W O R K E R S O F A L L C O U N T R I E S, U N I T E !

From Marx to Mao 
ML 
İ Digital Reprints 
2006

RUSSIAN EDITION 
PUBLISHED BY DECISION 
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY 
OF THE SOVIET UNION 
(BOLSHEVIKS)

. p...ma puu .cex cm pa., coe.u...mec.! 
..CT.T.T ...KC.‹......C.‹...... .p. .K .K.(.) 
n.b. CTAlnH 
.....E... 

 
. . . . 
............... ............ ............ .......... 
. o c . . a € 1 9 4 6

FOREIGN LANGUAGES PUBLISHING HOUSE 
M o s c o w € 1 9 5 3 
E 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
J. V. STALIN 
w o R k s 
VOLUME 
 
!()&_!(!#


FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
C O N T E N T S 
Page 
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XI 
1907 
PREFACE TO THE GEORGIAN EDITION OF K. KAUTSKYıS 
PAMPHLET THE DRIVING FORCES AND 
PROSPECTS OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1 
THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN ST. PETERSBURG AND 
THE MENSHEVIKS . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 
THE AUTOCRACY OF THE CADETS OR THE SOVEREIGNTY 
OF THE PEOPLE? . . . . . . . . . . 21 
THE PROLETARIAT IS FIGHTING, THE BOURGEOISIE 
IS CONCLUDING AN ALLIANCE WITH THE 
GOVERNMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 
COMRADE G. TELIA. In Memoriam . . . . . . . 28 
THE ADVANCED PROLETARIAT AND THE FIFTH 
PARTY CONGRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 
MUDDLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 
OUR CAUCASIAN CLOWNS . . . . . . . . . . . 39 
THE DISPERSION OF THE DUMA AND THE TASKS 
OF THE PROLETARIAT . . . . . . . . . . 42 
THE LONDON CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN SOCIALDEMOCRATIC 
LABOUR PARTY (Notes of a Delegate) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 
I. The Composition of the Congress . . . . . . 49 
II. The Agenda. Report of the Central Committee 
Report of the Group in the Duma . . . . . . 53 
III. The Non-Proletarian Parties . . . . . . . . 61 
IV. The Labour Congress . . . . . . . . . . 70

CONTENTS VIII 
MANDATE TO THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DEPUTIES 
IN THE THIRD STATE DUMA, Adopted at a Meeting 
of the Delegates of the Workersı Curia in the City of Baku, 
September 22, 1907 . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 
BOYCOTT THE CONFERENCE! . . . . . . . . . 84 
1908 
BEFORE THE ELECTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . 90 
MORE ABOUT A CONFERENCE WITH GUARANTEES 95 
WHAT DO OUR RECENT STRIKES TELL US? . . . 101 
THE CHANGE IN THE OIL OWNERSı TACTICS . . . 105 
WE MUST PREPARE! . . . . . . . . . . . . 110 
ECONOMIC TERRORISM AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 
THE OIL OWNERS ON ECONOMIC TERRORISM . . 117 
THE PRESS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 
Flunkey ³Socialists². . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 
Hypocritical Zubatovites . . . . . . . . . . . 134 
1909 
THE CONFERENCE AND THE WORKERS . . . . . 138 
THE PARTY CRISIS AND OUR TASKS . . . . . 150 
THE FORTHCOMING GENERAL STRIKE . . . . 163 
PARTY NEWS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 
Resolution of the Baku Committee on the Disagreements 
on the Enlarged Editorial Board of Proletary 170 
THE DECEMBER STRIKE AND THE DECEMBER 
AGREEMENT (On the Occasion of the Fifth Anniversary) 174 
1910 
LETTERS FROM THE CAUCASUS . . . . . . . . 179 
I. Baku . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 
The Situation in the Oil Industry . . . . . . 179 
Local Government in the Oil Fields . . . . . 182 
The State of the Organisation . . . . . . . . 186 
³Legal Possibilities² . . . . . . . . . . . 188

CONTENTS IX 
II. Tiflis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193 
Programmatic Liquidationism . . . . . . 194 
Tactical Liquidationism . . . . . . . . 198 
RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY THE BAKU COMMITTEE 
ON JANUARY 22, 1910 (For the Forthcoming General 
Party Conference). . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 
I. Political Agitation and the Actual Consolidation 
of the Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202 
II. Representation at the Forthcoming General Party 
Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204 
AUGUST BEBEL, LEADER OF THE GERMAN 
WORKERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206 
A LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE 
PARTY FROM EXILE IN SOLVYCHEGODSK . . 215 
1912 
FOR THE PARTY!. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 
LONG LIVE THE FIRST OF MAY ! . . . . . . . 225 
A NEW PERIOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 
LIBERAL HYPOCRITES . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 
NON-PARTY SIMPLETONS . . . . . . . . . . . 235 
LIFE TRIUMPHS! . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238 
THEY ARE WORKING WELL . . . . . . . . . . 241 
THE ICE HAS BROKEN! . . . . . . . . . . . . 244 
HOW THEY ARE PREPARING FOR THE ELECTIONS 246 
DEDUCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250 
OUR AIMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 255 
MANDATE OF THE ST. PETERSBURG WORKERS TO 
THEIR LABOUR DEPUTY . . . . . . . . 257 
THE WILL OF THE VOTERSı DELEGATES . . . . 260 
THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS IN THE WORKERSı 
CURIA OF ST. PETERSBURG . . . . . 263 
1. The Election of the Votersı Delegates . . . . . 263 
2. The Election of Electors . . . . . . . . . . 264

CONTENTS X 
3. Two Unities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 265 
4. The Election of the Duma Deputy . . . . . 267 
TODAY IS ELECTION DAY . . . . . . . . . . . 269 
1913 
TO ALL THE WORKING MEN AND WORKING WOMEN 
OF RUSSIA! January 9 . . . . . . . . . . 273 
THE ELECTIONS IN ST. PETERSBURG (A Letter From 
St. Petersburg) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 279 
I. The Workersı Curia . . . . . . . . . . 280 
1. The Fight for Elections . . . . . . . . . 280 
2. The Deputyıs Mandate . . . . . . . . . 282 
3. Unity as a Mask, and the Election of the 
Duma Deputy . . . . . . . . . . . . 285 
II. The City Curia . . . . . . . . . . . . 289 
III. Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 292 
ON THE ROAD TO NATIONALISM (A Letter From the Caucasus) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 295 
MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION . . . 300 
I. The Nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303 
II. The National Movement . . . . . . . . . 313 
III. Presentation of the Question . . . . . . . 323 
IV. Cultural-National Autonomy. . . . . . . . 331 
V. The Bund, Its Nationalism, Its Separatism . 344 
VI. The Caucasians, the Conference of the Liquidators 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359 
VII. The National Question in Russia . . . . . . 373 
THE SITUATION IN THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC 
GROUP IN THE DUMA . . . . . . . . . 382 
THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE LENA MASSACRE . . 387 
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 391 
Biographical Chronicle (1907 to March 1917) . . . . . 422

PREFACE 
Volume 2 of the Works of J . V. Stalin contains 
writings mainly of the period from the latter half of 
1907 to 1913, prior to Comrade Stalinıs exile to the 
Turukhansk region, where he remained until February 
1917. These works cover mainly two periods of Comrade 
Stalinıs revolutionary activities, the Baku period and 
the St. Petersburg period. 
The writings of the first half of 1907 deal with the tactics 
of the Bolsheviks during the first Russian revolution 
(³Preface to the Georgian Edition of K. Kautskyıs 
Pamphlet The Driving Forces and Prospects of the Russian 
Revolution,² the article ³The Election Campaign in St. 
Petersburg and the Mensheviks,² and others). The articles 
of this period were published in the Georgian Bolshevik 
newspapers Chveni Tskhovreba and Dro. They appear 
in Russian for the first time. 
The writings from June 1907 onwards‹in the period 
of Comrade Stalinıs revolutionary activities mainly 
in Baku‹deal with the struggle the Bolsheviks waged 
against the Menshevik Liquidators for the preservation

PREFACE XII 
and strengthening of the underground revolutionary Marxist 
Party (³The Party Crisis and Our Tasks,² ³Resolutions 
Adopted by the Baku Committee on January 22, 
1910,² ³Letters From the Caucasus²). Questions concerning 
the leadership of the revolutionary labour movement 
and the trade unions are dealt with in the articles: 
³What Do Our Recent Strikes Tell Us?² ³The Oil Owners 
on Economic Terrorism,² ³The Conference and the 
Workers,² and others. An analysis of the Fifth Congress 
of the R.S.D.L.P. is presented in the article ³The London 
Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Notes of a Delegate).² 
J. V. Stalinıs articles of this period included in Volume 
2 were published in the newspapers Bakinsky Proletary, 
Gudok and Sotsial-Demokrat. 
The latter half of 1911 marked the beginning of 
the St. Petersburg period of Comrade Stalinıs revolutionary 
activities (1911-1913). As the head of the Russian 
Bureau of the Central Committee, Comrade Stalin directed 
the work of the Party in Russia in carrying out the 
decisions of the Prague Conference of the Party. It 
was in this period that the works were written dealing 
mainly with the new revolutionary upsurge in the labour 
movement and with the tasks of the Bolshevik Party 
in connection with the elections to the Fourth State 
Duma. Among these are the leaflet ³For the Party!², 
the articles ³A New Stage,² ³They Are Working 
Well. . . .², ³The Ice Has Broken! . . .², ³Mandate of 
the St. Petersburg Workers to Their Labour Deputy,² 
³The Will of the Votersı Delegates,² ³The Elections 
in St. Petersburg,² and others. These articles were 
published in the St. Petersburg newspapers Zvezda and 
Pravda.

PREFACE XIII 
This volume includes J. V. Stalinıs well-known work 
Marxism and the National Question (1913), in which 
the Bolshevik theory and programme on the national 
question are developed. 
The article ³On Cultural-National Autonomy,² which 
Comrade Stalin wrote during his exile in Turukhansk 
region, and a number of other works, have not yet been 
discovered. 
Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute 
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)


!()&_!(!#


PREFACE TO THE GEORGIAN EDITION 
OF K. KAUTSKYıS PAMPHLET 
THE DRIVING FORCES AND PROSPECTS 
OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION 1 
Karl Kautskyıs name is not new to us. He has long 
been known as an outstanding theoretician of Social- 
Democracy. But Kautsky is known not only from that 
aspect; he is notable also as a thorough and thoughtful investigator 
of tactical problems. In this respect he has won 
great authority not only among the European comrades, 
but also among us. That is not surprising: today, when 
disagreements on tactics are splitting Russian Social- 
Democracy into two groups, when mutual criticism often 
aggravates the situation by passing into recrimination and 
it becomes extremely difficult to ascertain the truth, it is 
very interesting to hear what an unbiassed and experienced 
comrade like K. Kautsky has to say. That is why our 
comrades have set to work so zealously to study Kautskyıs 
articles on tactics: ³The State Duma,² ³The Moscow 
Insurrection,² ³The Agrarian Question,² ³The Russian 
Peasantry and the Revolution,² ³The Anti-Jewish Pogroms 
in Russia,² and others. But the present pamphlet 
has engaged the attention of the comrades far more than 
those works, and that is because it touches upon all the 
main questions that divide Social-Democracy into two 
groups. It appears that Plekhanov, who recently sought

J. V. S T A L I N 2
the advice of foreign comrades to clear up our burning 
problems, submitted these problems also to Kautsky 
with a request to answer them. As is evident from what 
Kautsky says, the present pamphlet is an answer to that 
request. After that, it was, of course, natural that the 
comrades should pay greater attention to the pamphlet. 
Obviously, that also enhances the importance of the 
pamphlet for us. 
It will be very useful, therefore, if we recall, if 
only in general outline, the questions of our disagreements 
and, in passing, ascertain Kautskyıs views on this 
or that question. 
On whose side is Kautsky, whom does he support, 
the Bolsheviks or the Mensheviks? 
The first question that is splitting Russian Social- 
Democracy into two parts is the question of the general 
character of our revolution. That our revolution is a 
bourgeois-democratic and not a socialist revolution, that 
it must end with the destruction of feudalism and not 
of capitalism, is clear to everybody. The question is, 
however, who will lead this revolution, and who will 
unite around itself the discontented elements of the 
people: the bourgeoisie or the proletariat? Will the 
proletariat drag at the tail of the bourgeoisie as was 
the case in France, or will the bourgeoisie follow the 
proletariat? That is how the question stands. 
The Mensheviks say through the mouth of Martynov 
that our revolution is a bourgeois revolution, that it is 
a repetition of the French revolution; and as the French 
revolution, being a bourgeois revolution, was led by the 
bourgeoisie, so our revolution must also be led by the 
bourgeoisie. ³The hegemony of the proletariat is a harm

PREFACE TO K. KAUTSKYıS PAMPHLET 3 
ful utopia. . . .² ³The proletariat must follow the 
extreme bourgeois opposition² (see Martynovıs Two Dictatorships). 
The Bolsheviks, however, say: True, our revolution 
is a bourgeois revolution, but that does not mean in the 
least that it is a repetition of the French revolution, 
that it must necessarily be led by the bourgeoisie, as 
was the case in France. In France, the proletariat was 
an unorganised force with little class consciousness 
and, as a consequence, the bourgeoisie retained the hegemony 
in the revolution. In our country, however, the 
proletariat is a relatively more class conscious and organised 
force; as a consequence, it is no longer content 
with the role of appendage to the bourgeoisie and, as 
the most revolutionary class, is coming out at the head 
of the present-day movement. The hegemony of the proletariat 
is not a utopia, it is a living fact; the proletariat 
is actually uniting the discontented elements 
around itself. And whoever advises it ³to follow the 
bourgeois opposition² is depriving it of independence, 
is converting the Russian proletariat into a tool of the 
bourgeoisie (see Leninıs Two Tactics). 
What is K. Kautskyıs view on this question? 
³The liberals often refer to the great French revolution 
and often do so without justification. Conditions 
in present-day Russia are in many respects quite different 
from what they were in France in 1789² (see Chapter III 
of the pamphlet). . . . ³Russian liberalism is quite different 
from the liberalism of Western Europe, and for 
this reason alone it is a great mistake to take the great 
French revolution simply as a model for the present Russian 
revolution. The leading class in the revolutionary

J. V. S T A L I N 4
movements in Western Europe was the petty bourgeoisie, 
especially the petty bourgeoisie in the large cities² 
(see Chapter IV). . . . ³The day of bourgeois revolutions, 
i.e., revolutions in which the bourgeoisie was the driving 
force, has passed away, and it has passed away also for 
Russia. There, too, the proletariat is no longer a mere 
appendage and tool of the bourgeoisie, as was the case 
during the bourgeois revolutions, but is an independent 
class, with independent revolutionary aims² (see Chapter 
V). 
That is what K. Kautsky says about the general character 
of the Russian revolution; that is how Kautsky 
understands the role of the proletariat in the present 
Russian revolution. The bourgeoisie cannot lead the 
Russian revolution‹hence, the proletariat must come 
out as the leader of the revolution. 
The second question of our disagreements is: Can the 
liberal bourgeoisie be at least an ally of the proletariat 
in the present revolution? 
The Bolsheviks say that it cannot. True, during the 
French revolution, the liberal bourgeoisie played a revolutionary 
role, but that was because the class struggle 
in that country was not so acute, the proletariat had 
little class consciousness and was content with the 
role of appendage to the liberals, whereas in our country, 
the class struggle is extremely acute, the proletariat 
is far more class conscious and cannot resign itself to 
the role of appendage to the liberals. Where the proletariat 
fights consciously, the liberal bourgeoisie ceases 
to be revolutionary. That is why the Cadet-liberals, 
frightened by the proletariatıs struggle, are seeking 
protection under the wing of reaction. That is why

PREFACE TO K. KAUTSKYıS PAMPHLET 5 
they are fighting the revolution rather than the reaction. 
That is why the Cadets2 would sooner conclude an 
alliance with the reaction against the revolution than 
with the revolution. Yes, our liberal bourgeoisie, and 
its champions the Cadets, are the allies of the reaction, 
they are the ³enlightened² enemies of the revolution. 
It is altogether different with the poor peasants. The 
Bolsheviks say that only the poor peasants will extend 
a hand to the revolutionary proletariat, and only 
they can conclude a firm alliance with the proletariat 
for the whole period of the present revolution. And 
it is those peasants that the proletariat must support 
against the reaction and the Cadets. And if these two main 
forces conclude an alliance, if the workers and peasants 
support each other, the victory of the revolution will be 
assured. If they do not, the victory of the revolution is 
impossible. That is why the Bolsheviks are not supporting 
the Cadets, either in the Duma or outside the Duma, in 
the first stage of the elections. That is why the Bolsheviks, 
during the elections and in the Duma, support only 
the revolutionary representatives of the peasants against 
the reaction and the Cadets. That is why the Bolsheviks 
unite the broad masses of the people only around the 
revolutionary part of the Duma and not around the entire 
Duma. That is why the Bolsheviks do not support the 
demand for the appointment of a Cadet ministry (see 
Leninıs Two Tactics and ³The Victory of the Cadets²). 
The Mensheviks argue quite differently. True, the 
liberal bourgeoisie is wavering between reaction and revolution, 
but in the end, in the opinion of the Mensheviks, 
it will join the revolution and, after all, play a revolutionary 
role. Why? Because the liberal bourgeoisie played

J. V. S T A L I N 6
a revolutionary role in France, because it is opposed 
to the old order and, consequently, will be obliged to 
join the revolution. In the opinion of the Mensheviks, 
the liberal bourgeoisie, and its champions the Cadets, 
cannot be called traitors to the present revolution, they 
are the allies of the revolution. That is why the Mensheviks 
support them during the elections and in the Duma. 
The Mensheviks assert that the class struggle should never 
eclipse the general struggle. That is why they call upon 
the masses of the people to rally around the entire Duma 
and not merely around its revolutionary part; that is why 
they, with all their might, support the demand for the appointment 
of a Cadet ministry; that is why the Mensheviks 
are ready to consign the maximum programme 
to oblivion, to cut down the minimum programme, and 
to repudiate the democratic republic so as not to frighten 
away the Cadets. Some readers may think that all that 
is libel against the Mensheviks and will demand facts. 
Here are the facts. 
The following is what the well-known Menshevik 
writer Malishevsky wrote recently: 
³Our bourgeoisie does not want a republic, consequently, 
we cannot have a republic . . . ,² and so ³. . . as 
a result of our revolution there must arise a constitutional 
system, but certainly not a democratic republic.² That 
is why Malishevsky advises ³the comrades² to abandon 
³republican illusions² (see First Symposium,3 pp. 288, 289). 
That is the first fact. 
On the eve of the elections the Menshevik leader Cherevanin 
wrote: 
³It would be absurd and insane for the proletariat to 
try, as some people propose, jointly with the peasantry,

PREFACE TO K. KAUTSKYıS PAMPHLET 7 
to enter into a struggle against both the government and 
the bourgeoisie for a sovereign and popular Constituent 
Assembly.² We, he says, are now trying to reach agreement 
with the Cadets and to get a Cadet ministry (see 
Nashe Delo,4 No. 1). 
That is the second fact. 
But all that was only written words. Another Menshevik 
leader, Plekhanov, did not confine himself to that and 
wanted to put what was written into practice. At the 
time when a fierce debate was raging in the Party on 
the question of electoral tactics, when everybody 
was asking whether it was permissible to enter into 
an agreement with the Cadets during the first stage of 
the elections, Plekhanov held even an agreement with the 
Cadets inadequate, and began to advocate a direct 
bloc, a temporary fusion, with the Cadets. Recall the 
newspaper Tovarishch5 of November 24 (1906) in which 
Plekhanov published his little article. One of the readers of 
Tovarishch asked Plekhanov: Is it possible for the Social- 
Democrats to have a common platform with the Cadets; 
if it is, ³what could be the nature . . . of a common 
election platform?² Plekhanov answered that a common 
platform was essential, and that such a platform must be 
³a sovereign Duma.² . . . ³There is no other answer, 
nor can there be² (see Tovarishch, November 24, 1906). 
What do Plekhanovıs words mean? They have only one 
meaning, namely, that during the elections the Party 
of the proletarians, i . e . , Social-Democracy, should 
actually join with the party of the employers, i.e., 
the Cadets, should jointly with them publish agitational 
leaflets addressed to the workers, should in fact renounce 
the slogan of a popular Constituent Assembly and

J. V. S T A L I N 8
the Social-Democratic minimum programme and instead 
issue the Cadet slogan of a sovereign Duma. Actually, 
that means renouncing our minimum programme to please 
the Cadets and to enhance our reputation in their eyes. 
That is the third fact. 
But what Plekhanov said somewhat timidly was said 
with remarkable boldness by a third Menshevik leader, 
Vasilyev. Listen to this: 
³First of all, let the whole of society, all citizens . . . 
establish constitutional government. Since this will be 
a peopleıs government, the people, in conformity with 
their grouping according to class and interests . . . can 
proceed to settle all problems. Then the struggle of classes 
and groups will not only be appropriate, but also necessary. 
. . . Now, however, at the present moment, it would 
be suicidal and criminal. . . .² It is therefore necessary 
for the various classes and groups ³to abandon all Œthe very 
best of programmesı for a time and merge in one constitutional 
party. . . .² ³My proposal is that there should 
be a common platform, the basis of which should be the 
laying of the elementary foundations for a sovereign society 
which alone can provide a corresponding Duma. . . .² 
³The contents of such a platform are . . . a ministry responsible 
to the peopleıs representatives . . . free speech 
and press . . .² etc. (see Tovarishch, December 17, 1906). 
As regards the popular Constituent Assembly, and our 
minimum programme in general, all that must be ³abandoned² 
according to Vasilyev. . . . 
That is the fourth fact. 
True, Martov, a fourth Menshevik leader, disagrees 
with the Menshevik Vasilyev and haughtily reproves him 
for having written the above-mentioned article (see

PREFACE TO K. KAUTSKYıS PAMPHLET 9 
Otkliki,6 No. 2). But Plekhanov speaks in high praise of 
Vasilyev, who, in Plekhanovıs opinion, is a ³tireless 
and popular Social-Democratic organiser of the Swiss workers² 
and who ³will render numerous services to the 
Russian workersı cause² (see Mir Bozhy7 for June 1906). 
Which of these two Mensheviks should be believed? 
Plekhanov or Martov? And besides, did not Martov himself 
write recently: ³The strife between the bourgeoisie 
and the proletariat strengthens the position of the autocracy 
and thereby retards the success of the emancipation 
of the people²? (See Elmar, ³The People and the 
State Duma,² p. 20.) Who does not know that this non- 
Marxist view is the real basis of the liberal ³proposal² 
advanced by Vasilyev? 
As you see, the Mensheviks are so enchanted with the 
³revolutionariness² of the liberal bourgeoisie, they place 
so much hope on its ³revolutionariness,² that to please 
it they are even ready to consign the Social-Democratic 
programme to oblivion. 
How does K. Kautsky regard our liberal bourgeoisie? 
Whom does he regard as the true ally of the proletariat? 
What does he say on this question? 
³At the present time (i.e., in the present Russian 
revolution) the proletariat is no longer a mere appendage 
and tool of the bourgeoisie, as was the case during the 
bourgeois revolutions, but is an independent class, with independent 
revolutionary aims. But where the proletariat 
comes out in this manner the bourgeoisie ceases to be a 
revolutionary class. The Russian bourgeoisie, in so far 
as it is liberal at all and pursues an independent class 
policy, undoubtedly hates absolutism, but it hates revolution 
still more. . . . And in so far as it wants political

J. V. S T A L I N 10 
freedom it does so mainly because it regards it as the 
only means of putting an end to revolution. Thus, the 
bourgeoisie is not one of the driving forces of the presentday 
revolutionary movement in Russia. . . . The proletariat 
and the peasantry alone have a firm community of interests 
during the whole period of the revolutionary struggle. 
And this is what must serve as the basis of the entire 
revolutionary tactics of Russian Social-Democracy. . . . 
Without the peasants we cannot today achieve victory 
in Russia² (see Chapter V). 
That is what Kautsky says. 
We think that comment is superfluous. 
The third question of our disagreements is: What 
will be the class content of the victory of our revolution, 
or, in other words, which classes must achieve victory 
in our revolution, which classes must win power? 
The Bolsheviks assert that as the proletariat and the 
peasantry are the main forces in the present revolution, 
and as their victory is impossible unless they support 
each other, it is they who will win power, and, therefore, 
the victory of the revolution will mean the establishment 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry 
(see Leninıs Two Tactics and ³The Victory of the 
Cadets²). 
The Mensheviks, on the other hand, reject the dictatorship 
of the proletariat and peasantry, they do not 
believe that power will be won by the proletariat and the 
peasantry. In their opinion power must come into the 
hands of a Cadet Duma. Consequently, they support 
with extraordinary zeal the Cadet slogan of a responsible 
ministry. Thus, instead of the dictatorship of the proletariat 
and peasantry, the Mensheviks offer us the

PREFACE TO K. KAUTSKYıS PAMPHLET 11 
dictatorship of the Cadets (see Martynovıs Two Dictatorships, 
and also the newspapers Golos Truda, 8 Nashe 
Delo, and others). 
What is K. Kautskyıs view on this question? 
On this point Kautsky bluntly says that ³the revolutionary 
strength of Russian Social-Democracy and the 
possibility of its victory lie in the community of interests 
of the industrial proletariat and the peasantry² (see 
Chapter V). That is to say, the revolution will be victorious 
only if the proletariat and the peasantry fight side 
by side for the common victory‹the dictatorship of the 
Cadets is anti-revolutionary. 
The fourth question of our disagreements is: During 
revolutionary storms a so-called provisional revolutionary 
government will, of course, automatically arise. 
Is it permissible for Social-Democracy to enter the revolutionary 
government? 
The Bolsheviks say that to enter such a provisional 
government is not only permissible from the point of 
view of principle, but also necessary for practical 
reasons, in order that Social-Democracy may effectively 
protect the interests of the proletariat and of the 
revolution in the provisional revolutionary government. 
If in the street fighting the proletariat, jointly with 
the peasants, overthrows the old order, and if it sheds 
its blood together with them, it is only natural that it 
should also enter the provisional revolutionary government 
with them, in order to lead the revolution to the 
desired results (see Leninıs Two Tactics). 
The Mensheviks, however, reject the idea of entering 
the provisional revolutionary government. They say 
that it is impermissible for Social-Democracy, that it

J. V. S T A L I N 12 
is unseemly for a Social-Democrat, that it will be fatal 
for the proletariat (see Martynovıs Two Dictatorships). 
What does K. Kautsky say on this point? 
³It is quite possible that with the further progress 
of the revolution victory will be achieved by the Social- 
Democratic Party. . . .² But it does not mean that ³the 
revolution which Russia is passing through will at once 
lead to the introduction in Russia of the socialist mode 
of production, even if it temporarily entrusted the helm 
of state to Social-Democracy² (see Chapter V). 
As you see, in Kautskyıs opinion, not only is it permissible 
to enter a provisional revolutionary government, 
it may even happen that ³the helm of state will 
temporarily² pass entirely and exclusively into the hands 
of Social-Democracy. 
Such are Kautskyıs views on the principal questions 
of our disagreements. 
As you see, Kautsky, an outstanding theoretician 
of Social-Democracy, and the Bolsheviks are in complete 
agreement with each other. 
This is not denied even by the Mensheviks, except, of 
course, for a few ³official² Mensheviks who have probably 
not set eyes on Kautskyıs pamphlet. Martov, for example, 
definitely says that ³in his final deduction, Kautsky 
agrees with Comrade Lenin and his like-minded friends 
who have proclaimed the democratic dictatorship of the 
proletariat and peasantry² (see Otkliki, No. 2, p. 19). 
And that means that the Mensheviks do not agree with 
K. Kautsky, or rather, that Kautsky does not agree with 
the Mensheviks. 
And so, who agrees with the Mensheviks, and with 
whom, finally, do the Mensheviks agree?

PREFACE TO K. KAUTSKYıS PAMPHLET 13 
Here is what history tells us about it. On December 
27 (1906), a debate was held in Solyanoi Gorodok (in 
St. Petersburg). In the course of the debate the Cadet 
leader P. Struve said: ³You will all be Cadets. . . . 
The Mensheviks are already being called semi-Cadets. 
Many people regard Plekhanov as a Cadet and, indeed, 
the Cadets can welcome much of what Plekhanov says 
now, it is a pity, however, that he did not say this when 
the Cadets stood alone² (see Tovarishch of December 
28, 1906). 
So you see who agrees with the Mensheviks. 
Will it be surprising if the Mensheviks agree with 
them and take the path of liberalism?. . . 
February 10, 1907 
Reprinted from the pamphlet 
Signed: Koba 
Translated from the Georgian

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN 
IN ST. PETERSBURG 
AND THE MENSHEVIKS 
Nowhere was the election campaign fought with such 
intensity as it was in St. Petersburg. Nowhere were 
there such conflicts between the parties as in St. 
Petersburg. Social-Democrats, Narodniks, Cadets, Black 
Hundreds, Bolsheviks and Mensheviks in the Social- 
Democratic movement, Trudoviks,9 Socialist-Revolutionaries 
and Popular Socialists among the Narodniks, 
Left and Right Cadets in the Cadet Party‹all waged 
a fierce struggle. . . . 
On the other hand, nowhere was the complexion of 
the various parties revealed so clearly as it was in St. 
Petersburg. It could not have been otherwise. An election 
campaign is real action‹and the nature of parties can 
be ascertained only in action. It is obvious that the 
more fiercely the struggle was waged, the more distinctly 
was the complexion of the respective combatants bound 
to be revealed. 
In this respect, the conduct of the Bolsheviks and 
the Mensheviks during the election campaign is extremely 
interesting. 
You probably remember what the Mensheviks said. 
Even before the elections they had said that a Constituent 
Assembly and a democratic republic were an unnecessary 
burden, that what was needed first of all was a Duma

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN ST. PETERSBURG 15 
and a Cadet ministry and, consequently, what was needed 
was an election agreement with the Cadets. If that were 
not achieved, they said, the Black Hundreds would win. 
Here is what the Menshevik leader Cherevanin wrote on 
the eve of the elections: 
³It would be absurd and insane for the proletariat 
to try, as some people propose, jointly with the peasantry, 
to enter into a struggle against both the government 
and the bourgeoisie for a sovereign and popular Constituent 
Assembly² (see Nashe Delo, No. 1). 
Plekhanov, another Menshevik leader, seconding Cherevanin, 
also rejected a popular Constituent Assembly 
and proposed instead a ³sovereign Duma,² which was to 
become a ³common platform² for the Cadets and the 
Social-Democrats (see Tovarishch, November 24, 1906). 
And the well-known Menshevik Vasilyev said more 
frankly that the class struggle ³at the present moment 
would be suicidal and criminal . . . ,² that the various 
classes and groups must ³abandon all Œthe very best of 
programmesı for a time and merge in one constitutional 
party . . .² (see Tovarishch, December 17, 1906). 
That is what the Mensheviks said. 
The Bolsheviks, from the very beginning, condemned 
that position of the Mensheviks. They said that i t 
would be unseemly for Socialists to enter into an agreement 
with the Cadets, that the Socialists must come out 
independently in the election campaign. In the first 
stage of the election, agreements are permissible only 
in exceptional cases, and then only with parties whose 
slogans of the day are: a popular Constituent Assembly, 
confiscation of all the land, an eight-hour day, etc. 
The Cadets, however, reject all this. The ³Black-Hundred

J. V. S T A L I N 16 
danger² was invented by the liberals to frighten certain 
naive people. The Black Hundreds cannot ³capture² the 
Duma. The Mensheviks only repeat the words of the 
liberals when they talk about the ³Black-Hundred danger.² 
But there is a ³Cadet danger,² and it is a real 
danger. It is our duty to rally all the revolutionary elements 
around ourselves and fight the Cadets, who are 
concluding an alliance with the reaction against the 
revolution. We must fight simultaneously on two fronts: 
against the reaction and against the liberal bourgeoisie 
and its champions. 
That is what the Bolsheviks said. 
The opening day of the St. Petersburg Social-Democratic 
conference10 drew near. Here, at this conference, 
two sets of tactics were to be presented to the proletariat: 
the tactics of agreement with the Cadets, and the tactics 
of fighting the Cadets. . . . Now, at this conference, 
the proletariat was to appraise everything the Bolsheviks 
and Mensheviks had said hitherto. But the Mensheviks 
had a presentiment that defeat awaited them, they 
had a foreboding that the conference would condemn 
their tactics, and they, therefore, resolved to leave the 
conference, to break with Social-Democracy. For the 
sake of an agreement with the Cadets the Mensheviks 
started a split. They wanted to get ³their men² into 
the Duma by bargaining with the Cadets. 
The Bolsheviks emphatically condemned that spineless 
behaviour. They proved by figures that there was 
no ³Black-Hundred danger.² They ruthlessly criticised 
the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Trudoviks and openly 
called upon them to rally around the proletariat against 
the counter-revolution and the Cadets.

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN ST. PETERSBURG 17 
While the Bolsheviks were uniting the revolutionary 
elements around the proletariat, while they were undeviatingly 
pursuing the uncompromising tactics of the 
proletariat, the Mensheviks were negotiating with the 
Cadets behind the backs of the workers. 
Meanwhile, the Cadets were gradually inclining to 
the right. Stolypin invited the Cadet leader Milyukov to see 
him ³for negotiations.² The Cadets unanimously instructed 
Milyukov to negotiate with the reaction ³on behalf 
of the Party.² Obviously, the Cadets wanted to conclude 
an agreement with the reaction against the revolution. 
At the same time, another Cadet leader, Struve, openly 
stated that ³the Cadets want an agreement with the 
monarch with the object of obtaining a constitution² 
(see Rech,11 January 18, 1907). It was evident that the 
Cadets were entering into an alliance with the reaction. 
Nevertheless, the Mensheviks entered into negotiations 
with the Cadets, they still sought an alliance with 
them. Poor fellows! They had no idea that by entering 
into an agreement with the Cadets they were entering 
into an agreement with the reaction! 
Meanwhile, the discussion meetings, sanctioned by the 
authorities, commenced. Here, at these meetings, it became 
definitely clear that the ³Black-Hundred danger² 
was a myth, that the fight was chiefly between the Cadets 
and the Social-Democrats, and that whoever entered 
into an agreement with the Cadets was betraying Social- 
Democracy. The Mensheviks were no longer to be seen at 
the meetings; they tried to intercede for the Cadets two 
or three times, but they glaringly disgraced themselves 
and kept away. The Mensheviks‹the hangers-on of the 
Cadets‹were already discredited. Only the Bolsheviks

J. V. S T A L I N 18 
and the Cadets remained in the discussion arena. The 
meetings were taken up entirely with the struggle between 
them. The Socialist-Revolutionaries and the Trudoviks 
declined to negotiate with the Cadets. The Popular 
Socialists wavered. The Bolsheviks became the leaders in 
the election campaign. 
Where were the Mensheviks in the meantime? 
They were negotiating with the Cadets for three seats 
in the Duma. It may sound incredible, but it is a fact; 
and it is our duty openly to tell the truth. 
The Bolsheviks declared: Down with the hegemony 
of the Cadets! 
The Mensheviks, however, rejected this slogan, and 
thereby submitted to the hegemony of the Cadets and 
dragged at their tail. 
Meanwhile, elections took place in the workersı curia. 
It turned out that in the Menshevik districts the workers had 
nearly everywhere elected Socialist-Revolutionaries as their 
votersı delegates. ³We cannot vote for those who compromise 
with the Cadets; after all the Socialist-Revolutionaries 
are better than they are,²‹that is what the workers 
said. The workers called the Social-Democrats liberals, 
and preferred to go with the bourgeois-democrats, with the 
Socialist-Revolutionaries! That is what the opportunism 
of the Mensheviks led to! 
The Bolsheviks pursued their uncompromising tactics 
and called upon all the revolutionary elements to unite 
around the proletariat. The Socialist-Revolutionaries 
and Trudoviks openly associated themselves with the 
Bolshevik slogan: Down with the hegemony of the Cadets! 
The Popular Socialists broke with the Cadets. It became 
obvious to everybody that the agreement between the

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN IN ST. PETERSBURG 19 
Social-Democrats on the one hand and the Socialist- 
Revolutionaries and Trudoviks on the other would under 
no circumstances split the vote to such a degree as to 
let the Black Hundreds win. Either the Cadets or the 
extreme Left would win‹the ³Black-Hundred danger² 
was a myth. 
Meanwhile, the Cadets broke off negotiations with the 
Mensheviks. Evidently an agreement failed to come off. 
The Bolsheviks, however, concluded an agreement with 
the Socialist-Revolutionaries, Trudoviks and Popular Socialists, 
isolated the Cadets, and launched a general offensive 
against the reaction and the Cadets. Three election 
lists were put up in St. Petersburg: the Black Hundreds, 
the Cadets and the extreme Left. Thus, the Bolsheviksı 
forecast that there would be three lists came true 
in spite of the Mensheviks. 
Rejected by the proletariat, left empty-handed by 
the Cadets, made a laughing-stock of by the Socialist- 
Revolutionaries and Trudoviks and disgraced by history, 
the Mensheviks laid down their arms and voted for the 
list of the extreme Left, against the Cadets. The Vyborg 
District Committee of the Mensheviks openly stated that 
the Mensheviks would vote for the extreme Left, against 
the Cadets. 
And that meant that the Mensheviks repudiated 
the existence of a ³Black-Hundred danger,² that they 
rejected an agreement with the Cadets and backed the 
Bolshevik slogan‹Down with the hegemony of the 
Cadets! 
It meant also that the Mensheviks rejected their 
own tactics and openly recognised the Bolshevik tactics.

J. V. S T A L I N 20 
And lastly, it meant that the Mensheviks had stopped 
dragging at the tail of the Cadets and now dragged at the 
tail of the Bolsheviks. 
Finally, the elections took place and it turned out 
that not a single one of the Black Hundreds was elected 
in St. Petersburg! 
That is how the correctness of the Bolshevik tactics 
was proved in St. Petersburg. 
That is how the Mensheviks sustained defeat. 
Chveni Tskhovreba 
(Our Life),12 No. 1, 
February 18, 1907 
Unsigned 
Translated from the Georgian

THE AUTOCRACY OF THE CADETS 
OR THE SOVEREIGNTY OF THE PEOPLE? 
Who should take power during the revolution? Which 
classes should take the helm of social and political life? 
The people, the proletariat and peasantry!‹the Bolsheviks 
answered, and thus they answer now. In their 
opinion, the victory of the revolution means the establishment 
of the dictatorship (sovereignty) of the proletariat 
and peasantry with the object of winning an eighthour 
day, of confiscating all the landlordsı land and of 
setting up a democratic regime. The Mensheviks reject 
the sovereignty of the people and, until lately, did not 
give a straight answer to the question as to who should 
take power. But now that they have obviously turned 
towards the Cadets they are more boldly stating that 
power must be taken by the Cadets and not by the proletariat 
and the peasantry. Listen to this: 
³The dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry is . . . 
a paradox² (an incongruity) . . . it is ³an inclination towards 
Socialist-Revolutionary views² (see the Menshevik organ Na 
Ocheredi,13 No. 4, pp. 4-5, article by Potresov). 
True, that outstanding Marxist, K. Kautsky, clearly 
says that the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat 
and peasantry is essential; but who is K. Kautsky

J. V. S T A L I N 22 
to contradict Potresov? Everybody knows that Potresov 
is a true Marxist and Kautsky is not! 
Another Menshevik adds: 
³The slogan of a responsible ministry will become the slogan 
of the struggle for power, the struggle to transfer power from 
the bureaucracy to the people² (see ibid., p. 3, article by Koltsov). 
In Koltsovıs opinion, as you see, the slogan of a responsible 
ministry must become the slogan of the peopleıs 
struggle, that is, the proletariat and the peasantry must 
fight under that slogan and no other, and must shed their 
blood not for a democratic republic, but for a Cadet ministry. 
This, then, is what the Mensheviks call conquest of 
power by the people. 
Think of it! It turns out that the dictatorship of 
the proletariat and peasantry is harmful, but the 
dictatorship of the Cadets is beneficial! As much as to 
say: We donıt want the sovereignty of the people, we 
want the autocracy of the Cadets! 
Yes, indeed! It is not for nothing that the Cadets, 
the enemies of the people, are praising the Mensheviks! 
. . . 
Dro (Time),14 No. 2, 
March 13, 1907 
Unsigned 
Translated from the Georgian

THE PROLETARIAT IS FIGHTING, 
THE BOURGEOISIE IS CONCLUDING 
AN ALLIANCE WITH THE GOVERNMENT 
³The Prussian bourgeoisie was not, as the French of 
1789 had been . . . It had sunk to the level of a sort 
of social estate . . . inclined from the very beginning to 
betray the people and compromise with the crowned 
representative of the old society.² 
That is what Karl Marx wrote about the Prussian 
liberals. 
And indeed, even before the revolution had really 
unfolded, the German liberals started to make a deal 
with the ³supreme power.² They soon concluded this 
deal, and then, jointly with the government, attacked 
the workers and peasants. How bitingly and aptly 
Karl Marx exposed the duplicity of the liberals is 
well known: 
³Without faith in itself, without faith in the people, 
grumbling at those above, trembling before those below, 
egoistic towards both sides and conscious of its egoism, 
revolutionary in relation to the conservatives and conservative 
in relation to the revolutionists, distrustful 
of its own mottoes, intimidated by the world storm, exploiting 
the world storm; no energy in any respect, 
plagiarism in every respect; base because it lacked 
originality, original in its baseness; haggling with

J. V. S T A L I N 24 
its own desires, without initiative, without a worldhistorical 
calling; an execrable old man, . . . sans eyes, 
sans ears, sans teeth, sans everything‹such was the 
Prussian bourgeoisie that found itself at the helm of the 
Prussian state after the March Revolution² (see Neue 
Rheinische Zeitung).15 
Something similar to this is taking place here, in 
the course of the Russian revolution. 
The point is that our bourgeoisie also differs from 
the French bourgeoisie of 1789. Our liberal bourgeoisie 
has been even more prompt and outspoken than the German 
bourgeoisie in declaring that it would ³conclude an 
agreement with the supreme power² against the workers 
and peasants. The liberal-bourgeois party, the so-called 
Cadets, started secret negotiations with Stolypin behind 
the back of the people long ago. What was the object of 
these negotiations? What had the Cadets to talk about 
with the ³field court-martial² minister if, in fact, they were 
not betraying the interests of the people? Concerning this, 
the French and English newspapers wrote not long ago 
that the government and the Cadets were entering into 
an alliance with the object of curbing the revolution. 
The terms of this secret alliance are as follows: The Cadets 
are to drop their oppositional demands and in return 
the government will appoint several Cadets to ministerial 
posts. The Cadets took offence and protested that it 
was not true. But, in fact, it turned out that it was true, 
it turned out that the Cadets had already concluded an 
alliance with the Rights and the government. 
What does the recent voting in the Duma show if 
not that the Cadets are in alliance with the government? 
Recall the facts: the Social-Democrats introduce a mo

THE PROLETARIAT IS FIGHTING 25 
tion to set up a commission to deal with the starving 
peasantry. They want the matter of helping the faminestricken 
to be taken up by the people themselves apart 
from the deputies and the bureaucracy, and that the people 
themselves should expose ³the heroic deeds² of the Gurkos 
and Lidvals.16 This is good, this is desirable, because 
all this will strengthen the connections between the 
deputies and the people; all this will give the sullen discontent 
of the people a conscious character. Clearly, 
whoever was really serving the interests of the people 
would unfailingly support the proposal of the Social- 
Democrats as a measure beneficial to the people. But 
what did the Cadets do? Did they support the Social- 
Democrats? No! In conjunction with the Octobrists17 
and the Black Hundreds they unanimously voted down 
the Social-Democratsı proposal. If your proposal were 
carried out it would give rise to a popular movement 
and for that reason it is harmful, said the Cadet leader 
Hessen in reply to the Social-Democrats (see Parus,18 
No. 24). I am entirely in agreement with you, gentlemen, 
you are right‹said Stolypin, giving the Cadets 
their due (ibid.). As a result, the Social-Democrats were 
supported only by the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the 
Popular Socialists and the majority of the Trudoviks. 
Thus, the Duma split up into two camps: the camp 
of the enemies of the peopleıs movement and the camp 
of the supporters of the peopleıs movement. In the first 
camp are the Black Hundreds, the Octobrists, Stolypin, 
the Cadets and others. In the second camp are 
the Social-Democrats, the Socialist-Revolutionaries, the 
Popular Socialists, the majority of the Trudoviks, 
and others.

J. V. S T A L I N 26 
What does this show if not that the Cadets have already 
entered into an alliance with the government? 
As is evident, the Bolsheviksı tactics, which sow 
distrust towards the Cadets, the traitors to the people, 
and call for a struggle against them, are justified. 
But that is not all. The point is that the abovementioned 
rumours disseminated by the French and 
English newspapers have been fully confirmed. During 
the past few days the newspapers of the capital have 
been reporting from ³reliable sources² that the Cadets 
have already struck a bargain with the government. And 
just imagine! It appears that the terms of this bargain 
have been ascertained even down to details. True, the 
Cadets deny it, but this is nothing but hypocrisy. Listen 
to this: 
³Segodnya19 reports from most reliable sources that Stolypinıs 
speech in the State Duma yesterday did not in the least come 
as a surprise to the Cadets and the Octobrists. Preliminary negotiations 
concerning it had been going on all day between the Prime 
Minister, Kutler . . . and Fyodorov, who represented the Right 
Centre. A definite agreement between these persons was reached 
in the editorial offices of Slovo,20 which Count Witte also intended 
to visit. . . . In main outline the agreement amounts to the following: 
1) The Cadets will openly break off all connections with 
the Left parties and occupy a strictly central position in the Duma. 
2) The Cadets will abandon part of their agrarian programme 
and make it approximate to the programme of the Octobrists. 
3) The Cadets will for a time refrain from insisting on equal rights 
for the nationalities. 4) The Cadets will support the foreign loan. 
In return for this, the Cadets are promised: 1) Immediate legalisation 
of the Cadet Party. 2) . . . The Cadets will be offered the portfolios 
of the Ministries of Land Settlement and Agriculture, Public 
Education, Commerce and Industry, and Justice. 3) Partial 
amnesty. 4) Support for the Cadet bill to abolish the field courtsmartial² 
(see Parus, No. 25).

THE PROLETARIAT IS FIGHTING 27 
That is how the matter stands. 
While the people are fighting, while the workers and 
peasants are shedding their blood in order to crush the 
reaction, the Cadets are concluding an alliance with the 
reaction in order to curb the peopleıs revolution! 
That is what the Cadets are! 
That, it appears, is why they want to ³save² the 
Duma! 
That is why they did not support the Social-Democratsı 
proposal to set up a famine commission! 
The Menshevik thesis that the Cadets are democratic 
thus collapses. 
The Menshevik tactics of supporting the Cadets thus 
collapse: after this, supporting the Cadets means supporting 
the government! 
The Bolshevik view that at a critical moment we shall 
be supported only by the politically-conscious representatives 
of the peasants, such as the Socialist-Revolutionaries 
and others, is justified. 
Clearly, we must also support them against the 
Cadets. 
Or perhaps the Mensheviks think of continuing to 
support the Cadets? . . . 
Dro (Time), No. 6, 
March 17, 1907 
Unsigned 
Translated from the Georgian

COMRADE G. TELIA21 
In Memoriam 
Excessive eulogy of departed comrades has become 
a custom in our Party circles. The hushing up of the 
weak sides and the exaggeration of positive sides is a 
characteristic feature of obituary notices today. That, 
of course, is an unwise custom. We do not wish to follow 
it. We wish to say only what is true about Comrade 
G. Telia; we want to present Telia to our readers as he 
was in reality. And reality tells us that Comrade G. Telia, 
an advanced working man and an active Party worker, 
was a man of irreproachable character and of inestimable 
value for the Party. All that which most of all characterises 
the Social-Democratic Party‹thirst for knowledge, 
independence, undeviating progress, staunchness, industry 
and moral strength‹all combined in the person 
of Comrade Telia. Telia personified the best features of the 
proletarian. That is not an exaggeration. The following 
brief biography of him will prove this. 
Comrade Telia was not a ³scholar.² He learned to 
read and write by his own efforts and became class 
conscious. Leaving the village of Chagani (Telia was 
born in the village of Chagani, Kutais Uyezd), he obtained 
a job as a domestic servant in Tiflis. Here he 
learned to speak Russian and acquired a passion for

COMRADE G. TELIA 29 
reading books. He quickly grew tired of being a domestic 
servant and soon got a job in the carpentersı 
shop at the railway workshops. These workshops rendered 
Comrade Telia a great service. They were his school; 
there he became a Social-Democrat; there he was steeled 
and became a staunch fighter; there he came to the front 
as a capable and class-conscious worker. 
In 1900-01 Telia already stood out among the advanced 
workers as an esteemed leader. He had known no 
rest since the demonstration in Tiflis in 1901.22 Ardent 
propaganda, the formation of organisations, attendance 
at important meetings, persevering effort in socialist 
self-education‹to that he devoted all his spare time. 
He was hunted by the police, who searched for him ³with 
lanterns,² but it only served to redouble his energy and 
ardour in the struggle. Comrade Telia was the inspirer 
of the 1903 demonstration (in Tiflis).23 The police were 
hot on his heels, but, notwithstanding this, he hoisted 
the flag and delivered a speech. After that demonstration 
he passed entirely underground. In that year, on 
the instructions of the organisation, he began to ³travel² 
from one town to another in Transcaucasia. In that same 
year, on the instructions of the organisation, he went 
to Batum to organise a secret printing plant, but he was 
arrested at the Batum station with the equipment for 
this printing plant in his possession and soon after he 
was sent to the Kutais prison. That marked the beginning 
of a new period in his ³restless² life. The eighteen 
months of imprisonment were not lost on Telia. The 
prison became his second school. Constant study, the 
reading of socialist books and participation in discussions 
markedly increased his stock of knowledge. Here

J. V. S T A L I N 30 
his indomitable revolutionary character, which many 
of his comrades envied, was definitely moulded. But the 
prison also left on him the impress of death, this prison 
infected him with a fatal disease (consumption), which 
carried our splendid comrade to his grave. 
Telia was aware of the fatal state of his health, but 
this did not daunt him. The only thing that troubled 
him was ³sitting in idleness and inaction.² ³How I long 
for the day when I shall be free and do what I want to 
do, see the masses again, put myself in their embrace and 
begin to serve them!²‹that is what our comrade dreamed 
of during his confinement in jail. The dream came true. 
Eighteen months later he was transferred to the ³little² 
Kutais prison, from which he forthwith made his escape 
and appeared in Tiflis. At that time a split was taking 
place in the Party. Comrade Telia then belonged to 
the Mensheviks, but he did not in the least resemble 
the ³official² Mensheviks who regard Menshevism as 
their ³Koran,² who regard themselves as the faithful 
and the Bolsheviks as infidels. Nor did Telia resemble 
those ³advanced² workers who pose as ³born Social- 
Democrats,² and being utter ignoramuses shout in 
their comical way: We are workers‹we donıt need 
any knowledge! The characteristic feature of Comrade 
Telia was precisely that he rejected factional fanaticism, 
that he utterly despised blind imitation and 
wanted to think everything out for himself. That is 
why, after escaping from prison, he at once pounced 
upon the books: Minutes of the Second Congress, Martovıs 
State of Siege, and Leninıs What Is To Be Done? 
and One Step Forward. It was a sight to see Telia, 
his face pale and emaciated, poring over these books

COMRADE G. TELIA 31 
and to hear him say with a smile: ³I can see itıs not 
such an easy matter to decide whether to be a Bolshevik 
or a Menshevik; until I have studied these books 
my Menshevism is built on sand.² And so, after studying 
the necessary literature, after pondering over the 
controversies between the Bolsheviks and the Mensheviks, 
after weighing everything up, and only after 
that, Comrade Telia said: ³Comrades, I am a Bolshevik. 
As it looks to me, whoever is not a Bolshevik 
is certainly betraying the revolutionary spirit of 
Marxism.² 
After that he became an apostle of revolutionary 
Marxism (Bolshevism). In 1905, on the instructions of 
the organisation, he went to Baku. There he set up a 
printing plant, improved the work of the district organisations, 
was an active member of the leading body and 
wrote articles for Proletariatis Brdzola24‹such was the 
work Comrade Telia performed. During the well-known 
police raid he, too, was arrested, but here too he 
³slipped away² and again hastened to Tiflis. After 
working in the leading organisation of Tiflis for a 
short time he attended the All-Russian Conference 
of Bolsheviks in Tammerfors in 1905. His impressions 
of that conference are interesting. He viewed the Partyıs 
future with great hope and he used to say with glistening 
eyes: I shall not begrudge my last ounce of strength 
for this Party. The unfortunate thing, however, was 
that immediately on his return from Russia he took to 
his bed, never to rise from it again. Only now did he 
commence serious literary activity. During his illness 
he wrote: ³What We Need² (see Akhali Tskhovreba),25 
³Old and New Corpses² (a reply to Archil Jordjadze),

J. V. S T A L I N 32 
³Anarchism and Social-Democracy,²* ³Why We Are 
Called Blanquists,² and others. 
A few days before he died he wrote to us that he was 
working on a pamphlet on the history of Social-Democracy 
in the Caucasus, but cruel death prematurely tore 
the pen out of the hand of our tireless comrade. 
Such is the picture of Comrade Teliaıs short but 
stormy life. 
Amazing capabilities, inexhaustible energy, independence, 
profound love for the cause, heroic determination 
and apostolic talent‹that is what characterised 
Comrade Telia. 
Men like Telia are met with only in the ranks of the 
proletariat; only the proletariat gives birth to heroes 
like Telia; and the proletariat will take revenge on the 
accursed system to which our comrade, the working man 
G. Telia, fell a victim. 
Dro (Time), No. 10, 
March 22, 1907 
Signed: Ko. . . . 
Translated from the Georgian 
The last two pamphlets could not be printed as the manuscripts 
were seized by the police during a raid.

THE ADVANCED PROLETARIAT 
AND THE FIFTH PARTY CONGRESS 
The preparations for the congress are drawing to a 
close.26 The relative strength of the different groups is 
gradually becoming revealed. It is becoming apparent that 
the industrial districts largely support the Bolsheviks. 
St. Petersburg, Moscow, the Central Industrial region, 
Poland, the Baltic region and the Urals‹these are the 
regions where the Bolsheviksı tactics are trusted. The 
Caucasus, the trans-Caspian region, South Russia, several 
towns in the areas where the Bund27 has influence, 
and the peasant organisations of the Spilka28‹these 
are the sources from which the Menshevik comrades 
draw their strength. South Russia is the only industrial 
area where the Mensheviks enjoy confidence. The rest 
of the Menshevik strongholds are for the most part centres 
of small industry. 
It is becoming apparent that the Mensheviksı tactics 
are mainly the tactics of the backward towns, where the 
development of the revolution and the growth of class 
consciousness are frowned upon. 
It is becoming apparent that the Bolsheviksı tactics 
are mainly the tactics of the advanced towns, the industrial 
centres, where the intensification of the revolution 
and the development of class consciousness are the main 
focus of attention. . . .

J. V. S T A L I N 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
34 
At one time Russian Social-Democracy consisted of 
a handful of members. At that time it bore the character 
of a movement of intellectuals and was unable to influence 
the proletarian struggle. Party policy was then directed 
by one or two individuals‹the voice of the proletarian 
membership of the party was drowned. . . . The situation 
is entirely different today. Today we have a magnificent 
party‹the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, 
which has as many as 200,000 members in its ranks, 
which is influencing the proletarian struggle, is rallying 
around itself the revolutionary democracy of the whole 
of Russia, and is a terror to ³the powers that be.² And 
this magnificent party is all the more magnificent and 
splendid for the reason that its helm is in the hands 
of the general membership and not of one or two 
³enlightened individuals.² That was most clearly revealed 
during the Duma elections, when the general 
membership rejected the proposal of the ³authoritative² 
Plekhanov and refused to have a ³common platform² 
with the Cadets. True, the Menshevik comrades insist 
on calling our party a party of intellectuals, but that is 
probably because the majority in the party is not Menshevik. 
But if the German Social-Democratic Party, 
which with a proletariat numbering 18,000,000 has a 
membership of only 400,000, has the right to call itself 
a proletarian party, then the Russian Social-Democratic 
Party, which with a proletariat numbering 9,000,000 
has a membership of 200,000, also has the right to 
regard itself as a proletarian party. . . . 
Thus, the Russian Social-Democratic Party is magnificent 
also because it is a genuine proletarian party, 
which is marching towards the future along its own

THE ADVANCED PROLETARIAT AND THE FIFTH PARTY CONGRESS 35 
road, and is critical of the whispered advice of its old 
³leaders² 
In this respect the recent conferences in St. Petersburg 
and Moscow are instructive. 
At both conferences the workers set the keynote; at 
both conferences workers comprised nine-tenths of the 
delegates. Both conferences rejected the obsolete and 
inappropriate ³directives² of the ³old leaders² like Plekhanov. 
Both conferences loudly proclaimed the necessity 
of Bolshevism. And thus Moscow and St. Petersburg 
expressed their lack of confidence in the Menshevik tactics 
and recognised the necessity of the hegemony of the proletariat 
in the present revolution. 
St. Petersburg and Moscow speak for the entire classconscious 
proletariat. Moscow and St. Petersburg are 
leading all the other towns. From Moscow and St. 
Petersburg came the directives during the January and 
October actions; they led the movement during the 
glorious December days. There can be no doubt that they 
will give the signal for the impending revolutionary 
onslaught. 
And St. Petersburg and Moscow adhere to the tactics 
of Bolshevism. The tactics of Bolshevism alone are proletarian 
tactics‹that is what the workers of these cities 
say to the proletariat of Russia. . . . 
Dro (Time), No. 25, 
April 8, 1907 
Unsigned 
Translated from the Georgian

MUDDLE. . . 
The ³publicists² of Lakhvari29 are still unable to 
define their tactics. In their first issue they wrote: We 
are supporting only the ³progressive steps² of the Cadets, 
but not the Cadets themselves. Commenting on this we 
said that it was amusing sophistry, since the Mensheviks 
voted for the Cadet candidates to the Duma and not 
only for their ³steps²; they helped to get into the Duma 
Cadets as such and not only their ³steps,² and they 
helped to elect a Cadet as such as President of the Duma 
and not only his ³steps²‹and this clearly confirms the 
fact that the Mensheviks supported the Cadets. This is 
so obvious and the Mensheviks have talked so much 
about supporting the Cadets, that denial of the fact has 
only raised a laugh. . . . 
Now, having ³pondered² over the matter a little, 
they are talking differently: true, ³during the elections 
we supported the Cadets² (see Lakhvari, No. 3), but this 
was only during the elections; in the Duma we are supporting 
not the Cadets but only their ³steps²; you, they 
say, ³do not distinguish between tactics in the Duma 
and tactics during elections.² In the first place, ³tactics² 
which safeguard you from doing stupid things only in 
the Duma but prompt you to do stupid things during 
elections are very funny tactics. Secondly, is it not true 
that the Mensheviks helped to elect a Cadet as President

MUDDLE. . . 37 
of the Duma? Under what category of tactics should 
we place helping to elect a Cadet as President‹³tactics 
in the Duma² or tactics outside the Duma? We 
think that Golovin was elected President of the Duma 
in the Duma, and not president of the street in the 
street. 
Clearly, the Mensheviks pursued the same tactics 
in the Duma as they pursued outside the Duma. These 
are the tactics of supporting the Cadets. If they deny 
it now, it is because they have fallen victims to muddle. 
Supporting the Cadets does not mean creating a reputation 
for the Cadets; if it does, then you are creating 
a reputation for the Socialist-Revolutionaries by supporting 
them‹says Lakhvari. What comical fellows those 
³Lakhvarists² are! Apparently it does not occur to them 
that any support that Social-Democracy lends a party 
creates a reputation for that party! That is why they 
have been so lavish in their promises of every kind of 
³support.² . . . Yes, dear comrades, by supporting the 
Socialist-Revolutionaries, Social-Democracy creates a 
reputation for them in the eyes of the people, and this 
is exactly why such support is permissible only in exceptional 
cases, and as a means of defeating the Cadets. Supporting 
the Socialist-Revolutionaries is by no means 
ideal, i t is an inevitable evil, resorted to in order 
to curb the Cadets. You, however, supported the very 
Cadets who are betraying the workers and peasants; 
the Socialist-Revolutionaries are superior to them because 
they side with the revolution. . . . 
³The Cadets, for example, demanded universal 
suffrage. It turns out that this demand is a great evil, 
because it is a Cadet demand² (ibid.).

J. V. S T A L I N 38 
Well, arenıt they comical? You see, it turns out that 
universal suffrage is a ³Cadet demand²! The Tiflis Mensheviks, 
it turns out, do not know that universal suffrage 
is not a Cadet demand, but the demand of revolutionary 
democracy, which Social-Democracy advocates more 
consistently than anyone else! No, comrades, if you 
cannot even understand that the Cadets are not revolutionary 
democrats; if you cannot even understand that 
the fight against them in order to strengthen the 
hegemony of the proletariat is the question of the day 
for us; if you cannot even distinguish between what you 
said yesterday and what you are saying today‹then you 
had better put your pens aside, get yourselves out of the 
muddle you are in, and only after that launch into ³criticism.² 
. . . 
By the holy Duma, that would be better! 
Dro (Time), No. 26 
April 10, 1907 
Unsigned 
Translated from the Georgian

OUR CAUCASIAN CLOWNS 
The Menshevik newspaper Lakhvari flew into a 
rage over our articles. Evidently our accusations hit the 
mark. It makes, of course, a very amusing spectacle. . . . 
Whatıs it all about? 
We wrote that the Dumaıs swing to the right does not 
surprise us. Why? Because the Duma is dominated by the 
liberal bourgeoisie, and this bourgeoisie is entering into 
an alliance with the government and breaking with the 
workers and peasants. Hence the weakness of the Duma. 
And the fact that the workers and revolutionary peasants 
are not dragging at the tail of the anti-revolutionary 
Duma; the fact that they are indeed breaking with the 
Duma majority‹shows that the people of our country are 
more politically conscious than the French people were in 
the eighteenth century. Hence again the weakness of 
the Duma. That is how we explained the Dumaıs weakness 
and its swing to the right. 
It turns out that on reading this explanation the 
Mensheviksı hearts sank into their boots and they howled 
in horror: 
³No, if the explanation offered by the Bolsheviks were true, 
we would have to shrug our shoulders and say that it is all up with 
the Russian revolution² (see Lakhvari, No. 6).

J. V. S T A L I N 40 
Poor fellows! They believe in their own revolutionariness 
less than they believe in that of the Cadets! 
The liberals are betraying the revolution‹hence, the 
revolution has grown weaker! The workers and revolutionary 
peasants, it appears, are a mere cypher. Woe 
to you if you have no more penetration than that! 
They are not even faithful to themselves. For example, 
eighteen months ago, the same Mensheviks wrote 
something different in their newspaper Skhivi:30 
³The December strike repelled the bourgeoisie from the revolution 
and made it conservative. The further development of the revolution 
must proceed against the liberals. Will the revolution be 
able to do this? That will depend upon who will be the driving 
force of the revolution. Here, too, of course, the proletariat is the 
leader of the revolution. It will be unable to carry the revolution 
to the end unless it has a powerful and faithful ally, and this ally 
is the peasantry, and only the peasantry² (see Skhivi, No. 12). 
Yes, that is what the Mensheviks said when they 
were adhering to the standpoint of Social-Democracy. . . . 
But now, having turned their backs on Social- 
Democracy, they are singing a different song and are 
proclaiming the liberals as the hub of the revolution, as 
the saviours of the revolution. 
And after all this they have the effrontery to assure 
us that the Caucasian Mensheviks are not clowns, that 
they do not deck themselves in Social-Democratic apparel 
in order to cover up their Cadet natures! 
³How did it happen,² the Mensheviks ask, ³that in the First 
Duma the Cadets acted more boldly, demanded a ministry responsible 
to the Duma, etc.? How is it to be explained that on the 
day after the Duma was dispersed the Cadets signed the Vyborg 
manifesto?

OUR CAUCASIAN CLOWNS 41 
³Why are they not behaving in the same way today? 
³To this question the political philosophy of the Bolsheviks 
provides no reply, nor can it do so² (ibid.). 
It is no use trying to console yourselves, poor frightened 
comrades. We answered that question long ago: the 
present Duma is more colourless because the proletariat 
is now more politically conscious and united than it was 
in the period of the First Duma, and this is pushing the 
liberal bourgeoisie to the side of reaction. Get that well 
into your minds once and for all, pro-liberal comrades: the 
more consciously the proletariat fights the more counter-revolutionary 
the bourgeoisie becomes. That is our explanation. 
And how do you explain the colourlessness of the 
Second Duma, dear comrades? 
For example: In No. 4 of Lakhvari you write that the 
Dumaıs weakness and colourlessness are due to ³the peopleıs 
lack of political consciousness and organisation.² 
You yourselves say that the First Duma was ³bolder,²‹ 
it follows, therefore, that at that time the people were 
³politically conscious and organised.² The Second Duma 
is more colourless‹hence, this year the people are less 
³politically conscious and organised² than they were last 
year, and hence, the revolution and the political consciousness 
of the people have receded! Is this not what 
you wanted to say, comrades? Is this not how you want to 
justify your gravitation towards the Cadets, dear friends? 
Woe to you and to your muddled ³logic² if you think 
of continuing to remain clowns. . . . 
Dro (Time), No. 29 
April 13, 1907 
Unsigned 
Translated from the Georgian

THE DISPERSION OF THE DUMA 
AND THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT 
The Second Duma has been dispersed.31 It was not 
merely dissolved, it was shut up with a bang‹exactly 
like the First Duma. Here we have the ³dispersion manifesto² 
with the hypocrite tsarıs ³sincere regret² at the 
dispersion. We also have a ³new electoral law² which 
practically nullifies the franchise for the workers and 
peasants. We even have a promise to ³renovate² Russia 
with the aid, of course, of shootings and a Third Duma. 
In short, we have everything we had only recently, when 
the First Duma was dispersed. The tsar has briefly reenacted 
the dispersion of the First Duma. 
In dispersing the Second Duma the tsar did not 
act idly, without an object in view. With the aid 
of the Duma he wanted to establish contact with the 
peasantry, to transform it from an ally of the proletariat 
into an ally of the government and, by making the 
proletariat stand alone, by isolating it, to cripple the 
revolution, to make its victory impossible. For that 
purpose the government resorted to the aid of the liberal 
bourgeoisie, which still exercised some influence over 
the ignorant masses of the peasants; and through this 
bourgeoisie it wanted to establish contact with the vast 
masses of the peasants. That is how it wanted to utilise 
the Second State Duma.

THE DISPERSION OF THE DUMA AND THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT 43 
But the opposite happened. The very first sessions of 
the Second Duma showed that the peasant deputies 
distrusted not only the government but also the liberal-
bourgeois deputies. This distrust grew as a consequence 
of a series of votes which were taken and it 
finally reached the stage of open hostility towards the 
deputies of the liberal bourgeoisie. Thus, the government 
failed to rally the peasant deputies around the liberals 
and, through them, around the old regime. The governmentıs 
design‹to establish contact with the peasantry 
through the Duma and to isolate the proletariat‹was 
frustrated. The opposite happened: the peasant deputies 
more and more rallied around the proletarian deputies, 
around the Social-Democrats. And the more they moved 
away from the liberals, from the Cadets, the more 
resolutely did they draw closer to the Social-Democratic 
deputies. This greatly facilitated the task of rallying the 
peasants around the proletariat outside the Duma. 
The result was not the isolation of the proletariat, but 
the isolation of the liberal bourgeoisie and the government 
from the peasants‹the proletariat consolidated 
its backing by the vast masses of the peasantry‹it was 
not the revolution that was thrown out of gear, as the 
government wanted, but the counter-revolution. In view 
of this, the existence of the Second Duma became increasingly 
dangerous for the government. And so it ³dissolved² 
the Duma. 
In order more effectively to prevent the peasants and 
the proletariat from coming together, in order to rouse 
hostility towards the Social-Democrats among the ignorant 
masses of the peasants and to rally them around itself, 
the government resorted to two measures.

J. V. S T A L I N 44 
First, it attacked the Social-Democratic group in the 
Duma, falsely accused its members of calling for an immediate 
insurrection and made it appear as if they were chiefly 
responsible for the dispersion of the Duma, as much 
as to say: we would not have dispersed your ³nice little 
Duma,² dear peasants, but the Social-Democrats threatened 
us with an insurrection, and so we were obliged 
to ³dissolve² the Duma. 
Second, the government promulgated a ³new law² 
which reduces the number of peasant electors by half, 
doubles the number of landlord electors, gives the latter 
the opportunity to elect peasant deputies at general 
meetings, reduces the number of workersı electors also 
by nearly half (124 instead of 237), reserves for the government 
the right to redistribute voters ³according to 
locality, various qualifications and nationality,² destroys 
all possibility of conducting free election propaganda, 
etc., etc. And all this has been done in order to 
prevent revolutionary representatives of the workers and 
peasants from getting into the Third Duma, in order to 
fill the Duma with the liberal and reactionary representatives 
of the landlords and factory owners, to get the 
peasants misrepresented by making possible the election 
of the most conservative peasant candidates in spite of the 
wishes of the peasants, and thereby to deprive the proletariat 
of the opportunity of openly rallying the broad 
masses of the peasants around itself‹in other words, to 
have an opportunity for an open rapprochement with 
the peasantry. 
This is the idea behind the dispersion of the Second 
State Duma.

THE DISPERSION OF THE DUMA AND THE TASKS OF THE PROLETARIAT 45 
Evidently, the liberal bourgeoisie understands all 
this and, by the agency of its Cadets, is helping 
the government. It struck a bargain with the old regime 
already in the Second Duma and tried to isolate the 
proletariat by flirting with the peasant deputies. On 
the eve of the dispersion, the Cadet leader Milyukov 
called upon his party to rally all and sundry around 
the ³Stolypin government,² to enter into an agreement 
with it, and declare war on the revolution, that is to say, 
on the proletariat. And Struve, the second Cadet leader, 
after the Duma was already dispersed, defended ³the 
idea of surrendering² the Social-Democratic deputies to 
the government, called upon the Cadets openly to take 
the road of fighting the revolution, to merge with the 
counter-revolutionary Octobrists and, after isolating the 
restless proletariat, to wage a struggle against it. The 
Cadet Party is silent‹which means that it agrees with 
its leaders. 
Evidently, the liberal bourgeoisie is aware of the 
gravity of the present situation. 
All the more clearly, therefore, is the proletariat 
faced with the task of overthrowing the tsarist regime. 
Just think! There was the First Duma. There was the 
Second Duma. But neither the one nor the other 
³solved² a single problem of the revolution, nor, indeed, 
could either of them ³solve² these problems. Just as 
before, the peasants are without land, the workers are 
without the eight-hour day, and all citizens are without 
political freedom. Why? Because the tsarist regime is 
not yet dead, it still exists, dispersing the Second Duma 
after it dispersed the First, organising the counter-revolution, 
and trying to break up the revolutionary forces,

J. V. S T A L I N 46 
to divorce the vast masses of the peasants from the 
proletarians. Meanwhile, the subterranean forces of 
the revolution‹the crisis in the towns and famine in 
the rural districts‹are continuing their work, rousing 
more and more the broad masses of the workers and 
peasants, and more and more persistently demanding 
a solution of the fundamental problems of our revolution. 
The exertions of the tsarist regime serve only to aggravate 
the crisis. The efforts of the liberal bourgeoisie to divorce 
the peasants from the proletarians are only intensifying 
the revolution. Clearly, it will be impossible to satisfy 
the broad masses of the workers and peasants unless 
the tsarist regime is overthrown and a Popular Constituent 
Assembly is convened. It is no less clear that the 
fundamental problems of the revolution can be solved 
only in alliance with the peasantry against the tsarist 
regime and against the liberal bourgeoisie. 
To the overthrow of the tsarist regime and the convocation 
of a Popular Constituent Assembly‹this is what 
the dispersion of the Second Duma is leading to. 
War against the treacherous liberal bourgeoisie and 
close alliance with the peasantry‹this is what the dispersion 
of the Second Duma means. 
The task of the proletariat is consciously to take this 
path and worthily to play the part of leader of the revolution. 
Bakinsky Proletary, No. 1, Reprinted from the newspaper 
June 20, 1907 
Unsigned

THE LONDON CONGRESS OF THE RUSSIAN 
SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC LABOUR PARTY 
(Notes of a Delgate)32 
The London Congress is over. In spite of the expectations 
of liberal hacks, such as the Vergezhskys33 and 
Kuskovas,34 the congress did not result in a split, but 
in the further consolidation of the Party, in the further 
unification of the advanced workers of all Russia in 
one indivisible party. It was a real all-Russian unity 
congress, for at this congress our Polish comrades, our 
comrades of the Bund, and our Lettish comrades were for 
the first time most widely and fully represented, for the 
first time they took an active part in the work of the 
Party congress and, consequently, for the first time most 
directly linked the fate of their respective organisations 
with the fate of the entire Party. In this respect the London 
Congress greatly contributed to the consolidation 
and strengthening of the Russian Social-Democratic 
Labour Party. 
Such is the first and an important result of the 
London Congress. 
But the importance of the London Congress is not 
confined to this. The point is that, in spite of the wishes 
of the liberal hacks we have referred to, the congress 
ended in the victory of ³Bolshevism,² in the victory

J. V. S T A L I N 48 
of revolutionary Social-Democracy over the opportunist 
wing of our Party, over ³Menshevism.² Everybody, of 
course, is aware of the disagreements among us on the 
role of the different classes and parties in our revolution 
and of our attitude towards them. Everybody knows, 
too, that in a number of pronouncements the official 
centre of the Party, which is Menshevik in composition, 
took a stand in opposition to the Party as a whole. 
Recall, for example, the case of the Central Committeeıs 
slogan of a responsible Cadet ministry, which 
the Party rejected in the period of the First Duma; 
the case of the same Central Committeeıs slogan of 
³resumption of the session of the Duma² after the 
First Duma was dispersed, which was also rejected 
by the Party; and the case of the Central Committeeıs 
well-known call for a general strike in connection with 
the dispersion of the First Duma, which was also rejected 
by the Party. . . . It was necessary to put an end to 
that abnormal situation. And to do this it was necessary 
to sum up the actual victories the Party had achieved 
over the opportunist Central Committee, the victories 
which fill the history of our Partyıs internal development 
during the whole of the past year. And so the London 
Congress summed up all these victories of revolutionary 
Social-Democracy and sealed the victory by adopting 
the tactics of that section of Social-Democracy. 
Consequently, the Party will henceforth pursue the 
strictly class policy of the socialist proletariat. The 
red flag of the proletariat will no longer be hauled down 
before the spell-binders of liberalism. A mortal blow 
has been struck at the vacillation characteristic of intellectuals, 
which is unbecoming to the proletariat.

LONDON CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. 49 
Such is the second and no less important result of 
the London Congress of our Party. 
The actual unification of the advanced workers of 
all Russia into a single all-Russian party under the banner 
of revolutionary Social-Democracy‹that is the significance 
of the London Congress, that is its general 
character. 
We shall now pass to a more detailed characterisation 
of the congress. 
I 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE CONGRESS 
In all about 330 delegates were present at the congress. 
Of these, 302 had the right to vote; they represented 
over 150,000 Party members. The rest were consultative 
delegates. The distribution of the delegates according 
to groups was approximately as follows (counting only 
those with right to vote): Bolsheviks 92, Mensheviks 
85, Bundists 54, Poles 45 and Letts 26. 
As regards the social status of the delegates (workers 
or non-workers) the congress presented the following picture: 
manual workers 116 in all, office and distributive 
workers 24, the rest were non-workers. The manual workers 
were distributed among the different groups as follows: 
Bolshevik group 38 (36 per cent), Menshevik group 30 
(31 per cent), Poles 27 (61 per cent), Letts 12 (40 per 
cent) and Bundists 9 (15 per cent). Professional revolutionaries 
were distributed among the groups as follows: 
Bolshevik group 18 (17 per cent), Menshevik group 22 (22 
per cent), Poles 5 (11 per cent), Letts 2 (6 per cent), 
Bundists 9 (15 per cent).

J. V. S T A L I N 50 
We were all ³amazed² by these statistics. How is 
this? The Mensheviks had shouted so much about our 
Party consisting of intellectuals; day and night they 
had been denouncing the Bolsheviks as intellectuals; they 
had threatened to drive all the intellectuals out of the 
Party and had all the time been reviling the professional 
revolutionaries‹and suddenly it turned out that they 
had far fewer workers in their group than the Bolshevik 
³intellectuals² had! It turned out that they had 
far more professional revolutionaries than the Bolsheviks! 
But we explained the Menshevik shouts by 
the proverb: ³The tongue ever turns to the aching 
tooth.² 
Still more interesting are the figures of the composition 
of the congress showing the ³territorial distribution² 
of the delegates. It turned out that the large groups 
of Menshevik delegates came mainly from the peasant 
and handicraft districts: Guria (9 delegates), Tiflis (10 
delegates), Little-Russian peasant organisation ³Spilka² 
(I think 12 delegates), the Bund (the overwhelming 
majority were Mensheviks) and, by way of exception, 
the Donets Basin (7 delegates). On the other hand, the 
large groups of Bolshevik delegates came exclusively 
from the large-scale industry districts: St. Petersburg 
(12 delegates), Moscow (13 or 14 delegates), the Urals 
(21 delegates), Ivanovo-Voznesensk (11 delegates), 
Poland (45 delegates). 
Obviously, the tactics of the Bolsheviks are the tactics 
of the proletarians in big industry, the tactics of 
those areas where class contradictions are especially clear 
and the class struggle especially acute. Bolshevism is 
the tactics of the real proletarians.

LONDON CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. 51 
On the other hand, it is no less obvious that the tactics 
of the Mensheviks are primarily the tactics of the 
handicraft workers and the peasant semi-proletarians, 
the tactics of those areas where class contradictions are 
not quite clear and the class struggle is masked. Menshevism 
is the tactics of the semi-bourgeois elements among 
the proletariat. 
So say the figures. 
And this is not difficult to understand: it is impossible 
to talk seriously among the workers of Lodz, Moscow 
or Ivanovo-Voznesensk about blocs with the very same 
liberal bourgeoisie whose members are waging a fierce 
struggle against them and who, every now and again, 
³punish² them with partial dismissals and mass lockouts. 
There Menshevism will find no sympathy; there 
Bolshevism, the tactics of uncompromising proletarian 
class struggle, is needed. On the other hand, it is extremely 
difficult to inculcate the idea of the class struggle 
among the peasants of Guria or say, the handicraftsmen 
of Shklov, who do not feel the sharp and systematic 
blows of the class struggle and, therefore, readily agree 
to all sorts of agreements against the ³common enemy.² 
There Bolshevism is not yet needed; there Menshevism 
is needed, for there an atmosphere of agreements and 
compromises pervades everything. 
No less interesting is the national composition of the 
congress. The figures showed that the majority of the Menshevik 
group were Jews (not counting the Bundists, of 
course), then came Georgians and then Russians. On the 
other hand, the overwhelming majority of the Bolshevik 
group were Russians, then came Jews (not counting 
Poles and Letts, of course), then Georgians, etc. In this

J. V. S T A L I N 52 
connection one of the Bolsheviks (I think it was Comrade 
Alexinsky35) observed in jest that the Mensheviks constituted 
a Jewish group while the Bolsheviks constituted 
a true-Russian group and, therefore, it wouldnıt 
be a bad idea for us Bolsheviks to organise a pogrom in 
the Party. 
It is not difficult to explain this composition of the 
different groups: the main centres of Bolshevism are 
the areas of large-scale industry, purely Russian districts 
with the exception of Poland, whereas the Menshevik 
districts are districts with small production and, at 
the same time, Jewish, Georgian, etc., districts. 
As regards the different trends revealed at the congress, 
i t must be noted that the formal division of 
the congress into five groups (Bolsheviks, Mensheviks, 
Poles, etc.) retained a certain validity, inconsiderable 
it is true, only up to the discussion on questions of 
principle (the question of the non-proletarian parties, 
the labour congress, etc.). When these questions of principle 
came up for discussion the formal grouping was in 
fact cast aside, and when a vote was taken the congress, 
as a rule, divided into two parts: Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. 
There was no so-called centre, or marsh, at the 
congress. Trotsky proved to be ³pretty but useless.² 
All the Poles definitely sided with the Bolsheviks. 
The overwhelming majority of the Letts also definitely supported 
the Bolsheviks. The Bund, the overwhelming 
majority of whose delegates in fact always supported the 
Mensheviks, formally pursued an extremely ambiguous 
policy, which, on the one hand, raised a smile, and on 
the other, caused irritation. Comrade Rosa Luxemburg 
aptly characterised the policy of the Bund when she

LONDON CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. 53 
said that the Bundıs policy was not the policy of a 
mature political organisation that influenced the masses, 
but the policy of shopkeepers who are eternally looking 
forward to, and hopefully expecting, a drop in the price 
of sugar tomorrow. Of the Bundists, only 8 to 10 delegates 
supported the Bolsheviks, and then not always. 
In general, predominance, and rather considerable 
predominance, was on the side of the Bolsheviks. 
Thus, the congress was a Bolshevik congress, although 
not sharply Bolshevik. Of the Menshevik resolutions only 
the one on guerilla actions was carried, and that by sheer 
accident: on that point the Bolsheviks did not accept 
battle, or rather, they did not wish to fight the issue 
to a conclusion, purely out of the desire to ³give the Menshevik 
comrades at least one opportunity to rejoice.² . . . 
II 
THE AGENDA. 
REPORT OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE. 
REPORT OF THE GROUP IN THE DUMA 
As regards political trends at the congress, its proceedings 
can be divided up into two parts. 
First part: debates on formal questions, such as the 
agenda of the congress, the reports of the Central Committee 
and report of the group in the Duma, i.e., questions 
of profound political significance, but linked, 
or being linked, with the ³honour² of this or that 
group, with the idea ³not to offend² this or that group, 
³not to cause a split²‹and for that reason called 
formal questions. This part of the congress was the 
most stormy, and absorbed the largest amount of time.

J. V. S T A L I N 54 
This was due to the fact that considerations of principle 
were forced into the background by ³moral² considerations 
(³not to offend²) and, consequently, no strictly 
defined groups were formed; it was impossible to tell at 
once ³who would win,² and in the hope of winning over 
the ³neutral and polite,² the groups plunged into a 
furious struggle for predominance. 
Second part: discussion on questions of principle, such 
as the question of the non-proletarian parties, the labour 
congress, etc. Here ³moral² considerations were absent, 
definite groups were formed in conformity with strictly 
defined trends of principle; the relation of forces between 
the groups was revealed at once, and for that reason this 
part of the congress was the calmest and most fruitful‹ 
clear proof that keeping to principle in discussion gives 
the best guarantee that the proceedings of a congress 
will be calm and fruitful. 
We shall now pass to a brief characterisation of the 
first part of the congress proceedings. 
After a speech by Comrade Plekhanov, who opened 
the congress and in his speech urged the necessity of 
agreements ³as occasion arises² with ³the progressive 
elements² of bourgeois society, the congress elected a 
presidium of five (one from each group), elected a credentials 
committee and then proceeded to draw up the 
agenda. It is characteristic that at this congress, just as 
they did at last yearıs Unity Congress, the Mensheviks furiously 
opposed the Bolsheviksı proposal to include in the 
agenda the questions of the present situation and of the 
class tasks of the proletariat in our revolution. Is the 
revolutionary tide rising or subsiding and, accordingly, 
should we ³liquidate² the revolution or carry it through

LONDON CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. 55 
to the end? What are the proletariatıs class tasks in our 
revolution which sharply distinguish it from the other 
classes in Russian society? Such are the questions which the 
Menshevik comrades are afraid of. They flee from them 
like shadows from the sun; they do not wish to bring to 
light the roots of our disagreements. Why? Because the 
Menshevik group itself is split by profound disagreements 
on these questions, because Menshevism is not an integral 
trend; Menshevism is a medley of trends, which 
are imperceptible during the factional struggle against 
Bolshevism but which spring to the surface as soon as 
current questions and our tactics are discussed from the 
point of view of principle. The Mensheviks do not wish 
to expose this inherent weakness of their group. The 
Bolsheviks were aware of this, and in order to keep 
the discussions closer to principles, insisted on the inclusion 
of the above-mentioned questions in the agenda. 
Realising that keeping to principles would kill them, the 
Mensheviks became stubborn; they hinted to the ³polite 
comrades² that they would be ³offended,² and so the 
congress did not include the question of the present 
situation, etc., in the agenda. In the end, the following 
agenda was adopted: report of the Central Committee, 
report of the group in the Duma, attitude towards the 
non-proletarian parties, the Duma, the labour congress, 
the trade unions, guerilla actions, crises, lockouts and 
unemployment, the International Congress at Stuttgart,36 
and organisational questions. 
The chief speakers on the report of the Central Committee 
were Comrade Martov (for the Mensheviks) 
and Comrade Ryadovoi37 (for the Bolsheviks). Strictly

J. V. S T A L I N 56 
speaking, Martovıs report was not a serious elucidation 
of facts, but a sentimental story about how the innocent 
Central Committee set to work to guide the Party and then 
the group in the Duma, and how the ³awful² Bolsheviks 
hindered it in its work by pestering it with their principles. 
Martov justified the Central Committeeıs slogans of 
a responsible Cadet ministry, ³resumption of the session 
of the Duma,² etc., etc., which the Party subsequently 
rejected, on the plea that the situation was indefinite 
and that it was impossible to advance different slogans 
in a period of lull. And he justified the Central Committeeıs 
misguided call for a general strike, and later 
for partial actions immediately after the dispersion of 
the First Duma, also on the plea that the situation was 
indefinite and that it was impossible to define precisely 
the mood of the masses. He spoke very little about 
the part the Central Committee played in the split in 
the St. Petersburg organisation.38 But he spoke too much 
about the conference of military and combat organisations 
that was convened on the initiative of a certain 
group of Bolsheviks, and which, in Martovıs opinion, 
caused disruption and anarchy in the Party organisations. 
At the end of his report Martov called upon the congress 
to bear in mind the difficulties connected with the work 
of guiding the Party in view of the exceptionally complicated 
and confused situation, and asked it not to be 
severe in its criticism of the Central Committee. Evidently, 
Martov himself realised that the Central Committee 
had grave sins to answer for. 
Comrade Ryadovoiıs report was of an entirely different 
character. He expressed the opinion that it was 
the duty of the Central Committee of the Party: 1) to

LONDON CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. 57 
defend and carry out the Party programme, 2) to carry out 
the tactical directives given it by the Party Congress, 
3) to safeguard the integrity of the Party, and 4) to co-ordinate 
the positive activities of the Party. The Central 
Committee had not carried out any one of these duties. Instead 
of defending and carrying out the Party programme, 
the Central Committee, in connection with the wellknown 
agrarian appeal of the First Duma,39 instructed 
the Social-Democratic group in the Duma, with a view 
to ensuring the unity of the opposition and winning 
over the Cadets, not to try to secure the inclusion in the 
Dumaıs appeal of the well-known point of our agrarian 
programme on the confiscation of all (landlordsı) land, 
but to confine itself to a simple statement about alienating 
the land without saying whether compensation 
should be paid or not. 
Just think of i t ! The Central Committee issued 
instructions to throw out the extremely important point 
in the Party programme on the confiscation of the land! 
The Central Committee violated the Party programme! 
The Central Committee as the violator of the programme‹
can you imagine anything more disgraceful? 
To proceed. Instead of carrying out at least the directives 
of the Unity Congress, instead of systematically 
intensifying the struggle between the parties in the Duma 
with the object of introducing greater political consciousness 
in the class struggle outside the Duma, instead of 
pursuing the strictly class, independent policy of the 
proletariat‹the Central Committee issued the slogans of 
a responsible Cadet ministry, ³resumption of the session 
of the Duma,² ³for the Duma against the camarilla,² 
etc., etc., slogans which obscured the struggle of the

J. V. S T A L I N 58 
Party in the Duma, glossed over the class antagonisms 
outside the Duma, obliterated all distinction between 
the militant policy of the proletariat and the compromising 
policy of the liberal bourgeoisie, and adapted 
the former to the latter. And when Comrade Plekhanov, 
a member of the editorial board of the Central Organ and, 
consequently, of the Central Committee, went even further 
on the road of compromise with the Cadets and proposed 
that the Party should enter into a bloc with the liberal 
bourgeoisie, abandoning the slogan of a Constituent 
Assembly and issuing the slogan acceptable to the liberal 
bourgeoisie of a ³sovereign Duma,² the Central Committee, 
far from protesting against Comrade Plekhanovıs 
sally which disgraced the Party, even agreed with it, 
although it did not dare to express its agreement 
officially. 
That is how the Central Committee of the Party violated 
the elementary requirements of the independent 
class policy of the proletariat and the decisions of the 
Unity Congress! 
A Central Committee which obscures the class consciousness 
of the proletariat; a Central Committee which 
subordinates the policy of the proletariat to the policy 
of the liberal bourgeoisie; a Central Committee which 
hauls down the flag of the proletariat before the charlatans 
of Cadet liberalism‹this is what the Menshevik 
opportunists have brought us to! 
We shall not dilate on the fact that far from safeguarding 
the unity and discipline of the Party the Central 
Committee systematically violated them by taking 
the initiative in splitting the St. Petersburg organisation.

LONDON CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. 59 
Nor do we wish to dilate on the fact that the Central 
Committee has not co-ordinated the Partyıs activities‹ 
this is clear enough as it is. 
How is all this, all these mistakes of the Central 
Committee, to be explained? Not, of course, by the fact 
that there were ³awful² people in the Central Committee, 
but by the fact that Menshevism, which then predominated 
in the Central Committee, is incapable of guiding 
the Party, is utterly bankrupt as a political trend. From 
this point of view, the entire history of the Central 
Committee is the history of the failure of Menshevism. 
And when the Menshevik comrades reproach us and say 
that we ³hindered² the Central Committee, that we 
³pestered² it, etc., etc., we cannot refrain from answering 
these moralising Comrades: yes Comrades, we ³hindered² 
the Central Committee in its violation of our 
programme, we ³hindered² it in its adaptation of the 
tactics of the proletariat to the tastes of the liberal 
bourgeoisie, and we will continue to hinder i t , for 
this is our sacred duty. . . . 
That is approximately what Comrade Ryadovoi said. 
The discussion showed that the majority of the comrades, 
even some Bundists, supported Comrade Ryadovoiıs 
point of view. And if, after all, the Bolshevik resolution, 
which noted the mistakes of the Central Committee, was 
not carried, it was because the consideration ³not to cause 
a split² strongly influenced the comrades. Nor, of course, 
was the Menshevik vote of confidence in the Central 
Committee carried. What was carried was simply a motion 
to pass to the order of the day without appraising the 
activities of the Central Committee. . . .

J. V. S T A L I N 60 
The discussion on the report of the group in the Duma 
was, in general, a repetition of the discussion on the 
preceding question. That is understandable; the group in 
the Duma acted under the direct guidance of the Central 
Committee and, naturally, criticism or defence of the 
Central Committee was at the same time criticism or 
defence of the group in the Duma. 
Of interest were the remarks of Comrade Alexinsky, 
the second reporter (the first reporter being Comrade 
Tsereteli), to the effect that the slogan of the group in 
the Duma, the majority of which was Menshevik, the 
slogan of unity of the opposition in the Duma, of not 
splitting the opposition and of the need to march with the 
Cadets‹this Menshevik slogan went completely bankrupt 
in the Duma, as Comrade Alexinsky put it, because on 
the most important questions, such as the budget, the 
army, etc., the Cadets sided with Stolypin, and the 
Menshevik Social-Democrats were obliged to fight hand 
in hand with the peasant deputies against the government 
and the Cadets. The Mensheviks were, in fact, obliged to 
admit the failure of their position and carry out in the 
Duma the Bolshevik slogan that the peasant deputies 
must be won for the struggle against the Rights and the 
Cadets. 
No less interesting were the remarks of the Polish 
comrades to the effect that it was impermissible for the 
group in the Duma to agree to joint meetings with the 
Narodovtsy,40 those Black Hundreds of Poland, who 
have more than once in the past organised the massacre 
of Socialists in Poland and are continuing to do so now. 
To this, two leaders of the Caucasian Mensheviks,41 one 
after another, replied that the important thing for the

LONDON CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. 61 
group in the Duma was not what the various parties 
did at home, but how they were behaving in the Duma, 
and that in the Duma the Narodovtsy were behaving 
more or less like liberals. It follows, therefore, that parties 
must be judged not by what they do outside the Duma, 
but by what they say in the Duma. Opportunism cannot 
go further than that. . . . 
Most of the speakers agreed with the point of view 
expressed by Comrade Alexinsky, but, for all that, no 
resolution was adopted on this question either; once 
again from the consideration ³not to offend.² The 
congress set aside the question of the resolution and 
passed straight on to the next question. 
III 
THE NON-PROLETARIAN PARTIES 
From formal questions we pass to questions of principle, 
to the questions of our disagreements. 
Our disagreements on tactics centre around the questions 
of the probable fate of our revolution, and of 
the role of the different classes and parties in Russian 
society in this revolution. That our revolution is a 
bourgeois revolution, that it must end in the rout of 
the feudal and not of the capitalist system, and that it 
can culminate only in a democratic republic‹on this, 
everybody seems to be agreed in our Party. Further, that, 
on the whole, the tide of our revolution is rising and 
not subsiding, and that our task is not to ³liquidate² the 
revolution but to carry it through to the end‹on this too, 
formally at least, everybody is agreed, for the Mensheviks,

J. V. S T A L I N 62 
as a group, have so far not said anything to the contrary. 
But how is our revolution to be carried through to the end? 
What is the role of the proletariat, of the peasantry and 
of the liberal bourgeoisie in this revolution? With what 
combination of fighting forces would it be possible to 
carry through this revolution to the end? Whom shall 
we march with, whom shall we fight? etc., etc. This is 
where our disagreements begin. 
The opinion of the Mensheviks. Since ours is a bourgeois 
revolution, only the bourgeoisie can be the leader 
of the revolution. The bourgeoisie was the leader of the 
great revolution in France, it was the leader of revolutions 
in other European countries‹it must be the leader 
of our Russian revolution too. The proletariat is the 
principal fighter in the revolution, but it must march 
behind the bourgeoisie and push it forward. The peasantry 
is also a revolutionary force, but it contains too 
much that is reactionary and, for that reason, the proletariat 
will have much less occasion to act jointly with 
it than with the liberal-democratic bourgeoisie. The 
bourgeoisie is a more reliable ally of the proletariat than 
the peasantry. It is around the liberal-democratic bourgeoisie, 
as the leader, that all the fighting forces must 
rally. Hence, our attitude towards the bourgeois parties 
must be determined not by the revolutionary thesis: 
together with the peasantry against the government and 
the liberal bourgeoisie, with the proletariat at the head‹ 
but by the opportunist thesis: together with the entire 
opposition against the government, with the liberal 
bourgeoisie at the head. Hence the tactics of compromising 
with the liberals. 
Such is the opinion of the Mensheviks.

LONDON CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. 63 
The opinion of the Bolsheviks. Ours is, indeed, a bourgeois 
revolution, but this does not mean that our liberal 
bourgeoisie will be its leader. In the eighteenth century 
the French bourgeoisie was the leader of the French 
revolution, but why? Because the French proletariat 
was weak, it did not come out independently, it did not 
put forward its own class demands, it had neither class 
consciousness nor organisation, it then dragged at the tail 
of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie used it as a tool 
for its bourgeois aims. As you see, the bourgeoisie was then 
not in need of an ally in the shape of the tsarist regime 
against the proletariat‹the proletariat itself was the ally 
and servant of the bourgeoisie‹and that is why the latter 
could then be revolutionary, even march at the head of the 
revolution. Something entirely different is observed here 
in Russia. The Russian proletariat can by no means be 
called weak: for several years already it has been acting 
quite independently, putting forward its own class 
demands; it is sufficiently armed with class consciousness 
to understand its own interests; it is united in its own 
party; its party is the strongest party in Russia, with 
its own programme and principles of tactics and organisation; 
led by this party, it has already won a number 
of brilliant victories over the bourgeoisie. . . . Under 
these circumstances, can our proletariat be satisfied 
with the role of tail of the liberal bourgeoisie, the role 
of a miserable tool in the hands of this bourgeoisie? 
Can it, must it march behind this bourgeoisie and make 
it its leader? Can it be anything else than the leader of the 
revolution? And see what is going on in the camp of our 
liberal bourgeoisie: our bourgeoisie is terrified by the 
revolutionary spirit of the proletariat; instead of marching

J. V. S T A L I N 64 
at the head of the revolution it rushes into the embrace 
of the counter-revolution and enters into an alliance with 
it against the proletariat. Its party, the Cadet Party, openly, 
before the eyes of the whole world, enters into an 
agreement with Stolypin, votes for the budget and the 
army for the benefit of tsarism and against the peopleıs 
revolution. Is it not clear that the Russian liberal bourgeoisie 
is an anti-revolutionary force against which the 
most relentless war must be waged? And was not Comrade 
Kautsky right when he said that where the proletariat 
comes out independently the bourgeoisie ceases to be 
revolutionary? . . . 
Thus, the Russian liberal bourgeoisie is anti-revolutionary; 
it cannot be the driving force of the revolution, 
and still less can it be its leader; it is the sworn enemy 
of the revolution and a persistent struggle must be waged 
against it. 
The only leader of our revolution, interested in and 
capable of leading the revolutionary forces in Russia in 
the assault upon the tsarist autocracy, is the proletariat. 
The proletariat alone will rally around itself the revolutionary 
elements of the country, it alone will carry through 
our revolution to the end. The task of Social-Democracy 
is to do everything possible to prepare the proletariat 
for the role of leader of the revolution. 
This is the pivot of the Bolshevik point of view. 
To the question: who, then, can be the reliable ally 
of the proletariat in the task of carrying through our 
revolution to the end, the Bolsheviks answer‹the only 
ally of the proletariat, to any extent reliable and powerful, 
is the revolutionary peasantry. Not the treacherous 
liberal bourgeoisie, but the revolutionary peasantry will

LONDON CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. 65 
fight side by side with the proletariat against all the 
props of the feudal system. 
Accordingly, our attitude towards the bourgeois 
parties must be determined by the proposition: together 
with the revolutionary peasantry against tsarism and 
the liberal bourgeoisie, with the proletariat at the head. 
Hence the necessity of combating the hegemony (leadership) 
of the Cadet bourgeoisie and, consequently, the 
impermissibility of compromising with the Cadets. 
Such is the opinion of the Bolsheviks. 
It was within the framework of these two positions 
that the speeches of the reporters‹Lenin and Martynov‹ 
and of all the other speakers revolved. 
Comrade Martynov touched the final depths of ³profundity² 
of the Menshevik point of view by categorically 
denying that the proletariat should assume hegemony, 
and also by categorically defending the idea of a bloc 
with the Cadets. 
The other speakers, the vast majority of them, 
expressed themselves in the spirit of the Bolshevik 
position. 
Of exceptional interest were the speeches of Comrade 
Rosa Luxemburg, who conveyed greetings to the congress 
on behalf of the German Social-Democrats and expounded 
the views of our German comrades on our disagreements. 
(Here we link together the two speeches R. L. delivered 
at different times.) Expressing her complete agreement 
with the Bolsheviks on the questions of the role of the 
proletariat as the leader of the revolution, the role of the 
liberal bourgeoisie as an anti-revolutionary force, etc., 
etc., Rosa Luxemburg criticised the Menshevik leaders 
Plekhanov and Axelrod, called them opportunists, and

J. V. S T A L I N 66 
put their position on a par with that of the Jaurèsists in 
France. I know, said Luxemburg, that the Bolsheviks, too, 
have certain faults and fads, that they are somewhat too 
rigid, but I fully understand and excuse them: one cannot 
help being rigid in face of the diffuse and jellylike mass of 
Menshevik opportunism. The same excessive rigidity was 
observed among the Guesdists42 in France, whose leader, 
Comrade Guesde, stated in a well-known election poster: 
³Donıt let a single bourgeois dare to vote for me, for in 
Parliament I will defend only the interests of the proletarians 
against all the bourgeois.² In spite of this, 
in spite of this sharpness, we German Social-Democrats 
always took the side of the Guesdists in their struggle 
against the traitors to Marxism, against the Jaurèsists. 
The same must be said about the Bolsheviks, whom we 
German Social-Democrats will support in their struggle 
against the Menshevik opportunists. . . . 
That approximately is what Comrade R. Luxemburg 
said. 
Still more interesting was the famous letter the Central 
Committee of the German Social-Democratic Party 
sent to the congress, and which Rosa Luxemburg read. 
It is interesting because, by advising the Party to fight 
liberalism, and recognising the special role played by the 
Russian proletariat as the leader of the Russian revolution, 
by the same token i t recognised all the main 
propositions of Bolshevism. 
Thus, it became clear that the German Social-Democratic 
Party, the most tried and tested and the most 
Revolutionary party in Europe, openly and clearly supported 
the Bolsheviks, as true Marxists, in their struggle 
against the traitors to Marxism, against the Mensheviks.

LONDON CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. 67 
Of interest also are several passages in the speech 
delivered by Comrade Tyszka, the representative of the 
Polish delegation in the Presidium. Both groups assure 
us, said Comrade Tyszka, that they stand firmly by the 
point of view of Marxism. It is not easy for everybody to 
understand who it is that really stands by this point of 
view, the Bolsheviks or the Mensheviks. . . . ³We stand 
by the point of view of Marxism²‹came an interruption 
from several Mensheviks on the ³Left.² ³No, comrades,² 
retorted Tyszka, ³you do not stand by it, you lie down 
on it, for all the helplessness you display in leading the 
class struggle of the proletariat, the fact that you can 
learn by rote the great words of the great Marx but are 
unable to apply them‹all this shows that you do not 
stand by but lie down on the point of view of Marxism.² 
Aptly put! 
Indeed, just take the following fact. The Mensheviks 
often say that it is the task of Social-Democracy 
always and everywhere to convert the proletariat into 
an independent political force. Is this true? Absolutely 
true! These are the great words of Marx, which every 
Marxist should always remember. But how do the 
Menshevik comrades apply them? Are they helping 
actually to separate the proletariat from the mass of 
bourgeois elements which surround it and to form it into 
an independent, self-reliant class? Are they rallying the 
revolutionary elements around the proletariat and preparing 
the proletariat for the role of leader of the revolution? 
The facts show that the Mensheviks are doing 
nothing of the kind. On the contrary, the Mensheviks 
advise the proletariat to enter more often into agreements 
with the liberal bourgeoisie‹and thereby they are

J. V. S T A L I N 68 
helping not to separate the proletariat as an independent 
class, but to fuse it with the bourgeoisie. The Mensheviks 
advise the proletariat to renounce the role of leader of 
the revolution, to cede that role to the bourgeoisie, 
to follow the bourgeoisie‹thereby they are helping to 
convert the proletariat not into an independent political 
force, but into an appendage of the bourgeoisie. . . . 
That is to say, the Mensheviks are doing the very 
opposite of what they should be doing from the standpoint 
of the correct Marxist proposition. 
Yes, Comrade Tyszka was right when he said that 
the Mensheviks do not stand by but lie down on the 
point of view of Marxism. . . . 
At the end of the discussion two draft resolutions 
were submitted: a Menshevik and a Bolshevik resolution. 
Of these two, the draft submitted by the Bolsheviks was 
adopted as a basis by an overwhelming majority of votes. 
Then came amendments to the draft. About eighty 
amendments were moved, mainly to two points in the 
draft: on the point concerning the proletariat as the leader 
of the revolution, and the point on the Cadets as an antirevolutionary 
force. That was the most interesting part 
of the discussion, for here the complexions of the different 
groups were revealed in special relief. The first important 
amendment was moved by Comrade Martov. He 
demanded that the words ³proletariat as the vanguard² be 
substituted for the words ³proletariat as the leader of the 
revolution.² In support of his amendment he said that 
the word ³vanguard² expressed the idea more precisely. 
He was answered by Comrade Alexinsky who said that 
it was not a matter of precision, but of the two opposite 
points of view that were reflected in this, for ³vanguard²

LONDON CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. 69 
and ³leader² are two totally different concepts. To be 
the vanguard (the advanced detachment) means fighting 
in the front ranks, occupying the points most heavily 
under fire, shedding oneıs blood, but at the same time 
being led by others, in this case by the bourgeois democrats; 
the vanguard never leads the general struggle, the vanguard 
is always led. On the other hand, to be a leader 
means not only fighting in the front ranks but also leading 
the general struggle, directing it towards its goal. We 
Bolsheviks do not want the proletariat to be led by the 
bourgeois democrats, we want the proletariat itself to 
lead the whole struggle of the people and direct it 
towards the democratic republic. 
As a result, Martovıs amendment was defeated. 
All the other amendments of a similar nature were 
also defeated. 
Another group of amendments was directed against 
the point about the Cadets. The Mensheviks proposed 
that it be recognised that the Cadets have not yet taken 
the path of counter-revolution. But the congress refused 
to accept this proposal and all amendments of that 
kind were rejected. The Mensheviks further proposed 
that in certain cases at least technical agreements with the 
Cadets be permitted. The congress also refused to accept 
this proposal and defeated all amendments of that kind. 
At last the resolution as a whole was voted on and 
it turned out that 159 votes were cast for the Bolshevik 
resolution, 104 against, the rest abstaining. 
The congress adopted the resolution of the Bolsheviks 
by a large majority. 
From that moment, the point of view of the Bolsheviks 
became the point of view of the Party.

J. V. S T A L I N 70 
Furthermore, this vote produced two important 
results. 
First, it put an end to the formal and artificial division 
of the congress into five groups (Bolsheviks, 
Mensheviks, Poles, Letts and Bundists) and introduced a 
new division based on principles: Bolsheviks (including 
here all the Poles and a majority of the Letts) and Mensheviks 
(including nearly all the Bundists). 
Second, the vote provided the most precise figures 
showing how the worker delegates were distributed among 
the groups: it turned out that in the Bolshevik group 
there were not 38 but 77 workers (38 plus 27 Poles plus 
12 Letts), and that in the Menshevik group there were 
not 30 workers but 39 (30 plus 9 Bundists). The Menshevik 
group turned out to be a group of intellectuals. 
IV 
THE LABOUR CONGRESS 
Before describing the discussion on the labour congress 
it is necessary to know the history of this question.* 
The fact of the matter is that this question is extremely 
confused and unclear. Whereas on the other points of our 
disagreements we already have two sharply defined trends 
in the Party, Bolshevik and Menshevik, on the question 
of the labour congress we have not two but a whole heap of 
* This is all the more necessary because the Menshevik comrades 
who have migrated to the editorial offices of bourgeois newspapers 
are spreading fables about the past and present of this 
question (see the article ³A Labour Congress,² from the pen of 
a prominent Menshevik, published in Tovarishch and reprinted 
in Bakinsky Dyen 43).

LONDON CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. 71 
trends, extremely unclear and contradictory. True, the 
Bolsheviks take a united and definite stand: they are 
opposed to a labour congress altogether. But among 
the Mensheviks utter chaos and confusion reign; they 
have split up into numerous groups, each one singing 
its own song and paying no heed to the others. Whereas 
the St. Petersburg Mensheviks, headed by Axelrod, 
propose that a labour congress be convened for the purpose 
of forming a party, the Moscow Mensheviks, headed 
by El, propose that it should be convened not for the 
purpose of forming a party, but with the object of forming 
a non-party ³All-Russian Workersı League.² The Mensheviks 
from the South go still further and, headed 
by Larin,44 call for the convocation of a labour congress 
with the object of forming not a party, and not 
a ³Workersı League,² but a wider ³Toilersı League² 
which, in addition to all the proletarian elements, could 
embrace also the Socialist-Revolutionary, semi-bourgeois 
³toiler² elements. I shall not dwell on other, less 
influential, groups and persons, like the Odessa and 
trans-Caspian groups, or like those half-witted ³authors² 
of a comical pamphlet who call themselves ³Brodyaga² 
and ³Shura.²45 
Such is the confusion that reigns in the ranks of the 
Mensheviks. 
But how is the labour congress to be convened? 
How is it to be organised? In connection with what is 
it to be convened? Who is to be invited to it? Who is to 
take the initiative in convening it? 
The same confusion reigns among the Mensheviks 
on all these questions as on the question of the object of 
the congress.

J. V. S T A L I N 72 
While some of them propose that the election of delegates 
to the congress should be made to coincide with 
the Duma elections and that the labour congress be thus 
organised by ³unauthorised means,² others propose to 
trust to the governmentıs ³connivance² or, in the last 
resort, to apply for its ³permission,² while still others 
advise that the delegates be sent abroad‹even if they 
number three or four thousand‹and that the labour 
congress be held underground there. 
While some Mensheviks propose that only definitely 
formed workersı organisations be allowed to send 
representatives to the congress, others advise inviting 
representatives of the entire organised and unorganised 
proletariat, which numbers not less than ten millions. 
While some Mensheviks propose that the labour congress 
be convened on the initiative of the Social-Democratic 
Party with the participation of intellectuals, others 
advise that the Party and the intellectuals be thrust 
aside, and that the congress be convened only on the initiative 
of the workers themselves, without the participation 
of any intellectuals. 
While some Mensheviks insist on a labour congress 
being convened immediately, others propose that it be 
postponed indefinitely, and that, meanwhile, only agitation 
in favour of the idea of a labour congress be conducted. 
But what is to be done with the existing Social-Democratic 
Labour Party which has been leading the proletarian 
struggle for several years already, which has 
united 150,000 members in its ranks, which has already 
held five congresses, etc., etc.! ³Send it to the devil?² 
Or what?

LONDON CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. 73 
In answer to this, all the Mensheviks, from Axelrod 
to Larin, declare unanimously that we have no proletarian 
party. ³The whole point is that we have no party,² 
said the Mensheviks at the congress. ³All we have is 
an organisation of petty-bourgeois intellectuals,² which 
must be replaced by a party with the aid of a labour 
congress. That is what Comrade Axelrod, the Menshevik 
reporter, said at the Party congress. 
But wait! What does that mean? Does it mean that 
all the congresses our Party has held, from the first 
(1898) to the latest (1907), in the organisation of which 
the Menshevik comrades took a most energetic part, 
that all the colossal expenditure of proletarian money 
and effort involved in the organisation of these congresses‹
and for which the Mensheviks are as much responsible 
as the Bolsheviks‹does it mean that all this 
was mere deception and hypocrisy?! 
Does it mean that all the fighting appeals the Party 
has issued to the proletariat, appeals which the Mensheviks 
also signed, that all the strikes and insurrections of 
1905, 1906 and 1907, which flared up with the Party at 
their head, and often on the Partyıs initiative, that all the 
victories achieved by the proletariat headed by our Party, 
that the thousands of proletarian victims who fell in the 
streets of St. Petersburg, Moscow, and elsewhere, who 
were immured in Siberia and who perished in prison for 
the sake of the Party, and under the banner of the Party‹ 
that all that was just a farce and a deception? 
So we have no party? We have only ³an organisation 
of petty-bourgeois intellectuals²? 
Of course, that was a downright lie; an outrageous, 
brazen lie.

J. V. S T A L I N 74 
That, evidently, explains the boundless indignation 
which the above-mentioned statement by Axelrod roused 
among the worker delegates from St. Petersburg and 
Moscow. They jumped to their feet and energetically 
answered the reporter Axelrod: ³You, who spend your 
time abroad, are bourgeois, not we. We are workers, and 
we have our Social-Democratic Party, and we will not 
allow anyone to defame it.² . . . 
But let us suppose that a labour congress is held; 
let us imagine that it has already been held. The existing 
Social-Democratic Party therefore has been put into the 
archives, a labour congress has been convened in some 
way or another, and we want to organise at it a league 
of ³workers² or ³toilers,² whatever it may be. Well, what 
next? What programme will this congress adopt? What will 
be the complexion of the labour congress? 
Some Mensheviks answer that the labour congress 
could adopt the programme of Social-Democracy, with 
certain deletions, of course; but they at once add that 
it might not adopt the programme of Social-Democracy 
and that this, in their opinion, would not be particularly 
harmful to the proletariat. Others answer more emphatically 
as follows: Since our proletariat is strongly imbued 
with petty-bourgeois tendencies, in all probability 
the labour congress will adopt not a Social-Democratic 
but a petty-bourgeois democratic programme. At the 
labour congress the proletariat will lose the Social-Democratic 
programme, but instead it will acquire a workersı 
organisation that will unite all the workers in one 
league. That is what, for example, N. Cherevanin, the 
head of the Moscow Mensheviks, says (see ³Problems of 
Tactics²).46

LONDON CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. 75 
And so: ³A workersı league without a Social-Democratic 
programme²‹such is the probable result of a 
labour congress. 
That, at all events, is what the Mensheviks themselves 
think. 
Evidently, while they disagree with one another on 
certain questions concerning the objects of the labour 
congress and the methods of convening it, the Mensheviks 
are agreed among themselves on the point that 
³we have no party, all we have is an organisation of 
petty-bourgeois intellectuals, which ought to be put into 
the archives.² . . . 
It was within this framework that Axelrodıs report 
revolved. 
It became evident from Axelrodıs report that agitation 
for a labour congress would practically and inevitably 
amount to agitation against the party, a war 
against it. 
And the practical work of convening the labour 
congress would also inevitably amount to practical 
work in disorganising and undermining our present 
party. 
And yet the Mensheviks‹through the mouth of 
their reporter, and also in their draft resolution‹requested 
the congress to prohibit agitation against attempts 
to organise a labour congress, i.e., against attempts 
leading to disorganisation of the Party. 
It is interesting to note that, running through the 
speeches of the Menshevik speakers (with the exception 
of Plekhanov, who said nothing about the labour 
congress), were the slogans: ³Down with the Party, 
down with Social-Democracy‹long live the non-party

J. V. S T A L I N 76 
principle, long live the non-Social-Democratic ŒWorkersı 
League.ı² These slogans were not openly advanced by the 
speakers, but they ran as an undertone through their 
speeches. 
It is not without reason that all the bourgeois writers, 
from the Syndicalists and Socialist-Revolutionaries to 
the Cadets and Octobrists‹all so ardently express themselves 
in favour of a labour congress; after all, they are 
all enemies of our Party, and the practical work of convening 
a labour congress might considerably weaken and 
disorganise the Party. Why should they not welcome 
³the idea of a labour congress²? 
The Bolshevik speakers said something entirely different. 
The Bolshevik reporter, Comrade Lindov, 47 after 
briefly characterising the main trends among the Mensheviks, 
proceeded to trace the conditions which gave 
rise to the idea of a labour congress. Agitation for a labour 
congress began in 1905, before the October days, during 
the repressions. It ceased during the October-November 
days. During the subsequent months of fresh repression, 
agitation for a labour congress revived. During the 
period of the First Duma, in the days of relative freedom, 
the agitation subsided. Then, after the dispersion of the 
Duma, it grew again, etc. The conclusion to be drawn 
is clear: in the period of relative freedom, when the 
Party is able to expand freely, there is naturally no 
ground for agitation for a labour congress with the object 
of forming ³a broad non-party party.² On the other 
hand, during periods of repression, when the influx of 
new members into the Party gives way to an exodus, 
agitation for a labour congress, as an artificial measure

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
77 
for widening the narrow party, or replacing it by ³a 
broad non-party party,² finds some ground. But it goes 
without saying that no artificial measures will be of any 
avail, for what is needed for the actual expansion of 
the Party is political freedom and not a labour congress, 
which itself needs such freedom. 
To proceed. The idea of a labour congress, taken concretely, 
is fundamentally false, for it rests not on facts, 
but on the false proposition that ³we have no party.² 
The point is that we have a proletarian party which 
loudly proclaims its existence, and whose existence is 
felt only too well by the enemies of the proletariat‹the 
Mensheviks are fully aware of this‹and precisely because 
we already have such a party, the idea of a labour 
congress is fundamentally false. Of course, if we did not 
have a party numbering over 150,000 advanced proletarians 
in its ranks, and leading hundreds of thousands of 
fighters, if we were only a tiny handful of uninfluential 
people as the German Social-Democrats were in the sixties 
or the French Socialists in the seventies of the last 
century, we ourselves would try to convene a labour congress 
with the object of squeezing a Social-Democratic 
Party out of it. But the whole point is that we already 
have a party, a real proletarian party, which exercises 
enormous influence among the masses, and to convene a 
labour congress, to form a fantastic ³non-party party,² 
we would, inevitably, first of all have to ³put an end² 
to the existing party, we would first of all have to 
wreck it. 
That is why, in practice, the work of convening a labour 
congress must inevitably amount to a work of disorganising 
the Party. And whether success could ever be achieved 
LONDON CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P.

J. V. S T A L I N 78 
in forming ³a broad non-party party² in place of it, and 
indeed, whether such a party ought to be formed, is questionable. 
That is why the enemies of our Party, the Cadets 
and Octobrists, and the like, so heartily praise the 
Mensheviks for their agitation in favour of a labour 
congress. 
That is why the Bolsheviks think that the work of 
convening a labour congress would be dangerous, would 
be harmful, for it would discredit the Party in the eyes 
of the masses and subject them to the influence of 
bourgeois democracy. 
That is approximately what Comrade Lindov said. 
For a labour congress and against the Social-Democratic 
Party? Or, for the Party and against a labour congress? 
This is how the question stood at the congress. 
The Bolshevik worker delegates understood the question 
at once and vigorously came out ³in defence of the 
Party²: ³We are Party patriots,² they said. ³We love 
our Party, and we shall not allow tired intellectuals 
to discredit it.² 
It is interesting to note that Comrade Rosa Luxemburg, 
the representative of German Social-Democracy, 
entirely agreed with the Bolsheviks. ³We German Social-
Democrats,² she said, ³cannot understand the comical 
dismay of the Menshevik comrades who are groping 
for the masses when the masses themselves are looking for 
the Party and are irresistibly pressing towards it.² . . . 
The discussion showed that the vast majority of the 
speakers supported the Bolsheviks. 
At the end of the discussion two draft resolutions 
were submitted to a vote: a Bolshevik draft and a Menshe

LONDON CONGRESS OF THE R.S.D.L.P. 79 
vik draft. Of these two, the Bolshevik draft was accepted 
as a basis. Nearly all amendments on points of 
principle were rejected. Only one more or less important 
amendment was accepted, viz., against restricting freedom 
to discuss the question of a labour congress. The 
resolution as a whole stated that ³the idea of convening 
a labour congress leads to the disorganisation of the 
Party,² ³to the subjection of the broad masses of the 
workers to the influence of bourgeois democracy,² and, 
as such, is harmful to the proletariat. Moreover, the 
resolution drew a strict distinction between a labour 
congress and Soviets of Workersı Deputies and their 
congresses which, far from disorganising the Party and 
competing with it, strengthen the Party by following its 
lead and helping it to solve practical problems in periods 
of revolutionary upsurge. 
Finally the resolution as a whole was adopted by a 
majority of 165 votes against 94. The rest of the delegates 
abstained from voting. 
Thus, the congress rejected the idea of a labour congress 
as harmful and anti-Party. 
The voting on this question revealed to us the following 
important fact. Of the 114 worker delegates who 
took part in the voting, only 25 voted for a labour congress. 
The rest voted against it. Expressed in percentages, 
22 per cent of the worker delegates voted for a labour 
congress, while 78 per cent voted against it. What is 
particularly important is that of the 94 delegates who 
voted for a labour congress, only 26 per cent were workers 
and 74 per cent were intellectuals. 
And yet the Mensheviks shouted all the time that 
the idea of a labour congress was a workersı idea, that

J. V. S T A L I N 80 
it was only the Bolshevik ³intellectuals² who were 
opposing the convocation of a congress, etc. Judging 
by this vote, one should rather admit that, on the contrary, 
the idea of a labour congress is the idea of intellectual 
dreamers. . . . 
Apparently, even the Menshevik workers did not 
vote for the labour congress: of the 39 worker delegates 
(30 Mensheviks plus 9 Bundists) only 24 voted for a 
labour congress. 
Baku, 1907 
First published in the 
Bakinsky Proletary, Nos. 1 and 2 
June 20 and July 10, 1907 
Signed: Koba Ivanovich

MANDATE TO THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC 
DEPUTIES IN THE THIRD STATE DUMA 
Adopted at a Meeting of the Delegates 
of the Workersı Curia in the City of Baku, 
September 22, 1907 48 
The Social-Democratic deputies in the State Duma must 
form a separate group which, as a Party organisation, 
must be most closely connected with the Party, 
and must submit to its guidance and to the directives 
of the Central Committee of the Party. 
The main task of the Social-Democratic group in the 
State Duma is to facilitate the proletariatıs class education 
and class struggle both for the emancipation of the 
working people from capitalist exploitation and for the 
fulfilment of the part of political leader which it is 
called upon to play in the present bourgeois-democratic 
revolution in Russia. 
For this purpose, the group must under all circumstances 
pursue its own proletarian class policy, which 
distinguishes Social-Democracy from all other organisations 
and revolutionary parties, from the Cadets to the 
Socialist-Revolutionaries. It must not under any 
circumstances sacrifice this task to the aim of conducting 
joint oppositional action with any other political parties 
or groups in the Duma. 
Our deputies must systematically expose in the Duma the 
entire counter-revolutionary nature both of the 
Black-Hundred landlord parties and of the treacherous,

J. V. S T A L I N 82 
liberal-monarchist, bourgeois, Cadet Party. On the other 
hand, they must strive to wrest the peasant pettybourgeois 
parties (Socialist-Revolutionaries, Popular 
Socialists and Trudoviks) from the liberals, push them on 
to the path of consistent democratic-revolutionary policy, 
and lead them in the struggle both against the Black 
Hundreds and against the Cadet bourgeoisie. At the same 
time, the Social-Democratic group must combat the 
reactionary, pseudo-socialist utopias in which the 
Socialist-Revolutionaries, Popular Socialists and others 
clothe what are in fact petty-bourgeois demands, and 
with the aid of which they obscure the purely proletarian, 
socialist class consciousness of the working class. From 
the floor of the Duma our group must tell the entire 
people the whole truth about the revolution through 
which we are passing. It must loudly proclaim to the 
people that in Russia their emancipation cannot be 
achieved by peaceful means, that the only path to 
freedom is the path of a nation-wide struggle against 
the tsarist regime. 
The slogan which Social-Democracy advances, and for 
which it must call upon the masses to launch another open 
struggle, is for a Constituent Assembly freely elected 
by the whole people on the basis of universal, direct, 
equal and secret suffrage, an assembly which will put 
an end to the tsarist autocracy and establish a democratic 
republic in Russia. No other slogans, such as a responsible 
ministry, etc., advanced by the liberal bourgeoisie 
in opposition to the proletarian slogans, can be accepted 
and supported by the Social-Democratic group. 
In taking part in the daily legislative and other activities 
of the State Duma, the Social-Democratic group

MANDATE TO THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC DEPUTIES 83 
must pursue its constant tasks of criticism and agitation 
and not pursue the object of direct legislation; and it 
must explain to the people that such legislation is ephemeral 
and futile so long as real power remains entirely in 
the hands of the autocratic government. 
By working in the Third State Duma in this way, 
the Social-Democratic group will facilitate the revolutionary 
struggle which the proletariat, and the peasantry 
along with it, are at present waging against the tsarist 
autocracy outside the Duma. 
Published in leaflet form Reprinted from the leaflet 
in September 1907

BOYCOTT THE CONFERENCE49 
The question whether to participate in or to boycott 
the conference with the oil owners is not a question 
of principle for us, but one of practical expediency. We 
cannot lay down a hard and fast rule to boycott every 
conference, as certain embittered and not quite sane ³individuals² 
propose. Nor can we lay down a hard and fast 
rule to participate in every conference, as our Cadet-like 
comrades manage to do. We must approach the question 
of participation or boycott from the point of view of 
living facts, and of facts alone. It may turn out that, 
given certain facts, certain conditions, our task of uniting 
the masses will make our participation imperative 
‹and in that case we must certainly participate. Given 
other conditions, however, that same task may render 
a boycott imperative‹and in that case we must certainly 
boycott the conference. 
Furthermore, to avoid confusion, we must first of 
all define the concepts with which we are operating. 
What does ³participating² in a conference mean? What 
does ³boycotting² a conference mean? If, in formulating 
common demands, electing delegates, etc., etc., at 
meetings, our aim is not to prevent the conference from 
being held, but, on the contrary, to go to the conference 
in order, submitting to and relying on its standing 
orders, to negotiate with the oil owners and in the

BOYCOTT THE CONFERENCE 85 
end reach an agreement of some kind‹we must 
describe such behaviour on our part as participation in 
the conference. But if, in drawing up demands, electing 
delegates to formulate these demands better, and in 
popularising and publishing the demands that have been 
formulated, our aim is not to participate in the proceedings 
of a conference with the oil owners, but to prevent 
the conference from being held, to frustrate any agreement 
with the oil owners before a fight (we think an agreement 
after a fight, especially after a successful fight, 
is essential)‹then we must describe our conduct as boycotting 
the conference; active boycotting, of course, 
because it will result in the prevention of the conference. 
Under no circumstances must tactics towards a conference 
be confused with tactics towards the Duma. 
The object of participating in or boycotting a conference 
is to prepare the ground for an improvement of the conditions 
prevailing in the oil fields, whereas the object of 
going into or boycotting the Duma is to improve general 
conditions in the country. The fate of a conference is 
determined wholly and exclusively by the proletariat in 
the given locality, for, if the proletariat does not participate, 
the conference automatically falls through, whereas 
the issue whether to go into or to boycott the 
Duma is determined not by the proletariat alone, but 
also by the peasantry. And finally, an active boycott 
of a conference (its prevention) can be conveniently carried 
out without active operations, and this is not the 
case with the results of boycotting the Duma. 
After these general remarks, we shall proceed to 
the concrete question of boycotting the forthcoming 
conference.

J. V. S T A L I N 86 
The history of the economic struggle waged by the 
Baku workers may be divided into two periods. 
The first period is the period of struggle up to recent 
times, during which the principal roles were played 
by the mechanics, while the oil workers50 simply and 
trustfully followed the mechanics as their leaders and were 
as yet unconscious of the enormously important part 
they played in production. The tactics pursued by the oil 
owners during that period may be described as the tactics 
of flirting with the mechanics, tactics of systematic concessions 
to the mechanics, and of equally systematic 
ignoring of the oil workers. 
The second period opens with the awakening of the oil 
workers, their independent entry on to the scene, and the 
simultaneous pushing of the mechanics into the background. 
But this entry bore the character of a burlesque, 
for 1) it went no further than the shameful demand for 
bonuses, and 2) it was tinged with the most fatal distrust 
towards the mechanics. The oil owners are trying to 
take advantage of the changed situation and are changing 
their tactics. They are no longer flirting with the mechanics; 
they are no longer trying to cajole the mechanics, 
for they know perfectly well that the oil workers will 
not always follow them now; on the contrary, the oil 
owners themselves are trying to provoke the mechanics 
to go on strike without the oil workers, in order, thereby, 
to demonstrate the relative weakness of the mechanics 
and make them submissive. Parallel with this, the 
oil owners, who previously had paid no attention to 
the oil workers, are now most brazenly flirting with 
them and treating them to bonuses. In this way they 
are trying completely to divorce the oil workers from

BOYCOTT THE CONFERENCE 87 
the mechanics, utterly to corrupt them, to infect them 
with slavish faith in the oil owners, to replace the 
principle of uncompromising struggle by the ³principle² 
of haggling and obsequious begging, and thus make all 
real improvement impossible. 
It was with these objects in view that the forthcoming 
conference was ³thought up.² 
Hence it is obvious that the immediate task of the 
advanced comrades is to launch a desperate struggle 
to win over the oil workers, a struggle to rally the 
oil workers around their comrades the mechanics by 
imbuing their minds with utter distrust of the oil owners, 
by obliterating from their minds the pernicious prejudices 
in favour of haggling and begging. We must loudly 
and sharply tell (not only in words but with facts!) the 
masses of the oil workers who have come on to the scene 
for the first time, and in such a clumsy and burlesque 
fashion at that (³beshkesh,²51 etc.), that improvements 
in conditions of life are not granted from above, 
nor as a result of haggling, but are obtained from below, 
by means of a general struggle jointly with the mechanics. 
Only if we have this task in mind can we correctly 
settle the question of the conference. 
And so, we think that participation in the forthcoming 
conference, a call for co-operation between the oil 
owners and the workers with the object of drawing up 
a binding agreement now, before a general struggle, 
when there is still the partial struggle, when the 
general struggle still lies ahead, when the oil owners 
are handing out bonuses right and left, divorcing the 
oil workers from the mechanics and corrupting their

J. V. S T A L I N 88 
newly awakened consciousness, we think that ³to go to 
the conference² in such a situation means not obliterating 
but still more strongly ingraining ³beshkesh² prejudices 
in the minds of the masses. It means imbuing 
the minds of the masses not with distrust of the oil owners, 
but with trust in them. It means not rallying the oil 
workers around the mechanics, not drawing them nearer 
to the mechanics, but abandoning them for a time, throwing 
them back into the clutches of the capitalists. 
Of course, ³itıs an ill wind that blows nobody any 
good.² At the present moment a conference may also be 
of some use in the organisational sense, in the sense of 
³extending the struggle,² as Comrade Kochegar52 expresses 
it. But if the harm caused by the conference undoubtedly 
exceeds this some use, then the conference must 
undoubtedly be cast aside like useless lumber. For if 
Comrade Kochegar is ready ³to go to the conference² 
mainly on the grounds that this conference ³organises² 
and ³extends the struggle,² then we simply cannot understand 
why it would not be right ³to go to the conference² 
also when the tide of the movement is rising, on the 
eve of a general struggle, at the beginning of a general 
struggle that is being organised. What is there to be 
afraid of? At such a time ³general organisation² and 
³extension of the struggle² are especially necessary, are 
they not? At such a time the masses should least of 
all fall for concessions from above, should they not? But 
the whole point is that electing delegates in itself does 
not mean organising the masses. The whole point is that 
to organise (in our and not in the Gapon sense of the 
term, of course) means first of all developing consciousness 
of the irreconcilable antagonism between the capi

BOYCOTT THE CONFERENCE 89 
talists and the workers. So long as that consciousness 
exists, all the rest will come of itself. 
This is exactly what the forthcoming conference 
cannot do. 
In view of this, the only tactics in keeping with our 
task under present conditions are the tactics of boycotting 
the conference. 
The boycott tactics best of all develop consciousness 
of the irreconcilable antagonism between the workers 
and the oil owners. 
The boycott tactics, by shattering ³beshkesh² prejudices 
and divorcing the oil workers from the oil owners, 
rally them around the mechanics. 
The boycott tactics, by imbuing distrust of the oil 
owners, best of all emphasise in the eyes of the masses 
the necessity of fighting as the only means of improving 
their conditions of life. 
That is why we must launch a boycott campaign: 
organise works meetings, draw up demands, elect delegates 
for the better formulation of common demands, 
distribute the demands in printed form, explain them, 
bring them to the masses again for final endorsement, 
etc., etc., and we must do all this under the slogan of 
boycott in order, after popularising the common demands 
and utilising the ³legal possibilities,² to boycott the 
conference, make a laughing-stock of it, and thereby emphasise 
the necessity of a struggle for common demands. 
And so‹boycott the conference! 
Gudok, No. 4, Reprinted from the newspaper 
September 29, 1907 
Signed: Ko. . . .

BEFORE THE ELECTIONS 
Messrs. the oil owners have retreated. Only recently 
they stated through the editor of their newspaper, Neftyanoye 
Delo, 53 that the trade unions in Baku are ³an 
adventitious element standing apart from the workers.² In 
obedience to their will, the authorities posted up notices 
inviting the workers to elect delegates to an organising 
committee, wishing thereby to remove the trade unions 
from the leadership of the campaign. That was the case 
yesterday. But now, on January 7, the factory inspector 
has informed the trade union secretaries that the oil owners 
have held a meeting at which they decided to request 
the City Governor to grant the trade unions permits to 
hold meetings in the oil fields and at the works. 
Messrs. the capitalists are afraid of the growing 
influence of the trade unions; they would like to see the 
workers in a state of disunity and disorganisation, and 
with this object they refuse to recognise even the oil 
field and works commissions. But we have now compelled 
them to admit that the task of guiding the settlement 
of one of the most important questions of working-
class life, the question of a conference and a collective 
agreement, is and must be the task of the trade 
unions.

BEFORE THE ELECTIONS 91 
We have compelled them to recognise the leading 
role played by the trade unions, despite the fact that 
Messrs. the Dashnaktsakans54 and Socialist-Revolutionaries 
came to the aid of Messrs. the oil owners and the 
authorities in their struggle against the workersı organisations. 
Messrs. the Dashnaktsakans hurriedly responded to 
the call of the City Governor and immediately proceeded 
with the elections, in pursuit of their own ends, of 
course‹to evade the conditions demanded by the trade 
unions for the conduct of the campaign, and above all 
the principal condition‹recognition of the workersı organisations. 
But Messrs. the oil owners were not satisfied with the 
hurried activity of the Dashnaktsakans. The latter had a 
following only among the workers employed by the smaller 
firms, such as Abiyants, Raduga, Ararat, Pharos and 
others, and at the big Armenian firms elections took 
place only at two or three. 
The workers employed by the Caspian-Black Sea 
Company, Nobelıs, Kokorevıs, Bornıs, Shibayevıs, Asadullayevıs, 
the Moscow-Caucasus Company, and other 
firms, passed resolutions protesting against these elections 
and refused to take part in them until permits 
were issued to the trade unions. 
The workers employed at the largest and most influential 
firms clearly and definitely expressed their 
will, and thereby answered not only Messrs. the oil 
owners, but also those ³friends² of theirs who are fond 
of talking too eloquently about nothing. 
By their resolutions the workers clearly and definitely 
confirmed the fact that the conditions demanded

J. V. S T A L I N 92 
by the trade unions were not the inventions of ³leaders,² 
as the Socialist-Revolutionaries assert in their pamphlet 
Why We Are Not Going to the Conference. 
The authorities, the oil owners and the Dashnaktsakans 
are trying to counteract the growing influence 
of the trade unions. The workers are expressing their 
confidence in the trade unions and their agreement 
with the conditions which the trade unions are demanding. 
The workers are not and must not be scared by the 
words ³conference² and ³negotiations,² any more than 
they are scared by the prospect of negotiations and of 
putting forward demands on the eve of a strike. The 
presentation of demands sometimes removes the necessity 
of a strike to settle a dispute. Most often, the opposite 
happens. But in order that ³negotiations² may 
unfold before the workers the whole picture of the present 
state of affairs, in order that the campaign around 
the conference may render the workers inestimable 
service by securing the wide presentation and public 
discussion of all questions affecting the workersı lives, 
the conditions demanded by the trade unions, which 
will be included in the instructions to the elected 
delegates, must be conceded. 
No negotiations are ³terrible² if they are conducted 
in sight of the masses of the workers. The conditions 
that are demanded ensure the possibility of 
the wide participation of all the workers in the discussion 
of all the questions connected with the conference. 
Conferences of the Shendrikov type, of sad memory, 
have been buried forever.

BEFORE THE ELECTIONS 93 
We have succeeded in persuading the comrades 
³associated² with the mechanicsı union to follow our 
lead and to abandon the slogan of ³a conference at all 
costs.² And they have decided to boycott the elections 
if the principal condition, recognition of the leading importance 
of the trade unions, is not conceded. And we 
shall see to it that there will be no more supporters of 
boycott ³at all costs.² A conference, and what is the 
chief thing, a campaign around the conference, will be 
acceptable to the workers if the necessary conditions for 
it are provided. 
The workers, by the resolutions they passed recently, 
have confirmed the correctness of our position. 
Permits have been issued to us. Hence, we have obtained 
from the authorities and the oil owners recognition 
of the leading role of the unions. 
The majority of the workers employed by the larger 
firms have declared in favour of participating in the 
elections on the conditions that we have indicated. 
We can now calmly and confidently proceed with 
the election of delegates who, we advise, should be given 
the following instructions: let the sixteen representatives 
whom you elect be such as will demand, as an absolute 
condition for conducting negotiations in the organising 
committee, the recognition primarily of the following 
points: 
1) The date of the conference to be decided by the 
delegates of the workers and employers as equal parties, 
i.e., by mutual agreement. 
2) The general assembly of delegates, elected at the 
rate of one for every hundred workers, to remain 
in session until the end of the conference, to meet

J. V. S T A L I N 94 
periodically, and, as circumstances demand, to discuss 
the reports of the workersı representatives at the conference 
and to give them guiding instructions. 
3) Delegates to have the right to organise meetings 
at works, oil fields and workshops to discuss the terms 
of the agreement demanded and offered. 
4) The executives of the oil industry workersı and 
mechanicsı trade unions to have the right to send to the 
conference with the oil owners representatives with 
right of voice but not of vote, and also to have the right 
to report to all conference committees, delegate meetings, 
works and oil field meetings, etc. 
5) Representatives on the organising committee are 
to be elected by the Delegate Council as a whole, without 
division according to craft. Negotiations in the organising 
committee are also to be conducted as a whole 
(a single agreement for all the workers). 
Gudok, No. 14, Reprinted from the newspaper 
January 13, 1908 
Unsigned

MORE ABOUT A CONFERENCE 
WITH GUARANTEES 
The conference campaign is at its height. The election 
of delegates is drawing to a close. The Delegate 
Council will meet in the near future. Is there to be a 
conference or not? With what guarantees (conditions) 
is a conference desirable? How are these guarantees to be 
understood? Such, primarily, are the questions with 
which the Delegate Council will deal. 
What should be our line of conduct on the Delegate 
Council? 
We repeat that conferences with the oil owners are 
not a novelty for us. We had a conference in 1905. We had 
a second in 1906. What did we get out of these conferences? 
What did they teach us? Was it worth while 
holding them? 
At that time, and again quite recently, we were 
told that conferences by themselves, without any conditions, 
unite the masses. The facts, however, have shown 
that neither of the two past conferences united the 
masses, nor could they do so‹only elections were held, 
and with this all the ³uniting² ended. 
Why? 
Because in organising the past conferences there was 
not even a hint of any kind of freedom of speech and

J. V. S T A L I N 96 
assembly, it was impossible to assemble the masses at the 
works‹in the oil fields‹and in their living quarters, 
to draw up instructions on each point, and generally 
to intervene actively in all the affairs of the conference. 
Consequently, the masses were obliged to remain idle; 
only the representatives were active, far away from the 
masses of the workers. But we have known for a long 
time that the masses can be organised only during 
action. . . . 
Further‹because there was no Delegate Council 
acting freely as a permanent organ of the workers all 
the time the conference was in session, uniting around 
itself the workers in all firms and districts, drawing 
up the demands of these workers, and controlling the 
workersı representatives on the basis of these demands. 
The oil owners would not permit the formation of such 
a Delegate Council, while the initiators of the conference 
meekly resigned themselves to this. 
This is quite apart from the fact that at that time 
there were no such centres of the movement as the trade 
unions, which could rally the Delegate Council around 
themselves and direct it along the path of the class 
struggle. . . . 
At one time we were told that a conference, even by 
itself, could satisfy the demands of the workers. But 
the experience of the first two conferences has refuted 
this assumption too, for when our representatives at 
the first conference began to talk about the workersı 
demands, the oil owners interrupted them and said 
that ³this is not on the agenda of the conference,² that 
the function of the conference was to discuss the ³supply 
of liquid fuel for industry,² and not demands of any

MORE ABOUT A CONFERENCE WITH GUARANTEES 97 
kind. When our representatives at the second conference 
demanded that representatives of the unemployed 
also be allowed to take part, the oil owners again interrupted 
them and said that they had no authority to 
deal with demands of that kind. With that our representatives 
were thrown out by the scruff of the neck. And when 
some of the comrades raised the question of backing our 
representatives by means of a general struggle‹it turned 
out that such a struggle was impossible because the capitalists 
had arranged both conferences in the slack season 
favourable for themselves, in the winter, when navigation 
on the Volga was closed, when the price of oil products 
was dropping and, consequently, when it was quite senseless 
even to think of a victory for the workers. 
That is how ³worth while² the two previous conferences 
were. 
Clearly, a conference by itself, a conference without 
a free Delegate Council, a conference without the participation 
and guidance of the unions, and moreover 
one called in the winter‹in short, a conference without 
guarantees‹is merely an empty sound. Far from uniting 
the workers and facilitating the achievement of our 
demands, such a conference can only disorganise the 
workers and put off the satisfaction of our demands, for 
it feeds the workers on empty promises, while giving 
them nothing. 
That is what the two preceding conferences have 
taught us. 
That is why the class-conscious proletariat boycotted 
the third conference in November 1907. 
Let this be remembered by those individual comrades 
in the mechanicsı union who are agitating for a conference

J. V. S T A L I N 98 
without guarantees, in spite of the entire experience 
of the previous conferences, in spite of the will of 
the majority of the proletariat in the oil industry, 
and, lastly, in spite of the agreement reached between the 
unions! 
Let them remember this and not violate this agreement. 
But does this mean that we must wave aside all conferences? 
No, it does not! 
To the remarks of the boycottist Socialist-Revolutionaries 
that we must not go to the conference because 
our enemy, the bourgeoisie, is inviting us to it, we can 
answer only with a laugh. After all it is the same enemy, 
the bourgeoisie, who invites us to go to work in the 
factories, at the works, or in the oil fields. Should we 
therefore boycott the factories, works or oil fields only 
because our enemy, the bourgeoisie, invites us to them? 
If we did, we might all die of starvation! If that argument 
were sound, it would mean that all the workers 
have taken leave of their senses by going to work on the 
invitation of the bourgeoisie! 
As for the statement made by the Dashnaktsakans 
that we must not go to the conference because it is a 
bourgeois institution‹we need not pay any attention 
whatever to this absurd statement. After all, presentday 
social life is also a bourgeois ³institution,² the 
factories, works and oil fields are all bourgeois ³institutions,² 
organised ³in the image and likeness of² the 
bourgeoisie, and for the benefit of the bourgeoisie. Shall 
we boycott all these merely because they are bourgeois? 
If so, where shall we migrate to, to Mars, Jupiter, or

MORE ABOUT A CONFERENCE WITH GUARANTEES 99 
perhaps to the castles in the air built by the Dashnaktsakans 
and Socialist-Revolutionaries? . . .* 
No, comrades! We must not turn our backs on the 
positions of the bourgeoisie, we must face and storm 
them! We must not leave the bourgeoisie in possession of 
their positions, we must capture them, step by step, and 
eject the bourgeoisie from them! Only those who live in 
castles in the air can fail to understand this simple truth! 
We shall not go to the conference if we do not receive 
in advance the guarantees we demand. But if we 
obtain the guarantees we demand, we shall go to the 
conference in order, by relying on these guarantees, to 
transform the conference from a begging instrument into 
a weapon in the further struggle, in the same way as 
we go to work, after certain necessary conditions are 
satisfied, in order to transform the factories, works and 
oil fields from an arena of oppression into an arena of 
emancipation. 
By organising a conference with guarantees won by 
the workers, and by calling upon the mass of fifty thousand 
workers to elect a Delegate Council and to draw 
up our demands, we shall lead the working-class movement 
in Baku on to a new road of struggle advantageous to 
it, on to the road of an organised and class-conscious and 
not of a spontaneous (disunited) and beshkesh movement. 
* That the boycottist stand taken by Messrs. the Dashnaktsakans 
and Socialist-Revolutionaries is utterly inconsistent and 
unrealistic is proved by the very fact that they themselves are 
favourably inclined towards a conference between the typographical 
workers and their employers, and towards a collective agreement 
between them. Furthermore, individual members of these 
parties are even permitted to take a hand in this matter.

J. V. S T A L I N 100 
That, properly speaking, is what we expect from a 
conference with guarantees; that is why we say: a conference 
with guarantees, or no conference at all!55 
Let the gentlemen who supported the old type of 
conference agitate against guarantees; let them extol 
conferences without guarantees; let them flounder in 
the Zubatov marsh‹the proletariat will drag them out 
of the marsh and teach them to walk through the wide 
fields of the class struggle! 
Let Messrs. the Dashnaktsakans and Socialist- 
Revolutionaries ³soar²; let them boycott the organised 
action of the workers from their lofty heights. The 
class-conscious proletariat will pull them down to this 
sinful earth and compel them to bow their heads before 
a conference with guarantees! 
Our object is clear: to gather the proletariat around 
the Delegate Council and to rally the latter around the 
unions for the achievement of our common demands, for 
the improvement of our conditions of life. 
Our road is clear: from a conference with guarantees 
to the satisfaction of the vital needs of the proletariat in 
the oil industry. 
In due time we shall call upon the Delegate Council 
to fight both the marsh-dweller supporters of a conference 
and the fairy-tale fantasies of the Socialist-Revolutionary 
and Dashnak boycottists. 
A conference with certain guarantees, or a conference 
is unnecessary! 
Gudok, No. 17, Reprinted from the newspaper 
February 3, 1908 
Unsigned

WHAT DO OUR RECENT STRIKES 
TELL US? 
Characteristic of the January and February strikes 
are certain new features, which introduce new elements 
into our movement. One of these features‹the defensive 
character of the strikes‹has already been mentioned 
in Gudok.56 But that is an external feature. Of much 
greater interest are the other, internal features, which 
throw a clear light on the development of our movement. 
We have in mind the character of the demands, 
the methods of waging the strikes, the new methods of 
struggle, etc. 
The first thing that strikes one is the content of the 
demands. It is characteristic that in a considerable 
number of the strikes no demands for bonuses were put 
forward (at Nobelıs, Motovilikha, Molot, Mirzoyevıs, 
Adamovıs and others). Where demands for bonuses were 
put forward, the workers, ashamed to fight only for 
³beshkesh,² tried to put them at the end of their lists 
of demands (at Pitoyevıs and others). Evidently, the old 
beshkesh habits are breaking down. ³Beshkesh² is beginning 
to lose importance in the eyes of the workers. From 
petty-bourgeois demands (for bonuses), the workers are 
passing to proletarian demands: dismissal of the more 
arrogant managers (at Nobelıs, Molot, Adamovıs),

J. V. S T A L I N 102 
reinstatement of discharged comrades (at Mirzoyevıs), 
extension of the rights of the oil field and works commission 
(at Nobelıs, Mirzoyevıs). In this respect, the strike 
at Mirzoyevıs is of special interest.57 The workers at 
this firm demand recognition of the commission and the 
reinstatement of discharged comrades as a guarantee that 
the firm will not discharge a single worker in future 
without the consent of the commission. The strike has 
already lasted two weeks, and is being conducted with 
rare solidarity. One must see these workers, one must 
know with what pride they say: ³We are not fighting for 
bonuses, or for towels and soap, but for the rights and 
the honour of the workersı commission²‹one must know 
all this, I say, to realise what a change has taken place 
in the minds of the workers. 
The second feature of the recent strikes is the awakening 
and activity of the masses of the oil workers. The 
point is that up to now the oil workers had to follow the 
mechanics, and they did not always follow them willingly; 
they rose independently only for bonuses. Moreover, a 
certain hostility towards the mechanics existed among 
them, and this was fanned by the provocative beshkesh 
policy of the oil owners (the Bibi-Eibat Company last 
year, and Lapshinıs recently). The recent strikes show 
that the passivity of the oil workers is receding into 
the past. It was they who started the strike at Nobelıs 
(in January) and the mechanics followed their lead; the 
strike at Mirzoyevıs (in February) was also inspired by 
the oil workers. It goes without saying that with the 
awakening activity of the oil workers, their hostility 
towards the mechanics is waning. The oil workers are 
beginning to go hand in hand with the mechanics.

WHAT DO OUR RECENT STRIKES TELL US? 103 
Of still greater interest is the third feature‹the 
friendly attitude of the strikers towards our union and, 
in general, the relatively well-organised way in which 
the strikes were conducted. Characteristic, first of all, 
is the absence of yard-long lists of demands, which 
hindered the successful conduct of strikes (recall the 
strike at the Caspian Company last year); now only 
a few important demands capable of uniting the masses 
are put forward (at Nobelıs, Mirzoyevıs, Motovilikha, 
Molot, and Adamovıs). Secondly, hardly any of these 
strikes take place without the active intervention of 
the union: the workers consider it necessary to invite representatives 
of the union (at Kokorevıs, Nobelıs, Molot, Mirzoyevıs, 
and others). The rivalry that formerly existed 
between the oil field and works commissions on the one 
hand and the union on the other is becoming a thing of 
the past. The workers are beginning to regard the union 
as their own offspring. Instead of being the unionıs competitors, 
the oil field and works commissions are becoming 
its supporters. This explains the larger degree of 
organisation observed in the recent strikes. 
From this follows the fourth feature‹the relative 
success of the recent strikes, or rather, the fact that 
partial strikes do not fail so often, and then not always 
completely. We have in mind primarily the strike at 
Kokorevıs. We think that the strike at Kokorevıs 
marked a turning point in the development of our 
methods of struggle. It and several other strikes (at Pitoyevıs 
and Motovilikha) show that, given 1) the organised 
conduct of the strikes, 2) the active intervention of 
the union, 3) a certain amount of perseverance and 4) the 
right choice of the moment for launching the struggle,

J. V. S T A L I N 104 
partial strikes may be far from fruitless. At all events, 
it has become clear that those who ³on principle² cry: 
³Down with partial strikes!² are advancing a risky slogan 
which is not sufficiently justified by the facts of the recent 
movement. On the contrary, we think that, given leadership 
by the union and the right choice of the moment 
to launch the struggle, partial strikes can be converted 
into a very important factor in uniting the proletariat. 
Such, in our opinion, are the most important internal 
features of the recent strikes. 
Gudok, No. 21, Reprinted from the newspaper 
March 2, 1908 
Signed: K. Koto

THE CHANGE IN THE OIL OWNERSı 
TACTICS 
Not so long ago‹just a few months back‹our oil 
owners were ³talking² about ³European-style² relations 
between workers and employers. 
At that time they tried to behave in a conciliatory 
manner. This is understandable: the incessant preaching of 
the ³meditative² Rin on the divine origin of collective 
agreements, the growing wave of partial strikes, the oil 
ownersı expectations of being able to ³regulate production² 
by means of a ³European-style² conference, and 
the pressure exercised to some extent by the authorities‹
all this put the oil owners in a conciliatory, ³European² 
mood. 
³Down with the anarchy of strikes!²‹exclaimed Rin. 
³Long live order!² responded the oil owners, in harmony 
with Rin. 
And it looked as if ³order² was being introduced. 
The number of repressive actions on the part of the employers 
seemed to diminish. The number of strikes also 
diminished. The oil owners ³found it necessary to come 
to terms² (see Neftyanoye Delo, December). 
But then the campaign began. The workers emphatically 
rejected the old, backstage type of conference. The

J. V. S T A L I N 106 
overwhelming majority of them expressed themselves in 
favour of a conference with guarantees. Thereby, the 
workers expressed a definite desire to utilise the conference 
to the utmost, to convert it into a weapon of organised, 
conscious struggle. 
Well, what has happened? 
We no longer hear any talk about ³European-style² 
relations. About ³expectations² of being able to ³regulate 
production² we hear not a word. The ³anarchy of 
strikes² no longer frightens the oil owners; on the contrary, 
they themselves are driving the workers towards 
³anarchy² by attacking them, by robbing them of their 
gains, by discharging advanced comrades, etc., etc. 
Evidently, the oil owners no longer find it necessary 
to come to terms. They prefer to attack. 
Already at their congress at the end of January the 
oil owners launched their attack upon the workers. They 
gagged the representatives of the unions. They buried 
the question of workersı settlements. They decided to 
³cancel² the questions of schools, medical aid, etc. They 
deprived the workers of the right to participate in the 
management of the peopleıs halls. 
By all these measures the oil owners made it felt 
that they were taking a ³new,² ³non-European² path, 
the path of open attacks upon the workers. 
The Council of the Congress is continuing the ³work² 
of their congress. It launched an attack on the workers by 
introducing the ³ten-kopek hospital levy.² This is apart 
from the minor orders of the Council, which bear the 
impress of the same change in the oil ownersı tactics. 
Then followed the usual ³intensification² of reprisals 
in the shape of the cancellation of previously won

THE CHANGE IN THE OIL OWNERSı TACTICS 107 
oil field and works rights, reduction of staffs, discharge 
of advanced workers, lockouts, etc. 
They reduced the oil field and works commissions to a 
cipher. The conflicts over the commission at Rothschildıs 
(Balakhany), the Caspian Company, Shibayevıs (Balakhany), 
Bornıs (Balakhany), Bieringıs, Mirzoyevıs and 
the Naphtha Producersı Association clearly prove this. 
On the pretext of ³reducing staffs² they are ³kicking 
out² the most influential comrades, especially the council 
delegates. The incidents that have occurred at the 
Caspian Company, at Bornıs, Mukhtarovıs (Balakhany), 
Shibayevıs (Balakhany), Lapshinıs (Bibi-Eibat) and 
Malnikovıs leave no room for doubt on this score. 
The lockout at Wotanıs crowns the ³new² tactics of 
the oil owners. 
By all these measures they are driving the workers 
on to the path of spontaneous and anarchic outbursts, 
which exhaust the workers. 
Still more characteristic are the forms of the repressive 
actions taken against strikers. We have in mind the 
firm of Mirzoyevıs, or more exactly, the manager of that 
firm, Mr. Markarov, who is inciting Moslems armed with 
rifles against the Armenian strikers and is thus creating 
the conditions for Armenian-Tatar conflicts. 
Such is the change that has taken place in the oil 
ownersı tactics. 
Evidently, the oil owners no longer want ³European 
conditions.² 
Seeing no prospect of the conference being ³successful,² 
losing hope of being able to ³regulate production² 
by means of a conference alone, without satisfying the 
principal demands of the workers, seeing the conference

J. V. S T A L I N 108 
changing from an instrument of disruption into an instrument 
for organising the mass of 50,000 workers‹the oil 
owners want, in one way or another, to free themselves 
from the conference by postponing it indefinitely or, at 
least, devitalising it. 
With that object in view they are resorting to a system 
of repressive measures, provoking the workers to premature 
action, breaking up the growing general movement into 
separate partial movements, and pushing the workers 
from the broad road of the class struggle into the crooked 
back streets of group conflicts. 
With the aid of all these measures they want to divert 
the workersı attention from a conference with guarantees, 
to discredit in the eyes of the workers the Delegate 
Council, which might unite them, to prevent the workers 
from uniting and thereby prevent them from preparing 
to win their demands. 
By acting in this way they want to provoke the as 
yet unorganised workers to take premature general 
action, which may provide them with the opportunity 
of ³utterly² crushing the workers and ensuring ³uninterrupted² 
production of oil for a long time to come. 
Such is the significance of the change in the oil ownersı 
tactics. 
What should be our tactics in view of all that has 
been said above? 
The oil owners are attacking us, taking advantage 
of our lack of organisation Consequently, our task is 
to rally around our union and defend ourselves from their 
blows by every means in our power. 
Efforts are being made to provoke us into spontaneous, 
partial outbursts with the object of splitting

THE CHANGE IN THE OIL OWNERSı TACTICS 109 
up our general movement‹consequently, we must not 
fall into the oil ownersı trap, we must refrain, as far as 
possible, from partial strikes, we must not split up the 
general movement. 
Efforts are being made to deprive us of the instrument 
of our unity, to rob us of the Delegate Council, 
by indefinitely postponing the conference and provoking 
us to premature general action. Consequently, it is our 
duty to demand the immediate convocation of the Delegate 
Council, to set to work to draw up the workersı 
demands and, in the course of this work, to rally the 
masses around the Delegate Council. 
After strengthening the Delegate Council and rallying 
the mass of 50,000 workers around it, we shall not 
find it difficult to deal properly with the non-European 
schemes of Messrs. the oil owners. 
Gudok, No. 22, Reprinted from the newspaper 
March 9, 1908 
Unsigned

WE MUST PREPARE! 
The executive of the oil industry workersı union has 
decided to take measures to secure the speedy convocation 
of the Delegate Council.58 
In this the executive was prompted by the numerous 
statements from workers who are refusing to wait any 
longer and are demanding the immediate convocation 
of the Delegate Council. 
The mechanicsı union has decided to act along the 
same lines. 
In the last few days both unions submitted the necessary 
statement to the Senior Factory Inspector. 
It must be assumed that the question will soon be 
decided one way or another. 
How the possessors of power and capital will answer 
the statement of the unions we, of course, cannot yet tell. 
They may yield to the workers and immediately 
convene the Delegate Council and then, in all probability, 
the conference arrangements will take their ³normal 
course.² 
On the other hand, they may procrastinate and not 
give a definite answer for the time being. 
In either case, we must be prepared for every contingency 
so as to prevent the oil owners from deceiving the 
workers.

WE MUST PREPARE! 111 
We must be ready to confront the oil owners fully 
armed at any moment. 
For this we must immediately set to work to draw up 
demands. 
We are going to a conference with guarantees, but 
with what shall we come before the oil owners if not 
with demands approved by the entire mass of the oil 
proletariat? Let us then draw up the workersı demands 
on wages, working hours, workersı settlements, peopleıs 
halls, medical assistance, etc. 
Our union has already set to work. In the columns 
of Gudok it has expressed its opinion on the questions of 
settlements, medical assistance, peopleıs halls and schools. 
The union has already issued these demands in the 
form of a pamphlet entitled Materials for the Conference. 
But that is not enough. 
All these demands must be submitted to the masses, 
so that they can discuss them and pass their opinion, 
for only their opinion is binding on them. 
The union, moreover, has not yet worked out the 
questions of wages and working hours. Consequently, we 
must proceed immediately to draw up demands on these 
questions too. 
With this object, our union will elect a special 
commission to draw up demands. 
This commission will establish contact with the council 
delegates and the oil field and works commissions 
of the four districts with the object of jointly working 
out with them the urgent questions affecting our daily life. 
Later, general meetings will be held at the works, 
oil fields and in living quarters, at which the demands 
will be finally endorsed.

J. V. S T A L I N 112 
That should be our plan of work in preparation for 
a conference with guarantees. 
Only by drawing up demands and making them 
known among the masses shall we be able to rally these 
masses around the Delegate Council. 
By rallying the masses around their Council, we shall 
be able to safeguard them against surprises that may be 
sprung on them by the oil owners. 
Not flabby philosophising about ³concretising² the 
points of the guarantees (see Promyslovy Vestnik59), 
nor frivolous outcries about ³the coming of spring² 
(remember the Socialist-Revolutionaries), but persevering 
effort in drawing up the workersı demands‹that is 
what above all should occupy us in face of impending 
events. 
And so, let us more energetically prepare for a conference 
with guarantees! 
Gudok, No. 23, Reprinted from the newspaper 
March 16, 1908 
Unsigned

ECONOMIC TERRORISM 
AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT 
The workersı struggle does not always and everywhere 
assume the same form. 
There was a time when in fighting their employers 
the workers smashed machines and set fire to factories. 
Machines are the cause of poverty! The factory is the 
seat of oppression! Therefore, smash and burn them!‹ 
said the workers at that time. 
That was the period of unorganised, anarchist-rebel 
conflicts. 
We know also of other cases where the workers, disillusioned 
with incendiarism and destruction, adopted ³more 
violent forms²‹killing directors, managers, foremen, 
etc. It is impossible to destroy all the machines and 
all the factories, said the workers at that time, and 
besides, it is not in the workersı interests to do so, but 
i t is always possible to frighten the managers and 
knock the starch out of them by means of terrorism‹ 
therefore, beat them up, terrify them! 
This was the period of individual terroristic conflicts 
stemming from the economic struggle. 
The labour movement sharply condemned both these 
forms of struggle and made them a thing of the past.

J. V. S T A L I N 114 
This is understandable. There is no doubt that the 
factory is indeed the seat of exploitation of the workers, 
and the machine still helps the bourgeoisie to extend 
this exploitation, but this does not mean that the machine 
and the factory are in themselves the cause of poverty. 
On the contrary, i t is precisely the factory and the 
machine that will enable the proletariat to break the 
chains of slavery, abolish poverty and vanquish all 
oppression‹all that is needed is that the factories and 
machines be transformed from the private property 
of individual capitalists into the public property of the 
people. 
On the other hand, what would our lives become if we 
set to work to destroy and burn the machines, factories 
and railways? It would be like living in a dreary 
desert, and the workers would be the first to lose their 
bread! . . . 
Clearly, we must not smash up the machines and 
factories, but gain possession of them, when that becomes 
possible, if we are indeed striving to abolish poverty. 
That is why the labour movement rejects anarchistrebel 
conflicts. 
There is no doubt that economic terrorism also has 
some apparent ³justification,² in so far as it is resorted 
to in order to intimidate the bourgeoisie. But what is the 
use of this intimidation if it is transient and fleeting? 
That it can only be transient is clear from the one fact 
alone that it is impossible to resort to economic terrorism 
always and everywhere. That is the first point. The second 
point is: Of what use to us is the fleeting fear of the 
bourgeoisie and the concessions this fear may wring from 
it if we have not behind us a powerful, mass, workersı or

ECONOMIC TERRORISM AND THE LABOUR MOVEMENT 115 
ganisation, which will always be ready to fight for the 
workersı demands and be capable of retaining the concessions 
we have won? Indeed facts tell us convincingly that 
economic terrorism kills the desire for such an organisation, 
robs the workers of the urge to unite and come out 
independently‹since they have terrorist heroes who 
are able to act for them. Should we cultivate the spirit 
of independent action among the workers? Should 
we cultivate the desire for unity among the workers? 
Of course we should! But can we resort to economic 
terrorism i f i t kills the desire for both among the 
workers? 
No, comrades! It is against our principles to terrorise 
the bourgeoisie by means of individual, stealthy acts of 
violence. Let us leave such ³deeds² to the notorious terrorist 
elements. We must come out openly against the bourgeoisie, 
we must keep it in a state of fear all the time, 
until final victory is achieved! And for this we need not 
economic terrorism, but a strong mass organisation 
which will be capable of leading the workers into the 
struggle. 
That is why the labour movement rejects economic 
terrorism. 
In view of what has been said above, the resolution 
recently adopted by the strikers at Mirzoyevıs against 
incendiarism and ³economic² assassination is of special 
interest. In this resolution the joint commission of the 
1,500 men at Mirzoyevıs, after mentioning the setting 
fire to a boiler room (in Balakhany) and the assassination 
of a manager on economic grounds (Surakhany), 
declares that it ³protests against such methods of struggle 
as assassination and incendiarism² (see Gudok, No. 24).

J. V. S T A L I N 116 
By this the men at Mirzoyevıs announced their final 
rupture with the old, terrorist, rebel tendencies. 
By this they resolutely took the path of the true 
labour movement. 
We greet the comrades at Mirzoyevıs and call upon 
all the workers to take the path of the proletarian mass 
movement as resolutely as they have done. 
Gudok, No. 25, Reprinted from the newspaper 
March 30, 1908 
Unsigned

THE OIL OWNERS 
ON ECONOMIC TERRORISM 
The question of economic terrorism continues to engage 
the attention of the ³public.² 
We have already expressed our opinion on this question 
and have condemned economic terrorism as harmful 
for the working class and, therefore, an unsuitable 
method of struggle. 
The workers in the oil fields and at the works have 
expressed themselves approximately along the same lines. 
The oil owners too have, of course, expressed their 
opinion on this subject. And i t turns out that their 
³views² differ radically from the views expressed by the 
workers; for while they condemn economic terrorism 
³emanating from the workers,² they say nothing against 
the same kind of terrorism on the part of the oil owners. 
We have in mind the well-known leading article 
on economic terrorism in the well-known organ of the 
oil owners (see Neftyanoye Delo, No. 6, article by Mr. 
K‹za60) 
Let us discuss this leading article. It is interesting 
not only as substantiation of the oil ownersı ³views² 
but also as an expression of their mood in the present 
stage of their struggle against the workers. For the sake 
of convenience the article must be divided into three

J. V. S T A L I N 118 
parts first, where Mr. K‹za raises certain particular 
points against the workers and their organisations; 
second, where he deals with the causes of economic terrorism; 
and third, the measures to combat it. 
Let us begin with the particular points. First of all 
about the men at Mirzoyevıs. It is generally known that 
immediately after the assassination of the manager of the 
Surakhany oil fields and the fire in the boiler room, 
the joint commission of the men at Mirzoyevıs, on 
behalf of 1,500 workers, unanimously protested against 
this method of struggle and denied that there was any 
connection between the fire and assassination on the one 
hand and the strike on the other. There would seem to 
be no grounds for doubting the sincerity of their protest. 
But K‹za thinks otherwise. He, like a carping 
³critic,² nevertheless deems it necessary to throw doubt 
on the workersı sincerity and says that ³the commission 
is mistaken,² that there is a direct connection between 
the fire and assassination and the strike. And this after 
the unanimous protest of the representatives of 1,500 workers! 
What is that if not evidence of a desire to distort 
the facts, to discredit the workers, to ³pillory² them, 
even if slander has to be resorted to in the process? And 
after this, is it possible to believe in the sincerity of 
Mr. K‹za, who talks such a lot in his article about 
³ennobling the criminal will of people.² 
From the workers at Mirzoyevıs Mr. K‹za passes 
to our union. Everybody knows that our union is growing 
rapidly. One can judge of the enormous influence it 
exercises among the workers from the mere fact that 
the entire conference campaign is proceeding under its 
direct leadership. And Gudok merely noted a commonly

THE OIL OWNERS ON ECONOMIC TERRORISM 119 
known fact when it said that ³the influence and importance 
of the union is growing day by day, that it is 
gradually winning the recognition of even the most 
backward and uneducated sections of the masses of 
workers as the natural leader of their economic struggle.² 
Yes, all this is a commonly known fact. But our implacable 
³critic² cares nothing for facts, he ³throws doubt² 
on all and sundry, he is ready even to deny facts in order 
to lower the prestige and dignity of the workersı union 
in the eyes of his readers! And, after all this, Mr. K‹za 
has the effrontery to proclaim himself a supporter of 
our union and an advocate of ³ennobling the economic 
struggle²! 
Whoever takes one step must take the next; whoever 
rails against our union must also rail against our newspaper, 
and so Mr. K‹za passes on to Gudok; and it turns 
out that Gudok ³is not doing all it could do to clear 
the atmosphere of the economic struggle of unnecessary 
acrimony, dangerous resentment, excessive irritation and 
ignorant malice,² that Gudok does nothing but makes 
³forays against other organisations, parties, classes, 
newspapers and individuals, and even against its own 
brother, Promyslovy Vestnik.² 
That is the song Mr. K‹za sings. We could afford 
to ignore all this chatter of the celebrated ³critic²‹ 
what will a flunkey of capital not chatter about in the 
hope of pleasing his master! But so be it! Let us, on 
this occasion, devote a few words to the great critic 
from Baku. And so, Gudok ³is not clearing the atmosphere 
of the struggle of unnecessary acrimony, dangerous resentment.² 
. . . Let us assume that all this is true. But, in the 
sacred name of capital, tell us what can introduce more

J. V. S T A L I N 120 
acrimony and resentment‹the printed word of Gudok or 
the actual deeds of the oil owners, who are systematically 
discharging workers, introducing the ten-kopek hospital 
levy, depriving the workers of the peopleıs halls, resorting 
to the services of kochis,61 beating up workers, etc.? 
Why does not Mr. K‹za, this ³devoted² champion of 
the idea of ³ennobling the economic struggle,² find it 
necessary to say even a single word about the activities 
of the oil owners which incense and embitter the workers? 
After all, the ³dark² elements which are likely to resort 
to economic terrorism do not read our paper, they are more 
likely to be incensed and embittered by the repressive 
measures, big and small, of the oil owners‹that being 
the case, why does Mr. K‹za, who has so much to say 
against Gudok, say nothing at all about the ³dark deeds² 
of Messrs. the oil owners? And is it not clear after this 
that Mr. K‹zaıs insolence knows no bounds? 
Secondly, where does Mr. K‹za get the idea that 
Gudok has not tried ³to clear the atmosphere of the economic 
struggle of unnecessary acrimony and dangerous 
resentment²? What about Gudokıs agitation against economic 
terrorism and the stay-in strike, against 
anarchist-rebel strikes and in favour of organised strikes, 
against partial actions and in favour of the general 
class defence of our interests? What is that if not ³clearing 
the atmosphere of the struggle of unnecessary acrimony 
and dangerous resentment²? Is Mr. K‹za really 
unaware of all this? Or perhaps, in playing the role of 
capitalıs advocate, he considers it necessary to pretend 
that he does not know? But if that is the case, why 
all this fine talk about ³morality² and ³human conscience²?

THE OIL OWNERS ON ECONOMIC TERRORISM 121 
Gudok makes ³forays against other organisations, 
parties, classes, newspapers, individuals, and even against 
Promyslovy Vestnik,² says Mr. K‹za, continuing his 
indictment. Quite right, Mr. K‹za, you have accidentally 
spoken the truth! Gudok does, indeed, wage a struggle 
against other classes and their organs. But can 
you demand anything else from a newspaper of the 
workers, who are exploited by all the other classes 
and groups? Stop playing the part of ³innocent angel² 
and tell us straight, without equivocation: do you really 
not know that Neftyanoye Delo, the organ of the oil 
owners, and its master, the Council of the Congress, 
were established precisely for the purpose of making 
³forays² against the working class, against the workersı 
Party, and against the workersı newspapers? Have you 
really forgotten the recent instructions issued by the 
Council of the Congress to impose a ten-kopek levy, to 
raise the prices of meals, to reduce the number of schools 
and hutments, to deprive the workers of the peopleıs 
halls, etc.? And is not Neftyanoye Delo, the organ of the 
oil owners, trying to justify these Asiatic instructions? 
Or perhaps these are not ³forays² against the workers, 
but the ³ennobling of the criminal will,² regulation of 
the economic struggle, etc.? How else do you want a 
workersı newspaper to act towards the oil owners who 
are exploiting the workers, towards their organisation, 
which is fooling the workers, towards their organ, 
which i s corrupting the workers, and towards Mr. 
K‹za, for example, who is making comical efforts 
to find ³philosophical² justification for the Asiatically 
barbarous steps of the oil owners? Does Mr. K‹za really 
fail to understand the necessity of the class struggle

J. V. S T A L I N 122 
between the workers and the employers? Of course! Mr. 
K‹za understands all this perfectly well: he himself 
is waging a struggle against the proletariat and its organisations! 
But, firstly, he opposes the struggle waged 
by the workers, but not a struggle in general; secondly, 
the oil owners, it appears, are not fighting, but only 
³ennobling the struggle²; thirdly, K‹za is not opposed 
to the workers, no‹he is entirely for the workers for the 
benefit . . . of the oil owners; fourthly, after all K‹za 
³gets paid,² and this, too, must be taken into consideration, 
you know. . . . 
Evidently, Mr. K‹zaıs effrontery can successfully 
compete with his ³conscience² in its capacity to stretch 
as circumstances require. 
That is how the matter stands in Mr. K‹zaıs leading 
article as regards his particular points against the proletariat 
and its organisations. 
* 
* 
* 
Let us now pass to the second part of his article. 
In it the author speaks of the causes of economic 
terrorism. It ³transpires² that the cause is the ³darkness 
of the minds² and the ³criminal will² of the backward 
sections of the working class. This ³darkness,² this 
³criminality,² in their turn, are due to the fact that the 
workersı unions and newspapers are not conducting 
sufficiently energetic enlightening and ennobling activities 
among the workers. Of course, adds Mr. K‹za, ³the 
programmes (of the unions?) do not approve of economic 
terrorism,² but mere ³disapproval in the programme is 
not enough, once we see that life has taken the wrong 
road. Here an active struggle must be waged . . . by all

THE OIL OWNERS ON ECONOMIC TERRORISM 123 
parties and unions² ³against the evil which has arisen.² 
To explain what he means, Mr. K‹za goes on to say: 
³Only when . . . all friends of the workers, irrespective 
of their party affiliation, wage an energetic struggle 
against . . . economic terrorism, and only then, will 
assassination disappear,² etc. 
And so, the workersı minds are dark, and that is 
why they often resort to assassination; but their minds 
are dark because their unions and newspapers make no 
effort to ³enlighten and ennoble² them‹hence, the 
workersı unions and newspapers are to blame for everything. 
Such is the song Mr. K‹za sings. 
We shall not dwell on the confusion that reigns in 
Mr. K‹zaıs head about economic terrorism‹we have in 
mind his ignorant statement that economic terrorism is a 
programmatic question. We only wish to make the following 
observations: 1) If, in mentioning ³programmatic 
terrorism,² Mr. K‹za talks about unions, does he really 
not know that the unions in Russia do not have any 
programmes? Every working man knows that! 2) If, however, 
he has parties in mind, does he really not know what 
every schoolboy knows, that economic terrorism is not 
a question of programme, but a question of tactics? 
Why then all this palaver about a programme? We are surprised 
that Messrs. the oil owners were unable to hire 
a better, or at least a less ignorant ³ideologist.² 
Nor shall we dwell on the other, this time muddled 
(and not only ignorant!) statement of Mr. K‹zaıs that, 
as regards economic terrorism, ³life has taken the wrong 
road² and that ³we² must fight against life. We shall 
merely observe that our cause would be in a bad way

J. V. S T A L I N 124 
if it was life that had taken the wrong road, and 
not individuals who have dropped behind life. The 
strength of our agitation lies precisely in the fact that 
life itself, all-powerful, developing life, is demanding a 
struggle against economic terrorism. If Mr. K‹za fails 
to understand this, we advise him to migrate to 
another planet. There, perhaps, he will be able to apply 
his muddled theory about fighting against developing 
life. . . . 
Let us rather pass to Mr. K‹zaıs ³analysis.² 
First of all we would like to ask: does Mr. K‹za 
really think that it is the workersı unions and newspapers 
that are the cause of economic terrorism? 
What does ³enlightening² the workers mean? It 
means teaching the workers to wage a class-conscious 
systematic struggle! (Mr. K‹za agrees with this!) But 
who else could engage in this task if not the workersı 
unions and newspapers with their oral and printed agitation 
in favour of an organised struggle? 
What does ³ennobling² the economic struggle mean? 
It means directing it against the system, but under no 
circumstances against persons! (Even K‹za agrees with 
this!) But who engages in this task, except the workersı 
unions and newspapers? 
But do not the oil owners reduce this struggle against 
the working class to a struggle against individual workers, 
singling out and discharging the most class conscious 
of them? 
If Mr. K‹za is really convinced of the justice of 
his charge against the workersı unions and newspapers, 
why does he offer his advice to these unions and 
newspapers? Does he really not know that organisa

THE OIL OWNERS ON ECONOMIC TERRORISM 125 
tions ³which make forays against other classes, newspapers, 
individuals,² etc., will not follow his advice? 
Why does he waste his time pounding water in a 
mortar? 
Obviously, he himself does not believe his accusation. 
And if, in spite of this, Mr. K‹za talks against the 
unions, he does so only in order to divert the attention 
of his readers from the real cause, to conceal the real 
³culprits² from them. 
But no, Mr. K‹za! You will not succeed in concealing 
from your readers the real causes of economic terrorism. 
Not the workers and their organisations, but the activities 
of Messrs. the oil owners, which incense and embitter 
the workers, are the real cause of ³economic assassinations.² 
You point to the ³darkness² and ³ignorance² of 
certain sections of the proletariat. But where are ³darkness² 
and ³ignorance² to be combated if not in schools 
and at lectures? Why, then, are Messrs. the oil owners 
cutting down the number of schools and lectures? And 
why do not you, the ³sincere² advocate of the struggle 
against ³darkness,² raise your voice against the oil 
owners who are depriving the workers of schools and 
lectures? 
You talk about ³ennobling² habits. Why then, my 
dear sir, were you quiet when Messrs. the oil owners 
deprived the workers of the peopleıs halls, those centres 
of popular entertainment? 
You sing about ³ennobling the economic struggle,² 
but why were you silent when the hirelings of capital 
killed the working man Khanlar62 (at the Naphtha

J. V. S T A L I N 126 
Producersı Association), when Bornıs, the Caspian Company, 
Shibayevıs, Mirzoyevıs, Molot, Motovilikha, Bieringıs, 
Mukhtarovıs, Malnikovıs and other firms discharged 
their most advanced workers, and when workers 
at Shibayevıs, Mukhtarovıs, Molot, Runo, Kokorevıs in 
Bibi-Eibat, and other firms were beaten up? 
You talk about the workersı ³criminal will,² about 
³unnecessary acrimony,² etc., but where were you hiding 
when Messrs. the oil owners infuriated the workers, 
incensed the most sensitive and most easily inflamed of 
them‹the temporary workers and the unemployed? And 
do you know, my dear sir, that it was precisely that section 
of the workers which was doomed to starvation 
by the notorious ten-kopek hospital levy and the raising 
of the price of meals in the canteens run by the Council 
of the Congress? 
You talk about the horrors of ³blood and tears² 
called forth by economic terrorism, but do you know how 
much blood and tears is shed when large numbers of 
workers are in jured and can find no place in the hospitals 
run by the Council of the Congress? Why are Messrs. the 
oil owners reducing the number of hutments? And why are 
you not shouting about it as much as you are shouting 
against the workersı unions and newspapers? 
You sing about ³conscience,² and so forth; but why 
is your crystal clear conscience silent about all these 
reprisals which Messrs. the oil owners are carrying out? 
You say . . . but enough! It should be obvious that 
the main cause of ³economic assassinations² is not the 
workers and their organisations, but the activities of 
Messrs. the oil owners, which incense and embitter the 
workers.

THE OIL OWNERS ON ECONOMIC TERRORISM 127 
It is no less clear that Mr. K‹za is a miserable hireling 
of Messrs. the oil owners who throws all the blame upon 
the workersı organisations and thus tries to justify the 
actions of his masters in the eyes of the ³public.² 
* 
* 
* 
Let us now pass to the third part of Mr. K‹zaıs 
article. 
In the third part of his article Mr. K‹za speaks 
about measures to combat economic terrorism, and his 
³measures² are fully in keeping with his ³philosophy² 
³about the causes² of economic terrorism. 
Let us hear what the great philosopher from Baku 
has to say: 
³An active struggle must be waged against the evil 
that has arisen, and the slogan of this struggle must be 
issued. This slogan, to be accepted by all parties and 
organisations, unions, and circles, must now be: ŒDown 
with economic terrorism!ı Only when we boldly hoist 
the pure white flag bearing this slogan, and only then . . . 
will assassinations disappear.² 
Thus philosophises Mr. K‹za. 
As you see, Mr. K‹za remains faithful to his god 
capital to the end. 
Firstly, he removed (philosophically removed!) all 
³blame² for ³economic assassinations² from the oil owners 
and laid it on the workers, their unions and newspapers. 
In this way he fully ³justified² in the eyes of socalled 
³society² the Asiatically aggressive tactics of 
Messrs. the oil owners. . . . 
Secondly‹and most important for the oil owners‹ 
he ³invented² the cheapest method of combating

J. V. S T A L I N 128 
³assassinations,² a method that will involve no expenditure 
for the oil owners‹intensified agitation by the unions 
and newspapers against economic terrorism. By this he 
once again emphasised that the oil owners should not 
yield to the workers, should not incur ³expenditure.² 
Both cheap and easy! Messrs. the oil owners may 
exclaim on hearing Mr. K‹zaıs proposal. 
Of course, Messrs. the oil owners could ³conveniently 
flout² the opinion of so-called ³society,² but what 
objection can they have to a K‹za coming along and 
justifying them in the eyes of ³society² in the interests 
of ³the human conscience²? 
On the other hand, why should they not rejoice when, 
after this justification, the same K‹za comes along and 
proposes the ³surest² and cheapest means of combating 
economic terrorism? Let the unions and newspapers 
agitate freely and unhindered, so long as it does not 
affect the pocket of the oil owners. Well, isnıt that 
liberal? . . . Why should they not, after this, send 
Mr. K‹za, their ³Warbling Brigand,² on to the literary 
stage? 
And yet, it is sufficient to think a little, it is sufficient 
only to adopt the point of view of the classconscious 
workers, to see at once the utter absurdity of 
the measure Mr. K‹za proposes. 
Here it is by no means a matter of the unions and 
newspapers alone; the unions and newspapers have long 
been conducting agitation against economic terrorism, 
and yet ³assassinations² have not ceased. It is much 
more a matter of the activities of Messrs. the oil owners, 
which incense and embitter the workers, of the economic 
repressive measures, big and small, the Asiatically aggres

THE OIL OWNERS ON ECONOMIC TERRORISM 129 
sive tactics of Messrs. the oil owners, which foster, and 
will continue to foster, the ³economic assassinations² 
with which we are concerned. 
Tell me, if you please: what can agitation alone by 
the unions and newspapers do, even if those unions and 
newspapers are very influential, in face of the incensing 
activities of Messrs. the oil owners who are robbing the 
workers of one gain after another, thereby pushing the 
least class conscious of them on to the path of ³economic 
assassinations²? Clearly, anti-terrorist agitation alone, 
even if conducted under a ³pure white flag,² is powerless 
to abolish it. 
Obviously, more profound measures than simple agitation 
are needed to cause the ³disappearance² of ³economic 
assassinations²; and what is primarily needed is that 
the oil owners should drop their repressive measures, big 
and small, and satisfy the just demands of the workers. 
. . . Only when the oil owners abandon their Asiatically 
aggressive tactics of lowering wages, taking 
away the peopleıs halls, reducing the number of schools 
and hutments, collecting the ten-kopek hospital levy, 
raising the price of meals, systematically discharging 
advanced workers, beating them up, and so forth, only 
when the oil owners definitely take the path of cultured 
European-style relations with the masses of the workers 
and their unions and regard them as a force ³on an equal 
footing²‹only then will the ground for the ³disappearance² 
of ³assassinations² be created. 
All this is so clear that it needs no proof. 
But Mr. K‹za fails to understand it; indeed, he 
cannot, or more correctly, does not wish to understand 
it, because it is ³unprofitable² for Messrs. the oil

J. V. S T A L I N 130 
owners; for it would involve them in a certain 
amount of expenditure, and it would reveal the whole 
truth about those who are ³guilty² of economic ³assassinations.² 
. . . 
The only conclusion to be drawn is that K‹za is 
a flunkey of capital. 
But what follows from this, from K‹zaıs role as 
a flunkey? 
What follows is that Mr. K‹za is not expressing 
his own views, but the views of the oil owners who 
³inspire² him. Consequently, K‹zaıs article expresses 
not his own philosophy, but the philosophy of Messrs. 
the oil owners. Obviously, it is the oil owners who are 
speaking through the mouth of K‹za; K‹za is merely 
conveying their ³thoughts, wishes and sentiments.² 
In this, and this alone, lies the interest of Mr. 
K‹zaıs article that we are discussing. 
K‹za as Koza*, K‹za as a ³personality,² is an 
absolute nonentity for us, imponderable matter of no 
value whatever. K‹za has no grounds whatever for complaining 
that Gudok makes ³forays² against his ³personality²; 
we assure Mr. K‹za that Gudok was never 
interested in his so-called ³personality.² 
But K‹za as an impersonal something, K‹za as the 
absence of ³personality,² K‹za as the mere expression 
of the opinion and sentiments of Messrs. the oil owners is 
certainly of some value to us. It is from this aspect that 
we are examining both K‹za himself and his article. 
It is obvious that Mr. K‹za is not singing for nothing. 
The fact that in the first part of his article he fu- 
* Koza‹the Russian for goat.‹Tr.

THE OIL OWNERS ON ECONOMIC TERRORISM 131 
riously attacks the unions and tries to discredit them, 
that in the second part of his article he accuses the 
unions of cultivating economic terrorism, but says not a 
word about the Asiatic instructions issued by the oil 
owners, and that in the third part of his article he 
points to anti-terroristic agitation as the only measure 
with which to combat ³assassinations,² leaving aside 
the aggressive tactics of his masters,‹all that shows 
that the oil owners do not intend to make any concessions 
to the masses of the workers. 
The oil owners will attack, the oil owners must attack, 
but you workers and unions, be good enough to retreat‹this 
is what Mr. K‹zaıs article tells us, this is what the 
oil owners tell us through the mouth of their ³Warbling 
Brigand.² 
Such is the moral to be drawn from Mr. K‹zaıs 
article. 
It remains for us workers, our organisations and 
newspapers, to keep a close eye on Messrs. the oil owners, 
not to allow ourselves to be provoked by their outrageous 
actions, but to continue firmly and calmly along 
the path of converting our spontaneous struggle into 
a strictly class struggle, which systematically leads to 
a definite goal. 
As for the hypocritical screeching of various hirelings 
of capital, we can afford to ignore them. 
Gudok, Nos. 28, 30 and 32, Reprinted from the newspaper 
April 21, May 4 and 18, 1908 
Signed: K. Kato

THE PRESS63 
FLUNKEY ³SOCIALISTS² 
One of the newspapers published in Ti f l i s i s a 
Georgian-language one which calls itself Napertskali.64 
It is a new and at the same time a very old paper, 
for it is the continuation of all the Menshevik newspapers 
published in Tiflis since the time of Skhivi of 
1905. Napertskali is edited by an old group of Menshevik 
opportunists. But that is not the only point, of 
course. The main point is that the opportunism of this 
group is something exceptional, something fabulous. 
Opportunism is lack of principle, political spinelessness. 
We declare that no Menshevik group has displayed 
such crass spinelessness as is displayed by the Tiflis group. 
In 1905 this group recognised the role of the proletariat 
as the leader of the revolution (see Skhivi). In 1906 it 
changed its ³position² and declared that ³it is no use 
relying on the workers . . . the initiative can come 
only from the peasants² (see Skhivi). In 1907 it changed 
its ³position² again and stated that ³leadership of the 
revolution must belong to the liberal bourgeoisie² (see 
Azri65), etc., etc. 
But never has the above-mentioned groupıs lack 
of principle attained such a shameless degree as

FLUNKEY ³SOCIALISTS² 133 
now, in the summer of 1908. We have in mind the 
appraisal in the columns of Napertskali of the murder 
of that spiritual enslaver of the dispossessed, the 
so-called Exarch. The story of this murder is well 
known. A certain group killed the Exarch, and also a 
captain of gendarmes who was returning with a report 
from ³the scene of the crime,² and then attacked a procession 
of hooligans who were accompanying the body 
of the Exarch. Obviously, this was not a hooligan 
group, but nor was it a revolutionary group, for no 
revolutionary group would commit such an act at 
the present time, when our forces are being mustered, 
and thus jeopardise the cause of uniting the proletariat. 
The attitude of Social-Democracy towards groups 
of this kind i s commonly known: ascertaining the 
conditions which give rise to such groups, and combating 
these conditions, i t at the same time wages 
an ideological and organisational struggle against these 
groups, discredits them in the eyes of the proletariat 
and dissociates the proletariat from them. But that is 
not what Napertskali does. Without ascertaining or 
explaining anything, i t belches a few banal liberal 
phrases against terrorism in general, and then goes on 
to advise, and not only advise but order its readers to 
do nothing more nor less than report such groups to 
the police, to betray them to the police! This is disgraceful, 
but, unfortunately, i t is a fact. Listen to 
what Napertskali says: 
³To haul the murderers of the Exarch before a 
court‹such is the only means of wiping this stain from 
oneself forever. . . . Such is the duty of the advanced 
elements² (see Napertskali, No. 5).

J. V. S T A L I N 134 
Social-Democrats in the role of voluntary police 
informers‹this is what the Menshevik opportunists in 
Tiflis have brought us to! 
The political spinelessness of the opportunists is 
no mysterious growth. It springs from the irresistible 
striving to adapt oneself to the tastes of the bourgeoisie, 
a striving to please the ³masters² and earn their 
praise. Such is the psychological basis of the opportunist 
tactics of adaptation. And so, to stand well with 
the ³gentry,² to please them, or at all events to 
avert their wrath over the murder of the Exarch, our 
Menshevik opportunists grovel like flunkeys before them 
and take upon themselves the function of police sleuths! 
Tactics of adaptation could not go further than that ! 
HYPOCRITICAL ZUBATOVITES 
Among the cities in the Caucasus which produce 
original types of opportunism is Baku. In Baku there 
is a group which is still more to the right and, therefore, 
more unprincipled than the Tiflis group. We do 
not mean Promyslovy Vestnik, which has entered 
into unlawful cohabitation with the bourgeois Segodnya; 
enough has been written about that paper in our 
press. We are referring to the Shendrikovite Pravoye Delo 
group, the progenitors of the Baku Mensheviks. True, this 
group has long ceased to exist in Baku; to escape the wrath 
of the Baku workers and their organisations it had to 
migrate to St. Petersburg. But it sends its screeds to 
Baku, it writes only about Baku affairs, it is seeking 
for supporters precisely in Baku, it is striving to ³win² 
the Baku proletariat. It will not be amiss, there

HYPOCRITICAL ZUBATOVITES 135 
fore, to talk about this group. Before us lies a copy of 
Pravoye Delo, No. 2-3. We turn over the pages and before 
our eyes unfolds the old picture of the old, shady gang, 
Messrs. the Shendrikovs.66 Here is Ilya Shendrikov, the 
well-known ³handshaker² of Mr. Junkovsky, a veteran of 
backstage intrigue. Here also is Gleb Shendrikov, former 
Socialist-Revolutionary, former Menshevik, former 
³Zubatovite,² and now in retirement. And here is the celebrated 
chatterbox, the ³immaculate² Klavdia Shendrikova, 
a pleasant lady in all respects. Nor is there a lack of 
³followers² of various types, like the Groshevs and 
Kalinins, who played a part in the movement sometime 
ago, but who are now behind the times and are living 
only on their reminiscences. Even the shade of the late Lev 
rises before us. . . . In short, the picture is complete! 
But who needs all this? Why are these inglorious 
shadows of the gloomy past thrust upon the workers? 
Are they calling upon the workers to set fire to the derricks? 
Or to vilify the Party and trample it in the mire? 
Or to go to the conference without the workers and then 
strike a shady bargain with Mr. Junkovsky? 
No! The Shendrikovs want to ³save² the Baku workers! 
They ³see² that after 1905, i.e., after the workers 
had driven out the Shendrikovs, ³the workers find themselves 
on the brink of a precipice² (see Pravoye Delo 
p. 80); and so the Shendrikovs produced Pravoye Delo 
in order to ³save² the workers, to lead them out of the 
³blind alley.² To achieve this they propose that the 
workers should return to the past, abandon the gains 
of the last three years, turn their backs on Gudok and 
Promyslovy Vestnik, give up the existing unions, send 
Social-Democracy to the devil, and after expelling all

J. V. S T A L I N 136 
the non-Shendrikovites from the workersı commissions, 
unite around conciliation boards. Strikes are no longer 
needed, nor are illegal organisations‹all that the 
workers need are conciliation boards, on which the 
Shendrikovs and Gukasovs67 will ³settle questions² 
with Mr. Junkovskyıs permission. . . . 
That is how they want to lead the Baku labour 
movement out of the ³blind alley.² 
That is exactly what is proposed by Mr. K‹za, 
the chameleon from Neftyanoye Delo (see Neftyanoye 
Delo, No. 11). 
But is not this the way the workers were ³saved² 
by Zubatov in Moscow, by Gapon in St. Petersburg, 
and by Shayevich in Odessa? And did they not all turn 
out to be mortal enemies of the workers? 
Upon whom, then, do these hypocritical ³saviours² 
want to work their daylight swindle? 
No, Messrs. the Shendrikovs, although you, along with 
K‹za, assert that the Baku proletariat is ³not yet 
mature,² that it yet ³has to pass its matriculation examination² 
(before whom?) (see Pravoye Delo, p. 2), you 
will not succeed in fooling it! 
The Baku proletariat is sufficiently politically conscious 
to be able to tear off your masks and put you in 
your proper place! 
Who are you? Where do you come from? 
You are not Social-Democrats, for you grew up 
and are living in conflict with Social-Democracy, in 
conflict with the Party principle! 
Nor are you trade unionists, for you trample in the 
mire the workersı unions, which are naturally permeated 
with the spirit of Social-Democracy!

HYPOCRITICAL ZUBATOVITES 137 
You are just Gaponites and Zubatovites, hypocritically 
wearing the mask of ³friends of the people²! 
You are enemies within the camp and, therefore, 
the most dangerous enemies of the proletariat! 
Down with the Shendrikovites! Turn your backs 
on the Shendrikovites! 
That is our answer to your Pravoye Delo, Messrs. 
the Shendrikovs! 
And that is how the Baku proletariat will respond 
to your hypocritical advances to them! . . . 
Bakinsky Proletary, No. 5, Reprinted from the newspaper 
July 20, 1908 
Signed: Ko. . . .

THE CONFERENCE AND THE WORKERS 
The conference campaign has been suspended. Negotiations 
between the parties have been interrupted.68 
The old but eternally new conference has again been 
prevented from meeting. The Delegate Council, the organising 
committee, the drawing up of demands, reports 
to the masses, the broad union of the workers 
around their commissions, of the commissions around the 
trade unions and of the latter around Social-Democracy‹ 
all this has been interrupted and made a thing of the 
past. Forgotten also is the old hypocritical talk about 
³regulating production² by means of a conference, and 
about ³ennobling the relations² between the workers 
and the employers. Mr. Junkovsky, that old clown from 
Tiflis, announces that the ³show² is over. Mr. Kara- 
Murza, that dissipated flunkey of capital, applauds him. 
The curtain falls, and we get the old familiar picture: the 
oil owners and the workers are in their former positions, 
waiting for further storms, for new conflicts. 
But there is something ³incomprehensible² here. 
Only yesterday the oil owners were imploring the 
workers to agree to a conference with a view to putting 
an end to ³the anarchy of partial strikes,² to ³come 
to terms² with them, while the authorities, in the

THE CONFERENCE AND THE WORKERS 139 
person of the notorious Junkovsky, invited influential 
workers to meet them, arranged official negotiations 
with them, urged upon them the advantages of a collective 
agreement. But suddenly a sharp change took place‹ 
a conference was declared to be superfluous, a collective 
agreement harmful and ³the anarchy of partial strikes² 
desirable! 
What does it mean? How is this ³queer² situation to 
be explained? Who is ³to blame² for the prevention of 
the conference? 
The workers are to blame, of course, answers Mr. 
Junkovsky: We had not yet started negotiations, but 
they already came out with a demand in the form of 
an ultimatum about the unions. Let the workers abandon 
their unions and then we shall have a conference. 
If they do not, we do not want a conference! 
We agree, the oil owners respond in chorus. It is 
indeed the workers who are to blame. Let them abandon 
their unions. We do not want any unions! 
They are quite right; indeed the workers are to blame, 
says the ³mechanicsı union,² the union without workers, 
echoing the enemies of the workers. Why should not the 
workers abandon their unions? Would it not be better 
first to bargain a little after abandoning our demands, 
and then to talk about demands? 
Yes, thatıs right, assents Promyslovy Vestnik, the 
newspaper without readers, backing the union without 
workers. Respectable workers first bargain and then talk 
about ultimatums; first they surrender their positions 
and then win them back again. The Baku workers lacked 
this respectability, they proved to be too disreputable, 
almost boycottists.

J. V. S T A L I N 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
140 
We knew it, we foresaw it all long ago, the Dashnaks 
and Socialist-Revolutionaries observe with profundity. 
Had the workers shouted boycott, had they completely 
abandoned the unions, and had they plunged 
into a strike without any preparation and rallying of 
some sort of broad masses, they would have understood 
that a conference was impossible without ³land and freedom,² 
and that ³by struggle you will achieve your 
rights.²69 . . . 
That is what the ³friends² and the enemies of the 
Baku proletariat say. 
Does the unsoundness of these accusations against 
the Baku proletariat need any proof? It is enough to 
bring the Dashnaks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries, 
who accuse the workers of being enamoured with the 
conference, face to face with the mechanics and oil 
owners who accuse these very same workers of boycotting 
the conference‹it is enough, I say, to contrast these 
mutually exclusive views to see at once the utter 
absurdity and falsity of the above-mentioned accusations 
. . . 
But in that case, who is really ³to blame² for the 
prevention of the conference? 
Let us briefly review the history of the conference. 
This is not the first time that the oil owners have invited 
the workers to a conference‹this is the fourth conference 
we have seen (1905, 1906, 1907, 1908). On every occasion 
it was the oil owners who first called for a conference, 
and on every occasion the authorities helped them ³to 
come to terms² with the workers, to conclude a collective 
agreement. The oil owners were pursuing their own 
objects: in return for minor concessions they wanted

THE CONFERENCE AND THE WORKERS 141 
to guarantee themselves against strikes and ensure the 
uninterrupted bailing of o i l . The authorities were 
s t i l l more interested in the maintenance of ³peace 
and quiet² in the oil kingdom, quite apart from the 
fact that very many members of the government own 
shares in the big oil firms, that the taxes on the oil 
industry constitute one of the most important items of 
revenue in the state budget, that Baku crude oil feeds 
³home industry² and, consequently, the slightest hitch 
in the oil industry inevitably affects the state of industry 
in Russia. 
But this is not all. Apart from everything already said 
above, peace in Baku is important for the government 
because the mass actions of the Baku proletariat‹both 
the oil industry workers and the marine workers connected 
with them‹have a contagious effect on the proletariat 
in other cities. Recall the facts. The f i r s t general 
strike in Baku in the spring of 1903 marked the beginning 
of the celebrated July strikes and demonstrations 
in the South-Russian towns.70 The second general strike 
in November and December 190471 served as the signal 
for the glorious January and February actions all 
over Russia. In 1905, after quickly recovering from the 
Armenian-Tatar massacres, the Baku proletariat again 
rushed into battle, infecting with its enthusiasm ³the 
whole Caucasus.² Lastly, beginning with 1906, after 
the retreat of the revolution in Russia, Baku remains 
³irrepressible,² to this day actually enjoys certain 
liberties, and every year celebrates proletarian May 
Day better than any other place in Russia, rousing feelings 
of noble envy in other towns. . . . After all this, 
it is not difficult to understand why the authorities

J. V. S T A L I N 142 
tried not to incense the Baku workers, and on each occasion 
supported the oil owners in their attempts to confer 
with the workers, ³to come to terms,² to conclude a collective 
agreement. 
On every occasion, however, we Bolsheviks answered 
with a boycott. 
Why? 
Because the oil owners wanted to confer and conclude 
an agreement not with the masses, and not in sight of 
the masses, but with a handful of individuals behind 
the backs of the masses. They know perfectly well that 
only in this way can the many thousands of oil industry 
workers be deceived. 
What is the essence of our conference? Our conference 
means negotiations between the oil proletariat 
and the oil bourgeoisie regarding demands. I f the 
negotiations are successful, the conference will end in 
a collective agreement for a certain period and binding 
on both parties. Speaking generally, we have no 
objection to a conference, because under certain conditions 
it can unite the workers into a single whole on 
the basis of common demands. But a conference can 
unite the workers only: 1) if the masses take a most active 
part in it, freely discuss their demands, control their 
representatives, etc; 2) if the masses have the opportunity 
to back their demands by a general strike if necessary. 
Can the workers actively confer, discuss demands, etc., 
without a certain amount of freedom to meet in the oil 
fields and at the works, without a Delegate Council that 
can meet freely, without the leadership of the unions? 
Of course not! Is it possible to back oneıs demands in 
the winter, when navigation is closed and shipment of

THE CONFERENCE AND THE WORKERS 143 
oil ceases, when the employers can resist a general 
strike longer than in any other part of the year? Again 
no! And yet, all the conferences we have had up till now 
were called precisely in the winter, and were offered without 
freedom to discuss demands, without a free Delegate 
Council, and without the intervention of the unions; 
the masses of the workers and their organisations were 
carefully removed from the stage, the whole business 
was placed in the hands of a handful of Shendrikovminded 
³individuals.² It was like saying to the workers: 
gentlemen, elect your delegates and then disperse to 
your homes! A conference without the workers, a conference 
to deceive the workers‹that is what we were offered during 
three years. Such conferences deserve only to be boycotted, 
and we Bolsheviks proclaimed a boycott of them. . . . 
The workers did not at once understand all this 
and, therefore, in 1905, went to the first conference. 
But they were obliged to leave the conference, to disrupt 
it. 
The workers were again mistaken, in 1906, in going 
to the second conference. But they were again obliged 
to abandon the conference, to disrupt it again. 
All this shows that life itself censured and rectified 
the workersı mistakes, compelling the workers to take 
the path of boycotting backstage, fraudulent, Shendrikov 
type of conferences. 
The Mensheviks who invited the workers to go to 
such conferences unconsciously helped the oil owners to 
deceive the workers. . . . 
But in 1907 things took a different turn. The experience 
of the two conferences on the one hand, and the 
intensified agitation of the Bolsheviks on the other,

J. V. S T A L I N 144 
had its effect. The workers met the proposal of the authorities 
and the oil owners to hold a conference (the third!) 
with an emphatic refusal. 
This opened a new phase in the Baku labour movement. 
. . . 
But does that mean that the workers were afraid of 
a conference? Of course not. Why should they, who had 
gone through tremendous strikes, be afraid of negotiations 
with the oil owners? 
Does it mean that the workers ran away from a collective 
agreement? Of course not. Why should they, who 
had known the ³December agreement,² be afraid of a 
collective agreement? 
By boycotting the conference in November 1907 the 
workers said, in effect, that they were sufficiently mature 
not to permit their enemies to fool them any longer 
with a backstage Shendrikov type of conference. 
And so, when the authorities and the oil owners, 
haunted by the spectre of a boycott, asked us under what 
conditions we would agree to a conference, we answered: 
only on the condition that the masses of the workers and 
their unions take the widest possible part in the entire 
proceedings of the conference. Only when the workers 
are able 1) freely to discuss their demands, 2) freely 
to assemble a Delegate Council, 3) freely to utilise the 
services of their unions and 4) freely to choose the moment 
for opening the conference‹only then will the workers 
agree to a conference. And the cornerstone of our demands 
was recognition of the unions. These points were called 
guarantees. Here, for the first time, was issued the 
celebrated formula: a conference with guarantees or no 
conference at all!

THE CONFERENCE AND THE WORKERS 145 
Were we thereby false to the tactics of boycotting the 
old Shendrikov type of conference without the workers? Not 
by one iota! The boycott of the old type of conference remained 
in full force‹all we did was to proclaim a new 
type of conference, a conference with guarantees, and 
only such a conference! 
Does the correctness of these tactics need proof? 
Does it need proof that only by means of these tactics 
would we be able to convert the conference from an instrument 
for deceiving the workers into an instrument for 
uniting them around the unions in one vast army numbering 
many thousands and capable of standing up for 
its demands? 
Even the Mensheviks, the mechanicsı union and 
Promyslovy Vestnik were unable to take a stand against 
this position and, following our example, they proclaimed 
the point about the unions to be an ultimatum 
We are in possession of documents showing that the 
Mensheviks refused to agree not only to a conference, but 
also to the election of delegates unless the point about 
the unions was conceded, and unless permits were issued 
to the unions. All this took place before the negotiations 
in the organising committee, before the Delegate Council, 
before the election of delegates. Now, of course, they 
can say that ³ultimatums can be presented only at 
the end of negotiations,² that ³from the very beginning² 
they ³fought against the presentation of demands in 
the form of an ultimatum² (see Promyslovy Vestnik, 
No. 21), but these are the usual and long-known ³somersaults² 
of the spineless opportunists in the Menshevik 
camp, which prove once again the consistency of our 
tactics!

J. V. S T A L I N 146 
Even the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Dashnaks,who 
had anathemised ³anything and everything connected 
with a conference,² even they ³bowed their heads² before 
our tactics and decided to take part in the preparatory 
work connected with the conference! 
The workers understood that our position was correct, 
and the overwhelming majority of them voted for it. 
Of the 35,000 workers canvassed, only 8,000 voted for 
the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Dashnaks (a boycott 
under all circumstances), 8,000 voted for the Mensheviks 
(a conference under all circumstances), and 19,000 voted 
for our tactics, the tactics of a conference with guarantees. 
Thus, the workers rejected the Menshevik tactics, 
the tactics of a conference without the workers, without 
guarantees. The workers also rejected the tactics of the 
Dashnaks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, the tactics of 
an imaginary boycott and an unorganised general strike. 
The workers declared for a conference with guarantees, 
for systematically utilising the entire proceedings of the 
conference with the object of organising a general strike. 
Herein lies the secret of the prevention of the conference! 
The oil owners, with one voice, declared for a conference 
without guarantees. In this way they approved 
of the Mensheviksı tactics. We assert that this is the best 
possible proof that the stand taken by the Mensheviks 
was wrong. 
As, however, the workers rejected a conference without 
guarantees, the oil owners changed their tactics 
and . . . prevented the conference, boycotted it. In this 
way they expressed their solidarity with the tactics of the

THE CONFERENCE AND THE WORKERS 147 
Dashnaks and Socialist-Revolutionaries. We assert that 
this is the best possible proof that the stand taken by the 
Dashnaks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries was unsound. 
The tactics of the Baku proletariat proved to be the 
only correct tactics. 
That is why the oil bourgeoisie is attacking these 
tactics with all its might. The oil bourgeoisie fully 
approves of the Menshevik proposal for a conference without 
guarantees, and in the last resort it clutches at the 
Dashnak-Socialist-Revolutionary proposal for a boycott; 
but it will not at any price make peace with the Baku 
proletariat, which has declared for a conference with 
guarantees! 
This is understandable. Picture to yourself the following: 
certain points are conceded‹the guarantees; the workersı 
demands are discussed on the widest possible scale; 
the Delegate Council becomes more and more firmly established 
among the masses; in the course of drawing up 
their demands the masses rally around their Council 
and through it around their unions; the masses, 50,000 
strong, organised in a single army, present demands to 
the oil owners; the oil owners are obliged to surrender 
without a fight, or else reckon with the possibility of 
a thoroughly organised general strike, to take place at 
a time least convenient for them‹is that profitable for 
the oil bourgeoisie? After this, how can the bourgeois 
pets on Neftyanoye Delo and Baku72 help yapping and 
mewing? So‹down with the conference, since it cannot 
be held without those cursed guarantees‹say the oil 
owners, preventing the conference. 
That is the cause of the prevention of the conference 
by the authorities and the oil owners.

J. V. S T A L I N 148 
That is what the history of the conference tells us. 
But Promyslovy Vestnik, forgetting all this, goes on 
singing about the ³tactlessness of the leaders,² fatuously 
repeating and chewing the cud over the leading articles 
in Baku and Neftyanoye Delo! Even the Georgian newspaper 
of the Tiflis Mensheviks found it necessary to 
³raise its voice² and sing second to the Baku Cadets!73 
Miserable echoes! 
But what should be our tactics in the new situation? 
The oil owners have prevented the conference. They 
are provoking a general strike. Does that mean that we 
must immediately respond with a general strike? Of 
course not! Apart from the fact that the oil owners have 
already accumulated vast stocks of oil, that they have 
been long preparing to resist a general strike, we must 
not forget that we are not yet ready for such a serious 
struggle. For the time being we must resolutely give up 
the idea of a general economic strike. 
The only expedient form of retreat in the present 
situation is strikes at individual firms. The Mensheviks 
who deny the expediency of such strikes almost on 
³principle² (see L. A. Rinıs pamphlet74), are profoundly 
mistaken. The experience of the strikes in the spring 
shows that, with the active intervention of the unions 
and of our organisation, strikes at individual firms may 
prove to be one of the surest means of uniting the proletariat. 
All the more firmly, therefore, should we grasp 
such means. We must not forget that our organisation 
will grow only to the extent that we actively intervene 
in all the affairs of the proletarian struggle. 
Such is our immediate tactical task.

THE CONFERENCE AND THE WORKERS 149 
Having prevented the conference, the authorities now 
want to abolish completely the so-called ³Baku liberties.² 
Does that mean that we must go completely underground 
and leave the field free for the activities of 
the dark forces? Of course not! However fiercely the reaction 
may rage, no matter how much it may wreck our 
unions and organisations, it cannot abolish the oil field 
and works commissions without calling forth ³anarchy 
and conflicts² at the works and in the oil fields. It is our 
duty to strengthen these commissions, to imbue them 
with the spirit of socialism and to unite them according 
to the respective firms. To achieve this our works and 
oil field Party units must systematically come out at the 
head of these commissions and, in their turn, unite on an 
inter-district basis through their representatives also 
according to the respective firms. 
Such are our immediate organisational tasks. 
By carrying out these immediate tasks, and thereby 
strengthening the unions and our organisation, we shall 
be able to weld into one the masses of the oil industry 
workers numbering many thousands for the forthcoming 
battles against oil capital. 
Published as a supplement to Reprinted from the supplement 
Bakinsky Proletary, No. 5, to Bakinsky Proletary 
July 20, 1908 
Signed: Koba

THE PARTY CRISIS AND OUR TASKS 
It is no secret to anyone that our Party is passing 
through a severe crisis. The Partyıs loss of members, 
the shrinking and weakness of the organisations, the 
latterıs isolation from one another, and the absence of 
co-ordinated Party work‹all show that the Party is ailing, 
that it is passing through a grave crisis. 
The first thing that is particularly depressing the 
Party is the isolation of its organisations from the broad 
masses. At one time our organisations numbered thousands 
in their ranks and they led hundreds of thousands. 
At that time, the Party had firm roots among the masses. 
This is not the case now. Instead of thousands, tens and, 
at best, hundreds, have remained in the organisations. 
As regards leading hundreds of thousands, it is not worth 
speaking about. True, our Party exercises wide ideological 
influence among the masses; the masses know the 
Party, the masses respect it. That is what primarily distinguishes 
the ³post-revolution² Party from the ³pre-revolution² 
Party. But that is practically all that the Partyıs 
influence amounts to. And yet ideological influence alone 
is far from enough. The point is that the breadth of ideological 
influence is neutralised by the narrowness of

THE PARTY CRISIS AND OUR TASKS 151 
organisational consolidation. That is the cause of our 
organisationsı isolation from the broad masses. It is 
sufficient to point to St. Petersburg, where in 1907 we 
had about 8,000 members and where we can now scarcely 
muster 300 to 400, to appreciate at once the full gravity 
of the crisis. We shall not speak of Moscow, the Urals, 
Poland, the Donets Basin, etc., which are in a similar 
state. 
But that is not all. The Party is suffering not only 
from isolation from the masses, but also from the fact 
that its organisations are not linked up with one another, 
are not living the same Party life, are divorced from one 
another. St. Petersburg does not know what is going on 
in the Caucasus, the Caucasus does not know what is going 
on in the Urals, etc.; each little corner lives its own 
separate life. Strictly speaking, we no longer have a 
single Party living the same common life that we all 
spoke of with such pride in the period from 1905 to 1907. 
We are working according to the most scandalously 
amateurish methods. The organs now published abroad‹ 
Proletary75 and Golos76 on the one hand, and Sotsial- 
Demokrat77 on the other, do not and cannot link up the 
organisations scattered over Russia, and cannot endow 
them with a single Party life. Indeed, it would be strange 
to think that organs published abroad, far removed 
from Russian reality, can co-ordinate the work of the 
Party, which has long passed the study-circle stage. 
True, the isolated organisations have much in common 
which links them together ideologically‹they have a 
common programme, which has stood the test of revolution; 
they have common practical principles, which 
have been approved by the revolution, and glorious

J. V. S T A L I N 152 
revolutionary traditions. This is the second important 
distinction between the ³post-revolution² Party and the 
³pre-revolution² Party. But this is not enough. The 
point is that the ideological unity of the Party organisations 
does not by a long way save the Party from their 
want of organisational cohesion and isolation from one 
another. It is sufficient to point out that not even information 
by correspondence is kept at anything like a desirable 
level in the Party. How much more so is this the case 
as regards linking up the Party in a single organism. 
Thus: 1) The Partyıs isolation from the broad 
masses, and 2) the isolation of its organisations from one 
another‹that is the essence of the crisis the Party is 
passing through. 
It is not difficult to understand that the cause of 
all this is the crisis in the revolution itself, the temporary 
triumph of the counter-revolution, the lull after 
the various actions, and lastly, the loss of all those 
semi-liberties which the Party enjoyed during 1905 and 
1906. The Party developed, expanded and grew strong 
while the revolution was progressing, while liberties 
existed. The revolution retreated, the liberties vanished‹ 
and the Party began to ail, the intellectuals began to 
desert the Party, and later these were followed by the 
most vacillating of the workers. In particular, the desertion 
of the intellectuals was accelerated by the ideological 
growth of the Party, or rather of the advanced 
workers, who with their complex requirements have outgrown 
the meagre mental stock-in-trade of the ³intellectuals 
of 1905.² 
It by no means follows from this, of course, that 
the Party must vegetate in this state of crisis until

THE PARTY CRISIS AND OUR TASKS 153 
future liberties are ushered in, as some people mistakenly 
think. In the first place, the ushering in of 
these liberties depends largely upon whether the Party 
will emerge from the crisis healthy and renovated; liberties 
do not fall from the skies, they are won thanks, among 
other things, to the existence of a well-organised workersı 
Party. Secondly, the universally known laws of the 
class struggle tell us that the steadily growing organisation 
of the bourgeoisie must inevitably result in a 
corresponding organisation of the proletariat. And everybody 
knows that the renovation of our Party, as the only 
workersı party, is a necessary preliminary condition for 
the growth of the organisation of our proletariat as a 
class. 
Consequently, our Partyıs recovery before liberties 
are ushered in, its release from the crisis, is not only 
possible but inevitable. 
The whole point is to find ways of bringing about 
the recovery of the Party, to find means by which the 
Party 1) will link up with the masses, and 2) unite the 
organisations now isolated from one another in a single 
organism. 
* * 
* 
And so, how can our Party extricate itself from the 
crisis; what must be done to achieve this? 
Make the Party as legal as possible and unite it 
around the legal group in the Duma, some say to us. But 
how can it be made as legal as possible when the most innocuous 
legal institutions, such as cultural societies, etc., 
are suffering severe persecution? Can it be done by abandoning 
its revolutionary demands? But that would mean

J. V. S T A L I N 154 
burying the Party, not renovating it! Moreover, how can 
the group in the Duma link the Party with the masses 
when it is itself isolated not only from the masses, but 
also from the Party organisations? 
Clearly, such a solution of the problem serves only to 
confuse it further and to make it difficult for the Party 
to extricate itself from the crisis. 
Transfer as large a part of the Party functions as 
possible to the workers themselves and thereby rid the 
Party of the inconstant intellectual elements, others tell 
us. There can be no doubt that ridding the Party of useless 
guests and concentrating functions in the hands 
of the workers themselves would contribute a great deal 
to the renovation of the Party. But it is no less clear 
that the mere ³transfer of functions² under the old 
system of organisation, with the old methods of Party 
work, and with ³leadership² from abroad, cannot link the 
Party up with the masses and weld i t into a single 
whole. 
Obviously, half-measures cannot achieve much‹ 
we must seek radical means for a radical cure of the ailing 
Party. 
The Party is suffering primarily from its isolation 
from the masses; it must be linked up with the masses at 
all costs. But this can be done under our present conditions 
primarily and mainly on the basis of those questions 
which are particularly exciting the broad masses. 
Take, for example, the impoverishment of the masses 
and the offensive launched by capital. Huge lockouts 
swept over the workers like a hurricane, and the cutting 
down of production, arbitrary dismissals, reduction of 
wages, lengthening of the working day and the capitalist

THE PARTY CRISIS AND OUR TASKS 155 
offensive in general are continuing to this day. It can 
hardly be realised what suffering all this is causing among 
the workers, how intently it is making them think, what 
a host of ³misunderstandings² and conflicts arise between 
the workers and the employers, what a mass of 
interesting questions are arising in the minds of the 
workers on this basis. Let our organisations, in addition 
to conducting general political work, constantly intervene 
in all these minor conflicts, let them link these up 
with the great class struggle and, backing the masses 
in their daily protests and demands, demonstrate the 
great principles of our Party by means of living facts. 
It should be clear to everybody that only in this way 
will it be possible to stir the masses who have been 
³forced to the wall,² only in this way will it be possible to 
³shift² them past the accursed dead point. And ³shifting² 
them past this dead point means precisely‹rallying them 
around our organisations. 
The Party committees in the factories and works 
are the Party organs which could most successfully develop 
such activities among the masses. The advanced 
workers in the factory and works committees are the 
living people who could rally to the Party the masses 
who are around them. All that is needed is that the factory 
and works committees should constantly intervene 
in all the affairs of the workersı struggle, champion their 
daily interests and link up the latter with the fundamental 
interests of the proletarian class. To make the factory 
and works committees the principal bastions of the Party 
‹such is the task. 
Further, in pursuit of the same object of drawing 
closer to the masses, the structure of the other, higher,

J. V. S T A L I N 156 
Party organisations must be adapted to the task of 
defending not only the political but also the economic 
interests of the masses. Not a single branch of industry 
of any importance must escape the attention of the 
organisation. To achieve this, in building up the organisation 
the territorial principle must be supplemented 
by the industrial principle, i.e., the factory and works 
committees in the various branches of industry must be 
grouped in sub-districts according to industry, and these 
sub-districts must be linked up territorially in districts, 
etc. It will not matter if this increases the number of 
sub-districts‹the organisation will gain a firmer and 
more stable foundation, and it will become more closely 
linked with the masses. 
Of still greater importance for overcoming the crisis 
is the composition of the Party organisations. The 
most experienced and influential of the advanced workers 
must find a place in all the local organisations, 
the affairs of the organisations must be concentrated in 
their strong hands, and it is they who must occupy the 
most important posts in the organisations, from practical 
and organisational posts to literary posts. I t 
will not matter if the workers who occupy important 
posts are found to lack sufficient experience and 
training and even stumble at first‹practice and the 
advice of more experienced comrades will widen their 
outlook and in-the end train them to become real writers 
and leaders of the movement. It must not be forgotten 
that Bebels do not drop from the skies, they are trained 
only in the course of work, by practice, and our movement 
now needs Russian Bebels, experienced and mature leaders 
from the ranks of the workers, more than ever before.

THE PARTY CRISIS AND OUR TASKS 157 
That is why our organisational slogan must be: 
³Widen the road for the advanced workers in all spheres 
of Party activity,² ³give them more scope!² 
It goes without saying that in addition to the will 
to lead and initiative in leadership, the advanced workers 
must possess considerable knowledge. We have few workers 
who possess knowledge. But it is just here that the assistance 
of experienced and active intellectuals will be of use. 
Arrangements must be made for higher circles, ³discussion 
groups² for advanced workers, at least one in every 
district, at which they will systematically ³go through² 
the theory and practice of Marxism. All this would to 
a very large extent fill the gaps in the knowledge of the 
advanced workers and help them to become lecturers and 
ideological leaders in the future. At the same time, the 
advanced workers must more often deliver lectures at 
their works and factories to ³get the utmost practice,² 
even at the risk of ³making a mess of it² in the opinion 
of their audience. They must once and for all cast aside 
excessive modesty and stage fright, and arm themselves 
with audacity, confidence in their own strength. It will 
not matter if they make mistakes at first; they will stumble 
once or twice, and then learn to walk independently 
like ³Christ walking on the water.² 
In short, 1) intensified agitation around daily needs 
linked with the general class needs of the proletariat, 
2) organisation and consolidation of the committees 
in the factories and works as the Partyıs most 
important district centres, 3) the ³transfer² of the 
most important Party functions to the advanced workers 
and 4) the organisation of ³discussion groups² for the 
advanced workers‹such are the means by which our

J. V. S T A L I N 158 
organisations will be able to rally the broad masses 
around themselves. 
One cannot help observing that life itself is pointing 
out this path to the overcoming of the Party crisis. 
The Central region and the Urals have been doing 
without intellectuals for a long time; there the workers 
themselves are conducting the affairs of the organisations. 
In Sormovo, Lugansk (Donets Basin) and Nikolayev, 
the workers in 1908 published leaflets and in Nikolayev, 
in addition to leaflets, they published an illegal 
organ. In Baku the organisation has systematically 
intervened in all the affairs of the workersı struggle 
and has missed scarcely a single conflict between the 
workers and the oil owners, while, of course, at the 
same time conducting general political agitation. Incidentally, 
this explains why the Baku organisation has 
maintained contact with the masses to this day. 
Such is the situation as regards the methods of linking 
the Party with the broad masses of the workers. 
But the Party suffers not only from isolation from 
the masses. It also suffers from the isolation of its organisations 
from one another. 
Let us pass to this last question. 
* * 
* 
And so, how can the isolated local organisations be 
linked up with one another, how can they be linked up 
in a single well-knit Party, living a common life? 
One might think that the general Party conferences 
that are sometimes arranged would solve the problem, 
would unite the organisations; or that Proletary, Golos 
and Sotsial-Demokrat, which are published abroad, would,

THE PARTY CRISIS AND OUR TASKS 159 
in the long run, rally and unite the Party. There can 
be no doubt that both the first and the second are of 
no little importance in linking up the organisations. At 
any rate, the conferences and the organs that are published 
abroad have been until now the only means of 
linking up the isolated organisations. But in the first 
place, conferences, arranged very rarely at that, can link 
up the organisations only for a time and, therefore, not 
as durably as is required in general: in the intervals 
between conferences the connections are broken and the 
old amateurish methods continue as before. Secondly, 
as regards the organs that are published abroad, apart 
from the fact that they reach Russia in extremely limited 
quantities, they naturally lag behind the course of Party 
life in Russia, are unable to note in time and comment 
on the questions that excite the workers and, therefore, 
cannot link our local organisations together by permanent 
ties. The facts show that since the London Congress, 
the Party has succeeded in organising two conferences78 and 
in printing scores of issues of the organs published 
abroad; and yet the work of uniting our organisations 
in a genuine Party, the work of overcoming the crisis, 
has made scarcely any headway. 
Hence, conferences and organs published abroad, 
while extremely important for uniting the Party, are, 
nevertheless, inadequate for overcoming the crisis, for 
permanently uniting the local organisations. 
Evidently, a radical measure is needed. 
The only radical measure can be the publication 
of an all-Russian newspaper, a newspaper that will 
serve as the centre of Party activity and be published 
in Russia.

J. V. S T A L I N 160 
It will be possible to unite the organisations scattered 
over Russia only on the basis of common Party 
activity. But common Party activity will be impossible 
unless the experience of the local organisations is collected 
at a common centre from which the generalised Party 
experience can later be distributed to all the local organisations. 
An all-Russian newspaper could serve as this 
centre, a centre that would guide, co-ordinate and direct 
Party activity. But in order that it might really guide 
the Partyıs activity it must receive from the localities 
a constant stream of inquiries, statements, letters, information, 
complaints, protests, plans of work, questions 
which excite the masses, etc.; the closest and most 
durable ties must link the newspaper with the localities; 
acquiring in this way adequate material, the 
newspaper must note in time, comment on and elucidate 
the necessary questions, distil from this material the necessary 
directions and slogans and bring them to the knowledge 
of the entire Party, of all its organisations. . . . 
If these conditions do not exist there can be no 
leadership in Party work, and if there is no leadership 
in Party work the organisations cannot be permanently 
linked up in a single whole! 
That is why we emphasise the necessity of precisely 
an all-Russian newspaper (and not one published abroad), 
and precisely a leading newspaper (and not simply a 
popular one). 
Needless to say, the only institution that can undertake 
to launch and run such a newspaper is the Central 
Committee of the Party. Even apart from this it is the 
duty of the Central Committee to guide Party work; 
but at the present time it is performing this duty unsatis

THE PARTY CRISIS AND OUR TASKS 161 
factorily and, as a result, the local organisations are almost 
completely divorced from one another. And yet, 
a well-run all-Russian newspaper could serve as a most 
effective instrument in the hands of the Central Committee 
for effectively uniting the Party and guiding Party 
activity. More than that, we assert that only in this way 
can the Central Committee be transformed from a fictitious 
centre into a real, all-Party centre, which will 
really link up the Party, and really set the tone of its 
activity. In view of this, the organisation and running 
of an all-Russian newspaper is the direct task of the 
Central Committee. 
Thus, an all-Russian newspaper as an organ that will 
unite and rally the Party around the Central Committee‹
such is the task, such is the way of overcoming the 
crisis through which the Party is passing. 
Let us sum up all that has been said above. Owing to 
the crisis in the revolution, a crisis has developed in 
the Party‹the organisations have lost permanent contact 
with the masses, the Party has been broken up into 
separate organisations. 
Our organisations must be linked up with the broad 
masses‹this is a local task. 
The above-mentioned organisations must be linked 
up with one another, around the Central Committee of 
the Party‹this is a central task. 
To carry out the local task, in addition to general 
political agitation, economic agitation must be conducted 
around the acute daily needs of the workers; there 
must be systematic intervention in the workersı struggle;

J. V. S T A L I N 162 
factory and works Party committees must be formed and 
consolidated; as many of Party functions as possible must 
be concentrated in the hands of the advanced workers; 
³discussion groups² must be organised for the advanced 
workers for the purpose of training mature workersı 
leaders equipped with knowledge. 
To carry out the central task we must have an all- 
Russian newspaper that will link the local organisations 
with the Central Committee of the Party and unite them 
in a single whole. 
Only if these tasks are carried out will the Party be 
able to emerge from the crisis healthy and renovated; 
only by fulfilling these conditions can the Party undertake 
the responsible role of worthy vanguard of the heroic 
Russian proletariat. 
Such are the ways of overcoming the Party crisis. 
Needless to say, the more fully the Party utilises 
the legal possibilities around it‹from the floor of the 
Duma and the trade unions to co-operative societies and 
burial funds‹the sooner will the task of overcoming 
the crisis, the task of the renovation and recovery of the 
Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, be carried out. 
Bakinsky Proletary, Nos. 6 and 7, Reprinted from the newspaper 
August 1 and 27, 1909 
Unsigned

THE FORTHCOMING GENERAL STRIKE 
The Baku workers are going through hard times. The 
offensive which the oil owners launched in the spring of 
last year is still continuing. The gains which the workers 
won in the past are being taken away from them to the 
very last. And the workers ³have to² keep silent, to 
bear it ³without end.² 
Wages are being reduced by direct cuts or by the 
withdrawal of rent allowances, bonuses, etc. The working 
day is being lengthened, since the three-shift system 
is being replaced by the two-shift system, and overtime 
and gang work are becoming practically obligatory. 
The so-called ³reduction of staffs² is continuing as before. 
Workers, and particularly class-conscious workers, 
are discharged on trifling pretexts, and often without 
any pretext at all. ³Black-listing² is being applied in 
the most ruthless manner. The ³permanent² worker 
system is being replaced by the ³casual² docket system, 
under which workers can always be deprived of their 
livelihood on trifling pretexts. The ³system² of fines 
and beating-up is in full swing. The oil field and works 
commissions are no longer recognised. The workmenıs 
compensation law is evaded in the most flagrant manner. 
Medical assistance has been reduced to a minimum.

J. V. S T A L I N 164 
The ³hard-labour law,² as the ten-kopek hospital levy 
is called, continues to operate. Hygiene and sanitation 
are neglected. Education is in a wretched state. 
The peopleıs halls have been closed. No evening classes 
are being conducted. No lectures are being delivered. 
There are only dismissals without end! The lengths to 
which the oil owners go in their arrogance is seen from 
the fact that to avoid paying rent allowances many of 
the big firms, like the Caspian Company, for example, 
directly prohibit ³their² workers from marrying without 
the managementıs permission. And the oil kings 
do all this with impunity. Conscious of their strength, 
and seeing the success of their cunningly devised offensive 
tactics, they continue to torment the workers. 
But the success of the oil ownersı offensive is not at 
all accidental; it is wholly determined by many favourable 
external conditions. First of all, there is the general 
lull in Russia, the counter-revolutionary situation, which 
provides a favourable atmosphere for the capitalist offensive. 
Needless to say, under other circumstances, the 
oil owners would have been obliged to curb their appetites. 
Then there is the purely flunkey obsequiousness 
of the local authorities, headed by the pogromist Martynov, 
who are ready to do anything to please the 
oil owners‹recall, for example, the ³Mirzoyev case.² 
Further, the poor state of organisation of the workers 
due, to a large extent, to the constant flux among the 
oil workers. Everybody understands how important 
the oil workers are in the struggle against the oil 
owners, but it is they who are most closely connected 
with the rural districts and are least ³fit² for an organised 
struggle. Lastly, there is the system of split wages

THE FORTHCOMING GENERAL STRIKE 165 
(which consist, among other things, of bonuses, and 
of rent, travel, bath, and other allowances), which facilitates 
cuts. It needs no proof that direct wage cuts are 
not so easy to carry through as are disguised, partial 
cuts in the shape of the gradual withdrawal of bonuses 
and of rent, travel and other allowances, where the illusion 
is created that the ³actual² wage is left untouched. 
Naturally, all this, together with the growing experience 
and organisation of the oil owners, greatly facilitates 
the capitalist offensive in the kingdom of oil. 
When this furious offensive of the oil kings will cease, 
whether there will be a limit to their arrogance, depends 
upon whether they meet with the powerful and organised 
resistance of the workers. 
So far only one thing is clear, namely, that the 
oil owners want to smash the workers ³completely,² to 
knock the fighting spirit out of them ³once and for all,² 
to convert ³their² workers into obedient slaves ³at all 
costs.² They pursued this aim as far back as the spring 
of last year when, after preventing the conference, they 
tried to provoke the workers into an unorganised general 
strike in order to be able to crush them at one stroke. 
This is the aim they are pursuing now by maliciously 
and systematically attacking the workers, and often 
provoking them to spontaneous actions. 
So far the workers are silent, dumbly bearing the 
blows of the oil owners, while anger accumulates in their 
breasts. But in view of the fact that, on the one hand, 
the arrogance of the oil owners is steadily growing, that 
they are depriving the workers of their last crumbs, 
reducing the workers to pauperism, tormenting them and 
provoking them to spontaneous outbreaks, and that, on

J. V. S T A L I N 166 
the other hand, the patience of the workers is steadily 
running out, giving place to sullen, constantly increasing 
discontent against the oil owners‹in view of all this, 
we may confidently assert that an outburst of anger on 
the part of the oil workers is quite inevitable in the 
near future. One of two things: either the workers will 
indeed be patient ³without end² and sink to the level of 
slavishly obedient Chinese coolies‹or they will rise 
up against the oil owners and clear the road to a better 
life. The steadily rising anger of the masses shows that 
the workers will inevitably take the second path, the 
path of fighting the oil owners. 
The situation in the oil industry is such that it fully 
permits not only of a defensive struggle by the workers, 
not only the retention of the old positions, but also 
the passing to the offensive and the winning of new positions, 
further increases in wages, further reductions of 
the working day, etc. 
Indeed, since the oil ownersı profits are fabulously 
high at the present time compared with the profits of 
other employers in Russia and in Europe; since the oil 
market is not shrinking but, on the contrary, is expanding 
and spreading to new regions (Bulgaria, for example); 
since the gushers are steadily increasing in number, and 
since oil prices are not dropping but, on the contrary, 
show a tendency to rise‹is it not clear that it is quite possible 
for the workers to break the chains of slavish patience, 
throw off the yoke of shameful silence, hoist the 
flag of a counter-offensive against the oil owners and 
win from them new and better conditions of labour? . . . 
But while remembering all this, we must not forget 
that the forthcoming general strike will be the most

THE FORTHCOMING GENERAL STRIKE 167 
serious, prolonged and stubborn strike that has ever 
taken place in Baku. It must be borne in mind that 
in previous strikes we were favoured by 1) the general 
upsurge in Russia, 2) the relative ³neutrality² of 
the local authorities as a consequence of this, and 
3) the inexperience and lack of organisation of the 
oil owners, who lost their heads as soon as a strike 
broke out. But not one of these three conditions exists 
now. The general upsurge has given way to a general lull, 
which encourages the oil owners. The relative ³neutrality² 
of the local authorities has given way to their 
complete readiness to resort to every means of ³pacification.² 
The inexperience and lack of organisation 
of the oil owners has given way to their organisation. 
More than that, the oil owners have become so skilled 
at fighting that they themselves are provoking the workers 
to go on strike. They are even not averse to provoking 
them to go out on a general strike, so long as it is an unorganised 
one, which would enable them to ³crush² the 
workers ³at one stroke.² 
All this goes to show that the workers have before 
them a stern and difficult struggle against organised enemies. 
A fight is inevitable. Victory is possible in spite of 
numerous unfavourable conditions. All that is necessary 
is that the workersı struggle should not be spontaneous 
and sporadic, but organised, systematic and 
conscious. 
Only on this condition can victory be expected. 
We cannot tell just when the general strike will 
begin‹in any case it will not begin when it suits the 
oil owners. So far we know only one thing, namely, 
that we must at once initiate persevering preparatory

J. V. S T A L I N 168 
work for a general strike and devote to it all our mental 
capacities, our energy and our courage. 
Strengthen our solidarity, our organisation‹such is 
the slogan of our preparatory work. 
Hence, we must set to work at once to rally the 
masses of the workers around Social-Democracy, around 
the unions. First of all, we must put an end to the split 
in the organisation, we must unite the two groups in one 
body. We must also put an end to the split in the unions 
and unite them in one strong union. We must revive the 
oil field and works commissions, imbue them with the 
spirit of socialism, link them with the masses, and 
through them link ourselves with the entire army of oil 
industry workers. We must proceed to draw up common 
demands that can unite the workers in one powerful army. 
We must constantly intervene in all the conflicts between 
the workers and the oil owners and thereby in fact rally 
the workers around Social-Democracy. In short, we must 
prepare tirelessly, to the utmost, in order worthily to 
meet the difficult but glorious forthcoming general strike. 
We call for united efforts in the work of preparing 
for a general economic strike. 
Bakinsky Proletary, No. 7 Reprinted from the newspaper 
August 27, 1909 
Signed: K. Ko. . . .

PARTY NEWS79 
We publish below the resolution adopted by the Baku 
Committee on the disagreements on the Editorial Board 
of Proletary. These disagreements are not new. A controversy 
has long been going on around them in our press 
abroad. There is even talk about a split in the Bolshevik 
group. The Baku workers, however, know little or nothing 
about the nature of these disagreements. We consider 
it necessary, therefore, to preface the resolution with 
a few points of explanation. 
First of all, about the alleged split in the Bolshevik 
group. We declare that there is no split in the group, 
and that there never has been one; there are only disagreements 
on the question of legal possibilities. Disagreements 
of that sort have always existed and always will 
exist in such an active and live group as the Bolshevik 
group. Everybody knows that at one time there 
were rather serious disagreements in the group on the 
question of the agrarian programme, on guerilla actions, 
and on the unions and the Party, and in spite of that the 
group did not split, for complete solidarity reigned 
within the group on other important questions of tactics. 
The same must be said in the present case. Consequently, 
the talk about a split in the group is pure fiction.

J. V. S T A L I N 170 
As regards the disagreements, on the enlarged Editorial 
Board of Proletary,80 consisting of twelve members, 
two trends were revealed: the majority on the 
Board (ten against two) is of the opinion that the legal 
possibilities in the shape of the unions, clubs, and 
particularly the floor of the Duma, should be utilised 
for the purpose of strengthening the Party, that the Party 
should not recall our group from the Duma but, on the 
contrary, should help the group to rectify its mistakes 
and conduct correct, openly Social-Democratic agitation 
from the floor of the Duma. The minority on the Board 
(two), around whom the so-called Otzovists and Ultimatumists 
are grouped, are, on the contrary, of the opinion 
that the legal possibilities are of no particular value; 
they look with distrust upon our group in the Duma, do 
not think it necessary to support the group, and under 
certain circumstances would not be averse even from recalling 
it from the Duma. 
The Baku Committee is of the opinion that the point 
of view of the minority on the Editorial Board is not in 
accord with the interests of the Party and of the proletariat 
and, therefore, emphatically supports the stand taken by 
the majority on the Board represented by Comrade Lenin. 
RESOLUTION OF THE BAKU COMMITTEE 
OF THE DISAGREEMENTS ON THE ENLARGED 
EDITORIAL BOARD OF PROLETARY 
The Baku Committee discussed the situation on the 
enlarged Editorial Board of Proletary on the basis of the 
printed documents sent by both sections of the Board 
and arrived at the following conclusion.

PARTY NEWS 171 
1) As far as the substance of the matter is concerned, 
the stand taken by the majority on the Editorial Board 
regarding activities inside and outside the Duma is the 
only correct one. The Baku Committee believes that 
only such a stand can be described as truly Bolshevik, 
Bolshevik in spirit and not only in letter. 
2) ³Otzovism² as a trend in the group is a result 
of the underrating of legal possibilities, and of the Duma 
in particular, which is harmful to the Party. The Baku 
Committee asserts that under the present conditions of a 
lull, when other, more important means of conducting 
open Social-Democratic agitation are absent, using the 
Duma as a platform can and should be one of the most 
important branches of Party activity. 
3) ³Ultimatumism,² as a constant reminder to the 
group in the Duma about Party discipline does not constitute 
a trend in the Bolshevik group. In so far, however, 
as it tries to pose as a separate trend, which confines 
itself to demonstrating the rights of the Central Committee 
in relation to the group in the Duma, ³Ultimatumism² 
is the worst species of ³Otzovism.² The Baku 
Committee asserts that constant work by the Central 
Committee within and with the group can alone make 
the latter a truly Party and disciplined group. The Baku 
Committee believes that the facts concerning the Duma 
groupıs activities during the past few months clearly prove 
all this. 
4) So-called ³god-building² as a literary trend and, 
in general, the introduction of religious elements into 
socialism is the result of an interpretation of the principles 
of Marxism that is unscientific and therefore harmful 
for the proletariat. The Baku Committee emphasises that

J. V. S T A L I N 172 
Marxism took shape and developed into a definite world 
outlook not as the result of an alliance with religious 
elements, but as the result of an implacable struggle 
against them. 
5) Proceeding from the foregoing, the Baku Committee 
is of the opinion that an implacable ideological struggle 
against the above-mentioned trends which group themselves 
around the minority on the Editorial Board is one 
of the most urgent and immediate tasks of Party activity. 
6) On the other hand, in view of the fact that, notwithstanding 
the above-mentioned disagreements, both 
sections of the Editorial Board agree on questions of 
major importance for the group (appraisal of the current 
situation, the role of the proletariat and of other classes 
in the revolution, etc.), the Baku Committee believes 
that the unity of the group, and hence co-operation 
between both sections of the Editorial Board, are possible 
and necessary. 
7) In view of this, the Baku Committee disagrees 
with the organisational policy of the majority on the 
Editorial Board and protests against any ³ejection 
from our ranks² of supporters of the minority on the 
Editorial Board. The Baku Committee also protests 
against the conduct of Comrade Maximov who declared 
that he would not submit to the decisions of the Editorial 
Board, thus creating fresh grounds for new and 
greater friction. 
8) As a practical measure for putting an end to the 
present abnormal situation, the Baku Committee pro- 
-poses that a conference of Bolsheviks be held parallel with 
the general Party conference.81

PARTY NEWS 173 
On the questions of ³the school in X² and the attitude 
towards the ³Left Mensheviks,² the Baku Committee 
refrains from adopting any definite resolutions for the 
time being owing to the absence of sufficient material. 
August 2, 1909 
Bakinsky Proletary, No. 7, Reprinted from the newspaper 
August 27, 1909

THE DECEMBER STRIKE 
AND THE DECEMBER AGREEMENT 
(On the Occasion of the Fifth Anniversary) 
Comrades! 
Today marks the fifth anniversary of the declaration 
of the general economic strike in the districts of Baku 
in December 1904. 
In a few daysı time we shall see the fifth anniversary 
of the drafting by the workers and the oil owners of the 
famous December agreement, our ³oil constitution.² 
We proudly recall those days because they were the 
days of our victory, days of the defeat of the oil owners! 
Before our eyes rises the glorious scene, familiar to 
us a l l , when thousands of strikers surrounded the 
Electric Power offices and dictated the December 
demands to their delegates, while the representatives of 
the oil owners, who had taken shelter in the Electric 
Power offices and were besieged by the workers, ³expressed 
their solidarity,² signed the agreement, ³agreed 
to everything.² . . . 
That was a genuine victory for the poor proletarians 
over the rich capitalists, a victory which laid the foundations 
of a ³new order² in the oil industry. 
Before the December agreement we worked, on the 
average, eleven hours a day‹after the agreement a ninehour 
day was established and an eight-hour day was 
gradually introduced for the workers at the wells.

THE DECEMBER STRIKE AND THE DECEMBER AGREEMENT 175 
Before the December agreement we received on the 
average about eighty kopeks per day‹after the agreement 
wages were raised to a ruble and some kopeks per day. 
Before the December strike we received neither rent 
allowances, nor water, light or fuel‹thanks to the strike 
we obtained all these for the mechanics, and it remained 
only to extend these benefits to the rest of the workers. 
Before the December strike the flunkeys of capital exercised 
arbitrary power in the oil fields and at the works, 
and they beat us up and fined us with impunity‹thanks 
to the strike, a definite system, a definite ³constitution² 
was introduced; by virtue of which we were enabled 
to express our will through our delegates, collectively 
to reach agreement with the oil owners, and collectively 
to establish mutual relations with them. 
From ³amsharas²82 and ³pack animals² we, at one 
stroke, became men, fighting for a better life! 
That is what the December strike and the December 
agreement gave us! 
But that is not all. The main thing the December 
struggle gave us was confidence in our own strength, 
confidence in victory, readiness for fresh battles, the 
consciousness that only ³our own right hand² can shiver 
the chains of capitalist slavery. . . . 
After that we made continual progress, increasing 
wages, extending rent allowances to the oil workers, consolidating 
the ³oil constitution,² achieving the partial recognition 
of the oil field and works commissions, organising 
in unions and uniting around Social-Democracy. . . . 
But all this did not last long. When the revolution 
retreated and the counter-revolution gained strength, particularly 
from the beginning of 1908, the oil owners,

J. V. S T A L I N 176 
hypocritically pleading as an excuse the reduction of 
output and the shrinking of the oil market, began to 
withdraw our former gains. They withdrew the bonuses 
and rent allowances. They introduced the two-shift system 
and a twelve-hour day in place of the three-shift 
system and the eight-hour day. They cut down medical 
assistance. They have already taken away the peopleıs 
halls, and are taking away the schools, allocating a paltry 
sum for their maintenance while they spend over 600,000 
rubles per annum on the police. On top of all this, beating 
and fines are being reintroduced, the commissions 
have been abolished, and the myrmidons of the tsarist 
government, the servant of big capital, are persecuting 
the unions. . . . 
Thus, during the past two years, not only have we 
had to give up the idea of further improving our conditions, 
but our conditions have been made worse; we have 
been deprived of our former gains and have been thrown 
back to the old, pre-December times. 
And now, on December 13, the fifth anniversary of 
the victorious December strike, when the oil owners 
trembled before us and we, attacking, gained new rights‹ 
precisely today there rises before us the grave question 
which is exciting the masses of the oil industry workers: 
Shall we remain silent much longer, is there a limit to our 
patience, should we not break the chains of silence and 
hoist the flag of a general economic strike for our vital 
demands? 
Judge for yourselves! Output this year has reached 
500,000,000 poods‹a figure not reached in any of the 
past four years. The price of oil is not dropping at all, 
for the average price for the year is the same as last year‹

THE DECEMBER STRIKE AND THE DECEMBER AGREEMENT 177 
twenty-one kopeks. The quantity of gusher oil, which 
involves no expenditure‹is steadily increasing. The market 
is expanding day by day, abandoning coal and passing 
over to oil. Oil deliveries are steadily increasing. And 
yet, the more business improves for the oil owners, the 
more ³profit² they squeeze out of the workers, the more 
overbearing do they become to the latter, the more tightly 
do they squeeze the workers, the more zealously do 
they discharge class-conscious comrades, and the more 
determinedly do they deprive us of our last crumbs! 
Is it not clear, comrades, that the situation in the 
oil industry is becoming more and more favourable for 
a general struggle by the oil industry workers, and that 
the provocative conduct of the oil owners is inevitably 
pushing the workers towards such a struggle? 
For, comrades, one of two things: either we go on 
bearing it without end and sink to the level of dumb 
slaves‹or we rise up for a general struggle in support 
of our common demands. 
Our entire past and present, our struggle and our victories, 
point to the fact that we shall choose the second 
path, the path of the general strike for higher wages and 
an eight-hour day, for housing settlements and rent allowances, 
for peopleıs halls and schools, for medical assistance 
and compensation for disablement, for the rights 
of the oil field and works commissions and unions. 
And we shall gain our object, comrades, notwithstanding 
the unprecedented reprisals, notwithstanding the 
growing organisation of the oil owners; we shall bring our 
masters to their knees as we did five years ago, if we intensify 
our work in preparation for a general strike, if we 
strengthen our oil field and works commissions, if we

J. V. S T A L I N 178 
enlarge our unions, and if we rally around Social- 
Democracy. 
Social-Democracy led us to victory in December 1904; 
it will lead us to future victories through an organised 
general strike. 
This is what the experience of the glorious December 
struggle tells us. 
Let then this day, the opening day of the victorious 
strike in December 1904, inspire us to make united and 
persevering efforts to prepare for a general strike! 
Let our common feelings for this day serve the oil 
owners as a grim omen of the coming general strike led 
by Social-Democracy! 
Long Live the Coming General Strike! 
Long Live Social-Democracy! 
The Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. 
December 13, 1909 
Published in leaflet form Reprinted from the leaflet

LETTERS FROM THE CAUCASUS83 
I 
BAKU 
THE SITUATION IN THE OIL INDUSTRY 
After the country became ³pacified² to some extent, 
after the good harvest in Russia and a revival of activity 
in the Central Industrial region, the oil industry entered 
the phase of a minor boom. Owing to the risky nature 
of partial strikes (because of the cruel political reprisals 
and the growing organisation of the oil owners) arrears 
of oil output due to strikes dropped to a matter of half 
a million poods (in 1908 they amounted to 11,000,000 
poods and in 1907 to 26,000,000 poods). The absence of 
strikes and the steady rate of oil bailing served as 
one of the favourable conditions for increasing the output 
of gusher oil. The (relative) stability which set in in 
the oil industry helped it to recover the market it had 
lost during the past few years. This year oil output rose 
to 500,000,000 poods‹a figure not reached in any of the 
past four years (last year it amounted to 467,000,000 
poods). Thanks to the increased demand for liquid fuel 
in the Central Industrial region and to the substitution 
of oil for Donets coal on the South-Eastern, Ryazan-Urals 
and Moscow-Kazan railways, oil deliveries this year 
greatly exceed those of last year. Notwithstanding the 
wailing of the oil owners, the price of oil is not dropping 
but remains steady, for the average price for the year is

J. V. S T A L I N 180 
the same as that of last year (twenty-one kopeks). And 
every now and again the heaven-blessed wells burst out in 
gushers, and it rains oil for the benefit of the oil owners. 
In short, ³business² is improving for the oil owners. 
Meanwhile, economic reprisals, far from subsiding, 
are steadily increasing. ³Bonuses² and rent allowances 
are being withdrawn. The three-shift system (eight hoursı 
work) is being replaced by the two-shift system (twelve 
hoursı work), while overtime gang work is becoming 
systematic. Medical assistance and expenditure on 
schools are being reduced to a minimum (although the oil 
owners spend over 600,000 rubles per annum on the police!). 
Canteens and peopleıs halls have already been 
closed. The oil field and works commissions and the trade 
unions are absolutely ignored, class-conscious comrades 
are being discharged as in the old days. Fines and beatings 
are being reintroduced. 
The police and the gendarmerie‹the servants of the 
tsarist regime‹are entirely at the service of the oil 
kings. The inundation of the Baku oil districts with spies 
and provocateurs, the mass deportation of workers for 
the slightest conflict with the oil owners, complete 
destruction of actual ³liberties²‹Bakuıs privileges‹and 
arrests after arrests‹such is the picture of the ³constitutional² 
activities of the local authorities. This is quite 
understandable: firstly, they cannot ³by their very nature² 
refrain from strangling every ³liberty,² even the 
most elementary; secondly, they are obliged to behave 
in this way because the oil industry, which provides the 
Treasury with a ³revenue² of not less than 40,000,000 
rubles per annum in the shape of royalties, quotas in money 
or in kind from government fields, excise duties

LETTERS FROM THE CAUCASUS 181 
and transportation charges, ³needs² tranquillity and uninterrupted 
production. This is quite apart from the fact 
that every hitch in the oil industry has a depressing 
effect upon the Central Industrial region, and this, in 
turn, disturbs the governmentıs ³affairs.² True, in the 
recent past the government considered it necessary to 
permit certain ³liberties² in the oil districts and arranged 
³conferences² between the workers and the oil owners. 
But this was in the past, when the chances of the counter-
revolution were not yet clear‹then the policy of flirting 
with the workers was the most profitable one. Now, 
however, the situation is clear, the counter-revolution is 
³definitely² established‹and the policy of brutal reprisals 
has taken the place of the flirting policy, the pogromist- 
Martynov has replaced the silver-tongued Junkovsky. 
Meanwhile, the workers are becoming completely 
disillusioned about the expediency of partial strikes; 
they are more and more resolutely talking about a general 
economic strike. The fact that ³business² is improving 
for the oil owners but that their acts of persecution are 
increasing for all that, greatly incenses the workers and 
puts them in a fighting mood. And the more resolutely 
their former gains are withdrawn the more the idea 
of a general strike matures in their minds, and the 
greater is the impatience with which they are ³waiting² 
for the ³declaration² of a strike. 
The organisation took into account the favourable 
situation for a strike in the oil industry and the strike 
mood among the workers and decided to start preparatory 
work for a general strike. At present the Baku Committee 
is engaged in canvassing the masses and in drawing 
up common demands that can rally the entire oil

J. V. S T A L I N 182 
proletariat. In all probability the demands will include: 
an eight-hour day, higher wages, abolition of overtime 
and gang work, increased medical assistance, housing settlements 
and rent allowances, peopleıs halls and schools, 
recognition of the commissions and the unions. The 
organisation and its executive body, the Baku Committee, 
believe that, in spite of the intensification of the 
counter-revolution and the growing organisation of the 
oil owners, the workers will succeed in gaining what they 
want if they oppose the enemy forces with their class organisation 
by uniting the oil field and works commissions, 
by enlarging and strengthening the unions and by 
rallying around Social-Democracy. The choice of the 
moment to launch the struggle depends upon a variety of 
conditions which are difficult to foresee. So far, one thing 
is clear, namely, that a strike is inevitable and that it is 
necessary to prepare for it ³without a momentıs delay.² . . . 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE OIL FIELDS 
The revival in the oil industry is not the only important 
event in the life of the Baku proletariat. A no less 
important event is the ³Zemstvo campaign² that was 
launched here recently. We refer to local government in 
the Baku oil districts. After the Minister of the Interiorıs 
well-known ³plan² for setting up Zemstvos for the border 
regions and the corresponding ³circular² issued by 
the Viceroy of the Caucasus on the practical measures 
to be taken to introduce the Zemstvo in the Caucasus, the 
oil owners set to work to draw up a scheme of local government 
for the oil fields. The principles of the scheme, 
which the next (28th) oil ownersı congress will undoubt

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
183 
edly endorse, are approximately as follows: The oil 
region (Balakhany, Romany, Sabunchi, Surakhany and 
Bibi-Eibat) is to form a Zemstvo unit separate from the 
city and the uyezd, to be called the oil field local government 
body. The functions of the oil field local government 
body are to cover: water supply, lighting, road 
building, tramways, medical assistance, peopleıs halls, 
schools, erection of slaughter-houses and baths, workersı 
settlements, etc. In general the local government 
body is to be organised in conformity with the ³regulations² 
of June 12, 1890,84 with the difference, however, 
that according to these ³regulations² half the seats in 
the Zemstvo are guaranteed to the nobility, whereas here, 
owing to the absence of members of the nobility (by 
separating the oil region from the uyezd the oil owners 
have insured themselves against the predominance of 
the landowners and have established their own predominance) 
this proportion of seats is guaranteed not even 
to all the oil owners, but to 23 of the biggest. Of the 46 
seats in this local government body, 6 are allocated to 
representatives of government departments and public 
institutions, 4 to the working population numbering 
100,000, 18 to the group paying two-thirds of all the 
taxes, i.e., to 23 of the biggest oil owners (the total budget 
is to amount to about 600,000 rubles per annum), 9 
to the group paying one-sixth of the taxes, i.e., 140 to 
150 medium oil owners who are in vassal dependence 
upon the big ones, and the remaining 9 seats are to go 
to the petty trading and industrial bourgeoisie (about 
1,400 persons). 
As you see, we have before us, first, the privileged 
capitalists, and second, a purely industrial Zemstvo, 
LETTERS FROM THE CAUCASUS

J. V. S T A L I N 184 
which is bound to become the arena of sharp conflicts 
between labour and capital. 
By setting up a Zemstvo of precisely this character 
the oil owners want: firstly, to shift most of the cultural 
and municipal functions from their ³congress² to the 
oil field local government body and thus convert the 
³congress² into a pure syndicate; secondly, to pass on 
some of the expenditure on the needs of the oil-field 
working population to the rest of the bourgeoisie, the 
owners of auxiliary enterprises, boring contractors, etc. 
As regards the allocation of four seats to the workers, 
who will elect ³in conformity with the regulations governing 
the Third State Duma² (delegates to be elected 
by the workersı curia who are to elect four electors), 
this, far from being a sacrifice on the part of the oil 
owners, is very much to their advantage: four workersı 
representatives as window-dressing for the local government 
body is so ³liberal² and . . . so cheap, that the oil 
kings can readily concede this. 
On the other hand, there can be no doubt that in so 
far as the oil field local government body will unite the 
oil bourgeoisie and the ³auxiliary² bourgeoisie, so to 
speak, it must also unite the hitherto disunited oil industry 
workers and the workers in the auxiliary enterprises 
and give them the opportunity to voice their common 
demands through their four representatives. 
Taking all this into account, the Baku Committee, 
in its resolution on oil field local government, decided 
to utilise the proposed scheme of local government by 
participating in it for the purpose of conducting agitation 
for the general economic needs of the workers and of 
strengthening the latterıs organisation.

LETTERS FROM THE CAUCASUS 185 
Further, with a view to expanding the electoral system, 
and bearing in mind that the oil field local government 
body will, in general, deal with the same questions 
that excite the workers as those which the conferences 
hitherto called dealt with‹and in the latter the workers 
always had equal representation with the oil owners‹ 
the organisation is demanding in its resolution equal representation 
for the workers in the local government body, 
emphasising in this resolution that the struggle inside 
the local government body will be effective only to the 
extent that it is backed by the struggle outside the local 
government body and serves the interests of that struggle. 
Moreover, in view of the fact that the decision of the 
gubernia conference to exclude from the oil field local 
government area the villages of Balakhany, Sabunchi 
and Romany‹which are actually workersı settlements‹ 
is disadvantageous to the workers, the organisation is demanding 
that these villages be included in the oil field 
local government area. 
Lastly, in the general part of the resolution, pointing 
to universal, equal, direct and secret suffrage as an essential 
condition for the free development of local government 
bodies and for the free manifestation of existing 
class antagonisms, the Baku Committee emphasises the 
necessity of overthrowing the tsarist regime and of convening 
a popular Constituent Assembly as a preliminary 
condition for the creation of consistently democratic 
local government bodies. . . . 
Oil field local government is still in the formative 
stage. The scheme proposed by the oil ownersı commission 
has yet to be endorsed by the oil ownersı congress, 
after which it must be submitted to the Ministry of the

J. V. S T A L I N 186 
Interior through the Viceroyıs office, after that to the 
State Duma, etc. Nevertheless, the organisation decided 
to launch a campaign forthwith, and to convene meetings 
in the oil fields and at the works for the purpose of exposing 
the oil owners, of popularising our platform among the 
broad masses and of agitating for a popular Constituent 
Assembly. With the same objects in view it will not reject 
either ³participation² in the oil ownersı congress 
or utilisation of the floor of the Duma, and will supply 
our group in the Duma with the necessary materials. 
THE STATE OF THE ORGANISATION 
In view of certain specifically Baku conditions prevailing 
in the oil fields (some possibility of holding meetings 
not yet entirely destroyed by the authorities, the existence 
of the oil field and works commissions), the state of the 
organisation in Baku differs favourably from the state of 
the organisations in other parts of Russia. Furthermore, 
the existence of so-called legal possibilities also facilitates 
our work. As a consequence, the organisation has 
fairly considerable connections. But these connections are 
not being utilised owing to a shortage of forces and funds. 
Oral, and more especially printed, agitation must be conducted 
in the Tatar, Armenian and Russian languages, but, 
owing to the shortage of funds (and forces) we are obliged 
to confine ourselves to the Russian language, although 
the Moslem workers, for example, occupy the most important 
post in the industry (bailing) and they are relatively 
more numerous than the Russians or Armenians. 
Bakinsky Proletary (the organ of the Baku Committee)85 
which is published in Russian, has not come out for three

LETTERS FROM THE CAUCASUS 187 
months owing, chiefly, to the absence of funds. At its 
last meeting the Baku Committee accepted the proposal 
of the Tiflis Committee to publish a joint organ, if possible 
in four, or three, languages (Russian, Tatar, Georgian 
and Armenian). The membership (in the strict sense of 
the term) of our organisation does not exceed 300. Amalgamation 
with the Menshevik comrades (about 100 members) 
has not yet entered the phase of accomplishment‹ 
so far only wishes are observable, but the split cannot 
be liquidated by wishes alone. . . . Propaganda is being 
conducted only in the advanced study circles, which we 
here call ³discussion groups.² The system is one of lectures. 
A great shortage of serious propaganda literature is 
felt. . . . Isolation from the Party and complete lack 
of information about what the Party organisations in 
Russia are doing have a bad effect upon the Party membership. 
An all-Russian organ, regular general Party conferences, 
and systematic tours by members of the Central 
Committee could help matters. Of the decisions of a 
general organisational character adopted by the Baku 
Committee, the most important are the following two: 
on a general Party conference, and on an all-Russian 
organ.* On the first question, the Baku Committee considers 
that it is necessary to convene a conference at the 
earliest possible date to settle urgent, mainly organisational, 
questions. The Baku Committee also considers 
that it is necessary to convene, parallel with this conference, 
a conference of Bolsheviks to liquidate the abnormal 
situation that has existed within the group for the 
past few months. On the second question the Baku 
* See pp. 202-05 in this volume.‹Ed.

J. V. S T A L I N 188 
Committee, noting the isolation of the organisations from 
one another, and believing that only an all-Russian 
organ published in Russia can link up the Party organisations 
into a single whole, proposes that the Party should 
set to work to organise such a newspaper. 
³LEGAL POSSIBILITIES² 
The fact that our organisation has coped with the 
crisis with relative ease, that it never suspended its activities 
and always responded to all the questions of the 
day in one way or another, is due to a large extent to the 
³legal possibilities² it enjoys, which continue to exist 
to this day. The ³legal possibilities,² in their turn, owe 
their existence, of course, to the special conditions prevailing 
in the oil industry, to the special role the latter plays 
in the national economy, but that is not the point just 
now. . . . Of the ³legal possibilities² in Baku, of special 
interest are the oil field and works commissions. These 
commissions are elected by all the workers of a given 
firm without exception, irrespective of nationality and 
political convictions. Their function is to negotiate on 
behalf of the workers with the firmıs management on 
questions affecting the oil fields and works. They are 
not yet legal organisations in the direct sense of the 
term, but indirectly, and actually, they are fully legal, 
for they exist on the basis of the ³December agreement,² 
the whole of which is published in the workersı ³pay 
books² that have been issued with the permission of the 
authorities. The importance of the oil field and works 
commissions for our organisation is clear; they enable our 
organisation to exercise organised influence upon the 
entire mass of the oil workers; all that is necessary is that

LETTERS FROM THE CAUCASUS 189 
the commissions should uphold the decisions of our organisation 
before the masses. True, the importance of the 
commissions is not so great now, for the oil owners no 
longer reckon with them, but the workers do ³reckon² 
with them, and that is the most important for us. . . . 
In addition to the commissions there are also the 
unions, actually two unions: that of the ³oil industry 
workers² (about 900 members) and that of the ³mechanical 
workers² (about 300 members). The union for ³oil extraction² 
can be ignored, as its importance is extremely small. 
We shall not speak of the unions of other crafts which have 
no direct connection with the oil industry, or of the illegal 
seamenıs union (about 200 members), which is under the 
influence of the Socialist-Revolutionaries, although this 
union is important for the oil industry. Of the two 
unions mentioned, the first (under Bolshevik influence) 
is especially popular among the workers. It is organised 
on the principle of industrial unionism and unites the 
workers of all categories of labour in the oil industry (extraction, 
boring, mechanical, refining, general labour). 
This type of organisation is dictated by the conditions 
of the struggle, which make inexpedient strikes of mechanics, 
for example, independently of the oil producers, 
etc. This the workers realised* and they began to desert 
en masse the union of ³mechanical workers.² The point 
is that this union (under Menshevik influence) is 
* This has not yet been realised by Dmitriyev, who in his 
book Practical Experience of the Trade Union Movement ³proves² 
the necessity of three unions on the basis of an ³analysis² not of 
the conditions of the oil workersı struggle, but of . . . the technique 
of production: there are different crafts, therefore, there 
must be different unions, he argues.

J. V. S T A L I N 190 
organised as a craft union, rejects the principle of industrial 
unionism and instead of one general union proposes 
three separate unions (mechanics, oil workers, and 
refiners). The craft union principle, however, was rejected 
by Baku practice long ago. This, incidentally, explains 
the steady decline of the ³mechanical workersı² union. The 
leaders of the union themselves admit this by accepting 
as members workers other than mechanics, thereby violating 
their own principle. Had it not been for the false pride 
of the above-mentioned leaders, the union of ³mechanical 
workers,² after openly admitting its mistake, would long 
ago have merged with the union of the ³oil industry 
workers.² 
Incidentally, about merging. ³Negotiations² for 
merging the unions have been going on for two years 
already, but so far they have been fruitless because: 
1) the Menshevik leaders are deliberately hindering the 
merger for fear that they will be submerged by the Bolshevik 
majority; 2) the groups under whose influence 
the unions are functioning have so far not yet united. 
And besides, with whom shall we unite? The 80 
to 100 ³members² that perhaps the Mensheviks have 
are themselves not yet united. At all events, during the 
past eight months we have not seen a single leaflet or 
heard a single pronouncement from the Menshevik ³leading 
body,² in spite of the fact that during this period 
the oil districts have witnessed important campaigns 
such as the general strike, the Zemstvo, the temperance, 
and other campaigns. The Menshevik organisation is 
practically non-existent, liquidated. To put it plainly, 
there is nobody to unite with. And this state of affairs 
naturally hinders the merging of the unions. . . .

LETTERS FROM THE CAUCASUS 191 
Both unions are non-party; but this does not prevent 
them from maintaining the closest connection with the 
Party organisation. 
The influence of the unions upon the masses is considerable, 
especially that of the union of the ³oil industry 
workers,² and this automatically facilitates the task of 
uniting the most active elements around our organisation. 
Of the other ³legal possibilities,² those worthy of attention 
are the clubs (under Social-Democratic influence) 
and the ³Trud² consumersı co-operative society86 (under 
Socialist-Revolutionary and Social-Democratic influence), 
both being centres where the most active elements of 
the Baku proletariat are concentrated. Concerning their 
attitude towards the organisation, especially the attitude 
of the ³Znanie-Sila² club,87 which operates in all 
the oil districts (the ³Nauka² club operates only in the 
town), the same may be said as about the unions. . . . 
The past two weeks were taken up with the temperance 
campaign, which called for the activity of nearly 
all the legal organisations. The stand taken by the Baku 
Committee on this question is expressed in its resolution. 
In the latter, drunkenness is regarded as an inevitable 
evil under capitalism, which can be abolished 
only with the fall of capitalism and the triumph of 
socialism. By reducing the workers and peasants to the 
condition of rightless slaves and robbing them of the 
opportunity to satisfy their cultural requirements, the 
existing autocratic-feudal regime helps to spread drunkenness 
among the toiling population to the utmost 
degree. This is apart from the fact that representatives 
of the ³authorities² deliberately encourage drunkenness

J. V. S T A L I N 192 
as a source of revenue for the Treasury. In view of 
all this, the Baku Committee maintains that neither the 
sermons preached by the ³liberals,² who convene congresses 
to combat drunkenness and organise ³temperance 
societies,² nor the exhortations of priests can 
diminish, let alone abolish, drunkenness, which is engendered 
by the inequalities in society, and intensified by 
the autocratic regime. All that is possible and necessary 
within the framework of the capitalist system is a struggle 
with the object not of abolishing drunkenness, but of 
reducing it to a minimum. But for such a struggle to 
be successful it is first of all necessary to overthrow the 
tsarist regime and to win a democratic republic, which 
will create the possibility for the free development of the 
class struggle and for the organisation of the proletariat 
in town and country, for raising its cultural level and 
for widely training its forces for the great struggle for 
socialism. The Baku Committee regards the forthcoming 
congress to combat drunkenness88 as a means of agitating 
for the democratic and socialist demands of the Russian 
proletariat, and instructs our delegate to combat the 
opportunist delegates at the congress who obscure the 
class tasks of the proletariat. . . . 
December 20 
First published in 
Sotsial-Demokrat, No. 11, 
February 13 (26), 1910 
Signed: K. S. 
The section ³Legal 
Possibilities² was written on 
December 20, 1909 
Signed: K. Stefin 
Reprinted from the newspaper. 
The section ³Legal Possibilities² 
reprinted from the manuscript.

II 
TIFLIS 
As regards industrial development, Tiflis is the very 
opposite of Baku. While Baku is interesting as the centre 
of the oil industry, Tiflis can be of interest only as the 
administrative-commercial and ³cultural² centre of the 
Caucasus. The total number of industrial workers in 
Tiflis is about 20,000, i.e., less than the number of troops 
and police. The only large enterprise here is the railway 
workshops (employing about 3,500 workers). Other 
enterprises employ 200 or 100 workers each, but most 
employ from 40 to 20. On the other hand, Tiflis is literally 
crammed with commercial establishments and with 
a ³commercial proletariat² connected with them. Its 
small dependence on the big markets of Russia, which 
are always animated and feverish, puts an impress of 
stagnation on Tiflis. The absence of the sharp class conflicts 
that are characteristic only of large industrial 
centres converts it into something in the nature of a 
marsh, waiting to be stirred from outside. It is this, in 
particular, that explains why Menshevism, real, ³Right² 
Menshevism, has held on so long in Tiflis. How different 
from Baku, where the sharp class stand of the Bolsheviks 
finds a lively response among the workers!

J. V. S T A L I N 194 
What is ³self-evident² in Baku becomes evident in 
Tiflis only after prolonged discussion‹the uncompromising 
speeches of the Bolsheviks are assimilated with great 
difficulty. It is this, in particular, that explains the 
³exceptional propensity² of the Tiflis Bolsheviks for discussion 
and, on the contrary, the desire of the Mensheviks 
to ³avoid² discussion as far as possible. But the only 
conclusion to be drawn from the above is that the work 
of the revolutionary Social-Democrats in promoting the 
socialist education of the Tiflis proletariat will very often 
and inevitably assume the form of an ideological struggle 
against Menshevism. In view of this, exceptional interest 
attaches to even a cursory analysis of the ideological 
atmosphere, which must first of all be combated, and 
which is created by the Tiflis Mensheviks who so far are 
predominant in Tiflis. This atmosphere may be described 
as liquidationist, liquidationist not only in the organisational 
sense, but also in the tactical and programmatic 
sense. It is with a description of this atmosphere that 
we shall begin our cursory sketch of the state of Party 
affairs in Tiflis. 
PROGRAMMATIC LIQUIDATIONISM 
The organ in which Menshevik ³public opinion² 
finds expression is the Georgian Menshevik press. The 
credo of the Tiflis Mensheviks is expressed in the articles 
³Questions of the Day² (see issues of the Azri and Dasatskisi89). 
The author of these articles is the most influential 
of the Tiflis Mensheviks, Comrade An.90 
Let us proceed to review these articles, which provided 
the ideological ground for Liquidationism in Tiflis.

LETTERS FROM THE CAUCASUS 195 
In the above-mentioned articles the author undertakes 
a ³revaluation of all values² and arrives at the 
conclusion that the Party (and the Bolsheviks in particular) 
has erred in certain theses of its programme, 
especially its tactical theses. In the authorıs opinion, 
it is necessary ³radically to change the entire tactics 
of the Party² in order to make it possible ³to unite 
the forces of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat²‹the 
sole guarantee of victory for the revolution. But let the 
author himself speak. 
³The Bolsheviks argued,² says the author, ³that it (the proletariat) 
must carry out (in the bourgeois revolution) its entire 
minimum programme. But the carrying out of the social section 
of this minimum would fetter bourgeois production, would rouse 
the protest of the entire bourgeoisie, and lay the basis for a gigantic 
counter-revolution. . . . Who will dare assert that the introduction 
of an eight-hour day harmonises with the interests of the present-
day undeveloped bourgeoisie?² Clearly, ³the carrying out of 
the Bolshevik minimum programme is mere declamation² (see 
Azri, No. 17, February 1908). 
Of course, the Bolsheviks were not the only ones to 
talk about carrying out the entire minimum programme, 
and history knows of no Bolshevik minimum programme, 
it knows only of the minimum programme of the whole 
Party‹but that is not the point of interest just now. 
The important thing is that in view of ³the undeveloped 
state of the bourgeoisie² and the danger of counter-revolution 
that follows from it, our author rises in arms against 
the ³social section² of the programme as ³mere declamation,² 
which, evidently, ought to be liquidated. 
No analysis of the actual state of industry (Comrade 
An, obviously, uses incorrect terms in describing the 
backwardness of industry as the ³undeveloped state of

J. V. S T A L I N 196 
the bourgeoisie²‹K. St.) , no figures, nothing like 
serious data, are to be found in Comrade Anıs articles. 
He simply starts out with the bare proposition that 
the bourgeoisie will not tolerate the introduction of 
an eight-hour day, and yet, without the ³union of the 
forces of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie,² the victory 
of the revolution is impossible‹hence, down with the 
³social section² of the programme. . . . 
We shall not attempt to prove the absurdity of the 
authorıs assertions, which the liberals of our times advance 
against Social-Democrats every now and again. In 
our opinion it is quite sufficient to quote them to be able 
at once to grasp the nature of the Tiflis Mensheviks. . . . 
But our author rises in arms not only against the 
³social section² of the programme. He does not spare its 
political section either, although he does not attack it 
so bluntly and openly. Let us hear what he says: 
³The struggle of the proletariat alone, or of the bourgeoisie* 
alone, will under no circumstances smash the reaction. . . . Clearly, 
the union of their forces, their combination in one form or another, 
and their direction towards one common goal is the only path 
(our italics) to victory over the reaction.² . . . ³The defeat of the 
reaction, the winning of a constitution and the putting of the latter 
into effect, depends upon the conscious union of the forces 
of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat and their direction towards 
a common goal.² . . . Moreover, ³the proletariat must march in 
such a way as not to weaken the general movement by its uncompromising 
attitude.² But as ³the immediate demand of the bourgeoisie 
can consist only of a moderate constitution,² obviously 
it is the duty of the proletariat to cast aside its ³radical constitu- 
* By ³bourgeoisie² the author everywhere means the ³middle,² 
liberal bourgeoisie, ³whose ideologists are the Cadets.²‹K. St.

LETTERS FROM THE CAUCASUS 197 
tion² if it does not wish ³to weaken the general movement by its 
uncompromising attitude² and prevent the ³conscious direction 
of the forces of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat towards one 
common goal,² in short, if it does not want to prepare the ground 
for the victory of the counter-revolution (see Dasatskisi, No. 4, 
1908). 
The conclusion is obvious: down with the democratic 
republic, long live the ³general movement² and . . . 
a ³moderate constitution² ³to promote the victory² of 
the revolution, of course. . . . 
Before us, as you see, is a poor paraphrasing of the 
well-known article by the ex-Social-Democrat Vasilyev, 
in Tovarishch of 1906, on ³the union of classes,² on temporarily 
forgetting the class tasks of the proletariat, on withdrawing 
the demand for a democratic republic, etc. The 
difference is that Vasilyev spoke out bluntly and clearly, 
whereas Comrade An is ashamed to talk with sufficient 
clarity. 
We have neither the time nor the inclination at the 
present moment to analyse the whole of this liberal 
prattle which, in the main, was analysed and appraised 
in the Russian Social-Democratic press long ago. We 
would only like to call things by their proper names: our 
authorıs programmatic exercises, which the Tiflis Mensheviks 
have accepted as a ³new² group manifesto, are 
tantamount to the liquidation of the Partyıs minimum 
programme, a liquidation that calls for the adaptation 
of our programme to the programme of the Cadets. 
Let us pass from the ³new² programme of the Tiflis 
Mensheviks to their ³new tactics.²

J. V. S T A L I N 198 
TACTICAL LIQUIDATIONISM 
Comrade An is particularly displeased with the Partyıs 
tactics, which, in his opinion, must be ³radically 
changed² (see Dasatskisi, No 4). He therefore devotes 
the greater part of his articles to a criticism of these tactics. 
He particularly attacks the well-known ³Plekhanov 
formula² (³the revolution in Russia will be victorious 
as a workersı movement, or will not be victorious at 
all²91), identifies it with the proposition about the hegemony 
of the proletariat and decides that it does not 
stand criticism. He proposes that this ³formula² be replaced 
by a ³new² (old!) proposition about ³uniting the 
forces of the bourgeoisie and the proletariat² in the interests 
of the ³general movement² . . . ³towards one common 
goal.² Listen to this: 
³The proposition concerning the leading role of the proletariat 
in the bourgeois revolution is justified neither by Marxıs 
theory nor by historical facts.² 
The appeal to theory: 
³The proletariat cannot with i t s own hands build up the 
system of its own enemies. Hence, the leadership of the bourgeois 
revolution by the proletariat is impossible.² 
The appeal to historical facts: 
³Our revolution was at the same time our workersı movement, 
but in spite of that the revolution was not victorious. Clearly, 
Plekhanovıs formula proved to be wrong² (see Azri, No. 17). 
Short and clear. We can only feel sorry for German 
Social-Democracy which admitted (frivolously no doubt!) 
in its letter of greeting to the London Congress that

LETTERS FROM THE CAUCASUS 199 
the leading role of the proletariat in our revolution is 
fully proved both by ³Marxıs theory² and by ³historical 
facts.² We shall say nothing about our (unhappy!) 
Party. . . . 
What does our author substitute for the leading role 
of the proletariat? What does he offer in its place? 
³The struggle of the proletariat alone,² says Comrade An, 
³or of the bourgeoisie alone, will under no circumstances smash 
the reaction. . . . Clearly, the union of their forces, their combination 
in one form or another, and their direction towards one common 
goal is the only path to victory over the reaction.² Moreover, 
³the proletariat must march in such a way as not to weaken the 
general movement by i t s uncompromising attitude². . . (see 
Dasatskisi, No. 4). For, the author assures us, ³the weaker the class 
struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie the more 
victorious (all italics ours‹K. St.) is the bourgeois revolution, 
other conditions being equal, of course² (see Azri, No. 15). 
What ³other equal conditions² the author is referring 
to‹Allah knows! Only one thing is clear, and that 
is, that he is advocating a weakening of the class struggle 
in the interests . . . of the revolution. The proposition, 
confirmed by the experience of our entire revolution, 
that the more this revolution rests on the class struggle 
of the proletariat, which leads the rural poor against the 
landlords and the liberal bourgeoisie, the more complete 
will the victory of the revolution be‹this proposition has 
remained for our author a secret sealed with seven seals. 
The only guarantee of the triumph of the revolution 
that Comrade An can see is: ³The union of the forces 
of the proletariat with the forces of the bourgeoisie.² 
But what is this bourgeoisie in whom our author 
reposes such great hopes? Listen:

J. V. S T A L I N 200 
³The reactionaries,² says our author, ³are exceptionally vigorous 
in fighting the Cadet Party . . . because . . . the future 
masters of Russia will spring from that very middle class whose 
ideology the Cadets express. Political power can be wrested from 
the reactionaries only by the middle bourgeoisie, which has matured 
for the function of ruling; this class is their direct competitor, 
and that is why the reactionaries fear it more than any other.² 
In general, ³in all revolutions the reactionary class did not fear 
the revolutionaries as much as it feared the moderate bourgeoisie. 
Why? Because only that class takes the reins of government out 
of the hands of the old regime, as we said above. Hence, thanks 
to its moderate constitution it is this class that is destined to make 
the new system acceptable to the overwhelming majority and thereby 
cut the ground from under the feet of the reaction² (see Azri, 
No. 24). But as ³the bourgeoisie cannot establish the new system 
without the proletariat,² ³the proletariat will have to support 
the bourgeois opposition² (see Dasatskisi, No. 4). 
And so, it appears, the ³moderate² Cadet bourgeoisie 
with its ³moderate² monarchist constitution will save 
our revolution. 
And the peasantry, what is its role in the revolution? 
³Of course,² says our author, ³the peasantry will intervene in 
the movement and will lend it a spontaneous character, but only 
the two modern classes will play a decisive role²: the moderate 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat (see Dasatskisi, No. 4). 
And so, it is no use counting much on the peasantry, 
it appears. 
Now everything is clear. For the triumph of the revolution 
we need the moderate Cadet bourgeoisie with a 
moderate constitution. But it cannot achieve victory 
alone, it needs the assistance of the proletariat. The 
proletariat must assist it because it has nobody to rely 
on‹not even on the peasantry‹except the moderate

LETTERS FROM THE CAUCASUS 201 
bourgeoisie. But for this it must cast aside its own 
uncompromising attitude and, extending a hand to 
the moderate bourgeoisie, wage a common struggle for a 
moderate Cadet constitution. All the rest will come of 
its own accord. A party which regards the struggle of the 
workers and peasants against the moderate bourgeoisie 
and the feudal landlords as a guarantee of the triumph 
of the revolution‹is making a mistake. 
In short, instead of the leading role of the proletariat 
which leads the peasants, we have the leading role of the 
Cadet bourgeoisie which leads the proletariat by the nose. 
Such are the ³new² tactics of the Tiflis Mensheviks. 
There is no need, in our opinion, to analyse all this 
vile liberal rubbish. We need only observe that the 
³new² tactics of the Tiflis Mensheviks mean the liquidation 
of the Partyıs tactics, the correctness of which 
has been confirmed by the revolution, a liquidation which 
calls for the conversion of the proletariat into an appendage 
of the moderate Cadet bourgeoisie. 
First published in Diskussionny 
Listok. (Supplement to 
Sotsial-Demokrat), No. 2, 
May 25 (June 7), 1910 
Signed: K. St.

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED 
BY THE BAKU COMMITTEE 
ON JANUARY 22, 1910 
(For the Forthcoming General Party Conference) 
I 
POLITICAL AGITATION 
AND THE ACTUAL CONSOLIDATION 
OF THE PARTY 
The state of depression and torpor into which the 
driving forces of the Russian revolution had fallen at 
one time is beginning to pass off. 
The failure of the tsarist governmentıs policy in the 
Balkans, in Persia, and in the Far East, the ridiculous 
efforts of the government to pacify the peasants with 
the aid of the law of November 9,92 by which the poor 
are being driven from the land and the rich are being 
made richer; the utterly unsatisfactory nature of the 
governmentıs ³labour policy,² which is depriving the 
workers of elementary liberties and putting them at the 
mercy of the capitalist robbers; the growing indebtedness 
of the Treasury and the selling of Russia piecemeal to 
foreign capital; the utter collapse of the administrative 
departments expressed in thieving by quartermasters and 
railway magnates, in the blackmail practised by criminal 
investigation departments, in the swindles practised by 
the secret police, etc.‹all this is revealing to the 
masses the incapacity of the counter-revolution to cope 
with the latent forces of the revolution and is thereby

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY BAKU COMMITTEE, JAN. 22, 1910 203 
facilitating the revival observed among the workers 
during the past months, rousing among them an interest 
in the political life of the country, and giving rise to 
the questions: What is to be done? Where shall we go? 
And so on. 
The Party is faced with the burning necessity of conducting 
extensive political Party agitation. The pseudoliberal 
counter-revolutionaries, who enjoy freedom of the 
press, are attempting to tame the masses by means 
of legal ³congresses² and ³societies² and to undermine 
Social-Democratic influence among the masses; that 
makes the question of conducting Party political agitation 
a matter of life or death for the Party. 
Meanwhile, the isolation of our organisations from 
one another and the absence of a (leading) practical 
centre regularly functioning in Russia and actually 
uniting the local organisations in a single Party, preclude 
the possibility of conducting genuinely Party (and not 
amateurish group) political agitation, make it impossible 
for the Party effectively to counteract the systematic 
campaign of slander conducted by the ³liberals,² and 
so discredit the Party in the eyes of the workers. 
This is apart from the fact that, instead of leading to 
the utilisation of ³legal possibilities,² such a state of 
affairs can lead to the scattered and therefore weak illegal 
organisations being actually utilised by the ³legal 
possibilities,² to the detriment of the interests of Social- 
Democracy, of course. 
In view of all this, the Baku Committee regards as 
an immediate and urgent task the drafting of measures 
for the actual consolidation of the Party and, consequently, 
for the conduct of Party political agitation.

J. V. S T A L I N 204 
The Baku Committee is of the opinion that among 
the necessary measures, the following should occupy the 
principal place: 
1) the transference of the (leading) practical centre 
to Russia; 
2) the establishment of an all-Russian leading newspaper 
connected with the local organisations, to be 
published in Russia and edited by the above-mentioned 
practical centre; 
3) the establishment of local organs of the press in 
the most important centres of the labour movement (the 
Urals, Donets Basin, St. Petersburg, Moscow, Baku, etc.). 
The Baku Committee is firmly convinced that the 
adoption of these measures can unite in the Social-Democratic 
Party all the genuine Party elements, irrespective 
of group, can create the possibility of conducting extensive 
political agitation, and greatly facilitate the extensive 
utilisation of ³legal possibilities² for the purpose 
of enlarging and consolidating our Party. 
The Baku Committee therefore proposes that the Central 
Committee of the Party should immediately convene 
a general Party conference, at which the Baku Committee 
will submit the above-mentioned questions for discussion. 
II 
REPRESENTATION AT THE FORTHCOMING 
GENERAL PARTY CONFERENCE 
The Baku Committee, having examined the organisational 
plan (³The Immediate Task,² Proletary, No. 50) 
for the convocation of a general Party conference, is of 
the opinion that to it should be invited (in addition to

RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY BAKU COMMITTEE, JAN. 22, 1910 205 
the regular representation) representatives of the actually 
existing and functioning illegal Party organisations, and 
that attention should be paid mainly to the big centres 
where large masses of the proletariat are concentrated. 
The necessity of such a kind of representation requires 
no proof (see special resolution concerning the 
conference agenda). 
While recognising the necessity of enlarged representation 
at the conference, the Baku Committee, nevertheless, 
expresses its emphatic opposition to giving special 
representation to groups functioning in legal ³organisations.² 
The Baku Committee is of the opinion that special 
representation for such groups will contribute nothing 
material to the conference proceedings, either in those 
cases where such groups belong to local Party organisations 
and submit to their guidance, or in those cases 
where such groups only regard themselves as Social- 
Democratic, but do not recognise the leadership of the 
respective local organisations. In the first case, the representation 
of the Party organisations renders superfluous 
every kind of special representation. In the second case, 
special representation would contradict the very character 
of the conference, which must be strictly Party. 
Published in leaflet form Reprinted from the leaflet

AUGUST BEBEL, 
LEADER OF THE GERMAN WORKERS 
Who does not know Bebel, the veteran leader of the 
German workers, once a ³mere² turner, but now a famous 
political leader before whose criticism ³crowned heads² 
and accredited savants have often retreated as from 
hammer blows, whose words are heeded by the millions of 
proletarians in Germany like the words of a prophet? 
On February 22 of this year Bebel reached the age of 
seventy. 
On that day the militant proletariat of the whole 
of Germany, the International Socialist Bureau, and the 
organised workers in all countries all over the globe 
celebrated old Bebelıs seventieth birthday. 
How has Bebel earned this veneration? What has he 
done for the proletariat? 
How did Bebel rise from the mass of the workers, how 
did he, a ³mere² turner, become the great champion of 
the world proletariat? 
What is the story of his life? 
Bebel spent his childhood amidst poverty and privation. 
At the age of three he lost his father, the breadwinner 
of his family, a poor, consumptive non-commissioned 
officer. To provide the children with another 
breadwinner Bebelıs mother married a second time, 
this time a prison warder. The mother and children left

AUGUST BEBEL, LEADER OF THE GERMAN WORKERS 207 
the army barracks in which they had lived hitherto and 
moved to the prison building. 
But three years later the second husband died. The 
family was left without a breadwinner, so the mother 
took the children to her birthplace in the remote provinces, 
and there they lived in semi-starvation. Bebel, 
as the child of a poor family, was taken into a ³charity 
school,² which he successfully finished at the age of 
thirteen. But a year before he finished school another 
misfortune befell him‹he lost his mother, his last 
support. A complete orphan, left to his own devices, 
and unable to continue his education, Bebel became the 
apprentice of a turner of his acquaintance. 
A life of monotonous and arduous toil began. From 
five in the morning until seven at night Bebel worked in 
the workshop. Some variety was introduced in his life 
by books, to the reading of which he devoted all his 
spare time. To obtain books he subscribed to the local 
library, sacrificing the few pence per week he earned 
by carrying water for his mistress every morning before 
starting work. 
Evidently, far from breaking the spirit of young 
Bebel, far from killing in him his striving towards the 
light, poverty and privation still further strengthened 
his will, increased his thirst for knowledge, raised in 
his mind questions, the answers to which he zealously 
sought in books. 
And so, in the struggle against poverty, the future 
tireless fighter for the emancipation of the proletariat 
was trained. 
On reaching the age of seventeen Bebel finished his 
apprenticeship and started life as a journeyman turner.

J. V. S T A L I N 208 
At the age of nineteen he attended a meeting of workers 
in Leipzig and heard the speeches of socialist working 
men. This was the first meeting at which Bebel 
came face to face with working-men orators. He was 
not yet a Socialist, he sympathised with the liberals, 
but he was sincerely glad to hear the independent 
speeches of the workers, he envied them‹and he was 
filled with the ambition to become a working-man orator 
like them. 
From that moment a new life opened for Bebel‹ 
a definite road stretched before him. He joined workersı 
organisations and became very active in them. Soon 
he acquired influence, and he was elected to the committee 
of the workersı unions. In the course of his activities 
in the unions he fought the Socialists and went 
hand in hand with the liberals, but while fighting 
the Socialists he gradually became convinced that they 
were right. 
In his twenty-sixth year he was already a Social- 
Democrat. His fame spread so rapidly that a year later 
(1867) he was elected chairman of the committee of 
the unions and the first workersı representative in parliament. 
Thus, fighting and winning, step by step surmounting 
the obstacles that surrounded him, Bebel at last rose 
from the mass of the workers and became the leader of 
the militant workers of Germany. 
From that time onwards Bebel openly supported 
Social-Democracy. His immediate aim was to wage war 
against the liberals, to free the workers from their influence, 
and to unite the workers in their own workersı 
Social-Democratic Party.

AUGUST BEBEL, LEADER OF THE GERMAN WORKERS 209 
Bebel achieved his aim in the following year, 1868, 
at the Nuremberg Congress. The skilful and relentless 
attack he launched at this congress brought about the 
utter defeat of the liberals, and German Social-Democracy 
rose up on the ruins of liberalism. 
The emancipation of the workers can be the act 
only of the workers themselves, said Bebel at the congress, 
and therefore, the workers must break away 
from the bourgeois liberals and unite in their own 
workersı party‹and in spite of the opposition of the 
handful of liberals, the overwhelming majority at 
the congress repeated after him the great words of 
Karl Marx. 
To achieve their complete emancipation the workers 
of all countries must unite, said Bebel, and therefore, 
it was necessary to affiliate to the International Workingmenıs 
Association‹and the majority at the congress 
unanimously repeated after him the words of the 
great teacher. 
Thus, the Social-Democratic Labour Party of Germany 
was born, and Bebel was its midwife. 
From that time onwards Bebelıs life was merged 
with that of the Party, his sorrows and joys were merged 
with the Partyıs sorrows and joys. He became the German 
workersı beloved leader and inspirer, because, 
comrades, one cannot help loving a man who has done 
so much to put the workers on their own feet, to free 
them from the tutelage of the bourgeois liberals and to 
give them their own workersı party. 
The year 1870 put the young party to its first test. 
The war against France began, the German government 
demanded money for the war from parliament, of which

J. V. S T A L I N 210 
Bebel was also a member, and a definite stand had to 
be taken for or against the war. Bebel realised, of course, 
that the war benefited only the enemies of the proletariat; 
but all classes of German society, from the bourgeoisie 
to the workers, had been swept off their feet 
by the fever of false patriotism and regarded refusal 
to vote the government the money it demanded as 
treachery to the fatherland. But Bebel paid no heed to 
³patriotic² prejudices and, not fearing to swim against 
the stream, loudly proclaimed from the floor of parliament: 
I, as a Socialist and a republican, am in favour 
not of war but of the fraternity of nations, not of enmity 
with the French workers but of our German workersı 
unity with them. Denunciation, ridicule and contempt 
‹such was the response to Bebelıs bold pronouncement 
even on the part of the workers. But, faithful to the principles 
of scientific socialism, Bebel did not for a moment 
haul down the flag to suit the prejudices of his fellowworkers; 
on the contrary, he did all in his power to raise 
them to the level of clearly understanding the fatal consequences 
of the war. Subsequently, the workers realised 
their mistake and loved their staunch and sturdy 
Bebel all the more. The government, however, rewarded 
him with two yearsı imprisonment, but he did not 
idle away his time in prison. It was in prison that he 
wrote his famous book Woman and Socialism. 
The end of the ıseventies and the ıeighties put the party 
to further tests. Alarmed by the growth of Social-Democracy, 
the German government issued the Anti-Socialist 
Laws, broke up the party and trade union organisations, 
suppressed all the Social-Democratic newspapers without 
exception, annulled freedom of assembly and freedom

AUGUST BEBEL, LEADER OF THE GERMAN WORKERS 211 
of association, and the Social-Democratic Party, which 
had been legal only the day before, was driven underground. 
By these measures the government wanted to 
provoke Social-Democracy into unsuccessful and fatal 
actions, and to demoralise and crush it. Exceptional 
firmness and unexampled foresight were needed to avoid 
losing oneıs head, to change tactics in time, and 
wisely to adjust the movement to the new conditions, 
Many Social-Democrats yielded to these acts of provocation 
and swung towards anarchism. Others renounced 
all their ideals and sank to the level of the liberals. 
But Bebel staunchly remained at his post, encouraging 
some, cooling the excessive zeal of others and 
exposing the phrasemongering of s t i l l others, and 
skilfully guided the Party along the true path, forward, 
ever forward. Ten years later the government 
was obliged to yield to the growing strength of the 
labour movement and repealed the Anti-Socialist Laws. 
Bebelıs line of policy proved to be the only correct 
line. 
The end of the ınineties and the 1900ıs put the Party to 
still another test. Encouraged by the industrial boom and 
the relatively easy economic victories, the moderate 
elements in the Social-Democratic movement began to 
deny the necessity of an uncompromising class struggle 
and a socialist revolution. We must not be uncompromising, 
we do not need a revolution, they said; 
what we need is class collaboration, we need agreements 
with the bourgeoisie and the government, so that we 
may jointly with them patch up the existing system. 
Let us therefore vote for the bourgeois governmentıs 
budget, let us enter the present bourgeois government.

J. V. S T A L I N 212 
By these arguments the moderates undermined the principles 
of scientific socialism and the revolutionary tactics 
of Social-Democracy. Bebel realised how dangerous the 
situation was and, together with other leaders of the 
Party, he proclaimed uncompromising war upon the 
moderates. At the Dresden Congress (1903) he utterly 
defeated Bernstein and Vollmar, the German leaders of 
the moderates, and proclaimed the necessity of revolutionary 
methods of struggle. In the following year, 
in Amsterdam, in the presence of Socialists from all 
countries, he defeated Jean Jaurès, the international 
leader of the moderates, and once again proclaimed the 
necessity of an uncompromising struggle. From that 
time onwards he gave the ³moderate enemies of the 
Party² no rest, inflicting defeat after defeat upon them 
in Jena (1905) and Nuremberg (1908). As a result, the 
Party emerged from the internal struggle united and 
strong, astonishingly consolidated and immensely grown, 
and for a l l this i t was indebted mainly to August 
Bebel. . . . 
But Bebel was not satisfied merely with activity 
within the Party. His thunderous speeches in 
the German parliament, in which he lashed out at 
the musty aristocracy, tore the mask from the liberals 
and pilloried the ³imperial government,² and his 
long years of activity in the trade unions‹all show 
that Bebel, the faithful guardian of the interests of 
the proletariat, appeared wherever the fight was hottest, 
wherever his seething proletarian energy was 
needed. 
That is why the German and international Socialists 
revere Bebel so much.

AUGUST BEBEL, LEADER OF THE GERMAN WORKERS 213 
Of course, Bebel made mistakes‹who does not? 
(Only the dead make no mistakes.) But all small mistakes 
pale into insignificance when contrasted with the 
tremendous services he has rendered the Party, which 
today, after forty-two years of leadership by Bebel, 
has over 600,000 members, about 2,000,000 workers 
organised in trade unions, enjoys the confidence of 
3,000,000 to 4,000,000 voters, and by a wave of the hand 
can organise demonstrations of hundreds of thousands 
in Prussia. 
It is noteworthy that the celebrations in honour 
of Bebelıs birthday coincided with a striking demonstration 
of the might of German Social-Democracy, 
with huge and unprecedentedly well-organised 
demonstrations in favour of universal suffrage in 
Prussia. 
Bebel has every right to claim that he has not worked 
in vain. 
Such are the life and activities of old Bebel, yes, 
very old, but ever so young in spirit, standing, as of 
old, at his post in anticipation of fresh battles and fresh 
victories. 
Only the militant proletariat could have produced 
a man like Bebel, virile, eternally young and eternally 
forward looking, as it is itself. 
Only the theory of scientific socialism could have 
given wide scope for Bebelıs ebullient nature, for his 
tireless efforts to destroy the old, decaying capitalist 
world. 
Bebelıs life and activities testify to the strength and 
invincibility of the proletariat, to the inevitable triumph 
of socialism. . . .

J. V. S T A L I N 214 
Let us, then, comrades, send greetings to our beloved 
teacher‹the turner August Bebel! 
Let him serve as an example to us Russian workers, 
who are particularly in need of Bebels in the labour 
movement. 
Long Live Bebel! 
Long Live Internationa Social-Democracy! 
The Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. 
Published in leaflet form Reprinted from the leaflet 
March 23, 1910

A LETTER TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
OF THE PARTY FROM EXILE 
IN SOLVYCHEGODSK 
Comrade Semyon! Yesterday I received your letter 
from the comrades. First of all, hearty greetings to Lenin 
and the others. Next about your letter and, in general, 
about the ³vexed questions.² 
In my opinion, the line of the bloc (Lenin-Plekhanov) 
is the only correct one: 1) this line, and it alone, answers 
to the real interests of the work in Russia, which demand 
that all real Party elements should rally together; 2) this 
line, and it alone, will expedite the process of emancipation 
of the legal organisations from the yoke of the 
Liquidators, by digging a gulf between the Menshevik 
workers and the Liquidators, and dispersing and disposing 
of the latter. A fight for influence in the legal 
organisations is the burning question of the day, a necessary 
stage on the road towards the regeneration of the 
Party; and a bloc is the only means by which these 
organisations can be cleansed of the garbage of Liquidationism. 
The plan for a bloc reveals the hand of Lenin‹he 
is a shrewd fellow, and knows a thing or two. But this 
does not mean that any kind of bloc is good. A Trotsky 
bloc (he would have said ³synthesis²) would be rank 
unprincipledness, a Manilov amalgam of heterogeneous

J. V. S T A L I N 216 
principles, the helpless longing of an unprincipled person 
for a ³good² principle. The logic of things, by its 
nature, adheres strictly to principle and abhors an amalgam. 
A Lenin-Plekhanov bloc is practical because it 
is thoroughly based on principle, on unity of views on 
the question of how to regenerate the Party. But precisely 
because it is a bloc and not a merger‹precisely 
for that reason, the Bolsheviks must have their own 
group. It is quite possible that in the course of their 
work the Bolsheviks will completely tame the Plekhanovites, 
but that is only a possibility. At all events, 
we must not go to sleep and wait for such a result, even 
if it is a very probable one. The more unitedly the Bolsheviks 
act, the more organised they are in their actions, 
the greater will be the chances of taming. We must, 
therefore, tirelessly hammer away on all anvils. I shall 
say nothing about the Vperyod-ists, because they are 
now of less interest than the Liquidators and the Plekhanovites. 
If they do wake up one of these days‹all to 
the good, of course; but if not‹well, never mind, let 
them stew in their own juice. 
That is what I think about things abroad. 
But that is not all, nor even the most important. The 
most important thing is to organise the work in Russia. 
The history of our Party shows that disagreements are 
ironed out not in debates, but mainly in the course of 
the work, in the course of applying principles. Hence, 
the task of the day is to organise work in Russia around 
a strictly defined principle. The Liquidators at once 
realised what was in the wind (their scent is highly 
developed) and have begun to penetrate (have already 
penetrated) the legal workersı organisations, and it

A LETTER TO C.C. OF THE PARTY 217 
appears that they already have their underground centre 
in Russia, which is directing, etc., the work. We, however, 
are still only ³preparing,² still in the stage of rehearsals. 
In my opinion, our immediate task, the one that 
brooks no delay, is to organise a central group (in Russia), 
to co-ordinate the illegal, semi-legal and legal work 
at first in the main centres (St. Petersburg, Moscow, 
the Urals, the South). Call it what you like‹the ³Russian 
section of the Central Committee² or auxiliary 
group of the Central Committee‹it makes no difference, 
but such a group is as essential as air, as bread. At the 
present time lack of information, loneliness and isolation 
reign among the Party workers in the localities and 
they are all becoming discouraged. This group could give 
fresh stimulus to the work and introduce clarity. And 
that would clear the road for the actual utilisation of 
legal possibilities. And that, in my opinion, will start 
the revival of the Party spirit. To begin with, it 
would do no harm to arrange a conference of the Party 
workers who accept the decisions of the plenum,93 under 
the guidance of the Central Committee, of course. But 
all this after the ³reform² of the central bodies,94 
and provided the Plekhanovites agree. It is quite possible 
that such a conference will produce the people 
suitable for the above-mentioned central group. I think 
that the benefits of such a conference are obvious in many 
other respects too. But we must act firmly and relentlessly 
and not fear reproaches from the Liquidators, Trotskyites 
and Vperyod- i s t s . I f the Plekhanovites and 
Leninites unite on the basis of work in Russia, they can 
afford to ignore all reproaches, no matter from what 
quarter they come.

J. V. S T A L I N 218 
That is what I think about work in Russia. 
Now about myself. I have another six months to go 
here.95 When the term expires I shall be entirely at your 
service. If the need for Party workers is really acute, 
I could get away at once. I have read No. 1 of Mysl.96 
I can picture to myself how much clarity and encouragement 
the workers will gain even from the mere fact that 
yesterdayıs opponents are acting together, and how much 
confusion and chaos this will cause in the ranks of the 
Liquidators. And every honest person will say that this 
will not be bad. 
There is a decent crowd here in exile, and it would be 
a very good thing if they could be supplied with the 
illegal periodicals. Send us Sotsial-Demokrat No. 17 
and onwards, and also the ³Supplement² to Sotsial- 
Demokrat. We have not received Rabochaya Gazeta,97 
neither No. 1 nor No. 2, nor have we received Golos Sotsial-
Demokrata. I suppose we shall receive Zvezda.98 
Send to the following addresses: 1) Solvychegodsk, 
Vologda Gubernia, for Ivan Isaakovich Bogomolov; 
2) Solvychegodsk, Vologda Gubernia, for Pyotr Mikhailovich 
Serafimov. The address for correspondence with 
me is: Solvychegodsk, Vologda Gubernia, the house of 
Grigorov, for Nikolai Alexandrovich Voznesensky. 
With comradely greetings, K. S. 
Donıt send by registered mail. Write about how 
things are going on your side, I beg of you. 
Written: December 31, 1910 Reprinted from a copy of the letter

FOR THE PARTY!99 
Interest in political life is reviving in the country 
and, simultaneously with it, the crisis in our Party is 
coming to an end. The dead point is past, the torpor is 
beginning to pass off. The general Party conference which 
took place recently100 is a clear symptom of the Partyıs 
regeneration. Our Party gained strength with the growth 
of the Russian revolution and was shattered with its 
fall; it was therefore inevitable that the Party should 
rise to its feet with the political awakening of the country. 
The revival in the principal branches of industry and 
the growth of the capitalistsı profits, along with the 
drop in the real wages of the workers; the free development 
of the economic and political organisations of 
the bourgeoisie along with the forcible suppression of 
the legal and illegal organisations of the proletariat; 
the rise in the prices of the necessities of life and the 
rise in landlordsı profits, along with the ruination of 
peasant farming; the famine which has affected over 
25,000,000 of the population and has demonstrated the 
helplessness of the ³renovated² counter-revolutionary 
regime‹all this was bound to affect the toiling strata, 
and primarily the proletariat, by awakening their 
interest in political life. One of the striking expressions

J. V. S T A L I N 220 
of this awakening is the conference of the Russian Social- 
Democratic Labour Party held last January. 
But the awakening of minds and hearts cannot be 
self-contained‹under present political conditions it must 
inevitably develop into open mass action. 
The conditions of life of the workers must be improved, 
wages must be raised, the working day must be 
shortened, the conditions of the workers in the mills, 
factories and mines must be radically changed. But how 
can all this be done if not by means of still prohibited 
partial and general economic actions? 
We must win the right freely to wage a struggle 
against the employers, the right to strike, freedom of 
association, assembly, speech, press, etc.: otherwise the 
workersı struggle to improve their conditions of life 
will be hampered to the utmost degree. But how can all 
this be won if not by open political actions, by means of 
demonstrations, political strikes, etc.? 
We must bring about the recovery of the country, 
which is suffering from chronic starvation; we must 
put a stop to the present state of affairs under which 
tens of millions of tillers of the soil are compelled periodically 
to suffer famine with all its horrors; it is 
impossible to look on with folded arms and see starving 
fathers and mothers, with tears in their eyes, ³selling 
for a mere song² their daughters and sons! We must 
uproot the present rapacious financial policy which is 
ruining the poverty-stricken peasant farms and which 
with every crop failure inevitably pushes millions of 
peasants on to the path of devastating famine! The country 
must be saved from pauperisation and demoralisation! 
But can all this be done without overthrowing the entire

FOR THE PARTY! 221 
edifice of tsarism from top to bottom? And how can the 
tsarist government, with all its feudal survivals, be 
overthrown, if not by a wide, popular revolutionary 
movement, led by its historically recognised leader, 
the socialist proletariat? . . . 
But in order that the future actions shall not be 
isolated and sporadic, in order that the proletariat may 
honourably fulfil its lofty task of uniting and leading 
the future actions‹for all this it is necessary to have‹ 
in addition to the revolutionary consciousness of broad 
strata of the people and the class consciousness of the 
proletariat‹a strong and flexible proletarian party that 
will be able to unite the separate efforts of the local 
organisations in one common effort and thereby direct 
the mass revolutionary movement against the main 
fortifications of the enemy. To set to rights the party 
of the proletariat, the Russian Social-Democratic Labour 
Party‹that is what is particularly necessary in order 
that the proletariat may worthily meet the coming 
revolutionary actions. 
The imperative necessity of uniting the Party becomes 
still more strikingly evident in view of the approaching 
elections to the Fourth State Duma. 
But how can the Party be set to rights? 
First of all, the local party organisations must be 
strengthened. Broken up into small and tiny groups, 
surrounded by a slough of despondency and lack of 
confidence in the cause, destitute of intellectual forces 
and not infrequently disrupted by provocateurs‹is 
not this dismal picture of the life of the local organisations 
familiar to all? This dispersion of forces 
can and must be brought to an end! The incipient

J. V. S T A L I N 222 
awakening of the masses of the workers on the one hand, 
and the recent conference as an expression of this awakening 
on the other, greatly facilitate the task of putting 
an end to this dispersion. Let us, then, do all in our power 
to put an end to organisational dispersion! Let the Social-
Democratic workers in every town and in every 
industrial centre, all those, irrespective of group, who 
believe that an illegal Russian Social-Democratic Labour 
Party is needed, join together in local Party organisations! 
Let the machines which unite the workers 
in a single army of exploited‹let those very machines 
unite them in a single party of fighters against exploitation 
and violence! . . . There is no need to strive after 
a large membership: under present conditions of work 
this may even be dangerous. The whole point is the 
quality of the comrades, the whole point is that the influential 
comrades grouped in local organisations should 
appreciate the importance of the cause they are serving 
and steadfastly carry on their work on revolutionary 
Social-Democratic lines. And let the local organisations 
thus formed not shut themselves off in isolation, let 
them constantly intervene in all the affairs connected 
with the struggle of the proletariat, from the most 
³petty,² ordinary affairs to the biggest and most ³extraordinary²; 
let not a single clash between labour and 
capital, not a single protest of the masses of the workers 
against the brutalities of the tsarist government escape 
their influence. It must always be borne in mind that 
only in this way will it be possible to strengthen and 
bring about the recovery of the local organisations. 
That is why, among other things, they must maintain the 
most lively connections with the open mass organisations

FOR THE PARTY! 223 
of the workers, with the unions and clubs, and facilitate 
their development in every way. 
Let our comrades the workers not be daunted by the 
difficulties and complexity of the tasks that fall exclusively 
on them owing to the absence of intellectual 
forces; totally unnecessary modesty and fear of 
³unaccustomed² work must be cast aside once and for 
all; one must have the courage to undertake complex 
Party tasks! It does not matter if a few mistakes are 
discovered in the course of this; you will stumble once 
or twice, and then you will get accustomed to stepping 
out freely. Bebels do not drop from the skies, they grow 
up from the ranks in the course of Party activity in all 
its spheres. . . . 
But the local organisations taken separately, even if 
they are strong and influential, do not constitute the 
Party. To constitute the Party they must be gathered 
together, linked up in a single whole that lives a common 
life. Scattered local organisations, not only isolated 
from one another, but not even aware of one anotherıs 
existence, organisations left entirely to their own devices, 
acting entirely on their own initiative and not 
infrequently conducting their work on opposite lines‹ 
all this constitutes the familiar picture of amateurish 
methods in the Party. To link the local organisations 
together and rally them around the Central Committee of 
the Party means, precisely, putting an end to amateurish 
methods and preparing the ground for setting the proletarian 
party to rights. An influential Central Committee 
connected by living roots with the local organisations, 
systematically keeping the latter informed and linking 
them up together; a Central Committee which constantly

J. V. S T A L I N 224 
intervenes in all matters concerning general proletarian 
actions; a Central Committee which possesses an illegal 
newspaper published in Russia for the purpose of conducting 
wide political agitation‹such is the direction in 
which the renovation and consolidation of the Party 
must proceed. 
Needless to say, the Central Committee will be unable 
to cope with this difficult task unaided: the comrades 
in the local organisations must bear in mind that unless 
it receives their systematic support from the localities, 
the Central Committee will inevitably be converted 
into a cipher, and the Party will be reduced to a fiction. 
Hence, joint work of the Central Committee and the local 
organisations‹such is the essential condition for renovating 
the Party, that is what we call upon the comrades 
to do. 
And so, for the Party, comrades, for a regenerated, 
underground, Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party! 
Long Live the United Russian Social-Democratic Labour 
Party! 
The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. 
Published in leaflet form Reprinted from the manuscript 
in March 1912

LONG LIVE THE FIRST OF MAY!101 
Comrades! 
As far back as last century, the workers of all 
countries resolved to celebrate annually this day, the 
First of May. That was in 1889, when, at the Paris 
Congress of the Socialists of all countries, the workers 
resolved to proclaim, precisely on this day, the First 
of May, when nature is awakening from her winter sleep, 
when the woods and hills are donning their green mantles 
and the fields and meadows are adorning themselves 
with flowers, when the sun shines more warmly, the 
joy of revival fills the air and nature gives herself up to 
dancing and rejoicing‹they resolved to proclaim loudly 
and openly to the whole world, precisely on this day, 
that the workers are bringing spring to mankind and 
deliverance from the shackles of capitalism, that it is 
the mission of the workers to renovate the world on the 
basis of freedom and socialism. 
Every class has its own favourite festivals. The nobility 
introduced their festivals, and on them they proclaim 
their ³right² to rob the peasants. The bourgeoisie have 
their festivals and on them they ³justify² their ³right² to 
exploit the workers. The clergy, too, have their festivals, 
and on them they eulogise the existing system under which 
the toilers die in poverty while the idlers wallow in luxury. 
The workers, too, must have their festival, and on it

J. V. S T A L I N 226 
they must proclaim: universal labour, universal freedom, 
universal equality of all men. That festival is the festival 
of the First of May. 
That is what the workers resolved as far back as 1889. 
Since then the battle-cry of workersı socialism has 
rung out louder and louder at meetings and demonstrations 
on the First of May. The ocean of the labour movement 
is expanding more and more, spreading to new 
countries and states, from Europe and America to Asia, 
Africa and Australia. In the course of only a few 
decades the formerly weak international workersı association 
has grown into a mighty international brotherhood, 
which holds regular congresses and unites millions of 
workers in all parts of the world. The sea of proletarian 
wrath is rising in towering waves, and is more and more 
menacingly advancing against the tottering citadels of 
capitalism. The great coal minersı strike which recently 
flared up in Great Britain, Germany, Belgium, America, 
etc., a strike which struck fear into the hearts of 
the exploiters and rulers all over the world, is a clear 
sign that the socialist revolution is not far off. . . . 
³We do not worship the golden calf!² We do not want 
the kingdom of the bourgeoisie and the oppressors! 
Damnation and death to capitalism and its horrors of 
poverty and bloodshed! Long live the kingdom of labour, 
long live socialism! 
That is what the class-conscious workers of all countries 
proclaim on this day. 
And confident of victory, calm and strong, they are 
marching proudly along the road to the promised land, 
towards glorious socialism, step by step carrying out 
Karl Marxıs great call: ³Workers of all countries, unite!²

LONG LIVE THE FIRST OF MAY! 227 
That is how the workers in free countries celebrate 
the First of May. 
The Russian workers, ever since they began to realise 
their position, and not wishing to lag behind their 
comrades, have always joined the general chorus of their 
foreign comrades and, jointly with them, have celebrated 
the First of May in spite of everything, in spite of the 
brutal acts of repression of the tsarist government. True, 
for the past two or three years, during the period of counter-
revolutionary bacchanalia and disorganisation of the 
Party, industrial depression and the deadening political 
indifference of the broad masses, the Russian workers have 
been unable to celebrate their glorious workersı festival 
in the old way. But the revival that has started in the 
country recently; the economic strikes and the political 
protests of the workers in connection, say, with the rehearing 
of the case of the Social-Democratic deputies in 
the Second Duma; the growing discontent among broad 
strata of the peasants because of the famine which has 
affected over twenty gubernias, and the protests of 
hundreds of thousands of shop assistants against the 
³renovated² system of the Russian diehards‹all go to 
show that the deadening torpor is passing off, giving 
place to a political revival in the country, primarily 
among the proletariat. That is why this year the Russian 
workers can and must on this day extend a hand to 
their foreign comrades. That is why they must celebrate 
the First of May in one way or another together with 
them. 
They must declare today that they are at one with 
their comrades in the free countries‹they do not and 
will not worship the golden calf.

J. V. S T A L I N 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
228 
Moreover, to the general demand of the workers of 
all countries they must add their own Russian demand 
for the overthrow of tsarism and the establishment of 
a democratic republic. 
³We detest the crowns of tyrants!² ³We honour 
the chains of the martyred people!² Death to bloody 
tsarism! Death to landlordism! Death to the tyranny of 
the masters in factories, mills and mines! Land for the 
peasants! An eight-hour day for the workers! A democratic 
republic for all the citizens of Russia! 
That is also what the Russian workers must proclaim 
on this day. 
It is lies and grovelling before Nicholas the Last 
when the Russian liberals assure themselves and others 
that tsarism has consolidated itself in Russia and is 
capable of satisfying the principal needs of the people. 
It is deception and hypocrisy when the Russian 
liberals sing in all keys that the revolution is dead and 
that we are living under a ³renovated² system. 
Look around! Does long-suffering Russia resemble a 
³renovated,² ³well-governed² country? 
Instead of a democratic constitution‹a regime of 
gallows and brutal tyranny! 
Instead of a popular parliament‹the black Duma 
of the black landlords! 
Instead of the ³unshakeable foundations of civil 
liberty,² instead of the freedom of speech, assembly, 
press, association and strike promised by the Manifesto 
of October 17‹the dead hand of ³discretion² and 
³prevention,² the closing of newspapers, the deportation 
of editors, the suppression of unions and the breaking-up 
of meetings!

LONG LIVE THE FIRST OF MAY! 229 
Instead of inviolability of the person‹beating 
up in prisons, outrages against citizens, the bloody 
suppression of strikers in the Lena goldfields! 
Instead of satisfaction of the peasantsı needs‹ 
the policy of still further driving the peasant masses 
from the land! 
Instead of a well-ordered administration‹the thieving 
by quartermasters, thieving at railway Head Offices, 
thieving in the Forestry Department, thieving in the 
Naval Department! 
Instead of order and discipline in the governmental 
machine‹forgery in the courts, swindling and blackmail 
by criminal investigation departments, murder and 
provocation in the secret-police departments! 
Instead of the international greatness of the Russian 
state‹the ignominious failure of Russian ³policy² in 
the Near and Far East and the role of butcher and 
despoiler in the affairs of bleeding Persia! 
Instead of peace of mind and security for the inhabitants‹
suicides in the towns and horrible starvation 
among 30,000,000 peasants in the rural districts! 
Instead of improvement and purification of morals 
‹incredible dissoluteness in the monasteries, those 
citadels of official morality! 
And to complete the picture‹the brutal shooting 
of hundreds of toilers in the Lena goldfields! . . . 
Destroyers of already won liberties, worshippers 
of gallows and firing-squads, inventors of ³discretion² 
and ³prevention,² thieving quartermasters, thieving 
engineers, robber police, murdering secret police, dissolute 
Rasputins‹these are the ³renovators² of Russia! 
And yet there are people in the world who have the

J. V. S T A L I N 230 
effrontery to say that all is well in Russia, that the 
revolution is dead! 
No, comrades; where millions of peasants are starving 
and workers are shot down for going on strike the revolution 
will go on living until the disgrace to mankind‹ 
Russian tsarism‹is swept from the face of the earth. 
And on this day, the First of May, we must say in 
one way or another, at meetings, mass gatherings or at 
secret assemblies‹whichever is the most expedient‹ 
that we pledge ourselves to fight for the complete overthrow 
of the tsarist monarchy, that we welcome the 
coming Russian revolution, the liberator of Russia! 
Let us, then, extend our hands to our comrades 
abroad and together with them proclaim: 
Down With Capitalism! 
Long Live Socialism! 
Let us hoist the flag of the Russian revolution bearing 
the inscriptions: 
Down With the Tsarist Monarchy! 
Long Live the Democratic Republic! 
Comrades! Today we are celebrating the First of 
May! Long Live the First of May! 
Long Live International Social-Democracy! 
Long Live the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party! 
The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. 
Published in leaflet form Reprinted from the manuscript 
in April 1912

A NEW PERIOD 
The economic actions of the workers are being followed 
by their political actions. 
The strikes over wages are being followed by protests, 
meetings, and political strikes in connection with 
the Lena shooting. 
In St. Petersburg and Moscow, in Riga and Kiev, 
in Saratov and Yekaterinoslav, in Odessa and Kharkov, 
in Baku and Nikolayev‹everywhere, in all parts of 
Russia, the workers are rising in vindication of their 
comrades who were murdered on the Lena. 
³We live! Our scarlet blood seethes with the fire 
of unspent strength!² . . . 
In its increasing revival the labour movement is 
passing through a third stage. And this after the bacchanalia 
of the counter-revolution. 
About two years ago the workers were still trying 
to resist the growing attacks of the insatiable employers. 
Defensive strikes and, in places, offensive strikes‹ 
thus the revival of the movement expressed itself. That 
was the first stage. The Moscow region was the pioneer. 
About eighteen months ago the workers passed on to 
offensive strikes. They put forward new economic demands 
and strove to secure the restoration of the conditions of

J. V. S T A L I N 232 
1905-06, of which the workers were robbed when counter-
revolution was rampant. That was the second stage. 
Here the western border regions were the pioneers. 
Now the third stage has been reached, the period of 
the political movement. 
From stage to stage! 
And this was to be expected. The boom in the main 
branches of industry and the growth of capitalist profits 
simultaneously with the fall in real wages, the growth 
of the industrial and political organisations of the 
bourgeoisie simultaneously with the crushing of the 
workersı organisations, the rise in the prices of the 
necessities of life and growth of landlordsı incomes simultaneously 
with starvation reigning among 30,000,000 
peasants, when, driven by want, mothers and fathers 
are compelled to sell their daughters and sons‹all this 
was bound to bring about a political revival in the ranks 
of the working class. 
The Lena shooting merely served as a signal. 
Obviously, ³all is not quiet at the Shipka Pass.² This 
is felt even by the representatives of the government, 
who are hastily preparing to ³pacify² the country. Apparently, 
it is affecting even our foreign affairs. . . . 
But news of political protest strikes continues to 
pour in. 
There can be no doubt that the subterranean forces 
of the movement for emancipation have set to work. . . . 
Greetings to you, first swallows! 
The St. Petersburg Zvezda, Reprinted from the newspaper 
No. 30, April 15, 1912 
Signed: K. S.

LIBERAL HYPOCRITES 
Rech has ³erred² again! It appears that it ³did not 
expect² from ³the government² ³tactless² explanations 
of the Lena atrocities. You see, it had ³hoped² that 
Minister Makarov would ³take legal proceedings² against 
the Treshchenkos. But suddenly came Makarovıs statement 
that Treshchenko was right and that in future 
too the workers would be shot down! 
³We erred,² observes the liberal Rech with false contrition, 
commenting on this matter (see Rech of April 12). 
Poor Cadets! How many times they have ³erred² 
in their expectations concerning the government! 
Not so very long ago they ³thought² that we had a 
constitution in Russia, and they assured Europe, in 
all languages, that ³our united government² is ³quite 
constitutional.² That was in London, far away from 
Russia. But it was enough for them to return to Russia, 
to the land of ³discretion² and ³prevention,² for them 
to admit their ³error² and to ³become disillusioned.² 
Only very recently they ³believed² that Stolypin 
had succeeded in putting the country on the road to parliamentary 
³renovation.² But it was enough for Stolypin 
to put the notorious 87 clause102 into operation for the 
Cadets to start singing again about ³errors² and ³misunderstandings,²

J. V. S T A L I N 234
Was it so long ago that the Cadets drew a parallel 
between the Russian government (recall the dock 
workersı strike) and the British government in their 
attitude towards strikes? But it was enough for the 
Lena tragedy to be enacted for the Cadets to begin again 
to chant their hypocritical ³we erred.² 
The remarkable thing is that while ³errors² and 
³disillusionments² continue to multiply, the Cadet tactics 
of making advances to the government remain unchanged! 
Poor, poor Cadets! Evidently they ³count on² naive 
readers who believe in their sincerity. 
They ³think² that people do not notice their obsequious 
grovelling before the enemies of Russiaıs emancipation. 
They do not yet realise that, while until now they 
have ³erred² again and again in their expectations of 
the government, they are now going to be ³disillusioned² 
with the masses of the people, who, at last, will discern 
their counter-revolutionary character and turn their 
backs on them. 
Whom will Messrs. the Cadets deceive then? 
Grovelling before the government and hypocrisy 
towards the country‹why are they called the ³Party of 
Popular Freedom²? 
The St. Petersburg Zvezda, Reprinted from the newspaper 
No. 30, April 15, 1912 
Signed: S.

NON-PARTY SIMPLETONS 
Non-party progressivism has become the fashion. 
Such is the nature of the Russian intellectual‹he must 
have a fashion. At one time Saninism was the fashion, 
then decadence became the rage‹now it is the turn of 
non-partyism. 
What is non-partyism? 
In Russia there are landlords and peasants, their 
interests are antagonistic, a struggle between them is 
inevitable. But non-partyism ignores this fact, it is inclined 
to hush up the antagonism of interests. 
In Russia there are bourgeois and proletarians; the 
victory of one of these classes means the defeat of the 
other. But non-partyism glosses over the antagonism 
of interests, it shuts its eyes to their struggle. 
Every class has its own party, with a special programme 
and a special complexion. Parties direct the 
struggle of classes. Without parties there would be not 
a struggle but chaos, absence of clarity and confusion 
of interests. But non-partyism abhors clarity and definiteness, 
it prefers nebulousness and absence of programme. 
Glossing over of class antagonisms, hushing up 
of the class struggle, absence of a definite complexion, 
hostility to all programme, gravitation towards

J. V. S T A L I N 236 
chaos and the confusion of interests‹such is non-partyism. 
What is the aim of non-partyism? 
To unite the ununitable, to bring about the impossible. 
To unite bourgeois and proletarians in an alliance, 
to erect a bridge between the landlords and the peasants, 
to haul a wagon with the aid of a swan, a crab and a 
pike‹this is what non-partyism aims at. 
Non-partyism realises that it is incapable of uniting 
the ununitable and therefore says with a sigh: 
³If Œifsı and Œansı 
Were pots and pans. . . .² 
But ³ifs² and ³ans² are not pots and pans and so 
non-partyism is always left in the cart, always remains 
the simpleton. 
Non-partyism is like a man without a head on his 
shoulders, or‹rather‹like a man with a turnip instead 
of a head. 
This is precisely the position of the ³progressive² 
journal Zaprosy Zhizni.103 
³The parties of the Right have already taken a 
decision,² says Zaprosy Zhizni. ³They are uniting in 
one reactionary mass to fight the entire progressive 
opposition. . . . Therefore, the bloc of the Rights must 
be opposed by a bloc of the Lefts, which must 
embrace all the progressive social elements² (see Zaprosy 
Zhizni, No. 6). 
But who are these ³progressive elements²? 
They are the Party of Peaceful Renovation,104 the 
Cadets, the Trudoviks and the Social-Democrats. That is 
to say, the ³progressive² bourgeoisie, the pro-liberal land

NON-PARTY SIMPLETONS 237 
lords, the peasants who are thirsting for the landlordsı 
land, and the proletarians who are fighting the bourgeoisie. 
And Zaprosy Zhizni wants to unite these ³elements²! 
Very original and . . . foolish, is it not? 
And this organ of people without principles wants 
to lecture the Social-Democrats on the tactics they 
should pursue in the elections to the Fourth Duma! 
Simpletons! . . . 
The St. Petersburg Zvezda, Reprinted from the newspaper 
No. 30, April 15, 1912 
Signed: K. S‹n

LIFE TRIUMPHS! 
It was not so long ago, only a year back, that Messrs. 
the Liquidators, the zealous advocates of a ³legal party,² 
launched with a lot of noise and clamour the socalled 
petition campaign. 
The well-known Delo Zhizni, 105 the ³publicist² 
organ of the Liquidators, wrote that the immediate 
task of the labour movement was to fight for the right 
of association by means of petitions. 
Nasha Zarya,106 the ³scientific² organ of the Liquidators, 
³substantiating² this task, assured the workers 
that petitions would organise around them the ³broad 
masses.² 
But then the bloody tragedy in the Lena goldfields 
was enacted, real life with its implacable antagonisms 
came upon the scene and the Liquidatorsı petition 
tactics were scattered to the winds like dust. Lawful 
strikes, petitions, requests, were all simply swept over- 
³The petitions which the workers sent 
demanding freedom . . . of association 
did not improve their conditions in 
the least. On the contrary, in answer 
to these demands the workers were shot 
down.² . . . 
Excerpt from the speech 
delivered by Deputy Kuznetsov

LIFE TRIUMPHS! 239 
board. The ³renovated² system revealed its true features. 
And Minister Makarov, the representative of this 
system, stated, as if to introduce more clarity into 
the matter, that the shooting of 500 workers was not 
the end but only the beginning, and that, with 
Godıs help, the same thing would be repeated in 
future. . . . 
That was a perfect bullıs-eye! The petition 
tactics, so noisily proclaimed, were shattered by life! 
The petition policy proved to be impotent! 
It is evident, therefore, that it is not petitions that 
are destined to settle the age-long contest between the 
old and the new Russia. . . . 
And do not the innumerable meetings and strikes 
of the workers which have taken place throughout Russia 
in connection with the Lena massacre prove once again 
that the workers will not take the path of petitions? 
Listen to the workersı deputy Kuznetsov: 
³Actually, the petitions which the workers sent 
demanding freedom of association did not improve 
their conditions in the least. On the contrary, in 
answer to these demands the workers were shot 
down.² . . . 
That is what Deputy Kuznetsov says. 
A workersı deputy who heeds the voice of the workers, 
from whose ranks he comes, could not say anything 
else. 
No, the Liquidators are out of luck! . . . 
Well, what about the petition tactics? Where are 
they to be put? 
As far away from the workers as possible, of 
course. . . .

J. V. S T A L I N 240
Yes, indeed, the lessons of life are evidently not being 
wasted, even on the Liquidators. It seems that the 
petition intoxication is beginning to pass off. Well, we 
congratulate them on becoming sober, congratulate them 
from the bottom of our hearts! 
We have been saying for a long time: life is allpowerful, 
and it always triumphs. . . . 
The St. Petersburg Zvezda, Reprinted from the newspaper 
No. 30, April 15, 1912 
Signed: K. Salin

THEY ARE WORKING WELL. . . . 
After the Lena shooting‹strikes and protests all over 
Russia. 
After Minister Makarovıs ³explanations² in the 
Duma‹a demonstration in the capital of Russia. 
The government wanted to drive Russia into the 
clutches of sanguinary ³orders.² 
But Russia proved to be stronger than the government 
and decided to go its own way. . . . 
Let us cast another glance at the history of the Lena 
events. 
A strike of 6,000 workers was proceeding at the Lena 
goldfields. The strike was peaceful and organised. The 
mendacious Rech can, of course, speak of a ³spontaneous 
riot² on the Lena (see No. 103). But we judge, not 
by what the mendacious Rech says, but by the ³report² 
of the eyewitness Tulchinsky. And Mr. Tulchinsky asserts 
that on that day the workers behaved in an exemplary 
manner, that the workers had ³no sticks or stones.² And 
then the hellish conditions of labour in the goldfields, 
the very modest demands of the workers, their voluntary 
abandonment of the demand for an eight-hour day, 
the workersı readiness to make further concessions‹all 
this is the familiar picture of the peaceful Lena strike.

J. V. S T A L I N 242 
Nevertheless, the government found it necessary 
to shoot down the workers, peaceful unarmed workers 
with their tobacco pouches in their hands and with petitions 
in their pockets for the release of their arrested 
comrades. . . . 
Proceedings have not been taken against Treshchenko 
‹is i t not clear that he was acting on orders from 
above? 
It has been decided to take proceedings against the 
workers and not against Treshchenko‹is it not clear 
that somebody was thirsting for the proletariatıs blood? 
They wanted to kill two birds with one stone on the 
day of the shooting. First, to satisfy the voracious appetites 
of the Lena cannibals. Second, to intimidate the 
workers of other towns and localities, as much as to say‹ 
bear the yoke of capital uncomplainingly, otherwise we 
shall do to you what we did to the Lena workers. 
The result was that neither of these objects was 
achieved. 
The Lena cannibals have not been satisfied, for the 
strike in the goldfields is continuing. 
As for the workers of other towns, far from being 
intimidated, they have risen in strike after strike in protest 
against the shooting. 
More than that. St. Petersburg, the capital of Russia, 
responded to Makarovıs ³explanations² by a demonstration 
of thousands of students and workers. 
The most sensitive section of Russian society, the 
students, extended a hand to the most revolutionary 
section of the Russian people, the proletariat, and hoisting 
the red flag they proclaimed: Yes, ³so it was,² but 
it must never be so again!

THEY ARE WORKING WELL. . . . 243 
From a peaceful economic strike on the Lena to political 
strikes all over Russia, and from political strikes 
all over Russia to a demonstration of many thousands 
of students and workers in the very heart of Russia‹ 
that is what the representatives of the government have 
achieved in their struggle against the workers. 
Yes, the ³old mole² of the movement for emancipation, 
the far-sighted Russian government, is grubbing 
well²! 
Two or three more ³feats² like this and it will be 
possible to say with certainty that nothing will remain 
of Minister Makarovıs bluster except a miserable recollection. 
Go on working, gentlemen, go on working! 
The St. Petersburg Zvezda, Reprinted from the newspaper 
No. 31, April 17, 1912 
Signed: K. Solin

THE ICE HAS BROKEN! . . . 
The country lay in chains at the feet of its enslavers, 
It needed a popular constitution, but it received brutal 
tyranny, measures of ³prevention² and ³discretion.² 
It needed a popular parliament, but it was presented 
with the gentryıs Duma, the Duma of Purishkevich and 
Guchkov. 
It needed freedom of speech, press, assembly, strike 
and association, but it sees all around nothing but wrecked 
workersı organisations, suppressed newspapers, arrested 
editors, broken-up meetings and deported strikers. 
It demanded land for the peasants, and it was offered 
agrarian laws which intensified the land hunger of the 
masses of the peasants in order to please a handful of 
the rural rich. 
It was promised protection of ³person² and ³property,² 
but the prisons and places of exile are overcrowded 
with ³unreliables,² and the chiefs of criminal 
investigation departments (remember Kiev and Tiflis!) 
enter into an alliance with bandits and thieves to tyrannise 
over persons and to plunder property. 
It was promised ³prosperity² and ³abundance,² but 
peasant farming is steadily declining, tens of millions 
of peasants are starving, scurvy and typhus are carrying 
away thousands of victims. . . . 
And the country bore all this and went on bearing 
it. . . . 
Those who could not bear i t committed suicide.

THE ICE HAS BROKEN! . . . 245 
But everything must come to an end‹the patience 
of the country came to an end. 
The Lena shooting has broken the ice of silence‹and 
the river of the peopleıs movement has begun to flow. 
The ice has broken! 
All that was evil and pernicious in the present regime, 
all the ills of much-suffering Russia were focused 
in the one fact, the Lena events. 
That is why it was the Lena shooting that served 
as a signal for the strikes and demonstrations. 
That, and that alone, explains the latest events. 
And the bosses of the Duma‹the Octobrists, Cadets 
and Progressives107 are waiting for ³explanations² from 
above, from the lips of the representatives of the government! 
The Octobrists ³make inquiries,² the Progressives 
simply ³inquire² and the Cadets ³deem it opportune² to 
talk about certain Treshchenkos, miserable puppets in 
the hands of events! 
And this at a time when Makarov had already hurled 
at them his boastful: ³So it was, so it will be²! 
In the capital, tens of thousands of workers are on 
strike, the troops are ready for action, internal ³complications² 
are upsetting ³our² foreign affairs in connection 
with the Dardanelles‹but they are waiting for a reply 
from the ³upper spheres²! 
They are blind! They fail to see that today it is for 
the proletariat, and not the representatives of the government, 
to have its say. . . . 
The St. Petersburg Zvezda, Reprinted from the newspaper 
No. 32, April 19, 1912 
Signed: K. S.

HOW THEY ARE PREPARING 
FOR THE ELECTIONS 
The elections to the Fourth Duma108 are approaching 
and the enemies of the movement for emancipation are 
mobilising their forces. 
Before us are, first of all, the counter-revolutionary 
parties: the extreme Rights, the Nationalists, the Octobrists. 
All, in one way or another, support the government. 
What can they count on in the forthcoming election 
campaign? Not on the sympathy of broad strata of the 
population, of course; the parties which have bound 
their fate with the fate of the Lena massacre government 
cannot count on the sympathy of the masses! Their only 
hope is the governmentıs ³orders²: and, as usual, of 
³orders² there will be no lack. The Ministry of the Interior 
has already issued a circular to the Provincial 
Governors recommending the adoption of ³measures to ensure 
the election of delegates from the volosts who are fully 
reliable and do not belong to the Lefts.² What all these 
³measures² amount to we know from practical experience: 
the erasure of Left candidates from the lists, the framing 
up of charges against them, their arrest and deportation‹ 
such are the ³measures²! On the other hand, the Holy 
Synod is advising bishops to take a most active part 
in the forthcoming elections, to secure the election to

HOW THEY ARE PREPARING FOR THE ELECTIONS 247 
the Duma of staunch champions of the interests of the 
church, and with that object in view to convene election 
congresses of the clergy in their respective sees, to proceed 
to publish special election newspapers, etc. 
The affairs of the governmental parties must be in 
a very bad way indeed if even the fathers of the church 
are obliged to neglect ³church affairs² for the sake of 
³mundane affairs²! 
Elections under the pressure of the Provincial Governors, 
spiritual and temporal‹these, consequently, are 
the measures upon which they can count. 
True, there is one other method they can resort to, 
namely, to put on the non-party label, hoodwink the electors 
that way, get into the Duma somehow, and then 
throw off the mask. That is precisely the ³idea² of 
the Kovno nationalists, who came out under the nonparty 
mask the other day. But that method is a subtle 
one and will scarcely suit our clumsy diehards. . . . 
It is different with the Russian liberals‹the Cadets, 
the Peaceful Renovators, and the Progressives. That 
crowd is more agile and, perhaps, will be able to make the 
utmost use of the non-party label. . . . And the Cadets, 
whose colouring has faded, need this non-party label, 
need it in the extreme. 
The point is that during the period in which the Third 
Duma was functioning, the man in the street learned 
to look with a critical eye upon the Octobrists and Cadets. 
On the other hand, the ³First Curia² people, the 
big urban bourgeoisie, are ³disappointed² with the Octobrists, 
who failed to ³justify² their hopes. Consequently, 
an opportunity occurs to ³knock out of the saddle² 
the Octobrists, the Cadetsı competitors in Ministerial

J. V. S T A L I N 248 
ante-rooms. But how can a bridge to the ³First Curia² 
be erected if not through the progressive Peaceful Renovators? 
Therefore‹long live the alliance with the Peaceful 
Renovators! True, it is necessary to go ³just a little 
bit² to the right for this, but that does not matter: why 
not go to the right if it is so profitable? 
And so‹dress by the right! 
On the other hand, the ³small and medium urban 
people² of the ³Second Curia²‹the intellectuals, shop 
assistants and others‹have swung considerably to the 
left, especially in connection with the developing Lena 
events. The Cadets are conscious of having committed 
grave political sins, they have tried too often to betray 
the cause of the ³popular freedom,² and‹God knows‹ 
they would even now gladly rush into the Ministerial 
ante-rooms, if only they were sure that they would be 
admitted! But it is precisely for this reason that the 
urban democratic strata are beginning to look askance 
at the Cadets. Is it necessary to say also that to come 
before such voters without a mask, to expose their true 
features as liberal traitors, is somewhat dangerous? 
But what, under these circumstances, can be invented 
for the leftward-swinging urban people, who are already 
deserting the Cadets, but have not yet come over to the 
Social-Democrats? Of course, progressive fog . . . pardon 
me, I mean progressive non-partyism. Oh, donıt 
think that the Progressives are Cadets ! No, they are 
not Cadets at all; they will only vote for the Cadet candidates, 
they are only the ³non-party² servants of the 
Cadets. . . . And the Cadets advertise the ³non-party² 
Progressives: what else can they do? They must swing to the 
left, at least in words, in the direction of . . . non-partyism!

HOW THEY ARE PREPARING FOR THE ELECTIONS 249 
And so‹dress by the left! 
On the one hand . . . on the other hand . . . to the 
right . . . to the left. . . . Such is the policy of the party 
of the liberal deception of the people, the Cadet Party. 
Hoodwinking the voters‹such are the means the 
Russian liberals will count on. 
And‹this must be emphasised‹non-party charlatanry 
may play an important role in the elections. It may 
play an important role if the Social-Democrats fail to tear 
the masks off the liberal gentry, if they fail to conduct 
a vigorous campaign in connection with the forthcoming 
elections, if they fail to exercise all the strength at their 
command to rally the urban democratic strata around 
the leader of the movement for emancipation, around the 
Russian proletariat. 
The St. Petersburg Zvezda, Reprinted from the newspaper 
No. 32, April 19, 1912 
Signed: K. Solin

DEDUCTIONS 
The first wave of the political upsurge is beginning 
to recede. The ³last² strikes are in progress. Here and 
there voices of protesting strikers are still heard, but 
these will be the ³last² voices. For the time being, the 
country is beginning to assume its ³normal² appearance. 
. . . 
What lessons can the proletariat learn from the recent 
events? 
Let us reconstruct the picture of the ³days of the 
movement.² 
April 4. The Lena shooting. About 500 killed and 
wounded. Apparent calm reigns in the country. The 
governmentıs mood is firm. Protest strikes begin in 
the South. 
April 10. An interpellation in the Duma. Strikes 
increase in number. The situation becomes alarming. 
April 11. Minister Makarovıs answer: ³So it was, 
so it will be.² Timashov does ³not quite² agree with 
Makarov. The first signs of confusion are observed in 
the ranks of the government representatives. Meetings and 
strikes in St. Petersburg. The movement grows in the 
provinces. 
April 15. A demonstration of students and workers 
in St. Petersburg.

DEDUCTIONS 251 
April 18. Over 100,000 workers strike in St. 
Petersburg. Workersı demonstrations are organised. The 
government are losing their heads. Makarov is afraid to 
appear in the Duma. Timashov apologises. The government 
retreats. A concession to ³public opinion.² 
The deduction to be drawn is clear: emancipation 
cannot be achieved by silence and patience. The more 
loudly the voices of the workers resound, the more the 
forces of reaction lose their heads and the sooner they 
retreat. . . . 
The ³days of the movement² are the best field for 
testing the political parties. Parties must be assessed 
not by what they say, but by the way they behave 
³in the days of the struggle.² How did the parties 
which call themselves ³popular² parties behave in those 
days? 
The extreme Black-Hundred landlord group, headed 
by the Zamyslovskys and Markovs, had difficulty in 
concealing their joy over the Lena shooting. There! The 
government has displayed strength and sternness‹let 
the ³lazy² workers know whom they have to deal with! 
They applauded Makarov. They voted against the Social- 
Democratic groupıs interpellation in the Duma. Their 
newspaper Zemshchina109 did all in its power to incite 
the government against the Lena ³agitators,² against 
the workers on strike all over Russia, and against the 
workersı newspaper Zvezda. 
The moderate Black-Hundred landlord group, headed 
by the Balashovs and Krupenskys, had no real objection 
to the shooting‹it merely regretted that the government 
had acted in too transparent a manner, too openly. 
Therefore, while shedding crocodile tears over the

J. V. S T A L I N 252 
³killed,² it at the same time expressed the wish that the 
government should be ³tactful² in regard to shooting. It 
voted against the Social-Democratic groupıs interpellation, 
and its organ Novoye Vremya110 urged the government 
³not to stand on ceremony² with ³convinced 
strikers,² to subject demonstrators ³not to light fines or 
arrest, but to stern punishment² and, as regards the 
³agitators² under arrest, not to release them from prison. 
The party of the conservative landlords and parasitical 
strata of the bourgeoisie, the Octobrist Party, 
headed by the Guchkovs and Gololobovs, mourned, not 
over the dead, but over the fact that the ministry which 
it supported had suffered ³unpleasantness² (the strikes) 
as a consequence of the ³improper resort to firearms² on 
the Lena. Describing Makarovıs statement as being ³not 
altogether tactful² i t , in its organ Golos Moskvy,111 
expressed the conviction that the government was ³not 
to blame for the bloodshed.² It caused the defeat of the 
Social-Democratsı interpellation. It incited the authorities 
against the ³instigators²; and when Timashov tried to 
rehabilitate Makarov, it applauded him and considered 
the ³incident² closed. 
The party of the liberal landlords and the middle 
strata of the bourgeoisie, the Cadet Party, headed by the 
Milyukovs and Maklakovs, hurled verbal thunderbolts 
against the Lena shooting, but expressed the view that 
it was not the principles of the regime, but individuals 
of the type of Treshchenko and Belozyorov who were 
to blame. Therefore, while chanting a hypocritical ³we 
erred² in connection with Makarovıs statement, it was 
quite satisfied with Timashovıs ³repentant² statement 
and quietened down. On the one hand it supported the

DEDUCTIONS 253 
Social-Democratic group, which demanded that the 
representatives of the government should come before 
the court of the country. On the other hand, it welcomed 
the representatives of the industrial bourgeoisie, Messrs. 
the Peaceful Renovators, who appealed to the same representatives 
of the government to curb the striking workers 
by means of ³civilised measures.² And, to leave no doubt 
whatever about its, the Cadet Partyıs, loyalty, it came 
out and declared in its Rech that the Lena strike was a 
³spontaneous riot.² 
That is how all these ³popular² parties behaved during 
the ³days of the movement.² 
Let the workers remember it and give them their 
deserts during the ³days of the election² to the Fourth 
Duma. 
Social-Democracy alone defended the interests of 
the workers in the ³days of struggle,² it alone told the 
whole truth. 
The deduction to be drawn is clear: Social-Democracy 
is the sole champion of the proletariat. All the other 
parties mentioned are enemies of the working class, the 
only difference between them being the different ways 
in which they fight the workers: one fights by means 
of ³civilised measures,² another by means of ³not quite 
civilised measures² and a third by means of ³quite 
uncivilised measures.² 
Now that the first wave of the upsurge is receding, 
the dark forces which have been hiding behind a screen 
of crocodile tears are beginning to come out into the 
open again. Zemshchina is calling for ³measures² against 
the workersı press. Novoye Vremya urges that the ³convince² 
workers be shown no mercy. And the authorities

J. V. S T A L I N 254 
are setting to ³work,² arresting more and more ³unreliables.² 
What can they count on in their ³new campaign²? 
How are we to explain the boldness now displayed 
by the authorities, who had almost lost their wits. 
They can count on only one thing: on the impossibility 
of rousing mass protests on every occasion, on 
the unorganised state of the workers, on their insufficient 
class consciousness. 
The St. Petersburg Zvezda, Reprinted from the newspaper 
No. 33, April 22, 1912 
Signed: K. Solin

OUR AIMS 
Anyone who reads Zvezda and knows its contributors, 
who are also contributors to Pravda,112 will not find it 
difficult to understand the line Pravda will pursue. To 
illuminate the path of the Russian labour movement 
with the light of international Social-Democracy, to 
spread the truth among the workers about the friends and 
enemies of the working class, to guard the interests of 
labourıs cause‹such are the aims Pravda will pursue. 
In pursuing these aims we do not in the least intend 
to gloss over the disagreements that exist among the 
Social-Democratic workers. More than that: in our opinion, 
a powerful and virile movement is inconceivable without 
disagreements‹²complete identity of views² can exist 
only in the graveyard! But that does not mean that 
points of disagreement outweigh points of agreement. Far 
from it! Much as the advanced workers may disagree among 
themselves, they cannot forget that all of them, irrespective 
of group, are equally exploited, that all of them, irrespective 
of group, are equally without rights. Hence, Pravda 
will call, firstly and mainly, for unity in the proletarian 
class struggle, for unity at all costs. Just as we must 
be uncompromising towards our enemies, so must we 
yield to one another. War upon the enemies of the labour

J. V. S T A L I N 256 
movement, peace and co-operation within the movement 
‹that is what Pravda will be guided by in its daily 
activities. 
It is particularly necessary to emphasise this now, 
when the Lena events and the forthcoming elections 
to the Fourth Duma raise before the workers with exceptional 
persistence the necessity of uniting in a single 
class organisation. . . . 
In entering upon our task we are aware that our 
path is bestrewn with thorns. It is sufficient to recall 
Zvezda, which has experienced repeated confiscations and 
³prosecutions.² But the thorns will not daunt us if the 
sympathy of the workers which Pravda now enjoys continues 
in the future. From this sympathy it will draw 
energy for the struggle! We would like this sympathy 
to grow. Moreover, we would like the workers not to 
confine themselves to sympathy alone, but to take an 
active part in the conduct of our newspaper. Let not 
the workers say that they are ³not used to² writing. 
Working-class writers do not drop ready-made from the 
skies; they can be trained only gradually, in the course 
of literary activity. All that is needed is to start on the 
job boldly: you may stumble once or twice, but in the end 
you will learn to write. . . . 
And so, all together let us set to work! 
Pravda, No. 1, Reprinted from the newspaper 
April 22, 1912 
Unsigned

MANDATE 
OF THE ST. PETERSBURG WORKERS 
TO THEIR LABOUR DEPUTY113 
The demands of the Russian people that were advanced 
by the movement of 1905 have remained unfulfilled. 
The development of the reaction and of the ³renovated 
system² did not merely leave these demands unsatisfied; 
it made them still more imperative. 
The workers often lack the possibility not only of 
going on strike‹because there is no guarantee that they 
will not be shot down for doing so; not only of organising 
unions and holding meetings‹because there is no guarantee 
that they will not be arrested for doing so; but even 
of taking part in the Duma elections, because if they do 
so they will be ³interpreted²114 or deported all the same. 
Were not the workers at the Putilov Works and at the 
Neva Shipbuilding Yard ³interpreted² the other day? 
That is apart from the tens of millions of starving 
peasants who have been put at the mercy of the landlords 
and the Zemstvo officials. . . . 
All this points to the necessity of satisfying the 
demands of 1905. 
And the state of economic life in Russia, the already 
visible signs of a coming industrial crisis, and the 
steadily growing pauperisation of broad strata of the 
peasantry are making the fulfilment of the tasks of 1905 
imperative.

J. V. S T A L I N 258 
Hence, we think that Russia is on the eve of impending 
mass movements, which will, perhaps, be more 
profound than in 1905. That is proved by the Lena 
actions, by the protest strikes against ³interpretations,² 
etc. 
As in 1905, in the van of these movements will be 
the most advanced class in Russian society, the Russian 
proletariat. 
Its only ally can be the much-suffering peasantry, 
which is vitally interested in the emancipation of Russia. 
A fight on two fronts‹against the feudal-bureaucratic 
order of things and against the liberal bourgeoisie, who 
are seeking an alliance with the old regime‹that is the 
form the coming actions of the people must assume. 
And that struggle will be victorious only to the extent 
that the working class comes out at the head of the 
popular movement. 
But in order that the working class may honourably 
fulfil its role as leader of the popular movement, it must 
be equipped with consciousness of its interests and a 
high degree of organisation. 
Under the present conditions the floor of the Duma 
is one of the best means of enlightening and organising 
the broad masses of the proletariat. 
It is precisely for this reason that we are sending 
our deputy to the Duma and instructing him, and the 
entire Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma, 
widely to proclaim our demands from the floor of the 
Duma and not to indulge in the futile game of 
legislating in the Duma of the gentry. 
We would like the Social-Democratic group in the 
Fourth Duma, and our deputy in particular, to hold

MANDATE OF ST. PETERSBURG WORKERS TO THEIR DEPUTY 259 
high the banner of the working class in the hostile camp 
of the Black Duma. 
We would like to hear from the floor of the Duma 
the voices of the members of the Social-Democratic 
group loudly proclaiming the ultimate aim of the proletariat, 
the full and uncurtailed demands of 1905, proclaiming 
the Russian working class as the leader of the 
popular movement, the peasantry as the most reliable 
ally of the working class and the liberal bourgeoisie as 
the betrayer of ³popular freedom.² 
We would like the Social-Democratic group in the 
Fourth Duma to be united and solid in its activities on 
the basis of the above-mentioned slogans. 
We would like it to obtain its strength from permanent 
contact with the broad masses. 
We would like it to march in step with the political 
organisation of the working class of Russia. 
Published in leaflet form Reprinted from the leaflet 
in the first half 
of October 1912

THE WILL 
OF THE VOTERSı DELEGATES 
The results of the elections in the workersı curia 
have now been finally established.115 Of the six electors, 
three are Liquidators and three supporters of Pravda. 
Which one of them should be nominated for the Duma? 
Which one of them, indeed, ought to be nominated? Did 
the assembly of votersı delegates give any instructions 
on this matter? 
The Liquidators got their supporters elected because 
they concealed their views from the votersı delegates, 
they glossed over disagreements and played at ³unity.² 
They were supported by the non-party votersı delegates, 
who dislike disagreements and who accepted the word 
of the Liquidators. But in spite of all the Liquidatorsı 
efforts to confuse the issue, in one thing‹and the main 
thing at that‹the will of the votersı delegates made 
itself felt. This was on the question of the mandate. By 
an overwhelming majority the assembly of votersı delegates 
adopted a definite mandate to the Duma deputy, 
the mandate of the supporters of Pravda. 
In its report of the elections, Luch116 hushes up this 
point, but it cannot conceal from its readers the truth 
which is known to all the votersı delegates. We shall 
not permit it to misrepresent the will of the votersı 
delegates.

THE WILL OF THE VOTERSı DELEGATES 261 
The mandate is an instruction to the deputy. The 
mandate moulds the deputy. The deputy is the image 
of the mandate. What does the mandate proposed by 
the big plants in St. Petersburg, and adopted by the 
assembly of votersı delegates, speak of? 
First of all the mandate speaks of the tasks of 1905 
and says that these tasks have not been fulfilled, that the 
economic and political situation in the country makes the 
fulfilment of these tasks inevitable. According to the mandate, 
the emancipation of the country can be achieved by 
a struggle, a struggle on two fronts: against the feudalbureaucratic 
survivals on the one hand, and against the 
treacherous liberal bourgeoisie on the other. In this the 
peasantry alone can be the reliable ally of the workers. 
But the struggle can be victorious only on the condition 
that hegemony (the leading role) is exercised by the proletariat. 
The more class conscious and organised the workers 
are, the better will they fulfil the role of leader of the 
people. In view of the fact that under present conditions 
the floor of the Duma is one of the best means of 
organising and enlightening the masses, the workers are 
sending their deputy to the Duma in order that he, and 
the entire Social-Democratic group in the Fourth Duma, 
shall champion the fundamental tasks of the proletariat, 
the full and uncurtailed demands of the country. . . . 
Such is the content of the mandate. 
It is not difficult to perceive that this mandate differs 
fundamentally from the ³platform² of the Liquidators‹ 
it is entirely anti-Liquidationist. 
The question then arises: if the Liquidators, after 
all, dare to nominate their candidate for Duma deputy, 
what is to happen to the mandate which the Duma

J. V. S T A L I N 262 
deputy is in duty bound to carry out, since the assembly 
of votersı delegates passed a definite decision to that 
effect? 
An anti-Liquidationist mandate carried out by a Liquidator‹
will our Liquidators sink to such a disgrace? 
Do they realise that playing at ³unity² has driven 
them into an impasse? 
Or perhaps they intend to violate the mandate, to 
relegate it to oblivion? 
But in that case what about the will of the votersı 
delegates, which the workers of St. Petersburg will undoubtedly 
come out to defend? 
Will the Liquidators dare to trample upon the will 
of the votersı delegates? 
They are still talking about victory, but do they 
realise that the mandate has inflicted mortal defeat 
upon them by emphasising that only an anti-Liquidator 
can be a Duma deputy? 
Pravda, No. 147, Reprinted from the newspaper 
October 19, 1912 
Signed: K. St.

THE RESULTS OF THE ELECTIONS 
IN THE WORKERSı CURIA 
OF ST. PETERSBURG 
1. THE ELECTION OF THE VOTERSı DELEGATES 
The most characteristic feature of the temper of the 
workers compared with 1907 is the great revival of interest 
in the elections. If we leave out of account the small 
groups scattered here and there among the enterprises, 
we may boldly assert that the boycott mood is entirely 
absent. Obukhovıs117 did not boycott the elections, it 
was deprived of the opportunity to take part in them 
by the worksı administration. The Neva Shipbuilding 
Yard was the only place where the boycotters acted in 
an organised manner, but even there the overwhelming 
majority of the workers declared in favour of taking 
part in the elections. The broad masses of the workers 
were in favour of taking part in the elections. Moreover, 
they demanded elections and went to the polls with 
immense interest as long as no unsurmountable obstacles 
were put in their way. This i s proved by the 
recent mass protests against the ³interpretations.² . . . 
In almost every case Social-Democrats, or those associated 
with the Social-Democrats, were elected. Owing 
to circumstances beyond our control, it was possible only 
in a few factories to expound fully the platform of consistent 
workersı democracy, the more so because the 
Liquidators wisely hid their platform from the workers. 
But wherever such exposition was possible, the workers 
adopted the platform of the anti-Liquidators in the form

J. V. S T A L I N 264 
of a ³mandate.² In these cases, the Liquidators‹evidently 
having no respect for themselves or for their own 
views‹declared that ³in substance they too were in favour 
of such a mandate² (Neva Shipbuilding Yard), and they 
moved ³amendments² about freedom of association, which 
were rejected on the grounds that they were superfluous. 
Thus, the votersı delegates were elected mainly on their 
³personal merits.² The overwhelming majority of those 
elected proved to be Social-Democrats, or people associated 
with them. 
Social-Democracy alone expresses the interests of 
the working class‹that is what the election of the votersı 
delegates tells us. 
2. THE ELECTION OF ELECTORS 
Of the 82 votersı delegates who assembled, 26 were 
definite anti-Liquidators, 15 definite Liquidators, while 
the remaining 41 were ³just Social-Democrats,² people associated 
with the Social-Democrats, and non-party Lefts. 
For whom would these 41 vote, what political line 
would they approve of?‹that was the question that 
primarily interested the ³factionalists.² 
By an overwhelming majority the assembly of votersı 
delegates declared in favour of the mandate proposed by the 
supporters of Pravda. By so doing it defined its complexion. 
The political line of the anti-Liquidators triumphed 
The attempt of the Liquidators to prevent this failed. 
Had the Liquidators been politically honest and respected 
their own views they would have withdrawn 
their candidates and would have left all the places for 
the supporters of Pravda, for it was self-evident that

RESULTS OF ELECTIONS IN THE WORKERSı CURIA 265 
only supporters of the mandate could be nominated as 
candidates. Opponents of the mandate as champions of 
the mandate‹only political bankrupts could go to such 
lengths. The Liquidators did go even to such lengths! 
Concealing their own views from the votersı delegates, 
pretending for the time being to be ³our people² who 
³had no objection² to the mandate that had been adopted, 
playing at unity and complaining that the anti-Liquidators 
were splitters, they tried to soften the hearts of 
the non-factional votersı delegates and ³smuggle² their 
men through somehow. And in fact they did smuggle them 
through by deceiving the votersı delegates. 
It was evident that there would be no end to the 
trickery of the Liquidators. 
I t was no less evident that the political line of 
Pravda, and that line alone, enjoyed the sympathy of the 
St. Petersburg proletariat, that in conformity with the 
will of the votersı delegates only a supporter of Pravda 
could be a Duma deputy representing the workers. 
A bigger victory we could not have desired. . . . 
3. TWO UNITIES 
Before coming to the election of the Duma deputy 
we must say a word or two about the ³unity² which 
played a fatal role during the election of the electors, 
and at which the Liquidators are clutching like a 
drowning man at a straw. 
Trotsky recently wrote in Luch that Pravda was once 
for unity, but is now against it. Is that true? It 
is true and yet not true. It is true that Pravda was for 
unity. It is not true that it is now against unity:

J. V. S T A L I N 266 
Pravda always calls for the unity of consistent workersı 
democracy. 
What is the point then? The point is that Pravda, 
and Luch and Trotsky, look at unity in totally different 
ways. Evidently there are different kinds of unity. 
Pravda is of the opinion that only Bolsheviks and 
pro-Party Mensheviks can be united into a single whole. 
Unity on the basis of dissociation from anti-Party 
elements, from Liquidators! Pravda has always stood 
and always will stand for such unity. 
Trotsky, however, looks at the matter differently: 
he jumbles everybody together‹opponents of the Party 
principle as well as its supporters. And of course he gets 
no unity whatever: for five years he has been conducting 
this childish propaganda in favour of uniting the ununitable, 
and what he has achieved is that we have two 
newspapers, two platforms, two conferences, and not a 
scrap of unity between workersı democracy and the 
Liquidators! 
And while the Bolsheviks and the pro-Party Mensheviks 
are uniting more and more into a single whole, the 
Liquidators are digging a chasm between themselves 
and this whole. 
The practical experience of the movement confirms 
Pravdaıs plan of unity. 
The practical experience of the movement smashes 
Trotskyıs childish plan of uniting the ununitable. 
More than that. From an advocate of a fantastic unity 
Trotsky is turning into an agent of the Liquidators, doing 
what suits the Liquidators. 
Trotsky has done all in his power to ensure that we 
should have two rival newspapers, two rival platforms,

RESULTS OF ELECTIONS IN THE WORKERSı CURIA 267 
two conferences which repudiate each other‹and now 
this champion with fake muscles is singing us a song 
about unity! 
This is not unity, it is a game worthy of a comedian. 
And if this game enabled the Liquidators to secure the 
election of three of their men as electors it was only because 
it was impossible in the short period available to expose 
the unity comedians who concealed their flag from the 
workers. . . . 
4. THE ELECTION OF THE DUMA DEPUTY 
After that i t is not difficult to understand what 
kind of ³unity² the Liquidators talked about when they 
proposed to the supporters of Pravda the nomination 
of a joint candidate for the Duma. It was simply a proposal 
to vote for the Liquidatorsı candidate, in spite 
of the will expressed by the votersı delegates, and in 
spite of the mandate of the St. Petersburg proletariat. 
What other answer could the supporters of Pravda give 
except that the mandate of the votersı delegates was 
sacred, and that only a supporter of the mandate could be 
elected as Duma deputy? Should they have gone against 
the will of the votersı delegates to please the spineless 
Liquidators, or should they have disregarded the latterıs 
caprices for the sake of the mandate of the St. Petersburg 
proletariat? Luch is howling about Pravdaıs splitting tactics 
and is spreading fairy tales about the electors, but why 
did not the Liquidators agree to draw lots among the six 
electors from the workers as recommended by Pravda? In 
the interests of a joint workersı candidate we were ready 
to make even this concession, but why, we ask, did the

J. V. S T A L I N 268 
Liquidators reject the proposal to draw lots? Why did the 
supporters of Luch prefer six candidates for the Duma 
instead of one? In the interests of ³unity,² perhaps? 
Luch says that Gudkov nominated the Pravda supporter 
Badayev as a candidate, but, the Liquidator 
newspaper modestly adds, the proposal was rejected. But 
have the Luch Liquidators forgotten that it was their 
supporter Petrov, and not the ³Pravda-ist,² who refused 
to withdraw his candidature and so by his action exposed 
the Liquidatorsı urge for ³unity.² And yet they 
call this unity! Perhaps the fact that Gudkov, the other 
supporter of Luch, put up his candidature after Badayev, 
the supporter of Pravda, had already been elected, will 
also be claimed as unity? Who will believe it? 
Luch hypocritically advertises that political nonentity 
Sudakov who, it alleges, withdrew his candidature in 
the interests of unity. But does not Luch know that Sudakov 
simply could not go to the ballot because he had 
received only two nominations? What should we call a 
newspaper which dares to lie in full view of everybody? 
Is political spinelessness the only ³merit² of the 
Liquidators? 
The Liquidators tried to get their man into the Duma 
by the will of the Cadets and Octobrists in opposition 
to the will of the St. Petersburg workers. But does not 
Luch, which is divorced from the masses of the workers, 
realise that the St. Petersburg workers would have expressed 
their lack of confidence in such a deputy? 
Pravda, No. 151, Reprinted from the newspaper 
October 24, 1912 
Signed: K. St.

TODAY IS ELECTION DAY 
Today is election day in St. Petersburg. Elections 
in the Second Curia. The fight is between two camps: 
the Social-Democrats and the Cadets. The voters must 
decide to whom they are going to entrust the fate of the 
country. 
What do the Social-Democrats want? 
What do the Cadets want? 
The Social-Democrats, as the representatives of the 
working class, are striving to liberate mankind from all 
exploitation. 
The Cadets, however, as the representatives of the 
liberal bourgeoisie, build their future on the exploitation 
of man by man, an embellished exploitation, it 
is true, but exploitation for all that. 
The Social-Democrats are of the opinion that the 
question of renovating the country has remained unsettled, 
that it must be settled, and settled by the efforts of 
the country itself. 
The Cadets, however, believe that it is superfluous 
to talk about renovation because, ³thank God we have 
a Constitution.² . . . 
The Social-Democrats are of the opinion that on the 
road to the renovation of the country Russia has split

J. V. S T A L I N 270 
up into two Russias: old, official Russia, and the new, 
future Russia. 
The Cadets, however, believe that after ³the granting 
of a Constitution² ³this contrasting² of the two Russias 
is ³no longer possible² because ³Russia is now one.² 
The only deduction to be drawn is: the constitutional 
ideal of the Cadets has already been achieved. The 
framework of the June the Third regime is not irksome 
to them. 
For example, the following is what Milyukov said 
at a banquet in London in 1909, at which he ³represented² 
Russia in conjunction with the Octobrist Guchkov 
and the ³moderate² Black-Hundred Bobrinsky: 
³You have before you men of very diverse shades of political 
opinion, but these differences, supplementing each other, represent 
our great ideal of a constitutional Russia² (see I. Yefremovıs 
book, Russiaıs Peopleıs Representatives, etc., p. 81). 
Thus, the Black-Hundred Bobrinsky, ³supplementing² 
the Cadet Milyukov in the interests of . . . ³popular 
freedom²‹such, it appears, is the ³great ideal² of the 
Cadets. 
Not a single representative of the workers, not a 
single representative of the peasants was present at the 
London banquet, but, it appears, the ³great ideals² of 
the Cadets can do without workers, can do without 
peasants. . . . 
A Constitution of the Bobrinskys, Guchkovs and 
Milyukovs without representatives of the workers, without 
representatives of the peasants‹such are the ³ideals² 
of the Cadets! 
Is it surprising, after this, that the Cadets in the Third 
Duma voted for 1) the anti-popular budget, 2) in

TODAY IS ELECTION DAY 271 
direct taxes, 3) grants for the maintenance of prisons, 
etc.? 
Is it surprising, after this, that the Cadets oppose 
the demands of the workers, of the peasants and of the 
entire democracy? 
Is it surprising, after this, that the Cadets, through 
the mouth of Maklakov, demanded ³more vigour, sternness 
and severity² towards the student movement, and 
in Rech contemptuously described the peaceful strike of 
the Lena workers as a ³spontaneous riot²? 
No, this is not a party of ³popular freedom,² but 
a party of betrayers of ³popular freedom.² 
Such people are only capable of striking a bargain 
with the bureaucracy behind the backs of the people. 
The ³negotiations² with Witte, Stolypin and Trepov, 
and now with Sazonov, are by no means accidental. 
Such people are only capable of entering into an alliance 
with the Black Hundreds to defeat the Social- 
Democrats in the elections in Kharkov, Kostroma, 
Yekaterinodar and Riga. 
To entrust the fate of the country to such people 
would be tantamount to surrendering the country to the 
derision of the enemies. 
We express the conviction that self-respecting voters 
will not link their honour with the fate of the Cadets. 
Let the Cadets today bear well-merited punishment 
for the heinous sins they have committed against the 
Russian people! 
Worker voters! Vote for those who represent your 
interests, for the Social-Democrats! 
Shop assistant voters! Donıt vote for the Cadets, 
who ignored your interests as regards leisure time‹

J. V. S T A L I N 272 
vote for the Social-Democrats, the only consistent champions 
of your interests! 
Polish voters! You are striving for the right to free 
national development‹remember that freedom for nationalities 
is inconceivable without general freedom, and 
the Cadets are betraying freedom! 
Jewish voters! You are striving for equal rights for 
the Jews, but remember that the Milyukovs who hobnob 
with the Bobrinskys, and the Cadets who enter into a 
bloc with the Rights, will not strive for equal rights! 
For the betrayers of the popular freedom, or for its 
champions; for the Cadets or for the Social-Democrats! 
Choose, citizens! 
Pravda, No. 152, Reprinted from the newspaper 
October 25, 1912 
Signed: K. St.

TO ALL THE WORKING MEN 
AND WORKING WOMEN OF RUSSIA!118 
January 9 
Comrades! 
We are again about to commemorate January 9 
‹the day that was sealed with the blood of hundreds 
of our fellow-workers who, on January 9, 1905, were 
shot down by tsar Nicholas Romanov because they had 
come to him, peaceful and unarmed, to petition for better 
conditions of life. 
Eight years have elapsed since then. Eight long years, 
during which, except for a brief flash of freedom, our 
country has been harrowed and tortured by the tsar and 
the landlords! 
And today, as in the past, workers in Russia are being 
shot down for peacefully going on strike‹as was the case 
on the Lena. And today, as in the past, millions and millions 
of peasants are being reduced to starvation‹as was 
the case in 1911. And today, as in the past, the finest 
sons of the people are being tortured and tormented in 
the tsarıs prisons and being driven to wholesale suicide‹ 
as was the case recently in Kutomar, Algachi,119 and 
elsewhere. And today, as in the past, the tsarıs courtsmartial 
sentence sailors and soldiers to be shot for demanding 
land for the peasants and freedom for all the

J. V. S T A L I N 274 
people‹as was the case recently with the seventeen 
sailors of the Black Sea Fleet.120 That is the way Nicholas 
Romanov, Autocrat of All the Russias by the grace of 
the landlords, is exercising the power bestowed on him 
³by God² and blessed by the surpliced villains of the 
Synod and by the Black Hundreds‹the Purishkeviches 
and Khvostovs. 
Russia is s t i l l being strangled by the Romanov 
monarchy, which is preparing this year to celebrate the 
300th anniversary of its bloody rule over our country. 
But Russia is no longer the downtrodden and submissive 
Russia which suffered in silence under the yoke of 
the Romanovs for so many years. And above all, our 
Russian working class, now marching at the head of 
all the fighters for freedom, is not what it was. We shall 
commemorate January 9, 1913, not as crushed and downtrodden 
slaves, but with heads erect‹a united army of 
fighters, who feel, who know, that the peopleıs Russia 
is waking up again, that the ice of the counter-revolution 
has been broken, that the river of the peopleıs movement 
has begun to flow again, and that ³behind us fresh warriors 
march in serried ranks.² . . . 
Eight years! How little lived, how much endured. . . . 
In this period we have seen three State Dumas. The first 
two, in which the liberals had the majority, but in which 
the voices of the workers and peasants were loudly heard, 
the tsar dispersed in obedience to the will of the Black- 
Hundred landlords. The Third Duma was a Black- 
Hundred Duma, and for five years it co-operated with 
the tsarist gang in still further enslaving and oppressing 
the peasants, the workers‹the whole of peopleıs Russia. 
During these years of dark counter-revolution it was

TO ALL THE WORKING MEN AND WORKING WOMEN OF RUSSIA! 275 
the working class that had to drain the bitterest cup. 
Since 1907, when the forces of the old order succeeded 
in temporarily crushing the revolutionary mass movement, 
the workers have been groaning under a double 
yoke. On them above all the tsarist gang took ruthless 
vengeance. And it is against them that the onslaught of 
the capitalist offensive was directed. Taking advantage 
of the political reaction, the factory and mill owners 
step by step robbed the workers of all the gains they 
had won with so much effort and sacrifice. By means 
of lockouts, and protected by the gendarmerie and the 
police, the employers lengthened the working day, cut 
wages and restored the old system in the factories and 
mills. 
Clenching their teeth, the workers remained silent. 
In 1908 and 1909 the Black Hundredsı intoxication with 
their triumph reached its peak and the labour movement 
reached its lowest ebb. But already in the summer of 1910 
a revival of workersı strikes began, and the end of 1911 
brought with it the active protest of tens of thousands 
of workers against the retention in penal servitude of the 
Social-Democratic deputies of the Second Duma, who had 
been sentenced on false charges.121 
The mass movement of the workers ended with the 
strike of November 22, 1907, against the sentences of 
penal servitude on the Social-Democratic deputies of the 
Second Duma; and the mass movement of the workers 
revived at the end of 1911, again in connection with 
the fate of the Social-Democratic deputies of the Second 
Duma, those front-rank fighters, those working-class 
heroes, whose work is now being continued by the workersı 
deputies in the Fourth Duma.

J. V. S T A L I N 276 
The revival of the political struggle is accompanied 
by the revival of the workersı economic struggle. The 
political strike fosters the economic strike and vice 
versa. Wave follows wave, and the workersı movement 
is surging forward in a mighty flood against the strongholds 
of the tsarist monarchy and of the autocracy of 
capital. More and more sections of the workers are awakening 
to new life. Larger and larger masses are being drawn 
into the new struggle. The strikes in connection with 
the Lena shooting, the May Day strikes, the strikes in 
protest against the disfranchisement of the workers, 
and the protest strike against the execution of the sailors 
of the Black Sea Fleet involved about a million participants. 
Those were revolutionary strikes, strikes which 
inscribed on their banners the slogan: ³Down with the 
Romanov monarchy, down with the whole of the old 
and decaying landlord regime which is strangling Russia!² 
The workersı revolutionary movement is expanding 
and growing. The working class is beginning to rouse 
other sections of the population for the new struggle. 
All honest men and women, all those who are pressing 
forward towards a better life, are beginning to protest 
against the violence of the hounds of tsarism. Even the 
bourgeoisie is grumbling, even it is displeased with the 
complete and undivided rule of the Purishkeviches. 
The June the Third regime has pacified nobody. All 
the years of counter-revolution have shown that there 
can be no free life in Russia so long as the Romanov monarchy 
and landlord rule remain intact. 
A new revolution is maturing, in which the working 
class will again play the honourable role of leader of the 
entire army of emancipation.

TO ALL THE WORKING MEN AND WORKING WOMEN OF RUSSIA! 277 
On the banner of the working class are still inscribed 
the three old demands for which so much sacrifice 
has been made and so much blood has been shed. 
An eight-hour day‹for the workers! 
All the landlordsı, tsarıs and monasterial lands with 
out compensation‹for the peasants! 
A democratic republic‹for the whole people! 
It is around these demands that the fight in Russia 
has raged and is raging today. They were advanced 
by the workers during the recent Lena strikes. They will 
be advanced also by the working class on January 9. 
In 1912, the workers in St. Petersburg, Riga and 
Nikolayev tried to commemorate January 9 by strikes 
and demonstrations. In 1913, we shall commemorate 
January 9 in this way everywhere‹all over Russia. On 
January 9, 1905, the first Russian revolution was born 
in the blood of the workers. Let the beginning of 1913 
serve as the threshold of the second revolution in Russia. 
The house of Romanov, in preparing to celebrate its 300th 
anniversary in 1913, contemplates remaining on the back 
of Russia for a long time to come. Let us, then, on 
January 9, 1913, say to this gang: 
Enough! Down with the Romanov monarchy! Long 
live the democratic republic! 
Comrades! Let not January 9, 1913, pass unobserved 
anywhere where Russian workers are living and fighting. 
With meetings, resolutions, mass rallies and where 
possible with 
a one-day strike and 
demonstrations 
let us everywhere commemorate this day.

J. V. S T A L I N 278 
Let us on this day remember the heroes who fell in 
the struggle! We shall pay the highest tribute to their 
memory if, on that day, our old demands ring out all 
over Russia: 
A Democratic Republic! 
Confiscation of the Landlordsı Land! 
An Eight-Hour Working Day! 
The Central Committee of the Russian 
Social-Democratic Labour Party 
Comrades! 
Prepare to protest on January 9. 
Published in leaflet form Reprinted from the leaflet 
at the end of December 1912 
and beginning of January 1913

THE ELECTIONS IN ST. PETERSBURG 
(A Letter From St. Petersburg) 
Unlike the elections of 1907, the elections in 1912 
coincided with a revolutionary revival among the workers. 
In 1907 the tide of revolution was receding and the 
counter-revolution triumphed, but in 1912 the first wave 
of a new revolution rose. This explains why the workers 
then went to the polls listlessly and in some places 
even boycotted the elections, boycotted them passively, 
of course, thereby showing that passive boycott is an 
undoubted symptom of listlessness and decline of strength. 
And it explains why now, in the atmosphere of a rising 
revolutionary tide, the workers went to the polls eagerly, 
casting aside flabby political indifference. More than 
that: the workers fought for the right to elections, strove 
for that right and secured it by means of immense strikes 
against the ³interpretations,² despite all the cunning 
devices and obstacles employed by the police. It is undoubtedly 
a sign that the political torpor has passed off, 
that the revolution has got past the dead point. True, 
the wave of the new revolution is not yet so strong as to 
enable us to raise the question, say, of a general political 
strike. But it is already strong enough to make it

J. V. S T A L I N 280 
possible, in places, to break through the web of ³interpretations² 
with the object of animating the elections, 
organising the forces of the proletariat, and politically 
enlightening the masses. 
I 
THE WORKERSı CURIA 
1. THE FIGHT FOR ELECTIONS 
It will not be superfluous to note that the initiative 
in the strike campaign was taken by the representative 
of the Central Committee and the St. Petersburg 
Committee of our Party. Late in the evening of October 
4, on the eve of the election of the electors, we learned 
that the Uyezd Commission had ³interpreted² the votersı 
delegates of the largest plants (Putilovıs and others). An 
hour later the Executive Commission of the St. Petersburg 
Committee met, together with the representative of the Central 
Committee,122 and after drawing up a new list of electors 
decided to call for a one-day protest strike. That same 
night the Social-Democratic group at the Putilov Works 
met and accepted the decision of the St. Petersburg 
Committee. On the 5th, the Putilov strike began. The 
whole plant went on strike. On the 7th (Sunday) the 
Social-Democratic group at the Neva Shipbuilding Yard 
met and associated itself with the decision of the St. 
Petersburg Committee. On the 8th, the entire shipyard 
went on strike. Their example was followed by other 
factories and works. Not only did the ³interpreted² 
factories go on strike, but so also did those which had not 
been ³interpreted² (Palıs), and also those which, according

THE ELECTION IN ST. PETERSBURG 281 
to the ³regulations governing the elections,² had no 
right to vote in the workersı curia. They struck in 
solidarity. Of revolutionary songs and demonstrations 
there was no lack. . . . Late at night on October 8 it 
was learned that the Gubernia Election Commission 
had annulled the election of electors, had countermanded 
the ³interpretations² of the Uyezd Commission, had 
³restored the rights² of the Putilov workers, and had 
extended the elections to a larger number of factories. 
The workers triumphed; they had won a victory. 
Of interest is the resolution adopted by the workers 
at the Neva Shipbuilding Yard and at the Putilov 
Works in declaring their strikes: 
³Protesting against the violation of our electoral rights, 
we declare that only the overthrow of tsarism and the winning 
of a democratic republic can ensure for the workers 
the right and real freedom to vote.² 
A resolution moved by the Liquidators to the 
effect that ³. . . only universal suffrage in the election 
of the State Duma can guarantee the right to vote² was 
rejected. These resolutions were first discussed by the 
Social-Democratic groups in the respective plants, and 
when it was ascertained, at the meeting of the group 
at the Neva Shipbuilding Yard, for example, that the 
Liquidatorsı resolution met with no sympathy, its supporters 
pledged themselves not to move it at the meeting of 
the non-party masses, but to support the resolution adopted 
by the group. It must be said to their honour that they 
kept their word. On the other hand, the anti-Liquidators 
displayed equal loyalty by securing the election of Gudkov 
as a votersı delegate, whom they could have ³dished 
as they had the majority at the shipyard behind them.

J. V. S T A L I N 282 
It would not be amiss if at least a particle of the same 
sense of responsibility had been displayed by Luch, which 
is able to write so well about what did not happen at the 
various plants, but which hushed up the above-mentioned 
resolution that was adopted at the Neva Shipbuilding 
Yard and, on top of that, garbled the resolution that 
was adopted at the Putilov Works. 
Thus, the workers fought for elections and secured 
elections. Let the St. Petersburg Socialist-Revolutionaries, 
who at the Neva Shipbuilding Yard so unsuccessfully 
opposed participation in the elections, learn a lesson 
from this. 
The workers fought for elections under the watchword 
of a democratic republic. Let the Liquidators of 
Luch, who make a fetish of ³partial reforms,² learn a 
lesson from this. 
2. THE DEPUTYıS MANDATE 
The ³interpretation² strikes were not yet over when 
the assembly of votersı delegates met. It was a foregone 
conclusion that the delegates would adopt the mandate 
which had been drawn up by the St. Petersburg Committee 
and approved by the big plants in St. Petersburg 
(Putilovıs, the Neva Shipbuilding Yard and Palıs). 
And indeed the mandate was adopted by an overwhelming 
majority, only an insignificant group of Liquidators 
abstaining. The latterıs attempts to prevent a vote from 
being taken were met with cries of ³donıt obstruct!² 
In their mandate to the Duma deputy the votersı 
delegates referred to the ³tasks of 1905² and said that 
these tasks had ³remained unfulfilled,² that the eco

THE ELECTION IN ST. PETERSBURG 283 
nomic and political development of Russia ³makes 
their fulfilment inevitable.² A struggle of the workers 
and the revolutionary peasants for the overthrow of 
tsarism in spite of the compromising policy of the Cadet 
bourgeoisie, a struggle of which only the proletariat 
can be the leader‹this, according to the mandate, could 
fulfil the tasks of 1905 (see ³The Mandate² in Sotsial- 
Demokrat, No. 28-29). 
As you see, this is very far from the liberal-liquidationist 
³revision of the agrarian decisions of the Third 
Duma,² or ³universal suffrage in the election of the State 
Duma² (see the Liquidatorsı platform).123 
The St. Petersburg workers remained loyal to the 
revolutionary traditions of our Party. The slogans of 
revolutionary Social-Democracy, and these slogans alone, 
received recognition at the assembly of votersı delegates. 
At the assembly the question was decided by the nonparty 
people (of the 82 delegates, 41 were ³just Social- 
Democrats² and non-party), and the fact that the mandate 
drawn up by the St. Petersburg Committee was 
adopted at even such an assembly shows that the slogans 
of the St. Petersburg Committee are deeply rooted 
in the heart and mind of the working class. 
What was the Liquidatorsı attitude towards all this? 
Had they really believed in their own views and not 
been shaky in the matter of political honesty, they 
would have launched an open struggle against the mandate, 
they would have proposed their own mandate or, 
if defeated, would have withdrawn their candidates from 
the lists. Did they not put up their own list of candidates 
for electors in opposition to the list put up by the anti- 
Liquidators? Why, then, could they not also openly

J. V. S T A L I N 284 
put forward their own views, their own mandate? And 
when the mandate of the anti-Liquidators was adopted, 
why did they not honestly and openly declare that as 
opponents of this mandate they could not stand for election 
as future champions of the mandate, that they would 
withdraw their candidates and leave the place open for 
the supporters of the mandate? After all, this is an elementary 
rule of political honesty. Or perhaps the Liquidators 
avoided the question of the mandate because 
the question had not been sufficiently debated and because 
at the assembly the question was settled by the 
votes of the non-party people? But if that was the case, 
why did they not submit to the decision of the 26 Social- 
Democratic votersı delegates who met secretly several 
days before the assembly of votersı delegates and after 
a discussion adopted the platform of the anti-Liquidators 
(by a majority of 16 to 9, with one abstaining), 
at which meeting the Liquidatorsı leaders as well as 
their votersı delegates were present? By what lofty 
considerations were the Liquidators guided when they 
trampled upon the mandate of the entire assembly 
and upon the will of the 26 Social-Democratic votersı 
delegates? Obviously, there could be only one consideration: 
To spite the anti-Liquidators and smuggle through 
their own people ³somehow.² But the whole point is that 
if the Liquidators had dared to launch an open struggle, 
not one of their supporters would have been elected, because 
it was obvious to everybody that the Liquidatorsı 
proposal for a ³revision of the agrarian decisions of the 
Third Duma² would find no support among the votersı 
delegates. There remained only one thing for them to do: to 
hide their flag, to pretend to be supporters of the mandate

THE ELECTION IN ST. PETERSBURG 285 
by declaring that ³strictly speaking we, too, are in favour 
of some such mandate² and thereby get their people 
elected ³somehow.² And that is what they did; but by 
behaving in that way the Liquidators admitted their 
defeat and registered themselves as political bankrupts. 
But compelling the enemy to furl his flag, i.e., 
compelling him to admit that his own flag is worthless, 
i.e., compelling him to admit the ideological superiority 
of his enemy‹means, precisely, gaining a moral 
victory. 
And so we have the following ³strange situation²: 
the Liquidators have a ³broad workersı party,² the 
anti-Liquidators, however, have only an ³ossified circle,² 
and yet the ³narrow circle² vanquishes the ³broad 
party²! 
What miracles happen in this world! . . . 
3. UNITY AS A MASK, AND THE ELECTION 
OF THE DUMA DEPUTY 
When bourgeois diplomats prepare for war they begin 
to shout very loudly about ³peace² and ³friendly 
relations.² When a Minister of Foreign Affairs begins 
to wax eloquent in favour of a ³peace conference,² 
you can take it for granted that ³his government² has 
already issued contracts for the construction of new 
dreadnoughts and monoplanes. A diplomatıs words must 
contradict his deeds‹otherwise, what sort of a diplomat 
is he? Words are one thing‹deeds something entirely 
different. Fine words are a mask to cover shady deeds. 
A sincere diplomat is like dry water, or wooden iron.

J. V. S T A L I N 286 
The same must be said about the Liquidators and 
their mendacious clamour about unity. Recently, Comrade 
Plekhanov, who is in favour of unity in the Party, wrote 
concerning the resolutions passed by the Liquidatorsı 
conference124 that ³they smell of diplomacy ten versts 
away.² And the same Comrade Plekhanov went on to 
describe their conference as a ³splittersı conference.² 
To put it more bluntly, the Liquidators are deceiving 
the workers by their diplomatic clamour about unity, for 
while they talk about unity they are engineering a 
split. Indeed, the Liquidators are diplomats in the Social- 
Democratic movement; with fine words about unity they 
cover up their shady deeds in engineering a split. When 
a Liquidator waxes eloquent in favour of unity, you can 
take it for granted that he has already trampled upon 
unity for the sake of a split. 
The elections in St. Petersburg are direct proof 
of this. 
Unity means first of all unity of action by the Social- 
Democratically organised workers within the working 
class, which is as yet unorganised, as yet unenlightened 
by the light of socialism. The Social-Democratically 
organised workers raise questions at their meetings, discuss 
them, adopt decisions and then, as a single whole, 
bring these decisions, which are absolutely binding upon 
the minority, before the non-party workers. Without this 
there can be no unity of Social-Democracy! Was there 
such a decision adopted in St. Petersburg? Yes, there was. 
It was the decision adopted by the 26 Social-Democratic 
votersı delegates (of both trends) who accepted the anti- 
Liquidatorsı platform. Why did not the Liquidators 
submit to this decision? Why did they thwart the will

THE ELECTION IN ST. PETERSBURG 287 
of the majority of the Social-Democratic votersı delegates? 
Why did they trample upon the unity of Social- 
Democracy in St. Petersburg? Because the Liquidators are 
diplomats in the Social-Democratic movement, engineering 
a split under the mask of unity. 
Further, unity means unity of action of the proletariat 
in face of the entire bourgeois world. The representatives 
of the proletariat adopt decisions and carry 
them out acting as a single whole, the condition being that 
the minority submits to the majority. Without this there 
can be no unity of the proletariat! Was there such a decision 
of the St. Petersburg proletariat? Yes, there was. It 
was the anti-liquidationist mandate adopted by the 
majority at the assembly of votersı delegates. Why 
did not the Liquidators submit to the mandate of the 
votersı delegates? Why did they thwart the will of the 
majority of the votersı delegates? Why did they trample 
upon working-class unity in St. Petersburg? Because liquidationist 
unity is a diplomatic phrase which covers up a 
policy of disrupting unity. . . . 
When, after thwarting the will of the majority, nominating 
waverers (Sudakov) and making promises of a 
most diplomatic nature, the Liquidators at last managed 
to secure the election of three of their electors, the question 
arose‹what is to be done now? 
The only honest way out was to draw lots. The 
anti-Liquidators proposed to the Liquidators that lots 
should be drawn, but the Liquidators rejected this proposal!! 
After discussing the proposal with the Bolshevik X, 
the Liquidator Y (we can, if necessary, give the names 
of the persons who discussed the matter on behalf of the

J. V. S T A L I N 288 
respective sides, provided the necessary secrecy is maintained),
125 consulted his like-minded friends and then 
replied that ³drawing lots is unacceptable, as our electors 
are bound by the decision of our leading body.² 
Let Messrs. the Liquidators try to refute this statement 
of ours! 
Thwarting the will of the majority of the Social- 
Democratic votersı delegates, thwarting the will of the 
majority at the assembly of votersı delegates, rejecting 
the proposal to draw lots, refusing to put up a joint candidate 
for the Duma,‹all this in the interests of unity. 
You have a very queer idea of ³unity,² Messrs. Liquidators! 
Incidentally, the Liquidatorsı splitting policy is not 
new. They have been agitating against the underground 
Party ever since 1908. The Liquidatorsı outrageous conduct 
during the elections in St. Petersburg was a continuation 
of their old splitting policy. 
It is said that by his ³unity² campaign Trotsky introduced 
a ³new current² into the Liquidatorsı old ³affairs.² 
But that is not true. In spite of Trotskyıs ³heroic² 
efforts and ³terrible threats² he, in the end, has proved 
to be merely a vociferous champion with fake muscles, 
for after five years of ³work² he has succeeded in uniting 
nobody but the Liquidators. New noise‹old actions! 
But let us return to the elections. The Liquidators 
could have counted only on one thing when they rejected 
the proposal to draw lots, namely, that the bourgeoisie 
(the Cadets and Octobrists) would prefer a Liquidator! 
To thwart this neat little scheme the St. Petersburg 
Committee had no alternative but to instruct all the 
electors to stand for election, for among the Liquidators

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
289 
there was a ³waverer² (Sudakov), and in general they 
had no solid group. In conformity with the instructions 
of the St. Petersburg Committee all the anti-liquidationist 
electors stood for election. And the Liquidatorsı neat 
little scheme was frustrated! Demoralisation set in not 
among the anti-Liquidators, but among the liquidationist 
electors, who rushed to stand for election in spite of 
the decision of their ³body.² The surprising thing is not 
that Gudkov agreed to Badayevıs nomination (hanging 
over Gudkovıs head was the anti-liquidationist mandate 
that was adopted at his plant), but the fact that the 
Liquidator Petrov, followed by Gudkov himself, stood 
for election after the election of Badayev. 
There is only one deduction to be drawn from the 
foregoing: for the Liquidators, unity is a mask to cover 
up their splitting policy, a means to get into the Duma 
in spite of the will expressed by the Social-Democrats 
and the proletariat of St. Petersburg. 
II 
THE CITY CURIA 
The Lena events, and the revival among the workers 
generally, did not fail to affect the voters in the Second 
Curia. The democratic strata of the city population swung 
considerably to the left. Five years ago, after the revolution 
was defeated, they ³buried² the ideals of 1905, 
but now, after the mass strikes, the old ideals began to 
revive. There was a definite mood of dissatisfaction with 
the dual policy of the Cadets, which the Cadets could 
not help noticing. 
THE ELECTION IN ST. PETERSBURG

J. V. S T A L I N 290 
On the other hand, the Octobrists had ³failed to 
justify² the hopes reposed in them by the big merchants 
and manufacturers. Vacancies occurred, which, too, the 
Cadets could not help noticing. 
And already in May of this year the Cadets resolved 
to play on two fronts. Not to fight, but to play. 
And that explains the dual character of the Cadetsı 
election campaign in the two different curiae, which 
could not fail to astonish the voters. 
The Social-Democratsı election campaign centred 
around their struggle with the Cadets for influence on 
the democratic strata. The hegemony of the counter-revolutionary 
bourgeoisie, or the hegemony of the revolutionary 
proletariat‹such was the ³formula² of the 
Bolsheviks, against which the Liquidators had been 
fighting hopelessly for many years, and which they were 
now obliged to accept as an obvious and inevitable vital 
necessity. 
Victory in the Second Curia depended on the conduct 
of the democratic strata, who were democratic by 
virtue of their conditions, but were not yet conscious of 
their interests. Whom would these strata support, Social-
Democracy or the Cadets? There was also a third 
camp, the Rights and the Octobrists, but there were no 
grounds for talking seriously about a ³Black-Hundred 
danger,² because it was evident that the Rights could poll 
only a small number of votes. Although there was some 
talk about ³not frightening the bourgeoisie² (see F. D.ıs 
article in Nevsky Golos126), it only raised a smile, because 
it was obvious that the task that confronted Social- 
Democracy was not only to ³frighten² this bour

THE ELECTION IN ST. PETERSBURG 291 
geoisie, but, in the shape of its advocates the Cadets, to 
dislodge it from its positions. 
The hegemony of Social-Democracy, or the hegemony 
of the Cadets‹that is how life itself presented the 
question. 
From that it was clear that the utmost solidarity 
was needed in the ranks of Social-Democracy throughout 
the campaign. 
It was precisely for that reason that the Election 
Commission of the St. Petersburg Committee concluded 
an agreement with the other Commission, which consisted 
of Mensheviks and solitary Liquidators. It was 
an agreement about persons, which allowed complete 
freedom for conducting election propaganda, on the definite 
understanding that the list of candidates for the 
Duma ³must not include any person whose name or 
activities are associated with the struggle against the 
Party principle² (excerpt from the ³minutes² of the negotiations). 
The well-known Social-Democratic list for 
the Second Curia was arrived at merely as a result of 
the anti-Liquidatorsı rejection of Ab . . . and L . . . , 
notorious St. Petersburg Liquidators ³whose name and 
activities are associated,² etc. It will not be superfluous 
to point out here, in order to characterise the 
³advocates of unity,² that after Chkheidze was nominated 
in Tiflis they emphatically refused to withdraw his 
nomination in favour of the Social-Democrat Pokrovsky, 
ex-member of the Third Duma, and threatened to put 
up a parallel list and disrupt the campaign. 
However, the reservation concerning ³freedom of 
election propaganda² was perhaps superfluous, for the 
course of the campaign had clearly demonstrated that

J. V. S T A L I N 292 
no campaign was possible in the fight against the Cadets 
other than a revolutionary Social-Democratic, i.e., 
a Bolshevik, campaign. Who does not remember the 
speeches delivered by the St. Petersburg speakers and 
Social-Democratic candidates about the ³hegemony of 
the proletariat² and about the ³old methods of struggle² 
as against the ³new parliamentary methods,² about 
the ³second movement² and the ³uselessness of the slogan 
of a responsible Cadet Ministry²? What became of the 
Liquidatorsı lamentations about ³not splitting the opposition,² 
about the ³Cadet bourgeoisie swinging to the left,² 
and about ³bringing pressure to bear² on this bourgeoisie? 
And what about the anti-Cadet agitation of the Liquidators 
of Luch who ³nagged² and ³frightened² the 
Cadets, sometimes even too much? Does not all this show 
that life itself uttered the truth even ³out of the mouths 
of babes and sucklings.² 
What became of the conscientious principles of Dan, 
Martov and the other opponents of ³Cadetophobia²? 
The Liquidatorsı ³broad workersı party² again sustained 
defeat in its struggle against the ³underground 
circle.² Just think: the ³broad workersı(?) party² a 
captive in the hands of the tiny, very tiny, ³circle²! 
What a miracle! . . . 
III 
SUMMARY 
The first thing that is clear from the foregoing is 
that all talk about two camps, the camp of the supporters 
of the June the Third regime and the camp of its opponents, 
is groundless. Actually, three and not two camps

THE ELECTION IN ST. PETERSBURG 293 
appeared in the elections: the revolutionary camp (the 
Social-Democrats), the counter-revolutionary camp (the 
Rights), and the camp of the compromisers, who are 
undermining the revolution and bringing grist to 
the mill of the counter-revolution (the Cadets). Of a 
³united opposition² against the reaction there was 
not a sign. 
Further, the elections show that the line of demarcation 
between the two extreme camps will become more 
distinct, that, as a consequence, the middle camp will 
melt away, free the democratically minded to the advantage 
of Social-Democracy, and itself gradually shift 
to the side of the counter-revolution. 
Hence, talk about ³reforms² from above, about ³upheavals² 
being impossible, and about Russiaıs ³organic 
development² under the aegis of a ³Constitution,² becomes 
utterly baseless. The course of events is inevitably 
leading to a new revolution, and despite the assurances 
of the Larins and other Liquidators, we shall live through 
³another 1905.² 
Lastly, the elections show that the proletariat, and 
the proletariat alone, is destined to lead the impending 
revolution, step by step rallying around itself all that 
is honest and democratic in Russia, all those who are 
thirsting for the liberation of their country from 
bondage. To become convinced of that, it is sufficient to 
note the course of the elections in the workersı curia, 
to note the sympathies of the St. Petersburg workers 
that were so clearly expressed in the mandate of the 
votersı delegates, and to note their revolutionary struggle 
for elections.

J. V. S T A L I N 294 
All this gives us grounds for asserting that the elections 
in St. Petersburg have fully confirmed the correctness 
of the slogans of revolutionary Social-Democracy. 
Revolutionary Social-Democracy is virile and strong‹ 
such is the first deduction to be drawn. 
The Liquidators are politically bankrupt‹such is 
the second deduction. 
Sotsial-Demokrat, No. 30, Reprinted from the newspaper 
January 12 (25), 1913 
Signed: K. Stalin

ON THE ROAD TO NATIONALISM 
(A Letter From the Caucasus) 
Among the decisions which will perpetuate the glory 
of the Liquidatorsı conference, the decision on ³culturalnational 
autonomy² occupies by no means the last place. 
Here it is: 
³Having heard the communication of the Caucasian 
delegation to the effect that at the last conference of the 
Caucasian organisations of the R.S.D.L.P., as well as 
in the literary organs of these organisations, the 
Caucasian comrades expressed the opinion that it is necessary 
to demand national-cultural autonomy, this conference, 
while expressing no opinion on the merits of 
this demand, declares that such an interpretation of the 
clause of the Party programme which recognises the right 
of every nationality to self-determination does not contradict 
the precise meaning of the programme, and it expresses 
the wish that the national question be put on the 
agenda of the next congress of the R.S.D.L.P.² 
This resolution is important not only because it expresses 
the Liquidatorsı opportunist shuffling in face of the 
rising nationalist tide. It is also important because every 
phrase in it is a gem. 
For example, what a pearl is the statement that the 
conference, ³while expressing no opinion on the merits of

J. V. S T A L I N 296 
this demand,² nevertheless ³declares² and decides? Things 
are ³decided² in this way only in comic opera! 
Or the phrase stating that ³such an interpretation of 
the clause of the Party programme which recognises the 
right of every nationality to self-determination does not 
contradict the precise meaning of the programme.² Just 
think! The clause in the programme referred to (Clause 9), 
speaks of freedom of nationalities, of the right of nationalities 
to develop freely, of the Partyıs duty to combat 
all violence against them. Speaking generally, the right 
of nationalities, within the meaning of that clause, must 
not be restricted, it may be extended to autonomy and 
federation, as well as to secession. But does this mean 
that it is a matter of indifference to the Party, that 
it is all the same to it, how a given nationality decides its 
destiny, whether in favour of centralism or of secession? 
Does it mean that on the basis of the abstract right of nationalities 
alone it is possible ³while expressing no opinion 
on the merits of this demand,² to recommend, even 
indirectly, autonomy for some, federation for others, 
and secession for still others? A nationality decides its 
destiny, but does that mean that the Party must not 
influence the will of a nationality towards a decision most 
in accordance with the interests of the proletariat? The Party 
stands for freedom of conscience, for the right of people 
to practise any religion they please. Does this mean that 
the Party will stand for Catholicism in Poland, for the 
Orthodox Church in Georgia and for the Gregorian Church 
in Armenia? That it will not combat these forms of 
world outlook? . . . And is i t not self-evident that 
Clause 9 of the Party programme and cultural-national 
autonomy are on two entirely different planes that

ON THE ROAD TO NATIONALISM 297 
are as capable of ³contradicting² each other as, say, 
Cheopsı pyramid and the notorious Liquidatorsı conference? 
But it is by means of such equilibristics that the 
conference ³decides² the question. 
The most important thing in the above-mentioned 
decision of the Liquidators is the ideological collapse 
of the Caucasian Liquidators, who betrayed the old banner 
of internationalism in the Caucasus and succeeded 
in obtaining this decision from the conference. 
The Caucasian Liquidatorsı turn towards nationalism 
is no accident. They began to liquidate the traditions 
of the Party long ago. The deletion of the ³social 
section² from the minimum programme, the repudiation 
of the ³hegemony of the proletariat² (see Diskussionny 
Listok, No. 2127), the declaration that the illegal Party 
is an auxiliary organisation of the legal organisations 
(see Dnevnik, No. 9128)‹all these are commonly 
known facts. Now the turn has come for the national 
question. 
From their very first appearance (in the beginning 
of the ınineties) the organisations in the Caucasus bore 
a strictly international character. A united organisation 
of Georgian, Russian, Armenian and Moslem workers 
fighting solidly against the foe‹such was the picture 
of Party life. . . . In 1903, at the first, inaugural congress 
of the Caucasian (strictly speaking Transcaucasian) 
Social-Democratic organisations, which laid the foundation 
for the Caucasian Union, the international principle 
of building up the organisation was re-affirmed as 
the only correct principle. From that time onwards Caucasian 
Social-Democracy grew in the struggle against

J. V. S T A L I N 298 
nationalism. The Georgian Social-Democrats fought ³their² 
nationalists, the National-Democrats and Federalists; the 
Armenian Social-Democrats fought ³their² Dashnaktsakans; 
the Moslem Social-Democrats fought the Pan-Islamists.
129 And in this fight Caucasian Social-Democracy 
expanded and strengthened its organisations irrespective 
of groups. . . . The question of cultural-national autonomy 
came up for the first time in 1906, at the Caucasian 
Regional Conference. It was introduced by a small group 
from Kutais, which demanded a decision in its favour. 
The question ³was a resounding failure,² as it was said at 
the time, because, among other things, it was opposed 
with equal vigour by both groups, represented respectively 
by Kostrov and the writer of these lines. It was 
decided that what was called ³regional self-government 
for the Caucasus² was the best solution for the national 
question, a solution most in accordance with the interests 
of the Caucasian proletariat which was united in the 
struggle. Yes, that is how it was in 1906. And this decision 
was re-affirmed at subsequent conferences: it was advocated 
and popularised in the Menshevik and Bolshevik 
press in the Caucasus, legal and illegal. . . . 
But 1912 arrived, and i t ³turned out² that ³we² 
need cultural-national autonomy, of course (of course!) 
in the interests of the proletariat! What had happened? 
What had changed? Perhaps the Caucasian proletariat 
had become less socialistic? But in that case, to erect 
national organisational and ³cultural² barriers between 
the workers would have been the most unwise thing to 
do! Perhaps it had become more socialistic? In that case, 
what can we call these ³Socialists,² save the mark, who 
artificially erect and reinforce barriers which are breaking

ON THE ROAD TO NATIONALISM 299 
down, and which nobody needs? . . . What had happened 
then? What had happened was that peasant Kutais 
had dragged in its wake the ³Social-Democratic Octobrists² 
of Tiflis. Henceforth, the affairs of the Caucasian 
Liquidators will be decided by the Kutais peasants who 
have been intimidated by militant nationalism. The 
Caucasian Liquidators were unable to stand up against 
the nationalist tide, they dropped the tried banner of 
internationalism and . . . they began to drift ³on the 
waves² of nationalism, throwing their last thing of value 
overboard: ³a useless thing, who wants it?² . . . 
But he who takes the first step must take the next: 
there is logic in everything. The Georgian, Armenian, 
Moslem (and Russian?) national-cultural autonomy advocated 
by the Caucasian Liquidators will be followed 
by Georgian, Armenian, Moslem and other Liquidationist 
parties. Instead of a common organisation we shall have 
separate national organisations, Georgian, Armenian and 
other ³Bunds,² so to speak. 
Is this what Messrs. the Caucasian Liquidators are 
driving at with their ³solution² of the national question? 
Well, we can wish them more courage. Do what you 
want to do! 
At all events, we can assure them that the other section 
of the Caucasian organisations, the Georgian, Russian, 
Armenian and Moslem pro-Party Social-Democrats, 
will resolutely break away from Messrs. the National- 
Liquidators, from these traitors to the glorious banner 
of internationalism in the Caucasus. 
Sotsial-Demokrat, No. 30, Reprinted from the newspaper 
January 12 (25), 1913 
Signed: K. St.

MARXISM 
AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION130 
The period of counter-revolution in Russia brought 
not only ³thunder and lightning² in its train, but also 
disillusionment in the movement and lack of faith in 
common forces. As long as people believed in ³a bright 
future,² they fought side by side irrespective of nationality‹
common questions first and foremost! But when 
doubt crept into peopleıs hearts, they began to depart, 
each to his own national tent‹let every man count only 
upon himself! The ³national question² first and foremost! 
At the same time a profound upheaval was taking 
place in the economic life of the country. The year 1905 
had not been in vain: one more blow had been struck 
at the survivals of serfdom in the countryside. The 
series of good harvests which succeeded the famine years, 
and the industrial boom which followed, furthered the 
progress of capitalism. Class differentiation in the countryside, 
the growth of the towns, the development of 
trade and means of communication all took a big stride 
forward. This applied particularly to the border regions. 
And it could not but hasten the process of economic

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 301 
consolidation of the nationalities of Russia. They were 
bound to be stirred into movement. . . . 
The ³constitutional regime² established at that 
time also acted in the same direction of awakening the 
nationalities. The spread of newspapers and of literature 
generally, a certain freedom of the press and cultural institutions, 
an increase in the number of national theatres, 
and so forth, all unquestionably helped to strengthen 
³national sentiments.² The Duma, with its election campaign 
and political groups, gave fresh opportunities for 
greater activity of the nations and provided a new and 
wide arena for their mobilisation. 
And the mounting wave of militant nationalism above 
and the series of repressive measures taken by the ³powers 
that be² in vengeance on the border regions for their 
³love of freedom,² evoked an answering wave of nationalism 
below, which at times took the form of crude chauvinism. 
The spread of Zionism131 among the Jews, the 
increase of chauvinism in Poland, Pan-Islamism among 
the Tatars, the spread of nationalism among the Armenians, 
Georgians and Ukrainians, the general swing of 
the philistine towards anti-Semitism‹all these are 
generally known facts. 
The wave of nationalism swept onwards with increasing 
force, threatening to engulf the mass of the workers. 
And the more the movement for emancipation declined, 
the more plentifully nationalism pushed forth its 
blossoms. 
At this difficult time Social-Democracy had a high 
mission‹to resist nationalism and to protect the 
masses from the general ³epidemic.² For Social-Democracy, 
and Social-Democracy alone, could do this, by

J. V. S T A L I N 302 
countering nationalism with the tried weapon of internationalism, 
with the unity and indivisibility of the class 
struggle. And the more powerfully the wave of nationalism 
advanced, the louder had to be the call of Social- 
Democracy for fraternity and unity among the proletarians 
of all the nationalities of Russia. And in this connection 
particular firmness was demanded of the Social- 
Democrats of the border regions, who came into direct 
contact with the nationalist movement. 
But not all Social-Democrats proved equal to 
the task‹and this applies particularly to the Social- 
Democrats of the border regions. The Bund, which had 
previously laid stress on the common tasks, now began 
to give prominence to its own specific, purely nationalist 
aims: it went to the length of declaring ³observance 
of the Sabbath² and ³recognition of Yiddish² a fighting 
issue in its election campaign.* The Bund was followed 
by the Caucasus; one section of the Caucasian 
Social-Democrats, which, like the rest of the Caucasian 
Social-Democrats, had formerly rejected ³cultural-national 
autonomy,² are now making it an immediate demand.** 
This is without mentioning the conference of the 
Liquidators, which in a diplomatic way gave its sanction 
to nationalist vacillations.*** 
But from this it follows that the views of Russian 
Social-Democracy on the national question are not yet 
clear to all Social-Democrats. 
It is evident that a serious and comprehensive dis- 
* See ³Report of the Ninth Conference of the Bund.² 
** See ³Announcement of the August Conference.² 
*** Ibid.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 303 
cussion of the national question is required. Consistent 
Social-Democrats must work solidly and indefatigably 
against the fog of nationalism, no matter from what 
quarter it proceeds. 
I 
THE NATION 
What is a nation? 
A nation is primarily a community, a definite community 
of people. 
This community is not racial, nor is it tribal. The 
modern Italian nation was formed from Romans, Teutons, 
Etruscans, Greeks, Arabs, and so forth. The French 
nation was formed from Gauls, Romans, Britons, Teutons, 
and so on. The same must be said of the British, 
the Germans and others, who were formed into nations 
from people of diverse races and tribes. 
Thus, a nation is not a racial or tribal, but a historically 
constituted community of people. 
On the other hand, it is unquestionable that the great 
empires of Cyrus and Alexander could not be called nations, 
although they came to be constituted historically 
and were formed out of different tribes and races. They 
were not nations, but casual and loosely-connected conglomerations 
of groups, which fell apart or joined together 
according to the victories or defeats of this or 
that conqueror. 
Thus, a nation is not a casual or ephemeral conglomeration, 
but a stable community of people. 
But not every stable community constitutes a nation. 
Austria and Russia are also stable communities,

J. V. S T A L I N 304 
but nobody calls them nations. What distinguishes a 
national community from a state community? The 
fact, among others, that a national community is inconceivable 
without a common language, while a state 
need not have a common language. The Czech nation 
in Austria and the Polish in Russia would be impossible 
if each did not have a common language, whereas the 
integrity of Russia and Austria is not affected by the 
fact that there are a number of different languages within 
their borders. We are referring, of course, to the spoken 
languages of the people and not to the official governmental 
languages. 
Thus, a common language is one of the characteristic 
features of a nation. 
This, of course, does not mean that different nations 
always and everywhere speak different languages, or that 
all who speak one language necessarily constitute one 
nation. A common language for every nation, but not 
necessarily different languages for different nations! There 
is no nation which at one and the same time speaks 
several languages, but this does not mean that there 
cannot be two nations speaking the same language! 
Englishmen and Americans speak one language, but they 
do not constitute one nation. The same is true of the 
Norwegians and the Danes, the English and the Irish. 
But why, for instance, do the English and the 
Americans not constitute one nation in spite of their 
common language? 
Firstly, because they do not live together, but inhabit 
different territories. A nation is formed only as a 
result of lengthy and systematic intercourse, as a result 
of people living together generation after generation.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 305 
But people cannot live together for lengthy periods 
unless they have a common territory. Englishmen and 
Americans originally inhabited the same territory, England, 
and constituted one nation. Later, one section 
of the English emigrated from England to a new territory, 
America, and there, in the new territory, in the 
course of time, came to form the new American nation. 
Difference of territory led to the formation of different 
nations. 
Thus, a common territory is one of the characteristic 
features of a nation. 
But this is not all. Common territory does not by 
itself create a nation. This requires, in addition, an internal 
economic bond to weld the various parts of the 
nation into a single whole. There is no such bond between 
England and America, and so they constitute two 
different nations. But the Americans themselves would 
not deserve to be called a nation were not the different 
parts of America bound together into an economic whole, 
as a result of division of labour between them, the development 
of means of communication, and so forth. 
Take the Georgians, for instance. The Georgians before 
the Reform inhabited a common territory and spoke 
one language. Nevertheless, they did not, strictly speaking, 
constitute one nation, for, being split up into a 
number of disconnected principalities, they could not 
share a common economic life; for centuries they waged 
war against each other and pillaged each other, each 
inciting the Persians and Turks against the other. The 
ephemeral and casual union of the principalities which 
some successful king sometimes managed to bring about 
embraced at best a superficial administrative sphere,

J. V. S T A L I N 306 
and rapidly disintegrated owing to the caprices of the 
princes and the indifference of the peasants. Nor could 
it be otherwise in economically disunited Georgia. . . . 
Georgia came on the scene as a nation only in the latter 
half of the nineteenth century, when the fall of 
serfdom and the growth of the economic life of the country, 
the development of means of communication and the 
rise of capitalism, introduced division of labour between 
the various districts of Georgia, completely shattered 
the economic isolation of the principalities and bound 
them together into a single whole. 
The same must be said of the other nations which 
have passed through the stage of feudalism and have 
developed capitalism. 
Thus, a common economic life, economic cohesion, is 
one of the characteristic features of a nation. 
But even this is not all. Apart from the foregoing, 
one must take into consideration the specific spiritual 
complexion of the people constituting a nation. Nations 
differ not only in their conditions of life, but also in 
spiritual complexion, which manifests itself in peculiarities 
of national culture. I f England, America and 
Ireland, which speak one language, nevertheless constitute 
three distinct nations, it is in no small measure due 
to the peculiar psychological make-up which they developed 
from generation to generation as a result of 
dissimilar conditions of existence. 
Of course, by itself, psychological make-up or, as it 
is otherwise called, ³national character,² is something 
intangible for the observer, but in so far as it manifests 
itself in a distinctive culture common to the nation it 
is something tangible and cannot be ignored.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 307 
Needless to say, ³national character² is not a thing 
that is fixed once and for all, but is modified by changes 
in the conditions of life; but since it exists at every given 
moment, it leaves its impress on the physiognomy of 
the nation. 
Thus, a common psychological make-up, which manifests 
itself in a common culture, is one of the characteristic 
featureıs of a nation. 
We have now exhausted the characteristic features of 
a nation. 
A nation is a historically constituted, stable community 
of people, formed on the basis of a common language, 
territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifested 
in a common culture. 
It goes without saying that a nation, like every historical 
phenomenon, is subject to the law of change, has its 
history, its beginning and end. 
It must be emphasised that none of the above characteristics 
taken separately is sufficient to define a nation. 
More than that, it is sufficient for a single one of these 
characteristics to be lacking and the nation ceases to be 
a nation. 
It is possible to conceive of people possessing a common 
³national character² who, nevertheless, cannot be 
said to constitute a single nation if they are economically 
disunited, inhabit different territories, speak different languages, 
and so forth. Such, for instance, are the Russian, 
Galician, American, Georgian and Caucasian Highland 
Jews, who, in our opinion, do not constitute a single 
nation. 
It is possible to conceive of people with a common 
territory and economic life who nevertheless would not

J. V. S T A L I N 308 
constitute a single nation because they have no common 
language and no common ³national character.² Such, 
for instance, are the Germans and Letts in the Baltic 
region. 
Finally, the Norwegians and the Danes speak one 
language, but they do not constitute a single nation owing 
to the absence of the other characteristics. 
It is only when all these characteristics are present together 
that we have a nation. 
I t might appear that ³national character² is not 
one of the characteristics but the sole essential characteristic 
of a nation, and that all the other characteristics 
are, properly speaking, only conditions for the development 
of a nation, rather than its characteristics. Such, 
for instance, is the view held by R. Springer, and more 
particularly by O. Bauer, who are Social-Democratic 
theoreticians on the national question well known in 
Austria. 
Let us examine their theory of the nation, 
According to Springer, ³a nation is a union of similarly thinking 
and similarly speaking persons.² It is ³a cultural community 
of modern people no longer tied to the ısoilı²* (our italics). 
Thus, a ³union² of similarly thinking and similarly 
speaking people, no matter how disconnected they may be, 
no matter where they live, is a nation. 
Bauer goes even further. 
³What is a nation?² he asks. ³Is it a common language which 
makes people a nation? But the English and the Irish . . . speak 
* See R. Springer, The National Problem, Obshchestvennaya 
Polza Publishing House, 1909, p. 43.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 309 
the same language without, however, being one people; the Jews 
have no common language and yet are a nation.²* 
What, then, is a nation? 
³A nation is a relative community of character.²** 
But what is character, in this case national character? 
National character is ³the sum total of characteristics which 
distinguish the people of one nationality from the people of another 
nationality‹the complex of physical and spiritual characteristics 
which distinguish one nation from an other.²*** 
Bauer knows, of course, that national character does 
not drop from the skies, and he therefore adds: 
³The character of people is determined by nothing so much 
as by their destiny. . . . A nation is nothing but a community with 
a common destiny² which, in turn, is determined ³by the conditions 
under which people produce their means of subsistence and 
distribute the products of their labour.²**** 
We thus arrive at the most ³complete,² as Bauer 
calls it, definition of a nation: 
³A nation is an aggregate of people bound into a community 
of character by a common destiny.²***** 
We thus have common national character based on 
a common destiny, but not necessarily connected with 
a common territory, language or economic life. 
But what in that case remains of the nation? What 
common nationality can there be among people who are 
economically disconnected, inhabit different territories 
* See O. Bauer, The National Question and Social-Democracy, 
Serp Publishing House, 1909, pp. 1-2. 
** Ibid., p. 6. 
*** Ibid., p. 2. 
**** Ibid., p. 24-25. 
***** Ibid., p. 139.

J. V. S T A L I N 310 
and from generation to generation speak different languages. 
Bauer speaks of the Jews as a nation, although they 
³have no common language²;* but what ³common destiny² 
and national cohesion is there, for instance, between 
the Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian and American Jews, 
who are completely separated from one another, inhabit 
different territories and speak different languages? 
The above-mentioned Jews undoubtedly lead their economic 
and political life in common with the Georgians, Daghestanians, 
Russians and Americans respectively, and 
they live in the same cultural atmosphere as these; this is 
bound to leave a definite impress on their national 
character; if there is anything common to them left, it is 
their religion, their common origin and certain relics of 
the national character. All this is beyond question. But 
how can it be seriously maintained that petrified religious 
rites and fading psychological relics affect the ³destiny² 
of these Jews more powerfully than the living 
social, economic and cultural environment that surrounds 
them? And it is only on this assumption that it is possible 
to speak of the Jews as a single nation at all. 
What, then, distinguishes Bauerıs nation from the 
mystical and self-sufficient ³national spirit² of the 
spiritualists? 
Bauer sets up an impassable barrier between the ³distinctive 
feature² of nations (national character) and the 
³conditions² of their life, divorcing the one from the other. 
But what is national character if not a reflection of the 
conditions of life, a coagulation of impressions derived 
* Ibid., p. 2.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 311 
from environment? How can one limit the matter to national 
character alone, isolating and divorcing it from the 
soil that gave rise to it? 
Further, what indeed distinguished the English nation 
from the American nation at the end of the eighteenth 
and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, when 
America was still known as New England? Not national 
character, of course; for the Americans had originated 
from England and had brought with them to 
America not only the English language, but also the English 
national character, which, of course, they could not 
lose so soon; although, under the influence of the new 
conditions, they would naturally be developing their 
own specific character. Yet, despite their more or less 
common character, they at that time already constituted 
a nation distinct from England! Obviously, New England 
as a nation differed then from England as a nation 
not by its specific national character, or not so much by 
its national character, as by its environment and conditions 
of life, which were distinct from those of England. 
It is therefore clear that there is in fact no single 
distinguishing characteristic of a nation. There is only a 
sum total of characteristics, of which, when nations are 
compared, sometimes one characteristic (national character), 
sometimes another (language), or sometimes a third 
(territory, economic conditions), stands out in sharper 
relief. A nation constitutes the combination of all these 
characteristics taken together. 
Bauerıs point of view, which identifies a nation with 
its national character, divorces the nation from its soil 
and converts it into an invisible, self-contained force. 
The result is not a living and active nation, but something

J. V. S T A L I N 312 
mystical, intangible and supernatural. For, I repeat, 
what sort of nation, for instance, is a Jewish nation which 
consists of Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian, American 
and other Jews, the members of which do not understand 
each other (since they speak different languages), 
inhabit different parts of the globe, will never see each 
other, and will never act together, whether in time of 
peace or in time of war?! 
No, it is not for such paper ³nations² that Social- 
Democracy draws up its national programme. It can reckon 
only with real nations, which act and move, and therefore 
insist on being reckoned with. 
Bauer is obviously confusing nation, which is a historical 
category, with tribe, which is an ethnographical 
category. 
However, Bauer himself apparently feels the weakness 
of his position. While in the beginning of his book 
he definitely declares the Jews to be a nation,* he corrects 
himself at the end of the book and states that ³in 
general capitalist society makes it impossible for them 
(the Jews) to continue as a nation,²** by causing them 
to assimilate with other nations. The reason, it appears, 
is that ³the Jews have no closed territory of settlement,²*** 
whereas the Czechs, for instance, have such 
a territory and, according to Bauer, will survive as a nation. 
In short, the reason lies in the absence of a territory. 
By arguing thus, Bauer wanted to prove that the 
Jewish workers cannot demand national autonomy,**** 
* See p. 2 of his book. 
** Ibid., p. 389. 
*** Ibid., p. 388. 
**** Ibid., p. 396.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 313 
but he thereby inadvertently refuted his own theory, 
which denies that a common territory is one of the characteristics 
of a nation. 
But Bauer goes further. In the beginning of his book 
he definitely declares that ³the Jews have no common 
language, and yet are a nation.²* But hardly has he 
reached p. 130 than he effects a change of front and just 
as definitely declares that ³unquestionably, no nation is 
possible without a common language²** (our italics). 
Bauer wanted to prove that ³language is the most 
important instrument of human intercourse,²*** but at 
the same time he inadvertently proved something he did 
not mean to prove, namely, the unsoundness of his own 
theory of nations, which denies the significance of a common 
language. 
Thus this theory, stitched together by idealistic 
threads, refutes itself. 
II 
THE NATIONAL MOVEMENT 
A nation is not merely a historical category but a 
historical category belonging to a definite epoch, the 
epoch of rising capitalism. The process of elimination of 
feudalism and development of capitalism is at the same 
time a process of the constitution of people into nations. 
Such, for instance, was the case in Western Europe. The 
* Ibid., p. 2. 
** Ibid., p. 130. 
*** Ibid.

J. V. S T A L I N 314 
British, French, Germans, Italians and others were 
formed into nations at the time of the victorious advance 
of capitalism and its triumph over feudal disunity. 
But the formation of nations in those instances at 
the same time signified their conversion into independent 
national states. The British, French and other 
nations are at the same time British, etc., states. Ireland, 
which did not participate in this process, does not alter 
the general picture. 
Matters proceeded somewhat differently in Eastern 
Europe. Whereas in the West nations developed into 
states, in the East multi-national states were formed, 
states consisting of several nationalities. Such are Austria-
Hungary and Russia. In Austria, the Germans proved 
to be politically the most developed, and they took it 
upon themselves to unite the Austrian nationalities into 
a state. In Hungary, the most adapted for state organisation 
were the Magyars‹the core of the Hungarian nationalities‹
and it was they who united Hungary. In Russia, 
the uniting of the nationalities was undertaken by the 
Great Russians, who were headed by a historically 
formed, powerful and well-organised aristocratic military 
bureaucracy. 
That was how matters proceeded in the East. 
This special method of formation of states could 
take place only where feudalism had not yet been eliminated, 
where capitalism was feebly developed, where 
the nationalities which had been forced into the background 
had not yet been able to consolidate themselves 
economically into integral nations. 
But capitalism also began to develop in the Eastern 
states. Trade and means of communication were develop

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 315 
ing. Large towns were springing up. The nations were 
becoming economically consolidated. Capitalism, erupting 
into the tranquil life of the nationalities which had 
been pushed into the background, was arousing them and 
stirring them into action. The development of the press 
and the theatre, the activity of the Reichsrat (Austria) 
and of the Duma (Russia) were helping to strengthen 
³national sentiments.² The intelligentsia that had arisen 
was being imbued with ³the national idea² and was 
acting in the same direction. . . . 
But the nations which had been pushed into the 
background and had now awakened to independent life, 
could no longer form themselves into independent national 
states; they encountered on their path the very 
powerful resistance of the ruling strata of the dominant 
nations, which had long ago assumed the control of the 
state. They were too late! . . . 
In this way the Czechs, Poles, etc., formed themselves 
into nations in Austria; the Croats, etc., in Hungary; 
the Letts, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians, 
etc., in Russia. What had been an exception in 
Western Europe (Ireland) became the rule in the East. 
In the West, Ireland responded to its exceptional 
position by a national movement. In the East, the 
awakened nations were bound to respond in the same 
fashion. 
Thus arose the circumstances which impelled the 
young nations of Eastern Europe on to the path of struggle. 
The struggle began and flared up, to be sure, not 
between nations as a whole, but between the ruling 
classes of the dominant nations and of those that had 
been pushed into the background. The struggle is usually

J. V. S T A L I N 316 
conducted by the urban petty bourgeoisie of the oppressed 
nation against the big bourgeoisie of the dominant 
nation (Czechs and Germans), or by the rural 
bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation against the landlords 
of the dominant nation (Ukrainians in Poland), 
or by the whole ³national² bourgeoisie of the oppressed 
nations against the ruling nobility of the dominant nation 
(Poland, Lithuania and the Ukraine in Russia). 
The bourgeoisie plays the leading role. 
The chief problem for the young bourgeoisie is the 
problem of the market. Its aim is to sell its goods and to 
emerge victorious from competition with the bourgeoisie 
of a different nationality. Hence its desire to secure its 
³own,² its ³home² market. The market is the first school 
in which the bourgeoisie learns its nationalism. 
But matters are usually not confined to the market. 
The semi-feudal, semi-bourgeois bureaucracy of the dominant 
nation intervenes in the struggle with its own 
methods of ³arresting and preventing.² The bourgeoisie‹ 
whether big or small‹of the dominant nation is able 
to deal more ³swiftly² and ³decisively² with its competitor. 
³Forces² are united and a series of restrictive 
measures is put into operation against the ³alien² bourgeoisie, 
measures passing into acts of repression. The 
struggle spreads from the economic sphere to the political 
sphere. Restriction of freedom of movement, repression 
of language, restriction of franchise, closing of schools, 
religious restrictions, and so on, are piled upon the head 
of the ³competitor.² Of course, such measures are designed 
not only in the interest of the bourgeois classes of 
the dominant nation, but also in furtherance of the specifically 
caste aims, so to speak, of the ruling bureaucracy.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 317 
But from the point of view of the results achieved this is 
quite immaterial; the bourgeois classes and the bureaucracy 
in this matter go hand in hand‹whether it be in 
Austria-Hungary or in Russia. 
The bourgeoisie of the oppressed nation, repressed 
on every hand, is naturally stirred into movement. It 
appeals to its ³native folk² and begins to shout about 
the ³fatherland,² claiming that its own cause is the 
cause of the nation as a whole. It recruits itself an 
army from among its ³countrymen² in the interests 
of . . . the ³fatherland.² Nor do the ³folk² always remain 
unresponsive to its appeals; they rally around its 
banner: the repression from above affects them too and 
provokes their discontent. 
Thus the national movement begins. 
The strength of the national movement is determined 
by the degree to which the wide strata of the nation, 
the proletariat and peasantry, participate in it. 
Whether the proletariat rallies to the banner of 
bourgeois nationalism depends on the degree of development 
of class antagonisms, on the class consciousness 
and degree of organisation of the proletariat. The classconscious 
proletariat has its own tried banner, and has 
no need to rally to the banner of the bourgeoisie. 
As far as the peasants are concerned, their participation 
in the national movement depends primarily on the 
character of the repressions. If the repressions affect 
the ³land,² as was the case in Ireland, then the mass of 
the peasants immediately rally to the banner of the 
national movement. 
On the other hand, if, for example, there is no serious 
anti-Russian nationalism in Georgia, it is primarily

J. V. S T A L I N 318 
because there are neither Russian landlords nor a 
Russian big bourgeoisie there to supply the fuel for 
such nationalism among the masses. In Georgia there 
is anti-Armenian nationalism; but this is because there 
is still an Armenian big bourgeoisie there which, by 
getting the better of the small and still unconsolidated 
Georgian bourgeoisie, drives the latter to anti-Armenian 
nationalism. 
Depending on these factors, the national movement 
either assumes a mass character and steadily grows (as in 
Ireland and Galicia), or is converted into a series of petty 
collisions, degenerating into squabbles and ³fights² over 
signboards (as in some of the small towns of Bohemia). 
The content of the national movement, of course, cannot 
everywhere be the same: it is wholly determined by 
the diverse demands made by the movement. In Ireland 
the movement bears an agrarian character; in Bohemia 
it bears a ³language² character; in one place the demand 
is for civil equality and religious freedom, in another 
for the nationıs ³own² officials, or its own Diet. The 
diversity of demands not infrequently reveals the diverse 
features which characterise a nation in general 
(language, territory, etc.). It is worthy of note that we 
never meet with a demand based on Bauerıs all-embracing 
³national character.² And this is natural: ³national 
character² in itself is something intangible, and, 
as was correctly remarked by J. Strasser, ³a politician 
canıt do anything with it.²* 
Such, in general, are the forms and character of the 
national movement. 
* See his Der Arbeiter und die Nation, 1912, p. 33.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 319 
From what has been said it will be clear that the national 
struggle under the conditions of rising capitalism 
is a struggle of the bourgeois classes among themselves. 
Sometimes the bourgeoisie succeeds in drawing the proletariat 
into the national movement, and then the national 
struggle externally assumes a ³nation-wide² character. 
But this is so only externally. In its essence it is 
always a bourgeois struggle, one that is to the advantage 
and profit mainly of the bourgeoisie. 
But it does not by any means follow that the proletariat 
should not put up a fight against the policy of 
national oppression. 
Restriction of freedom of movement, disfranchisement, 
repression of language, closing of schools, and 
other forms of persecution affect the workers no less, if 
not more, than the bourgeoisie. Such a state of affairs 
can only serve to retard the free development of the 
intellectual forces of the proletariat of subject nations. 
One cannot speak seriously of a full development 
of the intellectual faculties of the Tatar or Jewish 
worker if he is not allowed to use his native language 
at meetings and lectures, and if his schools are closed 
down. 
But the policy of nationalist persecution is dangerous 
to the cause of the proletariat also on another account. 
I t diverts the attention of large strata from social 
questions, questions of the class struggle, to national 
questions, questions ³common² to the proletariat and 
the bourgeoisie. And this creates a favourable soil for 
lying propaganda about ³harmony of interests,² for 
glossing over the class interests of the proletariat 
and for the intellectual enslavement of the workers.

J. V. S T A L I N 320 
This creates a serious obstacle to the cause of uniting 
the workers of all nationalities. If a considerable proportion 
of the Polish workers are still in intellectual bondage 
to the bourgeois nationalists, if they still stand aloof 
from the international labour movement, it is chiefly 
because the age-old anti-Polish policy of the ³powers 
that be² creates the soil for this bondage and hinders the 
emancipation of the workers from it. 
But the policy of persecution does not stop there. 
It not infrequently passes from a ³system² of oppression 
to a ³system² of inciting nations against each other, to a 
³system² of massacres and pogroms. Of course, the latter 
system is not everywhere and always possible, but where 
it is possible‹in the absence of elementary civil rights‹ 
it frequently assumes horrifying proportions and threatens 
to drown the cause of unity of the workers in blood 
and tears. The Caucasus and South Russia furnish numerous 
examples. ³Divide and rule²‹such is the purpose 
of the policy of incitement. And where such a policy 
succeeds, it is a tremendous evil for the proletariat and a 
serious obstacle to the cause of uniting the workers of 
all the nationalities in the state. 
But the workers are interested in the complete 
amalgamation of all their fellow-workers into a single 
international army, in their speedy and final emancipation 
from intellectual bondage to the bourgeoisie, and 
in the full and free development of the intellectual 
forces of their brothers, whatever nation they may 
belong to. 
The workers therefore combat and will continue to 
combat the policy of national oppression in all its forms, 
from the most subtle to the most crude, as well as the

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 321 
policy of inciting nations against each other in all its 
forms. 
Social-Democracy in all countries therefore proclaims 
the right of nations to self-determination. 
The right of self-determination means that only the 
nation itself has the right to determine its destiny, 
that no one has the right forcibly to interfere in the life 
of the nation, to destroy its schools and other institutions, 
to violate its habits and customs, to repress its language, 
or curtail its rights. 
This, of course, does not mean that Social-Democracy 
will support every custom and institution of a nation. 
While combating the coercion of any nation, it 
will uphold only the right of the nation itself to determine 
its own destiny, at the same time agitating against 
harmful customs and institutions of that nation in order 
to enable the toiling strata of the nation to emancipate 
themselves from them. 
The right of self-determination means that a nation 
may arrange its life in the way it wishes. It has the 
right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It 
has the right to enter into federal relations with 
other nations. It has the right to complete secession. 
Nations are sovereign, and a l l nations have equal 
rights. 
This, of course, does not mean that Social-Democracy 
will support every demand of a nation. A nation has the 
right even to return to the old order of things; but this 
does not mean that Social-Democracy will subscribe to 
such a decision if taken by some institution of a particular 
nation. The obligations of Social-Democracy, which defends 
the interests of the proletariat, and the rights of

J. V. S T A L I N 322 
a nation, which consists of various classes, are two 
different things. 
In fighting for the right of nations to self-determination, 
the aim of Social-Democracy is to put an end to 
the policy of national oppression, to render it impossible, 
and thereby to remove the grounds of strife between 
nations, to take the edge off that strife and reduce it to 
a minimum. 
This is what essentially distinguishes the policy 
of the class-conscious proletariat from the policy of the 
bourgeoisie, which attempts to aggravate and fan the 
national struggle and to prolong and sharpen the national 
movement. 
And that is why the class-conscious proletariat 
cannot rally under the ³national² flag of the bourgeoisie. 
That is why the so-called ³evolutionary national² 
policy advocated by Bauer cannot become the policy of 
the proletariat. Bauerıs attempt to identify his ³evolutionary 
national² policy with the policy of the ³modern 
working class²* is an attempt to adapt the class struggle 
of the workers to the struggle of the nations. 
The fate of a national movement, which is essentially 
a bourgeois movement, is naturally bound up with the fate 
of the bourgeoisie. The final disappearance of a national 
movement is possible only with the downfall of the bourgeoisie. 
Only under the reign of socialism can peace be 
fully established. But even within the framework of 
capitalism it is possible to reduce the national struggle 
to a minimum, to undermine it at the root, to render it as 
* See Bauerıs book, p. 166.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 323 
harmless as possible to the proletariat. This is borne out, 
for example, by Switzerland and America. It requires that 
the country should be democratised and the nations be 
given the opportunity of free development. 
III 
PRESENTATION OF THE QUESTION 
A nation has the right freely to determine its own 
destiny. It has the right to arrange its life as it sees fit, 
without, of course, trampling on the rights of other nations. 
That is beyond dispute. 
But how exactly should it arrange its own life, what 
forms should its future constitution take, if the interests 
of the majority of the nation and, above all, of the proletariat 
are to be borne in mind? 
A nation has the right to arrange its life on autonomous 
lines. It even has the right to secede. But this does 
not mean that it should do so under all circumstances, 
that autonomy, or separation, will everywhere and 
always be advantageous for a nation, i.e., for its majority, 
i . e . , for the toiling strata. The Transcaucasian 
Tatars as a nation may assemble, let us say, in their 
Diet and, succumbing to the influence of their beys and 
mullahs, decide to restore the old order of things and to 
secede from the state. According to the meaning of the 
clause on self-determination they are fully entitled to do 
so. But will this be in the interest of the toiling strata 
of the Tatar nation? Can Social-Democracy look on indifferently 
when the beys and mullahs assume the leadership 
of the masses in the solution of the national question?

J. V. S T A L I N 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
324 
Should not Social-Democracy interfere in the matter 
and influence the will of the nation in a definite way? 
Should it not come forward with a definite plan for the 
solution of the question, a plan which would be most 
advantageous for the Tatar masses? 
But what solution would be most compatible with 
the interests of the toiling masses? Autonomy, federation 
or separation? 
All these are problems the solution of which will 
depend on the concrete historical conditions in which 
the given nation finds itself. 
More than that; conditions, like everything else, 
change, and a decision which is correct at one particular 
time may prove to be entirely unsuitable at another. 
In the middle of the nineteenth century Marx was 
in favour of the secession of Russian Poland; and he was 
right, for it was then a question of emancipating a higher 
culture from a lower culture that was destroying it. And 
the question at that time was not only a theoretical 
one, an academic question, but a practical one, a question 
of actual reality. . . . 
At the end of the nineteenth century the Polish 
Marxists were already declaring against the secession 
of Poland; and they too were right, for during the fifty 
years that had elapsed profound changes had taken place, 
bringing Russia and Poland closer economically and 
culturally. Moreover, during that period the question 
of secession had been converted from a practical matter 
into a matter of academic dispute, which excited 
nobody except perhaps intellectuals abroad. 
This, of course, by no means precludes the possibility 
that certain internal and external conditions may arise

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 325 
in which the question of the secession of Poland may 
again come on the order of the day. 
The solution of the national question is possible 
only in connection with the historical conditions taken 
in their development. 
The economic, political and cultural conditions of a 
given nation constitute the only key to the question how 
a particular nation ought to arrange its life and what forms 
its future constitution ought to take. It is possible that 
a specific solution of the question will be required for each 
nation. If the dialectical approach to a question is required 
anywhere it is required here, in the national question. 
In view of this we must declare our decided opposition 
to a certain very widespread, but very summary 
manner of ³solving² the national question, which owes 
its inception to the Bund. We have in mind the easy 
method of referring to Austrian and South-Slav* 
Social-Democracy, which has supposedly already solved 
the national question and whose solution the Russian 
Social-Democrats should simply borrow. It is assumed 
that whatever, say, is right for Austria is also right for 
Russia. The most important and decisive factor is lost 
sight of here, namely, the concrete historical conditions 
in Russia as a whole and in the life of each of the nations 
inhabiting Russia in particular. 
Listen, for example, to what the well-known Bundist, 
V. Kossovsky, says: 
³When at the Fourth Congress of the Bund the principles of 
the question (i.e., the national question‹J. St.) were discussed, 
* South-Slav Social-Democracy operates in the southern part 
of Austria.

J. V. S T A L I N 326 
the proposal made by one of the members of the congress to settle 
the question in the spirit of the resolution of the South-Slav Social-
Democratic Party met with general approval.²* 
And the result was that ³the congress unanimously 
adopted² . . . national autonomy. 
And that was all! No analysis of the actual conditions 
in Russia, no investigation of the condition of 
the Jews in Russia. They first borrowed the solution of 
the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party, then they ³approved² 
it, and finally they ³unanimously adopted² 
it! This is the way the Bundists present and ³solve² the 
national question in Russia. . . . 
As a matter of fact, Austria and Russia represent 
entirely different conditions. This explains why the 
Social-Democrats in Austria, when they adopted their 
national programme at Brünn (1899)132 in the spirit of the 
resolution of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party 
(with certain insignificant amendments, it is true), approached 
the question in an entirely non-Russian way, so 
to speak, and, of course, solved it in a non-Russian way. 
First, as to the presentation of the question. How 
is the question presented by the Austrian theoreticians of 
cultural-national autonomy, the interpreters of the Brünn 
national programme and the resolution of the South-Slav 
Social-Democratic Party, Springer and Bauer? 
³Whether a multi-national state is possible,² says Springer, 
³and whether, in particular, the Austrian nationalities are obliged 
to form a single political entity, is a question we shall not answer 
here but shall assume to be settled. For anyone who will not concede 
this possibility and necessity, our investigation will, of course, 
be purposeless. Our theme i s as follows: inasmuch as these 
* See V. Kossovsky, Problems of Nationality, 1907, pp. 16-17.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 327 
nations are obliged to live together, what legal forms will enable 
them to live together in the best possible way?² (Springerıs italics).* 
Thus, the starting point is the state integrity of 
Austria. 
Bauer says the same thing: 
³We therefore start from the assumption that the Austrian 
nations will remain in the same state union in which they exist 
at present and inquire how the nations within this union will arrange 
their relations among themselves and to the state.²** 
Here again the first thing is the integrity of Austria. 
Can Russian Social-Democracy present the question 
in this way? No, it cannot. And it cannot because from 
the very outset it holds the view of the right of nations 
to self-determination, by virtue of which a nation has 
the right of secession. 
Even the Bundist Goldblatt admitted at the Second 
Congress of Russian Social-Democracy that the latter 
could not abandon the standpoint of self-determination. 
Here is what Goldblatt said on that occasion: 
³Nothing can be said against the right of self-determination. 
If any nation is striving for independence, we must not oppose it. 
If Poland does not wish to enter into Œlawful wedlockı with Russia, 
it is not for us to interfere with her.² 
All this is true. But i t follows that the starting 
points of the Austrian and Russian Social-Democrats, 
far from being identical, are diametrically opposite. After 
this, can there be any question of borrowing the national 
programme of the Austrians? 
* See Springer, The National Problem, p. 14. 
** See Bauer, The National Question and Social-Democracy, 
p. 399.

J. V. S T A L I N 328 
Furthermore, the Austrians hope to achieve the 
³freedom of nationalities² by means of petty reforms, 
by slow steps. While they propose cultural-national 
autonomy as a practical measure, they do not count on 
any radical change, on a democratic movement for liberation, 
which they do not even contemplate. The Russian 
Marxists, on the other hand, associate the ³freedom of 
nationalities² with a probable radical change, with 
a democratic movement for liberation, having no grounds 
for counting on reforms. And this essentially alters 
matters in regard to the probable fate of the nations of 
Russia. 
³Of course,² says Bauer, ³there is little probability that national 
autonomy will be the result of a great decision, of a bold 
action. Austria will develop towards national autonomy step by 
step, by a slow process of development, in the course of a severe 
struggle, as a consequence of which legislation and administration 
will be in a state of chronic paralysis. The new constitution will 
not be created by a great legislative act, but by a multitude of 
separate enactments for individual provinces and individual communities.²* 
Springer says the same thing. 
³I am very well aware,² he writes, ³that institutions of this 
kind (i.e., organs of national autonomy‹J. St.) are not created 
in a single year or a single decade. The reorganisation of the 
Prussian administration alone took considerable time. . . . It 
took the Prussians two decades finally to establish their basic 
administrative institutions. Let nobody think that I harbour any 
illusions as to the time required and the difficulties to be overcome 
in Austria.²** 
* See Bauer, The National Question, p. 422. 
** See Springer, The National Problem, pp. 281-82.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 329 
All this is very definite. But can the Russian Marxists 
avoid associating the national question with ³bold 
actions²? Can they count on partial reforms, on ³a multitude 
of separate enactments² as a means for achieving 
the ³freedom of nationalities²? But if they cannot and 
must not do so, is it not clear that the methods of struggle 
of the Austrians and the Russians and their prospects 
must be entirely different? How in such a state of affairs 
can they confine themselves to the one-sided, milkand-
water cultural-national autonomy of the Austrians? 
One or the other: either those who are in favour of borrowing 
do not count on ³bold actions² in Russia, or they 
do count on such actions but ³know not what they do.² 
Finally, the immediate tasks facing Russia and 
Austria are entirely different and consequently dictate 
different methods of solving the national question. In 
Austria parliamentarism prevails, and under present conditions 
no development in Austria is possible without 
parliament. But parliamentary life and legislation in 
Austria are frequently brought to a complete standstill 
by severe conflicts between the national parties. That 
explains the chronic political crisis from which Austria 
has for a long time been suffering. Hence, in Austria the 
national question is the very hub of political life; it is 
the vital question. It is therefore not surprising that the 
Austrian Social-Democratic politicians should first of 
all try in one way or another to find a solution for the 
national conflicts‹of course on the basis of the existing 
parliamentary system, by parliamentary methods. . . . 
Not so with Russia. In the first place, in Russia 
³there is no parliament, thank God.²133 In the second 
place‹and this i s the main point‹the hub of the

J. V. S T A L I N 330 
political life of Russia is not the national but the 
agrarian question. Consequently, the fate of the Russian 
problem, and, accordingly, the ³liberation² of the nations 
too, is bound up in Russia with the solution of the 
agrarian question, i.e., with the destruction of the relics 
of feudalism, i.e., with the democratisation of the country. 
That explains why in Russia the national question 
is not an independent and decisive one, but a part of 
the general and more important question of the emancipation 
of the country. 
³The barrenness of the Austrian parliament,² writes Springer, 
³is due precisely to the fact that every reform gives rise to antagonisms 
within the national parties which may affect their unity. 
The leaders of the parties, therefore, avoid everything that smacks 
of reform. Progress in Austria is generally conceivable only if 
the nations are granted indefeasible legal rights which will relieve 
them of the necessity of constantly maintaining national militant 
groups in parliament and will enable them to turn their attention 
to the solution of economic and social problems.²* 
Bauer says the same thing. 
³National peace is indispensable first of all for the state. The 
state cannot permit legislation to be brought to a standstill by 
the very stupid question of language or by every quarrel between 
excited people on a linguistic frontier, or over every new school.²** 
All this is clear. But it is no less clear that the national 
question in Russia is on an entirely different 
plane. It is not the national, but the agrarian question 
that decides the fate of progress in Russia. The national 
question is a subordinate one. 
* See Springer, The National Problem, p. 36. 
** See Bauer, The National Question, p. 401.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 331 
And so we have different presentations of the question, 
different prospects and methods of struggle, different 
immediate tasks. Is it not clear that, such being the state 
of affairs, only pedants who ³solve² the national question 
without reference to space and time can think of adopting 
examples from Austria and of borrowing a programme? 
To repeat: the concrete historical conditions as the 
starting point, and the dialectical presentation of the 
question as the only correct way of presenting it‹such is 
the key to solving the national question. 
IV 
CULTURAL-NATIONAL AUTONOMY 
We spoke above of the formal aspect of the Austrian 
national programme and of the methodological grounds 
which make it impossible for the Russian Marxists simply 
to adopt the example of Austrian Social-Democracy and 
make the latterıs programme their own. 
Let us now examine the essence of the programme 
itself. 
What then is the national programme of the Austrian 
Social-Democrats? 
It is expressed in two words: cultural-national autonomy. 
This means, firstly, that autonomy would be granted, 
let us say, not to Bohemia or Poland, which are inhabited 
mainly by Czechs and Poles, but to Czechs and Poles 
generally, irrespective of territory, no matter what part 
of Austria they inhabit.

J. V. S T A L I N 332 
That is why this autonomy is called national and not 
territorial. 
It means, secondly, that the Czechs, Poles, Germans, 
and so on, scattered over the various parts of Austria, 
taken personally, as individuals, are to be organised 
into integral nations, and are as such to form part of 
the Austrian state. In this way Austria would represent 
not a union of autonomous regions, but a union of 
autonomous nationalities, constituted irrespective of 
territory. 
I t means, thirdly, that the national institutions 
which are to be created for this purpose for the Poles, 
Czechs, and so forth, are to have jurisdiction only over 
³cultural,² not ³political² questions. Specifically political 
questions would be reserved for the Austrian parliament 
(the Reichsrat). 
That is why this autonomy is also called cultural, 
cultural-national autonomy. 
And here is the text of the programme adopted by the 
Austrian Social-Democratic Party at the Brünn Congress 
in 1899.* 
Having referred to the fact that ³national dissension 
in Austria is hindering political progress,² that ³the 
final solution of the national question . . . is primarily 
a cultural necessity,² and that ³the solution is possible 
only in a genuinely democratic society, constructed on 
the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage,² the 
programme goes on to say: 
* The representatives of the South-Slav Social-Democratic 
Party also voted for it. See Discussion of the National Question 
at the Brünn Congress, 1906, p. 72.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 333 
³The preservation and development of the national peculiarities* 
of the peoples of Austria is possible only on the basis of equal 
rights and by avoiding all oppression. Hence, all bureaucratic 
state centralism and the feudal privileges of individual provinces 
must first of all be rejected. 
³Under these conditions, and only under these conditions, 
will it be possible to establish national order in Austria in place 
of national dissension, namely, on the following principles: 
³1. Austria must be transformed into a democratic state federation 
of nationalities. 
³2. The historical crown provinces must be replaced by nationally 
delimited self-governing corporations, in each of which 
legislation and administration shall be entrusted to national 
parliaments elected on the basis of universal, direct and equal 
suffrage. 
³3. All the self-governing regions of one and the same nation 
must jointly form a single national union, which shall manage its 
national affairs on an absolutely autonomous basis. 
³4. The rights of national minorities must be guaranteed by 
a special law passed by the Imperial Parliament.² 
The programme ends with an appeal for the solidarity 
of all the nations of Austria.** 
It is not difficult to see that this programme retains 
certain traces of ³territorialism,² but that in general 
it gives a formulation of national autonomy. It is not 
without good reason that Springer, the first agitator 
on behalf of cultural-national autonomy, greets it with 
* In M. Paninıs Russian translation (see his translation of 
Bauerıs book), ³national individualities² is given in place of ³national 
peculiarities.² Panin translated this passage incorrectly. 
The word ³individuality² is not in the German text, which speaks 
of nationalen Eigenart, i.e., peculiarities, which is far from being 
the same thing. 
** Verhandlungen des Gesamtparteitages in Brünn, 1899.

J. V. S T A L I N 334 
enthusiasm;* Bauer also supports this programme, calling 
it a ³theoretical victory²** for national autonomy; 
only, in the interests of greater clarity, he proposes that 
Point 4 be replaced by a more definite formulation, which 
would declare the necessity of ³constituting the national 
minority within each self-governing region into a public 
corporation² for the management of educational and 
other cultural affairs.*** 
Such is the national programme of Austrian Social- 
Democracy. 
Let us examine its scientific foundations. 
Let us see how the Austrian Social-Democratic Party 
justifies the cultural-national autonomy it advocates. 
Let us turn to the theoreticians of cultural-national 
autonomy, Springer and Bauer. 
The starting point of national autonomy is the conception 
of a nation as a union of individuals without regard 
to a definite territory. 
³Nationality,² according to Springer, ³is not essentially 
connected with territory²; nations are ³autonomous unions of 
persons.²**** 
Bauer also speaks of a nation as a ³community of 
persons² which does not enjoy ³exclusive sovereignty in 
any particular region.²***** 
But the persons constituting a nation do not always 
live in one compact mass; they are frequently divided 
* See Springer, The National Problem, p. 286. 
** See The National Question, p. 549. 
*** Ibid., p. 555. 
**** See Springer, The National Problem, p. 19. 
***** See The National Question, p. 286.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 335 
into groups, and in that form are interspersed among 
alien national organisms. It is capitalism which drives 
them into various regions and cities in search of a livelihood. 
But when they enter foreign national territories 
and there form minorities, these groups are made to 
suffer by the local national majorities in the way of 
restrictions on their language, schools, etc. Hence national 
conflicts. Hence the ³unsuitability² of territorial 
autonomy. The only solution to such a situation, according 
to Springer and Bauer, is to organise the minorities 
of the given nationality dispersed over various parts 
of the state into a single, general, inter-class national 
union. Such a union alone, in their opinion, can protect 
the cultural interests of national minorities, and it alone 
is capable of putting an end to national discord. 
³Hence the necessity,² says Springer, ³to organise the nationalities, 
to invest them with rights and responsibilities. . . .²* 
Of course, ³a law is easily drafted, but will it be effective?². . . 
³If one wants to make a law for nations, one must first create the 
nations. . . .²** ³Unless the nationalities are constituted it is 
impossible to create national rights and eliminate national dissension.²*** 
Bauer expressed himself in the same spirit when he 
proposed, as ³a demand of the working class,² that ³the 
minorities should be constituted into public corporations 
based on the personal principle.²**** 
But how is a nation to be organised? How is one to 
determine to what nation any given individual belongs? 
* See The National Problem, p. 74. 
** Ibid., pp. 88-89. 
*** Ibid., p. 89. 
**** See The National Question, p. 552.

J. V. S T A L I N 336 
³Nationality,² says Springer, ³will be determined by certificates; 
every individual domiciled in a given region must declare 
his affiliation to one of the nationalities of that region.²* 
³The personal principle,² says Bauer, ³presumes that the 
population will be divided into nationalities. . . . On the basis of 
the free declaration of the adult citizens national registers must 
be drawn up.²** 
Further. 
³All the Germans in nationally homogeneous districts,² says 
Bauer, ³and all the Germans entered in the national registers in 
the dual districts will constitute the German nation and elect a 
National Council.²*** 
The same applies to the Czechs, Poles, and so on. 
³The National Council,² according to Springer, ³is the cultural 
parliament of the nation, empowered to establish the principles 
and to grant funds, thereby assuming guardianship over national 
education, national literature, art and science, the formation 
of academies, museums, galleries, theatres,² etc.**** 
Such will be the organisation of a nation and its 
central institution. 
According to Bauer, the Austrian Social-Democratic 
Party is striving, by the creation of these inter-class 
institutions ³to make national culture . . . the possession 
of the whole people and thereby unite all the members 
of the nation into a national-cultural community²***** 
(our italics). 
* See The National Problem, p. 226. 
** See The National Question, p. 368. 
*** Ibid., p. 375. 
**** See The National Problem, p. 234. 
***** See The National Question, p. 553.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 337 
One might think that all this concerns Austria alone. 
But Bauer does not agree. He emphatically declares that 
national autonomy is essential also for other states which, 
like Austria, consist of several nationalities. 
³In the multi-national state,² according to Bauer, ³the working 
class of all the nations opposes the national power policy of 
the propertied classes with the demand for national autonomy.²* 
Then, imperceptibly substituting national autonomy 
for the self-determination of nations, he continues: 
³Thus, national autonomy, the self-determination of nations, 
will necessarily become the constitutional programme of the proletariat 
of all the nations in a multi-national state.²** 
But he goes still further. He profoundly believes 
that the inter-class ³national unions² ³constituted² by 
him and Springer will serve as a sort of prototype of the 
future socialist society. For he knows that ³the socialist 
system of society . . . will divide humanity into nationally 
delimited communities²;*** that under socialism 
there will take place ³a grouping of humanity into 
autonomous national communities,²**** that thus, ³socialist 
society will undoubtedly present a checkered 
picture of national unions of persons and territorial 
corporations,²***** and that accordingly ³the socialist 
principle of nationality is a higher synthesis of the national 
principle and national autonomy.²****** 
* Ibid., p. 337. 
** See The National Question, p. 333. 
*** Ibid., p. 555. 
**** Ibid., p. 556. 
***** Ibid., p. 543. 
****** Ibid., p. 542.

J. V. S T A L I N 338 
Enough, it would seem. . . . 
These are the arguments for cultural-national autonomy 
as given in the works of Bauer and Springer. 
The first thing that strikes the eye is the entirely 
inexplicable and absolutely unjustifiable substitution 
of national autonomy for self-determination of nations. 
One or the other: either Bauer failed to understand the 
meaning of self-determination, or he did understand it 
but for some reason or other deliberately narrowed its 
meaning. For there is no doubt a) that cultural-national 
autonomy presupposes the integrity of the multi-national 
state, whereas self-determination goes outside the framework 
of this integrity, and b) that self-determination 
endows a nation with complete rights, whereas national 
autonomy endows it only with ³cultural² rights. That in 
the first place. 
In the second place, a combination of internal and 
external conditions is fully possible at some future time 
by virtue of which one or another of the nationalities may 
decide to secede from a multi-national state, say from 
Austria. Did not the Ruthenian Social-Democrats at 
the Brünn Party Congress announce their readiness to 
unite the ³two parts² of their people into one whole?* 
What, in such a case, becomes of national autonomy, 
which is ³inevitable for the proletariat of all the nations²? 
That sort of ³solution² of the problem is it that mechanically 
squeezes nations into the Procrustean bed of an 
integral state? 
Further: National autonomy is contrary to the whole 
* See Proceedings of the Brünn Social-Democratic Party Congress, 
p. 48.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 339 
course of development of nations. It calls for the organisation 
of nations; but can they be artificially welded 
together if life, if economic development tears whole 
groups from them and disperses these groups over various 
regions? There is no doubt that in the early stages of 
capitalism nations become welded together. But there 
is also no doubt that in the higher stages of capitalism a 
process of dispersion of nations sets in, a process whereby a 
whole number of groups separate off from the nations, going 
off in search of a livelihood and subsequently settling permanently 
in other regions of the state; in the course of 
this these settlers lose their old connections and acquire 
new ones in their new domicile, and from generation to generation 
acquire new habits and new tastes, and possibly 
a new language. The question arises: is it possible to unite 
into a single national union groups that have grown so distinct? 
Where are the magic links to unite what cannot 
be united? Is it conceivable that, for instance, the Germans 
of the Baltic Provinces and the Germans of Transcaucasia 
can be ³united into a single nation²? But 
if it is not conceivable and not possible, wherein does 
national autonomy differ from the utopia of the old nationalists, 
who endeavoured to turn back the wheel of 
history? 
But the unity of a nation diminishes not only as a 
result of migration. It diminishes also from internal 
causes, owing to the growing acuteness of the class struggle. 
In the early stages of capitalism one can still speak 
of a ³common culture² of the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. 
But as large-scale industry develops and the 
class struggle becomes more and more acute, this ³common 
culture² begins to melt away. One cannot seriously

J. V. S T A L I N 340 
speak of the ³common culture² of a nation when employers 
and workers of one and the same nation cease to understand 
each other. What ³common destiny² can there be 
when the bourgeoisie thirsts for war, and the proletariat 
declares ³war on war²? Can a single inter-class national 
union be formed from such opposed elements? 
And, after this, can one speak of the ³union of all the 
members of the nation into a national-cultural community²?* 
Is it not obvious that national autonomy is 
contrary to the whole course of the class struggle? 
But let us assume for a moment that the slogan ³organise 
the nation² is practicable. One might understand 
bourgeois-nationalist parliamentarians endeavouring to 
³organise² a nation for the purpose of securing additional 
votes. But since when have Social-Democrats begun to 
occupy themselves with ³organising² nations, ³constituting² 
nations, ³creating² nations? 
What sort of Social-Democrats are they who in the 
epoch of extreme intensification of the class struggle 
organise inter-class national unions? Until now the 
Austrian, as well as every other, Social-Democratic Party, 
had one task before it: namely, to organise the proletariat. 
That task has apparently become ³antiquated.² 
Springer and Bauer are now setting a ³new² task, a more 
absorbing task, namely, to ³create,² to ³organise² a 
nation. 
However, logic has its obligations: he who adopts 
national autonomy must also adopt this ³new² task; 
but to adopt the latter means to abandon the class position 
and to take the path of nationalism. 
* Bauer, The National Question, p. 553

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 341 
Springerıs and Bauerıs cultural-national autonomy 
is a subtle form of nationalism. 
And it is by no means fortuitous that the national 
programme of the Austrian Social-Democrats enjoins a 
concern for the ³preservation and development of the 
national peculiarities of the peoples.² Just think: to 
³preserve² such ³national peculiarities² of the Transcaucasian 
Tatars as self-flagellation at the festival of 
Shakhsei-Vakhsei; or to ³develop² such ³national peculiarities² 
of the Georgians as the vendetta! . . . 
A demand of this character is in place in an 
outright bourgeois nationalist programme; and if it 
appears in the programme of the Austrian Social- 
Democrats it is because national autonomy tolerates such 
demands, it does not contradict them. 
But i f national autonomy i s unsuitable now, i t 
will be still more unsuitable in the future, socialist 
society. 
Bauerıs prophecy regarding the ³division of humanity 
into nationally delimited communities²* is refuted 
by the whole course of development of modern human 
society. National barriers are being demolished and 
are falling, rather than becoming firmer. As early as 
the ıforties Marx declared that ³national differences and 
antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more 
vanishing² and that ³the supremacy of the proletariat 
will cause them to vanish still faster.²134 The subsequent 
development of mankind, accompanied as it was 
by the colossal growth of capitalist production, the reshuffling 
of nationalities and the union of people 
* See the beginning of this chapter.

J. V. S T A L I N 342 
within ever larger territories, emphatically confirms 
Marxıs thought. 
Bauerıs desire to represent socialist society as a 
³checkered picture of national unions of persons and 
territorial corporations² is a timid attempt to substitute 
for Marxıs conception of socialism a revised version 
of Bakuninıs conception. The history of socialism proves 
that every such attempt contains the elements of inevitable 
failure. 
There is no need to mention the kind of ³socialist 
principle of nationality² glorified by Bauer, which, in 
our opinion, substitutes for the socialist principle of the 
class struggle the bourgeois ³principle of nationality.² If 
national autonomy is based on such a dubious principle, 
it must be admitted that it can only cause harm to the 
working-class movement. 
True, such nationalism is not so transparent, for 
it is skilfully masked by socialist phrases, but it is all 
the more harmful to the proletariat for that reason. 
We can always cope with open nationalism, for it can 
easily be discerned. It is much more difficult to combat 
nationalism when it is masked and unrecognisable beneath 
its mask. Protected by the armour of socialism, 
it is less vulnerable and more tenacious. Implanted 
among the workers, it poisons the atmosphere and spreads 
harmful ideas of mutual distrust and segregation among 
the workers of the different nationalities. 
But this does not exhaust the harm caused by national 
autonomy. It prepares the ground not only for the segregation 
of nations, but also for breaking up the united 
labour movement. The idea of national autonomy creates 
the psychological conditions for the division of the

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 343 
united workersı party into separate parties built on 
national lines. The break-up of the party is followed 
by the break-up of the trade unions, and complete segregation 
is the result. In this way the united class movement 
is broken up into separate national rivulets. 
Austria, the home of ³national autonomy,² provides 
the most deplorable examples of this. As early as 1897 the 
Wimberg Party Congress135) the once united Austrian 
Social-Democratic Party began to break up into separate 
parties. The break-up became still more marked after 
the Brünn Party Congress (1899), which adopted national 
autonomy. Matters have finally come to such a pass that 
in place of a united international party there are now 
six national parties, of which the Czech Social-Democratic 
Party will not even have anything to do with the German 
Social-Democratic Party. 
But with the parties are associated the trade unions. 
In Austria, both in the parties and in the trade unions, 
the main brunt of the work is borne by the same Social- 
Democratic workers. There was therefore reason to fear 
that separatism in the party would lead to separatism 
in the trade unions and that the trade unions would 
also break up. That, in fact, is what happened: the 
trade unions have also divided according to nationality. 
Now things frequently go so far that the Czech workers 
will even break a strike of German workers, or will unite 
at municipal elections with the Czech bourgeois against 
the German workers. 
It will be seen from the foregoing that culturalnational 
autonomy is no solution of the national question. 
Not only that, it serves to aggravate and confuse the 
question by creating a situation which favours the

J. V. S T A L I N 344 
destruction of the unity of the labour movement, fosters 
the segregation of the workers according to nationality 
and intensifies friction among them. 
Such is the harvest of national autonomy. 
V 
THE BUND, ITS NATIONALISM, 
ITS SEPARATISM 
We said above that Bauer, while granting the necessity 
of national autonomy for the Czechs, Poles, and so 
on, nevertheless opposes similar autonomy for the Jews. 
In answer to the question, ³Should the working class 
demand autonomy for the Jewish people?² Bauer says 
that ³national autonomy cannot be demanded by the 
Jewish workers.²* According to Bauer, the reason is 
that ³capitalist society makes it impossible for them 
(the Jews‹J. St.) to continue as a nation.²** 
In brief, the Jewish nation is coming to an end, 
and hence there is nobody to demand national autonomy 
for. The Jews are being assimilated. 
This view of the fate of the Jews as a nation is not 
a new one. It was expressed by Marx as early as the 
ıforties,***136 in reference chiefly to the German Jews. It 
was repeated by Kautsky in 1903,**** in reference to the 
Russian Jews. It is now being repeated by Bauer in 
reference to the Austrian Jews, with the difference, 
* See The National Question, pp. 381, 396. 
** Ibid., p. 389. 
*** See K. Marx, ³The Jewish Question,² 1906. 
**** See K. Kautsky, ³The Kishinev Pogrom and the Jewish 
Question,² 1903.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 345 
however, that he denies not the present but the future 
of the Jewish nation. 
Bauer explains the impossibility of preserving the 
existence of the Jews as a nation by the fact that ³the 
Jews have no closed territory of settlement.²* This 
explanation, in the main a correct one, does not however 
express the whole truth. The fact of the matter is primarily 
that among the Jews there is no large and stable 
stratum connected with the land, which would naturally 
rivet the nation together, serving not only as its framework 
but also as a ³national² market. Of the five or 
six million Russian Jews, only three to four per cent 
are connected with agriculture in any way. The remaining 
ninety-six per cent are employed in trade, industry, 
in urban institutions, and in general are town dwellers; 
moreover, they are spread all over Russia and do not 
constitute a majority in a single gubernia. 
Thus, interspersed as national minorities in areas 
inhabited by other nationalities, the Jews as a rule serve 
³foreign² nations as manufacturers and traders and as 
members of the liberal professions, naturally adapting 
themselves to the ³foreign nations² in respect to language 
and so forth. All this, taken together with the 
increasing re-shuffling of nationalities characteristic of 
developed forms of capitalism, leads to the assimilation 
of the Jews. The abolition of the ³Pale of Settlement² 
would only serve to hasten this process of assimilation. 
The question of national autonomy for the Russian 
Jews consequently assumes a somewhat curious character: 
autonomy is being proposed for a nation whose 
* See The National Question, p. 388.

J. V. S T A L I N 346 
future is denied and whose existence has still to be 
proved! 
Nevertheless, this was the curious and shaky position 
taken up by the Bund when at its Sixth Congress (1905) 
it adopted a ³national programme² on the lines of national 
autonomy. 
Two circumstances impelled the Bund to take this 
step. 
The first circumstance is the existence of the Bund 
as an organisation of Jewish, and only Jewish, Social- 
Democratic workers. Even before 1897 the Social-Democratic 
groups active among the Jewish workers set themselves 
the aim of creating ³a special Jewish workersı 
organisation.²* They founded such an organisation in 
1897 by uniting to form the Bund. That was at a time 
when Russian Social-Democracy as an integral body 
virtually did not yet exist. The Bund steadily grew and 
spread, and stood out more and more vividly against 
the background of the bleak days of Russian Social- 
Democracy. . . . Then came the 1900ıs. A mass labour 
movement came into being. Polish Social-Democracy 
grew and drew the Jewish workers into the mass struggle. 
Russian Social-Democracy grew and attracted the ³Bund² 
workers. Lacking a territorial basis, the national framework 
of the Bund became too restrictive. The Bund 
was faced with the problem of either merging with the 
general international tide, or of upholding its independent 
existence as an extra-territorial organisation. The 
Bund chose the latter course. 
* See Forms of the National Movement, etc., edited by Kastelyansky, 
p. 772.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 347 
Thus grew up the ³theory² that the Bund is ³the sole 
representative of the Jewish proletariat.² 
But to justify this strange ³theory² in any ³simple² 
way became impossible. Some kind of foundation ³on 
principle,² some justification ³on principle,² was needed. 
Cultural-national autonomy provided such a foundation. 
The Bund seized upon it, borrowing it from the Austrian 
Social-Democrats. If the Austrians had not had such a 
programme the Bund would have invented it in order to 
justify its independent existence ³on principle.² 
Thus, after a timid attempt in 1901 (the Fourth 
Congress), the Bund definitely adopted a ³national programme² 
in 1905 (the Sixth Congress). 
The second circumstance is the peculiar position 
of the Jews as separate national minorities within 
compact majorities of other nationalities in integral 
regions. We have already said that this position is undermining 
the existence of the Jews as a nation and puts 
them on the road to assimilation. But this is an objective 
process. Subjectively, in the minds of the Jews, 
it provokes a reaction and gives rise to the demand 
for a guarantee of the rights of a national minority, for 
a guarantee against assimilation. Preaching as it does 
the vitality of the Jewish ³nationality,² the Bund could 
not avoid being in favour of a ³guarantee.² And, having 
taken up this position, it could not but accept national 
autonomy. For if the Bund could seize upon any autonomy 
at all, it could only be national autonomy, i.e., 
cultural-national autonomy; there could be no question 
of territorial-political autonomy for the Jews, since the 
Jews have no definite integral territory. 
It is noteworthy that the Bund from the outset

J. V. S T A L I N 348 
stressed the character of national autonomy as a guarantee 
of the rights of national minorities, as a guarantee 
of the ³free development² of nations. Nor was it fortuitous 
that the representative of the Bund at the Second 
Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic Party, Goldblatt, 
defined national autonomy as ³institutions which 
guarantee them (i.e., nations‹J. St.) complete freedom 
of cultural development.²* A similar proposal was made 
by supporters of the ideas of the Bund to the Social- 
Democratic group in the Fourth Duma. . . . 
In this way the Bund adopted the curious position 
of national autonomy for the Jews. 
We have examined above national autonomy in 
general. The examination showed that national autonomy 
leads to nationalism. We shall see later that the Bund 
has arrived at the same end point. But the Bund also regards 
national autonomy from a special aspect, namely, 
from the aspect of guarantees of the rights of national minorities. 
Let us also examine the question from this special 
aspect. It is all the more necessary since the problem 
of national minorities‹and not of the Jewish minorities 
alone‹is one of serious moment for Social-Democracy. 
And so, it is a question of ³institutions which guarantee² 
nations ³complete freedom of cultural development² 
(our italics‹J. St.). 
But what are these ³institutions which guarantee,² 
etc.? 
They are primarily the ³National Council² of Springer 
and Bauer, something in the nature of a Diet for cultural 
affairs. 
* See Minutes of the Second Congress, p. 176.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 349 
But can these institutions guarantee a nation 
³complete freedom of cultural development²? Can a 
Diet for cultural affairs guarantee a nation against 
nationalist persecution? 
The Bund believes it can. 
But history proves the contrary. 
At one time a Diet existed in Russian Poland. It 
was a political Diet and, of course, endeavoured to 
guarantee freedom of ³cultural development² for the 
Poles. But, far from succeeding in doing so, it itself 
succumbed in the unequal struggle against the political 
conditions generally prevailing in Russia. 
A Diet has been in existence for a long time in Finland, 
and it too endeavours to protect the Finnish nationality 
from ³encroachments,² but how far it succeeds in 
doing so everybody can see. 
Of course, there are Diets and Diets, and it is not 
so easy to cope with the democratically organised Finnish 
Diet as it was with the aristocratic Polish Diet. 
But the decisive factor, nevertheless, is not the Diet, 
but the general regime in Russia. If such a grossly Asiatic 
social and political regime existed in Russia now as in 
the past, at the time the Polish Diet was abolished, 
things would go much harder with the Finnish Diet. 
Moreover, the policy of ³encroachments² upon Finland 
is growing, and it cannot be said that it has met with 
defeat . . . . 
If such is the case with old, historically evolved 
institutions‹political Diets‹still less will young Diets, 
young institutions, especially such feeble institutions 
as ³cultural² Diets, be able to guarantee the free development 
of nations.

J. V. S T A L I N 350 
Obviously, it is not a question of ³institutions,² 
but of the general regime prevailing in the country. 
If there is no democracy in the country there can be no 
guarantees of ³complete freedom for cultural development² 
of nationalities. One may say with certainty 
that the more democratic a country is the fewer are the 
³encroachments² made on the ³freedom of nationalities,² 
and the greater are the guarantees against such 
³encroachments.² 
Russia is a semi-Asiatic country, and therefore in 
Russia the policy of ³encroachments² not infrequently 
assumes the grossest form, the form of pogroms. It need 
hardly be said that in Russia ³guarantees² have been 
reduced to the very minimum. 
Germany is, however, European, and she enjoys a 
measure of political freedom. It is not surprising that 
the policy of ³encroachments² there never takes the form 
of pogroms. 
In France, of course, there are still more ³guarantees,² 
for France is more democratic than Germany. 
There is no need to mention Switzerland, where, thanks 
to her highly developed, although bourgeois democracy, 
nationalities live in freedom, whether they are a minority 
or a majority. 
Thus the Bund adopts a false position when it asserts 
that ³institutions² by themselves are able to guarantee 
complete cultural development for nationalities. 
I t may be said that the Bund itself regards the 
establishment of democracy in Russia as a preliminary 
condition for the ³creation of institutions² and guarantees 
of freedom. But this is not the case. From the report 
of the Eighth Conference of the Bund137 it will be seen

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 351 
that the Bund thinks it can secure ³institutions² on the 
basis of the present system in Russia, by ³reforming² the 
Jewish community. 
³The community,² one of the leaders of the Bund said at this 
conference, ³may become the nucleus of future cultural-national 
autonomy. Cultural-national autonomy is a form of self-service 
on the part of nations, a form of satisfying national needs. The 
community form conceals within itself a similar content. They are 
links in the same chain, stages in the same evolution.²* 
On this basis, the conference decided that it was 
necessary to strive ³for reforming the Jewish community 
and transforming it by legislative means into a secular 
institution,² democratically organised** (our italics‹ 
J. St.). 
It is evident that the Bund considers as the condition 
and guarantee not the democratisation of Russia, 
but some future ³secular institution² of the Jews, 
obtained by ³reforming the Jewish community,² so to 
speak, by ³legislative² means, through the Duma. 
But we have already seen that ³institutions² in 
themselves cannot serve as ³guarantees² if the regime 
in the state generally is not a democratic one. 
But what, i t may be asked, will be the position 
under a future democratic system? Will not special 
³cultural institutions which guarantee,² etc., be required 
even under democracy? What is the position 
in this respect in democratic Switzerland, for example? 
Are there special cultural institutions in Switzerland 
* Report of the Eighth Conference of the Bund, 1911, p. 62. 
** Ibid., pp. 83-84.

J. V. S T A L I N 352 
on the pattern of Springerıs ³National Council²? No, 
there are not. But do not the cultural interests of, for 
instance, the Italians, who constitute a minority there, 
suffer for that reason? One does not seem to hear that 
they do. And that is quite natural: in Switzerland all 
special cultural ³institutions,² which supposedly ³guarantee,² 
etc., are rendered superfluous by democracy. 
And so, impotent in the present and superfluous in 
the future‹such are the institutions of cultural-national 
autonomy, and such is national autonomy. 
But it becomes still more harmful when it is thrust 
upon a ³nation² whose existence and future are open 
to doubt. In such cases the advocates of national autonomy 
are obliged to protect and preserve all the peculiar 
features of the ³nation,² the bad as well as the good, just 
for the sake of ³saving the nation² from assimilation, 
just for the sake of ³preserving² it. 
That the Bund should take this dangerous path 
was inevitable. And it did take it. We are referring to 
the resolutions of recent conferences of the Bund on the 
question of the ³Sabbath,² ³Yiddish,² etc. 
Social-Democracy strives to secure for all nations 
the right to use their own language. But that does not 
satisfy the Bund; it demands that ³the rights of the Jewish 
language² (our italics‹J. St.) be championed with ³exceptional 
persistence,²* and the Bund itself in the elections 
to the Fourth Duma declared that it would give ³preference 
to those of them (i.e., electors) who undertake to 
defend the rights of the Jewish language.²** 
* See Report of the Eighth Conference of the Bund, p. 85. 
** See Report of the Ninth Conference of the Bund, 1912, p. 42.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 353 
Not the general right of all nations to use their 
own language, but the particular right of the Jewish 
language, Yiddish! Let the workers of the various nationalities 
fight primarily for their own language: the 
Jews for Jewish, the Georgians for Georgian, and so 
forth. The struggle for the general right of all nations 
is a secondary matter. You do not have to recognise the 
right of all oppressed nationalities to use their own 
language; but if you have recognised the right of Yiddish, 
know that the Bund will vote for you, the Bund will 
³prefer² you. 
But in what way then does the Bund differ from the 
bourgeois nationalists? 
Social-Democracy strives to secure the establishment 
of a compulsory weekly rest day. But that does not satisfy 
the Bund; it demands that ³by legislative means² ³the 
Jewish proletariat should be guaranteed the right to 
observe their Sabbath and be relieved of the obligation 
to observe another day.²* 
It is to be expected that the Bund will take another 
³step forward² and demand the right to observe all 
the ancient Hebrew holidays. And if, to the misfortune 
of the Bund, the Jewish workers have discarded 
religious prejudices and do not want to observe these 
holidays, the Bund with its agitation for ³the right to 
the Sabbath,² will remind them of the Sabbath, i t 
will, so to speak, cultivate among them ³the Sabbatarian 
spirit.² . . . 
Quite comprehensible, therefore, are the ³passionate 
speeches² delivered at the Eighth Conference of the 
* See Report of the Eighth Conference of the Bund, p. 83

J. V. S T A L I N 354 
Bund demanding ³Jewish hospitals,² a demand that was 
based on the argument that ³a patient feels more at 
home among his own people,² that ³the Jewish worker 
will not feel at ease among Polish workers, but will feel 
at ease among Jewish shopkeepers.²* 
Preservation of everything Jewish, conservation of 
all the national peculiarities of the Jews, even those 
that are patently harmful to the proletariat, isolation 
of the Jews from everything non-Jewish, even the establishment 
of special hospitals‹that is the level to which 
the Bund has sunk! 
Comrade Plekhanov was right a thousand times 
over when he said that the Bund ³is adapting socialism 
to nationalism.² Of course, V. Kossovsky and Bundists 
like him may denounce Plekhanov as a ³demagogue²**
138‹paper will put up with, anything that is 
written on it‹but those who are familiar with the activities 
of the Bund will easily realise that these brave 
fellows are simply afraid to tell the truth about themselves 
and are hiding behind strong language about 
³demagogy.² . . . 
But since it holds such a position on the national 
question, the Bund was naturally obliged, in the matter 
of organisation also, to take the path of segregating the 
Jewish workers, the path of formation of national curiae 
within Social-Democracy. Such is the logic of national 
autonomy! 
And, in fact, the Bund did pass from the theory of 
sole representation to the theory of ³national demar- 
* Ibid., p. 68. 
** See Nasha Zarya, No. 9-10, 1912, p. 120.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 355 
cation² of workers. The Bund demands that Russian 
Social-Democracy should ³in its organisational structure 
introduce demarcation according to nationalities.²* 
From ³demarcation² it made a ³step forward² to 
the theory of ³segregation.² It is not for nothing that 
speeches were made at the Eighth Conference of the 
Bund declaring that ³national existence lies in segregation.²** 
Organisational federalism harbours the elements of 
disintegration and separatism. The Bund is heading 
for separatism. 
And, indeed, there is nothing else it can head for. 
Its very existence as an extra-territorial organisation 
drives it to separatism. The Bund does not possess a 
definite integral territory; it operates on ³foreign² territories, 
whereas the neighbouring Polish, Lettish and 
Russian Social-Democracies are international territorial 
collective bodies. But the result is that every extension 
of these collective bodies means a ³loss² to the Bund 
and a restriction of its field of action. There are two 
alternatives: either Russian Social-Democracy as a whole 
must be reconstructed on the basis of national federalism‹
which will enable the Bund to ³secure² the Jewish 
proletariat for itself; or the territorial-international 
principle of these collective bodies remains in force‹in 
which case the Bund must be reconstructed on the basis 
of internationalism, as is the case with the Polish and 
Lettish Social-Democracies. 
* See An Announcement on the Seventh Congress of the 
Bund,139 p. 7. 
** See Report of the Eighth Conference of the Bund, p. 72.

J. V. S T A L I N 356 
This explains why the Bund from the very beginning 
demanded ³the reorganisation of Russian Social-Democracy 
on a federal basis.²* 
In 1906, yielding to the pressure from below in favour 
of unity, the Bund chose a middle path and joined Russian 
Social-Democracy. But how did it join? Whereas 
the Polish and Lettish Social-Democracies joined for 
the purpose of peaceable joint action, the Bund joined 
for the purpose of waging war for a federation. That 
is exactly what Medem, the leader of the Bundists, said 
at the time: 
³We are joining not for the sake of an idyll, but in order to 
fight. There is no idyll, and only Manilovs could hope for one 
in the near future. The Bund must join the Party armed from head 
to foot.²** 
It would be wrong to regard this as an expression 
of evil intent on Medemıs part. I t i s not a matter 
of evil intent, but of the peculiar position of the Bund, 
which compels it to fight Russian Social-Democracy, 
which is built on the basis of internationalism. And in 
fighting it the Bund naturally violated the interests 
of unity. Finally, matters went so far that the Bund 
formally broke with Russian Social-Democracy, violating 
its statutes, and in the elections to the Fourth Duma 
joining forces with the Polish nationalists against the 
Polish Social-Democrats. 
The Bund has apparently found that a rupture is 
the best guarantee for independent activity. 
* See Concerning National Autonomy and the Reorganisation 
of Russian Social-Democracy on a Federal Basis, 1902, published 
by the Bund. 
** Nashe Slovo, No. 3, Vilno, 1906, p. 24.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 357 
And so the ³principle² of organisational ³demarcation² 
led to separatism and to a complete rupture. 
In a controversy with the old Iskra140 on the question 
of federalism, the Bund once wrote: 
³Iskra wants to assure us that federal relations between the 
Bund and Russian Social-Democracy are bound to weaken the ties 
between them. We cannot refute this opinion by referring to practice 
in Russia, for the simple reason that Russian Social-Democracy 
does not exist as a federal body. But we can refer to the extremely 
instructive experience of Social-Democracy in Austria, 
which assumed a federal character by virtue of the decision of 
the Party Congress of 1897.²* 
That was written in 1902. 
But we are now in the year 1913. We now have both 
Russian ³practice² and the ³experience of Social-Democracy 
in Austria.² 
What do they tell us? 
Let us begin with ³the extremely instructive experience 
of Social-Democracy in Austria.² Up to 1896 there 
was a united Social-Democratic Party in Austria. In that 
year the Czechs at the International Congress in London 
for the first time demanded separate representation, and 
were given it. In 1897, at the Vienna (Wimberg) Party 
Congress, the united party was formally liquidated and in 
its place a federal league of six national ³Social-Democratic 
groups² was set up. Subsequently these ³groups² 
were converted into independent parties, which gradually 
severed contact with one another. Following the parties, 
the parliamentary group broke up‹national ³clubs² were 
* National Autonomy, etc., 1902, p. 17, published by the 
Bund.

J. V. S T A L I N 358 
formed. Next came the trade unions, which also split 
according to nationalities. Even the co-operative societies 
were affected, the Czech separatists calling upon the 
workers to split them up.* We will not dwell on the fact 
that separatist agitation weakens the workersı sense of 
solidarity and frequently drives them to strike-breaking. 
Thus ³the extremely instructive experience of Social- 
Democracy in Austria² speaks against the Bund and for 
the old Iskra. Federalism in the Austrian party has led 
to the most outrageous separatism, to the destruction of 
the unity of the labour movement. 
We have seen above that ³practical experience in Russia² 
also bears this out. Like the Czech separatists, the 
Bundist separatists have broken with the general Russian 
Social-Democratic Party. As for the trade unions, the 
Bundist trade unions, from the outset they were organised 
on national lines, that is to say, they were cut off 
from the workers of other nationalities. 
Complete segregation and complete rupture‹that is 
what is revealed by the ³Russian practical experience² 
of federalism. 
It is not surprising that the effect of this state of 
affairs upon the workers is to weaken their sense of solidarity 
and to demoralise them; and the latter process 
is also penetrating the Bund. We are referring to the 
increasing collisions between Jewish and Polish workers 
in connection with unemployment. Here is the kind of 
speech that was made on this subject at the Ninth Conference 
of the Bund: 
* See the words quoted from a brochure by Vanek141 in 
Dokumente des Separatismus, p. 29.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 359 
³. . . We regard the Polish workers, who are ousting us, 
as pogromists, as scabs; we do not support their strikes, we break 
them. Secondly, we reply to being ousted by ousting in our turn: 
we reply to Jewish workers not being allowed into the factories 
by not allowing Polish workers near the benches. . . . If we do not 
take this matter into our own hands the workers will follow others²* 
(our italics‹J. St.). 
That is the way they talk about solidarity at a Bundist 
conference. 
You cannot go further than that in the way of ³demarcation² 
and ³segregation.² The Bund has achieved 
its aim: it is carrying its demarcation between the workers 
of different nationalities to the point of conflicts 
and strike-breaking. And there is no other course: ³If 
we do not take this matter into our own hands the workers 
will follow others. . . .² 
Disorganisation of the labour movement, demoralisation 
of the Social-Democratic ranks‹that is what 
the federalism of the Bund leads to. 
Thus the idea of cultural-national autonomy, the 
atmosphere i t creates, has proved to be even more 
harmful in Russia than in Austria. 
VI 
THE CAUCASIANS, THE CONFERENCE 
OF THE LIQUIDATORS 
We spoke above of the waverings of one section of 
the Caucasian Social-Democrats who were unable to 
withstand the nationalist ³epidemic.² These waverings 
were revealed in the fact that, strange as it may seem, 
* See Report of the Ninth Conference of the Bund, p. 19.

J. V. S T A L I N 360 
the above-mentioned Social-Democrats followed in the 
footsteps of the Bund and proclaimed cultural-national 
autonomy. 
Regional autonomy for the Caucasus as a whole and 
cultural-national autonomy for the nations forming the 
Caucasus‹that is the way these Social-Democrats, who, 
incidentally, are linked with the Russian Liquidators, 
formulate their demand. 
Listen to their acknowledged leader, the not unknown 
N. 
³Everybody knows that the Caucasus differs profoundly from 
the central gubernias, both as regards the racial composition of its 
population and as regards its territory and agricultural development. 
The exploitation and material development of such a region 
require local workers acquainted with local peculiarities and accustomed 
to the local climate and culture. All laws designed to further 
the exploitation of the local territory should be issued locally 
and put into effect by local forces. Consequently, the jurisdiction 
of the central organ of Caucasian self-government should extend 
to legislation on local questions. . . . Hence, the functions of the 
Caucasian centre should consist in the passing of laws designed to 
further the economic exploitation of the local territory and the 
material prosperity of the region.²* 
Thus‹regional autonomy for the Caucasus. 
If we abstract ourselves from the rather confused and 
incoherent arguments of N., it must be admitted that 
his conclusion is correct. Regional autonomy for the 
Caucasus, within the framework of a general state constitution, 
which N. does not deny, is indeed essential 
because of the peculiarities of its composition and its 
conditions of life. This was also acknowledged by the 
* See the Georgian newspaper Chveni Tskhovreba (Our Life),142 
No. 12, 1912.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 361 
Russian Social-Democratic Party, which at its Second 
Congress proclaimed ³regional self-government for those 
border regions which in respect of their conditions of life 
and the composition of their population differ from the 
regions of Russia proper.² 
When Martov submitted this point for discussion 
at the Second Congress, he justified it on the grounds 
that ³the vast extent of Russia and the experience of 
our centralised administration point to the necessity 
and expediency of regional self-government for such large 
units as Finland, Poland, Lithuania and the Caucasus.² 
But it follows that regional self-government is to be 
interpreted as regional autonomy. 
But N. goes further. According to him, regional 
autonomy for the Caucasus covers ³only one aspect of the 
question.² 
³So far we have spoken only of the material development of 
local life. But the economic development of a region is facilitated 
not only by economic activity but also by spiritual, cultural activity.². 
. . ³A culturally strong nation is strong also in the economic 
sphere.². . . ³But the cultural development of nations is 
possible only in the national languages.². . . ³Consequently, all 
questions connected with the native language are questions of 
national culture. Such are the questions of education, the judicature, 
the church, literature, art, science, the theatre, etc. If the 
material development of a region unites nations, matters of national 
culture disunite them and place each in a separate sphere. Activities 
of the former kind are associated with a definite territory.². . . 
³This is not the case with matters of national culture. These are 
associated not with a definite territory but with the existence 
of a definite nation. The fate of the Georgian language interests 
a Georgian, no matter where he lives. It would be a sign of profound 
ignorance to say that Georgian culture concerns only the 
Georgians who live in Georgia. Take, for instance, the Armenian 
church. Armenians of various localities and states take part in

J. V. S T A L I N 362 
the administration of its affairs. Territory plays no part here. 
Or, for instance, the creation of a Georgian museum interests not 
only the Georgians of Tiflis, but also the Georgians of Baku, Kutais, 
St. Petersburg, etc. Hence, the administration and control 
of all affairs of national culture must be left to the nations concerned 
we proclaim in favour of cultural-national autonomy 
for the Caucasian nationalities.²* 
In short, since culture is not territory, and territory 
is not culture, cultural-national autonomy is required. 
That is all N. can say in the latterıs favour. 
We shall not stop to discuss again national-cultural 
autonomy in general; we have already spoken of its 
objectionable character. We should like to point out 
only that, while being unsuitable in general, culturalnational 
autonomy is also meaningless and nonsensical in 
relation to Caucasian conditions. 
And for the following reason: 
Cultural-national autonomy presumes more or less 
developed nationalities, with a developed culture and 
literature. Failing these conditions, autonomy loses all 
sense and becomes an absurdity. But in the Caucasus 
is there are a number of nationalities each possessing a 
primitive culture, a separate language, but without its 
own literature; nationalities, moreover, which are in a 
state of transition, partly becoming assimilated and partly 
continuing to develop. How is cultural-national autonomy 
to be applied to them? What is to be done with 
such nationalities? How are they to be ³organised² into 
separate cultural-national unions, as is undoubtedly implied 
by cultural-national autonomy? 
* See the Georgian newspaper Chveni Tskhovreba, No. 12, 1912.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 363 
What is to be done with the Mingrelians, the Abkhasians, 
the Adjarians, the Svanetians, the Lesghians, and 
so on, who speak different languages but do not possess 
a literature of their own? To what nations are they to be 
attached? Can they be ³organised² into national unions? 
Around what ³cultural affairs² are they to be ³organised²? 
What is to be done with the Ossetians, of whom the 
Transcaucasian Ossetians are becoming assimilated (but 
are as yet by no means wholly assimilated) by the Georgians 
while the Cis-Caucasian Ossetians are partly being 
assimilated by the Russians and partly continuing to 
develop and are creating their own literature? How are 
they to be ³organised² into a single national union? 
To what national union should one attach the Adjarians, 
who speak the Georgian language, but whose 
culture is Turkish and who profess the religion of Islam? 
Shall they be ³organised² separately from the Georgians 
with regard to religious affairs and together with the 
Georgians with regard to other cultural affairs? And what 
about the Kobuletians, the Ingushes, the Inghilois? 
What kind of autonomy is that which excludes a 
whole number of nationalities from the list? 
No, that is not a solution of the national question, 
but the fruit of idle fancy. 
But let us grant the impossible and assume that our 
N.ıs national-cultural autonomy has been put into 
effect. Where would it lead to, what would be its results? 
Take, for instance, the Transcaucasian Tatars, with their 
minimum percentage of literates, their schools controlled 
by the omnipotent mullahs and their culture 
permeated by the religious spirit. . . . It is not difficult to 
understand that to ³organise² them into a cultural

J. V. S T A L I N 364 
national union would mean to place them under the control 
of the mullahs, to deliver them over to the tender 
mercies of the reactionary mullahs, to create a new stronghold 
of spiritual enslavement of the Tatar masses to 
their worst enemy. 
But since when have Social-Democrats made it a 
practice to bring grist to the mill of the reactionaries? 
Could the Caucasian Liquidators really find nothing 
better to ³proclaim² than the isolation of the Transcaucasian 
Tatars within a cultural-national union which 
would place the masses under the thraldom of vicious 
reactionaries? 
No, that is no solution of the national question. 
The national question in the Caucasus can be solved 
only by drawing the belated nations and nationalities into the 
common stream of a higher culture. It is the only progressive 
solution and the only solution acceptable to Social- 
Democracy. Regional autonomy in the Caucasus is acceptable 
because it would draw the belated nations into 
the common cultural development; it would help them 
to cast off the shell of small-nation insularity; it would 
impel them forward and facilitate access to the benefits 
of higher culture. Cultural-national autonomy, however, 
acts in a diametrically opposite direction, because it 
shuts up the nations within their old shells, binds 
them to the lower stages of cultural development and 
prevents them from rising to the higher stages of 
culture. 
In this way national autonomy counteracts the beneficial 
aspects of regional autonomy and nullifies it. 
That is why the mixed type of autonomy which 
combines national-cultural autonomy and regional auton

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 365 
omy as proposed by N. is also unsuitable. This unnatural 
combination does not improve matters but makes 
them worse, because in addition to retarding the development 
of the belated nations it transforms regional autonomy 
into an arena of conflict between the nations organised 
in the national unions. 
Thus cultural-national autonomy, which is unsuitable 
generally, would be a senseless, reactionary undertaking 
in the Caucasus. 
So much for the cultural-national autonomy of N. 
and his Caucasian fellow-thinkers. 
Whether the Caucasian Liquidators will take ³a step 
forward² and follow in the footsteps of the Bund on 
the question of organisation also, the future will show. 
So far, in the history of Social-Democracy federalism in 
organisation always preceded national autonomy in programme. 
The Austrian Social-Democrats introduced organisational 
federalism as far back as 1897, and it was 
only two years later (1899) that they adopted national 
autonomy. The Bundists spoke distinctly of national autonomy 
for the first time in 1901, whereas organisational 
federalism had been practised by them since 1897. 
The Caucasian Liquidators have begun from the end, 
from national autonomy. If they continue to follow in 
the footsteps of the Bund they will first have to demolish 
the whole existing organisational edifice, which was 
erected at the end of the ınineties on the basis of internationalism. 
But, easy though it was to adopt national autonomy, 
which is still not understood by the workers, it 
will be difficult to demolish an edifice which it has taken 
years to build and which has been raised and cherished

J. V. S T A L I N 366 
by the workers of all the nationalities of the Caucasus. 
This Herostratian undertaking has only to be begun and 
the eyes of the workers will be opened to the nationalist 
character of cultural-national autonomy. 
While the Caucasians are settling the national question 
in the usual manner, by means of verbal and written 
discussion, the All-Russian Conference of the Liquidators 
has invented a most unusual method. It is a 
simple and easy method. Listen to this: 
³Having heard the communication of the Caucasian delegation 
to the effect that . . . it is necessary to demand national-cultural 
autonomy, this conference, while expressing no opinion on the 
merits of this demand, declares that such an interpretation of the 
clause of the programme which recognises the right of every nationality 
to self-determination does not contradict the precise meaning 
of the programme.² 
Thus, first of all they ³express no opinion on the 
merits² of the question, and then they ³declare.² An 
original method. . . . 
And what does this original conference ³declare²? 
That the ³demand² for national-cultural autonomy 
³does not contradict the precise meaning² of the programme, 
which recognises the right of nations to selfdetermination. 
Let us examine this proposition. 
The clause on self-determination speaks of the rights 
of nations. According to this clause, nations have the 
right not only of autonomy but also of secession. It 
is a question of political self-determination. Whom did 
the Liquidators want to fool when they endeavoured 
to misinterpret this right of nations to political self

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 367 
determination, which has long been recognised by the 
whole of international Social-Democracy? 
Or perhaps the Liquidators will try to wriggle out of 
the situation and defend themselves by the sophism 
that cultural-national autonomy ³does not contradict² 
the rights of nations? That is to say, if all the nations in 
a given state agree to arrange their affairs on the basis 
of cultural-national autonomy, they, the given sum of 
nations, are fully entitled to do so and nobody may 
forcibly impose a different form of political life on them. 
This is both new and clever. Should it not be added 
that, speaking generally, a nation has the right to abolish 
its own constitution, replace it by a system of tyranny 
and revert to the old order on the grounds that 
the nation, and the nation alone, has the right to determine 
its own destiny? We repeat: in this sense, neither 
cultural-national autonomy nor any other kind of nationalist 
reaction ³contradicts² the rights of nations. 
Is that what the esteemed conference wanted to say? 
No, not that. It specifically says that cultural-national 
autonomy ³does not contradict,² not the rights 
of nations, but ³the precise meaning² of the programme. The 
point here is the programme and not the rights of nations. 
And that is quite understandable. If it were some nation 
that addressed itself to the conference of Liquidators, 
the conference might have directly declared that 
the nation has a right to cultural-national autonomy. 
But it was not a nation that addressed itself to the conference, 
but a ³delegation² of Caucasian Social-Democrats‹
bad Social-Democrats, it is true, but Social- 
Democrats nevertheless. And they inquired not about the 
rights of nations, but whether cultural-national autonomy

J. V. S T A L I N 368 
contradicted the principles of Social-Democracy, whether 
it did not ³contradict² ³the precise meaning² of the programme 
of Social-Democracy. 
Thus, the rights of nations and ³the precise meaning² 
of the programme of Social-Democracy are not one and 
the same thing. 
Evidently, there are demands which, while they do 
not contradict the rights of nations, may yet contradict 
³the precise meaning² of the programme. 
For example. The programme of the Social-Democrats 
contains a clause on freedom of religion. According to 
this clause any group of persons have the right to profess 
any religion they please: Catholicism, the religion of the 
Orthodox Church, etc. Social-Democrats will combat 
all forms of religious persecution, be it of members 
of the Orthodox Church, Catholics or Protestants. Does 
this mean that Catholicism, Protestantism, etc., ³do 
not contradict the precise meaning² of the programme? 
No, it does not. Social-Democrats will always protest 
against persecution of Catholicism or Protestantism; they 
will always defend the right of nations to profess any 
religion they please; but at the same time, on the basis 
of a correct understanding of the interests of the proletariat, 
they will carry on agitation against Catholicism, 
Protestantism and the religion of the Orthodox 
Church in order to achieve the triumph of the socialist 
world outlook. 
And they will do so just because there is no doubt 
that Protestantism, Catholicism, the religion of the 
Orthodox Church, etc., ³contradict the precise meaning² 
of the programme, i.e., the correctly understood interests 
of the proletariat.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 369 
The same must be said of self-determination. Nations 
have a right to arrange their affairs as they please; 
they have a right to preserve any of their national 
institutions, whether beneficial or harmful‹nobody 
can (nobody has a right to!) forcibly interfere in the life 
of a nation. But that does not mean that Social- 
Democracy will not combat and agitate against the 
harmful institutions of nations and against the inexpedient 
demands of nations. On the contrary, it is the 
duty of Social-Democracy to conduct such agitation and 
to endeavour to influence the will of nations so that 
the nations may arrange their affairs in the way that 
will best correspond to the interests of the proletariat. 
For this reason Social-Democracy, while fighting for the 
right of nations to self-determination, will at the same 
time agitate, for instance, against the secession of the 
Tatars, or against cultural-national autonomy for the 
Caucasian nations; for both, while not contradicting 
the rights of these nations, do contradict ³the precise 
meaning² of the programme, i.e., the interests of the 
Caucasian proletariat. 
Obviously, ³the rights of nations² and the ³precise 
meaning² of the programme are on two entirely different 
planes. Whereas the ³precise meaning² of the programme 
expresses the interests of the proletariat, as scientifically 
formulated in the programme of the latter, the rights 
of nations may express the interests of any class‹bourgeoisie, 
aristocracy, clergy, etc.‹depending on the 
strength and influence of these classes. On the one hand 
are the duties of Marxists, on the other the rights of 
nations, which consist of various classes. The rights 
of nations and the principles of Social-Democracy may

J. V. S T A L I N 370 
or may not ³contradict² each other, just as, say, the 
pyramid of Cheops may or may not contradict the famous 
conference of the Liquidators. They are simply not 
comparable. 
But it follows that the esteemed conference most 
unpardonably muddled two entirely different things. The 
result obtained was not a solution of the national question 
but an absurdity, according to which the rights 
of nations and the principles of Social-Democracy ³do 
not contradict² each other, and, consequently, every 
demand of a nation may be made compatible with the 
interests of the proletariat; consequently, no demand of 
a nation which is striving for self-determination will 
³contradict the precise meaning² of the programme! 
They pay no heed to logic. . . . 
It was this absurdity that gave rise to the now famous 
resolution of the conference of the Liquidators 
which declares that the demand for national-cultural 
autonomy ³does not contradict the precise meaning² of 
the programme. 
But it was not only the laws of logic that were violated 
by the conference of the Liquidators. 
By sanctioning cultural-national autonomy it also 
violated its duty to Russian Social-Democracy. It most 
definitely did violate ³the precise meaning² of the 
programme, for it is well known that the Second Congress, 
which adopted the programme, emphatically repudiated 
cultural-national autonomy. Here is what was said at the 
congress in this connection: 
³Goldblatt (Bundist): . . . I deem it necessary that special 
institutions be set up to protect the freedom of cultural development 
of nationalities, and I therefore propose that the following

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 371 
words be added to § 8: Œand the creation of institutions which will 
guarantee them complete freedom of cultural development.ı² (This, 
as we know, is the Bundıs definition of cultural-national autonomy.‹
J. St.) 
³Martynov pointed out that general institutions must be so 
constituted as to protect particular interests also. It is impossible 
to create a special institution to guarantee freedom for cultural 
development of the nationalities. 
³Yegorov: On the question of nationality we can adopt only 
negative proposals, i.e., we are opposed to all restrictions upon 
nationality. But we, as Social-Democrats, are not concerned with 
whether any particular nationality will develop as such. That is 
a spontaneous process. 
³Koltsov: The delegates from the Bund are always offended 
when their nationalism is referred to. Yet the amendment proposed 
by the delegate from the Bund is of a purely nationalist character. 
We are asked to take purely offensive measures in order to support 
even nationalities that are dying out.² 
In the end ³Goldblattıs amendment was rejected by the majority, 
only three votes being cast for it.² 
Thus it is clear that the conference of the Liquidators 
did ³contradict the precise meaning² of the programme. 
It violated the programme. 
The Liquidators are now trying to justify themselves 
by referring to the Stockholm Congress, which they allege 
sanctioned cultural-national autonomy. Thus, 
V. Kossovsky writes: 
³As we know, according to the agreement adopted by the 
Stockholm Congress, the Bund was allowed to preserve its national 
programme (pending a decision on the national question by a 
general Party congress). This congress recorded that national-cultural 
autonomy at any rate does not contradict the general Party 
programme.²* 
* Nasha Zarya, No. 9-10, 1912, p. 120.

J. V. S T A L I N 372 
But the efforts of the Liquidators are in vain. The 
Stockholm Congress never thought of sanctioning the 
programme of the Bund‹it merely agreed to leave the 
question open for the time being. The brave Kossovsky 
did not have enough courage to tell the whole truth. 
But the facts speak for themselves. Here they are: 
³An amendment was moved by Galin: ŒThe question of the 
national programme is left open in view of the fact that it is not 
being examined by the congress.ı (For‹50 votes, against‹32.) 
³Voice: What does that mean‹open? 
³Chairman: When we say that the national question is left 
open, it means that the Bund may maintain its decision on this 
question until the next congress²* (our italics‹J. St.). 
As you see, the congress even did ³not examine² 
the question of the national programme of the Bund‹it 
simply left it ³open,² leaving the Bund itself to decide 
the fate of its programme until the next general congress 
met. In other words, the Stockholm Congress avoided 
the question, expressing no opinion on cultural-national 
autonomy one way or another. 
The conference of the Liquidators, however, most 
definitely undertakes to give an opinion on the matter, 
declares cultural-national autonomy to be acceptable, 
and endorses it in the name of the Party programme. 
The difference is only too evident. 
Thus, in spite of all its artifices, the conference of 
the Liquidators did not advance the national question 
a single step. 
All it could do was to squirm before the Bund and 
the Caucasian national-Liquidators. 
* See Nashe Slovo, No. 8, 1906, p. 53.

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
373 
VII 
THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN RUSSIA 
It remains for us to suggest a positive solution of the 
national question. 
We take as our starting point that the question 
can be solved only in intimate connection with the present 
situation in Russia. 
Russia is in a transitional period, when ³normal,² 
³constitutional² life has not yet been established and 
when the political crisis has not yet been settled. Days 
of storm and ³complications² are ahead. And this gives 
rise to the movement, the present and the future movement, 
the aim of which is to achieve complete democratisation. 
It is in connection with this movement that the national 
question must be examined. 
Thus the complete democratisation of the country is 
the basis and condition for the solution of the national 
question. 
When seeking a solution of the question we must 
take into account not only the situation at home but also 
the situation abroad. Russia is situated between Europe 
and Asia, between Austria and China. The growth of 
democracy in Asia is inevitable. The growth of imperialism 
in Europe is not fortuitous. In Europe, capital 
is beginning to feel cramped, and it is reaching out towards 
foreign countries in search of new markets, cheap labour 
and new fields of investment. But this leads to external 
complications and to war. No one can assert that the 
Balkan War143 is the end and not the beginning of 
MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION

J. V. S T A L I N 374 
the complications. It is quite possible, therefore, that 
a combination of internal and external conditions may 
arise in which one or another nationality in Russia may 
find it necessary to raise and settle the question of its 
independence. And, of course, it is not for Marxists to 
create obstacles in such cases. 
But it follows that Russian Marxists cannot dispense 
with the right of nations to self-determination. 
Thus, the right of self-determination is an essential 
element in the solution of the national question. 
Further. What must be our attitude towards nations 
which for one reason or another will prefer to remain 
within the framework of the whole? 
We have seen that cultural-national autonomy is 
unsuitable. Firstly, it is artificial and impracticable, 
for it proposes artificially to draw into a single nation 
people whom the march of events, real events, is disuniting 
and dispersing to every corner of the country. 
Secondly, it stimulates nationalism, because it leads 
to the viewpoint in favour of the ³demarcation² of 
people according to national curiae, the ³organisation² 
of nations, the ³preservation² and cultivation of 
³national peculiarities²‹all of which are entirely incompatible 
with Social-Democracy. It is not fortuitous that 
the Moravian separatists in the Reichsrat, having severed 
themselves from the German Social-Democratic deputies, 
have united with the Moravian bourgeois deputies to form 
a single, so to speak, Moravian ³kolo.² Nor is it fortuitous 
that the separatists of the Bund have got themselves 
involved in nationalism by acclaiming the ³Sabbath² 
and ³Yiddish.² There are no Bundist deputies 
yet in the Duma, but in the Bund area there is a cleri

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 375 
cal-reactionary Jewish community, in the ³controlling 
institutions² of which the Bund is arranging, for a beginning, 
a ³get-together² of the Jewish workers and 
bourgeois.* Such is the logic of cultural-national autonomy. 
Thus, national autonomy does not solve the problem. 
What, then, is the way out? 
The only correct solution is regional autonomy, autonomy 
for such crystallised units as Poland, Lithuania, 
the Ukraine, the Caucasus, etc. 
The advantage of regional autonomy consists, first of 
all, in the fact that it does not deal with a fiction bereft 
of territory, but with a definite population inhabiting 
a definite territory. Next, it does not divide people 
according to nations, it does not strengthen national 
barriers; on the contrary, it breaks down these barriers 
and unites the population in such a manner as to open 
the way for division of a different kind, division according 
to classes. Finally, i t makes i t possible to 
utilise the natural wealth of the region and to develop 
its productive forces in the best possible way without 
awaiting the decisions of a common centre‹functions 
which are not inherent features of cultural-national 
autonomy. 
Thus, regional autonomy is an essential element in the 
solution of the national question. 
Of course, not one of the regions constitutes a compact, 
homogeneous nation, for each is interspersed with 
national minorities. Such are the Jews in Poland, the 
* See Report of the Eighth Conference of the Bund, the concluding 
part of the resolution on the community.

J. V. S T A L I N 376 
Letts in Lithuania, the Russians in the Caucasus, the 
Poles in the Ukraine, and so on. It may be feared, therefore, 
that the minorities will be oppressed by the national 
majorities. But there will be grounds for fear 
only if the old order continues to prevail in the country. 
Give the country complete democracy and all grounds 
for fear will vanish. 
It is proposed to bind the dispersed minorities into 
a single national union. But what the minorities want is 
not an artificial union, but real rights in the localities 
they inhabit. What can such a union give them without 
complete democratisation? On the other hand, what 
need is there for a national union when there is complete 
democratisation? 
What is it that particularly agitates a national 
minority? 
A minority is discontented not because there is no 
national union but because it does not enjoy the right to 
use its native language. Permit it to use its native language 
and the discontent will pass of itself. 
A minority is discontented not because there is no 
artificial union but because it does not possess its own 
schools. Give it its own schools and all grounds for discontent 
will disappear. 
A minority is discontented not because there is no 
national union, but because it does not enjoy liberty 
of conscience (religious liberty), liberty of movement, 
etc. Give it these liberties and it will cease to be discontented. 
Thus, equal rights of nations in all forms (language, 
schools, etc.) is an essential element in the solution of 
the national question. Consequently, a state law based

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 377 
on complete democratisation of the country is required, 
prohibiting all national privileges without exception 
and every kind of disability or restriction on the rights of 
national minorities. 
That, and that alone, is the real, not a paper guarantee 
of the rights of a minority. 
One may or may not dispute the existence of a 
logical connection between organisational federalism 
and cultural-national autonomy. But one cannot dispute 
the fact that the latter creates an atmosphere favouring 
unlimited federalism, developing into complete rupture, 
into separatism. If the Czechs in Austria and the 
Bundists in Russia began with autonomy, passed to 
federation and ended in separatism, there can be no 
doubt that an important part in this was played by 
the nationalist atmosphere that is naturally generated 
by cultural-national autonomy. It is not fortuitous that 
national autonomy and organisational federalism go 
hand in hand. It is quite understandable. Both demand 
demarcation according to nationalities. Both presume 
organisation according to nationalities. The similarity is 
beyond question. The only difference is that in one 
case the population as a whole is divided, while in 
the other it is the Social-Democratic workers who are 
divided. 
We know where the demarcation of workers according 
to nationalities leads to. The disintegration of a united 
workersı party, the splitting of trade unions according to 
nationalities, aggravation of national friction, national 
strike-breaking, complete demoralisation within the ranks 
of Social-Democracy‹such are the results of organisational 
federalism. This is eloquently borne out by the history

J. V. S T A L I N 378 
of Social-Democracy in Austria and the activities of the 
Bund in Russia. 
The only cure for this is organisation on the basis 
of internationalism. 
To unite locally the workers of all nationalities of 
Russia into single, integral collective bodies, to unite 
these collective bodies into a single party‹such is 
the task. 
It goes without saying that a party structure of this 
kind does not preclude, but on the contrary presumes, 
wide autonomy for the regions within the single integral 
party. 
The experience of the Caucasus proves the expediency 
of this type of organisation. If the Caucasians have 
succeeded in overcoming the national friction between 
the Armenian and Tatar workers; if they have succeeded 
in safeguarding the population against the possibility of 
massacres and shooting affrays; if in Baku, that kaleidoscope 
of national groups, national conflicts are now no 
longer possible, and if it has been possible to draw the 
workers there into the single current of a powerful movement, 
then the international structure of the Caucasian 
Social-Democracy was not the least factor in bringing 
this about. 
The type of organisation influences not only practical 
work. It stamps an indelible impress on the whole mental 
life of the worker. The worker lives the life of his organisation, 
which stimulates his intellectual growth and 
educates him. And thus, acting within his organisation 
and continually meeting there comrades from other nationalities, 
and side by side with them waging a common 
struggle under the leadership of a common collective

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 379 
body, he becomes deeply imbued with the idea that 
workers are primarily members of one class family, 
members of the united army of socialism. And this cannot 
but have a tremendous educational value for large sections 
of the working class. 
Therefore, the international type of organisation 
serves as a school of fraternal sentiments and is a tremendous 
agitational factor on behalf of internationalism. 
But this is not the case with an organisation on the 
basis of nationalities. When the workers are organised 
according to nationality they isolate themselves within 
their national shells, fenced off from each other by organisational 
barriers. The stress is laid not on what is 
common to the workers but on what distinguishes them 
from each other. In this type of organisation the worker 
is primarily a member of his nation: a Jew, a Pole, and so 
on. It is not surprising that national federalism in organisation 
inculcates in the workers a spirit of national 
seclusion. 
Therefore, the national type of organisation is a school 
of national narrow-mindedness and stagnation. 
Thus we are confronted by two fundamentally different 
types of organisation: the type based on international 
solidarity and the type based on the organisational 
³demarcation² of the workers according to nationalities. 
Attempts to reconcile these two types have so far 
been vain. The compromise rules of the Austrian Social- 
Democratic Party drawn up in Wimberg in 1897 were left 
hanging in the air. The Austrian party fell to pieces and 
dragged the trade unions with it. ³Compromise² proved to 
be not only utopian, but harmful. Strasser is right when

J. V. S T A L I N 380 
he says that ³separatism achieved its first triumph at 
the Wimberg Party Congress.²* The same is true in 
Russia. The ³compromise² with the federalism of the 
Bund which took place at the Stockholm Congress ended 
in a complete fiasco. The Bund violated the Stockholm 
compromise. Ever since the Stockholm Congress the 
Bund has been an obstacle in the way of union of the 
workers locally in a single organisation, which would 
include workers of all nationalities. And the Bund 
has obstinately persisted in its separatist tactics in spite 
of the fact that in 1907 and in 1908 Russian Social- 
Democracy repeatedly demanded that unity should 
at last be established from below among the workers 
of all nationalities.144 The Bund, which began with 
organisational national autonomy, in fact passed to 
federalism, only to end in complete rupture, separatism. 
And by breaking with the Russian Social-Democratic 
Party it caused disharmony and disorganisation in the 
ranks of the latter. Let us recall the Jagiello affair,145 
for instance. 
The path of ³compromise² must therefore be discarded 
as utopian and harmful. 
One thing or the other: either the federalism of the 
Bund, in which case the Russian Social-Democratic 
Party must re-form itself on a basis of ³demarcation² of 
the workers according to nationalities; or an international 
type of organisation, in which case the Bund must reform 
itself on a basis of territorial autonomy after the 
pattern of the Caucasian, Lettish and Polish Social- 
Democracies, and thus make possible the direct union 
* See his Der Arbeiter und die Nation, 1912.

MARXISM AND THE NATIONAL QUESTION 381 
of the Jewish workers with the workers of the other nationalities 
of Russia. 
There is no middle course: principles triumph, they 
do not ³compromise.² 
Thus, the principle of international solidarity of the 
workers is an essential element in the solution of the national 
question. 
Vienna, January 1913 
First published in Prosveshcheniye,146 
Nos. 3-5, March-May 1913 
Signed: K. Stalin

THE SITUATION 
IN THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP 
IN THE DUMA 
In Pravda, No. 44, a ³statement² appeared from the 
seven Social-Democratic deputies in the Duma in which 
they attack the six workersı deputies.147 
In the same issue of Pravda the six workersı deputies 
answer the seven and describe their attack as the first 
step towards a split. 
Thus, the workers are faced with the question whether 
there is or is not to be a united Social-Democratic group 
in the Duma. 
Until now the Social-Democratic group has been 
united, and has been strong in its unity, sufficiently 
strong to make the enemies of the proletariat reckon 
with it. 
Now it may break up into two parts, to the amusement 
and joy of the enemies. . . . 
What has happened? Why have the members of the 
Social-Democratic group fallen out so sharply? What 
induced the seven deputies to attack their comrades in 
the columns of a newspaper, in front of the enemies of 
the working class? 
They raise two questions in their ³statement²: the 
question about contributing to Luch and Pravda, and the 
question of merging these two papers.

SITUATION IN THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP IN THE DUMA 383 
The seven deputies are of the opinion that it is the 
duty of the Social-Democratic deputies to contribute to 
both papers, and that the refusal of the six deputies to 
contribute to Luch is a violation of the unity of the 
Social-Democratic group. 
But is that so? Are the seven deputies right? 
Firstly, is it not strange to expect someone to contribute 
to a newspaper whose policy he not only does 
not agree with, but considers harmful? Can the orthodox 
Bebel, for example, be compelled to contribute to 
a revisionist paper, or can the revisionist Vollmar be 
compelled to contribute to an orthodox newspaper? In 
Germany they would laugh at such a demand, because 
there they know that united action does not preclude 
differences of opinion. In this country, however . . . in 
this country, thank God, we are not yet cultured. 
Secondly, we have the direct guidance of experience 
in Russia, which shows that it is possible for deputies 
to contribute to two different papers without undermining 
the unity of the group. We have in mind the third 
group.148 It is no secret to anyone that of the 13 members 
of the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma, 
nine contributed only to Zvezda, two only to Zhivoye 
Delo, 149 while the remaining two refrained entirely 
from contributing to either newspaper. . . . For all 
that, however, this did not undermine the unity of the 
third group one iota! The group, all the time, acted 
as one. 
Obviously, the seven deputies are on a false path 
in demanding that contributing to Luch should be obligatory. 
Apparently, they are still not quite clear on the 
question.

J. V. S T A L I N 384 
Further, the seven deputies demand that Pravda and 
Luch should be merged in one, non-factional newspaper. 
But how should they be merged? Is it possible to 
merge them in one newspaper? 
Do the seven deputies, these ³ideological supporters² 
of Luch, really not know that Luch is the first to 
reject such a merger? Have they read No. 108 of Luch, 
which contains the statement that ³unity cannot be 
achieved by mere mechanical measures, such as the merging 
of the two organs, etc.²? 
If they have read it, how can they talk seriously 
about a merger? 
Secondly, are the seven deputies aware of the liquidationist 
leadersı attitude towards unity in general, and 
towards having one common organ in particular? 
Listen to what P. Axelrod, the inspirer of Luch, 
says. Here is what he wrote in Nevsky Golos, No. 6, 
when a section of the St. Petersburg workers decided to 
publish one non-factional newspaper to offset Zvezda and 
Zhivoye Delo: 
³The idea of a non-factional Social-Democratic organ is at 
the present time a utopia and, moreover, a utopia which objectively 
runs counter to the interests of Party-political development 
and the organisational unity of the proletariat under the banner 
of Social-Democracy. Drive nature out of the door and it will fly 
in through the window. . . . Can the proposed workersı organ take 
a neutral stand between the two opposite camps? . . . Obviously 
not² (see Nevsky Golos, No. 6). 
Thus, according to Axelrod, one common newspaper 
is not only impossible but harmful, because it ³runs 
counter to the interests of the political development of 
the proletariat.²

SITUATION IN THE SOCIAL-DEMOCRATIC GROUP IN THE DUMA 385 
Let us hear what the other inspirer of Luch, the notorious 
Dan, has to say. 
³Great political tasks,² he writes, ³make inevitable a relentless 
war against anti-Liquidationism. . . . Anti-Liquidationism 
is a constant brake, constant disruption.² It is necessary . . . ³to 
exert every effort to kill it in embryo² (see Nasha Zarya, 
No. 6, 1911). 
Thus, ³relentless war against anti-Liquidationism,² 
i.e., against Pravda, ³to kill anti-Liquidationism,² i.e., 
Pravda‹that is what Dan proposes. 
After all this, how can the seven deputies talk seriously 
about merging the two newspapers? 
Whom do they want to merge, to unite? 
One thing or the other: 
Either they have not yet understood the question 
and have not yet managed to grasp the stand taken 
by Luch, whose supporters they claim to be‹and in 
that case they themselves ³know not what they do.² 
Or they are true Luch-ists, are ready with Dan ³to 
kill anti-Liquidationism²; like Axelrod, do not believe 
that a single paper is possible, but talk loudly about 
unity in order surreptitiously to prepare the ground for 
a split in the Duma group. . . . 
Be that as it may, one thing is beyond doubt: the 
workers are confronted with the question of maintaining 
the integrity of the Social-Democratic group, which 
is threatened with disruption. 
The group is in danger! 
Who can save the group, who can safeguard the integrity 
of the group? 
The workers, and the workers alone! Nobody but 
the workers!

J. V. S T A L I N 386 
Hence, it is the duty of the class-conscious workers 
to raise their voices against the splitting efforts within 
the group, no matter from what quarter they come. 
It is the duty of the class-conscious workers to call 
to order the seven Social-Democratic deputies who are 
attacking the other half of the Social-Democratic group. 
The workers must intervene in the matter forthwith 
in order to safeguard the unity of the group. 
It is impossible to remain silent now. More than 
that‹silence now is a crime. 
Pravda, No. 47, Reprinted from the newspaper 
February 26, 1913 
Signed: K. Stalin

THE ANNIVERSARY 
OF THE LENA MASSACRE150 
Comrades! 
A year has passed since 500 of our comrades were 
shot down on the Lena. On April 4, 1912, 500 of our 
brothers in the Lena goldfields were shot down for declaring 
a peaceful economic strike, shot down by order of the 
Russian tsar to please a handful of millionaires. 
Gendarme Captain Treshchenko, who perpetrated this 
massacre in the name of the tsar and who received high 
awards from the government and generous rewards from 
the gold-mine owners, is now frequenting aristocratic bars 
and waiting for an appointment as a chief of a department 
in the Secret Service. On the spur of the moment 
a promise was made to provide for the families of the 
murdered men, but this turned out to be an insolent 
l i e . A promise was made to introduce state insurance 
for the workers on the Lena, but it turned out to 
be a fraud. A promise was made to ³investigate² the 
affair, but actually even the investigation made by their 
own envoy, Senator Manukhin, was hushed up. 
³So it was, so it will be,² was the Minister-butcher 
Makarovıs retort from the floor of the Duma. And he 
proved to be right: the tsar and his ministers were, and

J. V. S T A L I N 388 
will be, liars, perjurers, shedders of blood, a camarilla 
which carries out the will of a handful of brutal landlords 
and millionaires. 
On January 9, 1905, faith in the old, pre-revolution 
autocracy was killed by the shooting in the Winter 
Palace Square in St. Petersburg. 
On April 4, 1912, faith in the present, ³renovated,² 
post-revolution autocracy was killed by the shooting 
on the distant Lena. 
All those who believed that we were already living 
under a constitutional system, all those who believed 
that the old atrocities were no longer possible, became 
convinced that this was not so, that the tsarist gang was 
still lording it over the great Russian people, that the 
Nicholas Romanov monarchy was still demanding for its 
altar the sacrifice of hundreds and thousands of Russian 
workers and peasants, that the whips and bullets of the 
tsarıs hirelings‹of the Treshchenkos who were displaying 
their prowess against unarmed Russian citizens‹ 
were still swishing and whistling all over Russia. 
The shooting on the Lena opened a new page in our 
history. The cup of patience was filled to overflowing. 
The sluice gates of popular indignation were burst open. 
The river of popular anger began to flood. The words 
of that tsarıs flunkey Makarov, ³So it was, so it will 
be,² poured oil on the flames. Their effect was the same 
as that produced in 1905 by the order of that other bloodhound 
of the tsar, Trepov: ³Spare no bullets!² The labour 
movement began to surge and foam like a stormy sea. 
The Russian workers retaliated to the Lena shooting 
by a united protest strike in which nearly half a million 
joined. And they held aloft our old red banner on which

THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE LENA MASSACRE 389 
the working class once again inscribed the three chief 
demands of the Russian Revolution: 
An eight-hour day‹for the workers. 
Confiscation of all landlordsı and tsarıs land‹for the 
peasants. 
A democratic republic‹for the whole people! 
A year of struggle lies behind us. Looking back we 
can say with gratification: a beginning has been made, 
the year has not passed in vain. 
The Lena strike merged with the May Day strike. 
The glorious May Day of 1912 inscribed a golden page 
in the history of our labour movement. Since that time 
the struggle has not waned for a moment. Political 
strikes are spreading and growing. In answer to the 
shooting of the 16 sailors in Sevastopol, 150,000 workers 
came out in a revolutionary strike, thereby proclaiming 
the alliance between the revolutionary proletariat and 
the revolutionary armed forces. By means of a strike, 
the St. Petersburg proletariat expressed their protest 
against the trickery with the elections to the Duma 
from the workersı curiae. On the day of the opening 
of the Fourth Duma,151 on the day the Social-Democratic 
group moved an interpellation on the insurance question, 
the workers of St. Petersburg organised one-day 
strikes and demonstrations. And lastly, on January 9, 
1913, as many as 200,000 Russian workers went on 
strike in honour of the memory of the fallen fighters, 
calling on all democratic Russia to launch a fresh struggle. 
Such is the main result of 1912. 
Comrades! The first anniversary of the Lena massacre 
is drawing near. We must make our voices heard 
on that day in one way or another. It is our duty to do so.

J. V. S T A L I N 390 
We must show that we honour the memory of our 
murdered comrades. We must show that we have not forgotten 
that bloody April 4, just as we have not forgotten 
Bloody Sunday, January 9. 
We must mark the Lena anniversary everywhere 
by meetings, demonstrations, collections of money, and 
so forth 
And let the whole of working-class Russia on that 
day join in one mighty shout: 
Down With the Romanov Monarchy! 
Long Live the New Revolution! 
Long Live the Democratic Republic! 
Glory to the Fallen Fighters! 
The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. 
Reprint and Distribute! 
Prepare to Celebrate the First of May! 
Written in January-February Reprinted from a hectographed 
1913 copy of the leaflet

N O T E S 
1 K. Kautskyıs pamphlet was translated into Georgian and 
published in Tiflis in March 1907. No. 7 of the Bolshevik 
newspaper Dro, of March 18, 1907, announced the publication 
of K. Kautskyıs pamphlet in the Georgian language with 
a preface by Koba (J. V. Stalin). p. 1 
2 Cadets‹the abbreviated title of the Constitutional-Democratic 
Party‹the principal party of the liberal-monarchist 
bourgeoisie, formed in October 1905 (see J. V. Stalin, Works, 
Vol. 1, p. 405, Note 52). p. 5 
3 First Symposium‹a Menshevik symposium, published in St. 
Petersburg in 1908. p. 6 
4 Nashe Delo (Our Cause)‹a weekly Menshevik journal published 
in Moscow from September 24 to November 25, 1906. 
p. 7 
5 Tovarishch (Comrade)‹a daily newspaper published in St. 
Petersburg from March 1906 till December 1907. Although 
not officially the organ of any party, it was actually the organ 
of the Left-wing Cadets. Mensheviks also contributed to the 
newspaper. p. 7 
6 Otkliki (Echoes)‹Menshevik symposia published in St. Petersburg 
in 1906-07. Three volumes were issued. p. 9 
7 Mir Bozhy (Godıs World)‹a monthly magazine of a liberal 
trend, began publication in St. Petersburg in 1892. In the

NOTES 392 
ı90ıs of the nineteenth century it published articles by the 
³legal Marxists.² During the 1905 revolution, Mensheviks 
contributed to the magazine. From 1906 to 1918 it was published 
under the name of Sovremenny Mir (The Contemporary 
World). p. 9 
8 Golos Truda (The Voice of Labour)‹a Menshevik newspaper 
published in St. Petersburg from June 21 to July 7, 1906. 
p. 11 
9 Trudoviks or Group of Toil‹a group of petty-bourgeois democrats 
formed in April 1906, consisting of the peasant deputies 
in the First State Duma (see J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 1, 
p. 266, Note 77). 
Popular Socialists‹a petty-bourgeois organisation which 
split off from the Right wing of the Socialist-Revolutionary 
Party in 1906. Their political demands did not go beyond 
a constitutional monarchy. Lenin called them ³Social-Cadets² 
and ³Socialist-Revolutionary Mensheviks.² p. 14 
10 This refers to the Social-Democratic conference held in St. 
Petersburg on January 6, 1907, to discuss the tactics to be 
pursued in the elections to the Second State Duma. The conference 
was attended by 40 Bolsheviks and 31 Mensheviks. 
The Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., on which the Mensheviks 
were in the majority, proposed that the conference 
should divide up into a city and gubernia conference. The 
Mensheviks counted on gaining a larger number of votes in 
this way. The conference rejected this proposal as being 
contrary to the Party Rules. In protest against this the 
Menshevik delegates left the meeting. The remaining delegates 
resolved to continue the conference. After hearing a report 
by V. I. Lenin, the conference expressed itself against concluding 
election agreements with the Cadets on the ground 
that such agreements would not only be impermissible in principle, 
but also positively harmful politically. It adopted a resolution 
³to bring up forthwith the extremely important question 
for St. Petersburg of agreements with the revolutionary

NOTES 393 
democracy.² The Menshevik representatives of the Central 
Committee who were present at the conference declared that 
the decisions of the conference were not binding on the St. 
Petersburg Social-Democratic organisation, and the Mensheviks 
who left the conference advocated in the press the conclusion 
of a bloc with the Cadets. p. 16 
11 Rech (Speech)‹a daily newspaper, the central organ of the 
Cadet Party, published in St. Petersburg from February 1906 
to October 26, 1917. p. 17 
12 Chveni Tskhovreba (Our Life)‹a Georgian daily Bolshevik 
newspaper published legally in Tiflis under the direction 
of J V. Stalin; it began publication on February 18, 1907. In 
a l l , thirteen numbers were issued. I t was suppressed on 
March 6, 1907, for its ³extremist trend.² p. 20 
13 Na Ocheredi (On the Order of the Day)‹a Menshevik weekly 
published in St. Petersburg from December 1906 to March 
1907. Four issues in all were published. p. 21 
14 Dro (Time)‹a Georgian daily Bolshevik newspaper, published 
in Tiflis after the suppression of Chveni Tskhovreba 
from March 11 to April 15, 1907, under the direction of 
J. V. Stalin. M. Tskhakaya and M. Davitashvili were members 
of the editorial staff. In all, 31 numbers were issued. p. 22 
15 See Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Selected Works, Eng. 
ed., Vol. I, Moscow 1951, pp. 64, 65. 
Neue Rheinische Zeitung was published in Cologne from 
June 1, 1848 to May 19, 1849, and was directed by K. Marx 
and F. Engels. p. 24 
16 Gurko‹Deputy-Minister of the Interior; Lidval‹a big speculator 
and swindler who in 1906 received from Gurko a contract 
to supply grain to the famine-stricken areas. The complicity 
of a high official of the tsarist government in Lidvalıs speculations 
led to a sensational t r i a l which was called the

NOTES 394 
³Lidvaliad.² Gurko suffered no other consequences than removal 
from his post. p. 25 
17 The Octobrists, or the Union of October Seventeenth‹a counter-
revolutionary party of the big commercial and industrial 
bourgeoisie and the big landowners was formed in November 
1905. It fully supported the Stolypin regime, the home and 
foreign policy of tsarism. p. 25 
18 Parus (The Sail)‹a daily newspaper, organ of the Cadets 
published in Moscow in 1907. p. 25 
19 Segodnya (Today)‹a gutter-type bourgeois evening newspaper 
published in St. Petersburg in 1906-08. p. 26 
20 Slovo (The Word)‹a daily newspaper which began publication 
in St. Petersburg in December 1904. From October 1905 
to July 1906 it was the organ of the Octobrist Party. p. 26 
21 G. P. Telia was born in 1880 and died in Sukhum on March 19 
1907. He was buried on March 25 in the village of Chagani, 
Kutais Uyezd. p. 28 
22 This refers to the First of May demonstration of the Tiflis 
workers which took place on April 22, 1901, under the direct 
leadership of J. V. Stalin. The demonstration was held in 
the Soldatsky market place, in the central part of Ti f l i s 
and about 2,000 persons took part in it. During the demonstration 
a clash occurred with the police and troops. Fourteen 
workers were injured and over 50 were arrested. Reporting 
the Tiflis demonstration, Leninıs Iskra stated: ³The events 
that occurred on Sunday April 22 (Old Style) in Tiflis are of 
historical significance for the whole of the Caucasus: on that 
day the open revolutionary movement commenced in the 
Caucasus² (Iskra, No. 6, July 1901). p. 29 
23 On February 23, 1903, in conformity with the decision adopted 
by the Tiflis Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., a demonstration

NOTES 395 
of Tiflis workers was held. About 6,000 persons took part in 
the demonstration, which ended in a collision with troops; 
150 persons were arrested. p. 29 
24 Proletariatis Brdzola (The Proletarian Struggle)‹an illegal 
Georgian newspaper, the organ of the Caucasian Union 
of the R.S.D.L.P. (see J. V. Stalin, Works , Vol . 1, p. 398, 
Note 21). p. 31 
25 Akhali Tskhovreba (New Life)‹a Georgian daily Bolshevik 
newspaper published in Tiflis from June 20 to July 14, 1906. 
Twenty issues appeared. The paper was directed by J. V. Stalin. 
M. Davitashvili, G. Telia, G. Kikodze and others were regular 
contributors. p. 31 
26 The Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. was held in London 
from April 30 to May 19, 1907. On all the main questions 
the congress adopted Bolshevik resolutions. J . V. Stalin 
was present at the congress as the delegate from the Tiflis 
organisation. He summed up the proceedings of the congress 
in his article ³The London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Notes 
of a Delegate),² (see pp. 47-80 of this volume). p. 33 
27 The Bund‹The General Jewish Workersı Union of Poland, 
Lithuania and Russia‹was formed in October 1897 (see 
J. V. Stalin, Works, Vol. 1, p. 394, Note 7). p. 33 
28 Spilka‹the Ukrainian Social-Democratic League, which stood 
close to the Mensheviks, was formed at the end of 1904 as a 
result of a break-away from the petty-bourgeois nationalist 
Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP). Ceased to exist during 
the Stolypin reaction. p. 33 
29 Lakhvari (The Spear)‹a Georgian daily Menshevik newspaper 
published in Tiflis from April to June 1907. p. 36 
30 Skhivi (The Ray)‹a daily newspaper published by the Georgian 
Mensheviks in Tiflis from December 1905 to January 1906. 
p. 40

NOTES 396 
31 The Second State Duma was dispersed by the tsarist government 
on June 3, 1907. The Social-Democratic group in the 
Duma, consisting of 65 deputies, was falsely charged with 
armed conspiracy. Most of the Social-Democratic deputies 
were sentenced to penal servitude and permanent exile. p. 42 
32 The article ³The London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. (Notes 
of a Delegate)² was not finished. Its completion was prevented 
by the intensified police shadowing of J. V. Stalin in the 
latter half of 1907 and his subsequent arrest. p. 47 
33 A. Vergezhsky‹the nom de plume of A. V. Tyrkova; she was 
a contributor to the Cadet newspaper Rech. p. 47 
34 E. D. Kuskova‹one of the authors of the programme of the 
Economists known as the ³Credo.² In 1906-07 she was a contributor 
to semi-Cadet and semi-Menshevik newspapers and 
journals. p. 47 
35 G. A. Alexinsky‹a member of the Bolshevik section of the 
Social-Democratic group in the Second State Duma. After the 
London Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. he advocated the tactics of 
boycotting the Third State Duma. Subsequently, he left the 
Bolshevik Party. After the October Socialist Revolution he 
became a White émigré. p. 52 
36 The question of the Stuttgart International Socialist Congress 
(the Seventh Congress of the Second International) was originally 
included in the agenda of the London Congress of the 
R.S.D.L.P. but was subsequently withdrawn by the congress. 
The Stuttgart Congress took place in August 5-11 (18-24) 
1907. The Bolsheviks were represented by V. I . Lenin, 
A. V. Lunacharsky, M. M. Litvinov and others. p. 55 
37 Ryadovoi (³rank-and-filer²)‹the pseudonym of A. A. Malinovsky, 
better known as Bogdanov. (He also used the pseudonym 
of Maximov. ) Joined the Bolsheviks in 1903, but

NOTES 397 
left the Bolshevik Party after the London Congress of the 
R.S.D.L.P. (see Note 80 in this volume). Died in 1928. p. 55 
38 Concerning the split in the St. Petersburg organisation, see 
J. V. Stalinıs article ³The Election Campaign in St. Petersburg 
and the Mensheviks² (see pp. 14-20 of this volume). 
p. 56 
39 Draft appeal on the land question ³In the Name of the 
State Duma² that was drawn up by the Cadets and 
published on July 5, 1906, in answer to the governmentıs 
announcement of June 20, 1906, concerning peasant land 
ownership. The Cadets urged the peasants to take no action 
until the Duma had finally drafted the land law. The Central 
Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., which was controlled by the 
Mensheviks, instructed the Social-Democratic group in the 
Duma to support the Cadetsı appeal. The group, however, 
voted against it. p. 57 
40 Narodovtsy (National-Democrats)‹the counter-revolutionary 
nationalist party of the Polish bourgeoisie formed in 1897. 
During the revolution of 1905-07 i t became the principal 
party of the Polish counter-revolution, the party of the Polish 
Black Hundreds. p. 60 
41 This refers to the speeches delivered at the Fifth (London) 
Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. by the Menshevik deputies in 
the Second State Duma A. L. Japaridze and I. G. Tsereteli 
(see Minutes of the Fifth Congress of the R.S.D.L.P., 1935, 
Russ. ed., pp. 250 and 354-355). p. 60 
42 Guesdists‹the supporters of Jules Guesde, the Left-wing 
Marxist trend in the ranks of the French Socialists. In 1901 
the Guesdists founded the Socialist Party of France. They fought 
the opportunists in the French labour movement and opposed 
the policy of concluding agreements with the bourgeoisie 
and of Socialists entering bourgeois governments. On the 
outbreak of the world imperialist war Guesde took a nationaldefence 
stand and entered the bourgeois government. A

NOTES 398 
section of the Guesdists who remained true to revolutionary 
Marxism subsequently joined the Communist Party of France. 
p. 66 
43 This refers to an article by Yuri Pereyaslavsky (G. Khrustalyov). 
Bakinsky Dyen (The Baku Day)‹a daily liberal newspaper 
published from June 1907 to January 1908. p. 70 
44 Y. Larin, also L. A. Rin, the pseudonyms of M. A. Lourier‹ 
a Menshevik Liquidator who in 1907 advocated the convocation 
of a ³broad labour congress.² In 1917 Y. Larin joined 
the Bolshevik Party. 
El (I. I. Luzin)‹a Menshevik Liquidator. p. 71 
45 This refers to the pamphlet The All-Russian Labour Congress 
and the ³Bolsheviks² published in Georgian in Tiflis in 1907. 
³Brodyaga² (³Tramp²)‹the nom de plume of the Menshevik 
Georgi Eradze. ³Shura,² the pseudonym of the Menshevik 
Pyshkina, wife of Eradze. p. 71 
46 Cherevaninıs article on the Labour Congress was published 
in the Menshevik symposium The Political Situation and Tactical 
Problems, Moscow 1906. p. 74 
47 Lindov‹the pseudonym of G. D. Leiteisen. p. 76 
48 In the autumn of 1907 the Baku Committee, under the direction 
of Comrade Stalin, conducted the election campaign for 
the Third State Duma. The meeting of votersı delegates 
representing the Baku workers held on September 22 elected 
Bolsheviks as electors who were finally to choose the workersı 
deputy for the Duma. The ³Mandate,² which was drawn up 
by J. V. Stalin, was adopted at this meeting and printed in 
leaflet form at the printing plant of the Balakhany District 
Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. p. 81 
49 This article was written in connection with the proposed 
convocation of a conference of the oil owners with representatives 
of the Baku workers. The tactics of boycotting the

NOTES 399 
conference, which the Bolsheviks pursued at that time, met 
with wide support among the masses of the workers. From 
October 10 to November 1, 1907, meetings of workers were 
held in the oil fields and works in Baku to discuss the question 
of the conference. Two-thirds of the workers attending these 
meetings expressed themselves against participating in the 
conference. The Mensheviks, who advocated participation in 
the conference at all costs, sustained defeat. p. 81 
50 Oil workers‹the workers employed in boring o i l wells 
and bailing oil. Mechanics‹the workers employed in the 
machine shops, electric power stations and other auxiliary 
plants serving the oil wells. p. 86 
51 ³Beshkesh² (gift)‹the term applied to the system, widely 
practised by the Baku oil owners, of giving the workers small 
sops in the form of bonuses with the object of keeping 
them out of the political struggle and of splitting the labour 
movement. The amounts of these bonuses varied and were 
fixed entirely at the discretion of the employer. The Bolsheviks 
strongly opposed the inclusion of bonuses in strike demands 
and fought for increases in basic wage rates. p. 87 
52 Rochegar (stoker)‹the pseudonym of I. Shitikov (Samartsev)‹
the official editor and publisher of the newspaper 
Gudok. p. 88 
53 Neftyanoye Delo (Oil Affairs)‹the organ of the oil owners, 
published by the Council of the Congress of Oil Owners in 
Baku in 1899-1920. 
The Council of the Congress, the organisation of the oil 
owners, was elected at congresses of oil owners from among 
the representatives of the biggest firms. It was the function 
of the Council to wage an organised struggle against the working 
class, to protect the interests of the oil owners in dealings 
with the government, to ensure high profits for the oil 
owners, etc. p. 90 
54 Dashnaktsakans, or Dashnaks‹members of the Armenian 
bourgeois nationalist party known as the Dashnaktsutyun.

NOTES 400 
In fighting for the interests of the Armenian bourgeoisie, the 
Dashnaks stirred up national strife among the working people 
of Transcaucasia. p. 91 
55 In November 1907 the Baku Bolsheviks headed by J. V. Stalin 
issued the slogan: ³A conference with guarantees, or no conference 
at all.² The terms on which the workers agreed to 
participate in the conference were the following: active participation 
in the conference campaign by the trade unions, the 
wide discussion of demands by the workers, freedom to convene 
the future Delegate Council, the date of the conference to be 
chosen by the workers. An extensive campaign was instituted 
in the Baku oil fields and works for the election of the Delegate 
Council which was finally to adopt the terms on which the 
workers were to participate in the conference and elect representatives 
to the organisation commission which was to convene 
the conference. These delegates were elected at open 
meetings. The majority of the workers voted for the line proposed 
by the Bolsheviks. The Dashnaks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, 
who advocated a boycott of the conference, and 
the Mensheviks, who were in favour of a conference without 
any guarantees, found no support among the masses. p. 100 
56 Gudok (The Siren)‹a legal Bolshevik weekly newspaper, the 
organ of the Baku oil industry workersı union. No. 1 of Gudok 
was issued on August 12, 1907. The paper published a number 
of leading articles written by J. V. Stalin which are included 
in the present volume. Frequent contributors to the paper 
were S. Shaumyan, A. Japaridze, S. Spandaryan, and others. 
No. 34, the last issue to be published under Bolshevik editorship, 
appeared on June 1, 1908. After that Gudok passed into 
Menshevik hands. The Bolsheviks began to issue in Baku 
a new legal trade union newspaper called Bakinsky Rabochy 
(The Baku Worker), the first number of which came out 
on September 6, 1908. p. 102 
57 As many as 1,500 workers took part in a strike at the Mirzoyev 
oil fields in Baku. The strike began on February 14, 1908, and 
lasted 73 days. p. 102

NOTES 401 
58 The election of the workersı delegates was concluded in 
the beginning of February 1908, but the convocation of the 
Delegate Council was postponed by order of Vorontsov-Dashkov, 
the Viceroy of the Caucasus. The first meeting of the 
Council took place on March 30, 1908, and the ensuing ones 
on April 6, 10, 26 and 29. Subsequently, G. K. Ordjonikidze 
wrote concerning the proceedings of the Council as follows: 
³While dark reaction was rampant all over Russia, in Baku 
a real workersı parliament was in session. In this parliament 
all the demands of the Baku workers were openly formulated 
and our speakers expounded our whole minimum programme.² 
In the Council 199 delegates voted for the Bolshevik proposal for 
a conference with guarantees, and 124 votes were cast for the 
proposal to boycott the conference. The supporters of a boycott‹
the Socialist-Revolutionaries and Dashnaks‹left the 
meeting. The proposal to present the Mandate as an ultimatum 
was adopted by 113 votes against 54. p. 110 
59 Promyslovy Vestnik (Oil-Field News)‹a legal Menshevik newspaper, 
the organ of the mechanicsı union, published in Baku 
two or three times a week in November and December 1907 
and from March to July 1908. p. 112 
60 K‹za (P. Kara-Murza)‹a member of the Cadet Party, editor 
of Neftyanoye Delo, the organ of the Baku oil owners. p. 117 
61 ³Kochi²‹robber, a hired assassin. p. 120 
62 Khanlar Safaraliyev‹a Bolshevik working man and talented 
organiser of the Azerbaijan workers. After a successful strike 
at the Naphtha oil fields he, on the night of September 19, 
1907, was mortally wounded by an assassin hired by the oil 
owners and died several days later. In response to the appeal 
of the Bibi-Eibat District Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. , 
the workers declared a general two-day strike and demanded 
that the Naphtha Producersı Association remove from the 
oil field Khanlarıs murderer‹the foreman driller Jafar, and 
also the manager Abuzarbek. Khanlarıs funeral developed

NOTES 402 
into a mighty protest demonstration in which 20,000 workers 
participated. J. V. Stalin delivered a speech at Khanlarıs 
graveside. p. 125 
63 J. V. Stalin wrote this review of the press in the summer of 
1908 in the Baku jail, where he was detained from March 25 
to November 9, 1908, when he was deported to Solvychegodsk. 
p. 132 
64 Napertskali (The Spark)‹a daily newspaper published by 
the Georgian Mensheviks in Tiflis from May to July 1908. 
p. 132 
65 Azri (Thought)‹a Menshevik Georgian newspaper published in 
Tiflis from January 29 to March 2, 1908. p. 132 
66 In 1904 the brothers Shendrikov (Lev, Ilya and Gleb) formed 
in Baku a Zubatov, i . e . , police-controlled, organisation 
known as the Organisation of the Balakhany and Bibi-Eibat 
Workers, subsequently renamed the Baku Workersı Union. 
The Shendrikovs conducted a campaign of slander against the 
Bolsheviks. By advancing narrow craft economic slogans 
they disorganised the strike movement, tried to disrupt the 
preparations for an armed insurrection, agitated for the formation 
of ³conciliation boards,² co-operatives, etc. They were 
subsidised by the oil owners and the tsarist authorities. The 
Mensheviks officially recognised the Zubatov organisation 
of the Shendrikovs as a party organisation. The Baku Bolsheviks 
exposed the Shendrikovs as hirelings of the tsarist 
secret police and utterly defeated them. 
The journal Pravoye Delo (The Just Cause) was published 
by the Shendrikovs in St. Petersburg. No. 1 appeared in November 
1907, and No. 2-3 in May 1908. Groshev and Kalinin, 
who are mentioned later on, were Mensheviks who supported 
the Shendrikovs. p. 135 
67 A. Gukasov‹one of the biggest oil owners in Baku and the 
leading member of the oil ownersı Council of the Congress. 
p. 136

NOTES 403 
68 The meeting of the organising committee which was 
responsible for the arrangements to convene the conference 
with the oil owners was held on May 13, 1908. Fourteen oil 
owners and 15 workers were present. On that same day the 
newspapers published an announcement that representatives 
of trade unions would not be permitted to go on the committee. 
The workersı delegation that appeared at the meeting 
refused to allow the proceedings to start unless representatives 
of the trade unions took part. Using this refusal as a pretext, 
chairman of the committee Junkovsky (a member of 
the Caucasian Viceroyıs Council) closed the meeting. p. 138 
69 ³Land and freedom,² ³By struggle you will achieve your 
rights²‹the slogans of the Socialist-Revolutionary Party. 
p. 140 
70 The general strike commenced on July 1, 1903, in Baku, on 
July 14 in Tiflis and on July 17 in Batum. The strike affected 
the whole of Transcaucasia and spread to South Russia (Odessa, 
Kiev, Yekaterinoslav and other places). p. 141 
71 The Baku general strike began on December 13, 1904, with 
strikes at the oil fields of Rothschildıs, Nobelıs and Mirzoyevıs 
in the Balakhany and Bibi-Eibat oil districts. From December 
14 to 18 it spread to most of the enterprises in Baku. The strike 
was led by J. V. Stalin. The leaflets issued by the Baku Committee 
during the first days of the strike contained political 
slogans and also the following economic demands‹an eighthour 
day, higher wages, abolition of fines, etc. During the 
strike numerous meetings of workers were held. The strike 
ended in a victory for the workers and the conclusion of a 
collective agreement between the workers and the oil 
owners, the first of its kind to be concluded in the history 
of the Russian labour movement. ³This strike was like a clap 
of thunder heralding a great revolutionary storm² (see History 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course, Moscow 1952, p. 94). The 
importance of the December strike in Baku is dealt with in 
detail in the present volume. See ³The December Strike and 
the December Agreement,² pp. 174-78. p. 141

NOTES 404 
72 Baku‹a bourgeois newspaper published with brief interruptions 
from 1902 to 1918. The newspaper expressed the 
interests mainly of the Armenian oil and commercial bourgeoisie. 
p. 147 
73 This refers to an article entitled ³The Workersı Commission 
in Baku² published in No. 4 of the Georgian Menshevik newspaper 
Khomli of July 17, 1908. p. 148 
74 L. A. Rinıs (Y. Larinıs) pamphlet ³The Conference With the 
Oil Owners² was published by the mechanicsı union in 1907. 
p. 148 
75 Proletary (The Proletarian)‹an illegal newspaper founded by 
the Bolsheviks after the Fourth (³Unity²) Congress of the Party. 
It appeared from August 21 (September 3), 1906 to November 28 
(December 11), 1909. Altogether 50 numbers were issued‹ 
the first 20 in Finland, and the rest in Geneva and Paris. 
Actually Proletary was the central organ of the Bolsheviks 
and was edited by V. I. Lenin. During the Stolypin reaction 
the paper played a leading role in preserving and strengthening 
the Bolshevik organisations. p. 151 
76 Golos Sotsial-Demokrata (The Voice of the Social-Democrat)‹ 
the organ of the Menshevik Liquidators, published abroad 
from February 1908 to December 1911. The editorial board 
consisted of G. V. Plekhanov, P. B. Axelrod, Y. O. Martov, 
F. I. Dan and A. S. Martynov. In view of the paperıs pronouncedly 
liquidationist trend, Plekhanov ceased contributing 
to i t in December 1908 and subsequently formally 
resigned from the editorial board. In spite of the decision 
adopted by the Plenum of the Central Committee of the 
R.S.D.L.P. in January 1910 that the paper should cease 
publication, the Mensheviks continued to issue i t , openly 
advocating Liquidationism in its columns. p. 151 
77 Sotsial-Demokrat (The Social-Democrat)‹the Central Organ 
of the R.S.D.L.P., published from February 1908 to January 
1917. The first issue was published in Russia, but after that

NOTES 405 
the paper was published abroad, first in Paris and then in 
Geneva. In conformity with the decision of the Central 
Committee of the R.S.D.L.P., the editorial board of the Central 
Organ was constituted of representatives of the Bolsheviks, 
Mensheviks and Polish Social-Democrats. The paper published 
leading articles by V. I. Lenin. On the editorial board of the 
paper Lenin fought for a consistent Bolshevik line. A section 
of the editorial board (Kamenev and Zinoviev) took up a 
conciliatory attitude towards the Liquidators and tried to 
thwart Leninıs policy. The Mensheviks Martov and Dan sabotaged 
the work of the editorial board of the Central Organ 
and at the same time openly defended Liquidationism in the 
columns of Golos Sotsial-Demokrata. Leninıs uncompromising 
struggle against the Liquidators led to the resignation of 
Martov and Dan from the editorial board of Sotsial-Demokrat 
in June 1911. Beginning with December 1911 the paper was 
edited by V. I . Lenin. I t published a number of articles 
by J. V. Stalin which are reproduced in the present volume. 
The Sotsial-Demokrat systematically published information on 
the work of the local Party organisations in Russia, including 
those in Transcaucasia. p. 151 
78 The Third Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (the ³Second All- 
Russian Conference²) was held on July 21-23, 1907, and the 
Fourth Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. (the ³Third All-Russian 
Conference²) was held on November 5-12, 1907. p. 159 
79 This was the heading of a section of the Bakinsky Proletary. 
p. 169 
80 The enlarged editorial board of Proletary was in fact the 
Bolshevik centre, elected at a meeting of the Bolshevik section 
of the Fifth (London) Congress of the R.S.D.L.P. held in 1907. 
The meeting of the enlarged editorial board was held in Paris 
on June 8-17 (21-30), 1909, under the direction of V. I. Lenin. 
The meeting condemned Otzovism and Ultimatumism as 
³Liquidationism inside out.² It described the ³party² school 
set up by the Otzovists in Capri as ³the centre of a group 
that is breaking away from the Bolsheviks.² A. Bogdanov

NOTES 406 
(supported by V. Shantser) refused to submit to the decisions 
of the enlarged editorial board of Proletary and was expelled 
from the Bolshevik organisation. p. 170 
81 The resolution of the Baku Committee was published in Proletary, 
No. 49, on October 3 (16), 1909, with the following 
editorial note: ³We have not said anything different 
from what the Baku comrades have said about the Otzovists, 
Ultimatumists and God-builders. The Baku comrades themselves 
Œprotest against the conduct of Comrade Maximov who 
declared that he would not submit to the decisions of the editorial 
board.ı But if Comrade Maximov had submitted to the decisions 
of the organ of the Bolsheviks and had not launched a 
whole campaign of disruption against the Bolshevik group, 
there would have been no Œbreak-away. ı ŒThe refusal to 
submitı i s in i t s e l f , of course, a Œbreak-away. ı We have 
discussed the question of our alleged Œsplittingı policy at 
great length in the present issue in the article ŒA Talk With 
St. Petersburg Bolsheviksı concerning a resolution of a similar 
nature which they had sent us, and which we received before 
the Baku resolution.² The article ³A Talk With St. Petersburg 
Bolsheviks² was written by V. I . Lenin (see V. I . Lenin, 
Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 16, pp. 49-59). p. 172 
82 ³Amshara² (fellow countryman)‹the common appellation 
given the Iranian unskilled labourers who came to work in 
Baku. p. 175 
83 The ³Letters From the Caucasus² were written in November-
December 1909 and were intended for publication in Proletary 
or Sotsial-Demokrat. As Proletary had ceased publication 
by that time the ³Letters² were sent to the Central Organ 
of the R.S.D.L.P. , Sotsial-Demokrat. Owing to the fact 
that the second letter contained sharp criticism of Liquidationism, 
the Menshevik section of the editorial board of 
Sotsial-Demokrat refused to allow it to be published in the 
columns of the Central Organ and it was therefore published 
in Diskussionny Listok (Discussion Sheet), a supplement to 
Sotsial-Demokrat. p. 179

NOTES 407 
84 The regulations of June 12, 1890, concerning the Zemstvo administrative 
bodies, were introduced by the tsarist government 
in place of the regulations of 1864. The new regulations, which 
introduced electorates according to social estates in place of 
the former property qualification for election to the Zemstvo, 
gave the nobility an absolute majority in most of the Uyezd 
Zemstvo Assemblies and made the Zemstvo more dependent 
upon the central government. p. 183 
85 Bakinsky Proletary (The Baku Proletarian)‹an illegal 
Bolshevik newspaper published in Baku from June 20, 
1907 to August 27, 1909. Seven issues appeared. The first 
came out as the organ of the Balakhany District of the Baku 
organisation of the R.S.D.L.P., the second as the organ of the 
Balakhany and Cherny Gorod districts of the Baku organisation 
of the R.S.D.L.P., while the third and subsequent issues came 
out as the organ of the Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. 
The paper was edited by J. V. Stalin, who wrote a number 
of leading articles for it which are reproduced in the present 
volume. Among the contributors were S. Shaumyan, A. Japaridze 
and S. Spandaryan. After the appearance of the fifth 
issue, publication was suspended and was resumed on August 1, 
1909, when J. V. Stalin returned to Baku after his escape from 
exile in Solvychegodsk. No. 7, the last issue, came out on 
August 27, 1909. The editorial board of Bakinsky Proletary 
was closely connected with Proletary and Sotsial-Demokrat. 
p. 186 
86 Trud (Labour)‹the name of the united consumersı co-operative 
society organised in the beginning of 1908 by the workers 
of the city or Baku and the Baku oil districts and having about 
1,200 members. It opened branches in the Balakhany, Bibi- 
Eibat, Zavokzalny and Cherny Gorod districts. In 1909 the cooperative 
society published a weekly journal called Trudovoi 
Golos (The Voice of Labour). The Bolsheviks took an 
active part in the work of this co-operative society. p. 191 
87 The aim of the clubs ³Znanie-Sila² (³Knowledge Is Power²) 
and ³Nauka² (³Science²) was to promote self-education among

NOTES 408 
the oil industry workers. They organised general educational and 
technical classes, circles and lectures. They obtained their funds 
from membership dues and also from receipts from lectures and 
theatrical performances. The ³Knowledge Is Power² club, which 
served the oil-field districts, was directed by Bolsheviks; the 
³Science² club was directed by Mensheviks. p. 191 
88 The temperance congress was opened in St. Petersburg on 
December 28, 1909, and lasted several days. Five hundred 
and ten delegates attended. The workersı group numbered 
43 delegates, of whom two represented the Baku workers. 
Some of the workersı delegates were arrested by the police 
immediately after the congress closed. p. 192 
89 Dasatskisi (The Beginning)‹a Georgian legal Menshevik newspaper 
published in Tiflis from March 4 to 30, 1908. p. 194 
90 An, N. and Kostrov‹pseudonyms of Noah Jordania, the leader 
of the Georgian Liquidator Mensheviks. p. 194 
91 G. V. Plekhanov uttered these words in a speech he delivered at 
the International Socialist Congress in Paris in 1889. p. 198 
92 This refers to the agrarian law (ukase) issued by the tsarist 
Minister Stolypin on November 9, 1906, granting the peasants 
the right to leave the village communities and to set up individual 
homesteads. p. 202 
93 This refers to the plenum of the Central Committee 
of the R.S.D.L.P. that was held in Paris on January 2-23 
(January 15-February 5), 1910. The plenum adopted a resolution 
on the necessity of ³abolishing a l l more or less 
organised groups and of transforming them into trends that 
will not disrupt the unity of Party activities.² On the insistence 
of V. I. Lenin, the plenum condemned Liquidationism and 
Otzovism, although the terms ³Liquidationism² and ³Otzovism² 
were not used in the resolution. The predominance of conciliatory 
elements at the plenum rendered possible the adoption

NOTES 409 
of a number of anti-Leninist decisions. In spite of V. I. Leninıs 
protests, several Liquidator Mensheviks were elected to the central 
bodies of the Party. After this plenum the Liquidators 
intensified their struggle against the Party. p. 217 
94 This refers to the decision to reorganise (³reform²) the central 
bodies of the Party, i.e., the Central Committee, the editorial 
board of the Central Organ, the Bureau of the Central Committee 
Abroad, and the Collegium of the Central Committee in 
Russia. This decision was adopted by the plenum of 
the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. held in January 1910 
(see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, 
Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part I, 6th 
Russ. ed., 1940, pp. 157, 158). p. 217 
95 J V. Stalinıs term of exile was to expire at the end of June 
1911. p. 218 
96 Mysl (Thought)‹a legal Bolshevik monthly magazine of philosophical 
and social-economic questions, published in Moscow 
from December 1910 to April 1911. Five numbers were issued. 
The magazine was founded by V. I. Lenin, and he was its actual 
director. Nos. 1-4 contained articles by him. Among the contributors 
were V. V. Vorovsky, M. S. Olminsky and I. I. Skvortsov-
Stepanov. In addition to Bolsheviks, Plekhanov and other 
pro-Party Mensheviks contributed to the magazine. p. 218 
97 Rabochaya Gazeta (The Workersı Newspaper)‹a popular Bolshevik 
newspaper published in Paris from October 30 (November 
12), 1910 to July 30 (August 12), 1912. It was organised 
and directed by V. I. Lenin. The Prague Conference of the 
Party held in January 1912 noted the services rendered by 
Rabochaya Gazeta in defending the Party and the Party principle 
and recognised it as the official organ of the Central 
Committee of the Party. p. 218 
98 Zvezda (The Star)‹a legal Bolshevik newspaper published 
in St. Petersburg from December 16, 1910 to April 22, 1912,

NOTES 410 
first as a weekly and later two or three times a week. Its activities 
were directed by V. I. Lenin, who regularly sent articles 
for it from abroad. Regular contributors to the paper were 
V. M. Molotov, M. S. Olminsky, N. G. Poletayev, N. N. Baturin, 
K. S. Yeremeyev, and others. Contributions were also 
received from Maxim Gorky. In the spring of 1912, when 
J. V. Stalin was in St. Petersburg, the paper came out under 
his direction, and he wrote a number of articles for it which 
are reproduced in the present volume. The circulation of individual 
issues of the paper reached 50,000 to 60,000. Zvezda 
paved the way for the publication of the Bolshevik daily Pravda. 
On April 22, 1912, the tsarist government suppressed Zvezda. 
It was succeeded by Nevskaya Zvezda (The Neva Star), which 
continued publication until October 1912. p. 218 
99 The leaflet headed ³For the Party!² was written by J. V. Stalin 
at the beginning of March 1912 and was widely distributed 
all over the country together with the leaflet entitled ³The 
Election Platform of the R.S.D.L.P.² written by V. I. Lenin. 
No. 26 of Sotsial-Demokrat published a communication from 
the Bureau of the Central Committee stating: ³The Central 
Committee has published in Russia the leaflets: 1) ŒFor the 
Party!ı (6,000); 2) ŒThe Election Platformı (10,000). These 
leaflets have been delivered to 18 centres, including a number 
of the largest ones. . . . The Central Committeeıs leaflets were 
eagerly welcomed everywhere, the only complaint being that 
there were so few of them.² On March 29, 1912, G. K. Ordjonikidze 
wrote from Kiev that both leaflets ³created a very 
good impression, and readers went into raptures over them.² 
Somewhat later N. K. Krupskaya wrote on V. I. Leninıs 
instructions: ³We have received your two letters (about local 
affairs and the plans in view) and the two leaflets: ŒFor the 
Party!ı and the ŒPlatform.ı We heartily welcome them.²
p. 219 
100 The leaflet referred to the Sixth All-Russian Party Conference 
that was held in Prague on January 5-17 (18-30), 1912. This 
conference united the Bolshevik organisations and registered

NOTES 411 
the independent existence of the Bolshevik Party. By a decision 
of the conference the Mensheviks were expelled from the 
Party and the formal unity of the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks 
within one party was ended forever. The Prague Conference 
inaugurated a Party of a new type (see History of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.), Short Course, Moscow 1952, pp. 217-25).
p. 219 
101 The leaflet ³Long Live the First of May!² was written by 
J. V. Stalin in Moscow, at the beginning of April 1912. It 
was printed clandestinely at a legal printing plant in Tiflis 
and all the copies were subsequently sent to St. Petersburg. 
p. 225 
102 Clause 87 of the Fundamental Law of the State authorised 
the Council of Ministers to submit Bills directly to the tsar 
for his signature when the State Duma was not in session. 
This enabled Stolypin to issue a number of important laws, 
on the agrarian question in particular, without the consent 
of the Duma. p. 233 
103 Zaprosy Zhizni (Requirements of Life)‹a magazine published 
in St. Petersburg in 1909-12. In the summer of 1912 V. I. Lenin 
wrote to Maxim Gorky: ³Incidentally, i t is a queer magazine‹
Liquidationist-Trudovik-Vekhist² (see V. I . Lenin, 
Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 35, p. 30). p. 236 
104 Peaceful Renovators‹the Party of Peaceful Renovation, which 
represented the big commercial and industrial bourgeoisie 
and the big landlords; was formed in 1906. Lenin called it 
³the Party of Peaceful Depredation.² p. 236 
105 Delo Zhizni (Lifeıs Cause)‹a legal liquidationist Menshevik 
magazine published in St. Petersburg from January 22 to October 
31, 1911. p. 238 
106 Nasha Zarya (Our Dawn)‹a legal monthly magazine, the 
organ of the liquidationist Mensheviks, published in St. Petersburg 
from 1910 to 1914. p. 238

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
NOTES 412 
107 The Progressives‹a liberal monarchist group of the Russian 
bourgeoisie standing between the Octobrists and the Cadets. 
The leaders of this group were the Moscow industrialists 
Ryabushinsky, Konovalov, and others. p. 215 
108 The elections to the Fourth State Duma took place in the 
autumn of 1912, but the Bolsheviks, headed by V. I. Lenin 
and J. V. Stalin, began to prepare for the election campaign 
as early as the spring of that year. The Bolshevik Party came 
out independently in the elections with the slogans of a democratic 
republic, an eight-hour day and confiscation of the land 
of the landlords. In March 1912 V. I. Lenin wrote ³The Election 
Platform of the R. S. D. L. P.,² which was published in 
leaflet form and distributed in a number of the biggest towns 
of Russia. The Bolshevik election campaign was conducted 
under the direct guidance of J. V. Stalin. His arrest on April 22, 
1912, temporarily interrupted this work. He returned to St. 
Petersburg after escaping from his place of exile in Narym in 
September 1912, when the election campaign was at i t s 
height. p. 246 
109 Zemshchina‹a Black-Hundred newspaper, the organ of the 
deputies of the extreme right in the State Duma; published 
in St. Petersburg from 1909 to 1917. p. 251 
110 Novoye Vremya (New Times)‹organ of the reactionary nobility 
and bureaucratic circles; published in St. Petersburg from 
1868 to October 1917. In 1905 it became one of the organs 
of the Black Hundreds. p. 252 
111 Golos Moskvy (The Voice of Moscow)‹a daily newspaper, 
organ of the Octobrist Party, published in Moscow from December 
1906 to 1915, edited and published by A. I. Guchkov. 
p. 252 
112 Pravda (Truth)‹a daily Bolshevik legal newspaper published 
in St. Petersburg. It was founded in the spring of 1912 on 
the initiative of the St. Petersburg workers.

NOTES 413 
The first issue of the newspaper appeared on April 22 (May 
5), 1912. On March 15, 1917, J. V. Stalin was appointed a member 
of the editorial board of Pravda. On his return to Russia 
in April 1917, V. I. Lenin took over the direction of Pravda. 
Regular contributors to the paper were: V. M. Molotov, 
Y. M. Sverdlov, M. S. Olminsky, K. N. Samoilova and 
others. During that period, Pravda, in spite of the persecution 
and vilification to which it was subjected, performed tremendous 
work in rallying the workers, revolutionary soldiers and 
peasants around the Bolshevik Party, exposed the imperialist 
bourgeoisie and its hangers-on‹the Mensheviks and Socialist- 
Revolutionaries‹and fought for the transition from the bourgeois-
democratic to the socialist revolution. p. 255 
113 ³Mandate of the St . Petersburg Workers to Their 
Labour Deputy² was written at the beginning of October 
1912. It was unanimously adopted at meetings of workers 
in the largest plants in St. Petersburg and at the assembly of 
the workersı votersı delegates held on October 17, 1912. 
J. V. Stalin directed the discussion of the ³Mandate² at impromptu 
meetings in the factories. V. I. Lenin attached exceptional 
importance to the ³Mandate.² On sending i t to the 
printers for publication in Sotsial-Demokrat he wrote on the 
margin: ³Return without fail!! Keep clean. Highly important 
to preserve this document.² The ³Mandate² was published 
in Sotsial-Demokrat, No. 28-29, November 5 (18), 1912. In 
a letter to the editorial board of Pravda Lenin wrote: ³You 
must publish this ŒMandateı to the St. Petersburg Deputy 
without fail in a prominent place in large type² (see V. I. Lenin, 
Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 35, p. 38). p. 257 
114 The term ³interpretation² appeared in connection with the 
³ruling² Senateıs interpretation of the electoral laws in a 
sense favourable for the government. In ³interpreting² 
the laws the authorities arbitrarily annulled elections.
p. 257 
115 The first election of electors in the workersı curia of the St. 
Petersburg Gubernia took place at the gubernia assembly

NOTES 414 
of votersı delegates on October 5, 1912. In spite of the fact 
that 21 of the largest plants in St. Petersburg had been deprived 
of the right to vote, among the six electors elected by the 
assembly there were four Bolsheviks. As a result of the pressure 
of the masses, the right to vote of the workers in the ³interpreted² 
plants was restored. On October 14, 1912, new elections of 
votersı delegates took place at these plants, and on October 17 
the second assembly was held of votersı delegates from 
the workersı curia of the St. Petersburg Gubernia. At this 
assembly a second election of electors took place, and five 
candidates polled an absolute majority‹two Bolsheviks 
and three Mensheviks. Next day a supplementary poll 
was taken to elect a sixth elector, and a Bolshevik was 
elected. 
The course of the election struggle is described in detail 
in J. V. Stalinıs correspondence to the Sotsial-Demokrat entitled 
³The Elections in St. Petersburg,² pp. 279-94 of this 
volume. p. 260 
116 Luch (The Ray)‹a legal daily newspaper published in St. 
Petersburg by the Menshevik Liquidators from September 
1912 to July 1913. In the columns of the Luch the Liquidators 
openly attacked the underground Party. The newspaper was 
run with the aid of funds obtained mainly from the bourgeoisie. 
p. 260 
117 This refers to the Obukhov Works. p. 263 
118 The leaflet ³To All the Working Men and Working Women of 
Russia!² concerning the eighth anniversary of ³Bloody Sunday,² 
January 9, 1905, was written by J. V. Stalin in December 
1912. Urging the necessity of issuing such a leaflet, 
V. I. Lenin wrote from Cracow to J. V. Stalin in St. Petersburg 
on November 23 (December 6), 1912, as follows: ³Dear friend, 
in connection with January 9, it is extremely important to 
think the matter over and prepare for it beforehand. A leaflet 
must be ready in advance calling for meetings, a one-day strike 
and demonstrations (these must be arranged on the spot, it 
is easier to judge on the spot). . . . The slogans proclaimed in

NOTES 415 
the leaflet must be the three main revolutionary slogans (a 
republic, the eight-hour day and the confiscation of the land of 
the landlords) with special emphasis on the tercentenary of 
the Œshamefulı Romanov dynasty. If you are not fully and 
absolutely certain of being able to have such a leaflet done 
in St. Petersburg it will have to be done in good time here 
and sent on² (see V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 18, 
p. 401). p. 273 
119 In August-October 1912 among the political prisoners confined 
in the Kutomar and Algachi hard-labour prisons (Nerchinsk 
penal servitude area in the Trans-Baikal) mass hunger 
strikes and suicides took place in protest against the brutality 
of the prison administration. This called forth workersı 
protest strikes and student meetings in St. Petersburg, Moscow 
and Warsaw. p. 273 
120 In October 1912, 142 sailors of the Black Sea Fleet were tried 
before a naval court-martial in Sevastopol on the charge of 
organising a mutiny in the fleet. Seventeen of the accused 
were sentenced to death, 106 were sentenced to penal servitude, 
and 19 were acquitted. In Moscow, St. Petersburg, Kharkov, 
Nikolayev, Riga and other towns, mass strikes and demonstrations 
were held in protest against these sentences. 
p. 274 
121 At the end of 1911 new documents appeared in the press exposing 
the governmentıs frame-up against the Social-Democratic 
deputies in the Second Duma. It transpired that the 
evidence brought against them had been entirely fabricated 
by the secret police in St. Petersburg. In the middle of November 
1911, the Social-Democratic group in the Third Duma 
moved an interpellation calling for a revision of the case of the 
Social-Democratic deputies in the Second Duma. The Duma 
rejected the interpellation. As a result mass meetings of many 
thousands took place in St. Petersburg, Riga, Warsaw and other 
towns, at which resolutions were passed demanding the release 
of the convicted deputies. p. 275

NOTES 416 
122 J. V. Stalin was the Central Committeeıs representative during 
the election campaign in St . Petersburg . The Executive 
Commission of the St. Petersburg Committee was a small 
committee of members of the St. Petersburg Committee appointed 
to direct current work. p. 280 
123 The Liquidators left out of the election platform which they 
issued in September 1912 the main political demands of the 
minimum programme of the R.S.D.L.P. Instead of the demand 
for a democratic republic they inserted the demand for universal 
suffrage ³in the election of the State Duma and local government 
bodies,² and instead of the demand for the confiscation 
of the land of the landlords they inserted the demand for 
³a revision of the agrarian legislation of the Third Duma.² 
p. 283 
124 This refers to the so-called ³August² conference of the Liquidators 
which was held in Vienna in August 1912 as a counterstroke 
to the Prague Conference of the Bolsheviks. p. 286 
125 The Bolshevik ³X² was N. G. Poletayev; the Liquidator ³Y² 
was probably E. Mayevsky (V. A. Gutovsky). 
The St. Petersburg Liquidators ³Ab. . . and L. . .² mentioned 
lower down were V. M. Abrosimov and V. Levitsky 
(V. O. Zederbaum). p. 288 
126 Nevsky Golos (The Voice of the Neva)‹a legal weekly newspaper 
published by the Menshevik Liquidators in St. Petersburg 
May-August 1912. p. 290 
127 See ³Letters From the Caucasus,² pp. 194-97 in this volume. 
p. 297 
128 In No. 9 of Dnevnik Sotsial-Demokrata (A Social-Democratıs 
Diary) G. V. Plekhanov criticised the statements made by 
the Georgian Menshevik Liquidator S. Jibladze in Golos Sotsial- 
Demokrata. p. 297

NOTES 417 
129 Pan-Islamism‹a reactionary religious and political ideology 
which arose in Turkey in the latter half of the nineteenth century 
among the landlords, the bourgeoisie and the clergy and 
later spread among the propertied classes of other Moslem 
peoples. It advocated the union into a single whole of all 
peoples professing the Moslem religion. With the aid of Pan- 
Islamism the ruling classes among the Moslem peoples tried 
to strengthen their positions and to strangle the revolutionary 
movement among the working people of the Orient. Today 
the U.S.-British imperialists use Pan-Islamism as a weapon 
in their preparations for an imperialist war against the U.S.S.R. 
and the Peopleıs Democracies, and for suppressing the national-
liberation movement. p. 298 
130 Marxism and the National Question was written at the end of 
1912 and the beginning of 1913 in Vienna. It first appeared in the 
magazine Prosveshcheniye (Enlightenment), Nos. 3-5, 1913, under 
the title ³The National Question and Social-Democracy² and 
was signed K. Stalin. In 1914 it was published by the Priboy 
Publishers, St. Petersburg, as a separate pamphlet entitled 
The National Question and Marxism. By order of the Minister 
of the Interior the pamphlet was withdrawn from all public 
libraries and reading rooms. In 1920 the article was republished 
by the Peopleıs Commissariat for Nationalities in a 
Collection of Articles by J. V. Stalin on the national question 
(State Publishing House, Tula). In 1934 the article was 
included in the book: J. Stalin, Marxism and the National and 
Colonial Question. A Collection of Articles and Speeches. Lenin, 
in his article ³The National Programme of the R.S.D.L.P.,² 
referring to the reasons which were lending prominence to 
the national question a t that period, wrote: ³This state 
of affairs, and the principles of the national programme of 
Social-Democracy, have already been dealt with recently in 
theoretical Marxist literature (prime place must here be given 
to Stalinıs article).² In February 1913, Lenin wrote to Maxim 
Gorky: ³We have a wonderful Georgian here who has sat down 
to write a big article for Prosveshcheniye after collecting all the 
Austrian and other material.² Learning that it was proposed

NOTES 418 
to pr i n t the article wi t h the reservation that i t was for 
discussion only, Lenin vigorously objected, and wrote: 
³Of course, we are absolutely against this. It is a very good 
article. The question is a burning issue, and we shall not 
yield one jot of principle to the Bundist scum.² (Archives 
of the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute.) Soon after J. V. Stalinıs 
arrest, in March 1913, Lenin wrote to the editors of Sotsial- 
Demokrat: ³. . . Arrests among us are very heavy. Koba has 
been taken. . . . Koba managed to write a long article (for 
three issues of Prosveshcheniye) on the national question. Good! 
We must fight for the truth and against separatists and opportunists 
of the Bund and among the Liquidators.² (Archives of 
the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute.) p. 300 
131 Zionism‹a reactionary nationalist trend of the Jewish bourgeoisie, 
which had followers among the intellectuals and the 
more backward sections of the Jewish workers. The Zionists 
endeavoured to isolate the Jewish working-class masses from 
the general struggle of the proletariat. Today the Zionist 
organisations are the agents of the American imperialists in 
their machinations directed against the U.S.S.R. and the Peopleıs 
Democracies and the revolutionary movement in capitalist 
and colonial countries. p. 301 
132 The Brünn Parteitag, or Congress, of the Austrian Social- 
Democratic Party was held on September 24-29, 1899. The 
resolution on the national question adopted by this congress 
is quoted by J. V. Stalin in the next chapter of this work 
(see p. 333). p. 326 
133 ³Thank God we have no parliament here²‹the words uttered 
by V. Kokovtsev, tsarist Minister of Finance (later Prime 
Minister), in the State Duma on April 24, 1908. p. 329 
134 See Chapter II of the Manifesto of the Communist Party by Karl 
Marx and Frederick Engels (Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, 
Selected Works, Eng. ed., Vol. I, Moscow 1951, p. 49). p. 341

NOTES 419 
135 The Vienna Congress (or Wimberg Congress‹after the name 
of the hotel in which it met) of the Austrian Social-Democratic 
Party was held June 6-12, 1897. p. 343 
136 The reference is to an article by Karl Marx entitled ³Zur 
Judenfrage² (³The Jewish Question²), published in 1844 in 
the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher. (See Marx/Engels, Gesamtausgabe, 
Erste Abteilung, Band 1, Halbband 1.) p. 344 
137 The Eighth Conference of the Bund was held in September 
1910 in Lvov. p. 350 
138 In an article entitled ³Another Splittersı Conference,² published 
in the newspaper Za Partiyu, October 2 (15), 1912, G. V. Plekhanov 
condemned the ³August² Conference of the Liquidators 
and described the stand of the Bundists and Caucasian Social- 
Democrats as an adaptation of socialism to nationalism. Kossovsky, 
leader of the Bundists, criticised Plekhanov in a 
letter to the Liquidatorsı magazine Nasha Zarya. p. 354 
139 The Seventh Congress of the Bund was held in Lvov at the end 
of August and beginning of September 1906. p. 355 
140 Iskra (The Spark)‹the first all-Russian illegal Marxist newspaper 
founded by V. I. Lenin in 1900 (see J. V. Stalin, Works, 
Vol. 1, p. 400, Note 26). p. 357 
141 Karl Vanek‹a Czech Social-Democrat who took an openly 
chauvinist and separatist stand. p. 358 
142 Chveni Tskhovreba (Our Life)‹a daily newspaper published 
by the Georgian Mensheviks in Kutais from July 1 to 22, 
1912. p. 360 
143 The reference is to the first Balkan War, which broke out 
in October 1912 between Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro 
on the one hand, and Turkey on the other. p. 373

NOTES 420 
144 See the resolutions of the Fourth (the ³Third All-Russian²) 
Conference of the R.S.D.L.P. held November 5-12, 1907, and 
of the Fifth (the ³All-Russian 1908²) Conference of the 
R.S.D.L.P. held December 21-27, 1908 (January 3-9, 1909) 
(See Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U. (B.) Congresses, 
Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Vol. 1, 6th Russ. 
ed., 1940, pp. 118, 131.) p. 380 
145 E. J. Jagiello‹a member of the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.), 
was elected to the Fourth State Duma for Warsaw as a result 
of a bloc formed by the Bund, the Polish Socialist Party and 
the bourgeois nationalists against the Polish Social-Democrats. 
By a vote of the seven Menshevik Liquidators against the six 
Bolsheviks, the Social-Democratic group in the Duma adopted 
a resolution that Jagiello be accepted as a member of the group. 
p. 380 
146 Prosveshcheniye (Enlightenment)‹a Bolshevik monthly published 
legally in St. Petersburg, the first issue appearing in 
December 1911. It was directed by Lenin through regular 
correspondence with the members of the editorial board in 
Russia (M. A. Savelyev, M. S. Olminsky, A. I. Elizarova). 
When J. V. Stalin was in St. Petersburg he took an active 
part in the work of the journal. Prosveshcheniye was closely 
connected with Pravda. In June 1914, on the eve of the First 
World War, it was suppressed by the government. One double 
number appeared in the autumn of 1917. p. 381 
147 In December 1912 the workersı deputies in the Fourth Duma 
agreed to allow their names to be included in the list of contributors 
to Luch. At the same time they continued to contribute 
to Pravda. Actually, they did not contribute to Luch. Later, 
on the instructions of the Central Committee they announced 
that they withdrew their names from the list of contributors 
to Luch. This gave rise to a fierce controversy between the Bolshevik 
six and the Menshevik seven, the two sections of the 
Social-Democratic group in the Duma. p. 382

NOTES 421 
148 This refers to the Social-Democratic group in the Third State 
Duma. p. 383 
149 Zhivoye Delo (The Living Cause)‹a legal weekly newspaper 
published by the Menshevik Liquidators in St . Petersburg 
from January to April 1912. p. 383 
150 The leaflet ³The Anniversary of the Lena Massacre² was written 
by J. V. Stalin in Cracow in January-February 1913. It 
was copied by hand by N. K. Krupskaya, was duplicated 
on a hectograph and sent to Russia, where it was distributed 
in St . Petersburg, Kiev, Moghilev, Tiflis and other towns. 
p. 387 
151 The Fourth State Duma was opened on November 15, 1912. 
p. 389

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 
(1907 to March 1917) 
1 9 0 7 
January 1 No. 1 of the newspaper Mnatobi (The Torch), 
directed by J. V. Stalin, appears. 
No. 8 of the newspaper Akhali Droyeba 
(New Times) publishes the continuation of 
J. V. Stalinıs work Anarchism or Socialism? 
February 10 J. V. Stalin writes the preface to the Georgian 
edition of K. Kautskyıs pamphlet The Driving 
Forces and Prospects of the Russian Reaolution. 
February 18 No. 1 of the newspaper Chveni Tskhovreba (Our 
Life), directed by J. V. Stalin, appears, containing 
his article ³The Election Campaign 
in St. Petersburg and the Mensheviks.² 
February 21-28 Nos. 3, 5, 8 and 9 of Chveni Tskhovreba publish 
the continuation of J. V. Stalinıs work Anarchism 
or Socialism? 
March 11 No. 1 of the newspaper Dro (Time), directed 
by J. V. Stalin, appears. 
March 13 No. 2 of Dro publishes J. V. Stalinıs article 
³The Autocracy of the Cadets or the Sovereignty 
of the People?²

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 423 
No. 6 of Dro publishes J. V. Stalinıs leading 
article ³The Proletariat Is Fighting, the Bourgeoisie 
Is Concluding an Alliance With the 
Government.² 
No. 10 of Dro publishes J. V. Stalinıs article 
³Comrade G. Telia. In Memoriam.² 
Dro publishes the decisions of the worker 
Bolsheviks in Ti f l i s to elect J. V. Stalin as 
a delegate to the Fifth Congress of the 
R.S.D.L.P. 
Nos. 21-23 and 26 of Dro publish the continuation 
of J. V. Stalinıs work Anarchism or Socialism? 
No. 25 of Dro publishes J. V. Stalinıs leading 
article ³The Advanced Proletariat and the 
Fifth Party Congress. ³ 
No. 26 of Dro publishes J. V. Stalinıs article 
³Muddle. . .² 
No. 29 of Dro publishes J. V. Stalinıs article 
³Our Caucasian Clowns.² 
J . V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings 
of the Fifth (³London²) Congress of the 
R.S.D.L.P. as the delegate of the Tiflis organisation. 
On returning from the Fifth (³London²) Congress 
of the R.S.D.L.P. , J . V. Stalin visits 
Baku and Ti f l i s and delivers reports on the 
congress at meetings of the Social-Democratic 
organisations of Baku, Ti f l i s and a number 
of districts in Western Georgia. J. V. Stalin 
leads the struggle of the Bolsheviks against 
March 17 
March 22 
March 28 
and 30 
April 4-6 
and 10 
April 8 
April 10 
April 13 
April 30- 
May 19 
First half of 
June

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 424 
June 20 
Summer-Autumn 
July 10 
End of July 
August 12 
August 24 
the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and 
others. 
No. 1 of the underground Bolshevik newspaper 
Bakinsky Proletary (The Baku Proletarian) 
edited by J . V. Stalin, appears, containing 
the leading article written by him: ³The 
Dispersion of the Duma and the Tasks of the 
Proletariat,² and also his article ³The London 
Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic 
Labour Party (Notes of a Delegate).² 
J. V. Stalin speaks at discussion meetings organised 
in the districts of Baku in which he exposes 
the policy of the Mensheviks and the 
Socialist-Revolutionaries. 
J . V. Stalin directs the campaign to boycott 
the conference with the oil owners. 
No. 2 of Bakinsky Proletary publishes the 
continuation of J . V. Stalinıs article ³The 
London Congress of the Russian Social-Democratic 
Labour Party (Notes of a Delegate).² 
The Baku Bolsheviks, headed by J. V. Stalin, 
hold a Party conference of the oil districts, 
which declares in favour of organising a general 
strike. 
Appearance of No. 1 of the newspaper Gudok 
‹the legal Bolshevik organ of the Baku oil 
industry workersı union, formed on the initiative 
of J. V. Stalin. 
At a delegate meeting of five district Social- 
Democratic organisations and of the Moslem 
Social-Democratic group ³Gummet,² J. V. Stalin

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 425 
September- 
October 
September 29 
October 25 
First half of 
November 
November 22 
End of November 
November 1907- 
March 1908 
is elected a member of the organising committee 
set up to convene a city Party conference. 
J. V. Stalin directs the campaign during the 
Third State Duma elections. 
The ³Mandate² to the Social-Democratic 
deputies in the Third State Duma, written 
by J . V. Stalin, i s adopted a t a meeting of 
delegates of the workersı curia in Baku held 
on September 22. 
J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the grave of 
Khanlar Safaraliyev, a working man Bolshevik 
who was killed by the hired agents of the 
capitalists. 
No. 4 of Gudok publishes J. V. Stalinıs article 
³Boycott the Conference!² 
At a Baku city conference of Bolsheviks, 
J. V. Stalin is elected a member of the Baku 
Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. 
A meeting of the Baku Committee of the 
R.S.D.L.P. , which J . V. Stalin attended, 
is held in the premises of the Sabunchi Hospital. 
The Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. , 
directed by J. V. Stalin, conducts a one-day 
strike to protest against the prosecution of 
the Social-Democratic group in the Second 
State Duma. 
J. V. Stalin arrives in Tiflis on Party business. 
J. V. Stalin directs the campaign for the participation 
of the Baku workers in a conference 
with the oil owners on the condition that the 
rights of the workers are guaranteed.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 426 
January 13 
January-February 
February 3 
February 
March 2 
March 9 
March 16 
March 25 
March 25- 
November 9 
1 9 0 8 
No. 14 of Gudok publishes J. V. Stalinıs leading 
article ³Before the Elections.² 
The Baku Bolsheviks, directed by J. V. Stalin, 
organise a series of big strikes. 
No. 17 of Gudok publishes J. V. Stalinıs leading 
article ³More About a Conference With 
Guarantees.² 
The Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. , 
directed by J . V. Stalin, organises a ³Self- 
Defence Staff² in connection with the growing 
frequency of assaults by Black Hundreds. 
No. 21 of Gudok publishes J. V. Stalinıs article 
³What Do Our Recent Strikes Tell Us?² 
No. 22 of Gudok publishes J . V. Stalinıs 
leading article ³The Change in the Oil Ownersı 
Tactics.² 
No. 23 of Gudok publishes J. V. Stalinıs leading 
article ³We Must Prepare!² 
J . V. Stalin, under the alias Gaioz Nizharadze, 
is arrested and confined in the Bailov 
prison in Baku. 
While in prison J . V. Stalin establishes and 
maintains contact with the Baku Bolshevik 
organisation, directs the Baku Committee of 
the R.S.D.L.P. and writes articles for the 
Bakinsky Proletary and Gudok. He also conducts 
propaganda among the political pris

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 427 
March 30 
April 21- 
May 18 
July 20 
November 9 
January 
January 27 
February 8 
oners, holds debates with the Socialist-Revolutionaries 
and Mensheviks and organises the 
study of Marxist literature by the political 
prisoners. 
No. 25 of Gudok publishes J. V. Stalinıs leading 
article ³Economic Terrorism and the 
Labour Movement.² 
Nos. 28, 30 and 32 of Gudok publish 
J. V. Stalinıs article ³The Oil Owners on Economic 
Terrorism.² 
No. 5 of Bakinsky Proletary publishes 
J. V. Stalinıs articles ³Flunkey ŒSocialistsı² 
and ³Hypocritical Zubatovites.² 
The same issue of the newspaper publishes as 
a supplement J. V. Stalinıs article ³The Conference 
and the Workers.² 
J . V. Stalin i s deported to the Vologda Gubernia 
for two years to remain under open 
police surveillance. 
1 9 0 9 
J . V. Stalin arrives in Vologda under escort 
and is confined in the Vologda prison. 
J. V. Stalinıs place of exile is decided: Solvychegodsk, 
Vologda Gubernia. 
On the way to his place of exile under escort 
J . V. Stalin f a l l s sick with relapsing fever 
and i s taken from the Vyatka prison to the 
Vyatka Gubernia Zemstvo Hospital.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 428 
February 20 
February 27 
June 24 
Beginning of July 
First half of July 
August 
August 2 
August 27 
First half of 
September 
End of September 
J . V. Stalin i s transferred from the hospital 
to the Vyatka prison. 
J. V. Stalin arrives in Solvychegodsk. 
J. V. Stalin escapes from Solvychegodsk. 
While on his way J . V. Stalin stays several 
days in St. Petersburg. 
J. V. Stalin secretly arrives in Baku and directs 
the work of restoring and consolidating 
the Bolshevik organisations in Baku and 
Transcaucasia. 
After a year ıs suspension, Bakinsky Proletary 
resumes publication with No. 6, which 
contains J . V. Stalinıs leading article ³The 
Party Crisis and Our Tasks.² 
The Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. , 
directed by J. V. Stalin, adopts a resolution 
on the state of affairs on the editorial board 
of Proletary supporting ³the stand taken by 
the majority of the editorial board represented 
by Comrade Lenin.² 
No. 7 of Bakinsky Proletary publishes the 
conclusion of J. V. Stalinıs article ³The Party 
Crisis and Our Tasks,² and also the article 
³The Forthcoming General Strike.² 
J. V. Stalin leaves Baku for Tiflis, where he 
organises and directs the struggle of the Tiflis 
Bolshevik organisation against the Menshevik 
Liquidators. 
J . V. Stalin takes measures to re-establish 
the underground printing plant of the Baku 
Committee.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 429 
October 19- 
beginning of 
November 
Not later than 
November 12 
December 13 
November- 
December 
January 5 
January 22 
March 23 
J. V. Stalin arrives in Tiflis and makes preparations 
for the convocation of the Ti f l i s 
City Party Conference and for the publication 
of the Bolshevik newspaper Tiflissky 
Proletary. 
J. V. Stalin returns to Baku from Tiflis. 
The Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. issues 
a leaflet written by J. V. Stalin, ³The December 
Strike and the December Agreement² (on 
the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the 
Baku strike of 1904). 
J . V. Stalin writes ³Letters From the Caucasus² 
for the Central Organ of the Party. 
1 9 1 0 
Beginning with 1910, J. V. Stalin is a representative 
of the Central Committee of the Party 
(³agent of the C.C.²). 
No. 1. of the newspaper Tiflissky Proletary, 
founded with the direct participation of 
J. V. Stalin, appears. 
The Baku Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. adopts 
a resolution drafted by J. V. Stalin urging the 
necessity of convening a general Party conference, 
of transferring the practical centre for 
directing the activities of the Party to Russia 
and of publishing an all-Russian leading 
newspaper. 
J. V. Stalin is arrested under the alias Zakhar 
Grigoryan Melikyants.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 430 
March 26 
September 7 
September 23 
October 29 
November 1910- 
June 1911 
December 31 
March-June 
June 1 
June 23-26 
J . V. Stalinıs leaflet ³August Bebel, Leader 
of the German Workers,² appears. 
J. V. Stalin is confined in the Bailov Prison 
in Baku. 
While in prison J. V. Stalin receives the order 
of the Viceroy of the Caucasus dated August 27 
prohibiting him from residing in the Caucasus 
for five years. 
J. V. Stalin is taken under escort to Solvychegodsk. 
J. V. Stalin arrives in Solvychegodsk. 
J. V. Stalin establishes contact with V. I. Lenin. 
He organises meetings of exiles a t which 
papers are read and current political questions 
are discussed. 
J . V. Stalin writes a l e t t e r to the Central 
Committee of the Party (³A Letter to the 
Central Committee of the Party From Exile in 
Solvychegodsk²). 
1 9 1 1 
The police make repeated searches in 
J . V. Stalinıs lodgings ( a t the house of 
M. P. Kuzakova) in Solvychegodsk. 
At a conference of members of the Central 
Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. , held in Paris, 
J. V. Stalin is appointed in his absence an alternate 
member of the Organising Committee 
for convening the Party conference. 
J . V. Stalin in Solvychegodsk is kept under 
close arrest for three days for organising a 
meeting of exiled Social-Democrats.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 431 
June 27 
July 6 
July 16 
July-September 
July 
September 6 
September 7 
September 7-9 
September 9 
December 14 
December 25 
J. V. Stalin is released from open police surveillance 
in view of the expiration of his period 
of exile. Being prohibited from residing 
in the Caucasus, in the capitals and industrial 
centres, he chooses Vologda as his place of 
residence as it is on the way to St. Petersburg. 
J. V. Stalin, furnished with a transit permit, 
leaves Solvychegodsk for Vologda. 
J. V. Stalin arrives in Vologda. 
In Vologda J . V. Stalin i s kept under 
secret police surveillance. 
J . V. Stalin writes a l e t t e r to the editorial 
board of Rabochaya Gazeta (Workersı Newspaper) 
, directed by Lenin, informing i t of 
his intention to work in St . Petersburg or in 
Moscow. 
J . V. Stalin secretly leaves Vologda for St. 
Petersburg. 
J . V. Stalin arrives in S t . Petersburg and 
registers with the passport of P. A. Chizhikov. 
J . V. Stalin meets the Bolsheviks S. Todria 
and S. Alliluyev and establishes contact with 
the St. Petersburg Party organisation. 
J . V. Stalin i s arrested and confined in the 
St. Petersburg House of Preliminary Detention. 
J. V. Stalin is deported to Vologda for three 
years, to remain under open police surveillance. 
J. V. Stalin arrives in Vologda.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 432 
Between January 
5(18) and 17(30) 
Middle of 
February 
February 29 
Beginning of 
March 
First half of 
March 
March 29 
1 9 1 2 
At the Sixth (³Prague²) General Party Conference, 
J. V. Stalin is in his absence elected 
a member of the Central Committee of the 
Bolshevik Party. 
The conference sets up a practical centre known 
as the Russian Bureau of the Central Committee 
to direct revolutionary activities in Russia 
and places J. V. Stalin in char ge of this centre. 
On the instructions of V. I. Lenin, G. K. Ordjonikidze, 
a member of the Russian Bureau of 
the Central Committee, goes to see J. V. Stalin 
in Vologda to inform him of the decisions of 
the Prague Conference. 
J. V. Stalin escapes from exile in Vologda. 
J. V. Stalin writes the leaflet ³For the Party!² 
which is published in the name of the Central 
Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and i s widely 
distributed in Russia. 
J. V. Stalin visits Baku and Tiflis to organise 
the work of the Transcaucasian Bolshevik 
organisations in carrying out the decisions of 
the Prague Conference. He wr i t e s Circular 
Letter No. 1 of the Central Committee of the 
R.S.D.L.P. to the Party organisations announcing 
the definite formation of the Central 
Committee. 
J. V. Stalin conducts a conference of the Party 
workers of the Bolshevik district organisa

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 433 
March 30 
April 1 
Beginning of 
April 
April 10 
April 10-22 
Middle of April 
tions in Baku. The conference endorses the 
decisions of the Prague Conference. 
J. V. Stalin writes a report on the conference 
in Baku for the Sotsial-Demokrat. 
J . V. Stalin leaves Baku for St. Petersburg. 
On the way to S t . Petersburg J . V. Stalin 
stops in Moscow and meets G. K. Ordjonikidze. 
J. V. Stalin writes the leaflet ³Long Live the 
First of May!² 
J. V. Stalin sends to Tiflis a copy of the resolution 
adopted by a group of Moscow Party 
workers welcoming the decisions of the Prague 
Conference and the newly-formed Central 
Committee. 
On behalf of the Central Committee of the 
R.S.D.L.P. , J . V. Stalin writes to Clara 
Zetkin requesting her to transfer the Party 
funds held by her to the Central Committee 
for the purpose of conducting the Fourth 
State Duma election campaign. 
J. V. Stalin secretly arrives in St. Petersburg. 
J . V. Stalin edits the Bolshevik workers. 
newspaper Zvezda in which the following 
articles of his are published: ³A New Period² 
(leading a r t i c l e ) , ³Life Triumphs!², ³They 
Are Working Wel l . . . .², ³The Ice Has Broken! 
. . .² (leading article), ³How They Are 
Preparing for the Elections², ³Deductious² 
(leading article), and others. 
J . V. Stalin makes arrangements with the 
members of the Social-Democratic group in

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 434 
April 22 
July 2 
July 18 
September 1 
September 12 
September-October 
October 4 
the Third State Duma N. G. Poletyaev and 
I . P. Pokrovsky, as well as with the Bolshevik 
journalists M. S. Olminsky and N. N. Baturin, 
for the publication of the newspaper 
Pravda and for the drafting of its programme, 
and together with them makes up the f i r s t 
number of that newspaper. 
No. 1 of the workersı daily newspaper Pravda appears 
containing J. V. Stalinıs article ³Our Aims.² 
J . V. Stalin i s arrested and confined in the 
preliminary detention prison in St. Petersburg. 
J. V. Stalin is deported under escort from St. 
Petersburg to the Narym territory, to be kept 
under open police surveillance for three years. 
J. V. Stalin, accompanied by a prison warder, 
leaves Tomsk on the steamer Kolpashevets for 
his place of exile in Narym. 
J . V. Stalin escapes from exile in Narym. 
J. V. Stalin arrives in St. Petersbur g. 
J. V. Stalin directs the Fourth State Duma election 
campaign and organises the struggle 
against the Menshevik Liquidators. 
J. V. Stalin edits Pravda. 
A meeting of the Executive Commission of the 
S t . Petersburg Committee i s held under 
J . V. Stalinıs direction a t which a decision 
is adopted to call a one-day strike in protest 
against the annulment of the election of votersı 
delegates a t the biggest plants in St. 
Petersburg (Putilovıs and others).

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 435 
Beginning of 
October 
Middle of 
October 
October 17 
October 19 
October 21 
(November 3) 
October 24 
October 25 
J. V. Stalin conducts a secret Party conference 
a t which the tactics to be adopted in the 
struggle against the Liquidators is discussed 
and the workersı candidate for the Fourth State 
Duma is nominated. 
J . V. Stalin writes ³Mandate of the St. Petersburg 
Workers to Their Labour Deputy.² 
J. V. Stalin sends ³Mandate of the St. Petersburg 
Workers² to V. I. Lenin on the editorial 
board of Sotsial-Demokrat, in which paper it 
was published in the issue No. 28-29 of November 
5 (18), 1912. 
The ³Mandate² written by J . V. Stalin i s 
adopted at the assembly of votersı delegates 
of the workersı curia in the S t . Petersburg 
Gubernia. 
No. 147 of Pravda publishes the leading article 
by J. V. Stalin ³The Will of the Votersı 
Delegates.² 
On the instructions of V. I. Lenin, N. K. Krupskaya 
writes to Pravda and the members of 
the Social-Democratic group in the Duma 
stating that i t i s extremely important for 
J. V. Stalin to visit Cracow . 
No. 151 of Pravda publishes J . V. Stalinıs 
article ³The Results of the Elections in the 
Workersı Curia of St. Petersburg.² 
No. 152 of Pravda publishes J . V. Stalinıs 
article ³Today Is Election Day.²

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 436 
End of October 
October 29 
Before November 
10 
November 11(24) 
First half of 
November 
End of November-
beginning of 
December 
November 23 
(December 6) 
First half of 
December 
End of December 
J. V. Stalin visits Moscow for a short period 
and establishes contact with the newly-elected 
working men Bolshevik deputies of the Fourth 
State Duma. 
J . V. Stalin returns to S t . Petersburg from 
Moscow. 
J . V. Stalin secretly arrives in Cracow to 
visit V. I. Lenin. 
V. I . Lenin sends the ³Mandate² he had received 
from J . V. Stalin to Pravda with instructions 
to publish it ³in a prominent place 
in large type.² 
J . V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the 
members of the Central Committee of the 
R.S.D.L.P. in Cracow. 
Returning to S t . Petersburg from Cracow, 
J. V. Stalin directs the activities of the Social- 
Democratic group in the Fourth State Duma. 
V. I . Lenin writes to J . V. Stalin on preparations 
for the anniversary of January 9 
and on the need for leaflets to be published in 
connection with it. 
On the instructions of V. I. Lenin, N. K. Krupskaya 
writes to J . V. Stalin urging him to 
come to Cracow for a meeting of the members 
of the Central Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. 
and the six Bolshevik deputies in the Fourth 
Duma. 
J. V. Stalin secretly leaves for Cracow .

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 437 
December 28, 1912 
(January 10, 1913)- 
January 1(14), 
1913 
End of December 
1912-beginning 
of January 1913 
January 12 
Latter half of 
January 
January 
January-February 
Middle of February 
J . V. Stalin takes part in the ³February² 
conference of the Central Committee 
of the R.S.D.L.P. with Party workers and 
the Bolshevik members of the Social-Democratic 
group in the Duma, held under the direction 
of V. I. Lenin. At this conference V. I. Lenin 
and J. V. Stalin propose measures for improving 
the work of the editorial board of Pravda. 
The leaflet written by J. V. Stalin ³To All the 
Working Men and Working Women of Russia!² 
is issued. 
1 9 1 3 
No. 30 of Sotsial-Demokrat publishes 
J . V. Stalinıs articles ³The Elections in St. 
Petersburg (A Letter From St. Petersburg)² 
and ³On the Road to Nationalism (A Letter 
From the Caucasus).² 
J . V. Stalin arrives in Vienna from Cracow. 
In Vienna he arranges for the printing in 
Paris of the ³Announcement² written by 
V. I . Lenin concerning the ³February² conference 
and of the resolutions adopted by 
that conference. 
J . V. Stalin writes the work The National 
Question and Social-Democracy which is published 
in Nos. 3-5 of the magazine Prosveshcheniye 
in March-May 1913. 
J. V. Stalin writes the leaflet ³The Anniversary 
of the Lena Massacre.² 
J . V. Stalin returns to S t . Petersburg from 
abroad. Together with Y. M. Sverdlov he

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 438 
February 23 
February 26 
July 2 
July 11 
July 15 
August 10 
First half of 
March 
February 27 
proceeds to reorganise the editorial board of 
Pravda in conformity with V. I . Leninıs instructions. 
J . V. Stalin i s arrested in the hall of the 
Kalashnikov Exchange at a concert arranged by 
the St. Petersburg Bolshevik organisation and 
is taken to prison. 
No. 47 of Pravda publishes the article by 
J . V. Stalin ³The Situation in the Social- 
Democratic Group in the Duma.² 
J . V. Stalin i s deported under escort to the 
Turukhansk region to remain under open 
police surveillance for four years. 
J. V. Stalin arrives in Krasnoyarsk. 
J . V. Stalin leaves Krasnoyarsk for Turukhansk. 
J . V. Stalin arrives in Turukhansk and from 
there is sent to his place of exile, the hamlet 
of Kostino. 
1 9 1 4 
J . V. Stalin i s transferred to the hamlet of 
Kureika, north of the Arctic Circle, and i s 
placed under closer police surveillance. 
1 9 1 5 
J . V. Stalin writes a l e t t e r to V. I . Lenin 
from the village of Monastyrskoye, where he 
had gone to visit a fellow-exile S. Spandaryan.

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
439 BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 
In this l e t t e r J . V. Stalin criticises the 
defencist line of Plekhanov and of international 
Social-Democracy, which had taken an 
opportunist stand. 
J . V. Stalin takes part in a meeting held 
in the village of Monastyrskoye of the exiled 
members of the Russian Bureau of the Central 
Committee of the R.S.D.L.P. and of the Bolshevik 
group in the Fourth State Duma. At 
this meeting the question of the trial of the 
Bolshevik deputies is discussed. 
J . V. Stalin writes to V. I . Lenin and 
N. K. Krupskaya from hi s place of exile in 
Turukhansk.
1 9 1 6 
J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the Party Centre 
abroad concerning his work on articles on the 
national question. 
In a l e t t e r to the Bolshevik centre abroad, 
sent through Inessa Armand, J . V. Stalin 
inquires about his article ³Cultural-National 
Autonomy,² which he had sent abroad. 
J. V. Stalin, in conjunction with S. Spandaryan 
and other exiles, writes a letter to the journal 
Voprosy Strakhovaniya (Insurance Questions). 
In connection with the drafting of summarily 
exiled persons into the army J . V. Stalin is 
sent under escort to Krasnoyarsk. 
Summer 
November 10 
February 5 
February 25 
March 12 
December 14

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 440 
Printed in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
1 9 1 7 
The Drafting Commission in Krasnoyarsk 
exempts J . V. Stalin from military service. 
J. V. Stalin leaves Krasnoyarsk for Achinsk, 
where he had received permission to reside 
until the expiration of his period of exile. 
J . V. Stalin with a group of exiles leaves 
Achinsk for Petrograd. 
Beginning of 
February 
February 20 
March 8