 
It is hardly necessary to mention that the policy 
of conquest, abominable and filthy as it was, was 
by no means a monopoly of the Russian Tsars. Everyone 
knows that a policy of conquest was then the 
policy, to no less a degree, if not to a greater, of

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all the rulers and diplomats of Europe, including 
such an Emperor of bourgeois background as Napoleon, 
who notwithstanding his non-Tsarist origin, practised 
in his foreign policy, also, intrigue and deceit, perfidy 
and flattery, brutality and bribery, murder and 
incendiarism. Clearly, matters could not be otherwise. 
It is evident that in writing his pamphlet against 
Russian Tsardom, (Engels' article is a good fighting 
pamphlet), Engels was a little carried away, and, 
being carried away, forgot for a short time, certain 
elementary things which were well known to him. 
2. Characterising the situation in Europe, and expounding 
the causes and prospects of the approaching 
world war, Engels writes : 
"The European situation today is governed by three 
facts : 
(1). The annexation of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany. 
(2). The impending advance of Russian Tsardom 
upon Constantinople. (3). The struggle in all countries, 
ever growing fiercer, between the proletariat 
and the bourgeoisie, the working-class and the middle-
class, a struggle whose thermometer is the 
everywhere advancing socialist movement. 
The first two facts necessitate the grouping of 
Europe today, into two large camps. The German 
annexation makes France the ally of Russia against 
Germany; the threatening of Constantinople by Tsardom, 
makes Austria and even Italy, the allies of 
Germany. Both camps are preparing for a decisive 
battle, for a war such as the world has not yet 
seen, in which ten to fifteen million armed combatants 
will stand face to face. Only two circum

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stances have thus far prevented the outbreak of 
this fearful war : first, the incredibly rapid improvements 
in firearms, in consequence of which, 
every newly invented weapon is already superseded 
by a new invention, before it can be introduced into 
even one army; and, secondly, the absolute impossibility 
of calculating the chances, the complete 
uncertainty as to who will finally come out victor 
from this gigantic struggle. 
All this danger of a general war will disappear on 
the day when a change of things in Russia will allow 
the Russian people to blot out, at a stroke, the 
traditional policy of conquest of its Tsars; and to 
turn its attention to its own internal vital interests, 
now seriously menaced, instead of dreaming about 
universal supremacy. 
...a Russian National Assembly, in order to settle 
only the most pressing internal difficulties, would 
at once have to put a decided stop to all hankering 
after new conquests. 
Europe is gliding down an inclined plane with increasing 
swiftness towards the abyss of a general 
war, a war of hitherto unheard-of extent and fer - 
ocity. Only one thing can stop it - a change of system 
in Russia. That this must come about in a few years 
there can be no doubt. 
On that day, when Tsardom falls, - this last 
stronghold of the whole European reaction - on that 
day, a quite different wind will blow across Europe." 
It is impossible not to observe that in this 
characterisation of the situation in Europe, and 
summary of the causes leading towards world war,

16 
Engels omits one important factor, which later on 
played the most decisive part, namely, the factor 
of imperialist struggle for colonies, for markets, 
for sources of raw materials. This had very serious 
importance already at that time. He omits the role 
of Great Britain as a factor in the coming world 
war, the factor of the contradictions between Germany 
and Great Britain, contradictions which were 
already of serious importance and which later on 
played almost the determining part in the beginning 
and development of the world war. 
I think that this omission constitutes the principal 
weakness in Engels' article. From this weakness there 
ensue the remaining weaknesses of the article, of 
which the following are noteworthy : 
(a). Overestimation of the role of Tsarist Russia's 
striving towards Constantinople in connection with 
the maturing of the world war. True, Engels 
mentions first as a war factor, the annexation of 
Alsace-Lorraine by Germany, but thereafter, he removes 
this factor into the background and brings to 
the forefront the predatory strivings of Russian 
Tsardom, asserting that "all the danger of general 
war will disappear on the day when a change of things 
in Russia will allow the Russian people to blot out, 
at a stroke, the traditional policy of conquest of 
its Tsars." 
This is certainly an exaggeration. 
(b). Overestimation of the role of the bourgeois 
revolution in Russia, the role of the "Russian National 
Assembly" (bourgeois Parliament), in relation to 
averting the approaching world war. Engels asserts

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that the downfall of Russian Tsarism is the only 
means of averting world war. This is plain exaggeration. 
A new bourgeois order in Russia, with its 
"national assembly", could not avert war, if only 
because the principal sources of war lay in the increasing 
intensity of imperialist struggle between 
the main imperialist powers. The fact is, that from 
the time of Russia's defeat in the Crimea in the 
'fifties of the last century, the independent role of 
Tsarism in the sphere of European foreign policy, 
began to wane to a significant extent, and that, as 
a factor in the imperialist world conflict, Tsarist 
Russia served essentially as an auxiliary reserve 
for the principal powers of Europe. 
(c). Overestimation of the role of the Tsarist 
power as the "last stronghold of the whole European 
reaction." That the Tsarist power in Russia, was 
a mighty stronghold of all European (and also Asiatic) 
reaction, there can be no doubt. But that it was 
the last stronghold of this reaction, one can legitimately 
doubt. 
It is necessary to note that these weaknesses of 
Engels' article are not only of "historical value." 
They have, or can have, a most serious practical 
importance. Truly, if imperialist struggle for colonies 
and spheres of influence is lost sight of, as 
a factor in the approaching world war; if the imperialist 
contradictions between England and Germany 
are forgotten; if the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine 
by Germany is withdrawn from the foreground as a 
war factor in favour of Russian Tsardom's striving 
towards Constantinople, considered as the more se

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rious and determining factor; if, finally, Russian 
Tsardom represents the last rampart of all European 
reaction, - then, is it not clear that a war, let us 
say, of bourgeois Germany against Tsarist Russia 
is not an imperialist war, not a robber war, not an 
anti-popular war, but a war of liberation, or almost 
of liberation? 
One can hardly doubt that this way of thinking 
facilitated the sin of the German Social-Democrats 
on August 4th, 1914, when they decided to vote for 
war credits, and proclaimed the slogan of defence 
of the bourgeois Fatherland against Tsarist Russia 
and against "Russian barbarism" and so on. 
It is characteristic that, in his letters to Bebel 
written in 1891, a year after the publication of this 
article, when he deals with the prospects of the 
coming war, Engels says directly that "the victory 
of Germany is, therefore, the victory of the revolution", 
and that "if Russia starts a war, then - 
forward against the Russians and their allies, whoever 
they may be!" 
It is obvious that such a way of thinking allows 
no place for revolutionary war into civil war. 
That is how matters stand as regards the weaknesses 
in Engels' article. 
Evidently Engels, alarmed by the Franco-Russian 
alliance which was then (1801-91) being formed, with 
its edge directed against the Austro-German coalition 
set himself the task of attacking Russia's foreign 
policy in this article, so as to deprive it of all 
credit in the eyes of European public opinion, and 
especially British public opinion; but in carrying out

19 
this task, he lost sight of a number of other very 
important and even determining factors, with the 
result that he fell into the one-sidedness which we 
have revealed. 
After all this, is it appropriate to print Engels' 
article in our fighting organ, "Bolshevik", as an article 
which provides guidance, or which, in any case, 
is profoundly instructive - because it is clear that 
to print it in "Bolshevik", would mean to give it, 
tacitly, such a recommendation? 
I think it is not appropriate. 
J. V. Stalin. 
(Written as a letter to members of the political 
bureau of the C.P.S.U. on July 19, 1934). 
Bolshevik No. 9 
May 1941

20

21 
MARXISM VERSUS LIBERALISM. 
AN INTERVIEW WITH H. G. WELLS 
23 July 1934 
Wells : I am very much obliged to you, Mr. Stalin, 
for agreeing to see me. I was in the United States 
recently. I had a long conversation with President 
Roosevelt and tried to ascertain what his leading 
ideas were. Now I have come to ask you what you 
are doing to change the world. . . 
Stalin : Not so very much. . . 
Wells : I wander around the world as a common 
man and, as a common man, observe what is going 
on around me. 
Stalin : Important public men like yourself are 
not "common men". Of course, history alone can 
show how important this or that public man has been; 
at all events, you do not look at the world as a 
"common man." 
Wells : I am not pretending humility. What I mean 
is that I try to see the world through the eyes of 
the common man, and not as a party politician or 
a responsible administrator. My visit to the United 
States excited my mind. The old financial world is 
collapsing; the economic life of the country is being 
reorganized on new lines. Lenin said : "We must 
learn to do business, learn this from the capitalists." 
Today the capitalists have to learn from you, to 
grasp the spirit of socialism. It seems to me that

22 
what is taking place in the United States is a profound 
reorganisation, the creation of planned, that 
is, socialist, economy. You and Roosevelt begin from 
two different starting points. But is there not a 
relation in ideas, a kinship of ideas, between Moscow 
and Washington? In Washington I was struck by the 
same thing I see going on here; they are building 
offices, they are creating a number of state regulation 
bodies, they are organising a long-needed 
Civil Service. Their need, like yours, is directive 
ability. 
Stalin : The United States is pursuing a different 
aim from that which we are pursuing in the U.S.S.R. 
The aim which the Americans are pursuing, arose 
out of the economic troubles, out of the economic 
crisis. The Americans want to rid themselves of the 
crisis on the basis of private capitalist activity, 
without changing the economic basis. They are trying 
to reduce to a minimum the ruin, the losses caused 
by the existing economic system. Here, however, as 
you know, in place of the old, destroyed economic 
basis, an entirely different, a new economic basis 
has been created. Even if the Americans you mention 
partly achieve their aim, i.e., reduce these losses 
to a minimum, they will not destroy the roots of 
the anarchy which is inherent in the existing capitalist 
system. They are preserving the economic system 
which must inevitably lead, and cannot but lead, to 
anarchy in production. Thus, at best, it will be a 
matter, not of the reorganisation of society, not 
of abolishing the old social system which gives rise 
to anarchy and crises, but of restricting certain of

23 
its excesses. Subjectively, perhaps, these Americans 
think they are reorganising society; objectively, however, 
they are preserving the present basis of society. 
That is why, objectively, there will be no reorganisation 
of society. 
Nor will there be planned economy. What is planned 
economy? What are some of its attributes? Planned 
economy tries to abolish unemployment. Let us suppose 
it is possible, while preserving the capitalist 
system, to reduce unemployment to a certain minimum. 
But surely, no capitalist would ever agree to 
the complete abolition of unemployment, to the 
abolition of the reserve army of unemployed, the 
purpose of which is to bring pressure on the labour 
market, to ensure a supply of cheap labour. Here 
you have one of the rents in the "planned economy" 
of bourgeois society. Furthermore, planned economy 
presupposes increased output in those branches of 
industry which produce goods that the masses of the 
people need particularly. But you know that the expansion 
of production under capitalism takes place 
for entirely different motives, that capital flows 
into those branches of economy in which the rate of 
profit is highest. You will never compel a capitalist 
to incur loss to himself and agree to a lower rate 
of profit for the sake of satisfying the needs of the 
people. Without getting rid of the capitalists, without 
abolishing the principle of private property in 
the means of production, it is impossible to create 
planned economy. 
Wells : I agree with much of what you have said. 
But I would like to stress the point that if a country

24 
as a whole adopts the principle of planned economy, 
if the government, gradually, step by step, begins 
consistently to apply this principle, the financial 
oligarchy will at last be abolished and socialism, in 
the Anglo-Saxon meaning of the word, will be brought 
about. The effect of the ideas of Roosevelt's "New 
Deal" is most powerful, and in my opinion they are 
socialist ideas. It seems to me that instead of stressing 
the antagonism between the two worlds, we 
should, in the present circumstances, strive to establish 
a common tongue for all the constructive 
forces. 
Stalin : In speaking of the impossibility of realising 
the principles of planned economy while preserving 
the economic basis of capitalism, I do not in the 
least desire to belittle the outstanding personal 
qualities of Roosevelt, his initiative, courage and 
determination. Undoubtedly, Roosevelt stands out as 
one of the strongest figures among all the captains 
of the contemporary capitalist world. That is why 
I would like, once again, to emphasize the point that 
my conviction that planned economy is impossible 
under the conditions of capitalism, does not mean 
that I have any doubts about the personal abilities, 
talent and courage of President Roosevelt. But if 
the circumstances are unfavourable, the most talented 
captain cannot reach the goal you refer to. 
Theoretically, of course, the possibility of marching 
gradually, step by step, under the conditions of 
capitalism, towards the goal which you call socialism 
in the Anglo-Saxon meaning of the word, is not precluded. 
But what will this "socialism" be? At best,

25 
bridling to some extent, the most unbridled of individual 
representatives of capitalist profit, some 
increase in the application of the principle of regulation 
in national economy. That is all very well. But 
as soon as Roosevelt, or any other captain in the 
contemporary bourgeois world, proceeds to undertake 
something serious against the foundation of capitalism, 
he will inevitably suffer utter defeat. The banks, 
the industries, the large enterprises, the large farms 
are not in Roosevelt's hands. All these are private 
property. The railroads, the mercantile fleet, all 
these belong to private owners. And, finally, the 
army of skilled workers, the engineers, the technicians, 
these too are not at Roosevelt's command, 
they are at the command of the private owners; they 
all work for the private owners. We must not forget 
the functions of the State in the bourgeois world. 
The State is an institution that organises the defence 
of the country, organises the maintenance of "order"; 
it is an apparatus for collecting taxes. The capitalist 
State does not deal much with economy in the strict 
sense of the word; the latter is not in the hands of 
the State. On the contrary, the State is in the hands 
of capitalist economy. That is why I fear that in 
spite of all his energies and abilities, Roosevelt will 
not achieve the goal you mention, if indeed that is 
his goal. Perhaps, in the course of several generations 
it will be possible to approach this goal somewhat; 
but I personally think that even this is not very 
probable. 
Wells : Perhaps, I believe more strongly in the 
economic interpretation of politics than you do. Huge

26 
forces driving towards better organisation, for the 
better functioning of the community, that is, for 
socialism, have been brought into action by invention 
and modern science. Organisation, and the regulation 
of individual action, have become mechanical necessities, 
irrespective of social theories. If we begin 
with the State control of the banks and then follow 
with the control of transport, of the heavy industries 
of industry in general, of commerce, etc., such an 
all-embracing control will be equivalent to the State 
ownership of all branches of national economy. This 
will be the process of socialisation. Socialism and 
individualism are not opposites like black and white. 
There are many intermediate stages between them. 
There is individualism that borders on brigandage, 
and there is discipline and organisation that are the 
equivalent of socialism. The introduction of planned 
economy depends, to a large degree, upon the organisers 
of economy, upon the skilled technical intelligentsia, 
who, step by step, can be converted to 
the socialist principles of organisation. And this is 
the most important thing. Because organisation comes 
before socialism. It is the more important fact. 
Without organisation the socialist idea is a mere 
idea. 
Stalin : There is no, nor should there be, irreconcilable 
contrast between the individual and the 
collective, between the interests of the individual 
person and the interests of the collective. There 
should be no such contrast, because collectivism, 
socialism, does not deny, but combines individual 
interests with the interests of the collective.

27 
Socialism cannot abstract itself from individual 
interests. Socialist society alone can most fully 
satisfy these personal interests. More than that; 
socialist society alone can firmly safeguard the interests 
of the individual. In this sense there is no 
irreconcilable contrast between "individualism" and 
socialism. But can we deny the contrast between 
classes, between the propertied class, the capitalist 
class, and the toiling class, the proletarian class? 
On the one hand we have the propertied class which 
owns the banks, the factories, the mines, transport, 
the plantations in colonies. These people see nothing 
but their own interests, their striving after profits. 
They do not submit to the will of the collective; 
they strive to subordinate every collective to their 
will. On the other hand we have the class of the poor, 
the exploited class, which owns neither factories nor 
works, nor banks, which is compelled to live by 
selling its labour power to the capitalists which 
lacks the opportunity to satisfy its most elementary 
requirements. How can such opposite interests and 
strivings be reconciled? As far as I know, Roosevelt 
has not succeeded in finding the path of conciliation 
between these interests. And it is impossible, as 
experience has shown. Incidentally, you know the 
situation in the United States better than I do as I 
have never been there and I watch American affairs 
mainly from literature. But I have some experience 
in fighting for socialism, and this experience tells 
me that if Roosevelt makes a real attempt to satisfy 
the interests of the proletarian class at the 
expense of the capitalist class, the latter will put

28 
another president in his place. The capitalists will 
say : Presidents come and presidents go, but we go 
on forever; if this or that president does not protect 
our interests, we shall find another. What can the 
president oppose to the will of the capitalist class? 
Wells : I object to this simplified classification 
of mankind into poor and rich. Of course there is a 
category of people which strive only for profit. But 
are not these people regarded as nuisances in the 
West just as much as here? Are there not plenty 
of people in the West for whom profit is not an 
end, who own a certain amount of wealth, who want 
to invest and obtain a profit from this investment, 
but who do not regard this as the main object? They 
regard investment as an inconvenient necessity. Are 
there not plenty of capable and devoted engineers, 
organisers of economy, whose activities are stimulated 
by something other than profit? In my opinion 
there is a numerous class of capable people who admit 
that the present system is unsatisfactory and who 
are destined to play a great role in future socialist 
society. During the past few years I have been much 
engaged in and have thought of the need for conducting 
propaganda in favour of socialism and cosmopolitanism 
among wide circles of engineers, airmen, militarytechnical 
people, etc. It is useless to approach these 
circles with two-track class war propaganda. These 
people understand the condition of the world. They 
understand that it is a bloody muddle, but they regard 
your simple class-war antagonism as nonsense. 
Stalin : You object to the simplified classification 
of mankind into rich and poor. Of course there is a

29 
middle stratum, there is the technical intelligentsia 
that you have mentioned and among which there are 
very good and very honest people. Among them there 
are also dishonest and wicked people, there are all 
sorts of people among them, But first of all mankind 
is divided into rich and poor, into property owners 
and exploited; and to abstract oneself from this 
fundamental division and from the antagonism between 
poor and rich means abstracting oneself from the 
fundamental fact. I do not deny the existence of 
intermediate middle strata, which either take the 
side of one or the other of these two conflicting 
classes, or else take up a neutral or semi-neutral 
position in this struggle. But, I repeat, to abstract 
oneself from this fundamental division in society and 
from the fundamental struggle between the two main 
classes means ignoring facts. The struggle is going 
on and will continue. The outcome will be determined 
by the proletarian class, the working class, 
Wells : But are there not many people who are 
not poor, but who work and work productively? 
Stalin : Of course, there are small landowners, 
artisans, small traders, but it is not these people 
who decide the fate of a country, but the toiling 
masses, who produce all the things society requires. 
Wells : But there are very different kinds of 
capitalists. There are capitalists who only think about 
profit, about getting rich; but there are also those 
who are prepared to make sacrifices. Take old Morgan 
for example. He only thought about profit; he was 
a parasite on society, simply, he merely accumulated 
wealth. But take Rockefeller. He is a brilliant or

30 
ganiser; he has set an example of how to organise 
the delivery of oil that is worthy of emulation. Or 
take Ford. Of course Ford is selfish. But is he not 
a passionate organiser of rationalised production 
from whom you take lessons? I would like to emphasise 
the fact that recently an important change 
in opinion towards the U.S.S.R. has taken place in 
English speaking countries. The reason for this, first 
of all, is the position of Japan and the events in 
Germany. But there are other reasons besides those 
arising from international politics. There is a more 
profound reason namely, the recognition by many 
people of the fact that the system based on private 
profit is breaking down. Under these circumstances, 
it seems to me, we must not bring to the forefront 
the antagonism between the two worlds, but should 
strive to combine all the constructive movements, 
all the constructive forces in one line as much as 
possible. It seems to me that I am more to the 
Left than you, Mr. Stalin; I think the old system 
is nearer to its end than you think. 
Stalin : In speaking of the capitalists who strive 
only for profit, only to get rich, I do not want to 
say that these are the most worthless people, capable 
of nothing else. Many of them undoubtedly possess 
great organising talent, which I do not dream of 
denying. We Soviet people learn a great deal from 
the capitalists. And Morgan, whom you characterise 
so unfavourably, was undoubtedly a good, capable 
organiser. But if you mean people who are prepared 
to reconstruct the world, of course, you will not 
be able to find them in the ranks of those who

31 
faithfully serve the cause of profit. We and they 
stand at opposite poles. You mentioned Ford. Of 
course, he is a capable organiser of production. But 
don't you know his attitude to the working class? 
Don't you know how many workers he throws on the 
street? The capitalist is riveted to profit; and no 
power on earth can tear him away from it. Capitalism 
will be abolished, not by "organisers" of production 
not by the technical intelligentsia, but by the working 
class, because the aforementioned strata do not play 
an independent role. The engineer, the organiser of 
production does not work as he would like to, but 
as he is ordered, in such a way as to serve the interests 
of his employers. There are exceptions of 
course; there are people in this stratum who have 
awakened from the intoxication of capitalism. The 
technical intelligentsia can, under certain conditions, 
perform miracles and greatly benefit mankind. But 
it can also cause great harm. We Soviet people have 
not a little experience of the technical intelligentsia. 
After the October Revolution, a certain section of 
the technical intelligentsia refused to take part in 
the work of constructing the new society; they opposed 
this work of construction and sabotaged it. 
We did all we possibly could to bring the technical 
intelligentsia into this work of construction; we tried 
this way and that. Not a little time passed before 
our technical intelligentsia agreed actively to assist 
the new system. Today the best section of this technical 
intelligentsia are in the front rank of the 
builders of socialist society. Having this experience 
we are far from underestimating the good and the

32 
bad sides of the technical intelligentsia and we know 
that on the one hand it can do harm, and on the 
other hand, it can perform "miracles." Of course, 
things would be different if it were possible, at one 
stroke, spiritually to tear the technical intelligentsia 
away from the capitalist world. But that is utopia. 
Are there many of the technical intelligentsia who 
would dare break away from the bourgeois world and 
set to work reconstructing society? Do you think 
there are many people of this kind, say, in England 
or in France? No, there are few who would be willing 
to break away from their employers and begin reconstructing 
the world. 
Besides, can we lose sight of the fact that in 
order to transform the world it is necessary to have 
political power? It seems to me, Mr. Wells, that 
you greatly underestimate the question of political 
power, that it entirely drops out of your conception. 
What can those, even with the best intentions in the 
world, do if they are unable to raise the question of 
seizing power, and do not possess power? At best 
they can help the class which takes power, but they 
cannot change the world themselves. This can only 
be done by a great class which will take the place 
of the capitalist class and become the sovereign 
master as the latter was before. This class is the 
working class. Of course, the assistance of the technical 
intelligentsia must be accepted; and the latter 
in turn, must be assisted. But it must not be thought 
that the technical intelligentsia can play an independent 
historical role. The transformation of the 
world is a great, complicated and painful process.

33 
For this task a great class is required. Big ships go 
on long voyages. 
Wells : Yes, but for long voyages a captain and 
navigator are required. 
Stalin : That is true; but what is first required 
for a long voyage is a big ship. What is a navigator 
without a ship? An idle man, 
Wells : The big ship is humanity, not a class. 
Stalin : You, Mr. Wells, evidently start out with 
the assumption that all men are good. I, however, 
do not forget that there are many wicked men. I do 
not believe in the goodness of the bourgeoisie. 
Wells : I remember the situation with regard to 
the technical intelligentsia several decades ago. At 
that time the technical intelligentsia was numerically 
small, but there was much to do and every engineer, 
technician and intellectual found his opportunity. That 
is why the technical intelligentsia was the least revolutionary 
class. Now, however, there is a superabundance 
of technical intellectuals, and their mentality 
has changed very sharply. The skilled man, who 
would formerly never listen to revolutionary talk, is 
now greatly interested in it. Recently I was dining 
with the Royal Society, our great English scientific 
society. The President's speech was a speech for 
social planning and scientific control. Thirty years 
ago, they would not have listened to what I say to 
them now. Today, the man at the head of the Royal 
Society holds revolutionary views and insists on the 
scientific reorganisation of human society. Mentality 
changes. Your class-war propaganda has not kept pace 
with these facts.

34 
Stalin : Yes, I know this, and this is to be explained 
by the fact that capitalist society is now in 
a cul-de sac. The capitalists are seeking, but cannot 
find a way out of this cul-de-sac that would be 
compatible with the dignity of this class, compatible 
with the interests of this class. They could, to some 
extent, crawl out of the crisis on their hands and 
knees, but they cannot find an exit that would enable 
them to walk out of it with head raised high, a way 
out that would not fundamentally disturb the interests 
of capitalism. This, of course, is realised 
by wide circles of the technical intelligentsia. A 
large section of it is beginning to realise the community 
of its interests with those of the class which 
is capable of pointing the way out of the cul-de-sac. 
Wells : You of all people know something about 
revolutions, Mr. Stalin, from the practical side. Do 
the masses ever rise? Is it not an established truth 
that all revolutions are made by a minority? 
Stalin : To bring about a revolution a leading 
revolutionary minority is required; but the most 
talented, devoted and energetic minority would be 
helpless if it did not rely upon the at least passive 
support of millions. 
Wells : At least passive? Perhaps sub-conscious? 
Stalin : Partly also the semi-instinctive and semiconscious, 
but without the support of millions, the 
best minority is impotent. 
Wells : I watch communist propaganda in the West 
and it seems to me that in modern conditions this 
propaganda sounds very old-fashioned, because it is 
insurrectionary propaganda. Propaganda in favour of

35 
the violent overthrow of the social system was all 
very well when it was directed against tyranny. But 
under modern conditions, when the system is collapsing 
anyhow, stress should be laid on efficiency, 
on competence, on productiveness, and not on insurrection. 
It seems to me that the insurrectionary 
note is obsolete. The communist propaganda in the 
West is a nuisance to constructive-minded people 
Stalin : Of course the old system is breaking down 
and decaying. That is true. But it is also true that 
new efforts are being made by other methods, by 
every means, to protect, to save this dying system. 
You draw a wrong conclusion from a correct postulate. 
You rightly state that the old world is breaking down. 
But you are wrong in thinking that it is breaking 
down of its own accord. No, the substitution of one 
social system for another is a complicated and long 
revolutionary process. It is not simply a spontaneous 
process, but a struggle, it is a process connected 
with the clash of classes. Capitalism is decaying, but 
it must not be compared simply with a tree which 
has decayed to such an extent that it must fall to 
the ground of its own accord. No, revolution, the 
substitution of one social system for another, has 
always been a struggle, a painful and a cruel struggle, 
a life and death struggle. And every time the people 
of the new world came into power they had to defend 
themselves against the attempts of the old world to 
restore the old power by force; these people of the 
new world always had to be on the alert, always 
had to be ready to repel the attacks of the old world 
upon the new system.

36 
Yes, you are right when you say that the old 
social system is breaking down; but it is not breaking 
down of its own accord. Take Fascism for example. 
Fascism is a reactionary force which is trying to 
preserve the old system by means of violence. What 
will you do with the fascists? Argue with them? Try 
to convince them? But this will have no effect upon 
them at all. Communists do not in the least idealise 
the methods of violence. But they, the Communists, 
do not want to be taken by surprise, they cannot 
count on the old world voluntarily departing from 
the stage, they see that the old system is violently 
defending itself, and that is why the Communists 
say to the working class : Answer violence with violence; 
do all you can to prevent the old dying order 
from crushing you, do not permit it to put manacles 
on your hands, on the hands with which you will overthrow 
the old system. As you see, the Communists 
regard the substitution of one social system for 
another, not simply as a spontaneous and peaceful 
process, but as a complicated, long and violent process. 
Communists cannot ignore facts. 
Wells : But look at what is now going on in the 
capitalist world. The collapse is not a simple one; it 
is the outbreak of reactionary violence which is degenerating 
to gangsterism. And it seems to me that 
when it comes to a conflict with reactionary and 
unintelligent violence, socialists can appeal to the 
law, and instead of regarding the police as the enemy 
they should support them in the fight against the 
reactionaries. I think that it is useless operating 
with the methods of the old insurrectionary socialism.

37 
Stalin : The Communists base themselves on rich 
historical experience which teaches that obsolete 
classes do not voluntarily abandon the stage of history. 
Recall the history of England in the seventeenth 
century. Did not many say that the old social system 
had decayed? But did it not, nevertheless, require 
a Cromwell to crush it by force? 
Wells : Cromwell acted on the basis of the constitution 
and in the name of constitutional order. 
Stalin : In the name of the constitution he resorted 
to violence, beheaded the king, dispersed Parliament, 
arrested some and beheaded others! 
Or take an example from our history. Was it not 
clear for a long time that the tsarist system was 
decaying, was breaking down? But how much blood 
had to be shed in order to overthrow it? 
And what about the October Revolution? Were there 
not plenty of people who knew that we alone, the 
Bolsheviks, were indicating the only correct way out? 
Was it not clear that Russian capitalism had decayed? 
But you know how great was the resistance, how much 
blood had to be shed in order to defend the October 
Revolution from all its enemies, internal and external. 
Or take France at the end of the eighteenth century. 
Long before 1789 it was clear to many how 
rotten the royal power, the feudal system was. But 
a popular insurrection, a clash of classes was not, 
could not be avoided. Why? Because the classes which 
must abandon the stage of history are the last to 
become convinced that their role is ended. It is impossible 
to convince them of this. They think that 
the fissures in the decaying edifice of the old order

38 
can be repaired and saved. That is why dying classes 
take to arms and resort to every means to save 
their existence as a ruling class. 
Wells : But there were not a few lawyers at the 
head of the Great French Revolution. 
Stalin : Do you deny the role of the intelligentsia 
in revolutionary movements? Was the Great French 
Revolution a lawyers' revolution and not a popular 
revolution, which achieved victory by rousing vast 
masses of the people against feudalism and championed 
the interests of the Third Estate? And did 
the lawyers among the leaders of the Great French 
Revolution act in accordance with the laws of the 
old order? Did they not introduce new, bourgeoisrevolutionary 
laws? 
The rich experience of history teaches that up 
to now not a singIe class has voluntarily made way 
for another class. There is no such precedent in 
world history. The Communists have learned this 
lesson of history. Communists would welcome the 
voluntary departure of the bourgeoisie. But such a 
turn of affairs is improbable; that is what experience 
teaches. That is why the Communists want to be 
prepared for the worst and call upon the working 
class to be vigilant, to be prepared for battle. Who 
wants a captain who lulls the vigilance of his army, 
a captain who does not understand that the enemy 
will not surrender, that he must be crushed? To be 
such a captain means deceiving, betraying the working 
class. That is why I think that what seems to 
you to be old-fashioned is in fact a measure of revolutionary 
expediency for the working class.

39 
Wells : I do not deny that force has to be used, 
but I think the forms of the struggle should fit as 
closely as possible to the opportunities presented by 
the existing laws, which must be defended against 
reactionary attacks. There is no need to disorganise 
the old system because it is disorganising itself enough 
as it is. That is why it seems to me insurrection 
against the old order, against the law, is obsolete; 
old-fashioned. Incidentally, I deliberately exaggerate 
in order to bring the truth out more clearly. I can 
formulate my point of view in the following way : 
first, I am for order; second, I attack the present 
system in so far as it cannot assure order; third, I 
think that class war propaganda may detach from 
socialism just those educated people whom socialism 
needs. 
Stalin : In order to achieve a great object, an 
important social object, there must be a main force, 
a bulwark, a revolutionary class. Next it is necessary 
to organise the assistance of an auxiliary force for 
this main force; in this case this auxiliary force is 
the Party, to which the best forces of the intelligentsia 
belong. Just now you spoke about "educated 
people." But what educated people did you have in 
mind? Were there not plenty of educated people on 
the side of the old order in England in the seventeenth 
century, in France at the end of the eighteenth 
century, and in Russia in the epoch of the 
October Revolution? The old order had in its service 
many highly educated people who defended the old 
order, who opposed the new order. Education is a 
weapon the effect of which is determined by the

40 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
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hands which wield it, by who is to be struck down. 
Of course, the proletariat, socialism, needs highly 
educated people. Clearly, simpletons cannot help the 
proletariat to fight for socialism, to build a new 
society. I do not underestimate the role of the intelligentsia; 
on the contrary, I emphasize it. The question 
is, however, which intelligentsia are we discussing? 
Because there are different kinds of intelligentsia. 
Wells : There can be no revolution without a radical 
change in the educational system. It is sufficient 
to quote two examples: The example of the German 
Republic, which did not touch the old educational 
system, and therefore never became a republic; and 
the example of the British Labour Party, which lacks 
the determination to insist on a radical change in 
the educational system. 
Stalin : That is a correct observation. 
Permit me now to reply to your three points. 
First, the main thing for the revolution is the 
existence of a social bulwark. This bulwark of the 
revolution is the working class. 
Second, an auxiliary force is required, that which 
the Communists call a Party. To the Party belong 
the intelligent workers and those elements of the 
technical intelligentsia which are closely connected 
with the working class. The intelligentsia can be 
strong only if it combines with the working class. 
If it opposes the working class it becomes a cipher. 
Third, political power is required as a lever for 
change. The new political power creates the new laws, 
the new order, which is revolutionary order. 
I do not stand for any kind of order. I stand for

41 
order that corresponds to the interests of the working 
class. If, however, any of the laws of the old 
order can be utilised in the interests of the struggle 
for the new order, the old laws should be utilised. 
I cannot object to your postulate that the present 
system should be attacked in so far as it does not 
ensure the necessary order for the people. 
And, finally, you are wrong if you think that the 
Communists are enamoured of violence. They would 
be very pleased to drop violent methods if the ruling 
class agreed to give way to the working class. But 
the experience of history speaks against such an 
assumption. 
Wells : There was a case in the history of England, 
however, of a class voluntarily handing over 
power to another class. In the period between 1830 
and 1870, the aristocracy, whose influence was still 
very considerable at the end of the eighteenth century, 
voluntarily, without a severe struggle, surrendered 
power to the bourgeoisie, which serves as 
a sentimental support of the monarchy. Subsequently, 
this transference of power led to the establishment 
of the rule of the financial oligarchy. 
Stalin : But you have imperceptibly passed from 
questions of revolution to questions of reform. This 
is not the same thing. Don't you think that the 
Chartist movement played a great role in the Reforms 
in England in the nineteenth century? 
Wells : The Chartists did little and disappeared 
without leaving a trace. 
Stalin : I do not agree with you. The Chartists, 
and the strike movement which they organised, played

42 
a great role; they compelled the ruling class to make 
a number of concessions in regard to the franchise, 
in regard to abolishing the so-called "rotten boroughs," 
and in regard to some of the points of the "Charter." 
Chartism played a not unimportant historical role 
and compelled a section of the ruling classes to make 
certain concessions, reforms, in order to avert great 
shocks. Generally speaking, it must be said that of 
all the ruling classes, the ruling classes of England, 
both the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie, proved to 
be the cleverest, most flexible from the point of 
view of their class interests, from the point of view 
of maintaining their power. Take as an example, say, 
from modern history, the general strike in England 
in 1926. The first thing any other bourgeoisie would 
have done in the face of such an event, when the 
General Council of Trade Unions called for a strike, 
would have been to arrest the trade union leaders. 
The British bourgeoisie did not do that, and it acted 
cleverly from the point of view of its own interests. 
I cannot conceive of such a flexible strategy being 
employed by the bourgeoisie in the United States, 
Germany or France. In order to maintain their rule, 
the ruling classes of Great Britain have never foresworn 
small concessions, reforms. But it would be 
a mistake to think that these reforms were revolutionary. 
Wells : You have a higher opinion of the ruling 
classes of my country than I have. But is there a 
great difference between a small revolution and a 
great reform? Is not a reform a small revolution? 
Stalin : Owing to pressure from below, the pres

43 
sure of the masses, the bourgeoisie may sometimes 
concede certain partial reforms while remaining on 
the basis of the existing social-economic system. 
Acting in this way, it calculates that these concessions 
are necessary in order to preserve its class 
rule. This is the essence of reform. Revolution, 
however, means the transference of power from one 
class to another. That is why it is impossible to 
describe any reform as revolution. That is why we 
cannot count on the change of social systems taking 
place as an imperceptible transition from one system 
to another by means of reforms, by the ruling class 
making concessions. 
Wells : I am very grateful to you for this talk 
which has meant a great deal to me. In explaining 
things to me you probably called to mind how you 
had to explain the fundamentals of socialism in the 
illegal circles before the revolution. At the present 
time there are only two persons to whose opinion, 
to whose every word, millions are listening : you, 
and Roosevelt. Others may preach as much as they 
like; what they say will never be printed or heeded. 
I cannot yet appreciate what has been done in your 
country; I only arrived yesterday. But I have already 
seen the happy faces of healthy men and women and 
I know that something very considerable is being done 
here. The contrast with 1920 is astounding. 
Stalin : Much more could have been done had we 
Bolsheviks been cleverer. 
Wells : No, if human beings were cleverer. It 
would be a good thing to invent a five-year plan for 
the reconstruction of the human brain which obviously

44 
lacks many things needed for a perfect social order. 
(Laughter.) 
Stalin : Don't you intend to stay for the Congress 
of the Soviet Writers' Union? 
Wells : Unfortunately, I have various engagements 
to fulfil and I can stay in the USSR only for a week. 
I came to see you and I am very satisfied by our 
talk. But I intend to discuss with such Soviet writers 
as I can meet the possibility of their affiliating to 
the PEN club. This is an international organisation 
of writers founded by Galsworthy; after his death 
I became president. The organisation is still weak, 
but it has branches in many countries, and what is 
more important, the speeches of the members are 
widely reported in the press. It insists upon this 
free expression of opinion - even of opposition opinion. 
I hope to discuss this point with Gorky. I do not know 
if you are prepared yet for that much freedom here. 
Stalin : We Bolsheviks call it "self-criticism." It 
is widely used in the USSR. If there is anything I can 
do to help you I shall be glad to do so. 
Wells : (Expresses thanks.) 
Stalin : (Expresses thanks for the visit.)

45 
TALK WITH THE METAL PRODUCERS 
26 December 1934 
(In connection with the successful fulfilment by 
the iron and steel industry of the plan of production 
for 1934, a delegation of directors, engineers and 
workers of metallurgical plants was received on 
December 26, 1934, by Comrades Stalin, Molotov and 
Orjonikidze. 
In the course of the interview Stalin spoke of the 
tasks facing the iron and steel industry and of certain 
important problems of socialist development. 
Stalin said :-) 
...We had all too few technically trained people. 
We were faced with a dilemma : either to begin with 
giving people technical training in schools and to postpone 
the production and mass operation of machines 
for ten years until such time as our schools trained 
technically educated cadres; or to proceed immediately 
to create machines and to develop their mass operation 
in the national economy in order to train people in 
technical knowledge and to create cadres during the 
very process of production and operation of machines. 
We chose the second course. We frankly and deliberately 
consented to incur what in this case would be 
inevitable charges and over-expenditures owing to the 
inadequate number of technically trained people capable 
of handling machines. True, not a few of our 
machines were damaged during this period. But, on

46 
the other hand, we gained what was most precioustime, 
and created what is most valuable in production-
cadres. In a period of three or four years we 
created cadres of people technically educated both in 
the sphere of production of machines of all kinds 
(tractors, automobiles, tanks, airplanes, etc.) and 
in the sphere of their mass operation. What it took 
decades to perform in Europe, we were able in the 
rough and in the main to perform in a period of three 
to four years. The charges and over-expenditures, 
the damage to machines and the other losses have 
been repaid and more than repaid. That is the basis 
of the rapid industrialisation of our country. But we 
should not have had these successes if our iron and 
steel industry had not been developing, had not been 
thriving. 
We have every right to speak of the great successes 
of the iron and steel industry, which is the 
chief force in the national economy. We have succeeded 
it is true. But we must not grow conceited over these 
successes. The most dangerous thing is when people 
are complacently satisfied with their successes and 
forget the shortcomings, forget that further tasks 
face them... 
(Stalin enumerated certain of the shortcomings in 
the iron and steel industry, indicating how they should 
be removed.) 
In all developed countries, the production of steel 
exceeds the production of pig iron. There are countries 
where the production of steel exceeds the production 
of pig iron by 25 or 30 per cent. With us it is just 
the opposite - the production of steel lags behind the

47 
production of pig iron. How long will this continue? 
Why, it cannot now be said that we are a "wood" 
country, that there is no scrap iron in the country, 
and so on. We are now a metal country. Is it not time 
to put an end to this disproportion between pig iron 
and steel? 
(The next problem to which Stalin drew the attention 
of the metal producers was that the open 
hearth departments and the rolled steel departments 
of the iron and steel mills were lagging in the matter 
of mastering the technique of these processes. Stalin 
said :-) 
...Many have wrongly understood the slogan of the 
Party: "In the period of reconstruction technique 
decides everything." Many have understood this slogan 
mechanically, that is to say, they have understood 
it in the sense that if we pile up as many machines 
as possible, everything that this slogan requires will 
have been done. That is not true. Technique cannot 
be separated from the people who set the technique 
going. Without people, technique is dead. The slogan 
"In the period of reconstruction technique decides 
everything," refers not to naked technique but to 
technique in the charge of people who have mastered 
the technique. That is the only correct understanding 
of this slogan. And since we have already learnt to 
value technique, it is time to declare plainly that 
the chief thing now is the people who have mastered 
technique. But it follows from this that while formerly 
the emphasis was one-sidedly laid on technique, 
machinery, now the emphasis must be laid on the 
people who have mastered technique. This is what

48 
our slogan on technique demands. We must cherish 
every capable and intelligent worker, we must cherish 
and cultivate him. People must be cultivated as tenderly 
and carefully as a gardener cultivates a favourite 
fruit tree. We must train, help to grow, offer 
prospects, promote at the proper time, transfer to 
to other work at the proper time when a man is not 
equal to his job, and not wait until he has finally 
come to grief. What we need in order to create a 
numerous army of production and technical cadres 
is to carefully cultivate and train people, to place 
them and organize them properly in production, to 
organize wages in such a way as to strengthen the 
decisive links in production and to induce people to 
improve their vocational skill... 
Not everything with you is as it should be. At 
the blast furnaces you have been more or less able 
to cultivate and organize technically experienced 
people, but in other branches of metallurgy you have 
not yet been able to do so. And that is why steel 
and rolled steel are lagging behind pig iron. The task 
is to put an end to this discrepancy at last. Bear 
in mind that in addition to pig iron we need more 
steel and rolled steel... 
(Stalin's speech was followed by a lively exchange 
of views which lasted uninterruptedly for about seven 
hours. Responsible workers in the iron and steel industries, 
mill directors, technical directors, department 
foremen, Party workers and shock workers 
took part in the conversation and dwelt in detail on 
the prospects confronting the iron and steel industry 
in 1935, the methods by which the problems referred

49 
to by Stalin could be solved, and the spirit of creative 
enthusiasm which reigned in the mills.) 
Izvestiya 
29 December 1934

50

51 
DECISIONS ON THE MANUALS OF HISTORY 
According a greater significance to the institution 
of the teaching of civil history in the schools of the 
U.S.S.R., the Council of People's Commissars of the 
U.S.S.R. and Central Committee of the Communist 
Party, from the 16th May, 1934, made and published 
the following resolution - "On the teaching of civil 
history in the schools of the U.S.S.R." In this decision 
the Council of People's Commissars and the 
Party Central Committee stated that the teaching 
of history in the schools of the U.S.S.R. was not satisfactory. 
The Council of People's Commissars and the 
Party Central Committee established that the principal 
fault of the Manuals of History and of the teaching 
of history was their abstract schematic characteristic 
: "Instead of teaching history in a living 
and vital form with an expose of principal events, 
of achievements in chronological order and with the 
defining of the role of the leaders, we present to 
the pupils some abstract definitions of social or economic 
systems, thus replacing the vitality of civil 
history with abstract sociological schema". (Extract 
from the decision of the Council of People's Commissars 
and the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party of the 16th May, 1934). 
The Council of People's Commissars and the Central

52 
Committee indicated that "the pupils cannot profit 
from history lessons which do not observe the chronological 
order of historical events, leading figures and 
important dates. Only a course of history of this type 
can render accessible, intelligible and concrete the 
historical material which is indispensible for an 
analysis and a synthesis of historical events and capable 
of guiding the pupil towards a Marxist understanding 
of history". 
Consequently, it was decided to prepare for June 
1935, the following manuals of history : 
a) The history of ancient times. 
b) The history of the Middle Ages. 
c) Modern history. 
d) History of the U.S.S.R. 
e) History of modern dependent and colonial countries. 
The Council of People's Commissars and the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party decided to 
organize five groups charged with the responsibility 
of compiling the new manuals, and they confirmed 
the composition of these groups. 
On the 9th June, 1934, the Central Committee 
and the Council of People's Commissars resolved to 
introduce into primary schools, and into the 1st grade 
of the Secondary schools an elementary course of the 
history of the U.S.S.R., and they organized some 
groups charged with the composition of these elementary 
manuals of the history of the U.S.S.R. 
On the 14th August, the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party and the Council of People's 
Commissars approved the remarks made by Comrades

53 
Stalin, Kirov and Idanov, with respect to the summaries 
of the new manuals of "History of the U.S.S.R." and 
of "Modern History." 
In these remarks, all the summaries were submitted 
to a detailed examination and to a severe 
criticism. And it was established that the one which 
left the most to be desired was the summary of the 
manual of the "History of the U.S.S.R.", which abounded 
in anti-scientific and crude conceptions from the 
Marxist point of view and manifested an extreme 
negligence particularly inadmissible for the constitution 
of a manual where "each word, each conception, 
must be weighted." Although fewer, the faults 
of the summary of the manual of "Modern History" 
were equally important. 
The remarks of Comrades Stalin, Kirov and Idanov 
indicated exhaustively in which ways it would be necessary 
to transform these summaries and the complete 
manuals. However the Council of People's Commissars 
of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party are obliged to establish that the 
manuals of history that have just been presented to 
them, leave on the whole, a lot to be desired, and 
that they continue to show the same faults that have 
been indicated above. The books which leave the most 
to be desired are the manual of the "History of the 
U.S.S.R." presented by Professor Vanag's group as 
well as the manuals of the elementary course of the 
"History of the U.S.S.R." for use in primary schools, 
presented by the groups of Mintz and of Lozinsky. 
The fact that the authors of these manuals continue 
to defend the conceptions and historical principles

54 
already denounced more than once by the Party, and 
of which, the deficiency is clear, conceptions and 
principles which are based on errors well-known by 
Pokrovsky, cannot be interpreted by the Council of 
People's Commissars as anything other than testimony 
to the fact that one sector of our historians, 
especially the historians of the U.S.S.R., persist in 
conceptions from anti-Marxist and anti-Leninist historical 
science, which are fundamentally anti-scientific, 
and even the negation of history. The Council of 
People's Commissars and the Central Committee of 
the Communist Party emphasize that these harmful 
tendencies and these endeavours to liquidate history 
as a science expounded by the chief ring leader, are 
bound up with the presence amongst certain of our 
historians erroneous historical conceptions, appropriately 
called "the historical school of Pokrovsky." 
The Council of People's Commissars and the Central 
Committee of the Communist Party prescribe that 
the triumph over these harmful theories constitutes 
the indispensible necessity as much for the composition 
of historical manuals as for the development 
of Marxist-Leninist historical science, and for the 
historical instruction in the U.S.S.R. which is of 
capital importance for the cause of our State, for 
our Party, for the instruction of the young generations. 
Consequently, the Council of People's Commissars 
and the Central Committee of the Communist Party 
have decided to create, in order to examine and to 
radically improve and, in the case of necessity, to 
alter and correct the historical manuals already 
written, a commission from the Council of People's

55 
Commissars and the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party composed of Comrades Idanov (President), 
Radek, Svadindze, Gorin, Lukin, Jakoblev, 
Bystrjansky, Zatonsky, Faizulla, Khodjav, Bauman, 
Budnov, Bucharin. This commission has the right to 
organize groups for the examination of each manual 
and to open a concourse for the composition of the 
manuals which the Commission will decide need to 
be re-written. 
The Council of People's Commissars and the Central 
Committee decide unanimously to publish in the 
press the remarks of Comrades Stalin, Kirov and 
Idanov as well as other documents concerning this 
question. 
President of the Council of People's Commissars 
of the U.S.S.R. 
V. M. MOLOTOV 
The secretary of the Central Committee of the 
Communist Party. 
J. STALIN 
Pravda 
27 January 1936

56

57 
REMARKS ON A SUMMARY OF THE MANUAL OF 
THE HISTORY OF THE U.S.S.R. 
8 August 1934 
The group presided over by Vanag has not accomplished 
its task and has not even understood it. 
It has made a summary of "Russian History" and 
not of the history of the U.S.S.R., that is to say, 
a history of Russia, but without a history of the 
peoples who came into the bosom of the U.S.S.R. 
(Nothing is given on the history of the Ukraine, of 
Byelorussia, of Finland and of other Baltic countries, 
of people of North Caucasia and Transcaucasia, of 
people from Central Asia and the Far East, of people 
from the Volga and people from the North : Tartars, 
Bakhirs, Mordves, Tchovaks, etc). 
In the summary, the role of the colonizer for 
Russian Tsarism and its supporters, the Russian 
bourgeoisie and the landowners is not emphasized. 
(Tsarism, imprisonment of the people). 
In the summary the counter-revolutionary role 
of Russian Tsarism in foreign politics since Catherine 
II up until about 1850 and onwards is not emphasized. 
(Tsarism as international police). 
In the summary, the concepts of reaction and of 
counter-revolution, of bourgeois revolution, of bourgeois 
democratic revolution, and of revolution in 
general, are confused. 
In the summary the foundation and the origins

58 
of the national liberation movement of the peoples 
of Russia, downtrodden by Tsarism, does not figure 
and thus, the October Revolution, in as much as it 
was the revolution which liberated these people from 
the national yoke is not dealt with anymore than is 
the formation of the U.S.S.R. 
The summary abounds in banalities and cliches 
such as "the police terrorism of Nicholas I", "the 
insurrection of Razine", "the insurrection of Pugatchev", 
"the offensive of the counter-revolution of 
landowners in the 1870s", "the first steps of Tsarism 
and of the bourgeoisie in the fight against the 
revolution of 1905 - 1907", etc. The authors of the 
summary copy blindly the banalities and unscientific 
definitions of bourgeois historians, forgetting that 
they have to teach our youth the scientifically founded 
Marxist conceptions. 
The summary does not reflect the influence of 
the bourgeoisie and the Social-Revolutionaries from 
Eastern Europe on the formation of the bourgeois 
revolutionary movement and the proletarian socialist 
movement in Russia. The authors of the summary 
appear to have forgotten that the Russian revolutionaries 
are recognized to be the continuators and pupils 
of Marxist thought. 
In the summary, the ravages of the first imperialist 
war and the role of Tsarism in this war are 
not shown up, in as much as the dependence of Russian 
Tsarism on Russian capitalism and the dependence of 
Russian capitalism on Western Europe, is not brought 
out. Also the importance of the October Revolution 
which liberated Russia from her semi-colonial situation

59 
remains undefined. 
The summary does not acknowledge the existence 
of a European political crisis on the brink of a world 
war, which will be brought about by the decadence of 
bourgeois democracy and parliamentarianism. Also the 
importance of the Soviets from the viewpoint of universal 
history, as the representatives of the proletarian 
democracy, organs of the liberation of workers and 
peasants from capitalism remains undefined. 
The summary does not acknowledge the inner party 
struggle of the Communist Party of Russia, nor the 
struggle against Trotskyism and petty-bourgeois 
counter-revolution. 
And thus to continue. We judge a radical revision 
of this summary to be indispensible in the light of 
the propositions stated above, and it is necessary 
also to realise that this necessitates a manual where 
each word and each concept must be weighed and not 
just an unclear review which substantiates not more 
than idle and irresponsible chatter. 
We must have a manual of the history of the 
U.S.S.R. where primarily the history of our great 
Russia will not be detached from the other peoples 
of the U.S.S.R. and where secondly, the history of 
the peoples of the U.S.S.R. will not be detached from 
European history and world history in general. 
STALIN - IDANOV - KIROV 
Bolshevik No. 3 
1936

60

61 
REMARKS ON THE SUMMARY OF THE MANUAL OF 
MODERN HISTORY 
9 August 1934 
As modern history is the most rich in achievements 
and as it is this which is the most important thing 
in the modern history of bourgeois countries, if one 
considers the period preceding the October Revolution 
in Russia, it is the victory of the French Revolution 
and the affirmation of capitalism in Europe and 
America which should be emphasized and so we believe 
that it would be more valuable to have a manual of 
modern history beginning with a chapter on the French 
Revolution. 
The biggest failure of the summary seems to be 
that it does not emphasize clearly enough the great 
difference between the French Revolution (bourgeois 
revolution) and the October Revolution in Russia 
(socialist revolution). The central theme of a manual 
of modern history must be precisely the theme of 
the opposition between the bourgeois revolution and 
the socialist revolution. To show that the bourgeois 
revolution in France (as in all other countries) in 
liberating the people from the chains of feudalism 
and absolutism, imposes on them instead, the chains 
of capitalism and bourgeois democracy, whilst socialist 
revolution in Russia broke all chains and liberated the 
people from all forms of exploitation and that is 
what must be the thread running through a manual 
of modern history.

62 
One cannot claim that the French Revolution was 
complete. It is still necessary to recognize it as a 
bourgeois revolution and treat it as such. 
In the same way, one cannot give to our socialist 
revolution in Russia, only the name October Revolution. 
It is necessary to qualify it with the term 
socialist revolution, and to treat it as such. 
STALIN - IDANOV - KIROV 
Bolshevik No. 3 
1936

63 
THE DEATH OF KIROV 
1 December 1934 
A great sorrow has befallen our Party. On December 
1st, Comrade Kirov fell victim to the hand of an 
assassin, a scallawag sent by the class enemies. 
The death of Kirov is an irreparable loss, not only 
for us, his close friends and comrades, but also for 
all those who have known him in his revolutionary 
work, and have known him as a fighter, comrade and 
friend. A man who has given all his brilliant life to 
the cause of the working class, to the cause of 
Communism, to the cause of the liberation of humanity, 
is dead, victim of the enemy. 
Comrade Kirov was an example of Bolshevism, 
recognizing neither fear nor difficulties in the realizing 
of the great aim, fixed by the Party. His integrity, 
his will of iron, his astonishing qualities as 
an orator, inspired by the Revolution, were combined 
in him with such cordiality and such tenderness in his 
relations with his comrades and personal friends, with 
such warmth and modesty, all of which are traits of 
the true Leninist. 
Comrade Kirov has worked in different parts of 
the U.S.S.R. in the period of illegality and after the 
October Revolution - at Tomsk and Astrakhan, at 
Vladicaucase and Baku - and everywhere he upheld the 
high standard of the Party; he has won for the Party

64 
millions of workers, due to his revolutionary work, 
indefatigable, energetic and fruitful. 
During the last nine years, Comrade Kirov directed 
the organization of our Party in Lenin's town, and 
the region of Leningrad. There is no possibility, by 
means of a short and sad letter, to give an appreciation 
of his activities among the workers of Leningrad. It 
would have been difficult to find in our Party, a director 
who could be more successfully in harmony with 
the working class of Leningrad, who could so ably 
unite all the members of the Party and all the working 
class around the Party. He has created in the whole 
organization of Leningrad, this same atmosphere of 
organization, of discipline, of love and of Bolshevik 
devotion to the Revolution, which characterised Comrade 
Kirov himself. 
You were near us all Comrade Kirov, as a trusted 
friend, as a loved comrade, as a faithful companion 
in arms. We will remember you, dear friend, till the 
end of our life and of our struggle and we feel bitterness 
at our loss. You were always with us in the 
difficult years of the struggle for the victory of 
Socialism in our country, you were always with us 
in the years of uncertainty and internal difficulties 
in our Party, you have lived with us all the difficulties 
of these last years, and we have lost you at the 
moment when our country has achieved great victories. 
In all these struggles, in all our achievements, there 
is very much evidence of you, of your energy, your 
strength and your ardent love for the Communist 
cause. 
Farewell, Sergei, our dear friend and comrade.

65 
J. Stalin, S. Ordjonikidze, V. Molotov, M. Kalinin, 
K. Voroshilov, L. Kaganovich, A. Mikoyan, A. Andreyev, 
V. Tchoubar, A. Idanov, V. Kuibyshev, Ia. Roudzoutak, 
S. Kossior, P. Postychev, G. Petrovsky, A. Ienoukidze, 
M. Chkiriatov, Em. Iaroslavski, N. Ejov. 
Pravda 
2 December 1934

66

67 
LETTER TO COMRADE CHOUMIATSKY 
Greetings and best wishes to the workers of the 
Soviet cinema on its glorious fifteenth anniversary. 
The cinema, in the hands of Soviet power constitutes 
an inestimable force. 
Possessing exceptional possibilities of cultural influence 
on the masses, the cinema helps the working 
class and its party to educate the workers in the 
spirit of socialism, to organize the masses in the 
struggle for socialism, to heighten their sense of 
culture and political awareness. 
The Soviet power awaits more successes from you; 
new films glorifying, as did Tchapvaiev, the grandeur 
of historical achievements in the struggle of the 
workers and peasants for power in the Soviet Union, 
mobilizing them in order to accomplish new tasks and 
reviewing not only the successes but also pointing 
out the difficulties in socialist construction. 
The Soviet power awaits from you a courageous 
investigation by your teachers in the new fields of 
art, into this most important sphere of art (Lenin) 
which above all reflects the character of the masses. 
J. STALIN 
Pravda 
11 January 1935

68

69 
ADDRESS GIVEN AT THE RECEPTION OF THE 
1st MAY PARADE 
1 May 1935 
At the end of the reception, addressing the assembly, 
Comrade Stalin saluted the entire gathering 
of fighters and commanders of all the Red Army of 
workers and peasants. He speaks of them as being 
"Bolsheviks of the Party, and non-Party Bolsheviks" 
because one can be a Bolshevik without being a member 
of the Party. Millions and millions of non-Party 
members, strong, capable and talented, serve the 
working class with faith and truth. Many amongst 
them have not joined the Party because they are too 
young; others because they do not yet feel ready, 
because they have such a high estimation of the name 
"Party Member." 
Comrade Stalin toasts the health of the fearless 
submarine men, of the competent artillery men, of 
the strong tank drivers, the valiant pilots and bombardiers, 
of modest and hardy cavaliers, of the 
courageous infantrymen, consolidating the victory 
which serves the cause of the working people. 
"Our government and Party", said Stalin, "have 
no other interests, no other worries than those of 
the people." 
"To the health of the strong, capable, talented 
and courageous Bolsheviks, Party and non-Party," 
proclaimed Comrade Stalin, and his words were taken

70 
up by an endless ovation from the soldiers and commanders 
of the Red Army and participants in the 
1st of May parade. 
Pravda 
4 May 1935

71 
ADDRESS TO THE GRADUATES FROM 
THE RED ARMY ACADEMIES 
(Delivered in the Kremlin, May 4, 1935) 
Comrades, it cannot be denied that in the last 
few years we have achieved great successes both in 
the sphere of construction and in the sphere of administration. 
In this connection there is too much 
talk about the services rendered by chiefs, by leaders. 
They are credited with all, or nearly all, of our 
achievements. That, of course, is wrong, it is incorrect. 
It is not merely a matter of leaders. But 
it is not of this I wanted to speak today. I should 
like to say a few words about cadres, about our 
cadres in general and about the cadres of our Red 
Army in particular. 
You know that we inherited from the past a technically 
backward, impoverished and ruined country. 
Ruined by four years of imperialist war, and ruined 
again by three years of civil war, a country with a 
semi-literate population, with a low technical level, 
with isolated industrial oases lost in a sea of dwarf 
peasant farms - such was the country we inherited 
from the past. The task was to transfer this country 
from mediaeval darkness to modern industry and 
mechanized agriculture. A serious and difficult task, 
as you see. The question that confronted us was : 
Either we solve this problem in the shortest possible 
time and consolidate Socialism in our country, or 
we do not solve it, in which case our country - weak

72 
technically and unenlightened in the cultural sense - 
will lose its independence and become a stake in the 
game of the imperialist powers. 
At that time our country was passing through a 
period of an appalling dearth of technique. There 
were not enough machines for industry. There were 
no machines for agriculture. There were no machines 
for transport. There was not that elementary technical 
base without which the reorganization of a 
country on industrial lines is inconceivable. There 
were only isolated prerequisites for the creation of 
such a base. A first-class industry had to be built 
up. This industry had to be so directed as to be 
capable of technically reorganizing not only industry, 
but also agriculture and our railway transport. And 
to achieve this it was necessary to make sacrifices 
and to exercise the most rigorous economy in everything; 
it was necessary to economize on food, on 
schools, on textiles, in order to accumulate the funds 
required for building industry. There was no other 
way of overcoming the dearth of technique. That is 
what Lenin taught us, and in this matter we followed 
in the footsteps of Lenin. 
Naturally, uniform and rapid success could not 
be expected in so great and difficult a task. In a 
task like this, successes only become apparent after 
several years. We therefore had to arm ourselves 
with strong nerves, Bolshevik grit, and stubborn 
patience to overcome our first failures and to march 
unswervingly towards the great goal, permitting no 
wavering or uncertainty in our ranks. 
You know that that is precisely how we set about

73 
this task. But not all our comrades had the necessary 
spirit, patience and grit. There turned out to be 
people among our comrades who at the first difficulties 
began to call for a retreat. "Let bygones be bygones," 
it is said. That, of course, is true. But 
man is endowed with memory, and in summing up 
the results of our work, one involuntarily recalls the 
past. (Animation.) Well, then, there were comrades 
among us who were frightened by the difficulties and 
began to call on the Party to retreat. They said: 
"What is the good of your industrialisation and collectivisation, 
your machines, your iron and steel industry, 
tractors, harvester combines, automobiles? 
You should rather have given us more textiles, bought 
more raw materials for the production of consumers' 
goods, and given the population more of the small 
things that make life pleasant. The creation of an 
industry, and a first-class industry at that, when 
we are so backward, is a dangerous dream." 
Of course, we could have used the 3,000,000,000 
rubles in foreign currency obtained as a result of a 
most rigorous economy, and spent on building up our 
industry, for importing raw materials, and for increasing 
the output of articles of general consumption. 
That is also a "plan," in a way. But with such a 
"plan" we would not now have a metallurgical industry, 
or a machine-building industry, or tractors and 
automobiles, or aeroplanes and tanks. We would have 
found ourselves unarmed in the face of foreign foes. 
We would have undermined the foundations of Socialism 
in our country. We would have fallen captive to 
the bourgeoisie, home and foreign.

74 
It is obvious that a choice had to be made between 
two plans : between the plan of retreat, which would 
have led, and was bound to lead, to the defeat of 
Socialism, and the plan of advance, which led, as 
you know, and has already brought us to the victory 
of Socialism in our country. 
We chose the plan of advance, and moved forward 
along the Leninist road, brushing aside those comrades 
as people who could see more or less what was 
under their noses, but who closed their eyes to the 
immediate future of our country, to the future of 
Socialism in our country. 
But these comrades did not always confine themselves 
to criticism and passive resistance. They 
threatened to raise a revolt in the Party against 
the Central Committee. More, they threatened some 
of us with bullets. Evidently, they reckoned on frightening 
us and compelling us to turn from the Leninist 
road. These people, apparently, forgot that we Bolsheviks 
are people of a special cut. They forgot that 
neither difficulties nor threats can frighten Bolsheviks. 
They forgot that we had been trained and steeled 
by the great Lenin, our leader, our teacher, our 
father, who knew and recognised no fear in the fight. 
They forgot that the more the enemies rage and the 
more hysterical the foes within the Party become, 
the more ardent the Bolsheviks become for fresh 
struggles and the more vigorously they push forward. 
Of course, it never even occurred to us to turn 
from the Leninist road. Moreover, once we stood 
firmly on this road, we pushed forward still more 
vigorously, brushing every obstacle from our path.

75 
True, in pursuing this course we were obliged to 
handle some of these comrades roughly. But that 
cannot be helped. I must confess that I too had a 
hand in this. (Loud cheers and applause.) 
Yes, comrades, we proceeded confidently and vigorously 
along the road of industrialising and collectivising 
our country. And now we may consider that 
the road has been traversed. 
Everybody now admits that we have achieved tremendous 
successes along this road. Everybody now admits 
that we already have a powerful, first-class 
industry, a powerful mechanised agriculture, a growing 
and improving transport system, an organised 
and excellently equipped Red Army. 
This means that we have in the main emerged 
from the period of dearth in technique. 
But, having emerged from the period of dearth 
of technique, we have entered a new period, a period, 
I would say, of a dearth of people, of cadres, of 
workers capable of harnessing technique, and advancing 
it. The point is that we have factories, mills, 
collective farms, state farms, a transport system, 
an army; we have technique for all this; but we lack 
people with sufficient experience to squeeze out of 
this technique all that can be squeezed out of it. 
Formerly, we used to say that "technique decides 
everything." This slogan helped us to put an end to 
the dearth of technique and to create a vast technical 
base in every branch of activity, for the equipment 
of our people with first-class technique. That 
is very good. But it is not enough by far. In order 
to set technique going and to utilise it to the full,

76 
we need people who have mastered technique, we need 
cadres capable of mastering and utilising this technique 
according to all the rules of the art. Without 
people who have mastered technique, technique is 
dead. In the charge of people who have mastered 
technique, technique can and should perform miracles. 
If in our first-class mills and factories, in our state 
farms and collective farms, in our transport system 
and in our Red Army we had sufficient cadres capable 
of harnessing this technique, our country would 
secure results three times and four times as great 
as at present. That is why emphasis must now be 
laid on people, on cadres, on workers who have mastered 
technique. That is why the old slogan, "Technique 
decides everything," which is a reflection of 
a period already passed, a period in which we suffered 
from a dearth of technique, must now be replaced 
by a new slogan, the slogan "Cadres decide everything." 
That is the main thing now. 
Can it be said that our people have fully grasped 
and realised the great significance of this new slogan? 
I would not say that. Otherwise, there would not have 
been the outrageous attitude towards people, towards 
cadres, towards workers, which we not infrequently 
observe in practice. The slogan "Cadres decide everything" 
demands that our leaders should display the 
most solicitous attitude towards our workers, "little" 
and "big," no matter in what sphere they are engaged, 
cultivating them assiduously, assisting them 
when they need support, encouraging them when they 
show their first successes, promoting them, and so 
forth. Yet we meet in practice in a number of cases

77 
with a soulless, bureaucratic, and positively outrageous 
attitude towards workers. This, indeed, explains 
why instead of being studied, and placed at 
their posts only after being studied, people are 
frequently flung about like pawns. People have learned 
to value machinery and to make reports on how many 
machines we have in our mills and factories. But I 
do not know of a single instance when a report was 
made with equal zest on the number of people we 
trained in a given period, on how we have assisted 
people to grow and become tempered in their work. 
How is this to be explained? It is to be explained by 
the fact that we have not yet learned to value people, 
to value workers, to value cadres. 
I recall an incident in Siberia, where I lived at 
one time in exile. It was in the spring, at the time 
of the spring floods. About thirty men went to the 
river to pull out timber which had been carried away 
by the vast, swollen river. Towards evening they returned 
to the village, but with one comrade missing. 
When asked where the thirtieth man was, they replied 
indifferently that the thirtieth man had "remained 
there." To my question, "How do you mean, 
remained there?" they replied with the same indifference, 
"Why ask - drowned, of course." And thereupon 
one of them began to hurry away, saying, "I've 
got to go and water the mare." When I reproached 
them with having more concern for animals than for 
men, one of them said, amid the general approval 
of the rest : "Why should we be concerned about 
men? We can always make men. But a mare...just 
try and make a mare." (Animation.) Here you have

78 
a case, not very significant perhaps, but very characteristic. 
It seems to me that the indifference of 
certain of our leaders to people, to cadres, their 
inability to value people, is a survival of that strange 
attitude of man to man displayed in the episode in 
far off Siberia that I have just related. 
And so, comrades, if we want successfully to get 
over the dearth of people and to provide our country 
with sufficient cadres capable of advancing technique 
and setting it going, we must first of all, 
learn to value people, to value cadres, to value every 
worker capable of benefitting our common cause. It 
is time to realise that of all the valuable capital 
the world possesses, the most valuable and most 
decisive is people, cadres. It must be realised that 
under our present conditions "cadres decide everything." 
If we have good and numerous cadres in industry, 
agriculture, transport, and the army - our 
country will be invincible. If we do not have such 
cadres - we shall be lame on both legs. 
In concluding my speech, permit me to offer a 
toast to the health and success of our graduates 
from the Red Army Academies. I wish them success 
in the work of organising and directing the defence 
of our country. 
Comrades, you have graduated from institutions 
of higher learning, in which you received your first 
tempering. But school is only a preparatory stage. 
Cadres receive their real tempering in practical 
work, outside school, in fighting difficulties, in 
overcoming difficulties. Remember, comrades, that 
only those cadres are any good who do not fear dif

79 
ficulties, who do not hide from difficulties, but who, 
on the contrary, go out to meet difficulties, in order 
to overcome them and eliminate them. It is only 
in the fight against difficulties that real cadres 
are forged. And if our army possesses genuinely 
steeled cadres in sufficient numbers, it will be invincible. 
Your health, comrades! (Stormy applause. All rise. 
Loud cheers for Comrade Stalin.) 
Pravda 
6 May 1935

80

81 
ADDRESS TO THE SOLEMN MEETING ON THE 
OPENING OF THE L. M. KAGANOVICH METRO 
14th May, 1935 
Comrades, wait! Do not applaud in advance, said 
Stalin jokingly, - you do not yet know what I am 
going to say to you. (Laughter and applause). 
I have two corrections dictated by the comrades 
sitting right here. (Comrade Stalin made a large sweep 
of the hall with his hand). The matter can be presented 
as follows. 
The Party and the State have given decorations 
for the success of the construction of the Moscow 
Metro, the first with the Order of Lenin, the second 
with the Order of the Red Star, the third with the 
Order of the Red Flag of Labour, the fourth with 
the Charter of the Central Committee of Soviets. 
But here is the question. What to do with the others, 
what to do with the comrades who worked just as hard 
as those who have been decorated, who have put as 
much into their work with their ability and strength? 
Some among you seem to be happy and others are 
perplexed. What should we do? That is the question. 
Therefore, we want to repair this mistake of the 
Party and of the State in the face of all honest people. 
(Laughter and lively applause). I am not an amateur 
in making long speeches, therefore allow me to expound 
on the corrections. 
First correction : for the successful work of the

82 
Metro construction, congratulations on behalf of the 
Central Executive Committee and the Council of 
People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., to the shock 
workers, the whole collective of mechanics, technicians, 
working men and women of the Metro construction. 
(The hall greets the propositions of Comrade 
Stalin with cheers and a loud ovation - all rise). 
Even today, it is necessary to correct our mistake 
by congratulating the workers of the construction 
of the Metro (applause). Do not applaud me : it is 
the decision of all the comrades. 
And the second correction, I tell you it directly. 
For the particular merits in the cause of mobilization, 
deserved by the Komsomols in the successful construction 
of the Moscow Metro, I decorate with the 
Order of Lenin, the organization of Komsomols of 
Moscow. (More applause and ovations. Smiling, Comrade 
Stalin applauds with all the people assembled in 
the Hall of Collonades). It is also necessary to correct 
this mistake today and publish it tomorrow. (Holding 
up the paper of corrections, Comrade Stalin addressed 
the audience simply and warmly). Perhaps, Comrades, 
it is a small thing, but we have not been able to 
invent anything better. 
If we could do something else, go ahead, tell us! 
Saluting the workers and builders of the Metro, 
the director leaves the tribune. The operators of 
the concrete mixers, the shaft sinkers from the 
mines, the welders, the engineers, the foremen, the 
professors, the working men and women, happy people, 
leave the hall filled with joy, applauding and shouting 
"Hurrah for beloved Stalin!"

83 
In the sixth row, a young girl in a pink sweater 
stood up on a chair and addressing herself to the 
presidents, shouted with emotion, "A Komsomol Hurrah 
for Comrade Stalin!" 
The ovation continued for several minutes, and 
when finally the cheering stopped, Comrade Stalin 
asked the assembly once again "What do you think? 
Are these enough corrections?" 
And again the hall responded with a lively ovation. 
Pravda 
15 May 1935

84

85 
SPEECH DELIVERED AT A RECEPTION GIVEN BY 
LEADERS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE 
GOVERNMENT TO WOMEN COLLECTIVE FARM 
SHOCK WORKERS. 
10 November 1935 
Comrades, what we have seen here today is a 
slice of the new life we call the collective life, the 
socialist life. We have heard the simple accounts of 
simple toiling people, how they strove and overcame 
difficulties in order to achieve success in socialist 
competition. We have heard the speeches not of ordinary 
women, but, I would say, of women who are 
heroines of labour, because only heroines of labour 
could have achieved the successes they have achieved. 
We had no such women before. Here am I, already 
56 years of age, I have seen many things in my time, 
I have seen many labouring men and women. But 
never have I met such women. They are an absolutely 
new type of people. Only free labour, only collective 
farm labour could have given rise to such heroines 
of labour in the countryside. 
There were no such women, there could not have 
been such women in the old days. 
And, indeed, just think what women were before, 
in the old days. As long as a woman was unmarried 
she was regarded as the lowest of toilers. She worked 
for her father, she worked ceaselessly, and her 
father would nevertheless keep reproaching her : "I 
feed you." When she married, she would work for 
her husband, she would work just as much as her

86 
husband would compel her to work, and her husband 
too would keep reproaching her : "I feed you." Woman 
in the countryside was the lowest of toilers. Naturally, 
no heroines of labour could arise among the 
the peasant women under such conditions. Labour in 
those days was a curse to a woman, and she would 
avoid it as much as she could. 
Only the collective farm life could have made 
labour a thing of honour, it alone could have bred 
genuine heroines in the countryside. Only the collective 
farm life could have destroyed inequality and 
put woman on her feet. That you know very well, 
yourselves. The collective farm introduced the workday. 
And what is the work-day? Before the work-day 
all are equal - men and women. He who has most 
work-days to his credit earns most. Here, neither 
father nor husband can reproach a woman with the 
fact that he is feeding her. Now, if a woman works 
and has work-days to her credit, she is her own master. 
I remember conversing with several women 
comrades at the Second Collective Farm Congress. 
One of them, from the Northern Territory, said : 
"Two years ago no suitor would even have set his 
foot in our house. I had no dowry! Now I have five 
hundred work-days to my credit. And what do you 
think? Suitors give me no peace; they want to marry, 
they say. But I will take my time; I will pick out 
my own young man." 
The collective farm has liberated women, and 
made her independent by means of the work-days. 
She no longer works for her father when she is unmarried, 
but works primarily for herself. And that

87 
is just what is meant by the emancipation of peasant 
women; that is just what is meant by the collective 
farm system which makes the working woman the 
equal of every working man. Only on these grounds, 
only under these conditions could such splendid women 
arise. That is why I regard today's meeting not as 
just an ordinary meeting of prominent people with 
members of the government, but as a solemn day, 
on which the achievements and capabilities of the 
emancipated labour of women are being demonstrated. 
I think the government ought to confer distinctions 
on the heroines of labour who have come here to report 
their achievements to the government. 
How should this day be marked? We here, Comrades 
Voroshilov, Chernov, Molotov, Kaganovich, 
Orjonikidze, Kalinin, Mikoyan and myself have conferred 
together and have arrived at the idea of requesting 
the government to award our heroines of 
labour with the Order of Lenin, - the team leaders 
with the Order of Lenin, and the rank-and-file shock 
workers with the Order of the Banner of Labour. 
Comrade Maria Demchenko, of course, will have to 
be singled out specially. 
Voroshilov : Good girl! 
Molotov : The chief culprit! 
Stalin : I think that Maria Demchenko, as the 
pioneer in this matter, in addition to being awarded 
the Order of Lenin, should receive the thanks of the 
Central Executive Committee of the Soviets, and the 
women collective farmers in her team should be awarded 
the Order of the Banner of Labour. 
A voice : They are all present, except one. She

88 
is sick. 
Stalin : The sick one must also be awarded. That 
is how we think of marking this day. 
(Loud and prolonged applause. All rise.) 
Pravda 
11 November 1935

89 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
SPEECH AT THE FIRST ALL-UNION CONFERENCE 
OF STAKHANOVlTES. 
17 November 1935 
1. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STAKHANOV 
MOVEMENT. 
Comrades, so much has been said at this conference 
about the Stakhanovites, and it has been said 
so well, that there is really very little left for me 
to say. But since I have been called on to speak, I 
will have to say a few words. 
The Stakhanov movement cannot be regarded as 
an ordinary movement of working men and women. 
The Stakhanov movement is a movement of working 
men and women which will go down in the history of 
our Socialist construction as one of its most glorious 
pages. 
Wherein lies the significance of the Stakhanov 
movement? 
Primarily, in the fact that it is the expression 
of a new wave of Socialist emulation, a new and 
higher stage of Socialist emulation. Why new, and 
why higher? Because the Stakhanov movement, as an 
expression of Socialist emulation, contrasts favourably 
with the old stage of Socialist emulation. In the 
past, some three years ago, in the period of the 
first stage of Socialist emulation, Socialist emulation 
was not necessarily associated with modern technique.

90 
At that time, in fact, we had hardly any modern 
technique. The present stage of Socialist emulation, 
the Stakhanov movement, on the other hand, is necessarily 
associated with modern technique. The Stakhanov 
movement would be inconceivable without a new 
and higher technique. We have before us people like 
Comrades Stakhanov, Busygin, Smetanin, Krivonoss, 
Pronin, the Vinogradovas, and many others, new 
people, working men and women, who have completely 
mastered the technique of their jobs, have harnessed 
it and driven ahead. There were no such people, or 
hardly any such people, some three years ago. These 
are new people, people of a special type. 
Further, the Stakhanov movement is a movement 
of working men and women which sets itself the aim 
of surpassing the present technical standards, surpassing 
the existing designed capacities, surpassing 
the existing production plans and estimates. Surpassing 
them - because these standards have already 
become antiquated for our day, for our new people. 
This movement is breaking down the old views on 
technique, it is shattering the old technical standards, 
the old designed capacities, and the old production 
plans, and demands the creation of new and 
higher technical standards, designed capacities, and 
production plans. It is destined to produce a revolution 
in our industry. That is why the Stakhanov 
movement is at bottom a profoundly revolutionary 
movement. 
It has already been said here that the Stakhanov 
movement, as an expression of new and higher technical 
standards, is a model of that high productivity

91 
of labour which only Socialism can give, and which 
capitalism cannot give. That is absolutely true. Why 
was it that capitalism smashed and defeated feudalism? 
Because it created higher standards of productivity 
of labour, it enabled society to procure an 
incomparably greater quantity of products than could 
be procured under the feudal system; because it made 
society richer. Why is it that Socialism can, should 
and certainly will defeat the capitalist system of 
economy? Because it can furnish higher models of 
labour, a higher productivity of labour, than the 
capitalist system of economy; because it can provide 
society with more products and can make society 
richer than the capitalist system of economy. 
Some people think that Socialism can be consolidated 
by a certain equalisation of people's material 
conditions, based on a poor man's standard of living. 
That is not true. That is a petty-bourgeois conception 
of Socialism. In point of fact, Socialism can succeed 
only on the basis of a high productivity of labour, 
higher than under capitalism, on the basis of an 
abundance of products and of articles of consumption 
of all kinds, on the basis of a prosperous and cultured 
life for all members of society. But if Socialism 
is to achieve this aim and make our Soviet society 
the most prosperous of all societies, our country, 
must have a productivity of labour which surpasses 
that of the foremost capitalist countries. Without 
this we cannot even think of securing an abundance 
of products and of articles of consumption of all 
kinds. The significance of the Stakhanov movement 
lies in the fact that it is a movement which is smash

92 
ing the old technical standards, because they are inadequate, 
which in a number of cases is surpassing 
the productivity of labour of the foremost capitalist 
countries, and is thus creating the practical possibility 
of further consolidating Socialism in our 
country, the possibility of converting our country 
into the most prosperous of all countries. 
But the significance of the Stakhanov movement 
does not end there. Its significance lies also in the 
fact that it is preparing the conditions for the transition 
from Socialism to Communism. 
The principle of Socialism is that in a Socialist 
society each works according to his abilities and receives 
articles of consumption, not according to his 
needs, but according to the work he performs for 
society. This means that the cultural and technical 
level of the working class is as yet not a high one, 
that the distinction between mental and manual labour 
still exists, that the productivity of labour is still 
not high enough to ensure an abundance of articles 
of consumption, and, as a result, society is obliged 
to distribute articles of consumption not in accordance 
with the needs of its members, but in accordance 
with the work they perform for society. 
Communism represents a higher stage of development. 
The principle of Communism, is that in a 
Communist society each works according to his abilities 
and receives articles of consumption, not according 
to the work he performs, but according to 
his needs as a culturally developed individual. This 
means that the cultural and technical level of the 
working class has become high enough to undermine

93 
the basis of the distinction between mental labour 
and manual labour, that the distinction between mental 
labour and manual labour has already disappeared, 
and that productivity of labour has reached such a 
high level that it can provide an absolute abundance 
of articles of consumption, and as a result society 
is able to distribute these articles in accordance 
with the needs of its members. 
Some people think that the elimination of the 
distinction between mental labour and manual labour 
can be achieved by means of a certain cultural and 
and technical equalisation of mental and manual workers 
by lowering the cultural and technical level of 
engineers and technicians, of mental workers, to the 
level of average skilled workers. That is absolutely 
incorrect. Only petty-bourgeois windbags can conceive 
Communism in this way. In reality the elimination 
of the distinction between mental labour and manual 
labour can be brought about only by raising the cultural 
and technical level of the working class to the 
level of engineers and technical workers. It would be 
absurd to think that this is unfeasible. It is entirely 
feasible under the Soviet system, where the productive 
forces of the country have been freed from 
the fetters of capitalism, where labour has been 
freed from the yoke of exploitation, where the working 
class is in power, and where the younger generation 
of the working class has every opportunity 
of obtaining an adequate technical education. There 
is no reason to doubt that only such a rise in the 
cultural and technical level of the working class can 
undermine the basis of the distinction between men

94 
tal labour and manual labour, that only this can ensure 
the high level of productivity of labour and the 
abundance of articles of consumption which are necessary 
in order to begin the transition from Socialism 
to Communism. 
In this connection, the Stakhanov movement is 
significant for the fact that it contains the first 
beginnings - still feeble, it is true, but nevertheless 
the beginnings - of precisely such a rise in the cultural 
and technical level of the working class of our 
country. 
And, indeed, look at our comrades, the Stakhanovites, 
more closely. What type of people are they? 
They are mostly young or middle-aged working men 
and women, people with culture and technical knowledge, 
who show examples of precision and accuracy 
in work, who are able to appreciate the time factor 
in work, and who have learned to count not only the 
minutes, but also the seconds. The majority of them 
have taken the technical minimum courses and are 
continuing their technical education. They are free 
of the conservatism and stagnation of certain engineers, 
technicians and business executives; they 
are marching boldly forward, smashing the antiquated 
technical standards and creating new and higher standards; 
they are introducing amendments into the designed 
capacities and economic plans drawn up by the 
leaders of our industry; they often supplement and 
correct what the engineers and technicians have to 
say, they often teach them and impel them forward, 
for they are people who have completely mastered 
the technique of their job, and who are able to squeeze

95 
out of technique the maximum that can be squeezed 
out of it. Today the Stakhanovites are still few in 
number, but who can doubt that tomorrow there will 
be ten times more of them? Is it not clear that the 
Stakhanovites are innovators in our industry, that 
the Stakhanov movement represents the future of 
our industry, that it contains the seed of the future 
rise in the culture and technical level of the working 
class, that it opens to us the path by which alone 
can be achieved those high indices of productivity 
of labour which are essential for the transition from 
Socialism to Communism and for the elimination of 
the distinction between mental labour and manual 
labour. 
Such, comrades, is the significance of the Stakhanov 
movement for our Socialist construction. 
Did Stakhanov and Busygin think of this great 
significance of the Stakhanov movement when they 
began to smash the old technical standards? Of 
course not. They had their own worries - they were 
trying to get their enterprise out of difficulties 
and to over-fulfil the economic plan. But in seeking 
to achieve this aim they had to smash the old technical 
standards and to develop a high productivity 
of labour, surpassing that of the foremost capitalist 
countries. It would be ridiculous, however, to think 
that this circumstance can in any way detract from 
the great historical significance of the movement 
of the Stakhanovites. 
The same may be said of those workers who first 
organised the Soviets of Workers' Deputies in our 
country in 1905. They never thought, of course, that

96 
the Soviets of Workers' Deputies would become the 
foundation of the Socialist system. They were only 
defending themselves against tsarism, against the 
bourgeoisie, when they created the Soviets of Workers' 
Deputies. But this circumstance in no way contradicts 
the unquestionable fact that the movement 
for the Soviets of Workers' Deputies begun in 1905 
by the workers of Leningrad and Moscow, led in the 
end, to the rout of capitalism and the victory of 
Socialism on one-sixth of the globe. 
2. THE ROOTS OF THE STAKHANOV MOVEMENT. 
We now stand at the cradle of the Stakhanov 
movement, at its source. 
Certain characteristic features of the Stakhanov 
movement should be noted. 
What first of all strikes the eye is the fact that 
this movement began somehow, of itself, almost 
spontaneously, from below, without any pressure 
whatsoever from the administrators of our enterprises. 
More than that - this movement in a way, 
arose and began to develop in spite of the administrators 
of our enterprises, even in opposition to 
them. Comrade Molotov has already told you what 
troubles Comrade Mussinsky, the Archangelsk sawmill 
worker, had to go through when he worked out 
new and higher technical standards, in secret from 
the administration, in secret from the inspectors. 
The lot of Stakhanov himself was no better, for in 
his progress he had to defend himself not only against 
certain officials of the administration, but also 
against certain workers who hounded him because of

97 
his "new-fangled ideas." As to Busygin, we know that 
he almost paid for his "new-fangled ideas" by losing 
his job at the factory, and it was only the intervention 
of the shop superintendent, Comrade Sokolinsky, 
that helped him to remain at the factory. 
So you see, if there was any kind of action at all 
on the part of the administrators of our enterprises, 
it was not to help the Stakhanov movement, but to 
hinder it. Consequently, the Stakhanov movement 
arose and developed as a movement coming from below. 
And just because it arose of itself, just because 
it comes from below, it is the most vital and irresistible 
movement of the present day. 
Mention should further be made of another characteristic 
feature of the Stakhanov movement. This 
characteristic feature is that the Stakhanov movement 
spread over the whole of our Soviet Union not 
gradually, but at an unparalleled speed, like a hurricane. 
How did it begin? Stakhanov raised the technical 
standard of output of coal five or six times, 
if not more. Busygin and Smetanin did the same - one 
in the sphere of machine-building and the other in 
the shoe industry. The newspapers reported these 
facts. And suddenly, the flames of the Stakhanov 
movement enveloped the whole country. What was the 
reason? How is it that the Stakhanov movement has 
spread so rapidly? Is it perhaps because Stakhanov 
and Busygin are great organisers, with wide contacts 
in the regions and districts of the U.S.S.R., and they 
organised this movement themselves? No, of course 
not! Is it perhaps because Stakhanov and Busygin have 
ambitions of becoming great figures in our country,

98 
and they themselves carried the sparks of the Stakhanov 
movement all over the country? That is also 
not true. You have seen Stakhanov and Busygin here. 
They spoke at this conference. They are simple, modest 
people, without the slightest ambition to acquire 
the laurels of national figures. It even seems to me 
that they are somewhat embarassed by the scope 
the movement has acquired, beyond all their expectations. 
And if, in spite of this, the match thrown 
by Stakhanov and Busygin was sufficient to start a 
conflagration, that means that the Stakhanov movement 
is absolutely ripe. Only a movement that is absolutely 
ripe, and is awaiting just a jolt in order to 
burst free - only such a movement can spread with 
such rapidity and grow like a rolling snow-ball. 
How is it to be explained that the Stakhanov movement 
proved to be absolutely ripe? What are the 
causes for its rapid spread? What are the roots of 
the Stakhanov movement? 
There are at least four such causes. 
1. The basis for the Stakhanov movement was 
first and foremost the radical improvement in the 
material welfare of the workers. Life has improved, 
comrades. Life has become more joyous. And when 
life is joyous, work goes well. Hence the high rates 
of output. Hence the heroes and heroines of labour. 
That, primarily, is the root of the Stakhanov movement. 
If there had been a crisis in our country, if 
there had been unemployment - that scourge of the 
working class - if people in our country lived badly, 
drably, joylessly, we should have had nothing like the 
Stakhanov movement. (Applause.) Our proletarian rev

99 
olution is the only revolution in the world which had 
the opportunity of showing the people not only political 
results but also material results. Of all workers' 
revolutions, we know only one which managed to 
achieve power. That was the Paris Commune. But it 
did not last long. True, it endeavoured to smash the 
fetters of capitalism; but it did not have time enough 
to smash them, and still less to show the people 
the beneficial material results of revolution. Our 
revolution is the only one which not only smashed the 
the fetters of capitalism and brought the people 
freedom, but also succeeded in creating the material 
conditions of a prosperous life for the people. Therein 
lies the strength and invincibility of our revolution. 
It is a good thing, of course, to drive out the capitalists, 
to drive out the landlords, to drive out the 
tsarist henchmen, to seize power and achieve freedom. 
That is very good. But, unfortunately, freedom 
alone is not enough, by far. If there is a shortage 
of bread, a shortage of butter and fats, a shortage 
of textiles, and if housing conditions are bad, freedom 
will not carry you very far. It is very difficult, 
comrades, to live on freedom alone. (Shouts of approval. 
Applause.) In order to live well and joyously, 
the benefits of political freedom must be supplemented 
by material benefits. It is a distinctive feature 
of our revolution that it brought the people not only 
freedom, but also material benefits and the possibility 
of a prosperous and cultured life. That is why 
life has become joyous in our country, and that is 
the soil from which the Stakhanov movement sprang. 
2. The second source of the Stakhanov movement

100 
is the fact that there is no exploitation in our 
country. People in our country do not work for exploiters, 
for the enrichment of parasites, but for 
themselves, for their own class, for their own Soviet 
society, where power is wielded by the best members 
of the working class. That is why labour in our 
country has social significance, and is a matter of 
honour and glory. Under capitalism, labour bears a 
private and personal character. You have produced 
more - well, then, receive more, and live as best 
you can. Nobody knows you or wants to know you. You 
work for the capitalists, you enrich them? Well, 
what do you expect? That is why they hired you, so 
that you should enrich the exploiters. If you do not 
agree with that, join the ranks of the unemployed, 
and get along as best you can - "we shall find others 
who are more tractable." That is why people's labour 
is not valued very highly under capitalism. Under 
such conditions, of course, there can be no room 
for a Stakhanov movement. But things are different 
under the Soviet system. Here, the working man is 
held in esteem. Here, he works, not for the exploiters, 
but for himself, for his class, for society. 
Here, the working man cannot feel neglected and alone. 
On the contrary, the man who works, feels 
himself a free citizen of his country, a public figure 
in a way. And if he works well and gives society his 
best - he is a hero of labour, and is covered with 
glory. Obviously, the Stakhanov movement could have 
arisen only under such conditions. 
3. We must regard, as the third source of the 
Stakhanov movement, the fact that we have a mod

101 
ern technique. The Stakhanov movement is organically 
bound up with the modern technique. Without the 
modern technique, without the modern mills, and 
factories, without the modern machinery, the Stakhanov 
movement could not have arisen. Without modern 
technique, technical standards might have been 
doubled or trebled, but not more. And if the Stakhanovites 
have raised technical standards five and 
six times, that means that they rely entirely, on 
the modern technique. It thus follows, that the industrialisation 
of our country, the reconstruction 
of our mills and factories, the introduction of modern 
technique and modern machinery, was one of the 
causes that gave rise to the Stakhanov movement. 
4. But modern technique alone will not carry you 
very far. You may have first-class technique, firstclass 
mills and factories, but if you have not the 
people capable of harnessing that technique, you will 
find that your technique is just bare technique. For 
modern technique to produce results, people are required, 
cadres of working men and women, capable 
of taking charge of the technique and advancing it, 
The birth and growth of the Stakhanov movement 
means that such cadres have already appeared among 
the working men and women of our country. Some 
two years ago, the Party declared that in building 
new mills and factories, and supplying our enterprises 
with modern machinery, we had performed only half 
of the job. The Party then declared that enthusiasm 
for the construction of new factories must be supplemented 
by enthusiasm for mastering these new 
factories, that only in this way could the job be

102 
completed. It is obvious that the mastering of this 
new technique and the growth of new cadres have been 
proceeding during these two years. It is now clear 
that we already have such cadres. It is obvious that 
without such cadres, without these new people, we 
would never have had a Stakhanov movement. Hence 
the new people, working men and women, who have 
mastered the new technique, constitute the force 
that has shaped and advanced the Stakhanov movement. 
Such are the conditions that gave rise to, and 
advanced the Stakhanov movement. 
3. NEW PEOPLE - NEW TECHNICAL STANDARDS. 
I have said that the Stakhanov movement developed 
not gradually, but like an explosion, as if it 
had broken through some sort of dam. It is obvious 
that it had to overcome certain barriers. Somebody 
was hindering it, somebody was holding it back; and 
then, having gathered strength, the Stakhanov movement 
broke through these barriers and swept over 
the country. 
What was wrong? Who exactly was hindering it? 
It was the old technical standards, and the people 
behind these standards, that were hindering it. Several 
years ago, our engineers, technical workers, and 
business managers drew up certain technical standards, 
adapted to the technical backwardness of our 
working men and women. Several years have elapsed 
since then. During this period, people have grown, 
and acquired technical knowledge. But the technical 
standards have remained unchanged. Of course, these 
standards have now proved out of date for our new

103 
people. Everybody now abuses the existing technical 
standards. But, after all, they did not fall from 
the skies. And the point is not that these technical 
standards were set too low at the time when they 
were drawn up. The point is, primarily, that now, 
when these standards have already become antiquated, 
attempts are made to defend them as modern standards. 
People cling to the technical backwardness of 
our working men and women, guiding themselves by 
this backwardness, basing themselves on this backwardness, 
and matters finally reach a pitch, when 
people begin to pretend backwardness. But what is 
to be done if this backwardness is becoming a thing 
of the past? Are we really going to worship our backwardness 
and turn it into an icon, a fetish? What 
is to be done if the working men and women have 
already managed to grow and to gain technical knowledge? 
What is to be done if the old technical standards 
no longer correspond to reality, and our working 
men and women have already managed in practice 
to exceed them five or tenfold? Have we ever taken 
an oath of loyalty to our backwardness? It seems to 
me we have not, have we, comrades? (General laughter.) 
Did we ever assume that our working men and 
women would remain backward forever? We never did, 
did we? (General laughter.) Then what is the trouble? 
Will we really lack the courage to smash the conservatism 
of certain of our engineers and technicians, 
to smash the old traditions and standards and allow 
free scope to the new forces of the working class? 
People talk about science. They say that the data 
of science, the data contained in technical handbooks

104 
and instructions, contradict the demands of the Stakhanovites 
for new and higher technical standards. But 
what kind of science are they talking about? The data 
of science have always been tested by practice, by 
experience. Science which has severed contact with 
practice, with experience - what sort of science is 
that? If science were the thing it is represented to 
be by certain of our conservative comrades, it would 
have perished for humanity long ago. Science is called 
science just because it does not recognise fetishes, 
just because it does not fear to raise its hand 
against the obsolete and antiquated, and because it 
lends an attentive ear to the voice of experience, of 
practice. If it were otherwise, we would have no 
science at all; we would have no astronomy, say, and 
would still have to get along with the outworn system 
of Ptolemy; we would have no biology, and would still 
be comforting ourselves with the legend of the 
creation of man; we would have no chemistry, and 
would still have to get along with the auguries of 
the alchemists. 
That is why I think that our engineers, technical 
workers, and business managers, who have already 
managed to fall a fairly long distance behind the 
Stakhanov movement, would do well if they ceased 
to cling to the old technical standards and readjusted 
their work in a real scientific manner to the new 
way, the Stakhanov way. 
Very well, we shall be told, but what about technical 
standards in general? Does industry need them, 
or can we get along without any standards at all? 
Some say that we no longer need any technical

105 
standards. That is not true, comrades. More, it is 
stupid. Without technical standards, planned economy 
is impossible. Technical standards are, moreover, 
necessary in order to help the masses who have fallen 
behind to catch up with the more advanced. Technical 
standards are a great regulating force which 
organises the masses of the workers in the factories 
around the advanced elements of the working class. 
We therefore need technical standards; not those, 
however, that now exist, but higher ones. 
Others say that we need technical standards, but 
that they must immediately be raised to the level 
of the achievements of people like Stakhanov, Busygin, 
the Vinogradovas, and the others. That is also not 
true. Such standards would be unreal at the present 
time, since working men and women with less technical 
knowledge than Stakhanov and Busygin could not 
fulfil these standards. We need technical standards 
somewhere between the present technical standards 
and those achieved by people like Stakhanov and 
Busygin. Take, for example, Maria Demchenko, the 
well-known "five-hundreder" in sugar beet. She achieved 
a harvest of over 500 centners of sugar beet 
per hectare. Can this achievement be made the standard 
yield for the whole of sugar beet production, 
say, in the Ukraine? No, it cannot. It is too early 
to speak of that. Maria Demchenko secured over 500 
centners from one hectare, whereas the average 
sugar beet harvest this year in the Ukraine, for 
instance, is 130 or 132 centners per hectare. The 
difference, as you see, is not a small one. Can we 
set the standard of sugar beet yield at 400 or 300

106 
centners? Every expert in this field says that this 
cannot be done yet. Evidently, the standard yield 
per hectare for the Ukraine in 1936 must be set at 
200 or 250 centners. And this is not a low standard, 
for if it were fulfilled it might give us twice as 
much sugar as we got in 1935. The same must be 
said of industry. Stakhanov exceeded the existing 
standard of output ten times, or even more, I believe. 
To declare this achievement the new technical 
standard for all pneumatic drill operators would be 
unwise. Obviously, a standard must be set somewhere 
between the existing technical standard and that achieved 
by Comrade Stakhanov. 
One thing, at any rate, is clear : the present 
technical standards no longer correspond to reality; 
they have fallen behind and become a brake on our 
industry; and in order that there shall be no brake 
on our industry, they must be replaced by new, higher 
technical standards. New people, new times - new 
technical standards. 
4. IMMEDIATE TASKS. 
What are our immediate tasks from the standpoint 
of the interests of the Stakhanov movement? 
In order not to be diffuse, let us reduce the 
matter to two immediate tasks. 
First. The task is to help the Stakhanovites to 
further develop the Stakhanov movement, and to 
spread it in all directions, throughout all the regions 
and districts of the U.S.S.R. That, on the one hand. 
And on the other hand, the task is to curb all those 
elements among the business managers, engineers,

107 
and technical workers who obstinately cling to the 
old, do not want to advance, and systematically 
hinder the development of the Stakhanov movement. 
The Stakhanovites alone, of course, cannot spread 
the Stakhanov movement in its full scope over the 
whole face of our country. Our Party organisations 
must take a hand in this matter, and help the Stakhanovites 
to consummate the movement. In this respect, 
the Donetz regional organisation has undoubtedly 
displayed great initiative. Good work is being 
done in this direction by the Moscow and Leningrad 
regional organisations. But what about the other 
regions? They, apparently, are still "getting started." 
For instance, we somehow hear nothing, or very little 
from the Urals, although, as you know, the Urals 
is a vast industrial centre. The same must be said 
of Western Siberia and the Kuzbas, where, to all 
appearances, they have not yet managed to "get 
started." However, we need have no doubt that our 
Party organisations will take a hand in this matter 
and help the Stakhanovites to overcome their difficulties. 
As to the other aspect of the matter - the 
curbing of the obstinate conservatives among the 
business managers, engineers and technical workers 
- things will be a little more complicated. We shall 
have in the first place, to persuade these conservative 
elements in industry, persuade them in a 
patient and comradely manner, of the progressive 
nature of the Stakhanov movement, and of the necessity 
of readjusting themselves to the Stakhanov 
way. And if persuasion does not help, more vigorous 
measures will have to be adopted. Take, for instance,

108 
the People's Commissariat of Railways. In the central 
apparatus of that Commissariat, there was, until 
recently, a group of professors, engineers, and other 
experts - among them Communists - who assured 
everybody that a commercial speed of 13 or 14 kilometres 
per hour was a limit that could not be exceeded 
without contradicting "the science of railway 
operation." This was a fairly authoritative group, 
who preached their views in verbal and printed form, 
issued instructions to the various departments of 
the People's Commissariat of Railways, and, in 
general, were the "dictators of opinion" in the traffic 
departments. We, who are not experts in this sphere, 
basing ourselves on the suggestions of a number of 
practical workers on the railway, on our part assured 
these authoritative professors that 13 or 14 kilometres 
could not be the limit, and that if matters 
were organised in a certain way, this limit could be 
extended. In reply, this group, instead of heeding 
the voice of experience and practice, and revising 
their attitude to the matter, launched into a fight 
against the progressive elements on the railways and 
still further intensified the propaganda of their conservative 
views. Of course, we had to give these 
esteemed individuals a light tap on the jaw and very 
politely remove them from the central apparatus of 
the People's Commissariat of Railways. (Applause.) 
And what is the result? We now have a commercial 
speed of 18 and 19 kilometres per hour. (Applause.) 
It seems to me, comrades, that at the worst, we 
shall have to resort to this method in other branches 
of our national economy as well - that is, of course,

109 
if the stubborn conservatives do not cease interfering 
and putting spokes in the wheels of the Stakhanov 
movement. 
Second. In the case of those business executives, 
engineers and technicians who do not want to hinder 
the Stakhanov movement, who sympathise with this 
movement, but have not yet been able to readjust 
themselves and assume the lead of the Stakhanov 
movement, the task is to help them readjust themselves 
and take the lead of the Stakhanov movement. 
I must say, comrades, that we have quite a few 
such business executives, engineers and technicians. 
And if we help these comrades, there will undoubtedly 
be still more of them. 
I think that if we fulfil these tasks, the Stakhanov 
movement will develop to its full scope, will 
embrace every region and district of our country, 
and will show us miracles of new achievements. 
5. A FEW MORE WORDS. 
A few words regarding the present conference, 
regarding its significance. Lenin taught us that only 
such leaders can be real Bolshevik leaders, as know 
not only how to teach the workers and peasants, but 
also how to learn from them. Certain Bolsheviks were 
not pleased with these words of Lenin's. But history 
has shown that Lenin was one hundred per cent right 
in this field also. And, indeed, millions of working 
people, workers and peasants, labour, live and struggle. 
Who can doubt that these people do not live in 
vain, that, living and struggling, these people accumulate 
vast practical experience? Can it be doubted

110 
that leaders who scorn this experience cannot be regarded 
as real leaders? Hence, we leaders of the 
Party and the government must not only teach the 
workers, but also learn from them. I shall not undertake 
to deny that you, the members of the present 
conference, have learned something here at this conference 
from the leaders of our government. But 
neither can it be denied that we, the leaders of the 
government, have learned a great deal from you, the 
Stakhanovites, the members of this conference. Well, 
comrades, thanks for the lesson, many thanks! (Loud 
applause.) 
Finally, two words about how it would be fitting 
to mark this conference. We here in the presidium 
have conferred and have decided that this conference 
between the leaders of the government and the leaders 
of the Stakhanov movement must be marked in some 
way. Well, we have come to the decision that a 
hundred or a hundred and twenty of you will have to 
be recommended for the highest distinction. 
Voices : Quite right. (Loud applause.) 
Stalin : If you approve, comrades, that is what 
we shall do. 
(The conference accords a stormy ovation to 
Comrade Stalin. Thunderous cheers and applause. 
Greetings are shouted to Comrade Stalin, the leader 
of the Party, from all parts of the hall. The three 
thousand members of the conference join in singing 
the proletarian hymn, the "Internationale.") 
Pravda 
22 November 1935

111 
SPEECH AT A CONFERENCE OF 
HARVESTER-COMBINE OPERATORS. 
1 December 1935 
Comrades, allow me first to congratulate you on 
the successes you have achieved on the harvest front. 
These successes are no mean ones. The fact that, 
on an average for the whole of the U.S.S.R., the 
performance per harvester combine has doubled in 
one year, is no mean achievement. This achievement 
is particularly important in the conditions prevailing 
in our country, where our number of technically 
trained people is still small. Our country was always 
distinguished by a lack of technically trained cadres, 
especially in the sphere of agriculture. The technical 
training of cadres on a country-wide scale is a very 
big job. It requires decades. And the fact that in a 
comparatively short space of time, we have managed 
to convert the peasant sons and daughters of yesterday 
into excellent harvester-combine operators, who 
are surpassing the standards of capitalist countries, 
means that the training of technical cadres in our 
country is proceeding at seven-league strides. Yes, 
comrades, your successes are great and important 
ones, and you fully deserve to be congratulated by 
the leaders of the Party and the government. 
And now let me pass to the essence of the matter. 
It is frequently said that we have already solved 
the grain problem. That, of course, is true if we are

112 
referring to the period we are now passing through. 
This year we shall gather in more than five and a 
half billion poods of grain. This is quite sufficient 
to feed the population to satiety and to lay aside 
adequate reserves for any unforeseen contingency. 
That, of course, is not bad for the present day. 
But we cannot confine ourselves to the present day. 
We must think of the morrow, of the immediate 
future. And if we regard the matter from the point 
of view of the morrow, the results achieved cannot 
satisfy us. How much grain shall we require in the 
immediate future, three or four years hence, let 
us say? We shall require not less than seven or eight 
billion poods of grain. That is how matters stand, 
comrades. This means that we must take measures 
at once, so that the production of grain in our country 
shall increase from year to year, and that by that 
time we shall prove fully prepared for the accomplishment 
of this most important task. In the old 
days, before the revolution, about four or five billion 
poods of grain were produced in our country 
annually. Whether this quantity of grain was sufficient 
or not is another question. At any rate, they 
all thought it sufficient, since 400 or 500 million 
poods of grain were exported annually. That is how 
matters stood in the past. But it is different now, 
under our Soviet conditions. I have already said that 
we must at once prepare ourselves to increase the 
annual production of grain to seven or eight billion 
poods in the immediate future, in about three or 
four years. As you see, the difference is not a small 
one. Four or five billion poods are one thing, seven

113 
or eight billion poods are another. 
Whence this difference? How are we to explain 
this colossal increase in the demand for grain in our 
country? 
It is to be explained by the fact that our country 
is now not what it was in the old, pre-revolutionary 
days. 
To begin, for example, with the fact that during 
the past few years, industry and towns have grown 
at least double as compared with the old days. We 
now have at least twice as many cities and city 
dwellers, industries and workers engaged in industry, 
as in the old days. What does this mean? It means 
that we have taken several million toilers from the 
countryside and transferred them to the cities, that 
we have made them workers and employees, and that 
they are now, together with the rest of the workers, 
advancing our industry. This means that whereas 
several million toilers, formerly connected with the 
countryside, used to produce grain, today they not 
only do not produce grain, but themselves require 
that grain should be brought to them from the 
countryside. And our cities will grow and the demand 
for grain will increase. 
That is the first reason for the increase in the 
demand for grain. 
Further, in the old days we had less industrial 
crops than now. We are now producing twice as much 
cotton as in the old days. As to flax, sugar beet, 
and other industrial crops, we are producing incomparably 
more than in the old days. What follows 
from this? It follows from this that the people who

114 
are engaged in the production of industrial crops, 
cannot adequately engage in grain growing. And therefore 
we must have large stocks of grain for the 
people who are producing industrial crops, so that 
it may be possible steadily to increase the production 
of industrial crops, the cultivation of cotton, flax, 
sugar beet, sunflower seed, and so forth. And we 
must steadily increase the production of industrial 
crops if we want to advance our light industries and 
our food industries. 
There you have the second reason for the increase 
in the demand for grain. 
Further, I have already said that in the old days 
our country used to produce four or five billion poods 
of grain annually, The tsarist ministers at that time 
used to say : "We will go short ourselves, but we 
will export grain." Who were the people who went 
short? Not the tsarist ministers, of course. The 
people who went short were the twenty or thirty 
million poor peasants, who did indeed go short, and 
lived a life of semi-starvation in order that the 
tsarist ministers might send grain abroad. Such was 
the state of affairs in the old days. But times with 
us have entirely changed. The Soviet government cannot 
permit the population to go short. For two or 
three years now we no longer have any poor, unemployment 
has ceased, undernourishment has disappeared, 
and we have firmly entered on the path 
of prosperity. You will ask, what has become of the 
twenty or thirty million hungry poor peasants? They 
have joined the collective farms, have established 
themselves there, and are successfully building a life

115 
of prosperity for themselves. And what does this 
mean? It means that we now need far more grain 
to feed our toiling peasants than in the old days; 
because the poor peasants of yesterday, who are the 
collective farmers of today, having established themselves 
in the collective farms, must have enough 
grain with which to build a prosperous life. You know 
they have it, and will have still more. 
That is the third reason for the colossal increase 
in the demand for grain in our country. 
Further, everybody is now saying that the material 
conditions of the toilers in our country have considerably 
improved, that life has become better, 
happier. That, of course, is true. But the result is 
that the population has begun to multiply far more 
rapidly than in the old days. Mortality has declined, 
births are increasing, and the net growth of population 
is incomparably greater. That, of course, is good, 
and we welcome it. (Amusement.) We now have an 
annual increase of population of about three million. 
That means that every year, there is an increase 
equal to one whole Finland. (Laughter.) Well, the result 
is that we have to feed more and more people. 
There you have another reason for the increase 
in the demand for bread. 
Finally, one more reason. I have spoken of people 
and their increased demand for bread. But man's food 
does not consist of bread alone. He also needs meats, 
fats. The growth of the cities, the increase in industrial 
crops, the general growth of the population, 
a prosperous life - all this results in an increase in 
the demand for meat and fats. It is therefore neces

116 
sary to have a well-ordered animal husbandry, with 
a great quantity of livestock, large and small, in 
order to be able to satisfy the growing demand of 
the population for meat products. All this is clear, 
But a growth of animal husbandry is inconceivable 
without large stores of grain for the livestock. Only 
a growing and expanding grain production can create 
the conditions for the growth of animal husbandry. 
There you have one more reason for the colossal 
increase in the demand for grain in our country. 
Such, comrades, are the causes which have radically 
changed the face of our country and which have confronted 
us with the urgent task of increasing the 
annual production of grain in the near future to seven 
or eight billion poods. 
Can we accomplish this task? 
Yes, we can. There can be no doubt of it. 
What is required to accomplish this task? 
It requires, firstly, that the prevailing form of 
enterprise in agriculture should be not the small farm, 
but the large farm. Why the large farm? Because 
only the large farm can master modern technique, 
only the large farm can utilize modern agronomical 
knowledge to a sufficient extent, only the large farm 
can make proper use of fertilizers. In capitalist 
countries, where the prevailing form of agriculture 
is the individual small farm, large farms are created 
by the enrichment of a small group of landowners 
and the ruin of the majority of the peasants. There, 
usually, the land of the ruined peasants passes into 
the hands of the rich landowners, while the peasants 
themselves, in order not to die of hunger, go to

117 
work as hands for the landowners. We consider this 
a wrong way and a ruinous way. It does not suit us. 
We have therefore adopted another way of forming 
large agricultural enterprises. The way we have adopted 
is to unite the small peasant farms into large 
collective farms, cultivating the land by collective 
labour, and taking advantage of all the benefits and 
opportunities offered by large-scale farming. That 
is the way of the collective farms. Is the collective 
form of large-scale farming the prevailing form of 
agriculture in our country? Yes, it is. About 90 per 
cent of our peasants are now in the collective farms. 
And so we already have large-scale enterprise in 
agriculture, collective farming, as the prevailing 
form. 
It requires, secondly, that our collective farms, 
our large farms should have enough suitable land. Have 
our collective farms enough suitable land? Yes, they 
have. You know that all the imperial, landlord and 
kulak lands have been handed over to the collective 
farms. You know that these lands have already been 
assigned to the collective farms in perpetuity. The 
collective farms therefore have enough suitable land 
to develop the production of grain to the utmost. 
It requires, thirdly, that the collective farms 
should have enough machinery, tractors, agricultural 
machines and harvester combines. I need not tell you 
that hand labour alone will not carry us very far. 
A rich technique is therefore required in order that 
the collective farms may be able to develop the 
production of grain. Have the collective farms this 
technique? Yes, they have. And this technique will

118 
increase as time goes on. 
It requires, finally, that the collective farms 
should have people, cadres capable of handling technique, 
who have mastered this technique and have 
learnt to harness it. Have the collective farms such 
people, such cadres? Yes, they have. Still not many, 
it is true, but they have them. This conference, 
which is attended by the finest harvester-combine 
operators, men and women, and which represents 
only a small part of the army of harvester-combine 
operators in the collective farms, is a proof that 
such cadres have already grown up in the collective 
farms. True, such cadres are still few, and that, 
comrades, is our chief difficulty. But there are no 
grounds for doubting that the number of such cadres 
will increase, not yearly and monthly, but daily and 
hourly. 
It follows, therefore, that we have all the conditions 
necessary for achieving an annual production 
of seven or eight billion poods of grain in the near 
future. 
That is why I think that the urgent task of which 
I have spoken can unquestionably be fulfilled. 
The main thing now is to devote ourselves to 
cadres, to train cadres, to help the backward to 
master technique, to develop, day in and day out, 
people capable of mastering technique and driving it 
forward. That is now the main thing, comrades. 
Particular attention must be devoted to harvester 
combines and the harvester-combine operators. You 
know that the most responsible job in grain farming 
is harvesting. Harvesting is a seasonal job - and it

119 
does not like to wait. If you have harvested in time - 
you have won, if you have delayed harvesting - you 
have lost. The importance of the harvester combine 
is that it helps to gather in the harvest in time. 
This is a very great and important job, comrades. 
But the importance of the harvester combine does 
not end here. Its importance also lies in the fact 
that it saves us from tremendous loss. You know 
yourselves that harvesting by means of reaping 
machines involves a tremendous loss of grain. You 
first have to reap the grain, then to gather it into 
sheaves, then to gather it into stacks, and then to 
carry the harvest to the threshing machines - and 
all this means loss after loss. Everybody admits that 
by this system of harvesting we lose about 20 or 25 
per cent of the harvest. The great importance of 
the harvester combine is that it reduces loss to an 
insignificant minimum. The experts tell us that, 
other conditions being equal, harvesting by means of 
reaping machines gives a harvest yield of ten poods 
less per hectare than does harvesting by means of 
harvester combines. If you take an area of one hundred 
million hectares of grain crops, and we have a far 
larger area, as you know, the loss as a result of 
harvesting by reaping machines would amount to one 
billion poods of grain. Now try to organise the harvesting 
of these hundred million hectares with the 
help of harvester combines, assuming that the combines 
do not work badly, and you will have a saving 
of a whole billion poods of grain. Not a small figure, 
you see. 
So you see how great is the importance of har

120 
vester combines and the people operating the harvester 
combines. 
That is why I think that the introduction of the 
harvester combine in agriculture, and the training 
of numerous cadres of harvester-combine operators, 
men and women, is a task of prime importance. 
That is why, in conclusion, I should like to express 
the wish that the number of harvester - combine 
operators, men and women, should increase, not 
daily, but hourly, that, by learning the technique 
of the harvester combine and teaching it to their 
comrades, they in the long run should become real 
victors in agriculture in our country. (Loud and prolonged 
cheers and applause. Cries of "Long live our 
beloved Stalin!") 
Two more words, comrades. We here in the presidium 
have been quietly conferring and have decided 
that it would be fitting to recommend the participants 
of this conference for the highest award, for an 
order of distinction - because of their good work. 
We think, comrades, that we shall put this matter 
through in the next few days. (Loud and prolonged 
applause. Cries of "Thanks, Comrade Stalin.") 
Pravda 
4 December 1935

121 
ADDRESS TO THE COMMISSION OF THE SECOND 
ALL UNION CONGRESS OF KOLKHOZINES 
15 February 1935 
If you want to consolidate the artel, if you want 
to have a mass kolkhozine movement, which will embrace 
millions of households and not just odd units 
and groups, if you want to achieve this objective, 
you are compelled to take into consideration in the 
actual conditions, not only the communal interests 
of the Kolkhozine people, but also their private interests. 
You do not at all take into consideration the private 
interests of the Kolkhozine people when you say that 
it is not necessary to give the Kolkhozine more than 
one-tenth of a hectare as his individual portion of 
land. Some people think it is not necessary for the 
Kolkhozine to have a cow, others think it not necessary 
to have a sow which is capable of breeding. And in 
general you want to stifle the Kolkhozine. This state 
of affairs cannot go on. It is incorrect. You are advanced 
people. I understand that you are very preoccupied 
with the Kolkhozine system and with the 
Kolkhozine economy. But are all the Kolkhozines like 
you? You are therefore a minority in the Kolkhoz. 
The majority think rather differently. Is it necessary 
to take this into account or not? I think it is necessary 
to take this into account. 
If in your artel, your products are not yet in

122 
abundance and you cannot give to the isolated Kolkhozine 
family all that it needs, then the Kolkhoz 
cannot claim to satisfy the social and private needs 
of the people. It would be better to admit frankly 
that one aspect of your work is social and the other 
is private. It would be better to admit squarely, 
openly and frankly that in the Kolkhozine household, 
there is inevitably minor but very definite exploitation 
of the individual. It is not enough to concern 
yourselves only with the large scale exploitation 
which is admittedly great, decisive and important 
and the handling of it is indispensible if the social 
needs of the people are to be satisfied, but of equal 
importance with this, if the private needs of the 
people are to be satisfied, is the handling of the 
small individual exploitation. If one has a family, 
children, individual needs and tastes, - with your 
method these things are not taken into consideration. 
And you have no right not to take into consideration 
these current interests of the Kolkhozines. Without 
this, the consolidation of the Kolkhoz is not possible. 
It is the combination of the private interests of 
the Kolkhozines with their social interests which will 
lead to consolidation. Here lies the key! 
Pravda 
13 March 1935

123 
SPEECH AT A CONFERENCE 
OF THE FOREMOST COLLECTIVE FARMERS 
OF TAJIKISTAN AND TURKMENISTAN 
4 December 1935 
Comrades, the presidium of this conference has 
instructed me to make two announcements : 
Firstly, that the presidium intends to recommend 
for highest award, for an order of distinction, all 
those present at this conference, men and women, 
for their excellent work. (Loud and prolonged applause 
and cheers. Cries of "Long live Comrade Stalin!" 
Shouts of greeting to the leaders of the Party and 
government.) 
Secondly, that the government has decided to 
make a gift of an automobile truck to every collective 
farm represented here and to present every participant 
at this conference with a gramophone and 
records (applause) and watches - pocket watches for 
the men and wrist watches for the women. (Prolonged 
applause.) 
I am being told on all hands that I must say 
something. 
Voices : Quite right. (Applause.) 
What is there to say? Everything has been said. 
Evidently, you are going to make a success of 
cotton. That is apparent from everything that is 
going on here. Your collective farms are growing, 
you have the desire to work, we shall give you 
machines, fertilizers you will receive, every kind

124 
of assistance you may possibly need - Comrade 
Molotov, the Chairman of the Council of People's 
Commissars, has already told you that - will be 
given. Consequently, you will make a success of cotton 
and a prosperous life is opening up. 
But, comrades, there is one thing more precious 
than cotton - it is the friendship between the peoples 
of our country. The present conference, your speeches, 
your actions, go to show that the friendship 
between the peoples of our great country is growing 
stronger. That is a very important and noteworthy 
fact, comrades. In the old days, when the tsar, the 
capitalists, and the landlords were in power in our 
country, it was the policy of the government to 
make one people - the Russian people - the dominant 
people, and all the other peoples subjugated and oppressed 
peoples. That was a bestial, a wolfish policy. 
In October 1917, when the great proletarian revolution 
began in our country, when we overthrew the 
tsar, the landlords and capitalists, the great Lenin, 
our teacher, our father and tutor, said that henceforth 
there must be neither dominant nor subjugated 
peoples, that the people must be equal and free. In 
this way he buried the old tsarist, bourgeois policy 
and proclaimed a new policy, a Bolshevik policy - a 
policy of friendship, a policy of brotherhood between 
the peoples of our country. 
Since then eighteen years have elapsed. And now 
we already see the beneficial results of this policy. 
The present conference is a vivid proof of the fact 
that the former-mistrust between the peoples of the 
U.S.S.R. has long ago been laid to rest, that mistrust

125 
has been replaced by complete and mutual trust, that 
the friendship between the peoples of the U.S.S.R. is 
growing and gaining in strength. That, comrades, is 
the most precious thing that the Bolshevik national 
policy has given us. 
And friendship among the peoples of the U.S.S.R. 
is a great and important achievement. For as long 
as this friendship exists, the peoples of our country 
will be free and invincible. Nothing can daunt us, 
neither enemies at home nor enemies abroad, as long 
as this friendship lives and flourishes. You need have 
no doubt of that, comrades. 
(Tumultuous applause. All rise and greet Comrade 
Stalin.) 
Pravda 
6 December 1935

126

127 
CONFERENCE OF THE AVANT-GARDIST KOLKHOZINE 
MEN AND WOMEN OF TAJIKSTAN AND OF 
TURKMENISTAN 
WITH THE DIRECTORS OF THE PARTY AND THE 
STATE 
4 December 1935 
Intervention of Comrade Gueldyev Ene, Kolkhozine 
president of the Executive Committee of the Farab 
district (Turkmenistan). 
On behalf of the Kolkhozine men and women, Komsomols 
and pioneers in the Farab district, I address 
an ardent, fraternal and friendly greeting to the 
Politburo and especially to Comrade Stalin (applause). 
On this solemn and joyful day, I cannot help but 
speak of the past of the Turkmenian women. Previously 
Turkmenian men took 5 or 6 women at the 
same time, They sold small girls of 8 - 10 years old. 
They considered a woman's place to be only in the 
house, a slave to the domestic household. Now the 
situation is very different. Comrades Lenin and Stalin 
suggested that it is indispensible to attract the 
Turkmenian women into all spheres of construction, 
to draw them into the Kolkhozes, into factories, 
into the management of Soviet work. We put these 
suggestions into practice. 
I want to tell you what happened in the district 
of Farab, to give an example of the ways in which 
suggestions made by Comrades Lenin and Stalin, regarding 
women, have been realized in practice. The 
district of Farab is very backward. In reading the 
discourse of Comrade Stalin, we have worked un

128 
ceasingly in order to transform the district of Farab 
into an avant-garde district, and we have succeeded. 
Our women do not only work in cotton, they also 
work in other branches of the economy. The women 
especially work in the carpet industry. Our carpet 
workers have become masters of their art. Moreover, 
the women of the Farab district now work in the silk 
industry. This year we have surpassed the plan concerning 
the production of silk. 
Comrade Stalin said to the 1st Congress of the 
Kolkhozine Oudarniks that woman is a great strength 
in the Kolkhoz, One cannot improve on this illustration 
as an example of our Farab district. The majority of 
men in the district work in navigation and Sovkhozes, 
Three - quarters of all work in the district is undertaken 
by women. And these women in the current year 
have brought the Farab district to the avant garde 
level. 
This year we have encountered great difficulties 
on two questions. The first, the hand mills. The women 
have wasted an enormous amount of time grinding 
cereal in the hand mills. I propose that help be given 
to the women in the Farab district and throughout 
Turkestan in order that they do not waste time working 
in the hand mills. 
Stalin : There are no power mills over there. 
Gueldyev Ene : Very few, hardly any. Our second 
difficulty is the khochany work. We have few male 
workers in our district. 
Stalin : What is khochany work? 
Gueldyev Ene : It is the cleaning up of the canals. 
All the time, in winter as well, we have to work in

129 
the water, up to our knees. I ask that help be given 
to the Farab district by supplying it with excavators 
and other machines in order to transfer the weight 
of the work onto the machinery. 
We are backward in things concerning our level of 
culture. We actually live in old kibitikas (old covered 
carts) in these rough little tents. We have no wood 
for building and it is for that reason that I am asking 
you now to give us help with some building materials 
and cement so that we can build and organize in an 
exemplary fashion, the Kolkhozine villages. 
Molotov : They must have help. 
Gueldyev Ene : Our great Party has led us along a 
great and joyous road, has given us a joyful life. Once 
we heard these suggestions from our leaders, we 
forced ourselves to work even harder to make better 
harvests, and to try to reach a higher standard of 
living. 
Kolkhozine men and women, Komsomols and pioneers 
of our district address a fraternal and friendly greeting 
to the Politburo and especially to Comrade Stalin. 
(Lengthy applause - all rise - shouts of "Hurrah!") 
I extend greetings to Comrade Stalin on behalf of 
the carpet workers of the Turkmenian Republic, an 
ardent salute and a portrait of V. I. Lenin (applause, 
shouts of "Hurrah", ovations to the addresses of 
Comrades Stalin and Molotov). 
Long live Stalin, well-beloved leader, friend and 
teacher of the people! (The cheers grow into an ovation 
- shouts of "Hurrah!") 
The Kolkhozine women have asked me to personally 
present this portrait of Comrade Lenin to our well

130 
beloved leader and to embrace him on behalf of all of 
us. (She embraces Comrade Stalin amidst lengthy applause 
and shouts of "Hurrah!") 
Stalin : (looking at the portrait of Lenin) - What 
an impressive work. (Lengthy ovations to Stalin). 
Address from Comrade Aga Iousoup Ali, President 
of the Bolshevik Kolkhoz of the Turkmenian district 
of Bairam-Altusk (in Turkmen). 
On behalf of the Kolkhozine men and women of 
Turkmenistan, I address a warm greeting to Comrade 
Stalin and the Politburo. (Applause). 
I have been delegated to the 2nd Congress of the 
Kolkhozine Oudarniks of the U.S.S.R. Under the leadership 
of Comrade Stalin, we have elaborated on the 
statutes of the agricultural artel. As a delegate, I 
have taken the spirit of the Congress to heart. So 
my contribution was 3,250 Kgs. of cotton per hectare. 
I promised Comrade Stalin that this year I would 
bring my quota to 4,000 Kgs. per hectare. I say to 
him now, the promise has been fulfilled. (Applause). 
Returning from the Congress together with all the 
Kolkhozines of our "Bolshevik" Kolkhoz, we studied 
in depth and detail, the statutes of the agricultural 
artel. The Kolkhozines have equally considered my 
promise to Comrade Stalin at the Congress. They 
have unanimously accepted it, and have decided to 
take to heart the word of their own president. When 
I spoke of the Stalinist statutes of the agricultural 
artel, I mentioned a couple of points about the number 
of cattle each Kolkhozine could own. "It is as if Comrade 
Stalin is present among us and knows the need 
of each individual Kolkhoz member." This is the extent

131 
of the influence on people of the statutes. We have 
promised to fulfil our obligations to our leader and 
we have kept this promise which we gave at the 2nd 
Congress of the Kolkhozines. 
As a result of this, we have brought in nearly 
one million roubles in revenue from cotton. Therefore 
we have exceeded our aim by 200,000 roubles, 
according to the fixed price of cotton. 
Stalin asks if this is what only one Kolkhoz has 
brought in. 
Aga Iousoup Ali : Yes, just one Kolkhoz. 
Stalin : How many groups? 
Aga Iousoup Ali : Forty seven. 
We now have electric lighting and radio. We have 
schools, we have money, but, Comrade Stalin, we 
are still living in these little tents as before. 
Stalin : You need wood for building. 
Aga Iousoup Ali : I ask you for help in getting 
building materials. 
Molotov : That's fair. 
Aga Iousoup Ali : We have money, we have everything, 
but in Turkmenistan there is no wood for 
building. I ask for immediate help in this matter. 
What people could come here before to a Congress? 
Previously only the Tsarist generals, the governors, 
the high functioneers could be here. Today, we are 
all present here at this Congress together with Comrade 
Stalin. This was never possible under the old 
regime. I live in the district of Bairam-Altusk. In 
this district there is an old property of Tsar Nicholas II. 
Iousoup Kahn, Voli-Kahn, used to live there. 
We used to work for them and we never knew how

132 
much we earned. He ruined us continuously. 
Now the Party has opened up for us a bright and 
joyful life. We owe this to the leadership of Comrade 
Stalin, to the leadership of our great Party. Long 
live Comrade Stalin, great leader and beloved by the 
people! Long live the members of the Politburo! 
(Prolonged applause). 
Pravda 
5 December 1935

133 
INTERVIEW BETWEEN J. STALIN AND ROY HOWARD 
(On March 1, 1936, Comrade Stalin granted an 
interview to Roy Howard, President of Scripps- 
Howard Newspapers.) 
Howard : What, in your opinion, would be the 
consequences of the recent events in Japan for the 
situation in the Far East? 
Stalin : So far it is difficult to say. Too little 
material is available to do so. The picture is not 
sufficiently clear. 
Howard : What will be the Soviet attitude should 
Japan launch the long predicted military drive against 
Outer Mongolia? 
Stalin : If Japan should venture to attack the 
Mongolian People's Republic and encroach upon its 
independence, we will have to help the Mongolian 
People's Republic. Stomonyakov, Litvinov's assistant, 
recently informed the Japanese ambassador in Moscow 
of this, and pointed to the immutable friendly relations 
which the U.S.S.R. has been maintaining with 
the Mongolian People's Republic since 1921. We will 
help the Mongolian People's Republic just as we helped 
it in 1921. 
Howard : Would a Japanese attempt to seize Ulan- 
Bator make positive action by the U.S.S.R. a necessity? 
Stalin : Yes. 
Howard : Have recent events developed any new

134 
Japanese activities in this region which are construed 
by the Soviets as of an aggressive nature? 
Stalin : The Japanese, I think, are continuing to 
concentrate troops on the frontiers of the Mongolian 
People's Republic, but no new attempts at frontier 
conflicts are so far observed. 
Howard : The Soviet Union appears to believe that 
Germany and Poland have aggressive designs against 
the Soviet Union, and are planning military cooperation. 
Poland, however, protested her unwillingness 
to permit any foreign troops using her territory 
as a basis for operations against a third nation. How 
does the Soviet Union envisage such aggression by 
Germany? From what position, in what direction would 
the German forces operate? 
Stalin : History shows that when any state intends 
to make war against another state, even not adjacent, 
it begins to seek for frontiers across which it can 
reach the frontiers of the state it wants to attack, 
Usually, the aggressive state finds such frontiers. 
It either finds them with the aid of force, as was 
the case in 1914 when Germany invaded Belgium in 
order to strike at France, or it "borrows" such a 
frontier, as Germany, for example, did from Latvia 
in 1918, in her drive to Leningrad. I do not know 
precisely what frontiers Germany may adapt to her 
aims, but I think she will find people willing to 
"lend" her a frontier. 
Howard : Seemingly, the entire world today is 
predicting another great war. If war proves inevitable, 
when, Mr. Stalin, do you think it will come? 
Stalin : It is impossible to predict that. War may

135 
break out unexpectedly. Wars are not declared, 
nowadays. They simply start. On the other hand, 
however, I think the positions of the friends of 
peace are becoming stronger. The friends of peace 
can work openly. They rely on the power of public 
opinion. They have at their command instruments 
like the League of Nations, for example. This is 
where the friends of peace have the advantage. Their 
strength lies in the fact that their activities against 
war are backed by the will of the broad masses of 
the people. There is not a people in the world that 
wants war. As for the enemies of peace, they are 
compelled to work secretly. That is where the enemies 
of peace are at a disadvantage. Incidentally, it is 
not precluded that precisely because of this they 
may decide upon a military adventure as an act of 
desperation. 
One of the latest successes the friends of peace 
have achieved is the ratification of the Franco-Soviet 
Pact of Mutual Assistance by the French Chamber 
of Deputies. To a certain extent, this pact is an 
obstacle to the enemies of peace. 
Howard : Should war come, Mr. Stalin, where is 
it most likely to break out? Where are the war clouds 
the most menacing, in the East or in the West? 
Stalin : In my opinion there are two seats of war 
danger. The first is in the Far East, in the zone 
of Japan. I have in mind the numerous statements 
made by Japanese military men containing threats 
against other powers. The second seat is in the zone 
of Germany. It is hard to say which is the most 
menacing, but both exist and are active. Compared

136 
with these two principal seats of war danger, the 
Italian-Abyssinian war is an episode. At present, the 
the Far Eastern seat of danger reveals the greatest 
activity. However, the centre of this danger may 
shift to Europe. This is indicated, for example, by 
the interview which Herr Hitler recently gave to a 
French newspaper. In this interview Hitler seems to 
have tried to say peaceful things, but he sprinkled 
his "peacefulness" so plentifully with threats against 
both France and the Soviet Union that nothing remained 
of his "peacefulness." You see, even when 
Herr Hitler wants to speak of peace he cannot avoid 
uttering threats. This is symptomatic. 
Howard : What situation or condition, in your opinion, 
furnishes the chief war menace today? 
Stalin : Capitalism. 
Howard : In which specific manifestation of capitalism? 
Stalin : Its imperialist, usurpatory manifestation. 
You remember how the first World War arose. It 
arose out of the desire to re-divide the world. Today 
we have the same background. There are capitalist 
states which consider that they were cheated in the 
previous redistribution of spheres of influence, territories, 
sources of raw materials, markets, etc., 
and which would want another redivision that would 
be in their favour. Capitalism, in its imperialist 
phase, is a system which considers war to be a 
legitimate instrument for settling international disputes, 
a legal method in fact, if not in law. 
Howard : May there not be an element of danger 
in the genuine fear existent in what you term cap

137 
italistic countries of an intent on the part of the 
Soviet Union to force its political theories on other 
nations? 
Stalin : There is no justification whatever for 
such fears. If you think that Soviet people want to 
change the face of surrounding states, and by forcible 
means at that, you are entirely mistaken. Of course, 
Soviet people would like to see the face of surrounding 
states changed, but that is the business of the surrounding 
states. I fail to see what danger the surrounding 
states can perceive in the ideas of the Soviet 
people if these states are really sitting firmly in 
the saddle. 
Howard : Does this, your statement, mean that 
the Soviet Union has to any degree abandoned its plans 
and intentions for bringing about world revolution? 
Stalin : We never had such plans and intentions. 
Howard : You appreciate, no doubt, Mr. Stalin, 
that much of the world has long entertained a different 
impression. 
Stalin : This is the product of a misunderstanding. 
Howard : A tragic misunderstanding? 
Stalin : No, a comical one. Or, perhaps, tragicomic. 
You see, we Marxists believe that a revolution 
will also take place in other countries. But it will 
take place only when the revolutionaries in those 
countries think it possible, or necessary. The export 
of revolution is nonsense. Every country will make 
its own revolution if it wants to, and if it does not 
want to, there will be no revolution. For example, 
our country wanted to make a revolution and made

138 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
it, and now we are building a new, classless society. 
But to assert that we want to make a revolution in 
other countries, to interfere in their lives, means 
saying what is untrue, and what we have never advocated. 
Howard : At the time of the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the U.S.S.R. and the 
U.S.A., President Roosevelt and Litvinov exchanged 
identical notes concerning the question of propaganda. 
Paragraph four of Litvinov's letter to President 
Roosevelt said that the Soviet government undertakes 
"not to permit the formation or residence on its 
territory of any organisation or group - and to prevent 
the activity on its territory of any organisation 
or group, or of representatives or officials of any 
organisation or group - which has as its aim, the 
overthrow, or preparation for the overthrow of, or 
the bringing about by force of a change in the political 
or social order of the whole or any part of its 
territories or possessions." Why, Mr. Stalin, did 
Litvinov sign this letter if compliance with the terms 
of paragraph four is incompatible with the interests 
of the Soviet Union or beyond its control? 
Stalin : The fulfilment of the obligations contained 
in the paragraph you have quoted is within our control; 
we have fulfilled, and will continue to fulfil, these 
obligations. 
According to our constitution, political emigrants 
have the right to reside on our territory. We provide 
them with the right of asylum just as the United 
States gives right of asylum to political emigrants. 
It is quite obvious that when Litvinov signed that

139 
letter he assumed that the obligations contained in 
it were mutual. Do you think, Mr. Howard, that the 
fact that there are on the territory of the U.S.A., 
Russian whiteguard emigrants who are carrying on 
propaganda against the Soviets, and in favour of capitalism, 
who enjoy the material support of American 
citizens, and who, in some cases, represent groups 
of terrorists, is contrary to the terms of the 
Roosevelt-Litvinov agreement? Evidently these emigrants 
enjoy the right of asylum, which also exists 
in the United States. As far as we are concerned, 
we would never tolerate on our territory a single 
terrorist, no matter against whom his criminal designs 
were directed. Evidently the right of asylum 
is given a wider interpretation in the U.S.A. than in 
our country. But we are not complaining. 
Perhaps you will say that we sympathize with the 
political emigrants who come on to our territory. 
But are there no American citizens who sympathize 
with the whiteguard emigrants who carry on propaganda 
in favour of capitalism and against the Soviets? So 
what is the point? The point is not to assist these 
people, not to finance their activities. The point is 
that official persons in either country must refrain 
from interfering in the internal life of the other 
country. Our officials are honestly fulfilling this 
obligation. If any of them has failed in his duty, let 
us be informed about it. 
If we were to go too far and to demand that all 
the white guard emigrants be deported from the United 
States, that would be encroaching on the right of 
asylum proclaimed both in the U.S.A. and in the

140 
U.S.S.R. A reasonable limit to claims and counterclaims 
must be recognised. Litvinov signed his letter 
to President Roosevelt, not in a private capacity, 
but in the capacity of representative of a state, 
just as President Roosevelt did. Their agreement is 
an agreement between two states. In signing that 
agreement both Litvinov and President Roosevelt, 
as representatives of two states, had in mind the 
activities of the agents of their states who must 
not and will not interfere in the internal affairs of 
the other side. The right of asylum proclaimed in 
both countries could not be affected by this agreement. 
The Roosevelt - Litvinov agreement, as an 
agreement between the representatives of two states, 
should be interpreted within these limits. 
Howard : Did not Browder and Darcy, the American 
Communists, appearing before the Seventh Congress 
of the Communist International last summer, appeal 
for the overthrow by force of the American government? 
Stalin : I confess I do not remember the speeches 
of Comrades Browder and Darcy; I do not even remember 
what they spoke about. Perhaps they did 
say something of the kind. But it was not Soviet 
people who formed the American Communist Party. 
It was formed by Americans. It exists in the U.S.A. 
legally. It puts up its candidates at elections, including 
presidential elections. If Comrades Browder 
and Darcy made speeches in Moscow once, they made 
hundreds of similar, and certainly stronger speeches 
at home, in the U.S.A. The American Communists 
are permitted to advocate their ideas freely, are

141 
they not? It would be quite wrong to hold the Soviet 
government responsible for the activities of American 
Communists. 
Howard : But in this instance, is it not a fact 
that their activities took place on Soviet soil, contrary 
to the terms of paragraph four of the agreement 
between Roosevelt and Litvinov? 
Stalin : What are the activities of the Communist 
Party; in what way can they manifest themselves? 
Usually their activities consist in organising the 
masses of the workers, in organising meetings, 
demonstrations, strikes, etc. It goes without saying 
that the American Communists cannot do all this 
on Soviet territory. We have no American workers 
in the U.S.S.R. 
Howard : I take it that the gist of your thought 
then is that an interpretation can be made which 
will safeguard and continue good relations between 
our countries? 
Stalin : Yes, absolutely. 
Howard : Admittedly communism has not been 
achieved in Russia. State socialism has been built. 
Have not fascism in Italy and National-Socialism in 
Germany claimed that they have attained similar 
results? Have not both been achieved at the price 
of privation and personal liberty, sacrificed for the 
good of the state? 
Stalin : The term "state socialism" is inexact. 
Many people take this term to mean the system under 
which a certain part of wealth, sometimes a fairly 
considerable part, passes into the hands of the state, 
or under its control, while in the overwhelming

142 
majority of cases the works, factories and the land 
remain the property of private persons. This is what 
many people take "state socialism" to mean. Sometimes 
this term covers a system under which the 
capitalist state, in order to prepare for, or wage 
war, runs a certain number of private enterprises 
at its own expense. The society which we have built 
cannot possibly be called "state socialism." Our Soviet 
society is socialist society, because the private 
ownership of the factories, works, the land, the 
banks and the transport system has been abolished 
and public ownership put in its place. The social 
organisation which we have created may be called a 
Soviet socialist organisation, not entirely completed, 
but fundamentally, a socialist organisation of society. 
The foundation of this society is public property : 
state, i.e., national, and also co-operative, collective 
farm property. Neither Italian fascism nor German 
National-"Socialism" has anything in common with 
such a society. Primarily, this is because the private 
ownership of the factories and works, of the land, 
the banks, transport, etc., has remained intact, 
and, therefore, capitalism remains in full force in 
Germany and in Italy. 
Yes , you are right, we have not yet built communist 
society. It is not so easy to build such a 
society. You are probably aware of the difference 
between socialist society and communist society. In 
socialist society certain inequalities in property still 
exist. But in socialist society there is no longer 
unemployment, no exploitation, no oppression of

143 
nationalities. In socialist society everyone is obliged 
to work, although he does not, in return for his 
labour receive according to his requirements, but 
according to the quantity and quality of the work he 
has performed. That is why wages, and, moreover, 
unequal, differentiated wages, still exist. Only when 
we have succeeded in creating a system under which, 
in return for their labour, people will receive from 
society, not according to the quantity and quality 
of the labour they perform, but according to their 
requirements, will it be possible to say that we have 
built communist society. 
You s ay that i n order t o build o ur s ocialis t s ociety 
we sacrificed personal liberty and suffered privation. 
Your question suggests that socialist society denies 
personal liberty. That is not true. Of course, in 
order to build something new one must economize, 
accumulate resources, reduce one's consumption for 
a time and borrow from others. If one wants to build 
a house one saves up money, cuts down consumption 
for a time, otherwise the house would never be built. 
How much more true is this when it is a matter of 
building a new human society? We had to cut down 
consumption somewhat for a time, collect the necessary 
resources and exert great effort. This is exactly 
what we did and we built a socialist society. 
But we did not build this society in order to restrict 
personal liberty but in order that the human 
individual may feel really free. We built it for the 
sake of real personal liberty, liberty without quotation 
marks. It is difficult for me to imagine what 
"personal liberty" is enjoyed by an unemployed person,

144 
who goes about hungry, and cannot find employment. 
Real liberty can exist only where exploitation has 
been abolished, where there is no oppression of some 
by others, where there is no unemployment and 
poverty, where a man is not haunted by the fear of 
being tomorrow deprived of work, of home and of 
bread. Only in such a society is real, and not paper, 
personal and every other liberty possible. 
Howard : Do you view as compatible the coincidental 
development of American democracy and the Soviet 
system? 
Stalin : American democracy and the Soviet system 
may peacefully exist side by side and compete with 
each other. But one cannot evolve into the other. 
The Soviet system will not evolve into American 
democracy, or vice versa. We can peacefully exist 
side by side if we do not find fault with each other 
over every trifling matter. 
Howard : A new constitution is being elaborated 
in the U.S.S.R. providing for a new system of 
elections. To what degree can this new system alter 
the situation in the U.S.S.R. since, as formerly, only 
one party will come forward at elections? 
Stalin : We shall probably adopt our new constitution 
at the end of this year. The commission 
appointed to draw up the constitution is working and 
should finish its labours soon. As has been announced 
already, according to the new constitution, the suffrage 
will be universal, equal, direct and secret. 
You are puzzled by the fact that only one party will 
come forward at elections. You cannot see how 
election contests can take place under these con

145 
ditions. Evidently candidates will be put forward not 
only by the Communist Party, but by all sorts of 
public, non-Party organisations. And we have hundreds 
of these. We have no contending parties any more 
than we have a capitalist class contending against a 
working class which is exploited by the capitalists. 
Our society consists exclusively of free toilers of 
town and country - workers, peasants, intellectuals. 
Each of these strata may have its special interests 
and express them by means of the numerous public 
organisations that exist. But since there are no 
classes, since the dividing lines between classes have 
been obliterated, since only a slight, but not a 
fundamental, difference between various strata in 
socialist society has remained, there can be no 
soil for the creation of contending parties. Where 
there are not several classes there cannot be several 
parties, for a party is part of a class. 
Under National-"Socialism" there is also only one 
party. But nothing will come of this fascist oneparty 
system. The point is that in Germany, capitalism 
and classes have remained, the class struggle 
has remained and will force itself to the surface in 
spite of everything, even in the struggle between 
parties which represent antagonistic classes, just 
as it did in Spain, for example. In Italy there is also 
only one party, the Fascist Party. But nothing will 
come of it there for the same reasons. 
Why will our suffrage be universal? Because all 
citizens, except those deprived of the franchise by 
the courts, will have the right to elect and be elected. 
Why will our suffrage be equal? Because neither

146 
differences in property (which still exist to some 
extent) nor racial or national affiliation will entail 
either privilege or disability. Women will enjoy the 
same rights to elect and be elected as men. Our 
suffrage will be really equal. 
Why s ecret? Because we want to give Soviet people 
complete freedom to vote for those they want to 
elect, for those whom they trust to safeguard their 
interests. 
Why direct? Because direct elections to all representative 
institutions, right up to the supreme 
bodies, will best of all safeguard the interests of 
the toilers of our boundless country. 
You think that there will be no election contests. 
But there will be, and I foresee very lively election 
campaigns. There are not a few institutions in our 
country which work badly. Cases occur when this or 
that local government body fails to satisfy certain 
of the multifarious and growing requirements of the 
toilers of town and country. Have you built a good 
school or not? Have you improved housing conditions? 
Are you a bureaucrat? Have you helped to make our 
labour more effective and our lives more cultured? 
Such will be the criteria with which millions of 
electors will measure the fitness of candidates, reject 
the unsuitable, expunge their names from candidates' 
lists, and promote and nominate the best. 
Yes, election campaigns will be very lively, they will 
be conducted around numerous, very acute problems, 
principally of a practical nature, of first class importance 
for the people. Our new electoral system 
will tighten up all institutions and organisations and

147 
compel them to improve their work. Universal, direct 
and secret suffrage in the U.S.S.R. will be a whip 
in the hands of the population against the organs of 
government which work badly. In my opinion our new 
Soviet constitution will be the most democratic constitution 
in the world. 
Pravda 
5 March 1936

148

149 
TELEGRAM FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF 
THE C.P.S.U.(B) TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF 
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF SPAIN. 
To Comrade Jose Diaz. 
The workers of the Soviet Union are merely carrying 
out their duty in giving help within their power to 
the revolutionary masses of Spain. They are aware 
that the liberation of Spain from the yoke of fascist 
reactionaries is not a private affair of the Spanish 
people but the common cause of the whole of advanced 
and progressive mankind.
Fraternal greetings, 
J. Stalin. 
Pravda 
16 October 1936

150

151 
ON THE 
DRAFT CONSTITUTION 
OF THE U.S.S.R. 
REPORT DELIVERED AT THE EXTRAORDINARY 
EIGHTH CONGRESS OF SOVIETS OF THE U.S.S.R. 
25 November 1936 
(Comrade Stalin's appearance on the rostrum is 
greeted by all present with loud and prolonged cheers. 
All rise. Shouts from all parts of the hall : "Hurrah 
for Comrade Stalin!" "Long live Comrade Stalin!" 
"Long live the great Stalin!" "Hurrah for the great 
genius, Comrade Stalin!" "Vivat!" "Rot Front!" "Hurrah 
for Comrade Stalin!") 
1. FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION COMMISSION 
AND ITS TASKS. 
Comrades, the Constitution Commission, whose 
draft has been submitted for consideration to the 
present Congress, was formed, as you know, by 
special decision of the Seventh Congress of Soviets 
of the U.S.S.R. This decision was adopted on February 
6, 1935. It reads : 
"1. To amend the Constitution of the Union 
Soviet Socialist Republics in the direction 
of :
"a) further democratizing the electoral 
system by replacing not entirely equal suffrage 
by equal suffrage, indirect elections, by direct 
elections and the open ballot by the secret

152 
ballot; 
"b) giving more precise definition to the 
social and economic basis of the Constitution 
by bringing the Constitution into conformity 
with the present relation of class forces in 
the U.S.S.R. (the creation of a new, Socialist 
industry, the demolition of the kulak class, 
the victory of the collective farm system, 
the consolidation of Socialist property as the 
basis of Soviet society, and so on). 
"2. To enjoin the Central Executive Committee 
of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
to elect a Constitution Commission 
which shall be instructed to draw up an amended 
text of the Constitution in accordance with 
the principles indicated in Clause 1, and to 
submit it for approval to a Session of the 
Central Executive Committee of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics. 
"3. To conduct the next ordinary elections 
of the organs of Soviet government in the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the basis 
of the new electoral system." 
This was on February 6, 1935. The day after this 
decision was adopted, i.e., February 7, 1935, the 
First Session of the Central Executive Committee 
of the U.S.S.R. met, and in pursuance of the decision 
of the Seventh Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., 
set up a Constitution Commission consisting of 31 
persons. It instructed the Constitution Commission 
to prepare a draft of an amended Constitution of 
of the U.S.S.R.

153 
Such were the formal grounds and instructions 
of the supreme body of the U.S.S.R. on the basis of 
which the work of the Constitution Commission was 
to proceed. 
Thus, the Constitution Commission was to introduce 
changes in the Constitution now in force, which 
was adopted in 1924, taking into account the changes 
in the direction of Socialism which have been brought 
about in the life of the U.S.S.R. in the period from 
1924 to the present day. 
II. CHANGES IN THE LIFE OF THE U.S.S.R. IN THE 
PERIOD FROM 1924 TO 1936. 
What are the changes in the life of the U.S.S.R. 
that have been brought about in the period from 
1924 to 1936 and which the Constitution Commission 
was to reflect in its Draft Constitution? 
What is the essence of these changes? 
What was the situation in 1924? 
That was the first period of the New Economic 
Policy, when the Soviet government permitted a 
certain revival of capitalism while taking all measures 
to develop Socialism; when it calculated on securing, 
in the course of competition between the two systems 
of economy - the capitalist system and the Socialist 
system - the preponderance of the Socialist system 
over the capitalist system. The task was to consolidate 
the position of Socialism in the course of 
this competition, to achieve the elimination of the 
capitalist elements, and to consummate the victory 
of the Socialist system as the fundamental system 
of the national economy.

154 
Our industry, particularly heavy industry, presented 
an unenviable picture at that time. True, it 
was being gradually restored, but it had not yet raised 
its output to anywhere near the pre-war level. It 
was based on the old, backward, and insufficient 
technique. Of course, it was developing in the direction 
of Socialism. The Socialist sector of our industry at 
that time accounted for about 80 per cent of the 
whole. But the capitalist sector still controlled no 
less than 20 per cent of industry. 
Our agriculture presented a still more unsightly 
picture. True, the landlord class had already been 
eliminated, but, on the other hand, the agricultural 
capitalist class, the kulak class, still represented 
a fairly considerable force. On the whole, agriculture 
at that time resembled a boundless ocean of small 
individual peasant farms with backward, mediaeval 
technical equipment. In this ocean there existed, in 
the form of isolated small dots and islets, collective 
farms and state farms which, strictly speaking, were 
not yet of any considerable significance in our national 
economy. The collective farms and state farms were 
weak, while the kulak was still strong. At that time 
we spoke not of eliminating the kulaks, but of restricting 
them. 
The same must be said about our country's trade. 
The Socialist sector in trade represented some 50 
or 60 per cent, not more, while all the rest of the 
field was occupied by merchants, profiteers, and 
other private traders.

155 
Such was the picture of economic life in our 
country in 1924. 
What is the situation now, in 1936? 
At that time we were in the first period of the 
New Economic Policy, the beginning of NEP, the 
period of a certain revival of capitalism; now, however, 
we are in the last period of NEP, the end of 
NEP, the period of the complete liquidation of capitalism 
in all spheres of the national economy. 
Take the fact, to begin with, that during this 
period our industry has grown into a gigantic force. 
Now it can no longer be described as weak and technically 
ill-equipped. On the contrary, it is now based on 
new, rich, modern technical equipment, with a powerfully 
developed heavy industry, and an even more 
developed machine-building industry. But the most 
important thing is that capitalism has been banished 
entirely from the sphere of our industry, while the 
Socialist form of production now holds undivided sway 
in the sphere of our industry. The fact that in volume 
of output our present Socialist industry exceeds prewar 
industry more than sevenfold cannot be regarded 
as a minor detail. 
In the sphere of agriculture, instead of the ocean 
of small individual peasant farms, with their poor 
technical equipment, and a strong kulak influence, 
we now have mechanized production, conducted on a 
scale larger than anywhere else in the world, with 
up-to-date technical equipment, in the form of an 
all-embracing system of collective farms and state 
farms. Everybody knows that the kulak class in 
agriculture has been eliminated, while the sector of

156 
small individual peasant farms, with its backward, 
mediaeval technical equipment, now occupies an insignificant 
place; its share in agriculture as regards 
crop area does not amount to more than two or three 
per cent. We must not overlook the fact that the 
collective farms now have at their disposal 316,000 
tractors with a total of 5,700,000 horse power, and, 
together with the state farms, over 400,000 tractors, 
with a total of 7,580,000 horse power. 
As for the country's trade, the merchants and 
profiteers have been banished entirely from this 
sphere. All trade is now in the hands of the state, 
the cooperative societies, and the collective farms. 
A new, Soviet trade - trade without profiteers, 
trade without capitalists - has arisen and developed. 
Thus the complete victory of the Socialist system 
in all spheres of the national economy is now a fact. 
And what does this mean? 
It means that the exploitation of man by man has 
been abolished, eliminated, while the Socialist ownership 
of the implements and means of production has 
been established as the unshakable foundation of our 
Soviet society. (Prolonged applause.) 
As a result of all these changes in the sphere of 
the national economy of the U.S.S.R., we now have 
a new, Socialist economy, which knows neither crises 
nor unemployment, which knows neither poverty nor 
ruin, and which provides our citizens with every opportunity 
to lead a prosperous and cultured life. 
Such, in the main, are the changes which have 
taken place in the sphere of our economy during the 
period from 1924 to 1936.

157 
In conformity with these changes in the economic 
life of the U.S.S.R., the class structure of our 
society has also changed. 
The landlord class, as you know, had already been 
eliminated as a result of the victorious conclusion 
of the civil war. As for the other exploiting classes, 
they have shared the fate of the landlord class. The 
capitalist class in the sphere of industry has ceased 
to exist. The kulak class in the sphere of agriculture 
has ceased to exist. And the merchants and profiteers 
in the sphere of trade have ceased to exist. Thus 
all the exploiting classes have been eliminated. 
There remains the working class. 
There remains the peasant class. 
There remains the intelligentsia. 
But it would be a mistake to think that these 
social groups have undergone no change during this 
period, that they have remained the same as they 
were, say, in the period of capitalism. 
Take, for example, the working class of the 
U.S.S.R. By force of habit, it is often called the 
proletariat. But what is the proletariat? The proletariat 
is a class bereft of the instruments and 
means of production, under an economic system in 
which the means and instruments of production belong 
to the capitalists and in which the capitalist class 
exploits the proletariat. The proletariat is a class 
exploited by the capitalists. But in our country, as 
you know, the capitalist class has already been 
eliminated, and the instruments and means of production 
have been taken from the capitalists and 
transferred to the state, of which the leading force

158 
is the working class. Consequently, our working class, 
far from being bereft of the instruments and means 
of production, on the contrary, possess them jointly 
with the whole people. And since it possesses them, 
and the capitalist class has been eliminated, all 
possibility of the working class being exploited is 
precluded. This being the case, can our working class 
be called the proletariat? Clearly, it cannot. Marx 
said that if the proletariat is to emancipate itself, 
it must crush the capitalist class, take the instruments 
and means of production from the capitalists, 
and abolish those conditions of production 
which give rise to the proletariat. Can it be said 
that the working class of the U.S.S.R. has already 
brought about these conditions for its emancipation? 
Unquestionably, this can and must be said. And what 
does this mean? This means that the proletariat of 
the U.S.S.R. has been transformed into an entirely 
new class, into the working class of the U.S.S.R., 
which has abolished the capitalist economic system, 
which has established the Socialist ownership of the 
instruments and means of production and is directing 
Soviet society along the road to Communism. 
As you see, the working class of the U.S.S.R. is 
an entirely new working class, a working class 
emancipated from exploitation, the like of which the 
history of mankind has never known before. 
Let us pass on to the question of the peasantry. 
It is customary to say that the peasantry is a class 
of small producers, with its members atomized, 
scattered over the face of the land, delving away 
in isolation on their small farms with their backward

159 
technical equipment; that they are slaves to private 
property and are exploited with impunity by landlords, 
kulaks, merchants, profiteers, usurers, and the like. 
And, indeed, in capitalist countries the peasantry, 
if we take it in the mass, is precisely such a class. 
Can it be said that our present-day peasantry, the 
Soviet peasantry, taken in the mass, resembles that 
kind of peasantry? No, that cannot be said. There 
is no longer such a peasantry in our country. Our 
Soviet peasantry is an entirely new peasantry. In our 
country there are no longer any landlords and kulaks, 
merchants and usurers who could exploit the peasants. 
Consequently, our peasantry is a peasantry emancipated 
from exploitation. Further Our Soviet peasantry, 
its overwhelming majority, is a collective farm 
peasantry, i.e., it bases its work and wealth not on 
individual labour and on backward technical equipment, 
but on collective labour and up-to-date technical 
equipment. Finally, the economy of our peasants is 
based, not on private property, but on collective 
property, which has grown up on the basis of collective 
labour. 
As you see, the Soviet peasantry is an entirely 
new peasantry, the like of which the history of mankind 
has never known before. 
Lastly, let us pass on to the question of the 
intelligentsia, to the question of engineers and technicians, 
of workers on the cultural front, of employees 
in general, and so on. The intelligentsia too, 
has undergone great changes during this period. It is 
no longer the old hidebound intelligentsia which tried 
to place itself above classes, but which actually,

160 
for the most part, served the landlords and the 
capitalists. Our Soviet intelligentsia is an entirely 
new intelligentsia, bound up by its very roots with 
the working class and the peasantry. In the first 
place, the composition of the intelligentsia has 
changed. People who come from the aristocracy and 
the bourgeoisie constitute but a small percentage 
of our Soviet intelligentsia; 80 to 90 per cent of the 
Soviet intelligentsia are people who have come from 
the working class, from the peasantry, or from 
some other strata of the working population. Finally, 
the very nature of the activities of the intelligentsia 
has changed. Formerly it had to serve the wealthy 
classes, for it had no alternative. Today it must 
serve the people, for there are no longer any exploiting 
classes. And that is precisely why it is now 
an equal member of Soviet society, in which, side 
by side with the workers and peasants, pulling together 
with them, it is engaged in building the new, 
classless, Socialist society. 
As you see, this is an entirely new, working intelligentsia, 
the like of which you will not find in 
any other country on earth. 
Such are the changes which have taken place during 
this period as regards the class structure of Soviet 
society. 
What do these changes signify? 
Firstly, they signify that the dividing lines 
between the working class and the peasantry, and 
between these classes and the intelligentsia, are 
being obliterated, and that the old class exclusiveness 
is disappearing. This means that the distance between

161 
these social groups is steadily diminishing. 
Secondly, they signify that the economic contradictions 
between these social groups are declining 
are becoming obliterated. 
And lastly, they signify that the political contradictions 
between them are also declining and becoming 
obliterated. 
Such is the position in regard to the changes in 
the class structure of the U.S.S.R. 
The picture of the changes in the social life of 
the U.S.S.R. would be incomplete if a few words were 
not said about the changes in yet another sphere. I 
have in mind the sphere of national relationships in 
the U.S.S.R. As you know, within the Soviet Union 
there are about sixty nations, national groups and 
nationalities. The Soviet state is a multi-national 
state. Clearly, the question of the relations among 
the peoples of the U.S.S.R. cannot but be one of prime 
importance for us. 
The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as you 
know, was formed in 1922, at the First Congress of 
Soviets of the U.S.S.R. It was formed on the principles 
of equality and the voluntary affiliation of the peoples 
of the U.S.S.R. The Constitution now in force, adopted 
in 1924, was the first Constitution of the 
U.S.S.R. That was the period when relations among 
the peoples had not yet been properly adjusted, when 
survivals of distrust towards the Great-Russians 
had not yet disappeared, and when centrifugal forces 
still continued to operate. Under those conditions 
it was necessary to establish fraternal cooperation 
among the peoples on the basis of economic, political,

162 
and military mutual aid by uniting them in a single 
federated, multi-national state. The Soviet government 
could not but see the difficulties of this task. 
It had before it the unsuccessful experiments of 
multi-national states in bourgeois countries. It had 
before it the experiment of old Austria-Hungary, 
which ended in failure. Nevertheless, it resolved to 
make the experiment of creating a multi-national 
state, for it knew that a multi-national state which 
has arisen on the basis of Socialism is bound to 
stand every and any test. 
Since then fourteen years have elapsed. A period 
long enough to test the experiment. And what do we 
find? This period has shown beyond a doubt that the 
experiment of forming a multi-national state based 
on Socialism has been completely successful. This is 
the undoubted victory of the Leninist national policy. 
(Prolonged applause.) 
How is this victory to be explained? 
The absence of exploiting classes, which are the 
principal organizers of strife between nations; the 
absence of exploitation, which cultivates mutual distrust 
and kindles nationalist passions; the fact that 
power is in the hands of the working class, which is 
the foe of all enslavement and the true vehicle of 
the ideas of internationalism; the actual practice of 
mutual aid among the peoples in all spheres of 
economic and social life; and, finally, the flourishing 
national culture of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., culture 
which is national in form and Socialist in content - 
all these and similar factors have brought about a 
radical change in the aspect of the peoples of the

163 
U.S.S.R.; their feeling of mutual distrust has disappeared, 
a feeling of mutual friendship has developed 
among them, and thus real fraternal cooperation 
among the peoples has been established within the 
system of a single federated state. 
As a result, we now have a fully formed multinational 
Socialist state, which has stood all tests, 
and whose stability might well be envied by any 
national state in any part of the world. (Loud applause.) 
Such are the changes which have taken place during 
this period in the sphere of national relations in the 
U.S.S.R. 
Such is the sum total of changes which have taken 
place in the sphere of the economic and social-political 
life of the U.S.S.R. in the period from 1924 to 1936. 
III. THE PRINCIPAL SPECIFIC FEATURES OF THE 
DRAFT CONSTITUTION. 
How are all these changes in the life of the U.S.S.R. 
reflected in the draft of the new Constitution? 
In other words : What are the principal specific 
features of the Draft Constitution submitted for 
consideration to the present Congress? 
The Constitution Commission was instructed to 
amend the text of the Constitution of 1924. The 
work of the Constitution Commission has resulted 
in a new text of the Constitution, a draft of a new 
Constitution of the U.S.S.R. In drafting the new 
Constitution, the Constitution Commission proceeded 
from the proposition that a constitution must not

164 
be confused with a program. This means that there 
is an essential difference between a program and a 
constitution. Whereas a program speaks of that which 
does not yet exist, of that which has yet to be 
achieved and won in the future, a constitution, on 
the contrary, must speak of that which already exists, 
of that which has already been achieved and 
won now, at the present time. A program deals 
mainly with the future, a constitution with the 
present. 
Two examples by way of illustration. 
Our Soviet society has already, in the main, 
succeeded in achieving Socialism; it has created a 
Socialist system, i.e., it has brought about what 
Marxists in other words call the first, or lower, 
phase of Communism. Hence, in the main, we have 
already achieved the first phase of Communism. 
Socialism. (Prolonged applause.) The fundamental 
principle of this phase of Communism is, as you 
know, the formula : "From each according to his 
abilities, to each according to his work." Should our 
Constitution reflect this fact, the fact that Socialism 
has been achieved? Should it be based on this 
achievement? Unquestionably, it should. It should, 
because for the U.S.S.R. Socialism is something already 
achieved and won. 
But Soviet society has not yet reached the higher 
phase of Communism, in which the ruling principle 
will be the formula : "From each according to his 
abilities, to each according to his needs," although 
it sets itself the aim of achieving the higher phase 
of Communism in the future. Can our Constitution

165 
be based on the higher phase of Communism, which 
does not yet exist and which has still to be achieved? 
No, it cannot, because for the U.S.S.R. the higher 
phase of Communism is something that has not yet 
been realized, and which has to be realized in the 
future. It cannot, if it is not to be converted into 
a program or a declaration of future achievements. 
Such are the limits of our Constitution at the 
present historical moment. 
Thus, the draft of the new Constitution is a 
summary of the path that has been traversed, a 
summary of the gains already achieved. In other 
words, it is the registration and legislative embodiment 
of what has already been achieved and won 
in actual fact. (Loud applause.) 
That is the first specific feature of the draft 
of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. 
Further. The constitutions of bourgeois countries 
usually proceed from the conviction that the capitalist 
system is immutable. The main foundation of 
these constitutions consists of the principles of 
capitalism, of its main pillars : the private ownership 
of the land, forests, factories, works, and 
other implements and means of production; the exploitation 
of man by man and the existence of exploiters 
and exploited; insecurity for the toiling 
majority at one pole of society, and luxury for the 
non-toiling but secure minority at the other pole, 
etc., etc. They rest on these, and similar pillars 
of capitalism. They reflect them, they embody them 
in law. 
Unlike these, the draft of the new Constitution

166 
of the U.S.S.R. proceeds from the fact that the 
capitalist system has been liquidated, and that the 
Socialist system has triumphed in the U.S.S.R. The 
main foundation of the draft of the new Constitution 
of the U.S.S.R. is the principles of Socialism, whose 
main pillars are things that have already been achieved 
and realized : the Socialist ownership of the land, 
forests, factories, works and other instruments and 
means of production; the abolition of exploitation 
and of exploiting classes; the abolition of poverty 
for the majority and of luxury for the minority; the 
abolition of unemployment; work as an obligation and 
an honourable duty for every able-bodied citizen, in 
accordance with the formula : "He who does not work, 
neither shall he eat"; the right to work, i.e., the 
right of every citizen to receive guaranteed employment; 
the right to rest and leisure; the right to 
education, etc., etc. The draft of the new Constitution 
rests on these, and similar pillars of 
Socialism. It reflects them, it enbodies them in law. 
Such is the second specific feature of the draft 
of the new Constitution. 
Further. Bourgeois constitutions tacitly proceed 
from the premise that society consists of antagonistic 
classes, of classes which own wealth and classes 
which do not own wealth; that no matter what party 
comes into power, the guidance of society by the 
state (the dictatorship) must be in the hands of the 
bourgeoisie; that a constitution is needed for the 
purpose of consolidating a social order desired by, 
and beneficial to, the propertied classes. 
Unlike bourgeois constitutions, the draft of the

167 
new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. proceeds from the 
fact that there are no longer any antagonistic classes 
in society; that society consists of two friendly 
classes, of workers and peasants; that it is these 
classes, the labouring classes, that are in power; 
that the guidance of society by the state (the dictatorship) 
is in the hands of the working class, the most 
advanced class in society, that a constitution is needed 
for the purpose of consolidating a social order desired 
by, and beneficial to, the working people. 
Such is the third specific feature of the draft 
of the new Constitution. 
Further. Bourgeois constitutions tacitly proceed 
from the premise that nations and races cannot have 
equal rights, that there are nations with full rights 
and nations without full rights, and that, in addition, 
there is a third category of nations or races, for 
example the colonies, which have even fewer rights 
than the nations without full rights. This means that, 
at bottom, all these constitutions are nationalistic, 
i.e., constitutions of ruling nations. 
Unlike these constitutions, the draft of the new 
Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is, on the contrary, 
profoundly internationalistic. It proceeds from the 
proposition that all nations and races have equal 
rights. It proceeds from the fact that neither difference 
in colour or language, cultural level, or level 
of political development, nor any other difference 
between nations and races, can serve as grounds for 
justifying national inequality of rights. It proceeds 
from the proposition that all nations and races, 
irrespective of their past and present position, ir

168 
respective of their strength or weakness, should 
enjoy equal rights in all spheres of the economic, 
social, political and cultural life of society. 
Such is the fourth specific feature of the draft 
of the new Constitution. 
The fifth specific feature of the draft of the 
new Constitution is its consistent and thoroughgoing 
democratism. From the standpoint of democratism, 
bourgeois constitutions may be divided into two 
groups : One group of constitutions openly denies, 
or actually nullifies, the equality of rights of citizens 
and democratic liberties. The other group of constitutions 
readily accepts, and even advertises democratic 
principles, but at the same time it makes 
reservations and provides for restrictions which 
utterly mutilate these democratic rights and liberties. 
They speak of equal suffrage for all citizens, 
but at the same time limit it by residential, educational, 
and even property qualifications. They 
speak of equal rights for citizens, but at the same 
time they make the reservation that this does not 
apply to women, or applies to them only in part. And 
so on and so forth. 
What distinguishes the draft of the new Constitution 
of the U.S.S.R. is the fact that it is free 
from such reservations and restrictions. For it, 
there exists no division of citizens into active and 
passive ones; for it, all citizens are active. It does 
not recognize any difference in rights as between 
men and women, "residents" and "non-residents," 
propertied and propertyless, educated and uneducated. 
For it, all citizens have equal rights. It is not

169 
property status, not national origin, not sex, nor 
office, but personal ability and personal labour, that 
determines the position of every citizen in society. 
Lastly, there is still one more specific feature 
of the draft of the new Constitution. Bourgeois 
constitutions usually confine themselves to stating 
the formal rights of citizens, without bothering 
about the conditions for the exercise of these rights, 
about the opportunity of exercising them, about the 
means by which they can be exercised. They speak 
of the equality of citizens, but forget that there 
cannot be real equality between employer and workman, 
between landlord and peasant, if the former 
possess wealth and political weight in society while 
the latter are deprived of both - if the former are 
exploiters while the latter are exploited. Or again : 
they speak of freedom of speech, assembly, and the 
press, but forget that all these liberties may be 
merely a hollow sound for the working class, if the 
latter cannot have access to suitable premises for 
meetings, good printing shops, a sufficient quantity 
of printing paper, etc. 
What distinguishes the draft of the new Constitution 
is the fact that it does not confine itself 
to stating the formal rights of citizens, but stresses 
the guarantee of these rights, the means by which 
these rights can be exercised. It does not merely 
proclaim equality of rights for citizens, but ensures 
it by giving legislative embodiment to the fact that 
the regime of exploitation has been abolished, to the 
fact that the citizens have been emancipated from 
all exploitation. It does not merely proclaim the

170 
right to work, but ensures it by giving legislative 
embodiment to the fact that there are no crises in 
Soviet society, and that unemployment has been 
abolished. It does not merely proclaim democratic 
liberties, but legislatively ensures them by providing 
definite material resources. It is clear, therefore, 
that the democratism of the draft of the new Constitution 
is not the "ordinary" and "universally recognized" 
democratism in the abstract, but Socialist 
democratism. 
These are the principle specific features of the 
draft of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. 
This is the way the draft of the new Constitution 
reflects the progress and changes that have been 
brought about in the economic and social-political 
life of the U.S.S.R. in the period from 1924 to 1936. 
IV. BOURGEOIS CRITICISM OF THE DRAFT 
CONSTITUTION 
A few words about bourgeois criticism of the 
Draft Constitution. 
The question of the attitude of the foreign 
bourgeois press towards the Draft Constitution is 
undoubtedly of some interest. Inasmuch as the foreign 
press reflects the public opinion of the various sections 
of the population of bourgeois countries, we cannot 
ignore its criticism of the Draft Constitution. 
The first reaction of the foreign press to the 
Draft Constitution was expressed in a definite tendency 
- to hush up the Draft Constitution, I am referring 
here to the most reactionary press, the

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fascist press. This group of critics thought it best 
to simply hush up the Draft Constitution and to 
pretend that there is no such Draft, and never has 
been. It may be said that silence is not criticism. 
But that is not true. The method of keeping silence, 
as a special method of ignoring things, is also a 
form of criticism - a stupid and ridiculous form, it 
is true, but a form of criticism, for all that. 
(Laughter and applause.) But their silence was of no 
avail. In the end they were obliged to open the valve 
and to inform the world that, sad though it may be, 
a Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R. does exist, and 
not only does it exist but it is beginning to exercise 
a pernicious influence on people's minds. Nor could 
it be otherwise; for, after all, there is such a thing 
as public opinion in the world, there is the reading 
public, living people, who want to know the facts, 
and to hold them in the vise of deception for long 
is quite impossible. Deception does not carry one 
far... 
The second group of critics admits that there 
really is such a thing as a Draft Constitution, but 
considers that the draft is not of much interest, 
because it is really not a Draft Constitution but a 
scrap of paper, an empty promise, with the idea of 
performing a certain manoeuvre to deceive people. 
And they add that the U.S.S.R. could not produce a 
better draft, because the U.S.S.R. itself is not a 
state, but only a geographical concept (general laughter), 
and since it is not a state, its Constitution 
cannot be a real constitution. A typical representative 
of this group of critics is, strange as it may appear,

172 
the German semi - official organ, : "Deutsche 
Diplomatisch-Politische Korrespondenz." This journal 
bluntly declares that the Draft Constitution of the 
U.S.S.R. is an empty promise, a fraud, a "Potemkin 
village." It unhesitatingly declares that the U.S.S.R. 
is not a state, that the U.S.S.R. "is nothing more 
nor less than a strictly defined geographical concept" 
(general laughter), and that in view of this, the 
Constitution of the U.S.S.R. cannot be regarded as 
a real constitution. 
What can one say about such critics, so-called? 
In one of his tales the great Russian writer 
Shchedrin portrays a pig-headed official, very narrowminded 
and obtuse, but self-confident and zealous 
to the extreme. After this bureaucrat had established 
"order and tranquillity" in the region "under his 
charge," having exterminated thousands of its inhabitants 
and burned down scores of towns in the 
process, he looked around him, and on the horizon 
espied America - a country little known, of course, 
where, it appears, there are liberties of some sort 
or other which serve to agitate the people, and where 
the state is administered in a different way. The 
bureaucrat espied America and became indignant : 
What country is that, how did it get there, by what 
right does it exist? (Laughter and applause.) Of 
course, it was discovered accidentally several centuries 
ago, but couldn't it be shut up again so that 
not a ghost of it remains? (General laughter.) Thereupon 
he wrote an order : "Shut America up again!" 
(General laughter.) 
It seems to me that the gentlemen of the

173 
"Deutsche Diplomatisch - Politische Korrespondenz" 
and Shchedrin's bureaucrat are as like as two peas. 
(Laughter and applause.) The U.S.S.R. has long been 
an eyesore to these gentlemen. For nineteen years 
the U.S.S.R. has stood like a beacon, spreading the 
the spirit of emancipation among the working class 
all over the world and rousing the fury of the enemies 
of the working class. And it turns out that this 
U.S.S.R. not only exists, but is even growing; is not 
only growing, but is even flourishing; and is not only 
flourishing, but is even composing a draft of a new 
Constitution, a draft which is stirring the minds 
and inspiring the oppressed classes with new hope. 
(Applause.) How can the gentlemen of the German 
semi-official organ be anything but indignant after 
this? What sort of country is this? - they howl; by 
what right does it exist? (General laughter.) And if 
it was discovered in October 1917, why can't it be 
shut up again so that not a ghost of it remains? 
Thereupon they resolved : Shut the U.S.S.R. up again; 
proclaim publicly that the U.S.S.R., as a state, does 
not exist, that the U.S.S.R. is nothing but a mere 
geographical concept. (General laughter.) 
In writing his order to shut America up again, 
Shchedrin's bureaucrat, despite all his obtuseness, 
evinced some reality by adding to himself : "However, 
it seems that same is not within my power." (Roars 
of laughter and applause.) I do not know whether the 
gentlemen of the German semi-official organ are 
endowed with sufficient intelligence to suspect that - 
while, of course, they can "shut up" this or that 
country on paper - speaking seriously, however, "same

174 
is not within their power..." (Roars of laughter and 
applause.) 
As for the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. being an 
empty promise, a "Potemkin village," etc., I would 
like to refer to a number of established facts which 
speak for themselves. 
In 1917 the peoples of the U.S.S.R. overthrew the 
bourgeoisie and established the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, established a Soviet government. This 
is a fact, not a promise. 
Further, the Soviet government eliminated the 
landlord class and transferred to the peasants over 
150,000,000 hectares of former landlord, government, 
and monasterial lands, over and above the 
lands which were already in the possession of the 
peasants. This is a fact, not a promise. 
Further, the Soviet government expropriated the 
capitalist class, took away their banks, factories, 
railways, and other implements and means of production, 
declared these to be Socialist property, and 
placed at the head of these enterprises the best 
members of the working class. This is a fact, not 
a promise. (Prolonged applause.) 
Further, having organized industry and agriculture 
on new, Socialist lines, with a new technical base, 
the Soviet government has today attained a position 
where agriculture in the U.S.S.R. is producing one 
and a half times as much as was produced in prewar 
times, where industry is producing seven times 
more than was produced in pre-war times, and where 
the national income has increased fourfold compared 
with pre-war times. All these are facts, not pro

175 
mises. (Prolonged applause.) 
Further, the Soviet government has abolished 
unemployment, has introduced the right to work, the 
right to rest and leisure, the right to education, 
has provided better material and cultural conditions 
for the workers, peasants and intelligentsia, and has 
ensured the introduction of universal, direct and 
equal suffrage with secret ballot for its citizens. 
All these are facts, not promises. (prolonged applause.) 
Finally, the U.S.S.R. has produced the draft of 
a new Constitution which is not a promise but the 
registration and legislative embodiment of these 
generally known facts, the registration and legislative 
embodiment of what has already been achieved and 
won. 
One may ask : In view of all this, what can all 
the talk of the gentlemen of the German semi-official 
organ about "Potemkin villages" amount to but an 
attempt on their part to conceal from the people 
the truth about the U.S.S.R., to mislead the people, 
to deceive them. 
Such are the facts. And facts, it is said, are 
stubborn things. The gentlemen of the German semiofficial 
organ may say : So much the worse for the 
facts. (Laughter.) But then, we can answer them in 
the words of the well-known Russian proverb : "Laws 
are not made for fools." (Laughter and prolonged 
applause.) 
The third group of critics are not averse to recognizing 
certain merits in the Draft Constitution; 
they regard it as a good thing; but, you see, they

176 
doubt very much whether a number of its principles 
can be applied in practice, because they are convinced 
that these principles are generally impracticable and 
must remain a dead letter. These, to put it mildly, 
are sceptics. These sceptics are to be found in all 
countries. 
It must be said that this is not the first time 
we have met them. When the Bolsheviks took power 
in 1917 the sceptics said : The Bolsheviks are not 
bad fellows, perhaps, but nothing will come of their 
government; they will fail. Actually it turned out, 
however, that it was not the Bolsheviks who failed, 
but the sceptics. 
During the civil war and foreign intervention this 
group of sceptics said : The Soviet government is 
not a bad thing, of course, but Denikin and Kolchak, 
plus the foreigners, will, we venture to say, come 
out on top. Actually, it turned out, however, that 
the sceptics were wrong again in their calculations. 
When the Soviet government published the First 
Five-Year Plan the sceptics again appeared on the 
scene saying : The Five-Year Plan is a good thing, 
of course, but it is hardly feasible; the Bolsheviks' 
Five-Year Plan is not likely to succeed. The facts 
proved, however, that once again the sceptics had 
bad luck : the Five-Year Plan was carried out in 
four years. 
The same must be said about the draft of the 
new Constitution and the criticism levelled against 
it by the sceptics. No sooner was the Draft published 
than this group of critics again appeared on the scene 
with their gloomy scepticism and their doubts as to

177 
the practicability of certain principles of the Constitution. 
There is not the slightest ground for doubt 
that in this case, too, the sceptics will fail, that 
they will fail today as they have failed more than 
once in the past. 
The fourth group of critics, in attacking the 
draft of the new Constitution, characterize it as a 
"swing to the Right," as the "abandonment of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat," as the "liquidation 
of the Bolshevik regime." "The Bolsheviks have swung 
to the Right, that is a fact," they declare in a 
chorus of different voices. Particularly zealous in 
this respect are certain Polish newspapers, and also 
some American newspapers. 
What can one say about these critics, so-called? 
If the broadening of the basis of the dictatorship 
of the working class and the transformation of the 
dictatorship into a more flexible, and, consequently, 
a more powerful system of guidance of society by 
the state is interpreted by them not as strengthening 
the dictatorship of the working class but as weakening 
it, or even abandoning it, then it is legitimate to 
ask : Do these gentlemen really know what the 
dictatorship of the working class means. 
If the legislative embodiment given to the victories 
of Socialism, the legislative embodiment given to 
the successes of industrialization, collectivization, 
and democratization is represented by them as a 
"swing to the Right," then it is legitimate to ask : 
Do these gentlemen really know the difference between 
left and right? (General laughter and applause.) 
There can be no doubt that these gentlemen have

178 
entirely lost their way in their criticism of the 
Draft Constitution, and, having lost their way, they 
confuse right with left. 
One cannot help recalling, in this connection, the 
"wench" Pelageya in Gogol's "Dead Souls." Gogol relates 
that Pelageya offered to act as guide to 
Chichikov's coachman, Seliphan; but not knowing the 
right side of the road from the left, she lost her 
way and got into an embarrassing situation. It must 
be admitted that, notwithstanding all their pretensions, 
the intelligence of our critics on the Polish 
newspapers is not much above that of the "wench" 
Pelageya in "Dead Souls." (Applause.) If you remember, 
the coachman Seliphan thought fit to chide 
Pelageya for confusing right with left and said to 
her : "Oh, you dirty-legs...you don't know which is 
right and which is left." It seems to me that our 
luckless critics should be chided in the same way : 
"Oh, you sorry critics...you don't know which is right 
and which is left." (Prolonged applause.) 
Finally, there is yet another group of critics. 
While the last-mentioned group accuses the Draft 
Constitution of abandoning the dictatorship of the 
working class, this group, on the contrary, accuses 
it of not changing anything in the existing position 
in the U.S.S.R., of leaving the dictatorship of the 
working class intact, of not granting freedom to 
political parties, and of preserving the present leading 
position of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R. And 
this group of critics maintains that the absence of 
freedom for parties in the U.S.S.R. is a symptom of 
the violation of the principles of democratism.

179 
I must admit that the draft of the new Constitution 
does preserve the regime of the dictatorship 
of the working class, just as it also preserves 
unchanged the present leading position of the Communist 
Party of the U.S.S.R. (Loud applause.) If the 
esteemed critics regard this as a flaw in the Draft 
Constitution, that is only to be regretted. We Bolsheviks 
regard it as a merit of the Draft Constitution. 
(Loud applause.) 
As to freedom for various political parties, we 
adhere to somewhat different views. A party is a 
part of a class, its most advanced part. Several 
parties, and, consequently, freedom for parties, 
can exist only in a society in which there are 
antagonistic classes whose interests are mutually 
hostile and irreconcilable - in which there are, say, 
capitalists and workers, landlords and peasants, 
kulaks and poor peasants, etc. But in the U.S.S.R. 
there are no longer such classes as the capitalists, 
the landlords, the kulaks, etc. In the U.S.S.R. there 
are only two classes, workers and peasants, whose 
interests - far from being mutually hostile - are, 
on the contrary, friendly. Hence, there is no ground 
in the U.S.S.R. for the existence of several parties, 
and, consequently, for freedom for these parties. 
In the U.S.S.R. there is ground only for one party, 
the Communist Party. In the U.S.S.R. only one party 
can exist, the Communist Party, which courageously 
defends the interests of the workers and peasants 
to the very end. And that it defends the interests 
of these classes not at all badly, of that there can 
hardly be any doubt. (Loud applause.)

180 
They talk of democracy. But what is democracy? 
Democracy in capitalist countries, where there are 
antagonistic classes, is, in the last analysis, democracy 
for the strong, democracy for the propertied 
minority. In the U.S.S.R., on the contrary, democracy 
is democracy for the working people, i.e., democracy 
for all. But from this it follows that the principles 
of democratism are violated, not by the draft of 
the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R., but by the 
bourgeois constitutions. That is why I think that the 
Constitution of the U.S.S.R. is the only thoroughly 
democratic Constitution in the world. 
Such is the position with regard to the bourgeois 
criticism of the draft of the new Constitution of 
the U.S.S.R. 
V. AMENDMENTS AND ADDENDA TO THE DRAFT 
CONSTITUTION. 
Let us pass on to the amendments and addenda 
to the Draft Constitution proposed by citizens during 
the nation-wide discussion of the draft. 
The nation-wide discussion of the Draft Constitution, 
as you know, produced a fairly large number 
of amendments and addenda. These have all been 
published in the Soviet press. In view of the great 
variety of amendments and the fact that they are 
not all of equal value, they should, in my opinion, 
be divided into three categories. 
The distinguishing feature of the amendments in 
the first category is that they deal not with constitutional 
questions but with questions which come

181 
within the scope of the current legislative work of 
the future legislative bodies. Certain questions concerning 
insurance, some questions concerning collective 
farm development, some questions concerning 
industrial development, financial questions - such are 
the subjects with which these amendments deal. 
Evidently the authors of these amendments were not 
clear as to the difference between constitutional 
questions and questions of current legislation. That 
is why they strive to squeeze as many laws as possible 
into the Constitution, thus tending to convert 
the Constitution into something in the nature of a 
code of laws. But a constitution is not a code of 
laws. A constitution is the fundamental law, and only 
the fundamental law. A constitution does not preclude 
but presupposes current legislative work on the part 
of the future legislative bodies. A constitution provides 
the juridical basis for the future legislative 
activities of these bodies. Therefore, amendments 
and addenda of this kind, which have no direct bearing 
on the Constitution, should, in my opinion, be referred 
to the future legislative bodies of the country. 
To the second category should be assigned those 
amendments and addenda which strive to introduce 
into the Constitution elements of historical references, 
or elements of declarations concerning 
what the Soviet government has not yet achieved and 
what it should achieve in the future. To describe in 
the Constitution the difficulties the Party, the working 
class, and all the working people have overcome 
during the long years of struggle for the victory of 
Socialism; to indicate in the Constitution the ultimate

182 
goal of the Soviet movement, i.e., the building of a 
complete Communist society - such are the subjects 
with which these amendments deal, in different 
variations. I think that such amendments and addenda 
should also be set aside as having no direct bearing 
on the Constitution. The Constitution is the registration 
and legislative embodiment of the gains that 
have already been achieved and secured. Unless we 
want to distort this fundamental character of the 
Constitution, we must refrain from filling it with 
historical references to the past, or with declarations 
concerning the future achievements of the working 
people of the U.S.S.R. For this we have other means 
and other documents. 
Finally, to the third category should be assigned 
amendments and addenda which have a direct bearing 
on the Draft Constitution. 
A large number of amendments in this category 
are simply a matter of wording. They could therefore 
be referred to the Drafting Commission of the present 
Congress which I think the Congress will set up, with 
instructions to decide on the final text of the new 
Constitution. 
As for the rest of the amendments in the third 
category, they are of greater material significance, 
and in my opinion a few words should be said about 
them. 
1. First of all about the amendments to Article 
1 of the Draft Constitution. There are four amendments. 
Some propose that we substitute for the words 
"state of workers and peasants" the words "state 
of working people." Others propose that we add the

183 
words "and working intelligentsia" to the words "state 
of workers and peasants." A third group proposes 
that we substitute for the words "state of workers 
and peasants" the words "state of all the races and 
nationalities inhabiting the territory of the U.S.S.R." 
A fourth group proposes that we substitute for the 
word "peasants" the words "collective farmers" or 
"toilers of Socialist agriculture." 
Should these amendments be adopted? I think they 
should not. 
What does Article 1 of the Draft Constitution 
speak of? It speaks of the class composition of 
Soviet society. Can we Marxists ignore the question 
of the class composition of our society in the Constitution? 
No, we cannot. As we know, Soviet society 
consists of two classes, workers and peasants. And 
it is of this that Article 1 of the Draft Constitution 
speaks. Consequently, Article 1 of the Draft Constitution 
properly reflects the class composition of 
our society. It may be asked : What about the working 
intelligentsia? The intelligentsia has never been 
a class, and can never be a class - it was and remains 
a stratum, which recruits its members from 
all classes of society. In the old days the intelligentsia 
recruited its members from the ranks of 
the nobility, of the bourgeoisie, partly from the 
ranks of the peasantry, and only to a very inconsiderable 
extent from the ranks of the workers. In 
our day, under the Soviets, the intelligentsia recruits 
its members mainly from the ranks of the workers 
and peasants. But no matter where it may recruit its 
members, and what character it may bear, the intel

184 
ligentsia is nevertheless a stratum and not a class. 
Does this circumstance infringe upon the rights 
of the working intelligentsia? Not in the least! Article 
1 of the Draft Constitution deals not with the rights 
of the various strata of Soviet society, but with 
the class composition of that society. The rights of 
the various strata of Soviet society, including the 
rights of the working intelligentsia, are dealt with 
mainly in Chapters X and XI of the Draft Constitution. 
It is evident from these chapters that the workers, 
the peasants, and the working intelligentsia enjoy 
entirely equal rights in all spheres of the economic, 
political, social, and cultural life of the country. 
Consequently, there can be no question of an infringement 
upon the rights of the working intelligentsia. 
The same must be said of the nations and races 
comprising the U.S.S.R. In Chapter II of the Draft 
Constitution it is stated that the U.S.S.R. is a free 
union of nations possessing equal rights. Is it worthwhile 
repeating this formula in Article 1 of the 
Draft Constitution, which deals not with the national 
composition of Soviet society, but with its class 
composition? Clearly, it is not worth-while. As to 
the rights of the nations and races comprising the 
U.S.S.R., these are dealt with in Chapters II, X, and 
XI of the Draft Constitution. From these chapters 
it is evident that the nations and races of the U.S.S.R. 
enjoy equal rights in all spheres of the economic, 
political, social and cultural life of the country. 
Consequently, there can be no question of an infringement 
upon national rights.

185 
It would also be wrong to substitute for the word 
"peasant" the words "collective farmer" or "toiler 
of Socialist agriculture." In the first place, besides 
the collective farmers, there are still over a million 
households of non-collective farmers among the 
peasantry. What is to be done about them? Do the 
authors of this amendment propose to strike them 
off the books? That would be unwise. Secondly, the 
fact that the majority of the peasants have started 
collective farming does not mean that they have 
already ceased to be peasants, that they no longer 
have their personal economy, their own households, 
etc. Thirdly, for the word "worker" we would then 
have to substitute the words "toiler of Socialist 
industry," which, however, the authors of the amendment 
for some reason or other do not propose. 
Finally, have the working class and the peasant class 
already disappeared in our country? And if they have 
not disappeared, is it worth while deleting from our 
vocabulary the established names for them? Evidently, 
what the authors of the amendment have in mind is 
not present society, but future society, when classes 
will no longer exist and when the workers and peasants 
will have been transformed into toilers of a homogeneous 
Communist society. Consequently, they are 
obviously running ahead. But in drawing up a constitution 
one must not proceed from the future, but 
from the present, from what already exists. A constitution 
should not and must not run ahead. 
2. Then follows an amendment to Article 17 of 
the Draft Constitution. The amendment proposes 
that we completely delete from the Constitution

186 
Article 17, which reserves to the Union Republics 
the right of free secession from the U.S.S.R. I think 
that this proposal is a wrong one and therefore should 
not be adopted by the Congress. The U.S.S.R. is a 
voluntary union of Union Republics with equal rights. 
To delete from the Constitution the article providing 
for the right of free secession from the U.S.S.R. 
would be to violate the voluntary character of this 
union. Can we agree to this step? I think that we 
cannot and should not agree to it. It is said that 
there is not a single republic in the U.S.S.R. that 
would want to secede from the U.S.S.R., and that 
therefore Article 17 is of no practical importance. 
It is, of course, true that there is not a single 
republic that would want to secede from the U.S.S.R. 
But this does not in the least mean that we should 
not fix in the Constitution the right of Union 
Republics freely to secede from the U.S.S.R. In the 
U.S.S.R. there is not a single Union Republic that 
would want to subjugate another Union Republic. But 
this does not in the least mean that we ought to 
delete from the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. the 
article dealing with the equality of rights of the 
Union Republics. 
3. Then there is a proposal that we add a new 
article to Chapter II of the Draft Constitution, to 
the following effect : that on reaching the proper 
level of economic and cultural development Autonomous 
Soviet Socialist Republics may be raised to 
the status of Union Soviet Socialist Republics. Can 
this proposal be adopted? I think that it should not 
be adopted. It is a wrong proposal, not only because

187 
of its content, but also because of the condition it 
lays down, Economic and cultural maturity can no 
more be urged as grounds for transferring Autonomous 
Republics to the category of Union Republics 
than economic or cultural backwardness can be urged 
as grounds for leaving any particular republic in the 
list of Autonomous Republics. This would not be a 
Marxist, not a Leninist approach. The Tatar Republic, 
for example, remains an Autonomous Republic, while 
the Kazakh Republic is to become a Union Republic; 
but this does not mean that from the standpoint of 
cultural and economic development the Kazakh Republic 
is on a higher level than the Tatar Republic. The 
very opposite is the case. The same can be said, for 
example, of the Volga German Autonomous Republic 
and the Kirghiz Union Republic, of which the former 
is on a higher cultural and economic level than the 
latter, although it remains an Autonomous Republic. 
What are the grounds for transferring Autonomous 
Republics to the category of Union Republics? 
There are three such grounds. 
First, the republic concerned must be a border 
republic, not surrounded on all sides by U.S.S.R. 
territory. Why? Because since the Union Republics 
have the right to secede from the U.S.S.R., a republic, 
on becoming a Union Republic, must be in a position 
logically and actually to raise the question of secession 
from the U.S.S.R. And this question can be raised 
only by a republic which, say, borders on some foreign 
state, and, consequently, is not surrounded on all 
sides by U.S.S.R. territory. Of course, none of our 
republics would actually raise the question of seceding

188 
from the U.S.S.R. But since the right to secede from 
the U.S.S.R. is reserved to the Union Republics, it 
must be so arranged that this right does not become 
a meaningless scrap of paper. Take, for example, 
the Bashkir Republic or the Tatar Republic. Let us 
assume that these Autonomous Republics are transferred 
to the category of Union Republics. Could they 
logically and actually raise the question of seceding 
from the U.S.S.R.? No, they could not. Why? Because 
they are surrounded on all sides by Soviet republics 
and regions, and, strictly speaking, they have nowhere 
to go if they secede from the U.S.S.R. (Laughter and 
applause.) Therefore, it would be wrong to transfer 
such republics to the category of Union Republics. 
Secondly, the nationality which gives its name to 
a given Soviet republic must constitute a more or 
less compact majority within that republic. Take the 
Crimean Autonomous Republic, for example. It is a 
border republic, but the Crimean Tatars do not constitute 
the majority in that republic; on the contrary, 
they are a minority. Consequently, it would be wrong 
to transfer the Crimean Republic to the category 
of Union Republics. 
Thirdly, the republic must not have too small a 
population; it should have a population of, say, not 
less but more than a million, at least. Why? Because 
it would be wrong to assume that a small Soviet 
republic with a very small population and a small 
army could hope to maintain its existence as an 
independent state. There can hardly be any doubt 
that the imperialist beasts of prey would soon lay 
hands on it.

189 
I think that unless these three objective grounds 
exist, it would be wrong at the present historical 
moment to raise the question of transferring any 
particular Autonomous Republic to the category of 
Union Republics. 
4. Next it is proposed to delete from Articles 22, 
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28 and 29 the detailed enumeration 
of the administrative territorial division of the 
Union Republics into territories and regions. I think 
that this proposal is also unacceptable. There are 
people in the U.S.S.R. who are always ready and eager 
to go on tirelessly recarving the territories and 
regions and thus cause confusion and uncertainty in 
our work. The Draft Constitution puts a check on 
these people. And that is very good, because here, 
as in many other things, we need an atmosphere of 
certainty, we need stability and clarity. 
5. The fifth amendment concerns Article 33. The 
creation of two chambers is regarded as inexpedient, 
and it is proposed that the Soviet of Nationalities 
be abolished. I think that this amendment is also 
wrong. A single-chamber system would be better than 
a dual-chamber system if the U.S.S.R. were a singlenation 
state. But the U.S.S.R. is not a single-nation 
state. The U.S.S.R., as we know, is a multi-national 
state. We have a supreme body in which are represented 
the common interests of all the working people of 
the U.S.S.R. irrespective of nationality. This is the 
Soviet of the Union. But in addition to common 
interests, the nationalities of the U.S.S.R. have their 
particular, specific interests, connected with their 
specific national characteristics. Can these specific

190 
interests be ignored? No, they cannot. Do we need 
a special supreme body to reflect precisely these 
specific interests? Unquestionably, we do. There can 
be no doubt that without such a body it would be 
impossible to administer a multi-national state like 
the U.S.S.R. Such a body is the second chamber, the 
Soviet of Nationalities of the U.S.S.R. 
Reference is made to the parliamentary history 
of European and American states; it is pointed out 
that the dual-chamber system in these countries has 
produced only negative results - that the second 
chamber usually degenerates into a centre of reaction 
and a brake on progress. All that is true. But this 
is due to the fact that in those countries there is 
no equality between the two chambers. As we know, 
the second chamber is not infrequently granted more 
rights than the first chamber, and, moreover, as a 
rule the second chamber is constituted undemocratically, 
its members not infrequently being appointed 
from above. Undoubtedly, these defects will 
be obviated if equality is established between the 
chambers and if the second chamber is constituted 
as democratically as the first. 
6. Further, an addendum to the Draft Constitution 
is proposed calling for an equal number of members 
in both chambers. I think that this proposal might 
be adopted. In my opinion, it has obvious political 
advantages, for it emphasizes the equality of the 
chambers. 
7. Next comes an addendum to the Draft Constitution 
which proposes that the members of the 
Soviet of Nationalities be elected by direct vote, as

191 
in the case of the members of the Soviet of the 
Union. I think that this proposal might also be adopted. 
True, it may create certain technical inconveniences 
during elections; but, on the other hand, it would be 
of great political advantage, for it would enhance 
the prestige of the Soviet of Nationalities. 
8. Then follows an addendum to Article 40, proposing 
that the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet be 
granted the right to pass provisional acts of legislation. 
I think that this addendum is wrong and should 
not be adopted by the Congress. It is time we put 
an end to a situation in which not one but a number 
of bodies legislate. Such a situation runs counter to the 
principle that laws should be stable. And we need 
stability of laws now more than ever. Legislative 
power in the U.S.S.R. must be exercised only by one 
body, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
9. Further, an addendum is proposed to Article 48 
of the Draft Constitution, demanding that the 
President of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. be 
elected not by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. but 
by the whole population of the country. I think this 
addendum is wrong, because it runs counter to the 
spirit of our Constitution. According to the system 
of our Constitution there must not be an individual 
president in the U.S.S.R., elected by the whole 
population on a par with the Supreme Soviet, and 
able to put himself in opposition to the Supreme 
Soviet. The president in the U.S.S.R. is a collegium, 
it is the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, including 
the President of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet, elected, not by the whole population, but by

192 
the Supreme Soviet, and accountable to the Supreme 
Soviet. Historical experience shows that such a 
structure of the supreme bodies is the most democratic, 
and safeguards the country against undesirable 
contingencies. 
10. Then follows another amendment to Article 48. 
It reads as follows : that the number of Vice- 
Presidents of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
of the U.S.S.R. be increased to eleven, one from 
each Union Republic. I think that this amendment 
might be adopted, for it would be an improvement 
and would only enhance the prestige of the Presidium 
of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
11. Then follows an amendment to Article 77. It 
calls for the organization of a new All-Union People's 
Commissariat - the People's Commissariat of the 
Defence Industry. I think that this amendment should 
likewise be accepted (applause), for the time has 
arrived to separate our defence industry and have a 
People's Commissariat for it. It seems to me that 
this would only improve the defence of our country. 
12. Next follows an amendment to Article 124 of 
the Draft Constitution, demanding that the article 
be changed to provide for the prohibition of religious 
rites. I think that this amendment should be rejected 
as running counter to the spirit of our Constitution. 
13. Finally, there is one other amendment of a 
more or less material character. I am referring to 
an amendment to Article 135 of the Draft Constitution. 
It proposes that ministers of religion, 
former Whiteguards, all the former rich, and persons 
not engaged in socially useful occupations be dis

193 
franchised, or, at all events, that the franchise of 
people in this category be restricted to the right 
to elect, but not to be elected. I think that this 
amendment should likewise be rejected. The Soviet 
government disfranchised the non-working and exploiting 
elements not for all time, but temporarily, 
up to a certain period. There was a time when these 
elements waged open war against the people and 
actively resisted the Soviet laws. The Soviet law 
depriving them of the franchise was the Soviet 
government's reply to this resistance. Quite some 
time has elapsed since then. During this period we 
have succeeded in abolishing the exploiting classes, 
and the Soviet government has become an invincible 
force. Has not the time arrived for us to revise 
this law? I think the time has arrived. It is said 
that this is dangerous, as elements hostile to the 
Soviet government, some of the former Whiteguards, 
kulaks, priests, etc., may worm their way into the 
supreme governing bodies of the country. But what 
is there to be afraid of? If you are afraid of wolves, 
keep out of the woods. (Laughter and loud applause.) 
In the first place, not all the former kulaks, Whiteguards 
and priests are hostile to the Soviet government. 
Secondly, if the people in some place or other 
do elect hostile persons, that will show that our 
propaganda work was very badly organized, and we 
shall fully deserve such a disgrace; if, however, our 
propaganda work is conducted in a Bolshevik way, the 
people will not let hostile persons slip into the supreme 
governing bodies. This means that we must work and 
not whine (loud applause), we must work and not wait

194 
to have everything put before us ready-made by 
official order. As far back as 1919, Lenin said that 
the time was not far distant when the Soviet government 
would deem it expedient to introduce universal 
suffrage without any restrictions. Please note : without 
any restrictions. He said this at a time when 
foreign military intervention had not yet been overcome, 
and when our industry and agriculture were in 
a desperate condition. Since then, seventeen years 
have elapsed. Comrades, is it not time we carried 
out Lenin's behest? I think it is. 
Here is what Lenin said in 1919 in his "Draft 
Program of the Communist Party of Russia." Permit 
me to read it. 
"The Russian Communist Party must explain 
to the masses of the working people, in order 
to avoid a wrong generalization of transient 
historical needs, that the disfranchizement of 
a section of citizens does not in the Soviet 
Republic affect, as has been the case in the 
majority of bourgeois-democratic republics, a 
definite category of citizens disfranchised for 
life, but applies only to the exploiters, only 
to those who in violation of the fundamental 
laws of the Socialist Soviet Republic, persist 
in defending their position as exploiters, in 
preserving capitalist relationships. Consequently, 
in the Soviet Republic, on the one hand, 
every day of added strength for Socialism and 
diminution in the number of those who have 
objective possibilities of remaining exploiters 
or of preserving capitalist relationships, auto

195 
matically reduces the percentage of disfranchised 
persons. In Russia at the present time 
this percentage is hardly more than two or 
three per cent. On the other hand in the not 
distant future the cessation of foreign invasion 
and the completion of the expropriation 
of the expropriators may, under certain conditions, 
create a situation in which the proletarian 
state power will choose other methods 
of suppressing the resistance of the exploiters 
and will introduce universal suffrage without 
any restrictions." (Lenin : Collected Works, 
Russian edition, Vol. XXIV, p. 94.) 
That is clear, I think. 
Such is the position with regard to the amendments 
and addenda to the Draft Constitution of the 
U.S.S.R. 
VI. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE 
NEW CONSTITUTION OF THE U.S.S.R. 
Judging by the results of the nation-wide discussion, 
which lasted nearly five months, it may be 
presumed that the Draft Constitution will be approved 
by the present Congress. (Loud applause and cheers. 
All rise.) 
In a few days' time the Soviet Union will have a 
new, Socialist Constitution, built on the principles 
of fully developed Socialist democratism. 
It will be an historical document dealing in simple 
and concise terms, almost in the style of minutes, 
with the facts of the victory of Socialism in the

196 
U.S.S.R., with the facts of the emancipation of the 
working people of the U.S.S.R. from capitalist slavery, 
with the facts of the victory in the U.S.S.R. of full 
and thoroughly consistent democracy. 
It will be a document testifying to the fact that 
what millions of honest people in capitalist countries 
have dreamed of and still dream of has already been 
realized in the U.S.S.R. (Loud applause.) 
It will be a document testifying to the fact that 
what has been realized in the U.S.S.R. is fully possible 
of realization in other countries also. (Loud 
applause.) 
But from this it follows that the international 
significance of the new Constitution of the U.S.S.R. 
can hardly be exaggerated. 
Today, when the turbid wave of fascism is bespattering 
the Socialist movement of the working 
class and besmirching the democratic strivings of 
the best people in the civilized world, the new Constitution 
of the U.S.S.R. will be an indictment against 
fascism, declaring that Socialism and democracy are 
invincible. (Applause.) The new Constitution of the 
U.S.S.R. will give moral assistance and real support 
to all those who are today fighting fascist barbarism. 
(Loud applause.) 
Still greater is the significance of the new Constitution 
of the U.S.S.R. for the peoples of the 
U.S.S.R. While for the peoples of capitalist countries 
the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. will have the significance 
of a program of action, it is significant 
for the peoples of the U.S.S.R. as the summary of 
their struggles, a summary of their victories in the

197 
struggle for the emancipation of mankind. After the 
path of struggle and privation that has been traversed, 
it is pleasant and joyful to have our Constitution, 
which treats of the fruits of our victories. It is 
pleasant and joyful to know what our people fought 
for and how they achieved this victory of worldwide 
historical importance. It is pleasant and joyful to 
know that the blood our people shed so plentifully 
was not shed in vain, that it has produced results. 
(Prolonged applause.) This arms our working class, 
our peasantry, our working intelligentsia spiritually. 
It impels them forward and rouses a sense of legitimate 
pride. It increases confidence in our strength 
and mobilizes us for fresh struggles for the achievement 
of new victories of Communism. (Thunderous 
ovation. All rise. Shouts from all parts of the hall : 
"Long live Comrade Stalin." All stand and sing the 
"Internationale," after which the ovation is resumed. 
Shouts of "Long live our leader, Comrade Stalin, 
hurrah.") 
Pravda 
26 November 1936

198

199 
CONSTITUTION (FUNDAMENTAL LAW) 
OF THE 
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. 
WITH AMENDMENTS AND ADDITIONS ADOPTED BY 
THE FIRST, SECOND, THIRD, SIXTH, SEVENTH AND 
EIGHTH SESSIONS OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF 
THE U.S.S.R. 
CHAPTER I 
THE ORGANIZATION OF SOCIETY 
ARTICLE 1. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
is a socialist state of workers and peasants. 
ARTICLE 2. The Soviets of Working People's Deputies, 
which grew and attained strength as a result 
of the overthrow of the landlords and capitalists and 
the achievement of the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
constitute the political foundation of the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 3. In the U.S.S.R. all power belongs to 
the working people of town and country as represented 
by the Soviets of Working People's Deputies. 
ARTICLE 4. The socialist system of economy and 
the socialist ownership of the means and instruments 
of production, firmly established as a result of the 
abolition of the capitalist system of economy, the 
abrogation of private ownership of the means and 
instruments of production and the abolition of the

200 
exploitation of man by man, constitute the economic 
foundation of the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 5. Socialist property in the U.S.S.R. 
exists either in the form of state property (the 
possession of the whole people), or in the form of 
cooperative and collective-farm property (property 
of a collective farm or property of a cooperative 
association). 
ARTICLE 6. The land, its natural deposits, 
waters, forests, mills, factories, mines, rail, water 
and air transport, banks, post, telegraph, and telephones, 
large state organized agricultural enterprises 
(state farms, machine and tractor stations and the 
like) as well as municipal enterprises and the bulk 
of the dwelling houses in the cities and industrial 
localities, are state property, that is, belong to 
the whole people. 
ARTICLE 7. Public enterprises in collective farms 
and cooperative organizations, with their livestock 
and implements, the products of the collective farms 
and cooperative organizations, as well as their common 
buildings, constitute the common, socialist 
property of the collective farms and cooperative 
organizations. 
In addition to its basic income from the public, 
collective-farm enterprise, every household in a 
collective farm has for its personal use a small 
plot of land attached to the dwelling and, as its 
personal property, a subsidiary establishment on the 
plot, a dwelling house, livestock, poultry and minor

201 
agricultural implements - in accordance with the 
the statutes of the agricultural artel. 
ARTICLE 8. The land occupied by collective farms 
is secured to them for their use free of charge and 
for an unlimited time, that is, in perpetuity. 
ARTICLE 9. Alongside the socialist system of 
economy, which is the predominant form of economy 
in the U.S.S.R., the law permits the small private 
economy of individual peasants and handicraftsmen 
based on their personal labour and precluding the 
exploitation of the labour of others. 
ARTICLE 10. The right of citizens to personal 
ownership of their incomes from work and of their 
savings, of their dwelling houses and subsidiary household 
economy, their household furniture and utensils 
and articles of personal use and convenience, as well 
as the right of inheritance of personal property of 
citizens, is protected by law. 
ARTICLE 11. The economic life of the U.S.S.R. 
is determined and directed by the state national 
economic plan with the aim of increasing the public 
wealth, of steadily improving the material conditions 
of the working people and raising their cultural level, 
of consolidating the independence of the U.S.S.R. and 
strengthening its defensive capacity. 
ARTICLE 12. In the U.S.S.R. work is a duty and 
a matter of honour for every able-bodied citizen, in

202 
accordance with the principle: "He who does not 
work, neither shall he eat." 
The principle applied in the U.S.S.R. is that of 
socialism : "From each according to his ability, to 
each according to his work." 
CHAPTER II 
THE ORGANIZATION OF THE STATE. 
ARTICLE 13. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
is a federal state, formed on the basis of the 
voluntary association of Soviet Socialist Republics 
having equal rights, namely : 
The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic 
The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic 
The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic 
The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic 
The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic 
The Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic 
The Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic 
The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic 
The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic 
The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic 
The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic 
The Karelo-Finnish Soviet Socialist Republic 
The Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic 
The Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic 
The Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic 
The Esthonian Soviet Socialist Republic 
ARTICLE 14. The jurisdiction of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, as represented by its

203 
highest organs of state authority and organs of 
government, covers : 
a) Representation of the Union in international 
relations, conclusion and ratification of treaties 
with other states; 
b) Questions of war and peace; 
c) Admission of new republics into the U.S.S.R.; 
d) Control over the observance of the Constitution 
of the U.S.S.R. and ensuring conformity of the Constitutions 
of the Union Republics with the Constitution 
of the U.S.S.R.; 
e) Confirmation of alterations of boundaries between 
Union Republics; 
f) Confirmation of the formation of new Territories 
and Regions and also of new Autonomous 
Republics within Union Republics; 
g) Organization of the defence of the U.S.S.R. 
and direction of all the armed forces of the U.S.S.R.; 
h) Foreign trade on the basis of state monopoly; 
i) Safeguarding the security of the state; 
j) Establishment of the national economic plans 
of the U.S.S.R.; 
k) Approval of the single state budget of the 
U.S.S.R. as well as of the taxes and revenues which 
go to the all-Union, Republican and local budgets; 
l) Administration of the banks, industrial and 
agricultural establishments and enterprises and 
trading enterprises of all-Union importance; 
m) Administration of transport and communications; 
n) Direction of the monetary and credit system; 
o) Organization of state insurance;

204 
p) Raising and granting of loans; 
q) Establishment of the basic principles for the 
use of land as well as for the use of natural deposits, 
forests and waters; 
r) Establishment of the basic principles in the 
spheres of education and public health; 
s) Organization of a uniform system of national 
economic statistics; 
t) Establishment of the principles of labour legislation; 
u) Legislation on the judicial system and judicial 
procedure; criminal and civil codes; 
v) Laws on citizenship of the Union; laws on the 
rights of foreigners; 
w) Issuing of all-Union acts of amnesty. 
ARTICLE 15. The sovereignty of the Union Republics 
is limited only within the provisions set forth 
in Article 14 of the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. 
Outside of these provisions, each Union Republic 
exercises state authority independently. The U.S.S.R. 
protects the sovereign rights of the Union Republics. 
ARTICLE 16. Each Union Republic has its own 
Constitution, which takes account of the specific 
features of the Republic and is drawn up in full conformity 
with the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 17. To every Union Republic is reserved 
the right freely to secede from the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 18. The territory of a Union Republic 
may not be altered without its consent.

205 
ARTICLE 19. The laws of the U.S.S.R. have the 
same force within the territory of every Union 
Republic. 
ARTICLE 20. In the event of a discrepancy between 
a law of a Union Republic and an all-Union law, the 
all-Union law prevails. 
ARTICLE 21. A single Union citizenship is established 
for all citizens of the U.S.S.R. 
Every citizen of a Union Republic is a citizen of 
the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 22. The Russian Soviet Federative Socialist 
Republic consists of the Altai, Krasnodar, Krasnoyarsk, 
Orjonikidze, Primorye and Khabarovsk Territories; 
the Archangel, Vologda, Voronezh, Gorky, 
Ivanovo, Irkutsk, Kalinin, Kirov, Kuibyshev, Kursk, 
Leningrad, Molotov, Moscow, Murmansk, Novosibirsk, 
Omsk, Orel, Penza, Rostov, Ryazan, Saratov, Sverdlovsk, 
Smolensk, Stalingrad, Tambov, Tula, Chelyabinsk, 
Chita, Chjkalov and Yaroslavl Regions; the Tatar, 
Bashkir, Daghestan, Buryat-Mongolian, Kabardino- 
Balkarian, Kalmyk, Komi, Crimean, Mari, Mordovian, 
Volga German, North Ossetian, Udmurt, Chechen- 
Ingush, Chuvash and Yakut Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republics; and the Adygei, Jewish, Karachai, Oirot, 
Khakass ans Cherkess Autonomous Regions. 
ARTICLE 23. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic 
consists of the Vinnitsa, Volhynia, Voroshilovgrad, 
Dniepropetrovsk, Drohobych, Zhitomir, Zaporozhye,

206 
Izmail, Kamenets-Podolsk, Kiev, Kirovograd, Lvov, 
Nikolayev, Odessa, Poltova, Rovno, Stalino, Stanislav, 
Sumi, Tarnapol; Kharkov, Chernigov and Chernovitsi 
Regions. 
ARTICLE 24. The Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist 
Republic includes the Nakhichevan Autonomous Soviet 
Socialist Republic and the Nagarno-Karabakh Autonomous 
Region. 
ARTICLE 25. The Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic 
includes the Abkhazian Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic, the Adjar Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republic and the South Ossetian Autonomous Region. 
ARTICLE 26. The Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic 
consists of the Bukhara, Samarkand, Tashkent, 
Ferghana and Khorezm Regions, and the Kara-Kalpak 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. 
ARTICLE 27. The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic 
consists of the Garm, Kulyab, Leninabad and Stalinabad 
Regions, and the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous 
Region. 
ARTICLE 28. The Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic 
consists of the Akmolinsk, Aktyubinsk, Alma-Ata 
East Kazakhstan, Guriev, Jambul, West Kazakhstan, 
Karaganda, Kzyl-Orda, Kustanai, Pavlodar, North 
Kazakhstan, Semipalatinsk and South Kazakhstan 
Regions.

207 
ARTICLE 29. The Byelorussian Soviet Socialist 
Republic consists of the Baranovichi, Byelostok, 
Brest, Vileyka, Vitebsk, Gomel, Minsk, Moghilev, 
Pinsk and Polessye Regions. 
ARTICLE 29-a. The Turkmen Soviet Socialist 
Republic consists of the Ashkhabad, Krasnovodsk, 
Mari, Tashauz and Charjow Regions. 
ARTICLE 29-b. The Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic 
consists of the Dzhalal-Abad, Issyk-Kul, Osh, 
Tien-Shan and Frunze Regions. 
CHAPTER III 
THE HIGHEST ORGANS OF STATE AUTHORITY 
OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. 
ARTICLE 30. The highest organ of state authority 
of the U.S.S.R. is the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 31. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
exercises all rights vested in the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics in accordance with Article 14 of 
the Constitution, in so far as they do not, by virtue 
of the Constitution, come within the jurisdiction 
of organs of the U.S.S.R. that are accountable to 
the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., that is, the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., 
the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. 
and the People's Commissariats of the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 32. The legislative power of the U.S.S.R.

208 
is exercised exclusively by the Supreme Soviet of 
the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 33. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
consists of two chambers : the Soviet of the Union 
and the Soviet of Nationalities. 
ARTICLE 34. The Soviet of the Union is elected 
by the citizens of the U.S.S.R. according to electoral 
areas on the basis of one deputy for every 300,000 
of the population. 
ARTICLE 35. The Soviet of Nationalities is elected 
by the citizens of the U.S.S.R. according to Union 
and Autonomous Republics, Autonomous Regions and 
national areas on the basis of twenty-five deputies 
from each Union Republic, eleven deputies from each 
Autonomous Republic, five deputies from each Autonomous 
Region and one deputy from each national 
area. 
ARTICLE 36. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
is elected for a term of four years. 
ARTICLE 37. Both Chambers of the Supreme Soviet 
of the U.S.S.R., the Soviet of the Union and the 
Soviet of Nationalities, have equal rights. 
ARTICLE 38. The Soviet of the Union and the 
Soviet of Nationalities have an equal right to initiate 
legislation.

209 
ARTICLE 39. A law is considered adopted if passed 
by both Chambers of the Supreme Soviet of the 
U.S.S.R. by a simple majority vote in each. 
ARTICLE 40. Laws passed by the Supreme Soviet 
of the U.S.S.R. are published in the languages of the 
Union Republics over the signatures of the President 
and Secretary of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 41. Sessions of the Soviet of the Union 
and the Soviet of Nationalities begin and terminate 
simultaneously. 
ARTICLE 42. The Soviet of the Union elects a 
Chairman of the Soviet of the Union and two Vice- 
Chairmen. 
ARTICLE 43. The Soviet of Nationalities elects 
a Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities and two 
Vice-Chairmen. 
ARTICLE 44. The Chairmen of the Soviet of the 
Union and the Soviet of Nationalities preside over 
the sittings of the respective Chambers and direct 
the procedure of these bodies. 
ARTICLE 45. Joint sittings of both Chambers of 
the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. are presided over 
alternately by the Chairman of the Soviet of the 
Union and the Chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities.

210 
ARTICLE 46. Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of 
the U.S.S.R. are convened by the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. twice a year. 
Special sessions are convened by the Presidium 
of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. at its discretion 
or on the demand of one of the Union Republics. 
ARTICLE 47. In the event of a disagreement between 
the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of 
Nationalities, the question is referred for settlement 
to a conciliation commission formed on a parity 
basis. If the conciliation commission fails to arrive 
at an agreement, or if its decision fails to satisfy 
one of the Chambers, the question is considered for 
a second time by the Chambers. Failing agreement 
between the two Chambers, the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. dissolves the Supreme 
Soviet of the U.S.S.R. and orders new elections. 
ARTICLE 48. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
at a joint sitting of both Chambers elects the 
Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., 
consisting of a President of the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., sixteen Vice- 
Presidents, a Secretary of the Presidium and twentyfour 
members of the Presidium. 
The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the 
U.S.S.R. is accountable to the Supreme Soviet of the 
U.S.S.R. for all its activities. 
ARTICLE 49. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
of the U.S.S.R. :

211 
a) Convenes the sessions of the Supreme Soviet 
of the U.S.S.R.; 
b) Interprets laws of the U.S.S.R. in operation, 
issues decrees; 
c) Dissolves the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
in conformity with Article 47 of the Constitution 
of the U.S.S.R. and orders new elections; 
d) Conducts referendums on its own initiative or 
on the demand of one of the Union Republics; 
e) Annuls decisions and orders of the Council of 
People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and of the 
Council of People's Commissars of the Union Republics 
in case they do not conform to law; 
f) In the intervals between sessions of the Supreme 
Soviet of the U.S.S.R., relieves of their posts and 
appoints People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. on the 
recommendation of the Chairman of the Council of 
People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., subject to 
subsequent confirmation by the Supreme Soviet of 
the U.S.S.R.; 
g) Awards with decorations and confers titles of 
honour of the U.S.S.R.; 
h) Exercises the right of pardon; 
i) Appoints and removes the higher commands of 
the armed forces of the U.S.S.R.; 
j) In the intervals between sessions of the Supreme 
Soviet of the U.S.S.R., proclaims a state of war in 
the event of armed attack on the U.S.S.R., or whenever 
necessary to fulfil international treaty obligations 
concerning mutual defence against aggression; 
k) Orders general or partial mobilization; 
l) Ratifies international treaties;

212
m) Appoints and recalls plenipotentiary representatives 
of the U.S.S.R. to foreign states; 
n) Receives the credentials and letters of recall 
of diplomatic representatives accredited to it by 
foreign states; 
o) Proclaims martial law in separate localities or 
throughout the U.S.S.R. in the interests of the defence 
of the U.S.S.R. or for the purpose of ensuring public 
order and state security. 
ARTICLE 50. The Soviet of the Union and the 
Soviet of Nationalities elect Credentials Commissions 
which verify the credentials of the members of the 
respective Chambers. 
On there commendation of the Credentials Commisions, 
the Chambers decide either to endorse the 
the credentials or to annul the election of the deputies 
concerned. 
ARTICLE 51. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
when it deems necessary, appoints commissions of 
enquiry and investigation on any matter. 
It is the duty of all institutions and public servants 
to comply with the demands of these commissions 
and to submit to them the necessary materials and 
documents. 
ARTICLE 52. A member of the Supreme Soviet 
of the U.S.S.R. may not be prosecuted or arrested 
without the consent of the Supreme Soviet of the 
U.S.S.R., and during the period when the Supreme 
Soviet of the U.S.S.R. is not in session, without the

213 
consent of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of 
the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 53. On the expiration of the term of 
office of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., or after 
the dissolution of the Supreme Soviet prior to the 
expiration of its term of office, the Presidium of 
the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. retains its powers 
until the formation of a new Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the U.S.S.R. by the newly-elected Supreme 
Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 54. On the expiration of the term of 
office of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., or in 
the event of its dissolution prior to the expiration 
of its term of office, the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the U.S.S.R. orders new elections to be 
held within a period not exceeding two months from 
the date of expiration of the term of office or 
dissolution of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 55. The newly-elected Supreme Soviet 
of the U.S.S.R. is convened by the outgoing Presidium 
of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. not later than 
one month after the elections. 
ARTICLE 56. The Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
at a joint sitting of both Chambers, appoints the 
Government of the U.S.S.R., namely, the Council of 
People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.

214 
CHAPTER IV 
THE HIGHEST ORGANS OF STATE AUTHORITY 
OF THE UNION REPUBLICS. 
ARTICLE 57. The highest organ of state authority 
of a Union Republic is the Supreme Soviet of the 
Union Republic. 
ARTICLE 58. The Supreme Soviet of a Union 
Republic is elected by the citizens of the Republic 
for a term of four years. 
The basis of representation is established by the 
Constitution of the Union Republic. 
ARTICLE 59. The Supreme Soviet of a Union 
Republic is the sole legislative organ of the Republic. 
ARTICLE 60. The Supreme Soviet of a Union 
Republic : 
a) Adopts the Constitution of the Republic and 
amends it in conformity with Article 16 of the 
Constitution of the U.S.S.R.; 
b) Confirms the Constitutions of the Autonomous 
Republics forming part of it and defines the boundaries 
of their territories; 
c) Approves the national economic plan and also 
the budget of the Republic; 
d) Exercises the right of amnesty and pardon of 
citizens sentenced by the judicial organs of the Union 
Republic.

215 
ARTICLE 61. The Supreme Soviet of a Union 
Republic elects the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
of the Union Republic, consisting of a Chairman of 
the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Union 
Republic, Vice-Chairmen, a Secretary of the Presidium 
and members of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
of the Union Republic. 
The powers of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
of a Union Republic are defined by the Constitution 
of the Union Republic. 
ARTICLE 62. The Supreme Soviet of a Union 
Republic elects a Chairman and a Vice-Chairman to 
conduct its sittings. 
ARTICLE 63. The Supreme Soviet of a Union 
Republic appoints the Government of the Union Republic, 
namely, the Council of People's Commissars of 
the Union Republic. 
CHAPTER V 
THE ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF 
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS. 
ARTICLE 64. The highest executive and administrative 
organ of state authority of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics is the Council of People's 
Commissars of the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 65. The Council of People's Commissars 
of the U.S.S.R. is responsible to the Supreme Soviet

216 
of the U.S.S.R. and accountable to it; and in the intervals 
between sessions of the Supreme Soviet it is 
responsible and accountable to the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 66. The Council of People's Commissars 
of the U.S.S.R. issues decisions and orders on the 
basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation, and 
supervises their execution. 
ARTICLE 67. Decisions and orders of the Council 
of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. are binding 
throughout the territory of the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 68. The Council of People's Commissars 
of the U.S.S.R. : 
a) Coordinates and directs the work of the All- 
Union and Union-Republican People's Commissariats 
of the U.S.S.R. and of other institutions, economic 
and cultural, under its administration; 
b) Adopts measures to carry out the national 
economic plan and the state budget, and to strengthen 
the credit and monetary system; 
c) Adopts measures for the maintenance of public 
order, for the protection of the interests of the 
state, and for the safeguarding of the rights of 
citizens; 
d) Exercises general guidance in respect of relations 
with foreign states; 
e) Fixes the annual contingent of citizens to be 
called up for military service and directs the general 
organization and development of the armed forces

217 
of the country; 
f) Sets up, whenever necessary, special Committees 
and Central Administrations under the Council of 
People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. for matters 
concerning economic, cultural and defence organization 
and development. 
ARTICLE 69. The Council of People's Commissars 
of the U.S.S.R. has the right, in respect of those 
branches of administration and economy which come 
within the jurisdiction of the U.S.S.R., to suspend 
decisions and orders of the Councils of People's Commissars 
of the Union Republics and to annul orders 
and instructions of People's Commissars of the 
U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 70. The Council of People's Commissars 
of the U.S.S.R. is appointed by the Supreme Soviet 
of the U.S.S.R. and consists of : 
The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars 
of the U.S.S.R.; 
The Vice-Chairmen of the Council of People's 
Commissars of the U.S.S.R.; 
The Chairman of the State Planning Commission 
of the U.S.S.R.; 
The Chairman of the Soviet Control Commission; 
The People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R.; 
The Chairman of the Committee on Arts; 
The Chairman of the Committee on Higher Education; 
The Chairman of the Board of the State Bank.

218 
ARTICLE 71. The Government of the U.S.S.R. or 
a People's Commissar of the U.S.S.R. to whom a 
question of a member of the Supreme Soviet of the 
U.S.S.R. is addressed must give a verbal or written 
reply in the respective Chamber within a period not 
exceeding three days. 
ARTICLE 72. The People's Commissars of the 
U.S.S.R. direct the branches of state administration 
which come within the jurisdiction of the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 73. The People's Commissars of the 
U.S.S.R. issue, within the limits of the jurisdiction 
of the respective People's Commissariats, orders 
and instructions on the basis and in pursuance of 
the laws in operation, and also of decisions and orders 
of the Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R., 
and supervise their execution. 
ARTICLE 74. The People's Commissariats of the 
U.S.S.R. are either All-Union or Union-Republican 
Commissariats. 
ARTICLE 75. The All-Union People's Commissariats 
direct the branches of state administration 
entrusted to them throughout the territory of the 
U.S.S.R. either directly or through bodies appointed 
by them. 
ARTICLE 76. The Union-Republican People's Commissariats, 
as a rule, direct the branches of state 
administration entrusted to them through the cor

219 
responding People's Commissariats of the Union 
Republics; they administer directly only a definite 
and limited number of enterprises according to a 
list confirmed by the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 77. The following People's Commissariats 
are All-Union People's Commissariats : 
Defence 
Foreign Affairs 
Foreign Trade 
Railways 
Post, Telegraph and Telephones 
Maritime Fleet 
River Fleet 
Coal-Mining Industry 
Oil Industry 
Electric Power Stations 
Electrical Engineering Industry 
Iron and Steel Industry 
Non-Ferrous Metals Industry 
Chemical Industry 
Aircraft Industry 
Shipbuilding Industry 
Munitions Industry 
Armaments Industry 
Heavy Machine-Building Industry 
Medium Machine-Building Industry 
General Machine-Building Industry 
Navy 
Agricultural Stocks 
Civil Engineering Industry

220 
Cellulose and Paper Industry. 
ARTICLE 78. The following People's Commissariats 
are Union-Republican People's Commissariats : 
Food Industry 
Fishing Industry 
Meat and Dairy Produce Industry 
Light Industry 
Textile Industry 
Timber Industry 
Agriculture 
State Grain and Livestock Farms 
Finance 
Trade 
Internal Affairs 
State Security 
Justice 
Public Health 
Building Materials Industry 
State Control. 
CHAPTER VI 
THE ORGANS OF GOVERNMENT OF THE 
UNION REPUBLICS 
ARTICLE 79. The highest executive and administrative 
organ of state authority of a Union Republic 
is the Council of People's Commissars of the Union 
Republic. 
ARTICLE 80. The Council of People's Commissars 
of a Union Republic is responsible to the Supreme

221 
Soviet of the Union Republic and accountable to it; 
and in the intervals between sessions of the Supreme 
Soviet of the Union Republic it is responsible and 
accountable to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet 
of the respective Union Republic. 
ARTICLE 81. The Council of People's Commissars 
of a Union Republic issues decisions and orders on 
the basis and in pursuance of the laws in operation 
of the U.S.S.R. and of the Union Republic, and of 
the decisions and orders of the Council of People's 
Commissars of the U.S.S.R., and supervises their 
execution. 
ARTICLE 82. The Council of People's Commissars 
of a Union Republic has the right to suspend decisions 
and orders of Councils of People's Commissars of 
Autonomous Republics, and to annul decisions and 
orders of Executive Committees of Soviets of Working 
People's Deputies of Territories, Regions and 
Autonomous Regions. 
ARTICLE 83. The Council of People's Commissars 
of a Union Republic is appointed by the Supreme Soviet 
of the Union Republic and consists of : 
The Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars 
of the Union Republic; 
The Vice-Chairmen; 
The Chairman of the State Planning Commission; 
The People's Commissars of : 
Food Industry 
Fishing Industry

222 
Meat and Dairy Produce Industry 
Light Industry 
Textile Industry 
Timber Industry 
Building Materials Industry 
Agriculture 
State Grain and Livestock Farms 
Finance 
Trade 
Internal Affairs 
State Security 
Justice 
Public Health 
State Control 
Education 
Local Industry 
Municipal Economy 
Social Maintenance 
Motor Transport 
The Chief of the Arts Administration; 
The Representatives of the All-Union People's 
Commissariats. 
ARTICLE 84. The People's Commissars of a Union 
Republic direct the branches of state administration 
which come within the jurisdiction of the Union 
Republic. 
ARTICLE 85. The People's Commissars of a Union 
Republic issue, within the limits of the jurisdiction 
of their respective People's Commissariats, orders 
and instructions on the basis and in pursuance of

223 
the laws of the U.S.S.R. and of the Union Republic, 
of the decisions and orders of the Council of People's 
Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and that of the Union 
Republic, and of the orders and instructions of the 
Union-Republican People's Commissariats of the 
U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 86. The People's Commissariats of a 
Union Republic are either Union-Republican or Republican 
Commissariats. 
ARTICLE 87. The Union-Republican People's Commissariats 
direct the branches of state administration 
entrusted to them, and are subordinate 
both to the Council of People's Commissars of the 
Union Republic and to the corresponding Union- 
Republican People's Commissariats of the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 88. The Republican People's Commissariats 
direct the branches of state administration 
entrusted to them and are directly subordinate to 
the Council of People's Commissars of the Union 
Republic. 
CHAPTER VII 
THE HIGHEST ORGANS OF STATE AUTHORITY OF 
THE AUTONOMOUS SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS 
ARTICLE 89. The highest organ of state authority 
of an Autonomous Republic is the Supreme Soviet of 
the Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic.

224 
ARTICLE 90. The Supreme Soviet of an Autonomous 
Republic is elected by the citizens of the 
Republic for a term of four years on the basis of 
representation established by the Constitution of the 
Autonomous Republic. 
ARTICLE 91. The Supreme Soviet of an Autonomous 
Republic is the sole legislative organ of the 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. 
ARTICLE 92. Each Autonomous Republic has its 
own Constitution, which takes account of the specific 
features of the Autonomous Republic and is drawn 
up in full conformity with the Constitution of the 
Union Republic. 
ARTICLE 93. The Supreme Soviet of an Autonomous 
Republic elects the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the Autonomous Republic and appoints the 
Council of People's Commissars of the Autonomous 
Republic, in accordance with its Constitution. 
CHAPTER VIII 
THE LOCAL ORGANS OF STATE AUTHORITY 
ARTICLE 94. The organs of state authority in 
territories, regions, autonomous regions, areas, 
districts, cities and rural localities (stanitsas, villages, 
hamlets, kishlaks, auls) are the Soviets of 
Working People's Deputies. 
ARTICLE 95. The Soviets of Working People's

225 
Deputies of territories, regions, autonomous regions, 
areas, districts, cities and rural localities (stanitsas, 
villages, hamlets, kishlaks, auls) are elected by the 
working people of the respective territories, regions, 
autonomous regions, areas, districts, cities or rural 
localities for a term of two years. 
ARTICLE 96. The basis of representation for 
Soviets of Working People's Deputies is defined by 
the Constitutions of the Union Republics. 
ARTICLE 97. The Soviets of Working People's 
Deputies direct the work of the organs of administration 
subordinate to them, ensure the maintenance 
of public order, the observance of the laws and the 
protection of the rights of citizens, direct local 
economic and cultural organization and development 
and draw up the local budgets. 
ARTICLE 98. The Soviets of Working People's 
Deputies adopt decisions and issue orders within the 
limits of the powers vested in them by the laws of 
the U.S.S.R. and of the Union Republic. 
ARTICLE 99. The executive and administrative 
organs of the Soviets of Working People's Deputies 
of territories, regions, autonomous regions, areas, 
districts, cities and rural localities are the Executive 
Committees elected by them, consisting of a Chairman, 
Vice-Chairmen, a Secretary and members. 
ARTICLE 100. The ex ecutive and administrative

226 
organ of rural Soviets of Working People's Deputies 
in small localities, in accordance with the Constitutions 
of the Union Republics, is the Chairman, the 
Vice-Chairman and the Secretary elected by them. 
ARTICLE 101. The executive organs of the Soviet s 
of Working People's Deputies are directly accountable 
both to the Soviets of Working People's Deputies 
which elected them and to the executive organ of 
the superior Soviet of Working People's Deputies. 
CHAPTER IX 
THE COURTS AND THE PROCURATOR'S OFFICE 
ARTICLE 102. In the U.S.S.R. justice is administered 
by the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R., the 
Supreme Courts of the Union Republics, the Territorial 
and the Regional courts, the courts of the 
Autonomous Republics and the Autonomous Regions, 
the Area courts, the special courts of the U.S.S.R. 
established by decision of the Supreme Soviet of the 
U.S.S.R., and the People's Courts. 
ARTICLE 103. In all courts cases are tried with 
the participation of people's assessors, except in 
cases specially provided for by law. 
ARTICLE 104. The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. 
is the highest judicial organ. The Supreme Court of 
the U.S.S.R. is charged with the supervision of the 
judicial activities of all the judicial organs of the 
U.S.S.R. and of the Union Republics.

227 
ARTICLE 105. The Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R. 
and the special courts of the U.S.S.R. are elected 
by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. for a term 
of five years. 
ARTICLE 106. The Supreme Courts of the Union 
Republics are elected by the Supreme Soviets of the 
Union Republics for a term of five years. 
ARTICLE 107. The Supreme Courts of the Autonomous 
Republics are elected by the Supreme Soviets 
of the Autonomous Republics for a term of five 
years. 
ARTICLE 108. The Territorial and the Regional 
courts, the courts of the Autonomous Regions and 
the Area courts are elected by the Territorial, 
Regional or Area Soviets of Working People's Deputies 
of the Autonomous Regions for a term of five years. 
ARTICLE 109. People's Courts are elected by the 
citizens of the district on the basis of universal, 
direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot for a term 
of three years. 
ARTICLE 110. Judicial proceedings are conducted 
in the language of the Union Republic, Autonomous 
Republic or Autonomous Region, persons not knowing 
this language being guaranteed every opportunity of 
fully acquainting themselves with the material of 
the case through an interpreter and likewise the 
right to use their own language in court.

228 
ARTICLE 111. In all courts of the U.S.S.R. cases 
are heard in public, unless otherwise provided for 
by law, and the accused is guaranteed the right to 
be defended by Counsel. 
ARTICLE 112. Judges are independent and subject 
only to the law. 
ARTICLE 113. Supreme supervisory power over 
the strict execution of the laws by all People's 
Commissariats and institutions subordinated to them, 
as well as by public servants and citizens of the 
U.S.S.R. is vested in the Procurator of the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 114. The Procurator of the U.S.S.R. is 
appointed by the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. for 
a term of seven years. 
ARTICLE 115. Procurators of Republics, Territories 
and Regions, as well as Procurators of 
Autonomous Republics and Autonomous Regions are 
appointed by the Procurator of the U.S.S.R. for a 
term of five years. 
ARTICLE 116. Area, district and city procurators 
are appointed for a term of five years by the Procurators 
of the Union Republics, subject to the approval 
of the Procurator of the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 117. The organs of the Procurator's 
Office perform their functions independently of any 
local organs whatsoever, being subordinate solely to 
the Procurator of the U.S.S.R.

229 
CHAPTER X 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF CITIZENS 
ARTICLE 118. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the 
right to work, that is, are guaranteed the right to 
employment and payment for their work in accordance 
with its quantity and quality. 
The right to work is ensured by the socialist organization 
of the national economy, the steady growth 
of the productive forces of Soviet society, the 
elimination of the possibility of economic crises, 
and the abolition of unemployment. 
ARTICLE 119. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the 
right to rest and leisure. 
The right to rest and leisure is ensured by the 
reduction of the working day to seven hours for the 
overwhelming majority of the workers, the institution 
of annual vacations with full pay for workers and 
employees and the provision of a wide network of 
sanatoria, rest homes and clubs for the accommodation 
of the working people. 
ARTICLE 120. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the 
right to maintenance in old age and also in the case 
of sickness or loss of capacity to work. 
This right is ensured by the extensive development of 
social insurance of workers and employees at state 
expense, free medical service for the working people 
and the provision of a wide network of health resorts 
for the use of the working people.

230 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
ARTICLE 121. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. have the 
right to education. 
This right is ensured by universal, compulsory 
elementary education; by education, including higher 
education, being free of charge; by the system of 
state stipends for the overwhelming majority of 
students in the universities and colleges; by instruction 
in schools being conducted in the native language, 
and by the organization in the factories, state farms, 
machine and tractor stations and collective farms 
of free vocational, technical and agronomic training 
for the working people. 
ARTICLE 122. Women in the U.S.S.R. are accorded 
equal rights with men in all spheres of economic, 
state, cultural, social and political life. 
The possibility of exercising these rights is ensured 
to women by granting them an equal right with 
men to work, payment for work, rest and leisure, 
social insurance and education, and by state protection 
of the interests of mother and child, pre-maternity 
and maternity leave with full pay, and the provision 
of a wide network of maternity homes, nurseries 
and kindergartens. 
ARTICLE 123. Equality of rights of citizens of 
the U.S.S.R., irrespective of their nationality or race, 
in all spheres of economic, state, cultural, social 
and political life, is an indefeasible law. 
Any direct or indirect restriction of the rights 
of, or, conversely, any establishment of direct or 
indirect privileges for, citizens on account of their

231 
race or nationality, as well as any advocacy of racial 
or national exclusiveness or hatred and contempt, 
is punishable by law. 
ARTICLE 124. In order to ensure to citizens 
freedom of conscience, the church in the U.S.S.R. 
is separated from the state, and the school from 
the church. Freedom of religious worship and freedom 
of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for 
all citizens. 
ARTICLE 125. In conformity with the interests 
of the working people, and in order to strengthen 
the socialist system, the citizens of the U.S.S.R. 
are guaranteed by law : 
a) freedom of speech; 
b) freedom of the press; 
c) freedom of assembly, including the holding of 
mass meetings; 
d) freedom of street processions and demonstrations; 
These civil rights are ensured by placing at the 
disposal of the working people and their organizations 
printing presses, stocks of paper, public buildings, 
the streets, communications facilities and other 
material requisites for the exercise of these rights. 
ARTICLE 126. In conformity with the interests 
of the working people, and in order to develop the 
organizational initiative and political activity of the 
masses of the people, citizens of the U.S.S.R. are 
ensured the right to unite in public organizations -

232 
trade unions, cooperative associations, youth organizations, 
sport and defence organizations, cultural, 
technical and scientific societies; and the most active 
and politically most conscious citizens in the ranks 
of the working class and other sections of the working 
people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the 
working people in their struggle to strengthen and 
develop the socialist system and is the leading core 
of all organizations of the working people, both public 
and state. 
ARTICLE 127. Citizens of the U.S.S.R. are guaranteed 
inviolability of the person. No person may be 
placed under arrest except by decision of a court 
or with the sanction of a procurator. 
ARTICLE 128. The inviolability of the homes of 
citizens and privacy of correspondence are protected 
by law. 
ARTICLE 129. The U.S.S.R. affords the right of 
asylum to foreign citizens persecuted for defending 
the interests of the working people, or for their 
scientific activities, or for their struggle for national 
liberation. 
ARTICLE 130. It is the duty of every citizen of 
the U.S.S.R. to abide by the Constitution of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, to observe the laws, 
to maintain labour discipline, honestly to perform 
public duties, and to respect the rules of socialist 
intercourse.

233 
ARTICLE 131. It is the duty of every citizen of 
the U.S.S.R. to safeguard and strengthen public, 
socialist property as the sacred and inviolable foundation 
of the Soviet system, as the source of the 
wealth and might of the country, as the source of 
the prosperous and cultured life of all the working 
people. 
Persons committing offences against public, socialist 
property are enemies of the people. 
ARTICLE 132. Universal military service is law. 
Military service in the Workers' and Peasants' 
Red Army is an honourable duty of the citizens of 
the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 133. To def en d the fatherland is the 
sacred duty of every citizen of the U.S.S.R. Treason 
to the country - violation of the oath of allegiance, 
desertion to the enemy, impairing the military power 
of the state, espionage - is punishable with all the 
severity of the law as the most heinous of crimes. 
CHAPTER XI 
THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM 
ARTICLE 134. Member s of all Soviets of Working 
People's Deputies - of the Supreme Soviet of the 
U.S.S.R., the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics, 
the Soviets of Working People's Deputies of the 
Territories and Regions, the Supreme Soviets of 
the Autonomous Republics, the Soviets of Working 
Peopleąs Deputies of Autonomous Regions, area,

234 
district, city and rural (stanitsa, village, hamlet, 
kishlak, aul) Soviets of Working People's Deputies 
- are chosen by the electors on the basis of universal, 
direct and equal suffrage by secret ballot. 
ARTICLE 135. Elections of deputies are universal 
: all citizens of the U.S.S.R. who have reached the 
age of eighteen, irrespective of race or nationality, 
religion, educational and residential qualifications, 
social origin, property status or past activities, 
have the right to vote in the election of deputies 
and to be elected, with the exception of insane persons 
and persons who have been convicted by a court 
of law and whose sentences include deprivation of 
electoral rights. 
ARTICLE 136. Elections of deputies are equal : 
each citizen has one vote; all citizens participate 
in elections on an equal footing. 
ARTICLE 137. Women have the right to elect and 
be elected on equal terms with men. 
ARTICLE 138. Citizens serving in the Red Army 
have the right to elect and be elected on equal terms 
with all other citizens. 
ARTICLE 139. Elections of deputies are direct : 
all Soviets of Working People's Deputies from rural 
and city Soviets of Working People's Deputies to 
the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., inclusive, are 
elected by the citizens by direct vote.

235 
ARTICLE 140. Voting at elections of deputies is 
secret. 
ARTICLE 141. Candidates for election are nominated 
according to electoral areas. 
The right to nominate candidates is secured to 
public organizations and societies of the working 
people : Communist Party organizations, trade unions, 
cooperatives, youth organizations and cultural societies. 
ARTICLE 142. It is the duty of every deputy to 
report to his electors on his work and on the work 
of the Soviet of Working People's Deputies, and he 
is liable to be recalled at any time in the manner 
established by law upon decision of a majority of 
the electors. 
CHAPTER XII 
ARMS, FLAG, CAPITAL 
ARTICLE 143. The arms of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics consists of a sickle and hammer 
against a globe depicted in the rays of the sun and 
surrounded by ears of grain with the inscription 
"Workers of All Countries, Unite!" in the languages 
of the Union Republics. At the top of the arms is 
a five-pointed star. 
ARTICLE 144. The state flag of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics is of red cloth with the 
sickle and hammer depicted in gold in the upper cor

236 
ner near the staff and above them a five-pointed 
star bordered in gold. The ratio of the width to the 
length is 1:2. 
ARTICLE 145. The capital of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics is the City of Moscow. 
CHAPTER XIII 
PROCEDURE FOR AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION 
ARTICLE 146. The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. 
may be amended only by decision of the Supreme 
Soviet of the U.S.S.R. adopted by a majority of not 
less than two-thirds of the votes cast in each of 
its Chambers. 
APPENDICES : LAWS ADOPTED BY THE TENTH 
SESSION OF THE SUPREME SOVIET OF THE U.S.S.R. 
APPENDIX I 
LAW 
ON CREATING TROOP FORMATIONS OF THE UNION 
REPUBLICS AND ON REORGANIZING THE PEOPLE'S 
COMMISSARIAT OF DEFENCE IN CONNECTION 
THEREWITH FROM AN ALL-UNION INTO A UNION 
REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT 
With the object of strengthening the defence 
capacity of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
the Supreme Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics decrees :

237 
1. To establish that the Union Republics shall 
organize troop formations of their respective Republics. 
2. To introduce into the Constitution of the 
U.S.S.R. the following amendments: 
a) to insert in ARTICLE 14g of the Constitution 
of the U.S.S.R. after the words "Organization of 
the defence of the U.S.S.R. and direction of all the 
armed forces of the U.S.S.R.," the words - "establishment 
of the guiding principles of organization 
of the troop formations of the Union Republics," 
thus formulating this point as follows : 
"g) Organization of the defence of the U.S.S.R., 
direction of all the armed forces of the U.S.S.R., 
establishment of the guiding principles of organization 
of the troop formations of the Union Republics." 
b) To add to the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 18 -b, as follows : 
"ARTICLE 18-b 
Each Union Republic has its own Republican 
troop formations." 
c) To add to ARTICLE 60 of the Constitution of 
of the U.S.S.R. sec. f, as follows : 
"f) Establishes the system of organization of 
the Republican troop formations." 
3. To reorganize the People's Commissariat of 
Defence from an All-Union into a Union-Republican 
People's Commissariat. 
M. KALININ. 
President of the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.

238 
A. GORKIN 
Secretary of the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
APPENDIX II 
LAW 
ON GRANTING THE UNION REPUBLICS PLENIPOTENTIARY 
POWERS IN THE SPHERE OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS AND ON REORGANIZING THE PEOPLE'S 
COMMISSARIAT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS IN CONNECTION 
THEREWITH FROM AN ALL-UNION INTO A 
UNION-REPUBLICAN PEOPLE'S COMMISSARIAT 
With the object of extending international connections 
and strengthening the collaboration of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with other states 
and taking into consideration the growing requirements 
of the Union Republics in the matter of establishing 
direct relations with foreign states, the Supreme 
Soviet of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
decrees : 
1. To establish that the Union Republics may enter 
into direct relations with foreign states and conclude 
agreements with them. 
2. To introduce into the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. 
the following amendments : 
a) To insert in ARTICLE 14a of the Constitution 
of the U.S.S.R., after the words "Representation of 
the Union in international relations, conclusion and 
ratification of treaties with other states," the 
words - "establishment of a uniform system in the

239 
relations between the Union Republics and foreign 
states," thus formulating this point as follows : 
"a) Representation of the Union in international 
relations, conclusion and ratification of treaties 
with other states, establishment of a uniform system 
in the relations between the Union Republics and 
foreign states." 
b) To add to the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. 
ARTICLE 18-a, as follows : 
"ARTICLE 18-a 
"Each Union Republic has the right to enter 
into direct relations with foreign states, conclude 
agreements with them and exchange diplomatic 
and consular representatives." 
c) To add to ARTICLE 60 of the Constitution of 
the U.S.S.R. sec. e, as follows : 
"e) Establishes representation of the Union 
Republic in international relations." 
3. To reorganize the People's Commissariat of 
Foreign Affairs from an All-Union into a Union- 
Republican People's Commissariat. 
M. KALININ 
President of the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
A. GORKIN 
Secretary of the Presidium of the 
Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
Moscow, The Kremlin 
February 1, 1944.

240 
The following text was published as 
a pamphlet in the United States under 
the title Mastering Bolshevism. 
M-L Digital Reprints

241 
REPORT AND SPEECH IN REPLY TO DEBATE AT 
THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF 
THE C.P.S.U. 
3 - 5 March 1937 
DEFECTS IN PARTY WORK AND MEASURES FOR 
LIQUIDATING TROTSKYITE AND OTHER 
DOUBLE -DEALERS 
Comrades, from the reports and the debates on 
these reports heard at this Plenum it is evident that 
we are dealing with the following three main facts. 
First, the wrecking, diversionist and espionage 
work of the agents of foreign countries, among whom 
a rather active role was played by the Trotskyites, 
affected more or less all, or nearly all, our organisations 
- economic, administrative and Party. 
Second, the agents of foreign countries, among 
them the Trotskyites, not only penetrated into our 
lower organisations, but also into a number of responsible 
positions. 
Third, some of our leading comrades, at the centre 
and in the districts, not only failed to discern the 
real face of these wreckers, diversionists, spies and 
assassins, but proved to be so careless, complacent 
and naive that not infrequently they themselves helped 
to promote agents of foreign powers to responsible 
positions. 
Such are the three incontrovertible facts which 
naturally emerge from the reports and the debates 
on these reports.

242 
1. POLITICAL CARELESSNESS 
How are we to explain the fact that our leading 
comrades, who have rich experience in the fight against 
all sorts of anti-Party and anti-Soviet trends, proved 
in this case to be so naive and blind that they were 
unable to see the real face of the enemies of the 
people, were unable to discern the wolves in sheep's 
clothing, unable to tear off their masks? 
Can it be said that the wrecking, diversionist 
and espionage work of the agents of foreign powers 
operating in the territory of the U.S.S.R. can be 
anything unexpected and unprecedented for us? No, 
that cannot be said. This is shown by the wrecking 
activities in various branches of national economy 
during the past ten years, beginning with the Shakhti 
period, activities which are registered in official 
documents. 
Can it be said that in this past period there were 
no warning signals and warning signs about the wrecking, 
espionage or terrorist activities of the Trotskyite- 
Zinovievite agents of fascism? No, that cannot be 
said. We had such signals, and Bolsheviks have no 
right to forget about them. 
The foul murder of Comrade Kirov was the first 
serious warning which showed that the enemies of 
the people would resort to duplicity, and resorting 
to duplicity would disguise themselves as Bolsheviks, 
as Party members, in order to worm their way into 
our confidence and gain access to our organizations. 
The trial of the "Leningrad Centre" as well as 
the "Zinoviev-Kamenev" trial gave fresh grounds for

243 
the lessons which followed from the foul murder of 
Comrade Kirov. 
The trial of the "Zinovievite-Trotskyite bloc" 
broadened the lessons of the preceding trials and 
strikingly demonstrated that the Zinovievites and 
Trotskyites had united around themselves all the 
hostile bourgeois elements, that they had become 
transformed into an espionage, diversionist and terrorist 
agency of the German secret police, that duplicity 
and camouflage are the only means by which 
the Zinovievites and Trotskyites can penetrate into 
our organizations, that vigilance and political insight 
are the surest means of preventing such penetration, 
of liquidating the Zinovievite-Trotskyite gang. 
The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. in its 
confidential letter of January 18, 1935, on the foul 
murder of Comrade Kirov emphatically warned the 
Party organizations against political complacency and 
philistine heedlessness. In the confidential letter it 
was stated : 
"We must put a stop to opportunist complacency 
which comes from the mistaken assumption 
that as we grow in strength our 
enemies become tamer and more innocuous. 
Such an assumption is radically wrong. It is an 
echo of the Right deviation which assured all 
and sundry that the enemy would quietly creep 
into socialism, that in the end they would become 
real socialists. Bolsheviks cannot rest 
on their laurels and become heedless. We do 
not want complacency, but vigilance, real Bol

244 
shevik, revolutionary vigilance, We must remember 
that the more hopeless the position 
of the enemies becomes the more eagerly will 
they clutch at extreme methods as the only 
methods of the doomed in their struggle against 
the Soviet power. We must remember this and 
be vigilant." 
In its confidential letter of July 29, 1936, on the 
espionage - terrorist activities of the Trotskyite - 
Zinovievite bloc the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. 
once again called upon the Party organizations to 
display the utmost vigilance, to acquire the ability 
to discern the enemies of the people no matter how 
well disguised they may be. In that confidential letter 
it was stated : 
"Now that it has been proved that the 
Trotskyite - Zinovievite monsters are uniting 
in their struggle against the Soviet power all 
the most enraged and sworn enemies of the 
toilers of our country - spies, provocateurs, 
diversionists, whiteguards, kulaks, etc. - when 
between these elements and the Trotskyites 
and Zinovievites all lines of demarcation have 
been obliterated, all our Party organizations, 
all members of the Party, must understand 
that the vigilance of Communists is needed 
on every sector and under all circumstances. 
An inalienable quality of every Bolshevik under 
present conditions must be the ability to discern 
the enemy of the Party no matter how

245 
well he may disguise himself." 
And so there were signals and warnings. 
What did these signals and warnings call for? 
They called for the elimination of the weakness 
of Party organizational work and for the transformation 
of the Party into an impregnable fortress 
into which not a single double-dealer could penetrate. 
They called upon us to put a stop to the underestimation 
of Party political work and to make an 
emphatic turn in the direction of intensifying this 
work to the utmost, of intensifying political vigilance. 
But what happened? The facts show that our comrades 
reacted to these signals and warnings very 
slowly. 
This is eloquently shown by all the known facts 
that have emerged from the campaign of verifying 
and exchanging Party documents. 
How are we to explain the fact that these warnings 
and signals did not have the required effect? 
How are we to explain the fact that our Party 
comrades, notwithstanding their experience in the 
struggle against anti-Soviet elements, notwithstanding 
the numerous warning signals and warning signs, 
proved to be politically short-sighted in face of the 
wrecking, espionage and diversionist work of the 
enemies of the people? 
Perhaps our Party comrades have deteriorated, 
have become less class-conscious and less disciplined? 
No, of course not! 
Perhaps they have begun to degenerate? Again, 
of course not! There are no grounds whatever for

246 
such an assumption. 
What is the matter then? Whence this heedlessness, 
carelessness, complacency, blindness? 
The matter is that our comrades, carried away 
by economic campaigns and by colossal successes on 
the front of economic construction, simply forgot 
about certain very important facts which Bolsheviks 
have no right to forget. They forgot about the main 
fact in the international position of the U.S.S.R. and 
failed to notice two very important facts which have 
direct relation to the present-day wreckers, spies, 
diversionists and assassins who are concealing themselves 
behind Party membership cards and disguising 
themselves as Bolsheviks. 
II. THE CAPITALIST ENCIRCLEMENT 
What are the facts which our Party comrades 
forgot about, or simply failed to notice? 
They forgot that the Soviet power is victorious 
only on one-sixth of the globe, that five-sixths of 
the globe are in the possession of capitalist states. 
They forgot that the Soviet Union is encircled by 
capitalist states. It is an accepted thing among us 
to chatter about capitalist encirclement, but people 
refuse to ponder over what sort of thing this capitalist 
encirclement is. Capitalist encirclement is 
not an empty phrase, it is a very real and unpleasant 
thing. Capitalist encirclement means that there is 
a country, the Soviet Union, which has established 
the socialist system, and that there are, besides, 
many other countries, bourgeois countries, which

247 
continue to lead the capitalist mode of life and which 
surround the Soviet Union, waiting for an opportunity 
to attack her, to crush her, or, at all events, to 
undermine her might and weaken her. 
It is this main fact that our comrades forgot. 
But it is precisely this fact that determines the 
basis of the relations between the capitalist encirclement 
and the Soviet Union. 
Take the bourgeois states, for example. Naive 
people might think that exceptionally good relations 
exist between them, as between states of the same 
type. But only naive people can think like that. As 
a matter of fact relations far from neighbourly 
exist between them. It has been proved as definitely 
as twice two are four that the bourgeois states send 
to each other spies, wreckers, diversionists, and 
sometimes also assassins, instruct them to penetrate 
into the institutions and enterprises of these states, 
set up their agencies and "in case of necessity" disrupt 
their rear, in order to weaken them and to 
undermine their strength. Such is the case at the 
present time. Such, also, was the case in the past. 
For example, take the states in Europe at the time 
of Napoleon the First. At that time France was 
swarming with spies and diversionists from the side 
of the Russians, Germans, Austrians and English. 
On the other hand, England, the German states, 
Austria and Russia, had in their rear a no smaller 
number of spies and diversionists from the French 
side. English agents twice made an attempt on the 
life of Napoleon, and several times they roused the 
peasants of the Vendee in France against the Napoleon

248 
government. And what was this Napoleon government? 
A bourgeois government, which strangled the French 
Revolution and preserved only those results of the 
revolution which were of advantage to the big bourgeoisie. 
Needless to say the Napoleon government did 
not remain in debt to its neighbours and also undertook 
diversionist measures. Such was the case in the 
past, 130 years ago. That is the case now, 130 years 
after Napoleon the First. Today France and England 
are swarming with German spies and diversionists, 
and, on the other hand, Anglo-French spies and diversionists 
are busy in Germany; America is swarming 
with Japanese spies and diversionists, and Japan is 
swarming with American spies and diversionists. 
Such is the law of the relations between bourgeois 
states. 
The question arises, why should the bourgeois 
states treat the Soviet socialist state more gently 
and in a more neighbourly manner than they treat 
bourgeois states of their own type? Why should they 
send to the Soviet Union fewer spies, wreckers, 
diversionists and assassins than they send to their 
kindred bourgeois states? Why should you think so? 
Would it not be more correct from the point of view 
of Marxism to assume that the bourgeois states 
would send twice and three times as many wreckers, 
spies, diversionists and assassins to the Soviet Union 
as they send to any bourgeois state? 
Is it not clear that as long as capitalist encirclement 
exists we shall have wreckers, spies, diversionists 
and assassins sent to us by agents of foreign 
states?

249 
Our Party comrades forgot about all this, and 
having forgotten about it, they were caught unawares. 
That is why the espionage and diversionist work 
of the Trotskyite agents of the Japano-German secret 
police proved to be quite unexpected for some of 
our comrades. 
III. PRESENT DAY TROTSKYISM 
Further, while fighting the Trotskyite agents, 
our Party comrades failed to notice, overlooked the 
fact that present-day Trotskyism is not what it was, 
say, seven or eight years ago, that during this period 
Trotskyism and the Trotskyites had undergone an 
important evolution which radically changed the face 
of Trotskyism, that in view of this, the struggle 
against Trotskyism, the methods of fighting it, have 
to be radically changed. Our Party comrades failed 
to notice that Trotskyism had ceased to be a political 
trend in the working class, that from the political 
trend in the working class that it was seven or eight 
years ago Trotskyism had become transformed into 
a wild and unprincipled gang of wreckers, diversionists, 
spies and assassins acting on the instructions 
of the intelligence services of foreign states. 
What is a political trend in the working class? A 
political trend in the working class is a group, or 
party, which has a definite political face, a platform, 
a program, which does not and cannot hide its views 
from the working class, but on the contrary, advocates 
its views openly and honestly before the working class, 
which is not afraid of showing its political face to

250 
the working class, which is not afraid of demonstrating 
its real aims and objects to the working class, but 
on the contrary, goes to the working class with open 
visor in order to convince it of the correctness of 
its views. In the past, seven or eight years ago, 
Trotskyism was such a political trend in the working 
class, an anti-Leninist and, therefore, a profoundly 
mistaken trend, it is true, but a political trend, 
nevertheless. 
Can it be said that present-day Trotskyism, 
Trotskyism, say, of 1936, is a political trend in the 
working class? No, this cannot be said, Why? Because 
the present-day Trotskyites are afraid to show their 
real face to the working class, are afraid to reveal 
to it their real aims and objects, carefully hide 
their political face from the working class, fearing 
that if the working class learns about their real 
intentions it will curse them as people alien to it 
and drive them away. This, in fact, explains why the 
principal methods of Trotskyite work are now not 
the open and honest advocacy of its views in the 
working class, but the disguising of its views, the 
obsequious, fawning eulogy of the views of its opponents, 
the pharisaical and hypocritical trampling 
of its own views in the mud. 
At the trial in 1936, if you remember, Kamenev 
and Zinoviev emphatically denied that they had any 
political platform. They had every opportunity of 
unfolding their political platform at the trial. But 
they did not do this, declaring that they had no 
political platform. There can be no doubt that both 
of them were lying when they denied that they had

251 
a political platform. Now even the blind can see that 
they had a political platform. But why did they deny 
that they had a political platform? Because they were 
afraid to reveal their real political face, they were 
afraid to demonstrate their real platform of restoring 
capitalism in the U.S.S.R., they were afraid 
because such a platform would cause revulsion in the 
ranks of the working class. 
At the trial in 1937, Pyatakov, Radek and Sokolnikov 
took a different line. They did not deny that the 
Trotskyites and Zinovievites had a political platform. 
They admitted that they had a definite political 
platform, admitted it and unfolded it in their evidence. 
But they unfolded it not in order to call upon the 
working class, to call upon the people, to support 
the Trotskyite platform, but in order to curse and 
brand it as an anti-people and anti-proletarian platform. 
The restoration of capitalism, the liquidation 
of the collective farms and state farms, the restoration 
of the system of exploitation, alliance with 
the fascist forces of Germany and Japan to bring 
nearer war against the Soviet Union, the fight for 
war and against the policy of peace, the territorial 
dismemberment of the Soviet Union in which the 
Ukraine was to be surrendered to the Germans and 
the Maritime Region to the Japanese, preparation 
for the military defeat of the Soviet Union in the 
event of an attack on her by hostile states and, as 
a means of achieving these aims, wrecking, diversion, 
individual acts of terrorism against the leaders of 
the Soviet government, espionage on behalf of the 
Japano-German fascist forces - such was the political

252 
platform of present-day Trotskyism unfolded by 
Pyatakov, Radek and Sokolnikov. Naturally the Trotskyites 
could not but hide such a platform from the 
people, from the working class. And they hid it not 
only from the working class, but also from the rankand-
file Trotskyites, and not only from the rankand-
file Trotskyites, but even from the leading 
Trotskyite group consisting of a small clique of 
thirty or forty people. When Radek and Pyatakov 
demanded from Trotsky permission to convene a 
small conference of thirty or forty Trotskyites for 
the purpose of informing them about the character 
of this platform, Trotsky forbade them on the ground 
that it was inexpedient to tell even a small clique 
of Trotskyites about the real character of this platform, 
for such an "operation" might cause a split. 
"Political figures," hiding their views and their 
platform not only from the working class, but also 
from the Trotskyite rank-and-file, and not only from 
the Trotskyite rank-and-file, but from the leading 
group of the Trotskyites - such is the face of presentday 
Trotskyism. 
But it follows from this that present-day Trotskyism 
can no longer be called a political trend in the 
working class. 
Present-day Trotskyism is not a political trend 
in the working class, but a gang without principles 
and without ideals, a gang of wreckers, diversionists, 
intelligence service agents, spies, assassins, 
a gang of sworn enemies of the working class, working 
in the pay of the intelligence services of foreign 
states.

253 
Such is the incontrovertible result of the evolution 
of Trotskyism in the last seven or eight years. 
Such is the difference between Trotskyism in the 
past and Trotskyism at the present time. 
The mistake our Party comrades made is that 
they failed to notice this profound difference between 
Trotskyism in the past and Trotskyism at the present 
time. They failed to notice that the Trotskyites have 
long ceased to be people devoted to an ideal, that 
the Trotskyites long ago became highway robbers, 
capable of any foulness, capable of all that is disgusting, 
to the point of espionage and the downright 
betrayal of their country, if only they can harm the 
Soviet government and Soviet power. They failed to 
notice this and therefore were unable to adapt themselves 
in time to fight the Trotskyites in a new way, 
more determinedly. 
That is why the abominable work of the Trotskyites 
during the last few years was quite unexpected 
for some of our Party comrades. 
To proceed. Finally, our Party comrades failed to 
notice that there is an important difference between 
the present-day wreckers and diversionists, among 
whom the Trotskyite agents of fascism play rather 
an active part, and the wreckers and diversionists 
of the time of the Shakhti case. 
Firstly, the Shakhti and Industrial Party wreckers 
were people openly alien to us. They were for the 
most part former factory owners, former managers 
for the old employers, former share-holders in joint 
stock companies, or simply old bourgeois specialists 
who were openly hostile to us politically. None of our

254 
people had any doubt about the real political face of 
these gentlemen. And the Shakhti wreckers themselves 
did not conceal their dislike for the Soviet system. 
The same cannot be said about the present-day wreckers 
and diversionists, the Trotskyites. The presentday 
wreckers and diversionists, the Trotskyites, are 
for the most part Party people with a Party card 
in their pocket, consequently, people who, formally, 
are not alien to us. The old wreckers opposed our 
people, but the new wreckers fawn upon our people, 
praise them, toady to them in order to worm their 
way into their confidence. As you see, the difference 
is an important one, 
Secondly, the strength of the Shakhti and Industrial 
Party wreckers was that they, more or less, possessed 
the necessary technical knowledge, whereas 
our people, not possessing such knowledge, were compelled 
to learn from them. This circumstance put the 
wreckers of the Shakhti period in an advantageous 
position, it enabled them to carry on their wrecking 
work freely and unhindered, enabled them to deceive 
our people technically. This is not the case with the 
present-day wreckers, with the Trotskyites. The 
present-day wreckers are not superior to our people 
in technical knowledge. On the contrary, our people 
are technically better trained than the present-day 
wreckers, than the Trotskyites. During the period 
from the Shakhti case to the present day tens of 
thousands of genuine, technically well-equipped Bolshevik 
cadres have grown up among us. One could 
mention thousands and tens of thousands of technically 
educated Bolshevik leaders, compared with whom people

255 
like Pyatakov and Livshitz, Shestov and Boguslavsky, 
Muralov and Drobnis are empty windbags and mere 
tyros from the standpoint of technical training. That 
being the case, wherein lies the strength of the 
present-day wreckers, the Trotskyites? Their strength 
lies in the Party card, in the possession of a Party 
card. Their strength lies in the fact that the Party 
card enables them to be politically trusted and gives 
them access to all our institutions and organizations. 
Their advantage lies in that, holding a Party card 
and pretending to be friends of the Soviet power, they 
deceived our people politically, abused their confidence, 
did their wrecking work furtively and disclosed our 
state secrets to the enemies of the Soviet Union. The 
political and moral value of this "advantage" is a 
doubtful one, but still, it is an "advantage." This 
"advantage" explains why the Trotskyite wreckers, 
having a Party card, having access to all places in 
our institutions and organizations, were a real windfall 
for the intelligence services of foreign states. 
The mistake some of our Party comrades made is 
that they failed to notice, did not understand this 
difference between the old and the new wreckers, 
between the Shakhti wreckers and the Trotskyites, 
and, not noticing this, they were unable to adapt 
themselves in time to fight the new wreckers in a 
new way. 
IV. THE BAD SIDE OF ECONOMIC SUCCESSES 
Such are the main facts of our international and 
internal situation which many of our Party comrades

256 
forgot, or which they failed to notice. 
That is why our people were taken unawares by the 
events of the last few years as regards wrecking and 
diversion. 
It may be asked : But why did our people fail to 
notice all this, why did they forget about all this? 
Where did all this forgetfulness, blindness, carelessness, 
complacency, come from? 
Is it an organic defect in the work of our people? 
No, it is not an organic defect. It is a temporary 
phenomenon which can be rapidly removed if our people 
make some effort. 
What is the matter then? 
The matter is that during the last few years our 
Party comrades have been totally absorbed in economic 
work, have been carried away to the extreme by 
economic successes, and being absorbed by all this, 
they forgot about everything else, neglected everything 
else. 
The matter is that, being carried away by economic 
successes, they began to regard this as the beginning 
and end of all things, and simply ceased to pay attention 
to such things as the international position 
of the Soviet Union, the capitalist encirclement, increasing 
the political work of the Party, the struggle 
against wrecking, etc., assuming that all these were 
second-rate or even third-rate matters. 
Successes and achievements are a great thing, of 
course. Our successes in the sphere of socialist construction 
are truly enormous. But successes, like 
everything else in the world, have their bad side. 
Among people who are not very skilled in politics,

257 
big successes and big achievements not infrequently 
give rise to carelessness, complacency, self satisfaction, 
excessive self-confidence, swelled-headedness 
and boastfulness. You cannot deny that lately braggarts 
have multiplied among us enormously. It is not 
surprising that in this atmosphere of great and important 
successes in the sphere of socialist construction 
boastfulness should arise, that showy 
demonstrations of our successes, underestimation of 
the strength of our enemies, overestimation of our 
own strength, and, as a result of all this, political 
blindness, should arise. 
Here I must say a few words about the dangers 
connected with successes, about the dangers connected 
with achievements. 
We know by experience about the dangers connected 
with difficulties. We have been fighting against such 
dangers for a number of years and, I may say, not 
without success. Among people who are not staunch, 
dangers connected with difficulties not infrequently 
give rise to despondency, lack of confidence in their 
own strength, feelings of pessimism. When, however, 
it is a matter of combating dangers which arise from 
difficulties, people are hardened in this struggle and 
emerge from the struggle really granite Bolsheviks. 
Such is the nature of the dangers connected with difficulties. 
Such are the results of overcoming difficulties. 
But there is another kind of danger, the danger 
connected with successes, the danger connected with 
achievements. Yes, yes, comrades, dangers connected 
with successes, with achievements. These dangers are

258 
that among people not very skilled in politics and not 
having seen much, the atmosphere of successes - 
success after success, achievement after achievement, 
overfulfilment of plans after overfulfilment 
of plans - gives rise to carelessness and selfsatisfaction, 
creates an atmosphere of showy triumphs 
and mutual congratulations, which kills the sense of 
proportion and dulls political intuition, takes the spring 
out of people and causes them to rest on their laurels. 
It is not surprising that in this intoxicating atmosphere 
of swelled-headedness and self-satisfaction 
in this atmosphere of showy demonstrations and loud 
self-praise, people forget certain essential facts of 
first-rate importance for the fate of our country; 
people begin not to notice such unpleasant facts as 
the capitalist encirclement, the new forms of wrecking, 
the dangers connected with our successes, and 
so forth. Capitalist encirclement? Oh, that's nothing! 
What does capitalist encirclement matter if we are 
fulfilling and overfulfilling our economic plans? The 
new forms of wrecking, the struggle against Trotskyism? 
Mere trifles! What do these trifles matter if 
we are fulfilling and overfulfilling our economic plans? 
The Party rules, electing Party bodies, Party leaders 
reporting to the Party members? Is there really any 
need for all this? Is it worth while bothering about 
all these trifles if our economy is growing and the 
material conditions of the workers and peasants are 
becoming better and better? Mere trifles! The plans 
are being overfulfilled, our Party is not a bad one, 
the Central Committee of our Party is also not a 
bad one - what else do we need? They are some funny

259 
people sitting there in Moscow, in the Central Committee 
of the Party, inventing all sorts of problems, 
talk about wrecking, don't sleep themselves and don't 
let other people sleep . . . 
This is a striking example of how easily and "simply" 
some of our inexperienced comrades are infected with 
political blindness as a result of dizzying rapture 
over economic successes. 
Such are the dangers connected with successes, 
with achievements. 
Such are the reasons why our Party comrades, 
having been carried away by economic successes, forgot 
about facts of an international and internal character 
which are of vital importance for the Soviet Union, 
and failed to notice a number of dangers surrounding 
our country. 
Such are the roots of our carelessness, forgetfulness, 
complacency, political blindness. 
Such are the roots of the defects in our economic 
and Party work. 
V. OUR TASKS 
How can these defects in our work be removed? 
What must be done to achieve this? 
The following measures must be carried out : 
1) First of all the attention of our Party comrades 
who have become submerged in "current questions" 
in some department or other must be turned towards 
the big political international and internal problems. 
2) The political work of our Party must be raised 
to the proper level, making the cornerstone the task

260 
of politically educating and giving Bolshevik hardness 
to the Party, Soviet and economic cadres. 
3) It must be explained to our Party comrades that 
the economic successes, the significance of which is 
undoubtedly very great and which we shall go on striving 
to achieve, day after day, year after year, are nevertheless 
not the whole of our work of socialist construction. 
It must be explained that the bad sides connected 
with economic successes which are expressed in selfsatisfaction, 
carelessness, the dulling of political 
intuition, can be removed only if economic successes 
are combined with successes in Party construction 
and extensive political work of our Party. 
It must be explained that economic successes, 
their stability and duration wholly and entirely depend 
on the successes of Party organizational and Party 
political work, that without this, economic successes 
may prove to have been built on sand. 
4) We must remember and never forget that the 
capitalist encirclement is the main fact which determines 
the international position of the Soviet Union. 
We must remember and never forget that as long 
as the capitalist encirclement exists there will be 
wreckers, diversionists, spies, terrorists, sent to 
the Soviet Union by the intelligence services of foreign 
states; this must be borne in mind and a struggle 
must be waged against those comrades who underestimate 
the significance of the capitalist encirclement, 
who underestimate the strength and significance 
of wrecking. 
It must be explained to our Party comrades that

261 
no economic successes, no matter how great, can 
annul the capitalist encirclement and the consequences 
arising from it. 
The necessary measures must be taken to enable 
our comrades, both Party and non-Party Bolsheviks, 
to become familiar with the aims and objects, with 
the practice and technique of the wrecking, diversionist 
and espionage work of the foreign intelligence 
services. 
5) It must be explained to our Party comrades 
that the Trotskyites, who are the active elements 
in the diversionist, wrecking and espionage work of 
the foreign intelligence services, have long ceased 
to be a political trend in the working class, that 
they have long ceased to serve any ideal compatible 
with the interests of the working class, that they 
have become a gang of wreckers, diversionists, spies, 
assassins, without principles and ideals, working in 
the pay of foreign intelligence services. 
It must be explained that in the struggle against 
present-day Trotskyism, not the old methods, the 
methods of discussion, must be used, but new methods, 
uprooting and smashing methods. 
6) We must explain to our Party comrades the 
difference between the present-day wreckers and the 
wreckers of the Shakhti period; we must explain that 
whereas the wreckers of the Shakhti period deceived 
our people in the sphere of technique, taking advantage 
of their technical backwardness, the present-day 
wreckers, with Party cards in their possession, deceive 
our people by taking advantage of the political confidence 
shown towards them as Party members, by

262 
taking advantage of the political carelessness of our 
people. 
The old slogan of the mastery of technique which 
corresponded to the Shakhti period must be supplemented 
by the new slogan of political training of 
cadres, the mastery of Bolshevism and abandonment 
of our political trustfulness, a slogan which fully 
corresponds to the period we are now passing through. 
It may be asked : Was it not possible ten years 
ago, during the Shakhti period, to advance both slogans 
simultaneously, the first slogan on the mastery of 
technique, and the second slogan on the political training 
of cadres? No, it was not possible. Things are 
not done that way in the Bolshevik Party. At the 
turning points of the revolutionary movement some 
basic slogan is always advanced as the key slogan 
which we grasp in order to pull the whole chain. That 
is what Lenin taught us : find the main link in the 
chain of our work, grasp it, pull it and thus pull 
the whole chain forward. The history of the revolutionary 
movement shows that this is the only correct 
tactic. In the Shakhti period the weakness of 
our people lay in their technical backwardness. Technical 
questions and not political ones were our weak 
spot at that time. Our political attitude towards the 
wreckers of that time was perfectly clear, it was 
the attitude of Bolsheviks towards politically alien 
people. We eliminated our technical weakness by advancing 
the slogan on the mastery of technique and 
by educating during this period tens and hundreds of 
technically equipped Bolshevik cadres. It is a different 
matter now when we have technically equipped Bol

263 
shevik cadres and when the part of wreckers is being 
played by people who are not openly alien to us and 
moreover are not technically superior to us, but who 
possess Party cards and enjoy all the rights of Party 
members. The weakness from which our people suffer 
now is not technical backwardness but political carelessness, 
blind faith in people who have accidentally 
obtained Party cards, the failure to judge people not 
by their political declarations, but by the results 
of their work. The key question now facing us is not 
the elimination of the technical backwardness of our 
cadres for, in the main, this has already been done, 
but the elimination of the political carelessness and 
political trustfulness in wreckers who have accidentally 
obtained Party cards. 
Such is the radical difference between the key 
question in the struggle for cadres in the Shakhti 
period and the key question at the present time. 
That is why we could and should not have issued 
both slogans ten years ago : the one on the mastery 
of technique and the one on the political training of 
cadres. 
That is why the old slogan on the mastery of 
technique must now be supplemented by the new slogan 
on the mastery of Bolshevism, the political training 
of cadres and the abandonment of our political carelessness. 
7) We must smash and cast aside the rotten theory 
that with every advance we make the class struggle 
here must subside, the more successes we achieve 
the tamer will the class enemy become. 
This is not only a rotten theory but a dangerous

264 
one, for it lulls our people, leads them into a trap, 
and enables the class enemy to recuperate for the 
struggle against the Soviet government. 
On the contrary, the further forward we advance, 
the greater the successes we achieve, the greater 
will be the fury of the remnants of the defeated 
exploiting classes, the more ready will they be to 
resort to sharper forms of struggle, the more will 
they seek to harm the Soviet state, and the more 
will they clutch at the most desperate means of 
struggle as the last resort of the doomed. 
It must be borne in mind that the remnants of 
the defeated classes in the U.S.S.R. do not stand 
alone. They have the direct support of our enemies 
beyond the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. It would be a 
mistake to think that the sphere of the class struggle 
is limited to the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. One end 
of the class struggle operates within the frontiers 
of the U.S.S.R., but its other end stretches across 
the frontiers of the bourgeois states surrounding 
us. The remnants of the defeated classes cannot but 
be aware of this. And precisely because they are 
aware of it, they will continue their desperate sorties. 
This is what history teaches us. This is what 
Leninism teaches us. 
We must remember all this and be on the alert. 
8) We must smash and cast aside another rotten 
theory to the effect that a person who is not always 
engaged in wrecking and who even occasionally shows 
successes in his work cannot be a wrecker. 
This strange theory exposes the naivete of its 
authors. No wrecker will engage in wrecking all the

265 
time if he wants to avoid being exposed in the shortest 
possible time. On the contrary, the real wrecker 
must from time to time show successes in his work, 
for this is his only means of preservation as a wrecker, 
of winning the confidence of people and of continuing 
his wrecking work. 
I think that this question is clear and requires 
no further explanation. 
9) We must smash and cast aside the third rotten 
theory to the effect that the systematic fulfilment 
of the economic plans nullifies wrecking and its consequences. 
Such a theory can only have one purpose, namely 
to tickle the self-esteem of our department officials, 
to lull them and to weaken their struggle against 
wrecking. 
What does "the systematic fulfilment of our 
economic plans" mean? 
Firstly, it has been proved that all our economic 
plans are too low, for they do not take into account 
the enormous reserves and possibilities lying hidden in 
our national economy. 
Secondly, the total fulfilment of economic plans 
by the respective People's Commissariats does not 
mean that there are not some very important branches 
which fail to fulfil their plans. On the contrary, the 
facts go to show that quite a number of People's 
Commissariats which have fulfilled or even more than 
fulfilled the annual economic plans, systematically 
fail to fulfil the plans in several very important 
branches of national economy. 
Thirdly, there can be no doubt that had the wreck

266 
ers not been exposed and ejected, the position in 
respect to the fulfilment of economic plans would 
have been far worse. This is something which the 
short-sighted authors of the theory under review 
ought to remember. 
Fourthly, the wreckers usually time the main part 
of their wrecking work not for peace time, but for 
the eve of war, or for war itself. Suppose we lulled 
ourselves with this rotten "systematic fulfilment 
of economic plans" theory and did not touch the 
wreckers. Do the authors of this rotten theory appreciate 
what an enormous amount of harm the wreckers 
would do to our country in case of war if we 
allowed them to remain within the body of our national 
economy, sheltered by the rotten "systematic fulfilment 
of economic plans" theory? 
Is it not clear that this "systematic fulfilment 
of economic plans" theory is a theory which is advantageous 
to the wreckers? 
10) We must smash and cast aside the fourth 
rotten theory to the effect that the Stakhanov movement 
is the principal means for the liquidation of 
wrecking. 
This theory has been invented in order, amidst 
the noisy chatter about the Stakhanovites and the 
Stakhanov movement, to parry the blow against the 
wreckers. 
In his report Comrade Molotov quoted a number 
of facts which show how the Trotskyite and non- 
Trotskyite wreckers of the Kuznetsk and Donetz Basins 
abused the confidence of our politically careless comrades, 
systematically led the Stakhanovites by the

267 
nose, put spokes in their wheel, so to speak, deliberately 
created numerous obstacles to prevent them 
from working successfully and finally succeeded in 
disorganizing their work. What can the Stakhanovites 
do alone if capital construction as carried on by the 
wreckers, let us say, in the Donetz Basin, caused 
the preparatory work of coal mining to lag behind all 
other branches of the work? 
Is it not clear that the Stakhanov movement itself 
is in need of our real assistance against the various 
machinations of the wreckers so as to advance the 
movement and enable it to fulfil its great mission? 
Is it not clear that the struggle against wrecking, 
the fight to liquidate it, to curb this wrecking is 
a necessary condition to enable the Stakhanov movement 
to expand to the full? 
I think that this question is also clear and needs 
no further comment. 
11) We must smash and cast aside the fifth rotten 
theory to the effect that the Trotskyite wreckers 
have no more reserves, that they are mustering their 
last cadres. 
This is not true, comrades. Only naive people could 
invent such a theory. The Trotskyite wreckers have 
their reserves. These consist first of all of the 
remnants of the defeated exploiting classes in the 
U.S.S.R. They consist of a whole number of groups 
and organizations beyond the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. 
which are hostile to the Soviet Union. 
Take, for example, the Trotskyite counterrevolutionary 
Fourth International, two - thirds of 
which is made up of spies and diversionist agents. Is

268 
not this a reserve? Is it not clear that this international 
of spies will provide forces for the spying 
and wrecking work of the Trotskyites? 
Or take, for example, the group of that rascal, 
Scheflo, in Norway who provided a haven for the archspy 
Trotsky and helped him to harm the Soviet Union. 
Is not this group a reserve? Who can deny that this 
counter-revolutionary group will continue to render 
services to the Trotskyite spies and wreckers? 
Or take, for example, the group of another rascal 
like Scheflo, the Souvarine group in France. Is not 
this a reserve? Can it be denied that this group of 
rascals will also help the Trotskyites in their espionage 
and wrecking work against the Soviet Union? 
Those ladies and gentlemen from Germany, the 
Ruth Fischers, Maslovs, and Urbahns who have sold 
themselves body and soul to the fascists - are they 
not reserves for the espionage and wrecking work of 
the Trotskyites? 
Or take, for example, the well-known gang of 
writers in America headed by the well-known crook 
Eastman, all these pen pirates who live by slandering 
the working class of the Soviet Union - are they not 
reserves for Trotskyism? 
No, the rotten theory that the Trotskyites are 
mustering their last forces must be cast aside. 
12) Finally we must smash and cast aside still 
another rotten theory to the effect that since we 
Bolsheviks are many, while the wreckers are few, 
since we Bolsheviks have the support of tens of 
millions of people, while the Trotskyite wreckers 
can be numbered in tens and units, then we Bolsheviks

269 
can afford to ignore this handful of wreckers. 
This is wrong, comrades. This more than strange 
theory has been invented for the consolation of certain 
of our leading comrades who have failed in their 
work because of their inability to combat wrecking. 
It has been invented to lull their vigilance, to enable 
them to sleep peacefully. 
Of course it is true that the Trotskyite wreckers 
have the support of individuals, while the Bolsheviks 
have the support of tens of millions of people. But 
it by no means follows from this that the wreckers 
are not able to inflict very serious damage on us. 
It does not need a large number of people to do harm 
and to cause damage. To build a Dnieper Dam tens 
of thousands of workers have to be set to work. But 
to blow it up, only a score or so would be required. 
To win a battle in a war several Red Army corps 
may be required. But to nullify this gain at the front 
only a few spies are needed at Army Headquarters, 
or even at Divisional Headquarters, to steal the plan 
of operations and pass it on to the enemy. To build 
a big railway bridge thousands of people are required. 
But to blow it up a few are sufficient. Scores and 
hundreds of similar examples could be quoted. 
Consequently, we must not comfort ourselves with 
the fact that we are many, while they, the Trotskyite 
wreckers, are few. 
We must see to it that not a single Trotskyite 
wrecker is left in our ranks. 
This is how the matter stands with the question 
of how to remove the defects in our work, which 
are common to all our organizations - economic,

270 
Soviet, administrative and Party. 
Such are the measures that are necessary to remove 
these defects. 
As regards the Party organizations in particular, 
and the defects in their work, the measures necessary 
to remove these defects are indicated in sufficient 
detail in the Draft Resolution submitted for your 
consideration. I think, therefore, that there is no 
need to enlarge on this aspect of the question here. 
I would like to say just a few words on the question 
of political training and of improving our Party cadres. 
I think that if we were able, if we succeeded in 
giving our Party cadres, from top to bottom, 
ideological training and in hardening them politically 
so that they could easily find their bearings in the 
internal and international situation, if we succeeded 
in making them fully mature Leninists, Marxists, 
capable of solving the problems of leading the country 
without serious error, we would thereby solve ninetenths 
of our problems. 
What is the situation with regard to the leading 
forces of our Party? 
In our Party, if we have in mind its leading strata, 
there are 3,000 to 4,000 first rank leaders. These 
are what I would call the generals of our Party. 
Then there are 30,000 to 40,000 middle rank leaders, 
who are our Party's commissioned officers. 
Then there are about 100,000 to 150,000 lower 
Party leaders who are, so to speak, our Party's 
non-commissioned officers. 
The task is to raise the ideological level of these 
commanding cadres, to harden them politically, to

271 
infuse them with new forces which are awaiting promotion, 
and thus enlarge the ranks of these leading 
cadres. 
What is needed for this? 
First of all we must instruct each of our Party 
leaders, from secretaries of Party cells to secretaries 
of Regional and - Republic Party organizations, to 
select within a certain time two persons, two Party 
workers, who are capable of acting as his effective 
deputies. It might be asked : where are we to get 
these two deputies for each secretary, we have no 
such people, no workers who answer these requirements. 
This is wrong, comrades. We have tens of thousands 
of capable and talented people. All we have to do is 
get to know them and promote them in time so as 
not to keep them in one place too long, until they 
begin to rot. Seek and ye shall find. 
Further. For the Party instruction and re-training 
of secretaries of Party cells, four months' "Party 
courses" should be established in every Regional centre. 
The secretaries of all primary Party organizations 
(cells) should be sent to these courses, and when they 
finish and return home, their deputies and the most 
capable members of the primary Party organizations 
should be sent to these courses. 
Further. For the political re-training of first 
secretaries of District organizations, eight months' 
"Lenin courses" should be established in, say, ten 
of the most important centres in the U.S.S.R. The 
first secretaries of District and Regional Party 
organizations should be sent to these courses, and 
when they finish and return home, their deputies and

272 
the most capable members of the District and Regional 
organizations should be sent. 
Further, For the ideological re-training and political 
improvement of secretaries of city organizations, 
six months' "Courses for the study of Party history 
and policy" under the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. should be 
established. The first or second secretaries of city 
Party organizations should be sent to these courses, 
and when they finish and return home, the most 
capable members of the city Party organizations 
should be sent. 
Finally, a six months' "Conference on questions 
of internal and international policy" under the C.C. 
of the C.P.S.U. should be established. The first 
secretaries of Regional and Territorial organizations 
and of Central Committees of national Communist 
Parties should be sent here. These comrades should 
provide not one but several relays, capable of replacing 
the leaders of the Central Committee of our Party. 
This should and must be done. 
I now conclude, comrades. 
We have thus indicated the main defects in our 
work, those which are common to all our organizations 
- economic, administrative and Party, and also those 
which are peculiar only to the Party organizations, 
defects which the enemies of the working class have 
taken advantage of in their diversionist and wrecking, 
espionage and terrorist work. 
We have also indicated the principal measures that 
have to be adopted to remove these defects and to 
render harmless the diversionist, wrecking, espionage 
and terrorist sorties of the Trotskyite-fascist agents

273 
of the foreign intelligence services. 
The question arises : can we carry out all these 
measures, have we all the necessary means for this? 
Undoubtedly we can. We can because we have all 
the means necessary to carry out these measures. 
What do we lack? 
We lack only one thing, the readiness to rid ourselves 
of our carelessness, our complacency, our 
political short-sightedness. 
There's the rub. 
Cannot we, who have overthrown capitalism, who, 
in the main, have built Socialism and have raised 
aloft the great banner of world Communism, get rid 
of this ridiculous and idiotic disease? 
We have no reason to doubt that we shall certainly 
get rid of it, if, of course, we want to do so. We 
will not just get rid of it, but get rid of it in the 
Bolshevik way, in real earnest. 
And when we get rid of this idiotic disease we 
shall be able to say with complete confidence that 
we fear no enemies from within or without, we do 
not fear their sorties, for we shall smash them in 
the future as we are smashing them now and as we 
have smashed them in the past. (Applause.) 
Pravda 
29 March 1937

274

275 
SPEECH IN REPLY TO DEBATE 
5 March 37 
Comrades, in my report I dealt with the main 
problems of the subject we are discussing. The debate 
has shown that there is now complete clarity among 
us, that we understand the tasks and that we are 
ready to remove the defects in our work. But the 
debate has also shown that there are several definite 
questions of our organizational and political practice 
on which there is not yet complete and clear understanding. 
I have counted seven such questions. 
Permit me to say a few words about these questions. 
1) We must assume that everybody now understands 
and realises that excessive absorption in economic 
campaigns and allowing ourselves to be carried away 
by economic successes while Party political problems 
are underestimated and forgotten, lead into a culde-
sac. Consequently, the attention of Party workers 
must be turned in the direction of Party political 
problems so that economic successes may be combined 
and march side by side with successes in Party 
political work. 
How, practically, can the task of reinforcing 
Party political work, the task of freeing Party organizations 
from minor economic details, be carried 
out? As is evident from the debate, some comrades 
are inclined to draw from this the wrong conclusion

276 
that economic work must now be abandoned entirely, 
At all events, there were voices which said in effect : 
Well, now, thank god, we shall be free from economic 
affairs, now we shall be able to devote our attention 
to Party political work. Is this conclusion correct? 
No, it is not correct. When our Party comrades who 
were carried away by economic successes abandoned 
politics, it meant going to the extreme, for which 
we had to pay dearly. If, now, some comrades, in 
setting to work to reinforce Party political work, 
think of abandoning economic work, this will be going 
to the other extreme, for which we shall pay no less 
dearly. You must not rush from one extreme to the 
other. Politics cannot be separated from economics. 
We can no more abandon economics than we can abandon 
politics. For convenience of study people usually, 
methodologically separate problems of economy from 
problems of politics. But this is only done methodologically, 
artificially, only for convenience of study. 
In real life, however, in practice, politics are inseparable 
from economics. They exist together and 
operate together. And whoever thinks of separating 
economics from politics in our practical work, of 
reinforcing economic work at the expense of political 
work, or, on the contrary, of reinforcing political 
work at the expense of economic work, will inevitably 
find himself in a cul-de-sac. 
The meaning of the point in the draft resolution 
on freeing Party organizations from minor economic 
details and increasing Party political work is not that 
we must abandon economic work and economic leadership, 
but merely that we must no longer permit our

277 
Party organizations to supersede the business organizations, 
particularly the land departments, and deprive 
them of personal responsibility. Consequently, 
we must learn the Bolshevik method of leading business 
organizations, which is, systematically to help these 
organizations, systematically to strengthen them and 
to guide economy, not over the heads of these organizations, 
but through the medium of them. We 
must give the business organizations, and primarily 
the land departments, the best people, we must fill 
the staffs of these organizations with fresh workers 
of the best type who are capable of carrying out the 
duties entrusted to them. Only after this has been 
done can we count on the Party organizations being 
quite free from minor economic details. Of course, 
this is a serious matter and requires a certain 
amount of time. But until it is done the Party organizations 
will have to continue for a short period 
to deal very closely with agricultural affairs, with 
all the details of ploughing, sowing, harvesting, etc. 
2 ) Two word s about wreckers, diversionists, spies, 
etc. I think it is clear to everybody now that the 
present-day wreckers and diversionists, no matter 
what disguise they may adopt, either Trotskyite or 
Bukharinite, have long ceased to be a political trend 
in the labour movement, that they have become transformed 
into a gang of professional wreckers, diversionists, 
spies and assassins, without principles 
and without ideals. Of course, these gentlemen must 
be ruthlessly smashed and uprooted as the enemies 
of the working class, as betrayers of our country. 
This is clear and requires no further explanation.

278 
But the question arises : how is this task of 
smashing and uprooting the Japano-German Trotskyite 
agents to be carried out in practice? Does that mean 
that we must strike at and uproot, not only real 
Trotskyites, but also those who at some time or 
other wavered in the direction of Trotskyism and 
then, long ago, abandoned Trotskyism; not only those 
who are really Trotskyite wrecking agents, but also 
those who, at some time or other, had occasion to 
walk down a street through which some Trotskyite 
had passed? At all events, such voices were heard 
at this Plenum. Can such an interpretation of the 
resolution be regarded as correct? No, it cannot be 
regarded as correct. In this matter, as in all others, 
an individual, discriminate approach is required. You 
cannot measure everybody with the same yardstick. 
Such a wholesale approach can only hinder the fight 
against the real Trotskyite wreckers and spies. 
Among our responsible comrades there are a number 
of former Trotskyites who abandoned Trotskyism 
long ago and are fighting Trotskyism not less 
and perhaps more effectively than some of our respected 
comrades who have never wavered in the direction 
of Trotskyism. It would be foolish to cast 
a slur upon such comrades now. 
Among our comrades there are some who ideologically 
were always opposed to Trotskyism, but 
who, notwithstanding this, maintained personal connections 
with individual Trotskyites which they did 
not hesitate to dissolve as soon as the practical 
features of Trotskyism became clear to them. Of 
course, it would have been better had they broken

279 
off their personal friendly connections with individual 
Trotskyites at once, and not only after some delay. 
But it would be foolish to lump such comrades with 
the Trotskyites. 
3) What does choosing the right people and putting 
them in the right place mean? 
It means, firstly, choosing workers according to 
political principle, i.e., whether they are worthy of 
political confidence, and secondly, according to business 
principle, i.e., whether they are fit for such and 
such a definite job. 
This means that the business approach must not 
be transformed into a narrow business approach, 
when people interest themselves in the business 
qualifications of a worker but do not interest themselves 
in his political face. 
It means that the political approach must not be 
transformed into the sole and exclusive approach, 
when people interest themselves in the political face 
of the worker but do not interest themselves in his 
business qualifications. 
Can it be said that this Bolshevik rule is adhered 
to by our Party comrades? Unfortunately, this cannot 
be said. Reference was made to this at this Plenum. 
But not everything was said about it. The point is 
that this tried and tested rule is frequently violated 
in our practical work, and violated in the most flagrant 
manner. Most often, workers are not chosen for objective 
reasons, but for casual, subjective, philistine, 
petty-bourgeois reasons. Most often, so-called acquaintances, 
friends, fellow-townsmen, personally 
devoted people, masters in the art of praising their

280 
chiefs are chosen without regard for their political 
and business fitness. 
Naturally, instead of a leading group of responsible 
workers we get a little family of intimate people, 
an artel, the members of which try to live in peace, 
try not to offend each other, not to wash dirty linen 
in public, to praise each other, and from time to 
time send vapid and sickening reports to the centre 
about successes. 
It is not difficult to understand that in such a 
family atmosphere there can be no place for criticism 
of defects in the work, or for self-criticism by 
leaders of the work. 
Of course, such a family atmosphere creates a 
favourable medium for the cultivation of toadies, 
of people who lack a sense of self - respect, and 
therefore, have nothing in common with Bolshevism. 
Take for example Comrades Mirzoyan and Vainov. 
The first is the secretary of the Kazakhstan Territorial 
Party Organization, and the second is the 
secretary of the Yaroslavl Regional Party Organization. 
These people are not the worst in our midst. 
But how do they choose workers? The first dragged 
with him to Kazakhstan from Azerbaidjan and the 
Urals, where he had worked formerly, thirty to 
forty of his "own" people and placed them in responsible 
positions in Kazakhstan. The second dragged with him 
to Yaroslavl from the Donetz Basin, where he had 
worked formerly, over a dozen of his "own" people 
and also placed them in responsible positions. And so 
Comrade Mirzoyan has his own artel. And Comrade 
Vainov also has his own artel. Guided by the Bolshevik

281 
method of choosing and placing people, could they 
not choose workers from among the local people? Of 
course they could. Why, then, did they not do so? 
Because the Bolshevik method of choosing workers 
precludes the possibility of a philistine petty-bourgeois 
approach, precludes the possibility of choosing workers 
on the family and artel principle. Moreover, in 
choosing as workers people who were personally devoted 
to them these comrades evidently wanted to 
make themselves, to some extent, independent of 
the local people and independent of the Central Committee 
of the Party. Let us assume that Comrades 
Mirzoyan and Vainov, owing to some circumstance 
or other, are transferred from their present place 
of work to some other place. What, in such a case, 
will they do with their "tails"? Will they drag them 
again to the new places where they are going to 
work? 
This is the absurd position to which the violation 
of the Bolshevik rule of properly choosing and placing 
people leads. 
4) What does testing workers, verifying the fulfilment 
of tasks mean? 
Testing workers means testing them, not by their 
promises and declarations, but by the results of 
of their work, 
Verifying the fulfilment of tasks means verifying 
and testing, not only in offices and only by means 
of formal reports, but primarily at the place of 
work, according to actual results. 
Is such testing and verification required at all? 
Undoubtedly it is required. It is required, firstly,

282 
because only such testing and verification enables us 
to get to know the worker, to determine his real 
qualifications. It is required, secondly, because only 
such testing and verification enables us to determine 
the virtues and defects of the executive apparatus. 
It is required, thirdly, because only such testing and 
verification enables us to determine the virtues and 
defects of the tasks that are set. 
Some comrades think that people can be tested 
only from above, when leaders test those who are 
led by the results of their work. That is not true. 
Of course, testing from above is needed as one of 
the effective measures for testing people and verifying 
the fulfilment of tasks. But testing from above far 
from exhausts the whole business of testing. There 
is another kind of test, the test from below, when 
the masses, when those who are led, test the leaders, 
draw attention to their mistakes and indicate the 
way in which these mistakes may be rectified. This 
sort of testing is one of the most effective methods 
of testing people. 
The Party membership tests its leaders at meetings 
of Party actives, at conferences and at congresses 
by hearing their reports, by criticising defects and, 
finally, by electing or not electing this or that leading 
comrade to leading bodies. The strict adherence to 
democratic centralism in the Party, as the rules of 
our Party demand, the obligatory election of Party 
bodies, the right to nominate and to object to candidates, 
secret ballot, freedom of criticism and selfcriticism 
- all these and similar measures must be 
carried out in order, among other things, to facilitate

283 
the testing and control of Party leaders by the Party 
membership. 
The non-Party masses test their business, trade 
union and other leaders at meetings of non-Party 
actives, at mass conferences of all kinds, at which 
they hear the reports of their leaders, criticise 
defects and indicate the way in which these defects 
may be removed. 
Finally, the people test the leaders of the country 
during elections of the government bodies of the 
Soviet Union by means of universal, equal, direct and 
secret suffrage. 
The task is to combine testing from above with 
testing from below. 
5) What does educating cadres on their own mistakes 
mean? 
Lenin taught that conscientiously exposing the 
mistakes of the Party, studying the causes which 
gave rise to these mistakes and indicating the way 
in which these mistakes may be rectified are one of 
the surest means of properly training and educating 
Party cadres, of properly training and educating the 
working class and the toiling masses. Lenin says : 
"The attitude of a political party toward 
its own mistakes is one of the most important 
and surest criteria of the seriousness of the 
party and of how it fulfils in practice its obligations 
toward its class and toward the toiling 
masses. To admit a mistake openly, to disclose 
its reasons, to analyse the conditions which 
gave rise to it, to study attentively the means 
of correcting it - these are the signs of a

284 
serious party; this means the performance of 
its duties, this means educating and training 
the class, and then the masses." 
This means that it is the duty of Bolsheviks, not 
to gloss over their mistakes, not to wriggle out of 
admitting their mistakes, as often happens among us, 
but honestly and openly to admit their mistakes, 
honestly and openly to indicate the way in which these 
mistakes may be rectified, honestly and openly to 
rectify their mistakes. 
I would not say that many of our comrades would 
cheerfully agree to do this. But Bolsheviks, if they 
really want to be Bolsheviks, must have the courage 
openly to admit their mistakes, to reveal their causes, 
indicate the way in which they may be rectified, and 
in that way help the Party to give the cadres a proper 
training and proper political education. For only in 
this way, only in an atmosphere of open and honest 
self - criticism, is it possible to educate real Bolshevik 
cadres, is it possible to educate real Bolshevik leaders. 
Two examples to demonstrate the correctness of 
Lenin's thesis. 
Take, for example, our mistakes in collective 
farm construction. You, no doubt, remember 1930, 
when our Party comrades thought they could solve 
the very complicated problem of transferring the 
peasantry to collective farm construction in a matter 
of three or four months, and when the Central Committee 
of the Party found itself obliged to curb these 
over-zealous comrades. This was one of the most 
dangerous periods in the life of our Party. The mis

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take was that our Party comrades forgot about the 
voluntary nature of collective farm construction, 
forgot that the peasants could not be transferred 
to the collective farm path by administrative pressure, 
they forgot that collective farm construction required, 
not several months, but several years of 
careful and thoughtful work. They forgot about this 
and did not want to admit their mistakes. You, no 
doubt, remember that the Central Committee's 
reference to comrades being dizzy with success and 
its warning to our comrades in the districts not to 
run too far ahead and ignore the real situation were 
met with hostility. But this did not restrain the 
Central Committee from going against the stream 
and turning our Party comrades to the right path. 
Well? It is now clear to everybody that the Party 
achieved its aim by turning our Party comrades to 
the right path. Now we have tens of thousands of 
excellent peasant cadres for collective farm construction 
and for collective farm leadership. These 
cadres were educated and trained on the mistakes of 
1930. But we would not have had these cadres today 
had not the Party realised its mistakes then, and 
had it not rectified them in time. 
The other example is taken from the sphere of 
industrial construction. I have in mind our mistakes 
in the period of the Shakhti wrecking. Our mistakes 
were that we did not fully appreciate the danger of 
the technical backwardness of our cadres in industry, 
we were reconciled to this backwardness and thought 
that we could develop extensive socialist industrial 
construction with the aid of specialists who were

286 
hostile to us, dooming our own business cadres to 
the role of bad commissars attached to bourgeois 
specialists. You, no doubt, remember how unwillingly 
our business cadres admitted their mistakes at that 
time, how unwillingly they admitted their technical 
backwardness, and how slowly they assimilated the 
slogan "master technique." Well? The facts show that 
the slogan "master technique" had good effects and 
produced good results. Now we have tens and hundreds 
of thousands of excellent Bolshevik business cadres 
who have already mastered technique and are advancing 
our industry. But we would not have had these cadres 
now had the Party yielded to the stubbornness of 
the business leaders who would not admit their technical 
backwardness, had not the Party realised its 
mistakes then, and had it not rectified them in time. 
Some comrades say that it is inexpedient to talk 
openly about our mistakes, as the open admission of 
our mistakes may be construed by our enemies as 
our weakness and may be utilised by them. That is 
nonsense, comrades, sheer nonsense. On the contrary, 
the open admission of our mistakes and their honest 
rectification can only strengthen our Party, raise 
the prestige of our Party in the eyes of the workers, 
peasants and working intelligentsia, increase the 
strength and might of our state. And that is the 
main thing. If only the workers, peasants and working 
intelligentsia are with us, all the rest will come. 
Other comrades say that the open admission of 
our mistakes may lead, not to the training and strengthening 
of our cadres, but to their becoming weaker 
and disturbed, that we must spare and take care of

287 
our cadres, that we must spare their self-esteem 
and peace of mind. And so they propose that we gloss 
over the mistakes of our comrades, relax criticism, 
and still better, ignore these mistakes. Such a line 
is not only radically wrong but extremely dangerous, 
dangerous first of all for the cadres whom they want 
to "spare" and "take care of." To spare and take care 
of cadres by glossing over their mistakes means killing 
these very cadres for certain. We would certainly have 
killed our collective farm Bolshevik cadres had we not 
exposed the mistakes of 1930, and had we not educated 
them on these mistakes. We would certainly have 
killed our industrial Bolshevik cadres had we not exposed 
the mistakes of our comrades in the period of 
the Shakhti wrecking, and had we not educated our 
industrial cadres on these mistakes. Whoever thinks 
of sparing the self-esteem of our cadres by glossing 
over their mistakes is killing the cadres and the self - 
esteem of cadres, for by glossing over their mistakes 
he helps them to make fresh and perhaps even more 
serious mistakes, which, we may assume, will lead 
to the complete breakdown of the cadres, to the 
detriment of their "self-esteem" and "peace of mind." 
6) Lenin taught us not only to teach the masses, 
but also to learn from the masses. 
What does that mean? 
It means that we, the leaders, must not get swelled 
heads, must not think that because we are members 
of the Central Committee, or People's Commissars, 
we possess all the knowledge necessary to lead properly. 
Rank alone does not give knowledge and experience. 
Still less does title.

288 
It means that our experience alone, the experience 
of the leaders, is not sufficient to enable us to lead 
properly, that, consequently, we must supplement 
our experience, the experience of the leaders, with 
the experience of the masses, the experience of the 
Party membership, the experience of the working 
class, the experience of the people. 
It means that we must not for a moment relax, 
let alone sever our ties with the masses. 
And finally, it means that we must listen attentively 
to the voice of the masses, to the voice of the rankand-
file members of the Party, to the voice of the 
so-called "little people," to the voice of the people. 
What does leading properly mean? 
It does not in the least mean sitting in offices 
and writing instructions. 
Leading properly means : 
Firstly, finding the proper solution to a problem; 
but it is impossible to find the proper solution to a 
problem without taking into account the experience 
of the masses who feel the results of our leadership 
on their own backs; 
Secondly, organizing the application of the correct 
solution, which, however, cannot be done without the 
direct assistance of the masses; 
Thirdly, organizing the verification of the fulfilment 
of this solution, which again cannot be done 
without the direct assistance of the masses. 
We, the leaders, see things, events and people 
only from one side, I would say, from above; consequently, 
our field of vision is more or less limited. 
The masses, on the other hand, see things, events

289 
and people from the other side, I would say, from 
below; consequently, their field of vision is also to 
some extent limited. In order to find the proper 
solution to a problem these two experiences must be 
combined. Only then will the leadership be correct. 
This is what not only teaching the masses but also 
learning from the masses means. 
Two examples to demonstrate the correctness of 
Lenin's thesis. 
This happened several years ago. We, the members 
of the Central Committee, were discussing the question 
of improving the situation in the Donetz Basin. The 
measures proposed by the People's Commissariat of 
Heavy Industry were obviously unsatisfactory. Three 
times we sent the proposals back to the People's 
Commissariat of Heavy Industry. And three times we 
got different proposals from the People's Commissariat 
of Heavy Industry. But even then we could not 
regard them as satisfactory. Finally, we decided to 
call several workers and lower business and trade union 
officials from the Donetz Basin. For three days we 
discussed matters with these comrades. And all of us 
members of the Central Committee had to admit that 
only these ordinary workers, these "little people," 
were able to suggest the proper solution to us. You 
no doubt remember the decision of the Central Committee 
and of the Council of People's Commissars on 
measures for increasing coal output in the Donetz 
Basin. Well, this decision of the Central Committee 
and the Council of People's Commissars, which all our 
comrades admitted was a correct and even a remarkable 
one, was suggested to us by simple people from the 
ranks.

290 
The other example. I have in mind the case of 
Comrade Nikolayenko. Who is Nikolayenko? Nikolayenko 
is a rank-and-file member of the Party. She is an 
ordinary "little person." For a whole year she had 
been giving signals that all was not well in the Party 
organization in Kiev; she exposed the family spirit, 
the philistine petty-bourgeois approach to workers, 
the suppression of self-criticism, the prevalence of 
Trotskyite wreckers. But she was constantly brushed 
aside as if she were a pestiferous fly. Finally, in 
order to get rid of her they expelled her from the 
Party. Neither the Kiev organization nor the Central 
Committee of the C.P. of the Ukraine helped her to 
bring the truth to light. The intervention of the Central 
Committee of the Party alone helped to unravel 
the knot. And what transpired after the case was investigated? 
It transpired that Nikolayenko was right 
and the Kiev organization was wrong. Neither more 
nor less. And yet, who is Nikolayenko? Of course, she 
is not a member of the Central Committee, she is 
not a People's Commissar, she is not the secretary 
of the Kiev Regional Organization, she is not even 
the secretary of a Party cell, she is only a simple 
rank-and-file member of the Party, 
As you see, simple people sometimes prove to be 
much nearer to the truth than some high institutions. 
I could quote scores and hundreds of similar 
examples. Thus you see that our experience alone, the 
experience of the leaders, is far from enough for the 
leadership of our cause. In order to lead properly the 
experience of the leaders must be supplemented by 
the experience of the Party membership, the experience

291 
of the working class, the experience of the toilers, 
the experience of the so-called "little people." 
But when is it possible to do that? 
It is possible to do that only when the leaders are 
most closely connected with the masses, when they 
are connected with the Party membership, with the 
working class, with the peasantry, with the working 
intelligentsia. 
Connection with the masses, strengthening this 
connection, readiness to heed the voice of the masses 
- herein lies the strength and invincibility of Bolshevik 
leadership. 
We may take it as the rule that as long as the 
Bolsheviks maintain connection with the broad masses 
of the people they will be invincible. And, on the 
contrary, as soon as the Bolsheviks become severed 
from the masses and lose their connection with them, 
as soon as they become covered with bureaucratic 
rust, they will lose all their strength and become a 
mere squib. 
In the mythology of the ancient Greeks there is 
the celebrated hero Antaeus who, so the legend goes, 
was the son of Poseidon, god of the seas, and Gaea, 
goddess of the earth. Antaeus was particularly attached 
to his mother who gave birth to him, suckled him and 
reared him. There was not a hero whom this Antaeus 
did not vanquish. He was regarded as an invincible hero, 
Wherein lay his strength? It lay in the fact that every 
time he was hard pressed in the fight against his adversary 
he touched the earth, his mother, who gave 
birth to him and suckled him, and that gave him new 
strength.

292 
But he had a vulnerable spot - the danger of being 
detached from the earth in some way or other. His 
enemies took this into account and watched for it. 
One day an enemy appeared who took advantage of this 
vulnerable spot and vanquished Antaeus. This was 
Hercules. How did Hercules vanquish Antaeus? He lifted 
him off the ground, kept him suspended, prevented 
him from touching the ground and throttled him. 
I think that the Bolsheviks remind us of the hero 
of Greek mythology, Antaeus. They, like Antaeus, 
are strong because they maintain connection with their 
mother, the masses who gave birth to them, suckled 
them and reared them. And as long as they maintain 
connection with their mother, with the people, they 
have every chance of remaining invincible. 
This is the key to the invincibility of Bolshevik 
leadership. 
7) Lastly, one more question. I have in mind the 
question of the formal and heartlessly bureaucratic 
attitude of some of our Party comrades towards the 
fate of individual members of the Party, to the 
question of expelling members from the Party, or 
the question of reinstating expelled members of the 
Party. The point is that some of our Party leaders 
suffer from a lack of concern for people, for members 
of the Party, for workers. More than that, they do 
not study members of the Party, do not know what 
interests they have, how they are developing; generally, 
they do not know the workers. That is why they have 
no individual approach to Party members and Party 
workers. And because they have no individual approach 
in appraising Party members and Party workers they

293 
usually act in a haphazard way : either they praise 
them wholesale, without measure, or roundly abuse 
them, also wholesale and without measure, and expel 
thousands and tens of thousands of members from 
the Party. Such leaders generally try to think in tens 
of thousands, not caring about "units," about individual 
members of the Party, about their fate. 
They regard the expulsion of thousands and tens of 
thousands of people from the Party as a mere trifle 
and console themselves with the thought that our 
Party has two million members and that the expulsion 
of tens of thousands cannot in any way affect the 
Party's position. But only those who are in fact profoundly 
anti-Party can have such an approach to members 
of the Party. 
As a result of this heartless attitude towards 
people, towards members of the Party and Party 
workers, discontent and bitterness is artificially 
created among a section of the Party, and the Trotskyite 
double-dealers cunningly hook on to such embittered 
comrades and skilfully drag them into the bog of 
Trotskyite wrecking. 
Taken by themselves, the Trotskyites never represented 
a big force in our Party. Recall the last 
discussion in our Party in 1927. That was a real Party 
referendum. Of a total of 854,000 members of the 
Party, 730,000 took part in the voting. Of these, 
724,000 members of the Party voted for the Bolsheviks, 
for the Central Committee of the Party 
and against the Trotskyites, while 4,000 members 
of the Party, i.e., about one-half per cent, voted 
for the Trotskyites, and 2,600 members of the Party

294 
abstained from voting. One hundred and twenty-three 
thousand members of the Party did not take part in 
the voting. They did not take part in the voting either 
because they were away, or because they were working 
on night shift. If to the 4,000 who voted for the 
Trotskyites we add all those who abstained from voting 
on the assumption that they, too, sympathised with 
the Trotskyites, and if to this number we add, not 
half per cent of those who did not take part in the 
voting, as we should do by right, but five per cent, 
i.e., about 6,000 Party members, we will get about 
12,000 Party members who, in one way or another, 
sympathised with Trotskyism. This is the whole 
strength of Messieurs the Trotskyites. Add to this 
the fact that many of them became disillusioned with 
Trotskyism and left it, and you will get an idea of 
the insignificance of the Trotskyite forces. And if 
in spite of this the Trotskyite wreckers have some 
reserves around our Party it is because the wrong 
policy of some of our comrades on the question of 
expelling and reinstating members of the Party, the 
heartless attitude of some of our comrades towards 
the fate of individual members of the Party and individual 
workers, artificially creates a number of 
discontented and embittered people, and thus creates 
these reserves for the Trotskyites. 
For the most part people are expelled for socalled 
passivity. What is passivity? It transpires that 
if a member of the Party has not thoroughly mastered 
the Party program he is regarded as passive and subject 
to expulsion. But that is wrong, comrades. You 
cannot interpret the rules of our Party in such a

295 
pedantic fashion. In order to thoroughly master the 
Party program one must be a real Marxist, a tried 
and theoretically trained Marxist. I do not know 
whether we have many members of our Party who 
have thoroughly mastered our program, who have become 
real Marxists, theoretically trained and tried. 
If we continued further along this path we would have 
to leave only intellectuals and learned people generally 
in our Party. Who wants such a Party? We have 
Lenin's thoroughly tried and tested formula defining 
a member of the Party. According to this formula 
a member of the Party is one who accepts the 
program of the Party, pays membership dues and 
works in one of its organizations. Please note : 
Lenin's formula does not speak about thoroughly mastering 
the program, but about accepting the program. 
These are two very different things. It is not necessary 
to prove that Lenin is right here and not our 
Party comrades who chatter idly about thoroughly 
mastering the program. That should be clear. If the 
Party had proceeded from the assumption that only 
those comrades who have thoroughly mastered the 
program and have become theoretically trained Marxists 
could be members of the Party it would not have 
created thousands of Party circles, hundreds of Party 
schools where the members of the Party are taught 
Marxism, and where they are assisted to master 
our program. It is quite clear that if our Party organizes 
such schools and circles for the members of 
the Party it is because it knows that the members 
of the Party have not yet thoroughly mastered the 
Party program, have not yet become theoretically

296 
trained Marxists. 
Consequently, in order to rectify our policy on 
the question of Party membership and on expulsion 
from the Party we must put a stop to the present 
blockhead interpretation of the question of passivity. 
But there is another error in this sphere. It is 
that our comrades recognise no mean between two 
extremes. It is enough for a worker, a member of 
the Party, to commit a slight offence, to come late 
to a Party meeting once or twice, or to fail to pay 
membership dues for some reason or other, to be 
kicked out of the Party in a trice. No interest is 
taken in the degree to which he is to blame, the 
reason why he failed to attend a meeting, the reason 
why he did not pay membership dues. The bureaucratic 
approach displayed on these questions is positively 
unprecedented. It is not difficult to understand that 
it is precisely the result of this heartless policy 
that excellent, skilled workers, excellent Stakhanovites, 
found themselves expelled from the Party. Was 
it not possible to caution them before expelling them 
from the Party, or if that had no effect, to reprove 
or reprimand them, and if that had no effect, to 
put them on probation for a certain period, or, as 
an extreme measure, to reduce them to the position 
of candidates, but not expel them from the Party 
at one stroke? Of course it was. But this calls for 
concern for people, for the members of the Party, 
for the fate of members of the Party. And this is 
what some of our comrades lack. 
It is time, comrades, high time, to put a stop 
to this disgraceful state of affairs. (Applause.) 
Pravda 
1 April 1937

297 
LETTER TO THE AUTHORS OF THE MANUAL OF 
THE "HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY" 
I think that our manuals of the "History of the 
Communist Party" are far from satisfactory, for 
three main reasons. They are not satisfactory because 
either they present the history of the Communist 
Party of the U.S.S.R. without linking it with the 
history of the country, or because they limit themselves 
within the narration, to a simple description 
of events and achievements of the current struggle 
without giving the necessary Marxist explanation, or 
else because they are mistaken in their plan and mistaken 
in their grouping of events in given periods of 
time. 
In order to avoid these faults, the authors must 
be aware of the following considerations : firstly, it 
is necessary to precede each chapter (or part) of the 
manual with a brief historical introduction on the 
economic and political situation of the country. Otherwise 
the history of the Communist Party of the 
U.S.S.R. will have the aspect not of a history, but 
of a superficial recital of incomprehensible things 
of the past. 
Secondly, it is necessary not only to present the 
facts which show the abundance of contradictions 
within the Party and in the working class in the period 
of capitalism in the U.S.S.R., but also to give the 
Marxist explanations of these facts indicating :

298 
a) the presence in Russia before the Revolution of 
the new classes which were modern from the capitalist 
viewpoint, equally with the presence of the old 
pre-capitalist classes; b) the petty-bourgeois characteristics 
of the country, the heterogenous composition 
of the working class. It is necessary to indicate 
these things in so far as they constituted the 
conditions which favoured the existence of a multitude 
of contradictions within the Party and within the 
working class. Otherwise the abundance of these contradictions 
will remain incomprehensible. 
Thirdly it is necessary not only to present a 
narrative of these facts of this desperate struggle 
to solve contradictions but also to give the Marxist 
explanation of these features, indicating that the 
struggle of the Bolsheviks against these anti-Bolshevik 
factions and contradictions was chiefly a struggle 
for the principles of Leninism; that in these capitalist 
conditions and from a general standpoint, the 
existence of antagonistic classes, the contradictions 
and divergencies within the Party are inevitable; that 
we can only develop and consolidate the proletarian 
parties, under the conditions indicated by overcoming 
these contradictions; that without the principle fight 
against the anti-Leninist groups, without vanquishing 
them our Party will inevitably degenerate, as have 
degenerated the Social-Democratic Parties of the 
Second International which did not accept this struggle. 
One could use this occasion to mention a well-known 
letter from Engels to Bernstein (1882), that I cited 
in the first chapter of my report to the Seventh 
Plenary Session, enlarging upon "the Social-Democratic

299 
deviation in the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R." 
and added my comments to his subject. Without 
these explanations the struggle between factions and 
contradictions in the history of the Communist Party 
of the U.S.S.R., would appear to be merely the facts 
of an incomprehensible dispute and the Bolsheviks 
to be incorrigible and tireless quibblers and scrappers. 
It is necessary finally to put some order into the 
grouping by clarifying periods of events in the history 
of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R. 
I think that the following schema or analogy could 
serve as a good basis. 
SCHEMA : 
1. The struggle for the building of a Social-Democratic 
Party in Russia. (From the formation of the 
"Liberation of Labour" group of Plekhanov, in 1883, 
to the appearance of the first numbers of ISKRA, 
1900 - 1901). 
2. The formation of the first Social-Democratic 
Workers Party of Russia, and the appearance within 
the Party of the Bolshevik and Menshevik factions. 
(1901 - 1904). 
3. The Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in the period 
of the Russo-Japanese War and the first Russian Revolution 
(1904 - 1907). 
4. The Mensheviks and the Bolsheviks in the period 
of the reaction of Stolypin. The constitution of the 
Bolsheviks into an independent Social-Democratic Workers 
Party (1908 - 1912). 
5. The Bolshevik Party in the years of the progress 
of the Workers movement on the eve of the 
first imperialist war (1912 - 1914).

300 
6. The Bolshevik Party in the period of the imperialist 
war, and the second Russian Revolution of 
February (1914 - March, 1917). 
7. The Bolshevik Party in the preparation and 
realization of the Socialist Revolution of October 
(April 1917 - 1918). 
8. The Bolshevik Party in the period of the Civil 
War (1918 - 1920). 
9. The Bolshevik Party in the period of transition 
to the peaceful work of building up the National 
Economy (1921 - 1925). 
10. The Bolshevik Party in the struggle for the 
Socialist industrialization of the country (1926 - 1929). 
11. The Bolshevik Party in the struggle for the 
collectivization of agriculture (1930 - 1934). 
12. The Bolshevik Party in the struggle for the 
achievement of the construction of Socialist society. 
Also the application of the New Constitution (1935 - 
1937). 
J. STALIN 
Pravda 
6 May 1937

301 
ADDRESS TO THE RECEPTION OF DIRECTORS AND 
STAKHANOVITES OF THE METAL INDUSTRY AND 
THE COAL MINING INDUSTRY 
29 October 1937 
Comrades,
My toast will be a little singular and 
unusual. It is the custom with us to toast the health 
of the directors, heads, leaders and Commissars of 
the People. This is naturally not a bad thing, but 
outside of the superior leaders are the middle and 
lower leaders, and of these middle and lower leaders 
we have dozens. These are modest people, they do 
not push themselves forward, one hardly notices them. 
But it would be blindness not to notice them. Because 
on these people depends the output of production 
in all our National Economy. That is to say that on 
them depends also the destiny of our economic conditions. 
To the health of our middle and lower economic 
leaders. (Ovations and cheers). 
In general it must be said of these leaders that 
unfortunately they are not always aware of the heights 
to which history has raised them under the conditions 
of the Soviet regime. They do not always understand 
that to be a leader in the economy, under the conditions 
of our country, signifies that they must 
prove themselves worthy of this great honour, of 
this great consideration, and prove themselves worthy 
of the great confidence shown in them by the working

302 
class, by the people. In the old days, in the time 
of capitalism, the leaders of the economy, the diverse 
directors, administrators, heads, foremen and 
supervisors were considered guard dogs of the owners 
and capitalists. The people detested them and saw 
them as enemies, knowing that they directed the 
economy according to the interests of the owners, 
and to the profit of the capitalists. Conversely, in 
our Soviet regime, the directors of the economy 
have every reason to rejoice in the confidence and 
love of the people, because they direct the economy 
not for the profit of a handful of capitalists, but 
in the interests of the whole people. That is the 
reason why the title "leader of the economy" in the 
conditions of our country is an honoured title and 
why each head in the Soviet regime must prove himself 
worthy of this great honour, this great confidence, 
in the eyes of the people. The confidence 
of the people in the worker-directors of the economy 
is a great thing, Comrades. The leaders come and 
go, but the people remain. Only the people are immortal, 
everything else is ephemeral. That is why 
it is necessary to appreciate the full value of the 
confidence of the people. 
To the health of our worker-directors of the 
economy who have understood the greatness of their 
task and are conscious of it, and who will not allow 
anyone to dishonour and disgrace this great title of 
director of the Soviet economy. (Ovations and cheers). 
Comrades, we have amongst us the pioneers 
of the new cause in the sphere of the national economy, 
the fighters of the Stakhanovite movement.

303 
To the health of the pioneers and fighters for the 
new cause. To the health of Comrades Stakhanov, 
Droukanov, Isotov, Riobachapka, and others. (Cheers), 
And finally, to the health of the young and the 
old pioneers of the blast furnaces, of the metal 
industry, and above all to the health of the workers 
of the blast furnaces, Comrade Korolov, of his father, 
and his son, and of the whole Korolov family, workers 
of the blast furnaces, so that the Korolov family 
do not remain behind the new methods of work. 
(Tempestuous applause). 
Korolov, the father said, leaning towards Stalin : 
"Comrade Stalin, I am already an old man, but I will 
work with all my strength in order to accomplish 
your desire, and to march at the head of other workers 
in the mines." 
Pravda 
31 October 1937

304

305 
SPEECH DELIVERED BY COMRADE J. STALIN AT 
A MEETING OF VOTERS OF THE STALIN 
ELECTORAL AREA, MOSCOW 
(December 11, 1937, in the Grand Theatre) 
Chairman : Comrade Stalin, our candidate, has 
the floor. 
(Comrade Stalin's appearance in the rostrum is 
greeted by a stormy ovation lasting several minutes. 
The whole audience rises to greet Comrade Stalin. 
Constant cries from the audience : "Hurrah for the 
great Stalin!" "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin, the author 
of the Soviet Constitution, the most democratic in 
the world!" "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin, the leader 
of the oppressed all over the world!") 
Stalin : Comrades, to tell you the truth, I had 
no intention of making a speech. But our respected 
Nikita Sergeyevich (Kruschov) dragged me, so to 
speak, to this meeting. "Make a good speech," he 
said. What shall I talk about, exactly what sort of 
speech? Everything that had to be said before the 
elections has already been said and said again in the 
speeches of our leading comrades, Kalinin, Molotov, 
Voroshilov, Kaganovich, Yezhov and many other responsible 
comrades. What can be added to these 
speeches? 
What is needed, they say, are explanations of 
certain questions connected with the election campaign. 
What explanations, on what questions? Everything 
that had to be explained has been explained and

306 
explained again in the well-known appeals of the Bolshevik 
Party, the Young Communist League, the All- 
Union Central Trade Union Council, the Osoaviakhim 
and the Committee of Physical Culture. What can 
be added to these explanations? 
Of course, one could make a light sort of speech 
about everything and nothing. (Amusement.) Perhaps 
such a speech would amuse the audience. They say 
that there are some great hands at such speeches 
not only over there, in the capitalist countries, but 
here too, in the Soviet country. (Laughter and applause.) 
But, firstly, I am no great hand at such speeches. 
Secondly, is it worth while indulging in amusing things 
just now when all of us Bolsheviks are, as they say, 
"up to our necks" in work? I think not. 
Clearly, you cannot make a good speech under such 
circumstances. 
However, since I have taken the floor, I will have, 
of course, to say at least something one way or 
another. (Loud applause.) 
First of all, I would like to express my thanks 
(applause) to the electors for the confidence they 
have shown in me. (Applause.) 
I have been nominated as candidate, and the Election 
Commission of the Stalin Area of the Soviet capital 
has registered my candidature. This, comrades, is 
an expression of great confidence. Permit me to 
convey my profound Bolshevik gratitude for this confidence 
that you have shown in the Bolshevik Party 
of which I am a member, and in me personally as a 
representative of that Party. (Loud applause.) 
I know what confidence means. It naturally lays

307 
upon me new and additional duties and, consequently, 
new and additional responsibilities. Well, it is not 
customary among us Bolsheviks to refuse responsibilities. 
I accept them willingly. (Loud and prolonged 
applause.) 
For my part, I would like to assure you, comrades, 
that you may safely rely on Comrade Stalin. (Loud 
and sustained cheers. A voice : "And we all stand for 
Comrade Stalin!") You may take it for granted that 
Comrade Stalin will be able to discharge his duty to 
the people (applause), to the working class (applause), 
to the peasantry (applause) and to the intelligentsia. 
(Applause.) 
Further, comrades, I would like to congratulate 
you on the occasion of the forthcoming national holiday, 
the day of the elections to the Supreme Soviet 
of the Soviet Union. (Loud applause.) The forthcoming 
elections are not merely elections, comrades, they 
are really a national holiday of our workers, our 
peasants and our intelligentsia. (Loud applause.) Never 
in the history of the world have there been such really 
free and really democratic elections - never! History 
knows no other example like it. (Applause.) The point 
is not that our elections will be universal, equal, 
secret and direct, although that fact in itself is of 
great importance. The point is that our universal 
elections will be carried out as the freest elections 
and the most democratic of any country in the world. 
Universal elections exist and are held in some 
capitalist countries, too, so-called democratic countries. 
But in what atmosphere are elections held 
there? In an atmosphere of class conflicts, in an

308 
atmosphere of class enmity, in an atmosphere of 
pressure brought to bear on the electors by the 
capitalists, landlords, bankers and other capitalist 
sharks. Such elections, even if they are universal, 
equal, secret and direct, cannot be called altogether 
free and altogether democratic elections. 
Here, in our country, on the contrary, elections 
are held in an entirely different atmosphere. Here 
there are no capitalists and no landlords and, consequently, 
no pressure is exerted by propertied classes 
on non-propertied classes. Here elections are held in 
an atmosphere of collaboration between the workers, 
the peasants and the intelligentsia, in an atmosphere 
of mutual confidence between them, in an atmosphere, 
I would say, of mutual friendship; because there are 
no capitalists in our country, no landlords, no exploitation 
and nobody, in fact, to bring pressure to 
bear on people in order to distort their will. 
That is why our elections are the only really free 
and really democratic elections in the whole world. 
(Loud applause.) 
Such free and really democratic elections could 
arise only on the basis of the triumph of the socialist 
system, only on the basis of the fact that in our 
country socialism is not merely being built, but has 
already become part of life, of the daily life of the 
people. Some ten years ago the question might still 
be debated whether socialism could be built in our 
country or not. Today this is no longer a debatable 
question. Today it is a matter of facts, a matter 
of real life, a matter of habits that permeate the 
whole life of the people. Our mills and factories are

309 
being run without capitalists. The work is directed 
by men and women of the people. That is what we 
call socialism in practice. In our fields the tillers 
of the land work without landlords and without kulaks. 
The work is directed by men and women of the people. 
That is what we call socialism in daily life, that is 
what we call a free, socialist life. 
It is on this basis that our new, really free and 
really democratic elections have arisen, elections 
which have no precedent in the history of mankind. 
How then, after this, can one refrain from congratulating 
you on the occasion of the day of national 
celebration, the day of the elections to the Supreme 
Soviet of the Soviet Union! (Loud, general cheers.) 
Further, comrades, I would like to give you some 
advice, the advice of a candidate to his electors. If 
you take capitalist countries, you will find that peculiar, 
I would say, rather strange relations exist 
there between deputies and voters. As long as the 
elections are in progress, the deputies flirt with the 
electors, fawn on them, swear fidelity and make 
heaps of promises of every kind. It would appear that 
the deputies are completely dependent on the electors. 
As soon as the elections are over, and the candidates 
have become deputies, relations undergo a radical 
change. Instead of the deputies being dependent on 
the electors, they become entirely independent. For 
four or five years, that is, until the next elections, 
the deputy feels quite free, independent of the people, 
of his electors. He may pass from one camp to 
another, he may turn from the right road to the 
wrong road, he may even become entangled in machin

310 
ations of a not altogether desirable character, he 
may turn as many somersaults as he likes - he is 
independent. 
Can such relations be regarded as normal? By no 
means, comrades. This circumstance was taken into 
consideration by our Constitution and it made it a 
law that electors have the right to recall their deputies 
before the expiration of their term of office 
if they begin to play monkey tricks, if they turn off 
the road, or if they forget that they are dependent 
on the people, on the electors. 
This is a wonderful law, comrades. A deputy should 
know that he is the servant of the people, their 
emissary in the Supreme Soviet, and he must follow 
the line laid down in the mandate given him by the 
people. If he turns off the road, the electors are 
entitled to demand new elections, and as to the deputy 
who turned off the road, they have the right to 
blackball him. (Laughter and applause.) This is a wonderful 
law. My advice, the advice of a candidate to 
his electors, is that they remember this electors' 
right, the right to recall deputies before the expiration 
of their term of office, that they keep an 
eye on their deputies, control them and, if they 
should take it into their heads to turn off the right 
road, get rid of them and demand new elections. The 
government is obliged to appoint new elections. My 
advice is to remember this law and to take advantage 
of it should need arise. 
And, lastly, one more piece of advice from a 
candidate to his electors. What in general must one 
demand of one's deputies, selecting from all possible

311 
demands the most elementary? 
The electors, the people, must demand that their 
deputies should remain equal to their tasks, that in 
their work they should not sink to the level of political 
philistines, that in their posts they should remain 
political figures of the Lenin type, that as public 
figures they should be as clear and definite as Lenin 
was (applause), that they should be as fearless in 
battle and as merciless towards the enemies of the 
people as Lenin was (applause), that they should be 
free from all panic, from any semblance of panic, 
when things begin to get complicated and some danger 
or other looms on the horizon, that they should be 
as free from all semblance of panic as Lenin was 
(applause), that they should be as wise and deliberate 
in deciding complex problems requiring a comprehensive 
orientation and a comprehensive weighing of all pros 
and cons as Lenin was (applause), that they should 
be as upright and honest as Lenin was (applause), 
that they should love their people as Lenin did. 
(Applause.) 
Can we say that all the candidates are public 
figures precisely of this kind? I would not say so. 
There are all sorts of people in the world, there are 
all sorts of public figures in the world. There are 
people of whom you cannot say what they are, whether 
they are good or bad, courageous or timid, for the 
people heart and soul or for the enemies of the 
people. There are such people and there are such 
public figures. They are also to be found among us, 
the Bolsheviks. You know yourselves, comrades - there 
are black sheep in every family. (Laughter and applause.)

312 
Of people of this indefinite type, people who resemble 
political philistines rather than political figures, 
people of this vague, amorphous type, the great 
Russian writer, Gogol, rather aptly said : "Vague 
sort of people, says he, neither one thing nor the 
other, you can't make head or tail of them, they 
are neither Bogdan in town nor Seliphan in the country." 
(Laughter and applause.) There are also some rather 
apt popular sayings about such indefinite people and 
public figures : "A middling sort of man - neither 
fish nor flesh" (general laughter and applause), neither 
a candle for god nor a poker for the devil." (General 
laughter and applause.) 
I cannot say with absolute certainty that among 
the candidates (I beg their pardon, of course) and 
among our public figures there are not people who 
more than anything resemble political philistines, 
who in character and make-up resemble people of the 
type referred to in the popular saying : "Neither a 
candle for god nor a poker for the devil." (Laughter 
and applause.) 
I would like you, comrades, to exercise systematic 
influence on your deputies, to impress upon them 
that they must constantly keep before them the great 
image of the great Lenin and imitate Lenin in all 
things. (Applause.) 
The functions of the electors do not end with the 
elections. They continue during the whole term of 
the given Supreme Soviet. I have already mentioned 
the law which empowers the electors to recall their 
deputies before the expiration of their term of office 
if they should turn off the right road. Hence it is

313 
the duty and right of the electors to keep their deputies 
constantly under their control and to impress 
upon them that they must under no circumstances 
sink to the level of political philistines, impress upon 
their deputies that they must be like the great Lenin. 
(Applause.) 
Such, comrades, is my second piece of advice to 
you, the advice of a candidate to his electors, (Loud 
and sustained applause and cheers. All rise and turn 
towards the government box, to which Comrade Stalin 
proceeds from the platform. Voices : "Hurrah for 
the great Stalin!" "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!" "Long 
live Comrade Stalin!" "Long live the first of the 
Leninists, candidate for the Soviet of the Union, 
Comrade Stalin!") 
Pravda 
12 Decembre 1937

314

315 
ON THE FINAL VICTORY OF SOCIALISM IN THE 
U.S.S.R. 
18 January 1938 - 12 February 1938 
Ivan Philipovich Ivanov, staff propagandist of the 
Manturovsk District of the Young Communist League 
in the Kursk Region of the U.S.S.R., addressed a 
letter to Comrade Stalin requesting his opinion on 
the question of the final victory of Socialism in the 
Soviet Union. 
IVANOV TO STALIN 
Dear Comrade Stalin,
I earnestly request you to 
explain the following question : In the local districts 
here and even in the Regional Committee of the Young 
Communist League, a two-fold conception prevails 
about the final victory of socialism in our country, 
i.e., the first group of contradictions is confused 
with the second. 
In your works on the destiny of Socialism in the 
U.S.S.R. you speak of two groups of contradictions 
- internal and external. 
As for the first group of contradictions, we have, 
of course, solved them - within the country Socialism 
is victorious. 
I would like to have your answer about the second 
group of contradictions, i.e., those between the land 
of Socialism and capitalism. 
You point out that the final victory of Socialism 
implies the solution of the external contradictions, 
that we must be fully guaranteed against intervention

316 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
and, consequently, against the restoration of capitalism. 
But this group of contradictions can only be solved 
by the efforts of the workers of all countries. 
Besides, Comrade Lenin taught us that "we can 
achieve final victory only on a world scale, only by 
the joint efforts of the workers of all countries." 
While attending the class for staff propagandists 
at the Regional Committee of the Y.C.L., I, basing 
myself on your works, said that the final victory of 
Socialism is possible only on a world scale. But the 
leading regional committee workers - Urozhenko, First 
Secretary of the Regional Committee, and Kazelkov, 
propaganda instructor - described my statement as 
a Trotskyist sortie. 
I began to read to them passages from your works 
on this question, but Urozhenko ordered me to close 
the book and said : "Comrade Stalin said this in 1926, 
but we are now in 1938. At that time we did not have 
the final victory, but now we have it and there is 
no need for us at all to worry about intervention 
and restoration." 
Then he went on to say : "We have now the final 
victory of Socialism and a full guarantee against intervention 
and the restoration of capitalism." 
And so I was counted as an abettor of Trotskyism 
and removed from propaganda work and the question 
was raised as to whether I was fit to remain in the 
Y.C.L. 
Please, Comrade Stalin, will you explain whether 
we have the final victory of Socialism yet or not, 
Perhaps there is additional contemporary material

317 
on this question connected with recent changes that 
I have not come across yet. Also I think that Urozhenko's 
statement that Comrade Stalin's works on this question 
are somewhat out of date is an anti-Bolshevik one. 
Are the leading workers of the Regional Committee 
right in counting me as a Trotskyist? I feel very much 
hurt and offended over this. 
I hope, Comrade Stalin, that you will grant my 
request and reply to the Manturovsk District, Kursk 
Region, First Zasemsky Village Soviet, Ivan Philipovich 
Ivanov. 
(Signed) I. Ivanov. January 18, 1938. 
STALIN TO IVANOV 
Of course you are right, Comrade Ivanov, and your 
ideological opponents, i.e., Comrades Urozhenko and 
Kazelkov, are wrong. And for the following reasons : 
Undoubtedly the question of the victory of Socialism 
in one country, in this case our country, has 
two different sides. 
The first side of the question of the victory of 
Socialism in our country embraces the problem of the 
mutual relations between classes in our country. This 
concerns the sphere of internal relations. 
Can the working class of our country overcome 
the contradictions with our peasantry and establish 
an alliance, collaboration with them? 
Can the working class of our country, in alliance 
- with our peasantry, smash the bourgeoisie of our 
country, deprive it of the land, factories, mines, 
etc., and by its own efforts build a new, classless

318 
society, complete Socialist society? 
Such are the problems that are connected with the 
first side of the question of the victory of Socialism 
in our country. 
Leninism answers these problems in the affirmative. 
Lenin teaches us that "we have all that is necessary 
for the building of a complete Socialist society." 
Hence we can and must, by our own efforts, overcome 
our bourgeoisie and build Socialist society. 
Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, and those other gentlemen 
who later became spies and agents of fascism, 
denied that it was possible to build Socialism in our 
country unless the victory of the Socialist revolution 
was first achieved in other countries, in capitalist 
countries. As a matter of fact, these gentlemen 
wanted to turn our country back to the path of bourgeois 
development and they concealed their apostasy 
by hypocritically talking about the "victory of the 
revolution" in other countries. 
This was precisely the point of controversy between 
our Party and these gentlemen. 
Our country's subsequent course of development 
proved that the Party was right and that Trotsky 
and company were wrong. 
For, during this period, we succeeded in liquidating 
our bourgeoisie, in establishing fraternal collaboration 
with our peasantry and in building, in the main, Socialist 
society, notwithstanding the fact that the Socialist 
revolution has not yet been victorious in other 
countries. 
This is the position in regard to the first side 
of the question of the victory of Socialism in our

319 
country. 
I think, Comrade Ivanov, that this is not the side 
of the question that is the point of controversy between 
you and Comrades Urozhenko and Kazelkov. 
The second side of the question of the victory 
of Socialism in our country embraces the problem 
of the mutual relations between our country and other 
countries, capitalist countries; the problem of the 
mutual relations between the working class of our 
country and the bourgeoisie of other countries. This 
concerns the sphere of external, international relations. 
Can the victorious Socialism of one country, 
which is encircled by many strong capitalist countries, 
regard itself as being fully guaranteed against the 
danger of military invasion, and hence, against attempts 
to restore capitalism in our country? 
Can our working class and our peasantry, by their 
own efforts, without the serious assistance of the 
working class in capitalist countries, overcome the 
bourgeoisie of other countries in the same way as 
we overcame our own bourgeoisie? In other words : 
Can we regard the victory of Socialism in our country 
as final, i.e., as being free from the dangers of 
military attack and of attempts to restore capitalism, 
assuming that Socialism is victorious only in 
one country and that the capitalist encirclement continues 
to exist? 
Such are the problems that are connected with the 
second side of the question of the victory of Socialism 
in our country. 
Leninism answers these problems in the negative. 
Leninism teaches that "the final victory of Social

320 
ism, in the sense of full guarantee against the restoration 
of bourgeois relations, is possible only on 
an international scale" (c.f. resolution of the Fourteenth 
Conference of the Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union). 
This means that the serious assistance of the 
international proletariat is a force without which 
the problem of the final victory of Socialism in one 
country cannot be solved. 
This, of course, does not mean that we must sit 
with folded arms and wait for assistance from outside. 
On the contrary, this assistance of the international 
proletariat must be combined with our work 
to strengthen the defence of our country, to strengthen 
the Red Army and the Red Navy, to mobilise the whole 
country for the purpose of resisting military attack 
and attempts to restore bourgeois relations. 
This is what Lenin says on this score : 
"We are living not merely in a State but in 
a system of States, and it is inconceivable 
that the Soviet Republic should continue to coexist 
for a long period side by side with imperialist 
States. Ultimately one or other must 
conquer. Meanwhile, a number of terrible clashes 
between the Soviet Republic and the bourgeois 
States is inevitable. This means that if the 
proletariat, as the ruling class, wants to and 
will rule, it must prove this also by military 
organization." (Collected Works, Vol. 24. P. 122.) 
And further : 
"We are surrounded by people, classes and 
governments which openly express their hatred

321 
for us. We must remember that we are at all 
times but a hair's breadth from invasion." 
(Collected Works, Vol. 27. P. 117.) 
This is said sharply and strongly but honestly and 
truthfully without embellishment as Lenin was able 
to speak. 
On the basis of these premises Stalin stated in 
"Problems of Leninism" that : 
"The final victory of Socialism is the full 
guarantee against attempts at intervention, 
and that means against restoration, for any 
serious attempt at restoration can take place 
only with serious support from outside, only 
with the support of international capital. 
"Hence the support of our revolution by the 
workers of all countries, and still more, the 
victory of the workers in at least several 
countries, is a necessary condition for fully 
guaranteeing the first victorious country against 
attempts at intervention and restoration, a 
necessary condition for the final victory of 
Socialism," (Problems of Leninism, 1937. P. 134.) 
Indeed, it would be ridiculous and stupid to close 
our eyes to the capitalist encirclement and to think 
that our external enemies, the fascists, for example, 
will not, if the opportunity arises, make an attempt 
at a military attack upon the U.S.S.R. Only blind 
braggarts or masked enemies who desire to lull the 
vigilance of our people can think like that.

322 
No less ridiculous would it be to deny that in the 
event of the slightest success of military intervention, 
the interventionists would try to destroy the Soviet 
system in the districts they occupied and restore 
the bourgeois system. 
Did not Denikin and Kolchak restore the bourgeois 
system in the districts they occupied? Are the fascists 
any better than Denikin or Kolchak? 
Only blockheads or masked enemies who with their 
boastfulness want to conceal their hostility and are 
striving to demobilise the people, can deny the danger 
of military intervention and attempts at restoration 
as long as the capitalist encirclement exists. 
Can the victory of Socialism in one country be 
regarded as final if this country is encircled by capitalism, 
and if it is not fully guaranteed against the 
danger of intervention and restoration? 
Clearly, it cannot, 
This is the position in regard to the question of 
the victory of Socialism in one country. 
It follows that this question contains two different 
problems : 
1. The problem of the internal relations in our 
country, i.e., the problem of overcoming our own 
bourgeoisie and building complete Socialism; and 
2. The problem of the external relations of our 
country, i.e., the problem of completely ensuring our 
country against the dangers of military intervention 
and restoration. 
We have already solved the first problem, for our 
bourgeoisie has already been liquidated and Socialism 
has already been built in the main. This is what we

323 
call the victory of Socialism, or, to be more exact, 
the victory of Socialist Construction in one country. 
We could say that this victory is final if our country 
were situated on an island and if it were not surrounded 
by numerous capitalist countries. 
But as we are not living on an island but "in a 
system of States," a considerable number of which 
are hostile to the land of Socialism and create the 
danger of intervention and restoration, we say openly 
and honestly that the victory of Socialism in our 
country is not yet final. 
But from this it follows that the second problem 
is not yet solved and that it has yet to be solved. 
More than that : the second problem cannot be solved 
in the way that we solved the first problem, i.e., 
solely by the efforts of our country. 
The second problem can be solved only by combining 
the serious efforts of the international proletariat 
with the still more serious efforts of the whole of 
our Soviet people. 
The international proletarian ties between the 
working class of the U.S.S.R. and the working class 
in bourgeois countries must be increased and strengthened; 
the political assistance of the working class 
in the bourgeois countries for the working class of 
our country must be organized in the event of a 
military attack on our country; and also every assistance 
of the working class of our country for the 
working class in bourgeois countries must be organized; 
our Red Army, Red Navy, Red Air Fleet, and the 
Chemical and Air Defence Society must be increased 
and strengthened to the utmost.

324 
The whole of our people must be kept in a state 
of mobilisation and preparedness in the face of the 
danger of a military attack, so that no "accident" 
and no tricks on the part of our external enemies 
may take us by surprise . . . 
From your letter it is evident that Comrade 
Urozhenko adheres to different and not quite Leninist 
opinions. He, it appears, asserts that "we now have 
the final victory of Socialism and full guarantee 
against intervention and the restoration of capitalism." 
There cannot be the slightest doubt that Comrade 
Urozhenko is fundamentally wrong. 
Comrade Urozhenko's assertion can be explained 
only by his failure to understand the surrounding 
reality and his ignorance of the elementary propositions 
of Leninism, or by empty boastfulness of a conceited 
young bureaucrat. 
If it is true that "we have full guarantee against 
intervention and restoration of capitalism," then why 
do we need a strong Red Army, Red Navy, Red Air 
Fleet, a strong Chemical and Air Defence Society, 
more and stronger ties with the international proletariat? 
Would it not be better to spend the milliards that 
now go for the purpose of strengthening the Red Army 
on other needs and to reduce the Red Army to the 
utmost, or even to dissolve it altogether? 
People like Comrade Urozhenko, even if subjectively 
they are loyal to our cause, are objectively dangerous 
to it because by their boastfulness they - willingly 
or unwillingly (it makes no difference!) - lull the 
vigilance of our people, demobilise the workers and

325 
peasants and help the enemies to take us by surprise 
in the event of international complications. 
As for the fact that, as it appears, you, Comrade 
Ivanov, have been "removed from propaganda work 
and the question has been raised of your fitness to 
remain in the Y.C.L.," you have nothing to fear. 
If the people in the Regional Committee of the 
Y.C.L. really want to imitate Chekov's Sergeant 
Prishibeyev, you can be quite sure that they will 
lose on this game. 
Prishibeyevs are not liked in our country. 
Now you can judge whether the passage from the 
book "Problems of Leninism" on the victory of Socialism 
in one country is out of date or not. 
I myself would very much like it to be out of date. 
I would like unpleasant things like capitalist encirclement, 
the danger of military attack, the danger of 
the restoration of capitalism, etc., to be things of 
the past. Unfortunately, however, these unpleasant 
things still exist. 
(Signed) J. Stalin. February 12, 1938. 
Pravda 
14 February 1938

326

327 
LETTER ON PUBLICATIONS FOR CHILDREN DIRECTED 
TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE ALL 
UNION COMMUNIST YOUTH 
16 February 1938 
I am absolutely against the publication of "Stories 
of the childhood of Stalin." 
The book abounds with a mass of inexactitudes 
of fact, of alterations, of exaggerations and of 
unmerited praise. Some amateur writers, scribblers, 
(perhaps honest scribblers) and some adulators have 
led the author astray. It is a shame for the author, 
but a fact remains a fact. 
But this is not the important thing. The important 
thing resides in the fact that the book has a tendency 
to engrave on the minds of Soviet children (and 
people in general) the personality cult of leaders, of 
infallible heroes. This is dangerous and detrimental. 
The theory of "heroes" and the "crowd" is not a 
Bolshevik, but a Social-Revolutionary theory. The 
heroes make the people, transform them from a 
crowd into people, thus say the Social-Revolutionaries. 
The people make the heroes, thus reply the Bolsheviks 
to the Social-Revolutionaries. The book carries water 
to the windmill of the Social-Revolutionaries. No 
matter which book it is that brings the water to 
the windmill of the Social-Revolutionaries, this book 
is going to drown in our common, Bolshevik cause. 
I suggest we burn this book. 
Voprosy Istorii No. 11, 1953 J. STALIN 
(Questions of History)

328

329 
SPEECH DELIVERED AT A RECEPTION IN THE 
KREMLIN TO HIGHER EDUCATIONAL WORKERS 
17 May 1938 
Comrades, permit me to propose a toast to science 
and its progress, and to the health of the men of 
science. 
To the progress of science, of that science which 
will not permit its old and recognized leaders smugly 
to invest themselves in the robe of high priests and 
monopolists of science; which understands the meaning, 
significance and omnipotence of an alliance between 
the old scientists and the young scientists; which 
voluntarily and willingly throws open every door of 
science to the young forces of our country, and affords 
them the opportunity of scaling the peaks of 
science, and which recognizes that the future belongs 
to the young scientists. (Applause.) 
To the progress of science, of that science whose 
devotees, while understanding the power and significance 
of the established scientific traditions and 
ably utilising them in the interests of science, are 
nevertheless not willing to be slaves of these traditions; 
the science which has the courage and determination 
to smash the old traditions, standards and 
views when they become antiquated and begin to act 
as a fetter on progress, and which is able to create 
new traditions, new standards and new views. (Applause.) 
In the course of its development science has known 
not a few courageous men who were able to break

330 
down the old and create the new, despite all obstacles, 
despite everything. Such scientists as Galileo, Darwin 
- and many others - are widely known. I should like 
to dwell on one of these eminent men of science, 
one who at the same time was the greatest man of 
modern times. I am referring to Lenin, our teacher, 
our tutor. (Applause.) Remember 1917. A scientific 
analysis of the social development of Russia and of 
the international situation brought Lenin to the conclusion 
that the only way out of the situation lay in 
the victory of Socialism in Russia. This conclusion 
came as a complete surprise to many men of science 
of the day. Plekhanov, an outstanding man of science, 
spoke of Lenin with contempt, and declared that he 
was "raving." Other men of science, no less wellknown, 
declared that "Lenin had gone mad," and that 
he ought to be put away in a safe place. Scientists 
of all kinds set up a howl that Lenin was destroying 
science. But Lenin was not afraid to go against the 
current, against the force of routine. And Lenin won, 
(Applause.) 
Here you have an example of a man of science who 
boldly fought an antiquated science and laid the road 
for a new science. 
But sometimes it is not well-known men of science 
who lay the new roads for science and technology, but 
men entirely unknown in the scientific world, plain, 
practical men, innovators in their field. Here, sitting 
at this table, are Comrades Stakhanov and Papanin. 
They are unknown in the scientific world, they have 
no scientific degrees, but are just practical men in 
their field. But who does not know that in their prac

331 
tical work in industry Stakhanov and the Stakhanovites 
have upset the existing standards, which were established 
by well-known scientists and technologists, 
have shown that they were antiquated, and have introduced 
new standards which conform to the requirements 
of real science and technology? Who does not 
know that in their practical work on the drifting icefloe 
Papanin and the Papaninites upset the old conception 
of the Arctic, in passing, as it were, without 
any special effort, showed that it was antiquated, 
and established a new conception which conforms to 
the demands of real science? Who can deny that 
Stakhanov and Papanin are innovators in science, men 
of our advanced science. 
There you see what "miracles" are still performed 
in science. 
I have been speaking of science. But there are all 
kinds of science. 
The science of which I have been speaking is advanced 
science. 
To the progress of our advanced science! 
To the men of advanced science! 
To Lenin and Leninism! 
To Stakhanov and the Stakhanovites! 
To Papanin and the Papaninites! (Applause.) 
Pravda 
19 May 1938

332

333 
ON THE PROHIBITION OF THE EXCLUSION OF 
KOLKHOZINES FROM THE KOLKHOZES 
(Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of 
the U.S.S.R. and of the Central Committee of the 
C.P.S.U.(B) ) 
19 April 1938 
The Council of People's Commissars and the Central 
Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) have warned on several 
occasions, local Party organizations and Soviets about 
the prejudice which excludes Kolkhozines from the 
Kolkhozes, without any foundations. The Council of 
People's Commissars and the Central Committee of 
the C.P.S.U.(B) have shown more than once that such 
a practice is anti-Party and anti-Governmental. However, 
in many regions and many Republics, this unfounded 
exclusion of Kolkhozines has taken place. The 
exaggerations and the distortions, then, of the exclusion 
of Kolkhozines from the Kolkhozes have reached 
ridiculous proportions in the administrative regions 
of Sverdlovsk, Novossibirsk, Smolensk, Kalinine, Kamenetz, 
Podolsk and Jitomir, and in the regions of 
Altai, of Krasnoda, of Ordjonikidze and in the S.S.R. 
of Kazakhstan. The Council of People's Commissars 
and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) emphasize 
that the harmful practice of excluding Kolkhozines 
exists equally in other regions. 
The practice shows that the directors and presidents 
of the Kolkhozes, instead of respecting the statutes 
of the agricultural artel and not tolerating arbitration 
against Kolkhozines, are themselves committing illegal 
actions. The authority has established that exclusions

334 
of Kolkhozines have no foundation whatsoever, operate 
with absolutely no legitimate pretext and only from 
the most insignificant of motives. The most widespread 
form of illegal exclusions of Kolkhozines is the 
exclusion of members of families, of which the fathers 
are taking a temporary or a permanent part in working 
for firms or enterprises of the State. This form of 
exclusion based on parental ties, fundamentally contradicts 
the statutes of the agricultural artel. 
Before the permitting of the exclusion of Kolkhozines, 
the statutes of the agricultural artel state 
a series of intermediate measures of a preventive 
and educative nature for each Kolkhozine who violates 
the internal laws of the Kolkhoz, as for example : 
he is made to re-do work of a bad quality within his 
normal working hours without warning, without blame 
being put on the commune in general, without inscription 
on the black-list, without interfering with the five 
day week and without suspension. But the lines the 
Kolkhozes are taking, for some unknown reason, have 
not adhered to these measures and very often exclude 
Kolkhozines from the Kolkhozes for a simple 
violation of internal rules. 
If, according to the statutes of the agricultural 
artel, exclusion from the artel can only be effected 
by a decision of a general assembly of members of 
the artel and moreover with the participation of not 
less than two thirds of all the members, in effect 
this statutory law is very often violated. The cases 
are not rare where the exclusion of Kolkhozines are 
pronounced by the authorities of the Kolkhoz and even 
by its own president.

335 
Instead of repressing and correcting this harmful 
practice of exclusion of Kolkhozines, the workerdirectors 
of the Party and of the district Soviets 
do not take decisive measures for the repression of 
the arbitration against Kolkhozines; they have an insensitive 
and bureaucratic attitude of the type which 
is so harmful to Kolkhozines, the type of attitude 
which makes no use of the provisions made against 
the illegal exclusions within the Kolkhozes and leaves 
unpunished the people who persist in arbitration against 
Kolkhozines. The attitude of these people in fact reduces 
their own role to that of simply registering 
the cases of exclusion and drawing up statistical reports 
for the leading Soviet organs. Worse, the workers 
themselves often push the presidents and managements 
of the Kolkhozes on to the road of illegal exclusions 
of Kolkhozines under the pretext of purging the Kolkhozes 
of foreign and hostile social elements, from 
the class point of view. 
The Council of People's Commissars and the Central 
Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) estimate that at 
the basis of such a practice is found a formal attitude, 
bureaucratic and insensitive on the part of a great 
number of worker-directors of the Kolkhozes as regards 
the destiny of living people, the people of the 
Kolkhoz. These directors do not understand that to 
exclude a Kolkhozine from a Kolkhoz signifies depriving 
him of his means of livelihood and that signifies not 
only dishonouring him in the face of public opinion, 
but also condemning him to starvation. They do not 
understand that exclusion from the Kolkhoze artificially 
creates a dissatisfaction, an unrest among the

336 
excluded Kolkhozines, brought about in a great many 
cases by their insecurity and uncertainty regarding 
their standing in the Kolkhoz. That is what makes 
this affair the enemy of the people. 
The Council of People's Commissars and the Central 
Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) decree : 
1. To forbid the purging of the Kolkhozes under 
any pretext whatsoever. 
2. To forbid exclusion from the Kolkhozes of members 
of the families of Kolkhozines under the pretext 
that a member of that family is going to work 
temporarily or permanently for the State. 
3. To forbid exclusion from the Kolkhoz for the 
violation of internal rules and rulings. 
4. To establish for the future that exclusion of 
Kolkhozines from Kolkhozes can only be applied as 
an extreme measure against members of the Kolkhoz 
who are declared to be incorrigible and who disrupt 
or disorganize the Kolkhoz, only after the preventive 
and educative measures have been exhausted, and only 
in strict accordance with the type of exclusion defined 
by the statutes of the agricultural artel, that 
is to say, conforming with the decisions of the general 
assembly of members of the artel of which not less 
than two thirds must be present. 
Equally, in each case the appeals made by those 
excluded from the Kolkhoz must be examined with 
the greatest attention. 
5. To warn the directors and the management of 
the Kolkhozes as well as the workers of the Party 
and district Soviets, that those guilty of the violation 
of the present decree will be handed over to legal

337 
jurisdiction as would any common criminal. 
V. M. MOLOTOV 
President of the Council of People's Commissars 
J. STALIN 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) 
Pravda 
20 April 1938

338

339 
ON THE INCORRECT DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUES 
IN THE KOLKHOZES 
(Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of 
the U.S.S.R. and of the Central Committee of the 
C.P.S.U.(B)). 
19 April 1938 
The Council of People's Commissars and the Central 
Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) notice that from 
the fact of the complete victory of the Kolkhozine 
order and the growth of the output from the Kolkhozine 
fields, the communal revenues of the Kolkhozes 
together with the revenues from the daily work of 
the Kolkhozines, have augmented considerably. 
At the same time, the Council of People's Commissars 
of the U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee 
of the C.P.S.U.(B) state on the basis of innumerable 
facts that in the Kolkhozes from a series of regions 
and Republics and from administrative regions, the 
monetary revenues are incorrectly distributed in total 
contradiction with the interests of the Kolkhozines. 
The management of the Kolkhozes with the direct 
agreement of the Party organizations, and of the 
district Soviets, administrative regions, regions and 
Republics, spend a substantial portion of the revenues 
on Socialist construction in the Kolkhozes, production 
and administrative expenses after which the portion 
of revenues distributed among the Kolkhozines for 
their daily work, has reduced considerably. This often 
forces the Kolkhozines to look for work outside the 
Kolkhozes, and the Kolkhozes themselves often suffer

340 
from an insufficient work force. 
In the S.S.R. of Tatarie for example, on 172 Kolkhozes, 
on average, only 28 per cent of the revenue 
is distributed among the workers; in the administrative 
region of Gorki, on 1,279 Kolkhozes only 33 per cent 
of the monetary revenue is distributed among the 
workers. In certain administrative regions and Republics 
(administrative regions of the Rostov, Voronieze 
and of Riazan, the S.S.R. of Kazakhstan and 
others) there are some Kolkhozes in which the monetary 
revenues have absolutely not been distributed among 
the workers for their daily labour during the year 
1937. 
The Council of People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. 
and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) have 
at their disposal analogues of facts in appreciable 
numbers and which concern a great number of other 
administrative regions, regions and Republics. 
Instead of constantly caring for the augmentation 
of monetary revenue for the daily work of the Kolkhozines 
and of the correct combination of the individual 
interests of the Kolkhozines with the social 
interests of the Kolkhozes, the management of the 
Kolkhozes are infatuated with large scale work, with 
excessive production expenses and with the expenses 
of the economic and administrative management of 
the Kolkhozes. From the amount appropriated to the 
joint funds, the expenditure on economic, administrative 
and cultural needs, has not only not lowered but on 
the contrary, has largely exceeded the standards set 
by statutes of the agricultural artels. 
The statutes of the agricultural artels demand

341 
that the management of the Kolkhozes spend, only 
in that measure and only on those articles stipulated 
by the budget which was fixed at the conclusion of 
the general assembly of the Kolkhozines. In practice, 
however, several managements of Kolkhozes, firstly, 
themselves establish the budget with additional expenses, 
taking no notice of the budget already established 
and without asking for a general assembly 
of Kolkhozines, transferring arbitrarily, the expenditure 
from one article to another, without taking 
into consideration the realization of the plan for the 
revenues. These presidents and managements of the 
Kolkhozes do not have the right to change the fixed 
budget in an independent fashion, without the agreement 
of the Kolkhozines, to do this or that with 
the expenses; they forget that they are totally accountable 
to the general assembly of the Kolkhoz. 
The control commissions, as a general rule, do nothing 
which would transform the auxiliary apparatus of the 
management for the elaboration of a formal conclusion 
in the account of activities to be given at 
the end of the year. 
The statutes of the agricultural artel demand 
that all work of the Kolkhozes should be done by the 
members of the Kolkhozes and only in exceptional 
cases is the provisional enlisting of another worker 
tolerated. However, the facts show that there are 
quite a few cases where, owing to the poor organization 
of work, the management of Kolkhozes spend 
considerable sums of money in order to enlist an 
outside worker, and this contributes to the undermining 
of the resources of the Kolkhozes and to

342 
the lowering of their revenues. 
Instead of concentrating on the true task, the 
drawbacks and the realization of the Kolkhozine 
production, with the intention of increasing its 
monetary revenue, it is not unusual that the management 
of certain Kolkhozes, throughout the year conduct 
a practice condemned by the Party and the 
State, which consists of wasting Kolkhozine production 
by making distributions at the lowest prices 
both inside and outside the Kolkhozes. They are 
negligent in the delivery of goods, which leads finally 
to a decline in the price paid for the daily work of 
the Kolkhozines. 
The directors of the Party organizations and district 
Soviets, of administrative regions, of regions 
and Republics, do not themselves understand and do 
not explain to the Kolkhozines, that by the sensible 
augmentation of the revenues in the Kolkhozes and 
the reinforcement of their social funds in the form 
of buildings, cattle and machinery (the use of the 
machinery of the Kolkhoz), they have there the possibility 
of reducing the appropriation of the revenues 
of the Kolkhozes to their social funds, and the large 
expenses, and the expenses of production and to distribute 
a large portion of the monetary revenues of 
the Kolkhozes in payment for the work of the Kolkhozines. 
The directors of the Party and of the district 
Soviets, administrative regions, regions and Republics, 
forget that such a careless practice in the face of 
increasing wages paid for daily work, the wastage 
and depreciation of the resources of the Kolkhozes,

343 
are objectively acts of sabotage and anti-Kolkhozine. 
Our directors of the Party and of Soviets must 
remember that in a series of places, on the basis 
of artificial inflation, the expenses of production, 
large expenditure in the Kolkhozes and the reduction 
in the amount of monetary revenue distributed in 
payment for daily work, the enemies of the people, 
lying in wait in their agrarian organs and other places, 
have consciously incited provocation in order to sabotage 
the Kolkhozes. 
The Council of People's Commissars and the Central 
Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) decree : 
1. To condemn as anti-Kolkhozine, the practice 
of having a negligent attitude towards the daily work 
of the Kolkhozines and also the wastage of Kolkhozine 
revenues on unnecessary excessive expenditure on 
large scale work, on production, and on administrative 
and economic needs. The district committees, regional 
committees and the Central Committee of the 
C.P.S.U.(B) are ordered to put an end to these 
practices. 
2. To abolish the existing usage outlined by the 
statutes of the artel, concerning the distribution of 
the monetary revenues of the artel, and to establish 
that in the future the artel will redistribute among 
the Kolkhozines not less than 60 - 70 per cent of 
all the monetary revenues of the artel for their 
work. 
3. To establish that appropriation of funds to large 
scale work will not exceed 10 per cent of the monetary 
revenues, moreover that the amount to be spent on 
large scale work in the current year must be based

344 
on the revenue of the previous year. 
4. To establish that in the annual budget approved 
by the general assembly of Kolkhozines, for the needs 
of production, the management must not spend more 
than the 70 per cent outlined by the budget, before 
the final evaluation of the harvest. The remaining 
30 per cent must be kept in reserve and spent only 
after the final evaluation of the harvest and after 
the discussion of the general assembly of the Kolkhozines. 
In relation to this, Article 12 changes the statutes 
of the agricultural artel and re-directs them as 
follows : 
THE MONETARY REVENUES OF THE ARTEL 
a) Pays to the State the taxes fixed by law, and 
pays the insurance quotas. 
b) Distributes not less than 60 - 70 per cent of 
the monetary revenues among the members of the 
artel according to their daily work. 
c) Pays out the expenses which are necessary for 
the current needs of production and of current distributions 
of agricultural machinery, medical treatment 
for cattle, the struggle against saboteurs, etc. 
d) Covers the administrative and economic expenses 
of the artel without exceeding 2 per cent of 
the monetary revenue. 
e) Pays out the expenditure on cultural needs, 
e.g. training of brigadiers and other cadres, organization 
of nurseries, assembling radios. 
f) Completes the joint funds for the appropriation

345 
of the expenses of the following year in view of the 
purchase of cattle and agricultural material, of the 
regulation of building materials, of payment to workers 
recruited from outside for construction, of regular 
taxes to the agricultural bank according to the long 
term credits; moreover, the appropriation, in order 
to complete the joint funds must be carried out according 
to a figure which does not exceed 10 per cent 
of all the monetary revenue of the artel. 
All the remunerations must be recorded on a receipt 
of the artel, not later than the day of their 
payment. 
An annual budget is made by the artel as much 
for the remuneration as for the outlays, and which 
will not come into force until after the ratification 
of the general assembly of the members of the artel. 
The management can only effect these expenses 
on the articles outlined by the budget. The arbitrary 
transfer of resources from one article to another 
is forbidden. If a manager wants to do this, he must 
first confer with the general assembly. 
The annual budget for the needs of production of 
the Kolkhozes is fixed by the general assembly 
of Kolkhozines. The management cannot spend more 
than 70 per cent of the allowance outlined by the 
budget before the evaluation of the harvest. The other 
30 per cent must be kept in reserve and only spent 
after the final evaluation of the harvest, and after 
the decision of the general assembly of Kolkhozines. 
The artel keeps its monetary resources available 
in its current bank account or at the Savings Bank. 
The curtailment of the current account can only be

346 
effected by the order of the management of the artel, 
which is made valid by the signature of the President 
and accountable to the artel. 
5. To establish the usage, according to which the 
budget of each Kolkhoz is put, it is, after its ratification 
by the general assembly, submitted to an 
examination by a presidium of the executive committee 
of the district, which examines the budget 
submitted to the president of the management and 
to the President of the Commission of Registration 
of the Kolkhoz. 
6. To establish that the engaging of paid workers 
in the Kolkhoz can only be effected with the agreement 
of the general assembly of the Kolkhozines. To 
oblige the secretaries of the districts of the 
C.P.S.U.(B), and the president of the district executive 
committees not to tolerate the abuse and the violation 
of point 13 of the statutes of the agricultural 
artel, which forbids the paid employment of non- 
Kolkhozines, except in cases outlined by the artel. 
7. To oblige the committees of the administrative 
regions, the regions and the Central Committees of 
the national Communist Parties to re-establish the 
work of the Commission of Registration in all Kolkhozes 
in such a way that they can do their work of 
registration throughout the whole year, as demanded 
by the statutes, and not to merely limit themselves 
to giving a formal conclusion in the accounting of the 
work of the management at the end of the year. 
8. To establish that the branches of the State 
Banks and the agricultural banks only give credit to 
Kolkhozines in the case where it has been decided by

347 
the general assembly of Kolkhozines. 
9. To oblige the committees of the administrative 
regions, of regions, the Central Committees of the 
national Communist Parties, the executive committees 
of the administrative regions, and of regions, 
and the Council of People's Commissars, and the Republics, 
to make sure that their procurators bring 
to justice those responsible for illegal expenditure 
from the resources of the Kolkhozes, and those who 
violate the statutes of the agricultural artel and the 
interests of the Kolkhozine people, since these activities 
are considered to be a betrayal of the Kolkhozine 
cause, and a help to the enemies of the people. 
V. M. MOLOTOV 
President of the Council of People's Commissars of 
the U.S.S.R. 
J. STALIN 
Secretary of the Communist Party of the C.P.S.U.(B) 
Pravda 
20 April 1938

348

349 
ON THE TAXES AND OTHER OBLIGATIONS CONCERNING 
INDEPENDENT OPERATORS 
Decree of the Council of People's Commissars of the 
U.S.S.R. and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) 
19 April 1938 
On the basis of numerous facts, the Council of 
People's Commissars of the U.S.S.R. and the Central 
Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) have established that 
the policy and decrees of the State and of the Party 
concerning independent operators or free-lance workers, 
are violated by the organs of the Party and of 
Soviets in the Republics, the regions and the administrative 
regions. The obligations to the State are 
established by Soviet laws for the individual in the 
sphere of taxes, the delivery of grain, and meat. 
However, instead of guaranteeing the execution of 
these obligations, the local Party and district organs 
tolerate a situation in which the free-lance worker 
fails to fulfil his obligations to the State. In a series 
of administrative regions and regions, the free-lance 
workers are absolutely not called upon to deliver meat, 
and the execution of the tasks outlined in the district 
plan concerning the delivery of meat, falls back on 
the Kolkhozes. 
In this way, the Party and Soviet organizations 
put these free-lance workers in a privileged position 
in comparison with the Kolkhozes, which is a fundamental 
contradiction of existing laws. 
The horses, not taxable to the free-lance workers

350 
are, as a general rule, used by them, not in their 
agricultural efforts, but as a means of speculation 
and gain. 
In the face of the tolerance of the Party and Soviet 
organs in the districts, the managements of the Kolkhozes, 
violating the statutes of the agricultural 
artel come very often to the practice of engaging 
free-lance workers in the Kolkhozes, and pay them 
more than the Kolkhozines for the days work, a fact 
which can only undermine discipline in the Kolkhozes. 
This incorrect attitude to independent operations 
brings as a result direct prejudice owing to the ultimate 
engagement of free-lance workers in the Kolkhozes. 
All this bears witness to the presence of grave 
mistakes on the part of the organs of the Soviets, 
and of the Parties of the Republics, of the regions 
and the administrative regions concerning the freelance 
worker. 
The Council of Peoples' Commissars of the U.S.S.R. 
and the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) decree : 
1. To oblige the Central Committees of the national 
Communist Parties, the executive committees of 
regions and administrative regions, the Council of the 
People's Commissars of the Republics, the executive 
committees of the Soviets of regions and of administrative 
regions, to bring to an end this anti-State 
and anti-Party practice of complacency concerning 
the free-lance workers and to severely watch out that 
these individuals do carry out exactly all their obligations 
to the State, concerning taxes and delivery 
of grain and meat, etc. 
2. To re-establish, from August 25th, 1938, a

351 
state tax on the horses of free-lance workers. 
3. To oblige the Party and Soviet organizations of 
the Republics, regions and administrative regions not 
to tolerate in the future that the free-lance workers 
manage to avoid their responsibilities (work on the 
roads, working in the forests, education service, 
hospital service, etc.) and in the same way not to 
tolerate the holding of any privileges at the expense 
of the Kolkhozines. 
V. M. MOLOTOV 
President of the Council of People's Commissars of 
the U.S.S.R. 
J. STALIN 
Secretary of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) 
Pravda 
20 April 1938

352

353 
OATH OF ALLEGIANCE OF THE WORKERS' AND 
PEASANTS' RED ARMY 
23 February 1939 
I, a citizen of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 
joining the ranks of the Workers' and Peasants' 
Red Army, do hereby take the oath of allegiance and 
do solemnly vow to be an honest, brave, disciplined 
and vigilant fighter, to guard strictly all military 
and State secrets, to obey implicitly all Army regulations 
and orders of my commanders, commissars 
and superiors. 
I vow to study the duties of a soldier conscientiously, 
to safeguard Army and National property in every way 
possible and to be true to my People, my Soviet 
Motherland, and the Workers' and Peasants' Government 
to my last breath. 
I am always prepared at the order of the Workers' 
and Peasants' Government to come to the defence 
of my Motherland - the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics - and, as a fighter of the Workers' and 
Peasants' Red Army, I vow to defend her courageously, 
skilfully, creditably and honourably, without sparing 
my blood and my very life to achieve complete victory 
over the enemy. 
And if through evil intent I break this solemn oath, 
then let the stern punishment of the Soviet law, and 
the universal hatred and contempt of the working 
people, fall upon me. 
Pravda J. STALIN 
25 February 1939

354

355 
REPORT ON THE WORK OF THE CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE TO THE EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS OF 
THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 
(Delivered March 10, 1939.) 
I 
THE SOVIET UNION AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
Comrades, five years have elapsed since the Seventeenth 
Party Congress. No small period, as you see. 
During this period the world has undergone considerable 
changes. States and countries, and their mutual relations, 
are now in many respects totally altered. 
What changes exactly have taken place in the 
international situation in this period? In what way 
exactly have the foreign and internal affairs of our 
country changed? 
For the capitalist countries this period was one 
of very profound perturbations in both the economic 
and political spheres. In the economic sphere these 
were years of depression, followed, from the beginning 
of the latter half of 1937, by a period of new 
economic crisis, of a new decline of industry in the 
United States, Great Britain and France; consequently, 
these were years of new economic complications. In 
the political sphere they were years of serious political 
conflicts and perturbations. A new imperialist war 
is already in its second year, a war waged over a 
huge territory stretching from Shanghai to Gibraltar 
and involving over five hundred million people. The

356 
map of Europe, Africa and Asia is being forcibly redrawn. 
The entire post-war system, the so-called 
regime of peace, has been shaken to its foundations. 
For the Soviet Union, on the contrary, these were 
years of growth and prosperity, of further economic 
and cultural progress, of further development of 
political and military might, of struggle for the 
preservation of peace throughout the world. 
Such is the general picture. 
Let us now examine the concrete data illustrating 
the changes in the international situation. 
1. New Economic Crisis in the Capitalist Countries, 
Intensification of the Struggle for Markets and 
Sources of Raw Material, and for a New Redivision 
of the World. 
The economic crisis which broke out in the capitalist 
countries in the latter half of 1929 lasted 
until the end of 1933. After that the crisis passed 
into a depression, and was then followed by a certain 
revival, a certain upward trend of industry. But this 
upward trend of industry did not develop into a boom, 
as is usually the case in a period of revival. On the 
contrary, in the latter half of 1937 a new economic 
crisis began which seized the United States first of 
all and then England, France and a number of other 
countries. 
The capitalist countries thus found themselves 
faced with a new economic crisis before they had even 
recovered from the ravages of the recent one. 
This circumstance naturally led to an increase of

357 
unemployment. The number of unemployed in capitalist 
countries, which had fallen from thirty million in 
1933 to fourteen million in 1937, has now again risen 
to eighteen million as a result of the new economic 
crisis. 
A distinguishing feature of the new crisis is that 
it differs in many respects from the preceding one, 
and, moreover, differs for the worse and not for 
the better. 
Firstly, the new crisis did not begin after an industrial 
boom, as was the case in 1929, but after 
a depression and a certain revival, which, however, 
did not develop into a boom. This means that the 
present crisis will be more severe and more difficult 
to cope with than the previous crisis. 
Further, the present crisis has broken out not 
in time of peace, but at a time when a second imperialist 
war has already begun; at a time when Japan, 
already in the second year of her war with China, 
is disorganizing the immense Chinese market and rendering 
it almost inaccessible to the goods of other 
countries; when Italy and Germany have already placed 
their national economy on a war footing, squandering 
their reserves of raw material and foreign currency 
for this purpose; and when all the other big capitalist 
powers are beginning to reorganize themselves on a 
war footing. This means that capitalism will have 
far less resources at its disposal for a normal way 
out of the present crisis than during the preceding 
crisis. 
Lastly, as distinct from the preceding crisis, 
the present crisis is not a general one, but as yet

358 
involves chiefly the economically powerful countries 
which have not yet placed themselves on a war economy 
basis. As regards the aggressive countries, such as 
Japan, Germany and Italy, who have already reorganized 
their economy on a war footing, they, because of 
the intense development of their war industry, are 
not yet experiencing a crisis of overproduction, although 
they are approaching it. This means that by 
the time the economically powerful, non-aggressive 
countries begin to emerge from the phase of crisis 
the aggressive countries, having exhausted their reserves 
of gold and raw material in the course of the 
war fever, are bound to enter a phase of very severe 
crisis. 
This is clearly illustrated, for example, by the 
figures for the visible gold reserves of the capitalist 
countries. 
VISIBLE GOLD RESERVES OF THE CAPITALIST 
COUNTRIES (In millions of former gold dollars) 
End of 1936 Sept 1938 
Total . . . . . . . . . 12,980 14,301 
U.S.A. . . . . . . . . 6,649 8,126 
Great Britain . . . . 2,029 2,396 
France . . . . . . . . 1,769 1,435 
Holland . . . . . . . . 289 595 
Belgium . . . . . . . 373 318 
Switzerland . . . . . 387 407 
Germany . . . . . . . 16 17 
Italy . . . . . . . . . 123 124 
Japan . . . . . . . . . 273 97

359 
This table shows that the combined gold reserves 
of Germany, Italy and Japan amount to less than the 
reserves of Switzerland alone. 
Here are a few figures illustrating the state of 
crisis of industry in the capitalist countries during 
the past five years and the trend of industrial progress 
in the U.S.S.R. 
VOLUME OF INDUSTRIAL OUTPUT COMPARED WITH 
1929 (1929 = 100) 
1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
U.S.A. 66.4 75.6 88.1 92.2 72.0 
Great Britain 98.8 105.8 115.9 123.7 112.0 
France 71.0 67.4 79.3 82.8 70.0 
Italy 80.0 93.8 87.5 99.6 96.0 
Germany 79.8 94.0 106.3 117.2 125.0 
Japan 128.7 141.8 151.1 170.8 165.0 
U.S.S.R. 283.3 293.4 382.3 424.0 477.0 
This table shows that the Soviet Union is the only 
country in the world where crises are unknown and 
where industry is continuously on the upgrade. 
This table also shows that a serious economic 
crisis has already begun and is developing in the 
United States, Great Britain and France. 
Further, this table shows that in Italy and Japan, 
who placed their national economy on a war footing 
earlier than Germany, the downward course of industry 
already began in 1938. 
Lastly, this table shows that in Germany, who 
reorganized her economy on a war footing later than

360 
Italy and Japan, industry is still experiencing a certain 
upward trend - although a small one, it is true - 
corresponding to that which took place in Japan and 
Italy until recently. 
There can be no doubt that unless something unforeseen 
occurs, German industry must enter the 
same downward path as Japan and Italy have already 
taken. For what does placing the economy of a country 
on a war footing mean? It means giving industry a 
one-sided war direction; developing to the utmost the 
production of goods necessary for war and not for 
consumption by the population; restricting to the utmost 
the production and, especially, the sale of 
articles of general consumption - and, consequently, 
reducing consumption by the population and confronting 
the country with an economic crisis. 
Such is the concrete picture of the trend of the 
new economic crisis in the capitalist countries. 
Naturally, such an unfavourable turn of economic 
affairs could not but aggravate relations among the 
powers. The preceding crisis had already mixed the 
cards and intensified the struggle for markets and 
sources of raw materials. The seizure of Manchuria 
and North China by Japan, the seizure of Abyssinia 
by Italy - all this reflected the acuteness of the 
struggle among the powers. The new economic crisis 
must lead, and is actually leading, to a further 
sharpening of the imperialist struggle. It is no longer 
a question of competition in the markets, of a commercial 
war, of dumping. These methods of struggle 
have long been recognized as inadequate. It is now a 
question of a new redivision of the world, of spheres

361 
of influence and colonies, by military action. 
Japan tried to justify her aggressive actions by 
the argument that she had been cheated when the 
Nine-Power Pact was concluded and had not been 
allowed to extend her territory at the expense of 
China, whereas Britain and France possess vast 
colonies. Italy recalled that she had been cheated 
during the division of the spoils after the first imperialist 
war and that she must recompense herself 
at the expense of the spheres of influence of Britain 
and France. Germany, who had suffered severely as 
a result of the first imperialist war and the Peace 
of Versailles, joined forces with Japan and Italy, and 
demanded an extension of her territory in Europe 
and the return of the colonies of which the victors 
in the first imperialist war had deprived her. 
Thus the bloc of three aggressive states came 
to be formed. 
A new redivision of the world by means of war 
became imminent. 
2. Aggravation of the International Political Situation. 
Collapse of the Post-War System of Peace Treaties. 
Beginning of a New Imperialist War. 
Here is a list of the most important events during 
the period under review which mark the beginning of 
the new imperialist war. In 1935 Italy attacked and 
seized Abyssinia. In the summer of 1936 Germany 
and Italy organized military intervention in Spain, 
Germany entrenching herself in the north of Spain 
and in Spanish Morocco, and Italy in the south of

362 
Spain and in the Balearic Islands. Having seized 
Manchuria, Japan in 1937 invaded North and Central 
China, occupied Peking, Tientsin and Shanghai and 
began to oust her foreign competitors from the 
occupied zone. In the beginning of 1938 Germany 
seized Austria, and in the autumn of 1938 the Sudeten 
region of Czechoslovakia. At the end of 1938 Japan 
seized Canton, and at the beginning of 1939 the Island 
of Hainan. 
Thus the war, which has stolen so imperceptibly 
upon the nations, has drawn over five hundred million 
people into its orbit and has extended its sphere of 
action over a vast territory, stretching from Tientsin, 
Shanghai and Canton, through Abyssinia, to Gibraltar. 
After the first imperialist war the victor states, 
primarily Britain, France and the United States, had 
set up a new regime in the relations between countries, 
the post-war regime of peace. The main props of 
this regime were the Nine-Power Pact in the Far 
East, and the Versailles Treaty and a number of 
other treaties in Europe. The League of Nations was 
set up to regulate relations between countries within 
the framework of this regime, on the basis of a 
united front of states, of collective defence of the 
security of states. However, three aggressive states, 
and the new imperialist war launched by them, have 
upset the entire system of this post-war peace regime. 
Japan tore up the Nine-Power Pact, and Germany and 
Italy the Versailles Treaty. In order to have their 
hands free, these three states withdrew from the 
League of Nations. 
The new imperialist war became a fact.

363 
It is not so easy in our day to suddenly break loose 
and plunge straight into war without regard for treaties 
of any kind or for public opinion. Bourgeois politicians 
know this very well. So do the fascist rulers. That 
is why the fascist rulers decided, before plunging 
into war, to frame public opinion to suit their ends, 
that is, to mislead it, to deceive it. 
A military bloc of Germany and Italy against the 
interests of England and France in Europe? Bless us, 
do you call that a bloc? "We" have no military bloc. 
All "we" have is an innocuous "Berlin-Rome axis"; 
that is, just a geometrical equation for an axis. 
(Laughter.) 
A military bloc of Germany, Italy and Japan against 
the interests of the United States, Great Britain 
and France in the Far East? Nothing of the kind. 
"We" have no military bloc. All "we" have is an innocuous 
"Berlin-Rome-Tokyo triangle"; that is, a slight 
penchant for geometry. (General laughter.) 
A war against the interests of England, France, 
the United States? Nonsense! "We" are waging war 
on the Comintern, not on these states. If you don't 
believe it, read the "anti-Comintern pact" concluded 
between Italy, Germany and Japan. 
That is how Messieurs the aggressors thought of 
framing public opinion, although it was not hard to 
see how preposterous this whole clumsy game of 
camouflage was; for it is ridiculous to look for Comintern 
"hotbeds" in the deserts of Mongolia, in the 
mountains of Abyssinia, or in the wilds of Spanish 
Morocco. (Laughter.) 
But war is inexorable. It cannot be hidden under any

364 
guise. For no "axes," "triangles" or "anti-Comintern 
pacts" can hide the fact that in this period Japan 
has seized a vast stretch of territory in China, that 
Italy has seized Abyssinia, that Germany has seized 
Austria and the Sudeten region, that Germany and 
Italy together have seized Spain - and all this in 
defiance of the interests of the non-aggressive states. 
The war remains a war; the military bloc of aggressors 
remains a military bloc; and the aggressors remain 
aggressors. 
It is a distinguishing feature of the new imperialist 
war that it has not yet become universal, a world 
war. The war is being waged by aggressor states, 
who in every way infringe upon the interests of the 
non-aggressive states, primarily England, France and 
the U.S.A., while the latter draw back and retreat, 
making concession after concession to the aggressors. 
Thus we are witnessing an open redivision of the 
world and spheres of influence at the expense of the 
non-aggressive states, without the least attempt at 
resistance, and even with a certain amount of connivance, 
on the part of the latter. 
Incredible, but true. 
To what are we to attribute this one-sided and 
strange character of the new imperialist war? 
How is it that the non-aggressive countries, which 
possess such vast opportunities, have so easily, and 
without any resistance, abandoned their positions and 
their obligations to please the aggressors? 
Is it to be attributed to the weakness of the nonaggressive 
states? Of course not. Combined, the nonaggressive, 
democratic states are unquestionably

365 
stronger than the fascist states, both economically 
and in the military sense. 
To what then are we to attribute the systematic 
concessions made by these states to the aggressors? 
It might be attributed, for example, to the fear 
that a revolution might break out if the non-aggressive 
states were to go to war and the war were to assume 
world - wide proportions. The bourgeois politicians know, 
of course, that the first imperialist world war led 
to the victory of the revolution in one of the largest 
countries. They are afraid that the second imperialist 
world war may also lead to the victory of the revolution 
in one or several countries. 
But at present this is not the sole or even the 
chief reason. The chief reason is that the majority 
of the non-aggressive countries, particularly England 
and France, have rejected the policy of collective 
security, the policy of collective resistance to the 
aggressors, and have taken up a position of nonintervention, 
a position of "neutrality." 
Formally speaking, the policy of non-intervention 
might be defined as follows: "Let each country defend 
itself from the aggressors as it likes and as best it 
can. That is not our affair. We shall trade both with 
the aggressors and with their victims." But actually 
speaking, the policy of non-intervention means conniving 
at aggression, giving free rein to war, and, consequently, 
transforming the war into a world war. The policy of 
non-intervention reveals an eagerness, a desire, not 
to hinder the aggressors in their nefarious work: 
not to hinder Japan, say, from embroiling herself in 
a war with China, or, better still, with the Soviet

366 
Union : to allow all the belligerents to sink deeply 
into the mire of war, to encourage them surreptitiously 
in this, to allow them to weaken and exhaust one 
another; and then, when they have become weak enough, 
to appear on the scene with fresh strength, to appear, 
of course, "in the interests of peace," and to dictate 
conditions to the enfeebled belligerents. 
Cheap and easy! 
Take Japan, for instance. It is characteristic that 
before Japan invaded North China all the influential 
French and British newspapers shouted about China's 
weakness and her inability to offer resistance, and 
declared that Japan with her army could subjugate 
China in two or three months. Then the European and 
American politicians began to watch and wait. And 
then, when Japan started military operations, they 
let her have Shanghai, the vital centre of foreign 
capital in China; they let her have Canton, a centre 
of Britain's monopoly influence in South China; they 
let her have Hainan, and they allowed her to surround 
Hongkong. Does not this look very much like encouraging 
the aggressor? It is as though they were saying : 
"Embroil yourself deeper in war; then we shall see." 
Or take Germany, for instance. They let her have 
Austria, despite the undertaking to defend her independence; 
they let her have the Sudeten region; they 
abandoned Czechoslovakia to her fate, thereby violating 
all their obligations; and then began to lie vociferously 
in the press about "the weakness of the Russian army," 
"the demoralization of the Russian air force," and 
"riots" in the Soviet Union, egging the Germans on 
to march farther east, promising them easy pickings,

367 
and prompting them : "Just start war on the Bolsheviks, 
and everything will be all right." It must 
be admitted that this too looks very much like egging 
on and encouraging the aggressor. 
The hullabaloo raised by the British, French and 
American press over the Soviet Ukraine is characteristic. 
The gentlemen of the press there shouted until 
they were hoarse that the Germans were marching 
on Soviet Ukraine, that they now had what is called 
the Carpathian Ukraine, with a population of some 
seven hundred thousand, and that not later than this 
spring the Germans would annex the Soviet Ukraine, 
which has a population of over thirty million, to this 
so-called Carpathian Ukraine. It looks as if the object 
of this suspicious hullabaloo was to incense the Soviet 
Union against Germany, to poison the atmosphere and 
to provoke a conflict with Germany without any visible 
grounds. 
It is quite possible, of course, that there are 
madmen in Germany who dream of annexing the elephant, 
that is, the Soviet Ukraine, to the gnat, namely, the 
so-called Carpathian Ukraine. If there really are such 
lunatics in Germany, rest assured that we shall find 
enough straitjackets for them in our country. (Thunderous 
applause.) But if we ignore the madmen and turn 
to normal people, is it not clearly absurd and foolish 
to seriously talk of annexing the Soviet Ukraine to 
this so-called Carpathian Ukraine? Imagine : The gnat 
comes to the elephant and says perkily : "Ah, brother, 
how sorry I am for you . . . Here you are without 
any landlords, without any capitalists, with no national 
oppression, without any fascist bosses. Is that a way

368 
to live? . . . As I look at you I can't help thinking 
that there is no hope for you unless you annex yourself 
to me . . . (General laughter.) Well, so be it : 
I allow you to annex your tiny domain to my vast 
territories . . ." (General laughter and applause.) 
Even more characteristic is the fact that certain 
European and American politicians and pressmen, having 
lost patience waiting for "the march on the Soviet 
Ukraine," are themselves beginning to disclose what 
is really behind the policy of non-intervention. They 
are saying quite openly, putting it down in black on 
white, that the Germans have cruelly "disappointed" 
them, for instead of marching farther east, against 
the Soviet Union, they have turned, you see, to the 
west and are demanding colonies. One might think that 
the districts of Czechoslovakia were yielded to Germany 
as the price of an undertaking to launch war on the 
Soviet Union, but that now the Germans are refusing 
to meet their bills and are sending them to Hades. 
Far be it from me to moralize on the policy of 
non-intervention, to talk of treason, treachery and 
so on. It would be naive to preach morals to people 
who recognize no human morality. Politics is politics, 
as the old, case-hardened bourgeois diplomats say. 
It must be remarked, however, that the big and 
dangerous political game started by the supporters 
of the policy of non-intervention may end in a serious 
fiasco for them. 
Such is the true face of the prevailing policy of 
non-intervention. 
Such is the political situation in the capitalist 
countries.

369 
3. The Soviet Union and the Capitalist Countries. 
The war has created a new situation with regard 
to the relations between countries. It has enveloped 
them in an atmosphere of alarm and uncertainty. By 
undermining the post-war peace regime and overriding 
the elementary principles of international law, it has 
cast doubt on the value of international treaties and 
obligations. Pacifism and disarmament schemes are 
dead and buried. Feverish arming has taken their place. 
Everybody is arming, small states and big states, 
including primarily those which practise the policy 
of non-intervention. Nobody believes any longer in the 
unctuous speeches which claim that the Munich concessions 
to the aggressors and the Munich agreement 
opened a new era of "appeasement." They are disbelieved 
even by the signatories to the Munich agreement, 
Britain and France, who are increasing their 
armaments no less than other countries. 
Naturally, the U.S.S.R. could not ignore these 
ominous events. There is no doubt that any war, 
however small, started by the aggressors in any remote 
corner of the world constitutes a danger to the 
peacable countries. All the more serious then is the 
danger arising from the new imperialist war, which 
has already drawn into its orbit over five hundred 
million people in Asia, Africa and Europe. In view of 
this, while our country is unswervingly pursuing a 
policy of preserving peace, it is at the same time 
doing a great deal to increase the preparedness of 
our Red Army and our Red Navy. 
At the same time, in order to strengthen its

370 
international position, the Soviet Union decided to 
take certain other steps. At the end of 1934 our country 
joined the League of Nations, considering that despite 
its weakness the League might nevertheless serve as 
a place where aggressors can be exposed, and as a 
certain instrument of peace, however feeble, that 
might hinder the outbreak of war. The Soviet Union 
considers that in alarming times like these even so 
weak an international organization as the League of 
Nations should not be ignored. In May 1935 a treaty 
of mutual assistance against possible attack by aggressors 
was signed between France and the Soviet 
Union. A similar treaty was simultaneously concluded 
with Czechoslovakia. In March 1936 the Soviet Union 
concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with the 
Mongolian People's Republic. In August 1937 the Soviet 
Union concluded a pact of non-aggression with the 
Chinese Republic. 
It was in such difficult international conditions 
that the Soviet Union pursued its foreign policy of 
upholding the cause of peace. 
The foreign policy of the Soviet Union is clear 
and explicit. 
1. We stand for peace and the strengthening of 
business relations with all countries. That is our 
position; and we shall adhere to this position as long 
as these countries maintain like relations with the 
Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt 
to trespass on the interests of our country. 
2. We stand for peaceful, close and friendly relations 
with all the neighbouring countries which have 
common frontiers with the U.S.S.R. That is our

371 
position; and we shall adhere to this position as long 
as these countries maintain like relations with the 
Soviet Union, and as long as they make no attempt 
to trespass, directly or indirectly, on the integrity 
and inviolability of the frontiers of the Soviet state. 
3. We stand for the support of nations which are 
the victims of aggression and are fighting for the 
independence of their country. 
4. We are not afraid of the threats of aggressors, 
and are ready to deal two blows for every blow delivered 
by instigators of war who attempt to violate 
the Soviet borders. 
Such is the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. 
(Loud and prolonged applause.) 
In its foreign policy the Soviet Union relies upon : 
1. Its growing economic, political and cultural 
might; 
2. The moral and political unity of our Soviet 
society; 
3. The mutual friendship of the nations of our 
country; 
4. Its Red Army and Red Navy; 
5. Its policy of peace; 
6. The moral support of the working people of all 
countries, who are vitally concerned in the preservation 
of peace; 
7. The good sense of the countries which for one 
reason or another have no interest in the violation 
of peace. 
* * 
*

372 
The tasks of the Party in the sphere of foreign 
policy are : 
1. To continue the policy of peace and of strengthening 
business relations with all countries; 
2. To be cautious and not allow our country to be 
drawn into conflicts by warmongers who are accustomed 
to have others pull the chestnuts out of the fire for 
them; 
3. To strengthen the might of our Red Army and 
Red Navy to the utmost; 
4. To strengthen the international bonds of friendship 
with the working people of all countries, who are 
interested in peace and friendship among nations. 
II 
INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF THE SOVIET UNION 
Let us now pass to the internal affairs of our 
country. 
From the standpoint of its internal situation, the 
Soviet Union, during the period under review, presented 
a picture of further progress of its entire economic 
life, a rise in culture, and the strengthening of the 
political might of the country. 
In the sphere of economic development, we must 
regard the most important result during the period 
under review to be the fact that the reconstruction 
of industry and agriculture on the basis of a new, 
modern technique has been completed. There are no 
more or hardly any more old plants in our country, 
with their old technique, and hardly any old peasant

373 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
farms, with their antediluvian equipment. Our industry 
and agriculture are now based on new, up-to-date 
technique. It may be said without exaggeration that 
from the standpoint of the technique of production, 
from the standpoint of the degree of saturation of 
industry and agriculture with new machinery, our 
country is more advanced than any other country, 
where the old machinery acts as a fetter on production 
and hampers the introduction of modern technique. 
In the sphere of the social and political development 
of the country, we must regard the most important 
achievement of the period under review to 
be the fact that the remnants of the exploiting classes 
have been completely eliminated, that the workers, 
peasants and intellectuals have been welded into one 
common front of the working people, that the moral 
and political unity of Soviet society has been strengthened, 
that the friendship among the nations of our 
country has become closer, and, as a result, that 
the political life of our country has been completely 
democratized and a new Constitution created. No one 
will dare deny that our Constitution is the most 
democratic in the world, and that the results of the 
elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., as 
well as to the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics, 
have been the most exemplary. 
The result of all this is a completely stable internal 
situation and a stability of government which 
any other government in the world might envy. 
Let us examine the concrete data illustrating the 
economic and political situation of our country. 
1. Further Progress of Industry and Agriculture.

374 
a) Industry : During the period under review our 
industry presented a picture of uninterrupted progress, 
This progress was reflected not only in an increase 
of output generally, but, and primarily, in the flourishing 
state of Socialist industry, on the one hand, and the 
doom of private industry on the other. 
Here is a table which illustrates this : 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
In millions of rubles at 1926-27 prices 
42,030 
50,477 
62,137 
80,929 
90,166 
100,375 
42,002 
50,443 
62,114 
80,898 
90,138 
100,349 
28 
34 
23 
31 
28 
26 
Per cent 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
100.00 
99.93 
99.93 
99.96 
99.96 
99.97 
99.97 
0.07 
0.07 
0.04 
0.04 
0.03 
0.03 
Total output 
Of which : 
1. 
Socialist 
industry 
. 
. 
. 
2. 
Private 
industry 
. 
. 
. 
Total output 
Of which : 
1. 
Socialist 
industry 
. 
. 
. 
2. 
Private 
industry 
. 
. 
. 
Per cent of previous year 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
120.1 
123.1 
130.2 
111.4 
111.3 
120.1 
123.1 
130.2 
111.4 
111.3 
121.4 
67.6 
134.8 
90.3 
92.9 
1938 compared 
with 
1933 (per cent) 
238.8 
238.9 
92.9 
INDUSTRIAL PROGRESS OF THE U.S.S.R. IN 1934-38

375 
This table shows that during the period under review 
the output of our industry more than doubled, 
and that, moreover, the whole increase in output was 
accounted for by Socialist industry. 
Further, this table shows that the only system 
of industry in the U.S.S.R. is the Socialist system. 
Lastly, this table shows that the complete ruin 
of private industry is a fact which even a blind man 
cannot now deny. 
The ruin of private industry must not be regarded 
as a thing of chance. Private industry perished, 
firstly, because the Socialist economic system is 
superior to the capitalist system; and, secondly, 
because the Socialist economic system made it possible 
for us to re-equip in a few years the whole of our 
Socialist industry on new and up-to-date lines. This 
is a possibility which the capitalist economic system 
does not and cannot offer. It is a fact that, from 
the standpoint of the technique of production and 
from the standpoint of the degree of saturation of 
industry with modern machinery, our industry holds 
first place in the world. 
If we take the rate of growth of our industry, 
expressed in percentages of the pre-war level, and 
compare it with the rate of growth of the industry 
of the principal capitalist countries, we get the 
following picture :

376 
GROWTH OF INDUSTRY IN THE U.S.S.R. AND THE 
PRINCIPAL CAPITALIST COUNTRIES IN 1913 - 38 
1913 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
U.S.S.R. 100.0 380.5 457.0 562.6 732.7 816.4 908.8 
U.S.A. 100.0 108.7 112.9 128.6 149.8 156.9 120.0 
G.B. 100.0 87.0 97.1 104.0 114.2 121.9 113.3 
Germany 100.0 75.4 90.4 105.9 118.1 129.3 131.6 
France 100.0 107.0 99.0 94.0 98.0 101.0 93.2 
This table shows that our industry has grown more 
than nine-fold as compared with pre-war, whereas 
the industry of the principal capitalist countries 
continues to mark time round about the pre-war level, 
exceeding the latter by only 20 or 30 per cent. 
This means that as regards rate of growth our 
Socialist industry holds first place in the world. 
Thus we find that as regards technique of production 
and rate of growth of our industry, we have already 
overtaken and outstripped the principal capitalist 
countries. 
In what respect are we lagging? We are still lagging 
economically, that is, as regards the volume of our 
industrial output per head of population. In 1938 we 
produced about 15,000,000 tons of pig iron; Great 
Britain produced 7,000,000 tons. It might seem that 
we are better off than Great Britain. But if we divide

377 
this number of tons by the number of population we 
shall find that the output of pig iron per head of 
population in 1938 was 145 kilograms in Great Britain, 
and only 87 kilograms in the U.S.S.R. Or, further : 
in 1938 Great Britain produced 10,800,000 tons of 
steel and about 29,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours of 
electricity, whereas the U.S.S.R. produced 18,000,000 
tons of steel and over 39,000,000,000 kilowatt-hours 
of electricity. It might seem that we are better off 
than Great Britain. But if we divide this number of 
tons and kilowatt-hours by the number of population 
we shall find that in 1938 in Great Britain the output 
of steel per head of the population was 226 kilograms 
and of electricity 620 kilowatt-hours, whereas in the 
U.S.S.R. the output of steel per head of population 
was only 107 kilograms, and of electricity only 233 
kilowatt-hours. 
What is the reason for this? The reason is that 
our population is several times larger than that of 
Great Britain, and hence our requirements are greater : 
the Soviet Union has a population of 170,000,000, 
whereas Great Britain has a population of not more 
than 46,000,000. The economic power of a country's 
industry is not expressed by the volume of industrial 
output in general, irrespective of the size of population, 
but by the volume of industrial output taken in direct 
reference to the amount consumed per head of 
population. The larger a country's industrial output 
per head of population, the greater is its economic 
power; and, conversely, the smaller the output per 
head of population, the less is the economic power 
of the country and of its industry. Consequently, the

378 
larger a country's population, the greater is the need 
for articles of consumption, and hence the larger 
should be the industrial output of the country. 
Take, for example, the output of pig iron. In order 
to outstrip Great Britain economically in respect to 
the production of pig iron, which in 1938 amounted 
in that country to 7,000,000 tons, we must increase 
our annual output of pig iron to 25,000,000 tons. In 
order economically to outstrip Germany, which in 
1938 produced 18,000,000 tons of pig iron in all, we 
must raise our annual output to 40,000,000 or 45,000,000 
tons. And in order to outstrip the U.S.A. economically 
- not as regards the level of 1938, which was a year 
of crisis, and in which the U.S.A. produced only 
18,800,000 tons of pig iron, but as regards the level 
of 1929, when the U.S.A. was experiencing an industrial 
boom and when it produced about 43,000,000 
tons of pig iron - we must raise our annual output 
of pig iron to 50,000,000 or 60,000,000 tons. 
The same must be said of the production of steel 
and rolled steel, of the machine-building industry, 
and so on, inasmuch as all these branches of industry, 
like the other branches, depend in the long run on 
the production of pig iron. 
We have outstripped the principal capitalist countries 
as regards technique of production and rate of 
industrial development. That is very good, but it is 
not enough. We must outstrip them economically as 
well. We can do it, and we must do it. Only if we 
outstrip the principal capitalist countries economically 
can we reckon upon our country being fully saturated 
with consumers' goods, on having an abundance of

379 
products, and on being able to make the transition 
from the first phase of Communism to its second 
phase. 
What do we require to outstrip the principal capitalist 
countries economically? First of all, we require 
the earnest and indomitable desire to move ahead and 
the readiness to make sacrifices and invest very 
considerable amounts of capital for the utmost expansion 
of our Socialist industry. Have we these requisites? 
We undoubtedly have! Further, we require 
a high technique of production and a high rate of 
industrial development. Have we these requisites? 
We undoubtedly have! Lastly, we require time. Yes, 
comrades, time. We must build new factories. We 
must train new cadres for industry. But this requires 
time, and no little time at that. We cannot outstrip 
the principal capitalist countries economically in two 
or three years. It will require rather more than that. 
Take, for example, pig iron and its production. How 
much time do we require to outstrip the principal 
capitalist countries economically in regard to the 
production of pig iron? When the Second Five-Year 
Plan was being drawn up, certain members of the old 
personnel of the State Planning Commission proposed 
that the annual output of pig iron towards the end 
of the Second Five-Year Plan should be fixed in the 
amount of sixty million tons. That means that they 
assumed the possibility of an average annual increase 
in pig iron production of ten million tons. This, of 
course, was sheer fantasy, if not worse. Incidentally, 
it was not only in regard to the production of pig 
iron that these comrades indulged their fantasy. They

380 
considered, for example, that during the period of 
the Second Five-Year Plan the annual increase of 
population in the U.S.S.R. should amount to three or 
four million persons, or even more. This was also 
fantasy, if not worse. But if we ignore these fantastic 
dreamers and come down to reality, we may 
consider quite feasible an average annual increase in 
the output of pig iron of two or two and a half million 
tons, bearing in mind the present state of the technique 
of iron smelting. The industrial history of the 
principal capitalist countries, as well as of our country, 
shows that such an annual rate of increase involves 
a great strain, but is quite feasible. 
Hence, we require time, and no little time at that, 
in order to outstrip the principal capitalist countries 
economically. And the higher our productivity of labour 
becomes, and the more our technique of production 
is perfected, the more rapidly can we accomplish this 
cardinal economic task, and the more can we reduce 
the period of its accomplishment. 
b) Agriculture. Like the development of industry, 
the development of agriculture during the period under 
review has followed an upward trend. This upward trend 
is expressed not only in an increase of agricultural 
output, but, and primarily, in the growth and consolidation 
of Socialist agriculture on the one hand, 
and the utter decline of individual peasant farming 
on the other. Whereas the grain area of the collective 
farms increased from 75,000,000 hectares in 1933 
to 92,000,000 in 1938, the grain area of the individual 
peasant farmers dropped in this period from 15,700,000 
hectares to 600,000 hectares, or to 0.6 per cent of

381 
the total grain area. I will not mention the area under 
industrial crops, a branch where individual peasant 
farming has been reduced to zero. Furthermore, it 
is well known that the collective farms now unite 
18,800,000 peasant households, or 93.5 per cent of 
all the peasant households, aside from the collective 
fisheries and collective trapping and handicraft 
industries. 
This means that the collective farms have been 
firmly established and consolidated, and that the 
Socialist system of farming is now our only form 
of agriculture. 
If we compare the areas under all crops during 
the period under review with the crop areas in the 
pre-revolutionary period, we observe the following 
picture of growth : 
AREAS UNDER ALL CROPS IN THE U.S.S.R. 
1938 compared 
with 
1913 (per 
Millions of hectares cent) 
1913 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
Total 
crop area 105.0 131.5 132.8 133.8 135.3 136.9 130.4 
Of which : 
a)Grain 94.4 104.4 103.4 102.4 104.4 102.4 108.5 
b)Industrial 4.5 10.7 10.6 10.8 11.2 11.0 244.4 
c)Vegetable 3.8 8.8 9.9 9.8 9.0 9.4 247.4 
d)Fodder 2.1 7.1 8.6 10.6 10.6 14.1 671.4

382 
This table shows that we have an increase in area 
for all cultures, and above all for fodder, industrial 
crops and vegetables. 
This means that our agriculture is becoming more 
high-grade and productive, and that a solid foundation 
is being provided for the increasing application of 
proper crop rotation. 
The way our collective farms and state farms have 
been increasingly supplied with tractors, harvestercombines 
and other machines during the period under 
review is shown by the following tables. 
If in addition to these figures, we bear in mind 
that in the period under review the number of machine 
and tractor stations increased from 2,900 in 1934 
to 6,350 in 1938, it may be safely said that the reconstruction 
of our agriculture on the basis of a new 
and up-to-date machine technique has in the main 
already been completed. 
Our agriculture, consequently, is not only run on 
the largest scale, and is the most mechanized in the 
world, and therefore produces the largest surplus 
for the market, but is also more fully equipped with 
modern machinery than the agriculture of any other 
country. 
(See tables next page)

383 
1) TRACTORS EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE IN THE U.S.S.R. 
1938 comp. 
with 1933 
(per cent) 
I. Number of tractors 
(thousands) 
Total . . . . . . . . 
Of which : 
a) In machine and tractor 
stations. . . . . . 
b) In state farms and auxiliary 
agricultural undertakings 
. . . . . . 
II. Capacity (thous. h.p.) 
All tractors. . . . . . 
Of which : 
a) In machine and tractor 
stations. . . . . . 
b) In state farms and auxiliary 
agricultural undertakings 
. . . . . . 
2) TOTAL HARVESTER COMBINES AND OTHER MACHINES 
EMPLOYED IN AGRICULTURE IN THE U.S.S.R. 
(In thousands; at end of year) 
Harvester combines . . . 
Internal combustion and 
steam engines. . . . 
Complex and semi-complex 
grain trashers . . . . 
Motor trucks . . . . . 
Automobiles (units) . . . 
1938 comp. 
with 1933 
(per cent) 
1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
210.9276.4 360.3 422.7 454.5 483.5 229.3 
123.2 177.3 254.7 328.5 365.8 394.0 319.8 
83.2 95.5 102.1 88.5 84.5 85.0 102.2 
3,209.2 4,462.8 6,184.0 7,672.4 8,385.0 9,256.2 288.4 
1,758.1 2,753.94,281.6 5,856.0 6,679.2 7,437.0 423.0 
1,401.7 1,669.5 1,861.4 1,730.7 1,647.5 1,751.8 125.0 
1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
24.5 32.3 50.3 87.8 128.8 153.5 604.3 
48.0 60.969 .1 72.4 77.9 83.7 174.6 
120.3 121.9120.1 123.7 126.1 130.8 108.7 
26.6 40.3 63.7 96.2 144.5 195.8 736.1 
3,991 5,533 7,333 7,630 8,156 9,594 240.4

384 
1938 compared 
with 1933 
(per cent) 
In millions of centners 
1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
801.0 894.0 901.0 827.3 1,202.9 949.9 118.6 
7.4 11.8 17.2 23.9 25.8 26.9 363.5 
3.3 5.3 5.5 5.8 5.7 5.46 165.5 
109.0 113.6 162.1 168.3 218.6 166.8 153.0 
21.5 36.9 42.7 42.3 51.1 46.6 216.7 
Grain. . . . . . . . . . . 
Raw cotton . . . . . . . . 
Flax fibre . . . . . . . . 
Sugar beet . . . . . . . . 
Oil seed . . . . . . . . . 
GROSS PRODUCTION OF GRAIN AND INDUSTRIAL CROPS IN 
THE U.S.S.R. 
If we compare the harvests of grain and industrial 
crops during the period under review with the prerevolutionary 
period, we get the following picture 
of growth : 
From this table it can be seen that despite the 
drought in the eastern and southeastern districts in 
1936 and 1938, and despite the unprecedentedly large 
harvest in 1913, the gross production of grain and 
industrial crops during the period under review steadily 
increased as compared with 1913. 
Of particular interest is the question of the amount 
of grain marketed by the collective farms and state 
farms as compared with their gross harvests Comrade 
Nemchinov, the well-known statistician, has calculated 
that of a gross grain harvest of 5,000,000,000 poods 
in pre-war times, only about 1,300,000,000 poods 
were marketed. Thus the proportion of marketed 
produce of grain farming at that time was 26 per 
cent. Comrade Nemchinov computes that the proportion 
of marketed produce to gross harvest in the years

385 
1926-27, for example, was about 47 per cent in the 
case of collective and state farming, which is largescale 
farming, and about 12 per cent in the case of 
individual peasant farming. If we approach the matter 
more cautiously and assume the amount of marketed 
produce in the case of collective and state farming 
in 1938 to be 40 per cent of the gross harvest, we 
find that in the year our Socialist grain farming was 
able to release, and actually did release, about 
2,300,000,000 poods of grain for the market, or 
1,000,000,000 poods more than was marketed in prewar 
times. 
Consequently, the high proportion of produce marketed 
constitutes an important feature of state and 
collective farming, and is of cardinal importance for 
the food supply of our country. 
It is this feature of the collective farms and state 
farms that explains the secret why our country has 
succeeded so easily and rapidly in solving the grain 
problem, the problem of producing an adequate supply 
of market grain for this vast country. 
It should be noted that during the last three years 
annual grain deliveries to the state have not dropped 
below 1,600,000,000 poods, while sometimes, as for 
example in 1937, they have reached 1,800,000,000 
poods. If we add to this about 200,000,000 poods or 
so of grain purchased annually by the state, as well 
as several hundred million poods sold by collective 
farms and farmers directly in the market, we get 
in all the total of grain marketed by the collective 
farms and state farms already mentioned. 
Further, it is interesting to note that during the

386 
Horses . . . . 35.8 16.6 15.7 15.9 16.6 16.7 17.5 48.9 105.4 
Cattle. . . . . 60.6 38.4 42.4 49.2 56.7 57.0 63.2 104.3 164.6 
Sheep and goats . 121.2 50.2 51.9 61.1 73.7 81.3 102.5 84.6 204.2 
Hogs. . . . . 20.9 12.1 17.4 22.5 30.5 22.8 30.6 146.4 252.9 
1938 compared 
with
1933 
(per 
cent) 
1916 according 
to census 
(per 
cent) 
last three years the base of market grain has shifted 
from the Ukraine, which was formerly considered the 
granary of our country, to the north and the east, 
that is, to the R.S.F.S.R. We know that during the 
last two or three years grain deliveries in the Ukraine 
have amounted in all to about 400,000,000 poods 
annually, whereas in the R.S.F.S.R. the grain deliveries 
during these years have amounted to 1,100,000,000 
or 1,200,000,000 poods annually. 
That is how things stand with regard to grain 
farming. 
As regards livestock farming, considerable progress 
has been made during the past few years in this, the 
most backward branch of agriculture, as well. True, 
in the number of horses and in sheep breeding we are 
still below the pre-revolutionary level; but as regards 
cattle and hog breeding we have already passed the 
pre-revolutionary level. 
Here are the figures : 
TOTAL HEAD OF LIVESTOCK IN THE U.S.S.R. 
(In millions) 
July 1916according to 
census 
July July July July July July 
1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938

387 
285,355 286,236 268,713 298,473 327,361 356,930 125.1 
49,789.2 61,814.7 81,712.1 106,760.9 125,943.2 138,574.3 278.3 
11,500.0 14,000.0 14,500.0 15,607.2 17,799.7 24,399.2 212.2 
718 836 1,141 1,798 1,912 1,994 277.7 
1. State and cooperative 
retail stores 
and boothes‹ 
at end of year . 
2. State and cooperative 
retail 
trade, including 
public catering 
(in millions of 
rubles) . . . . . 
3. Trade in collective 
farm markets 
(in millions 
of rubles) . . . . 
4. Regional wholesale 
departments 
of the Peopleąs 
Commissariats of 
the Food Industry, 
Light Industry, 
Heavy Industry, 
Timber 
Industry, and 
Local Industry 
of the Union Republics‹
at end 
year . . . . . . 
There can be no doubt that the lag in horse breeding 
and sheep breeding will be remedied in a very short 
period. 
c) Trade and transport. The progress in industry 
and agriculture was accompanied by an increase in 
the trade of the country. During the period under 
review the number of state and cooperative retail 
stores increased by 25 per cent. State and cooperative 
retail trade increased by 178 per cent. Trade 
in the collective farm markets increased by 112 per 
cent. Here is the corresponding table : 
TRADE 
1938 
compared 
with 
1933 (percent) 
1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938

388 
169,500 205,700 258,100 323,400 354,800 369,100 217.7 
50,200 56,500 68,300 72,300 70,100 66,000 131.5 
3,100 6,400 9,800 21,900 24,900 31,700 1,022.6 
It is obvious that trade in the country could not 
have developed in this way without a certain increase 
in freight traffic. And indeed during the period under 
review freight traffic increased in all branches of 
transport, especially rail and air. There was an increase 
in water-borne freight, too, but with considerable 
fluctuations, and in 1938, it is to be regretted, 
there was even a drop in water-borne freight 
as compared with the previous year. 
Here is the corresponding table : 
FREIGHT TRAFFIC 
1938 
comparedwith 
1933(per cent) 
1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
Railways (in millions 
of ton-kilometres) 
River and marine 
transport (in millions 
of ton-kilometres) 
. . . . . 
Civil air fleet (in 
thousands of tonkilometres) 
. . . . 
There can be no doubt that the lag in water transport 
will be remedied in 1939. 
2. Further Rise in the Material and Cultural Standard 
of the People. 
The steady progress of industry and agriculture 
could not but lead, and has actually led, to a new 
rise in the material and cultural standard of the 
people.

389 
The abolition of exploitation and the consolidation 
of the Socialist economic system, the absence of 
unemployment, with its attendant poverty, in town 
and country, the enormous expansion of industry and 
the steady growth in the number of workers, the 
increase in the productivity of labour of the workers 
and collective farmers, the securement of the land 
to the collective farms in perpetuity, and the vast 
number of first-class tractors and agricultural 
machines supplied to the collective farms - all this 
has created effective conditions for a further rise 
in the standard of living of the workers and peasants. 
In its turn, the improvement in the standard of living 
of the workers and peasants has naturally led to an 
improvement in the standard of living of the intelligentsia, 
who represent a considerable force in 
our country and serve the interests of the workers 
and the peasants. 
Now it is no longer a question of finding room in 
industry for unemployed and homeless peasants who 
have been set adrift from their villages and live in 
fear of starvation - of giving them jobs out of charity. 
The time has long gone by when there were such 
peasants in our country. And this is a good thing, of 
course, for it testifies to the prosperity of our 
countryside. If anything, it is now a question of asking 
the collective farms to comply with our request and 
to release, say, one and a half million young collective 
farmers annually for the needs of our expanding industry. 
The collective farms, which have already become 
prosperous, should bear in mind that if we do 
not get this assistance from them it will be very

390 
difficult to continue the expansion of our industry, 
and that if we do not expand our industry we will not 
be able to satisfy the peasants' growing demand for 
consumers' goods. The collective farms are quite able 
to meet this request of ours, since the abundance 
of machinery in the collective farms releases a portion 
of the rural workers, who, if transferred to industry, 
could be of immense service to our whole national 
economy. 
As a result, we have the following indications of 
the improvement in the standard of living of the 
workers and peasants during the period under review : 
1. The national income rose from 48,500,000,000 
rubles in 1933 to 105,000,000,000 rubles in 1938; 
2. The number of workers and other employees 
rose from a little over 22,000,000 in 1933 to 28,000,000 
in 1938; 
3. The total annual payroll of workers and other 
employees rose from 34,953,000,000 rubles to 
96,425,000,000 rubles; 
4. The average annual wages of industrial workers, 
which amounted to 1,513 rubles in 1933, rose to 
3,447 rubles in 1938; 
5. The total monetary incomes of the collective 
farms rose from 5,661,900,000 rubles in 1933 to 
14,180,100,000 rubles in 1937; 
6. The average amount of grain received per 
collective-farm household in the grain growing regions 
rose from 61 poods in 1933 to 144 poods in 1937, 
exclusive of seed, emergency seed stocks, fodder 
for the collectively-owned cattle, grain deliveries, 
and payments in kind for work performed by the

391 
machine and tractor stations; 
7. State budget appropriations for social and cultural 
services rose from 5,839,900,000 rubles in 1933 to 
35,202,500,000 rubles in 1938. 
As regards the cultural standard of the people, 
the period under review has been marked by a veritable 
cultural revolution. The introduction of universal compulsory 
elementary education in the languages of the 
various nations of the U.S.S.R., an increasing number 
of schools and scholars of all grades, an increasing 
number of college-trained experts, and the creation 
and growth of a new intelligentsia, a Soviet intelligentsia 
- such is the general picture of the cultural advancement 
of our people. 
Here are the figures : 
(See next page) 
As a result of this immense cultural work a numerous 
new, Soviet intelligentsia has arisen in our country, 
an intelligentsia which has emerged from the ranks 
of the working class, peasantry and Soviet employees, 
which is of the flesh and blood of our people, which 
has never known the yoke of exploitation, which hates 
exploiters, and which is ready to serve the peoples 
of the U.S.S.R. faithfully and devotedly. 
I think that the rise of this new, Socialist intelligentsia 
of the people is one of the most important 
results of the cultural revolution in our country.

392 
Number of pupils and students of 
all grades . . . . . . . . . . thousands 23,814 33,965.4 142.6% 
Of which : 
In elementary schools . . . . . . ˛ 17,873.3 21,288.4 119.1% 
In intermediate schools (general and 
special) . . . . . . . . . ˛ 5,482.2 12,076.0 220.3% 
In higher educational institutions ˛ 458.3 601.0 131.1% 
Number of persons engaged in all 
forms of study in the U.S.S.R. ˛ ‹ 47,442.1 ‹ 
Number of public libraries . . . ˛ 40.3 70.7 173.7% 
Number of books in public libraries 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . millions 
Number of clubs . . . . . . . . thousands 61.1 95.6 156.5% 
Number of theatres . . . . . . . units 587 790 134.6% 
Number of cinema installations 
(excluding narrow-film) . . . . ˛ 27,467 30,461 110.9% 
Of which : 
With sound equipment . . . . ˛ 498 15,202 31 times 
Number of cinema installations 
(excluding narrow-film) in rural 
districts . . . . . . . . . . . ˛ 17,470 18,991 108.7% 
Of which : 
With sound equipment . . . . ˛ 24 6,670 278 times 
Annual newspaper circulation . . millions 4,984.6 7,092.4 142.3% 
Unit of 
measure- 1933-34 1938-39 
ment 
1933-39 
compared 
with 
1933-34 
1) RISE IN THE CULTURAL LEVEL OF THE PEOPLE 
In towns and In rural 
hamlets localities 
1933 . . . . . . . . . . 326 3,261 3,587 
1934 . . . . . . . . . . 577 3,488 4,065 
1935 . . . . . . . . . . 533 2,829 3,362 
1936 . . . . . . . . . . 1,505 4,206 5,711 
1937 . . . . . . . . . . 790 1,246 2,053 
1938 . . . . . . . . . . 583 1,246 1,829 
Total (1933-38) . . . 4,254 16,353 20,607 
2) NUMBER OF SCHOOLS BUILT IN THE U.S.S.R. IN 1933-38 
Total

393 
2) YOUNG SPECIALISTS GRADUATED FROM HIGHER 
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN 1933-38 
(In thousands) 
1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 
Total for U.S.S.R. (exclusive of 
military specialists) . . . . . 34.6 49.2 83.7 97.6 104.8 106.7 
1. Engineers for industry and 
building . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 14.9 29.6 29.2 27.6 25.2 
2. Engineers for transport and 
communications . . . . . . . 1.8 4.0 7.6 6.6 7.0 6.1 
3. Agricultural engineers, agronomists, 
veterinarians and zootechnicians 
. . . . . . . . . . 4.8 6.3 8.8 10.4 11.3 10.6 
4. Economists and jurists . . . . 2.5 2.5 5.0 6.4 5.0 5.7 
5. Teachers of intermediate 
schools, workersą facilities, technical 
schools, and other educational 
workers, including art 
workers . . . . . . . . . . . 10.5 7.9 12.5 21.6 31.7 35.7 
6. Physicians, pharmacists, and 
physical culture instructors . . 4.6 2.5 7.5 9.2 12.3 18.6 
7. Other specialists . . . . . . . 4.3 11.1 12.7 14.2 9.9 9.8 
3. Further Consolidation of the Soviet System. 
One of the most important results of the period 
under review is that it has led to the further internal 
consolidation of the country, to the further 
consolidation of the Soviet system. 
Nor could it be otherwise. The firm establishment 
of the Socialist system in all branches of national 
economy, the progress of industry and agriculture, 
the rising material standard of the people, the rising 
cultural standard of the people and their increasing 
political activity - all this, accomplished under the 
guidance of the Soviet power, could not but lead to 
the further consolidation of the Soviet system.

394 
The feature that distinguishes Soviet society today 
from any capitalist society is that it no longer contains 
antagonistic, hostile classes; that the exploiting classes 
have been eliminated, while the workers, peasants and 
intellectuals, who make up Soviet society, live and 
work in friendly collaboration. While capitalist society 
is torn by irreconcilable contradictions between 
workers and capitalists and between peasants and 
landlords - resulting in its internal instability - Soviet 
society, liberated from the yoke of exploitation, 
knows no such contradictions, is free of class conflicts, 
and presents a picture of friendly collaboration 
between workers, peasants and intellectuals. It is this 
community of interest which has formed the basis 
for the development of such motive forces as the 
moral and political unity of Soviet society, the mutual 
friendship of the nations of the U.S.S.R. and Soviet 
patriotism. It has also been the basis for the Constitution 
of the U.S.S.R. adopted in November 1936, 
and for the complete democratization of the elections 
to the supreme organs of the country. 
As to the elections themselves, they were a 
magnificent demonstration of that unity of Soviet 
society and of that amity among the nations of the 
U.S.S.R. which constitute the characteristic feature 
of the internal situation of our country. As we know, 
in the elections to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
in December 1937, nearly ninety million votes, or 
98.6 per cent of the total vote, were cast for the 
Communist and non-Party bloc, while in the elections 
to the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics in 
June 1938, ninety-two million votes, or 99.4 per cent

395 
of the total vote, were cast for the Communist and 
non-Party bloc. 
There you have the basis of the stability of the 
Soviet system and the source of the inexhaustible 
strength of the Soviet power. 
This means, incidentally, that in the case of war, 
the rear and front of our army, by reason of their 
homogeneity and inherent unity, will be stronger than 
those of any other country, a fact which people beyond 
our borders who are fond of military conflicts would 
do well to remember. 
Certain foreign pressmen have been talking drivel 
to the effect that the purging of Soviet organizations 
of spies, assassins and wreckers like Trotsky, Zinoviev, 
Kamenev, Yakir, Tukhachevsky, Rosengoltz, Bukharin 
and other fiends has "shaken" the Soviet system and 
caused its "demoralization." One can only laugh at 
such cheap drivel. How can the purging of Soviet 
organizations of noxious and hostile elements shake 
and demoralize the Soviet system? This Trotsky- 
Bukharin bunch of spies, assassins and wreckers, who 
kow-towed to the foreign world, who were possessed 
by a slavish instinct to grovel before every foreign 
bigwig, and, who were ready to enter his employ as 
a spy - this handful of people who did not understand 
that the humblest Soviet citizen, being free from 
the fetters of capital, stands head and shoulders 
above any high-placed foreign bigwig whose neck wears 
the yoke of capitalist slavery - who needs this miserable 
band of venal slaves, of what value can they be to 
the people, and whom can they "demoralize"? In 1937 
Tukhachevsky, Yakir, Uborevich and other fiends were

396 
sentenced to be shot. After that, the elections to 
the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. were held. In these 
elections, 98.6 per cent of the total vote was cast 
for the Soviet power. At the beginning of 1938 Rosengoltz, 
Rykov, Bukharin and other fiends were sentenced 
to be shot. After that, the elections to the 
Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics were held. In 
these elections 99.4 per cent of the total vote was 
cast for the Soviet power. Where are the symptoms 
of "demoralization," we would like to know, and why 
was this "demoralization" not reflected in the results 
of the elections? 
To listen to these foreign drivellers, one would 
think that if the spies, assassins and wreckers had 
been left at liberty to wreck, murder and spy without 
let or hindrance, the Soviet organizations would have 
been far sounder and stronger. (Laughter.) Are not 
these gentlemen giving themselves away too soon by 
so insolently defending the cause of spies, assassins 
and wreckers? 
Would it not be truer to say that the weeding out 
of spies, assassins and wreckers from our Soviet 
organizations was bound to lead, and did lead, to the 
further strengthening of these organizations? 
What, for instance, do the events at Lake Hassan 
show, if not that the weeding out of spies and wreckers 
is the surest means of strengthening our Soviet 
organizations. 
* * * 
The tasks of the Party in the sphere of industrial 
policy are : 
1. To increase the progress of our industry, the

397 
rise of productivity of labour, and the perfection of 
the technique of production, in order, having already 
outstripped the principal capitalist countries in technique 
of production and rate of industrial development, 
to outstrip them economically as well in the next ten 
or fifteen years. 
2. To increase the progress of our agriculture and 
stock breeding so as to achieve in the next three or 
four years an annual grain harvest of 8,000,000,000 
poods, with an average yield of 12-13 centners per 
hectare; an average increase in the harvest of industrial 
crops of 30-35 per cent; and an increase in 
the number of sheep and hogs by 100 per cent, of 
cattle by about 40 per cent, and of horses by about 
35 per cent. 
3. To continue to improve the material and cultural 
standards of the workers, peasants and intellectuals. 
4. Steadfastly to carry into effect our Socialist 
Constitution; to complete the democratization of the 
political life of the country; to strengthen the moral 
and political unity of Soviet society and fraternal 
collaboration among our workers, peasants and intellectuals; 
to promote the friendship of the peoples 
of the U.S.S.R. to the utmost, and to develop and 
cultivate Soviet patriotism. 
5. Never to forget that we are surrounded by a 
capitalist world; to remember that the foreign espionage 
services will smuggle spies, assassins and wreckers 
into our country; and, remembering this, to strengthen 
our Socialist intelligence service and systematically 
help it to defeat and eradicate the enemies of the 
people.

398 
III 
FURTHER STRENGTHENING OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 
From the standpoint of the political line and dayto-
day practical work, the period under review was 
one of complete victory for the general line of our 
Party. (Loud and prolonged applause.) 
The principal achievements demonstrating the correctness 
of the policy of our Party and the correctness 
of its leadership are the firm establishment of the 
Socialist system in the entire national economy, the 
completion of the reconstruction of industry and 
agriculture on the basis of a new technique, the 
fulfilment of the Second Five-Year Plan in industry 
ahead of time, the increase of the annual grain harvest 
to a level of 7,000,000,000 poods, the abolition of 
poverty and unemployment and the raising of the 
material and cultural standard of the people. 
In the face of these imposing achievements, the 
opponents of the general line of our Party, all the 
various "Left" and "Right" trends, all the Trotsky- 
Pyatakov and Bukharin-Rykov degenerates were forced 
to creep into their shells, to tuck away their hackneyed 
"platforms," and to go into hiding. Lacking the manhood 
to submit to the will of the people, they preferred 
to merge with the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries 
and fascists, to become the tools of foreign espionage 
services, to hire themselves out as spies, and to 
obligate themselves to help the enemies of the Soviet 
Union to dismember our country and to restore capitalist 
slavery in it.

399 
Such was the inglorious end of the opponents of 
the line of our Party, who finished up as enemies of 
the people. 
When it had smashed the enemies of the people 
and purged the Party and Soviet organizations of 
degenerates, the Party became still more united in 
its political and organizational work and rallied even 
more solidly around its Central Committee (Stormy 
applause. All the delegates rise and cheer the speaker. 
Shouts of "Hurrah for Comrade Stalin!" "Long live 
Comrade Stalin!" "Hurrah for the Central Committee 
of our Party!") 
Let us examine the concrete facts illustrating 
the development of the internal life of the Party 
and its organizational and propaganda work during the 
period under review. 
1. Measures to Improve the Composition of the Party 
Division of Organizations Closer Contact Between 
the Leading Party Bodies and the Work of the Lower 
Bodies. 
The strengthening of the Party and of its leading 
bodies during the period under review proceeded chiefly 
along two lines : along the line of regulating the 
composition of the Party, ejecting unreliable elements 
and selecting the best elements, and along the line 
of dividing up the organizations, reducing their size, 
and bringing the leading bodies closer to the concrete, 
day-to-day work of the lower bodies. 
There were 1,874,488 Party members represented 
at the Seventeenth Party Congress. Comparing this

400 
figure with the number of Party members represented 
at the preceding congress, the Sixteenth Party Congress, 
we find that in the interval between these 
two congresses 600,000 new members joined the Party. 
The Party could not but feel that in the conditions 
prevailing in 1930-33 such a mass influx into its ranks 
was an unhealthy and undesirable expansion of its 
membership. The Party knew that its ranks were being 
joined not only by honest and loyal people, but also 
by chance elements and careerists, who were seeking 
to utilize the badge of the Party for their own personal 
ends. The Party could not but know that its strength 
lay not only in the size of its membership, but, and 
above all, in the quality of its members. This raised 
the question of regulating the composition of the 
Party. It was decided to continue the purge of Party 
members and candidate members begun in 1933; and 
the purge actually was continued until May 1935. It 
was further decided to suspend the admission of new 
members into the Party; and the admission of new 
members actually was suspended until September 1936, 
the admission of new members being resumed only on 
November 1, 1936. Further, in connection with the 
dastardly murder of Comrade Kirov, which showed that 
there were quite a number of suspicious elements in 
the Party, it was decided to undertake a verification 
of the records of Party members and an exchange of 
old Party cards for new ones, both these measures 
being completed only in September 1936. Only after 
this was the admission of new members and candidate 
members into the Party resumed. As a result of all 
these measures, the Party succeeded in weeding out

401 
chance, passive, careerist and directly hostile elements, 
and in selecting the most staunch and loyal people. It 
cannot be said that the purge was not accompanied 
by grave mistakes. There were unfortunately more 
mistakes than might have been expected. Undoubtedly, 
we shall have no further need of resorting to the 
method of mass purges. Nevertheless, the purge of 
1933-36 was unavoidable and its results, on the whole, 
were beneficial. The number of Party members represented 
at this, the Eighteenth Congress is about 
1,600,000, which is 270,000 less than were represented 
at the Seventeenth Congress. But there is nothing 
bad in that. On the contrary, it is all to the good, 
for the Party strengthens itself by clearing its ranks 
of dross. Our Party is now somewhat smaller in 
membership, but on the other hand it is better in 
quality. 
That is a big achievement. 
As regards the improvement of the day-to-day 
leadership of the Party by bringing it closer to the 
work of the lower bodies and by making it more concrete, 
the Party came to the conclusion that the best way 
to make it easier for the Party bodies to guide the 
organizations and to make the leadership itself concrete, 
alive and practical was to divide up the organizations, 
to reduce their size, People's Commissariats 
as well as the administrative organizations 
of the various territorial divisions, that is, the Union 
Republics, territories, regions, districts, etc., were 
divided up. The result of the measures adopted is 
that instead of 7 Union Republics, we now have 11; 
instead of 14 People's Commissariats of the U.S.S.R.

402 
we now have 34; instead of 70 territories and regions 
we now have 110; instead of 2,559 urban and rural 
districts we now have 3,815. Correspondingly, within 
the system of leading Party bodies, we now have 11 
central committees, headed by the Central Committee 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.), 6 territorial committees, 104 
regional committees, 30 area committees, 212 city 
committees, 336 city district committees, 3,479 
rural district committees, and 113,060 primary Party 
organizations. 
It cannot be said that the division of organizations 
is already over. Most likely it will be carried further. 
But, however that may be, it is already yielding good 
results both in the improvement of the day-to-day 
leadership of the work and in bringing the leadership 
itself closer to the concrete work of the lower bodies. 
I need not mention that the division of organizations 
has made it possible to promote hundreds and thousands 
of new people to leading posts. 
That, too, is a big achievement. 
2. Selection, Promotion and Allocation of Cadres. 
The regulation of the composition of the Party 
and the bringing of the leading bodies closer to the 
concrete work of the lower bodies was not, and could 
not be, the only means of further strengthening the 
Party and its leadership. Another means adopted in 
the period under review was a radical improvement 
in the training of cadres, an improvement in the work 
of selecting, promoting and allocating cadres and of 
testing them in the process of work.

403 
The Party cadres constitute the commanding staff 
of the Party; and since our Party is in power, they 
also constitute the commanding staff of the leading 
organs of state. After a correct political line has 
been worked out and tested in practice, the Party 
cadres become the decisive force in the work of guiding 
the Party and the state. A correct political line is, 
of course, the primary and most important thing. 
But that in itself is not enough. A correct political 
line is not needed as a declaration, but as something 
to be carried into effect. But in order to carry a 
correct political line into effect, we must have cadres, 
people who understand the political line of the Party, 
who accept it as their own line, who are prepared 
to carry it into effect, who are able to put it into 
practice and are capable of answering for it, defending 
it and fighting for it. Failing this, a correct political 
line runs the risk of being purely nominal. 
And here arises the question of the correct selection 
of cadres, the training of cadres, the promotion of 
new people, the correct allocation of cadres, and the 
testing of cadres by work accomplished. 
What is meant by the correct selection of cadres? 
The correct selection of cadres does not mean just 
gathering around one a lot of assistants and subs, 
setting up an office and issuing order after order. 
(Laughter.) Nor does it mean abusing one's powers, 
switching scores and hundreds of people back and 
forth from one job to another without rhyme or 
reason and conducting endless "reorganizations." 
(Laughter.) 
The proper selection of cadres means :

404 
Firstly, valuing cadres as the gold reserve of the 
Party and the state, treasuring them, respecting 
them. 
Secondly, knowing cadres carefully studying their 
individual merits and shortcomings, knowing in what 
post the capacities of a given worker are most likely 
to develop. 
Thirdly, carefully fostering cadres, helping every 
promising worker to advance, not grudging time on 
patiently "bothering" with such workers and accelerating 
their development. 
Fourthly, boldly promoting new and young cadres 
in time, so as not to allow them to stagnate in their 
old posts and grow stale. 
Fifthly, allocating workers to posts in such a way 
that each feels he is in the right place, that each 
may contribute to our common cause the maximum 
his personal capacities enable him to contribute, and 
that the general trend of the work of allocating 
cadres may fully answer to the demands of the political 
line for the carrying out of which this allocation of 
cadres is designed. 
Particularly important in this respect is the bold 
and timely promotion of new and young cadres. It 
seems to me that our people are not quite clear on 
this point yet. Some think that in selecting people 
we must chiefly rely on the old cadres. Others, on 
the contrary, think that we must rely chiefly on the 
young cadres. It seems to me that both are mistaken, 
The old cadres, of course, represent a valuable asset 
to the Party and the state. They possess what the 
young cadres lack, namely, tremendous experience

405 
in leadership, a schooling in Marxist-Leninist principles, 
knowledge of affairs, and a capacity for orientation. 
But, firstly, there are never enough old cadres, 
there are far less than required, and they are already 
partly going out of commission owing to the operation 
of the laws of nature. Secondly, part of the old 
cadres are sometimes inclined to keep a too persistent 
eye on the past, to cling to the past, to stay in 
the old rut and fail to observe the new in life. This 
is called losing the sense of the new. It is a very 
serious and dangerous shortcoming. As to the young 
cadres, they, of course, have not the experience, 
the schooling, the knowledge of affairs and the capacity 
of orientation of the old cadres. But, firstly, the 
young cadres constitute the vast majority; secondly, 
they are young, and as yet are not subject to the 
danger of going out of commission; thirdly, they 
possess in abundance the sense of the new, which is 
a valuable quality in every Bolshevik worker; and, 
fourthly, they develop and acquire knowledge so rapidly, 
they press upward so eagerly, that the time is not 
far off when they will overtake the old fellows, take 
their stand side by side with them, and become worthy 
of replacing them. Consequently, the thing is not 
whether to rely on the old cadres or on the new cadres, 
but to steer for a combination, a union of the old 
and the young cadres in one common symphony of 
leadership of the Party and the state, (Prolonged 
applause.) 
That is why we must boldly and in good time 
promote young cadres to leading posts. 
One of the important achievements of the Party

406 
during the period under review in the matter of 
strengthening the Party leadership is that, when 
selecting cadres, it has successfully pursued, from 
top to bottom, just this course of combining old 
and young workers. 
Data in the possession of the Central Committee 
of the Party, show that during the period under review 
the Party succeeded in promoting to leading state 
and Party posts over five hundred thousand young 
Bolsheviks, members of the Party and people standing 
close to the Party, over twenty per cent of whom 
were women. 
What is our task now? 
Our task now is to concentrate the work of selecting 
cadres from top to bottom, in the hands of one 
body and to raise it to a proper, scientific, Bolshevik 
level. 
This entails putting an end to the division of the 
work of studying, promoting and selecting cadres 
among various departments and sectors, and concentrating 
it in one body. 
This body should be the Cadres Administration of 
the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.) and a 
corresponding cadres department in each of the republican, 
territorial and regional Party organizations. 
3. Party Propaganda. Marxist-Leninist Training of 
Party Members and Party Cadres. 
There is still another sphere of Party work, a 
very important and very responsible sphere, in which 
the work of strengthening the Party and its leading

407 
bodies has been carried on during the period under 
review. I am referring to Party propaganda and 
agitation, oral and printed, the work of training the 
Party members and the Party cadres in the spirit 
of Marxism-Leninism, the work of raising the political 
and theoretical level of the Party and its workers. 
There is hardly need to dwell on the cardinal importance 
of Party propaganda, of the Marxist- 
Leninist training of our people. I am referring not 
only to Party functionaries. I am also referring to 
the workers in the Young Communist League, trade 
union, trade, cooperative, economic, state, educational, 
military and other organizations. The work of regulating 
the composition of the Party and of bringing the 
leading bodies closer to the activities of the lower 
bodies may be organized satisfactorily; the work of 
promoting, selecting and allocating cadres may be 
organized satisfactorily; but, with all this, if our 
Party propaganda for some reason or other goes lame, 
if the Marxist-Leninist training of our cadres begins 
to languish, if our work of raising the political and 
theoretical level of these cadres flags, and the cadres 
themselves cease on account of this to show interest 
in the prospect of our further progress, cease to 
understand the truth of our cause and are transformed 
into narrow plodders with no outlook, blindly and 
mechanically carrying out instructions from above - 
then our entire state and Party work must inevitably 
languish. It must be accepted as an axiom that the 
higher the political level and the Marxist-Leninist 
knowledge of the workers in any branch of state 
Party work the better and more fruitful will be the

408 
work itself, and the more effective the results of 
the work; and, vice versa, the lower the political 
level of the workers, and the less they are imbued 
with the knowledge of Marxism-Leninism, the greater 
will be the likelihood of disruption and failure in the 
work, of the workers themselves becoming shallow 
and deteriorating into paltry plodders, of their degenerating 
altogether. It may be confidently stated 
that if we succeeded in training the cadres in all 
branches of our work ideologically, and in schooling 
them politically, to such an extent as to enable them 
easily to orientate themselves in the internal and 
international situation; if we succeeded in making 
them quite mature Marxist-Leninists capable of solving 
the problems involved in the guidance of the country 
without serious error, we would have every reason 
to consider nine-tenths of our problems already settled. 
And we certainly can accomplish this, for we have 
all the means and opportunities for doing so. 
The training and moulding of our young cadres 
usually proceeds in some particular branch of science 
or technology, along the line of specialization. This 
is necessary and desirable. There is no reason why a 
man who specializes in medicine should at the same 
time specialize in physics or botany, or vice versa, 
But there is one branch of science which Bolsheviks 
in all branches of science are in duty bound to know, 
and that is the Marxist-Leninist science of society, 
of the laws of social development, of the laws of 
development of the proletarian revolution, of the laws 
of development of Socialist construction, and of the 
victory of Communism. For a man who calls himself

409 
a Leninist cannot be considered a real Leninist if he 
shuts himself up in his speciality, in mathematics, 
botany or chemistry, let us say, and sees nothing 
beyond that speciality. A Leninist cannot be just a 
specialist in his favourite science; he must also be 
a political and social worker, keenly interested in 
the destinies of his country, acquainted with the laws 
of social development, capable of applying these laws, 
and striving to be an active participant in the political 
guidance of the country, This, of course, will be an 
additional burden on specialists who are Bolsheviks, 
But it will be a burden more than compensated for 
by its results. 
The task of Party propaganda, the task of the 
Marxist-Leninist training of cadres, is to help our 
cadres in all branches of work to become versed in 
the Marxist-Leninist science of the laws of social 
development. 
Measures for improving the work of propaganda 
and of the Marxist-Leninist training of cadres have 
been discussed many times by the Central Committee 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.) jointly with propagandists from 
various regional Party organizations, The publication, 
in September 1938, of the "History of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
- Short Course" was taken into account in this connection. 
It was ascertained that the publication of 
the "History of the C.P.S.U.(B.)" had given a new 
impetus to Marxist-Leninist propaganda in our country. 
The results of the work of the Central Committee 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.) have been published in its decision, 
"On the Organization of Party Propaganda in Con

410 
nection with the Publication of the History of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) - Short Course." 
On the basis of this decision and with due reference 
to the decisions of the Plenum of the Central Committee 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.) of March 1937, "On Defects 
in Party Work," the Central Committee of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) has outlined the following major measures 
for eliminating the defects in Party propaganda and 
improving the work of the Marxist-Leninist training 
of Party members and Party cadres : 
1. To concentrate the work of Party propaganda 
and agitation in one body and to merge the propaganda 
and agitation departments and the press departments 
into a single Propaganda and Agitation Administration 
of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), and 
to organize corresponding propaganda and agitation 
departments in each republican, territorial and regional 
Party organization; 
2. Recognizing as incorrect the infatuation for 
the system of propaganda through study circles, and 
considering the method of individual study of the 
principles of Marxism-Leninism by Party members 
to be more expedient, to centre the attention of the 
Party on propaganda through the press and on the 
organization of a system of propaganda by lectures; 
3. To organize one-year Courses of Instruction 
for our lower cadres in each regional centre; 
4. To organize two-year Lenin Schools for our 
middle cadres in various centres of the country; 
5. To organize a Higher School of Marxism-Leninism 
under the auspices of the Central Committee of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) with a three-year course for the training

411 
of highly qualified Party theoreticians; 
6. To set up one-year Courses of Instruction for 
propagandists and journalists in various centres of 
the country; 
7. To set up in connection with the Higher School 
of Marxism-Leninism six-month Courses of Instruction 
for teachers of Marxism-Leninism in the higher educational 
establishments. 
There can be no doubt that the realization of 
these measures, which are already being carried out, 
although not yet sufficiently, will soon yield beneficial 
results. 
4. Some Questions of Theory. 
Another of the defects of our propagandist and 
ideological work is the absence of full clarity among 
our comrades on certain theoretical questions of vital 
practical importance, the existence of a certain amount 
of confusion on these questions. I refer to the question 
of the state in general, and of our Socialist state 
in particular, and to the question of our Soviet 
intelligentsia. 
It is sometimes asked "We have abolished the 
exploiting classes; there are no longer any hostile 
classes in the country; there is nobody to suppress; 
hence there is no more need for the state; it must 
die away. - Why then do we not help our Socialist 
state to die away? Why do we not strive to put an 
end to it? Is it not time to throw out all this rubbish 
of a state?" 
Or further : "The exploiting classes have already

412 
been abolished in our country; Socialism has been built 
in the main; we are advancing towards Communism. 
Now, the Marxist doctrine of the state says that 
there is to be no state under Communism. - Why 
then do we not help our Socialist state to die away? 
Is it not time we relegated the state to the museum 
of antiquities? 
These questions show that those who ask them 
have conscientiously memorized certain propositions 
contained in the doctrine of Marx and Engels about 
the state. But they also show that these comrades 
have failed to understand the essential meaning of 
this doctrine; that they have failed to realise in what 
historical conditions the various propositions of this 
doctrine were elaborated; and, what is more, that 
they do not understand present-day international conditions, 
have overlooked the capitalist encirclement 
and the dangers it entails for the Socialist country. 
These questions not only betray an underestimation 
of the capitalist encirclement, but also an underestimation 
of the role and significance of the bourgeois 
states and their organs, which send spies, assassins 
and wreckers into our country and are waiting for a 
favourable opportunity to attack it by armed force. 
They likewise betray an underestimation of the role 
and significance of our Socialist state and of its 
military, punitive and intelligence organs, which are 
essential for the defence of the Socialist land from 
foreign attack. It must be confessed that the comrades 
mentioned are not the only ones to sin in this 
underestimation. All the Bolsheviks, all of us without 
exception, sin to a certain extent in this respect.

413 
Is it not surprising that we learned about the espionage 
and conspiratorial activities of the Trotskyite and 
Bukharinite leaders only quite recently, in 1937 and 
1938, although, as the evidence shows, these gentry 
were in the service of foreign espionage organizations 
and carried on conspiratorial activities from the very 
first days of the October Revolution? How could we 
have failed to notice so grave a matter? How are we 
to explain this blunder? The usual answer to this 
question is that we could not possibly have assumed 
that these people could have fallen so low. But that 
is no explanation, still less is it a justification : 
for the blunder was a blunder. How is this blunder 
to be explained? It is to be explained by an underestimation 
of the strength and consequence of the 
mechanism of the bourgeois states surrounding us 
and of their espionage organs, which endeavour to 
take advantage of people's weaknesses, their vanity, 
their slackness of will, to enmesh them in their 
espionage nets and use them to surround the organs 
of the Soviet state. It is to be explained by an underestimation 
of the role and significance of the mechanism 
of our Socialist state and of its intelligence 
service, by an underestimation of this intelligence 
service, by the twaddle that an intelligence service 
in a Soviet state is an unimportant trifle, and that 
the Soviet intelligence service and the Soviet state 
itself will soon have to be relegated to the museum 
of antiquities. 
What could have given rise to this underestimation? 
It arose owing to the fact that certain of the 
general propositions in the Marxist doctrine of the

414 
state were incompletely worked out and inadequate. 
It received currency owing to our unpardonably heedless 
attitude to matters pertaining to the theory of 
the state, in spite of the fact that we have twenty 
years of practical experience in state affairs which 
provides rich material for theoretical generalizations, 
and in spite of the fact that, given the desire, we 
have every opportunity of successfully filling this 
gap in theory. We have forgotten Lenin's highly important 
injunction about the theoretical duties of 
Russian Marxists, that it is their mission to further 
develop the Marxist theory. Here is what Lenin said 
in this connection : 
"We do not regard Marxist theory as something 
completed and inviolable; on the contrary, 
we are convinced that it has only laid the 
corner-stone of the science which Socialists 
must further advance in all directions if they 
wish to keep pace with life. We think that an 
independent elaboration of the Marxist theory 
is especially essential for Russian Socialists, 
for this theory provides only general guiding 
principles, which, in particular, are applied in 
England differently from France, in France 
differently from Germany, and in Germany 
differently from Russia." (Lenin, Collected 
Works, Russian Edition, Vol. II, p. 492.) 
Consider, for example, the classical formulation 
of the theory of the development of the Socialist 
state given by Engels : 
"As soon as there is no longer any class of

415 
society to be held in subjection; as soon as, 
along with class domination and the struggle 
for individual existence based on the former 
anarchy of production, the collisions and excesses 
arising from these have also been 
abolished, there is nothing more to be repressed 
which would make a special repressive 
force, a state, necessary. The first act in 
which the state really comes forward as the 
representative of society as a whole - the 
taking possession of the means of production 
in the name of society - is at the same time 
its last independent act as a state. The interference 
of the state power in social relations 
becomes superfluous in one sphere after 
another, and then ceases of itself. The government 
of persons is replaced by the administration 
of things and the direction of the process of 
production. The state is not 'abolished,' it 
withers away." (Herr Eugen Duhring's Revolution 
in Science (Anti-Duhring), pp. 308-09.) 
Is this proposition of Engels' correct? 
Yes, it is correct, but only on one of two conditions: 
(1) if we study the Socialist state only from 
the angle of the internal development of the country, 
abstracting ourselves in advance from the international 
factor, isolating, for the convenience of investigation, 
the country and the state from the international 
situation; or (2) if we assume that Socialism is already 
victorious in all countries, or in the majority of 
countries, that a Socialist encirclement exists in

416 
stead of a capitalist encirclement, that there is no 
more danger of foreign attack, and that there is no 
more need to strengthen the army and the state. 
Well, but what if Socialism has been victorious 
only in one country, taken singly, and if, in view of 
this, it is quite impossible to abstract oneself from 
international conditions - what then? Engels' formula 
does not furnish an answer to this question. As a 
matter of fact, Engels did not set himself this 
question, and therefore could not have given an answer 
to it. Engels proceeds from the assumption that 
Socialism has already been victorious in all countries, 
or in a majority of countries, more or less simultaneously. 
Consequently, Engels is not here investigating 
any specific Socialist state of any particular 
country, but the development of the Socialist 
state in general, on the assumption that Socialism 
has been victorious in a majority of countries - 
according to the formula : "Assuming that Socialism 
is victorious in a majority of countries, what changes 
must the proletarian, Socialist state undergo?" Only 
this general and abstract character of the problem 
can explain why in his investigation of the question 
of the Socialist state Engels completely abstracted 
himself from such a factor as international conditions, 
the international situation. 
But it follows from this that Engels' general 
formula about the destiny of the Socialist state in 
general cannot be extended to the partial and specific 
case of the victory of Socialism in one country only, 
a country which is surrounded by a capitalist world, 
is subject to the menace of foreign military attack,

417 
cannot therefore abstract itself from the international 
situation, and must have at its disposal a 
well-trained army, well-organized punitive organs, 
and a strong intelligence service consequently, must 
have its own state, strong enough to defend the 
conquests of Socialism from foreign attack. 
We have no right to expect of the classical Marxist 
writers, separated as they were from our day by a 
period of forty-five or fifty-five years, that they 
should have foreseen each and every zigzag of history 
in the distant future in every separate country. It 
would be ridiculous to expect that the classical Marxist 
writers should have elaborated for our benefit readymade 
solutions for each and every theoretical problem 
that might arise in any particular country fifty or 
one hundred years afterwards, so that we, the descendants 
of the classical Marxist writers, might calmly 
doze at the fireside and munch ready-made solutions. 
(General laughter.) But we can and should expect of 
the Marxists-Leninists of our day that they do not 
confine themselves to learning by rote a few general 
tenets of Marxism; that they delve deeply into the 
essence of Marxism; that they learn to take account 
of the experience gained in the twenty years of 
existence of the Socialist state in our country; that, 
lastly, they learn, with the use of this experience 
and with knowledge of the essence of Marxism, to 
apply the various general theses of Marxism concretely, 
to lend them greater precision and improve them. 
Lenin wrote his famous book, "The State and Revolution," 
in August 1917, that is, a few months before 
the October Revolution and the establishment

418 
of the Soviet state Lenin considered it the main 
task of this book to defend Marx's and Engels' doctrine 
of the state from the distortions and vulgarizations 
of the opportunists. Lenin was preparing to write a 
second volume of "The State and Revolution," in which 
he intended to sum up the principal lessons of the 
experience of the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 
1917. There can be no doubt that Lenin intended in 
the second volume of his book to elaborate and develop 
the theory of the state on the basis of the 
experience gained during the existence of Soviet power 
in our country. Death, however, prevented him from 
carrying this task into execution. But what Lenin 
did not manage to do should be done by his disciples. 
(Loud applause.) 
The state arose because society split up into 
antagonistic classes; it arose in order to keep in 
restraint the exploited majority in the interests of 
the exploiting minority. The instruments of state 
authority have been mainly concentrated in the army, 
the punitive organs, the espionage service, the prisons. 
Two basic functions characterize the activity of the 
state: at home (the main function), to keep in restraint 
the exploited majority; abroad (not the main 
function), to extend the territory of its class, the 
ruling class, at the expense of the territory of other 
states, or to defend the territory of its own state 
from attack by other states. Such was the case in 
slave society and under feudalism. Such is the case 
under capitalism. 
In order to overthrow capitalism it was not only 
necessary to remove the bourgeoisie from power, it

419 
was not only necessary to expropriate the capitalists, 
but also to smash entirely the bourgeois state 
machine and its old army, its bureaucratic officialdom 
and its police force, and to substitute for it a new, 
proletarian form of state, a new, Socialist state. 
And that, as we know, is exactly what the Bolsheviks 
did. But it does not follow that the new proletarian 
state may not preserve certain functions of the old 
state, changed to suit the requirements of the proletarian 
state. Still less does it follow that the forms 
of our Socialist state must remain unchanged, that 
all the original functions of our state must be fully 
preserved in future. As a matter of fact, the forms 
of our state are changing and will continue to change 
in line with the development of our country and with 
the changes in the international situation. 
Lenin was absolutely right when he said : 
"The forms of bourgeois states are extremely 
varied, but in essence they are all 
the same : in one way or another, in the final 
analysis, all these states are inevitably the 
dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. The transition 
from capitalism to Communism will certainly 
create a great variety and abundance of political 
forms, but their essence will inevitably be the 
same : the dictatorship of the proletariat." 
(Lenin, Selected Works, Vol. VII, p. 34.) 
Since the October Revolution, our Socialist state 
has passed through two main phases in its development. 
The first phase was the period from the October 
revolution to the elimination of the exploiting classes.

420 
The principal task in that period was to suppress 
the resistance of the overthrown classes, to organize 
the defence of the country against the attacks of 
the interventionists, to restore industry and agriculture, 
and to prepare the conditions for the elimination 
of the capitalist elements. Accordingly, in 
this period our state performed two main functions. 
The first function was to suppress the overthrown 
classes inside the country. In this respect our state 
bore a superficial resemblance to previous states 
whose functions had also been to suppress recalcitrants, 
with the fundamental difference, however, 
that our state suppressed the exploiting minority in 
the interests of the labouring majority, while previous 
states had suppressed the exploited majority in the 
interests of the exploiting minority. The second 
function was to defend the country from foreign 
attack. In this respect it likewise bore a superficial 
resemblance to previous states, which also undertook 
the armed defence of their countries, with the fundamental 
difference, however, that our state defended 
from foreign attack the gains of the labouring majority, 
while previous states in such cases defended the wealth 
and privileges of the exploiting minority. Our state 
had yet a third function : this was the work of 
economic organization and cultural education performed 
by our state bodies with the purpose of developing 
the infant shoots of the new, Socialist economic 
system and re-educating the people in the spirit of 
Socialism. But this new function did not attain to 
any considerable development in that period. 
The second phase was the period from the elim

421 
ination of the capitalist elements in town and country 
to the complete victory of the Socialist economic 
system and the adoption of the new Constitution. 
The principal task in this period was to establish 
the Socialist economic system all over the country 
and to eliminate the last remnants of the capitalist 
elements, to bring about a cultural revolution, and 
to form a thoroughly modern army for the defence 
of the country. And the functions of our Socialist 
state changed accordingly. The function of military 
suppression inside the country ceased, died away; for 
exploitation had been abolished, there were no more 
exploiters left, and so there was no one to suppress. 
In place of this function of suppression the state 
acquired the function of protecting Socialist property 
from thieves and pilferers of the people's property. 
The function of defending the country from foreign 
attack fully remained; consequently, the Red Army 
and the Navy also fully remained, as did the punitive 
organs and the intelligence service, which are indispensable 
for the detection and punishment of the spies, 
assassins and wreckers sent into our country by 
foreign espionage services. The function of economic 
organization and cultural education by the state organs 
also remained, and was developed to the full. Now 
the main task of our state inside the country is the 
work of peaceful economic organization and cultural 
education. As for our army, punitive organs, and intelligence 
service, their edge is no longer turned to 
the inside of the country, but to the outside, against 
external enemies. 
As you see, we now have an entirely new, Socialist

422 
state, without precedent in history and differing 
considerably in form and functions from the Socialist 
state of the first phase. 
But development cannot stop there. We are going 
ahead, towards Communism. Will our state remain 
in the period of Communism also? 
Yes, it will, unless the capitalist encirclement 
is liquidated, and unless the danger of foreign military 
attack has disappeared. Naturally, of course, the 
forms of our state will again change in conformity 
with the change in the situation at home and abroad. 
No, it will not remain and will atrophy if the 
capitalist encirclement is liquidated and a Socialist 
encirclement takes its place. 
That is how the question stands with regard to 
the Socialist state. 
The second question is that of the Soviet intelligentsia. 
On this question, too, as on the question of the 
state, there is a certain unclearness and confusion 
among Party members. 
In spite of the fact that the position of the Party 
on the question of the Soviet intelligentsia is perfectly 
clear, there are still current in our Party 
views hostile to the Soviet intelligentsia and incompatible 
with the Party position. As you know, those 
who hold these views practise a disdainful and contemptuous 
attitude to the Soviet intelligentsia and 
regard it as an alien force, even as a force hostile 
to the working class and the peasantry. True, during 
the period of Soviet development the intelligentsia 
has undergone a radical change both in its composition

423 
and status. It has come closer to the people and is 
honestly collaborating with the people, in which respect 
it differs fundamentally from the old, bourgeois 
intelligentsia. But this apparently means nothing to 
these comrades. They go on harping on the old tunes 
and wrongly apply to the Soviet intelligentsia views 
and attitudes which were justified in the old days 
when the intelligentsia was in the service of the 
landlords and capitalists. 
In the old days, under capitalism, before the 
revolution, the intelligentsia consisted primarily of 
members of the propertied classes - noblemen, manufacturers, 
merchants, kulaks and so on. Some members 
of the intelligentsia were sons of small tradesmen, 
petty officials, and even of peasants and workingmen, 
but they did not and could not play a decisive part. 
The intelligentsia as a whole depended for their livelihood 
on the propertied classes and ministered to the 
propertied classes. Hence it is easy to understand 
the mistrust, often bordering on hatred, with which 
the revolutionary elements of our country and above 
all the workers regarded the intellectuals. True, the 
old intelligentsia produced some courageous individuals, 
handfuls of revolutionary people who adopted the standpoint 
of the working class and completely threw in 
their lot with the working class. But such people were 
all too few among the intelligentsia, and they could 
not change the complexion of the intelligentsia as a 
whole. 
Matters with regard to the inteliigentsia have 
undergone a fundamental change, however, since the 
October Revolution, since the defeat of the foreign

424 
armed intervention, and especially since the victory 
of industrialization and collectivization, when the 
abolition of exploitation and the firm establishment 
of the Socialist economic system made it really possible 
to give the country a new constitution and to put it 
into effect. The most influential and qualified section 
of the old intelligentsia broke away from the main 
body in the very first days of the October Revolution, 
proclaimed war on the Soviet government, and joined 
the ranks of the saboteurs. They met with welldeserved 
punishment for this; they were smashed and 
dispersed by the organs of Soviet power. Subsequently 
the majority of those that survived were recruited 
by the enemies of our country as wreckers and spies, 
and thus were expunged by their own deeds from the 
ranks of the intellectuals. Another section of the old 
intelligentsia, less qualified but more numerous, long 
continued to mark time, waiting for "better days"; 
but then, apparently giving up hope, decided to go and 
serve and to live in harmony with the Soviet government. 
The greater part of this group of the old intelligentsia 
are well on in years and are beginning to 
go out of commission. A third section of the old intelligentsia, 
mainly comprising its rank-and-file, and 
still less qualified than the section just mentioned, 
joined forces with the people and supported the Soviet 
government. It needed to perfect its education, and 
it set about doing so in our universities. But parallel 
with this painful process of differentiation and breakup 
of the old intelligentsia there went on a rapid 
process of formation, mobilization and mustering of 
forces of a new intelligentsia. Hundreds of thousands

425 
of young people coming from the ranks of the working 
class, the peasantry and the working intelligentsia 
entered the universities and technical colleges, from 
which they emerged to reinforce the attenuated ranks 
of the intelligentsia. They infused fresh blood into 
it and reanimated it in a new, Soviet spirit. They 
radically changed the whole aspect of the intelligentsia, 
moulding it in their own form and image. The remnants 
of the old intelligentsia were dissolved in the new, 
Soviet intelligentsia, the intelligentsia of the people. 
There thus arose a new, Soviet intelligentsia, intimately 
bound up with the people and, for the most 
part, ready to serve them faithfully and loyally. 
As a result, we now have a numerous, new, popular, 
Socialist intelligentsia, fundamentally different from 
the old, bourgeois intelligentsia both in composition 
and in social and political character. 
The old theory about the intelligentsia, which taught 
that it should be treated with distrust and combated, 
fully applied to the old, pre-revolutionary intelligentsia, 
which served the landlords and capitalists. 
This theory is now out-of-date and does not fit our 
new, Soviet intelligentsia. Our new intelligentsia demands 
a new theory, a theory teaching the necessity 
for a cordial attitude towards it, solicitude and respect 
for it, and cooperation with it in the interests of 
the working class and the peasantry. 
That is clear, I should think. 
It is therefore all the more astonishing and strange 
that after all these fundamental changes in the status 
of the intelligentsia people should be found within 
our Party who attempt to apply the old theory, which

426 
was directed against the bourgeois intelligentsia, to 
our new, Soviet intelligentsia, which is basically a 
Socialist intelligentsia. These people, it appears, assert 
that workers and peasants who until recently were 
working in Stakhanov fashion in the factories and 
collective farms and who were then sent to the universities 
to be educated, thereby ceased to be real 
people and became second-rate people. So we are to 
conclude that education is a pernicious and dangerous 
thing. (Laughter.) We want all our workers and peasants 
to be cultured and educated, and we shall achieve this 
in time. But in the opinion of these queer comrades, 
this purpose harbours a grave danger; for after the 
workers and peasants become cultured and educated 
they may face the danger of being classified as secondrate 
people. (Loud laughter.) The possibility is not 
precluded that these queer comrades may in time sink 
to the position of extolling backwardness, ignorance, 
benightedness and obscurantism. It would be quite in 
the nature of things. Theoretical vagaries have never 
led, and never can lead, to any good. 
Such is the position with regard to our new, Socialist 
intelligentsia. 
* * * 
Our tasks in respect to the further strengthening 
of the Party are : 
1. To systematically improve the composition of 
the Party, raising the level of knowledge of its 
membership, and admitting into its ranks, by a process 
of individual selection, only tried and tested comrades 
who are loyal to the cause of Communism.

427 
2. To establish closer contact between the leading 
bodies and the work of the lower bodies, so as to 
make their work of leadership more practical and 
specific and less confined to meetings and offices. 
3. To centralize the work of selecting cadres, to 
train them carefully and foster them, to study the 
merits and demerits of workers thoroughly, to promote 
young workers boldly and adapt the selection of cadres 
to the requirements of the political line of the Party. 
4. To centralize Party propaganda and agitation, 
to extend the propaganda of the ideas of Marxism- 
Leninism, and to raise the theoretical level and improve 
the political schooling of our cadres. 
* * * 
Comrades, I am now about to conclude my report. 
I have sketched in broad outline the path traversed 
by our Party during the period under review. The results 
of the work of the Party and of its Central 
Committee during this period are well known. There 
have been mistakes and shortcomings in our work. 
The Party and the Central Committee did not conceal 
them and strove to correct them. There have also 
been important successes and big achievements, which 
must not be allowed to turn our heads. 
The chief conclusion to be drawn is that the working 
class of our country, having abolished the exploitation 
of man by man and firmly established the Socialist 
system, has proved to the world the truth of its 
cause. That is the chief conclusion, for it strengthens 
our faith in the power of the working class and in 
the inevitability of its ultimate victory.

428 
The bourgeoisie of all countries asserts that the 
people cannot get along without capitalists and landlords, 
without merchants and kulaks. The working 
class of our country has proved in practice that the 
people can get along without exploiters perfectly well. 
The bourgeoisie of all countries asserts that, having 
destroyed the old bourgeois system, the working class 
is incapable of building anything new to replace the 
old. The working class of our country has proved in 
practice that it is quite capable not only of destroying 
the old system but of building anew and better system, 
a Socialist system, a system, moreover, to which 
crises and unemployment are unknown, 
The bourgeoisie of all countries asserts that the 
peasantry is incapable of taking the path of Socialism. 
The collective farm peasants of our country have 
proved in practice that they can do so quite successfully. 
The chief endeavour of the bourgeoisie of all 
countries and of its reformist hangers-on is to kill 
in the working class faith in its own strength, faith 
in the possibility and inevitability of its victory, 
and thus to perpetuate capitalist slavery. For the 
bourgeoisie knows that if capitalism has not yet been 
overthrown and still continues to exist, it owes it 
not to its own merits, but to the fact that the 
proletariat has still not enough faith in the possibility 
of its victory. It cannot be said that the efforts of 
the bourgeoisie in this respect have been altogether 
unsuccessful. It must be confessed that the bourgeoisie 
and its agents among the working class have 
to some extent succeeded in poisoning the minds of

429 
the working class with the venom of doubt and scepticism. 
If the successes of the working class of our 
country, if its fight and victory serve to rouse the 
spirit of the working class in the capitalist countries 
and to strengthen its faith in its own power and in 
its victory, then our Party may say that its work 
has not been in vain. And there need be no doubt that 
this will be the case. (Loud and prolonged applause.) 
Long live our victorious working class! (Applause.) 
Long live our victorious collective-farm peasantry! 
(Applause.) 
Long live our Socialist intelligentsia! (AppIause.) 
Long live the great friendship of the nations of 
our country! (Applause.) 
Long live the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union! (Applause.) 
(The delegates rise and hail Comrade Stalin with 
loud and stormy cheers. Cries of : "Hurrah for 
Comrade Stalin!" "Hurrah for our great Stalin!" 
"Hurrah for our beloved Stalin!")

430

431 
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 
1935 
January 15 - 23 
J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the 16th 
Congress of Russian Soviets. The Congress elects 
J. V. Stalin as a member of the Central Committee 
of Soviets of Russia. 
January 28 - February 6 
J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the 7th 
Congress of the Soviets of the U.S.S.R. The Congress 
elects J. V. Stalin as a member of the Central Committee 
of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. 
February 7 
At the first session of the Central Committee 
of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., J. V. Stalin is elected to 
the Presidium of the Central Committee of Soviets 
of the U.S.S.R., and President of the Commission 
charged with the effecting of the alterations in the 
Constitution of the U.S.S.R. 
February 11 - 17 
J. V. Stalin attends the meeting of the 2nd Congress 
of avant-garde Kolkhozines of the U.S.S.R. He 
directs the work of the Commission charged with 
the examining of the draft of the Statute of the 
agricultural artel.

432 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
May 4 
J. V. Stalin delivers an address from the Kremlin 
to the graduates of the Red Army Academy. 
July 25 - August 20 
J. V. Stalin participates in the 7th Congress of 
the Communist International. He is elected member 
of the Executive Committee of the Communist International. 
November 14 - 17 
J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the general 
Conference of Stakhanovites of Industry and Transport 
of the U.S.S.R. 
November 17 
Speech by J. V. Stalin to the Conference of the 
Stakhanovites of Russia. 
December 1 
Speech by J. V. Stalin to the Operators of Combines 
of the U.S.S.R., a conference which was held 
with the participation of the members of the Central 
Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) and members of 
the government. 
December 4 
Speech by J. V. Stalin to the Conference of Kolkhozines 
of Tajikstan and Turkmenistan, which was 
held with the participation of the directors of the 
Party and the government.

433 
1936 
February 13 - 16 
J. V. Stalin takes part with the other directors 
of the Party and the government at the Conference 
of advanced workers in cattle raising. 
April 11 - 21 
J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the 10th 
Congress of Komsomols. 
June 1 - 4 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Plenum of the 
Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) and delivers 
a report on the Draft Constitution of the U.S.S.R. 
June 11 
At the reunion of the Presidium of the Central 
Committee of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., J. V. Stalin 
presents a report on the Draft Constitution of the 
U.S.S.R. 
June 20 
J. V. Stalin attends the burial of Gorky in Red 
Square. 
November 25 - December 5 
J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the Extraordinary 
Eighth Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. 
and presented there the report on the Draft Constitution 
of the U.S.S.R.

434 
December 5 
J. V. Stalin presents to the Eighth Congress (Extraordinary) 
of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. a report on the 
work of the Commission in drawing up the Draft 
Constitution. 
1937 
January 15 - 21 
J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the Extraordinary 
Thirteenth Congress of Soviets of S.S.R. The 
Congress elected J. V. Stalin to the Commission for 
the drawing up of the final text of the Constitution 
of the U.S.S.R. 
February 25 - March 5 
J. V. Stalin presides over the meeting of the Plenum 
of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B) and 
presents there a report "Defects in Party Work and 
Measures for Liquidating Trotskyites and other Double - 
dealers". 
October 29 
Speech by J. V. Stalin at a reception given in the 
Kremlin in honour of the directors and Stakhanovites 
of the metallurgy and coal mining industry. 
December 11 
J. V. Stalin's Electoral Speech at the Bolshoi Theatre 
to a meeting of voters of the Stalin Electoral Area, 
Moscow.

435 
December 12 
J. V. Stalin is elected deputy of the Stalin Electoral 
Zone, Moscow, to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
1938 
January 12 - 19 
J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the 1st 
Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. He is 
elected member of the Presidium of the Supreme 
Soviet of the U.S.S.R. 
May 17 
Speech delivered by J. V. Stalin at the reception 
organized at the Kremlin in honour of the participants 
in the 1st Conference of Higher Educational Workers. 
September 9 - 19 
J. V. Stalin's book, "History of the C.P.S.U.(B) - 
Short Course" is published in Pravda. 
September 27 - 29 
J. V. Stalin presides over the Conference of propagandists 
relating to the publication of the "History 
of the C.P.S.U.(B) - Short Course." 
1939 
March 10 - 21 
J. V. Stalin presides over the work of the 18th 
Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B), presents a report on 
the work of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B). 
He is elected by the Congress as a member of the

436 
Commission charged with the examination of the proposed 
corrections and additions to the speech submitted 
by V. M. Molotov on the 3rd Five Year Plan, 
and on the report of Idanov on the alterations of the 
statutes of the C.P.S.U.(B). 
March 22 
At the Plenum of the Central Committee of the 
C.P.S.U.(B), J. V. Stalin is elected a member of the 
Politburo, the organizational bureau, the secretariat 
of the Central Committee and is confirmed in his 
position as General Secretary of the Central Committee 
of the C.P.S.U.(B). 
December 20 
On the occasion of his 60th anniversary, by decree 
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the title 
"Hero of Socialist Work" is bestowed upon J. V. Stalin 
for his extraordinary merits in the organization of 
the Bolshevik Party, in the foundation of the Soviet 
State, in the construction of Socialist society in the 
U.S.S.R. and in the consolidation of the friendship 
between the peoples of the Soviet Union. 
December 21 
J. V. Stalin is elected honorary member of the 
"V. I. Lenin" Academy of Agricultural Sciences of 
the U.S.S.R. 
December 22 
J. V. Stalin is elected honorary member of the 
Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.

437 
1940 
March 26 - 28 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Plenum of 
the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B). 
March 29 - April 4 
J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the 6th 
Session of the first legislature of the Supreme Soviet 
of the U.S.S.R. 
May 28 - June 2 
J. V. Stalin participates in the work of the 3rd 
Session of the Supreme Soviet. 
July 29 - 31 
J. V. Stalin directs the work of the Plenum of 
the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B). 
August 1 - 7 
J. V. Stalin participates in the work-of the 7th 
Session of the first legislature of the Supreme Soviet 
of the U.S.S.R.

438

439

440