W O R K E R S O F A L L C O U N T R I E S, U N I T E !

From Marx to Mao 
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C O N T E N T S 
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . XIII 
WORKING WOMEN AND PEASANT WOMEN, REMEMBER 
AND CARRY OUT ILYICHıS BEHESTS! . . 1 
TO THE TEACHERSı CONGRESS . . . . . . . . 3 
THE TASKS OF THE MAGAZINE KRASNAYA MOLODYOZH 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
SPEECH DELIVERED AT A PLENUM OF THE 
CENTRAL COMMITTEE AND THE CENTRAL 
CONTROL COMMISSION OF THE R.C.P.(B.), January 
17, 1925 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
SPEECH DELIVERED AT THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.), January 19, 
1925 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 
TO RABOCHAYA GAZETA . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
A LETTER TO COMRADE D‹OV . . . . . . . . 16 
³DYMOVKA.² Speech Delivered at a Meeting of the 
Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of the 
R.C.P.(B.), January 26, 1925. . . . . . . . . 19 
CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF THE PROLETARIAT 
AND THE PEASANTRY. Speech Delivered at the Thirteenth 
Gubernia Conference of the Moscow Organisation of 
the R.C.P.(B.), January 27, 1925. . . . . . . . 25 
THE PROSPECTS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF 
GERMANY AND THE QUESTION OF BOLSHEVISATION. 
Interview with Herzog, Member of the C.P.G. . 34

CONTENTS VIII 
A LETTER TO COMRADE ME‹RT . . . . . . . 42 
INTERNATIONAL WOMENıS DAY . . . . . . . . 48 
THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) TO 
THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE 
KUOMINTANG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 
THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND THE TASKS 
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTIES . . . . . . . 51 
THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA. 
Speech Delivered in the Czechoslovak Commission of the 
E.C.C.I., March 27, 1925 . . . . . . . . . . 58 
CONCERNING THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA. 
Speech Delivered in the Yugoslav Commission of the 
E.C.C.I., March 30, 1925 . . . . . . . . . . 69 
THE ACTIVE OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE 
IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. Speech Delivered at a Meeting 
of the Organising Bureau of the Central Committee of 
the R.C.P.(B.), April 6, 1925. . . . . . . . . 77 
TO THE FIRST ALL-UNION CONFERENCE OF PROLETARIAN 
STUDENTS. A Message . . . . . . . 85 
THE RESULTS OF THE WORK OF THE FOURTEENTH 
CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.); Report Delivered 
at a Meeting of the Active of the Moscow Organisation 
of the R.C.P.(B.), May 9, 1925 . . . . . . . . 90 
I. The International Situation . . . . . . . 91 
II. The Immediate Tasks of the Communist Parties 
in the Capitalist Countries. . . . . . . . 102 
III. The Immediate Tasks of the Communist Elements 
in the Colonial and Dependent Countries . . . 107 
IV. The Fate of Socialism in the Soviet Union . . 110 
V. The Partyıs Policy in the Countryside . . . 123 
VI. The Metal Industry . . . . . . . . . . 130

CONTENTS IX 
THE POLITICAL TASKS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE 
PEOPLES OF THE EAST. Speech Delivered at a Meeting 
of Students of the Communist University of the 
Toilers of the East, May 18, 1925 . . . . . . . 135 
I. The Tasks of the Communist University of the 
Toilers of the East in Relation to the Soviet 
Republics of the East . . . . . . . . . . 136 
II. The Tasks of the Communist University of the 
Toilers of the East in Relation to the Colonial 
and Dependent Countries of the East . . . . 14 6 
TO ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE EDITORIAL BOARD 
OF KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA . . . . . . . 155 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS. Speech Delivered at the Sverdlov 
University, June 9, 1925 . . . . . . . . 158 
TO THE SVERDLOV UNIVERSITY. On the Occasion of 
the Second Graduation of Students of Basic and Trade 
Union Courses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 
THE NATIONAL QUESTION ONCE AGAIN. Concerning 
the Article by Semich . . . . . . . . . . . . 219 
THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN THE EAST. 
Interview Given to Mr. Fuse, Japanese Correspondent 
of Nichi-Nichi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231 
A LETTER TO COMRADE YERMAKOVSKY . . . . 237 
INTERVIEW WITH THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE 
OF AGITATION AND PROPAGANDA 
DEPARTMENTS, October 14, 1925 . . . . . . . 24 0 
THE TASKS OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE. 
Answers to Questions Submitted by the Editorial Board of 
Komsomolskaya Pravda . . . . . . . . . . . 24 7 
SPEECH AT THE FUNERAL OF M. V. FRUNZE, November 
3, 1925 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 256

CONTENTS X
OCTOBER, LENIN, AND THE PROSPECTS OF OUR 
DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . 258 
A LETTER TO THE PRESIDIUM OF THE TWENTYSECOND 
LENINGRAD GUBERNIA PARTY CONFERENCE 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 263 
THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.), 
December 18-31, 1925 . . . . . . . . . . . 265 
Political Report of the Central Committee, December 
18 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 
I. The International Situation . . . . . . . . . 267 
1. The Stabilisation of Capitalism. . . . . . . . 269 
2. Imperialism, the Colonies and Semi-Colonies . . . . 275 
3. Victors and Vanquished . . . . . . . . . . 277 
4. The Contradictions between the Victor Countries . . . 284 
5. The Capitalist World and the Soviet Union . . . . 288 
6. The External Position of the U.S.S.R. . . . . . . 295 
7. The Partyıs Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . 302 
II. The Internal Situation in the Soviet Union 304 
1. The National Economy as a Whole . . . . . . . 305 
2. Industry and Agriculture . . . . . . . . . 321 
3. Questions Concerning Trade . . . . . . . . . 325 
4. Classes, Their Activity, Their Correlation. . . . . 327 
5. Leninıs Three Slogans on the Peasant Question . . . 332 
6. Two Dangers and Two Deviations In Regard to the Peasant 
Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 2 
7. The Partyıs Tasks . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 7 
III. The Party . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351 
Reply to the Discussion on the Political Report of the 
Central Committee, December 23 . . . . . . . 362 
1. Sokolnikov and the Dawesation of Our Country . . . 363 
2. Kamenev and Our Concessions to the Peasantry . . . 365 
3. Whose Miscalculations? . . . . . . . . . . 369

CONTENTS XI 
4. How Sokolnikov Protects the Poor Peasants . . . . 370 
5. Ideological Struggle or Slander? . . . . . . . 372 
6. Concerning NEP . . . . . . . . . . . . 373 
7. Concerning State Capitalism . . . . . . . . . 375 
8. Zinoviev and the Peasantry . . . . . . . . . 381 
9. Concerning the History of the Disagreements . . . 389 
10. The Oppositionıs Platform . . . . . . . . . 397 
11. Their ³Desire for Peace² . . . . . . . . . 399 
12. The Party Will Achieve Unity . . . . . . . . 4 0 1 
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 0 4 
Biographical Chronicle (1925) . . . . . . . . . . 4 1 9


PREFACE 
The Seventh Volume of J. V. Stalinıs Works contains 
writings and speeches of the year 1925. 
In this period the working class and peasantry, 
led by the Bolshevik Party, were completing the restoration 
of the national economy. The Land of Soviets 
was passing into the period of socialist industrialisation, 
which was the key-note of the Fourteenth Congress of 
the Bolshevik Party. In this period the question of the 
character and prospects of our countryıs development, 
of the fate of socialism in the Soviet Union, was already 
confronting the Party as a practical question. 
In the works: ³The Results of the Work of the Fourteenth 
Conference of the R.C.P.(B.),² ³Questions and 
Answers,² ³October, Lenin, and the Prospects of Our 
Development,² ³The Political Report of the Central Committee 
to the Fourteenth Congress of the R.C.P.(B.),² 
and others, J. V. Stalin gives an all-round substantiation 
of the Bolshevik Partyıs general line for the victory of 
socialism in the U.S.S.R. in the conditions of capitalist 
encirclement, and exposes the defeatist line of the 
Trotskyites and Zinovievites, whose aim was to restore 
capitalism. 
The questions of strengthening the alliance between 
the working class and the peasantry, of educating the

PREFACE VIII 
masses of the working people and the youth, and of drawing 
them into active participation in building a socialist 
society are dealt with in the following works: ³Dymovka,² 
³Concerning the Question of the Proletariat and 
the Peasantry,² ³The Active of the Young Communist 
League in the Countryside,² ³The Tasks of the Young 
Communist League,² ³The First All-Union Conference 
of Proletarian Students,² ³The Political Tasks of the 
University of the Peoples of the East,² and in the interview 
with delegates at the Conference of Agitation and 
Propaganda Departments on October 14, 1925, etc. 
This volume also contains the following articles and 
speeches on the situation and tasks of the Communist 
Parties abroad under the conditions of the partial stabilisation 
of capitalism: ³The International Situation and 
the Tasks of the Communist Parties,² ³The Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia,² ³The National Question in 
Yugoslavia,² ³The Prospects of the Communist Party 
of Germany and the Question of Bolshevisation,² and 
³A Letter to Comrade Me‹rt.² 
The following are published for the f i r s t time: 
³Speech at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the 
R.C.P.(B.) on January 19, 1925,² ³Interview with Delegates 
at the Conference of Agitation and Propaganda 
Departments on October 14, 1925,² letter to the members 
of the editorial board of Komsomolskaya Pravda, 
and letters to Comrades D‹ov, Me‹rt and Yermakovsky. 
Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute 
of the C.C., C.P.S.U.(B.)

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WORKING WOMEN AND PEASANT WOMEN 
REMEMBER AND CARRY OUT ILYICHıS 
BEHESTS! 
A year ago, departing from us, the great leader and 
teacher of the working people, our Lenin, bequeathed 
to us his behests, indicated the road along which we 
must go to the final victory of communism. Carry out 
these behests of Ilyich, working women and peasant 
women! Bring up your children in the spirit of these 
behests! 
Comrade Lenin bequeathed to us the behest to 
strengthen with all our might the alliance of the workers 
and peasants. Then strengthen this alliance, working 
women and peasant women! 
Comrade Lenin taught the toiling people to support 
the working class in its struggle against the bourgeoisie, 
home and foreign. Remember this behest, working women 
and peasant women! Support the rule of the working 
class which is building a new life! 
Comrade Lenin taught us to hold high the banner of 
the Communist Party, the leader of all the oppressed. 
Then rally round this Party, working women and peasant 
women‹it is your Party!

J. V. S T A L I N 2 
On the anniversary of Ilyichıs death, the Party issues 
the watchword‹more scope for the working women 
and peasant women who, with the Party, are building a 
new life! 
J. Stalin 
Written January 5, 1925 
Published in the magazine 
Rabotnitsa, No. 1, 
January 1925

TO THE TEACHERSı CONGRESS1 
The phalanx of school-teachers is one of the most 
essential units of the great army of working people in our 
country who are building a new life on the basis of socialism. 
The path along which the working class is marching 
to socialism can lead to victory only if the vast masses 
of the toiling peasantry follow this path and march in 
step with the working class, only if the working class 
exercises unrelaxing leadership of the toiling masses. 
The village school-teacher must realise that if there 
is no such leadership there can be no proletarian dictatorship, 
and if there is no such dictatorship, our country 
cannot be free and independent. 
To become one of the links that connect the peasant 
masses with the working class‹such is the chief task of 
the village school-teacher if he really wants to serve the 
cause of his people, to serve the cause of its freedom and 
independence. 
J. Stalin 
January 6, 1925 
Uchitelskaya Gazeta, No. 2 
January 10, 1925

THE TASKS OF THE MAGAZINE 
KRASNAYA MOLODYOZH 2 
In his interview with the members of the editorial board, 
Comrade Stalin, dealing with the tasks of the magazine, said: 
The chief task the magazine should set itself is to 
encourage the proletarian non-Party students to take 
an active part in the work of the Soviet Government 
and of the Communist Party. The magazine will accomplish 
this only when it becomes a real Soviet studentsı 
magazine. There are still, of course, a number of defects 
in the work of higher educational institutions, organs 
of the Peopleıs Commissariat of Education, etc. The 
students, who know these defects better than anybody 
else, should systematically expose and criticise them, 
point them out, so that by common effort we may improve 
our work. It is therefore necessary, on a wide scale, 
to encourage the best of the non-Party proletarian students 
to write for the magazine. The students must feel 
that it is their own magazine, a means of facilitating 
their work and development. 
Referring to the tasks of some of the departments of the magazine, 
Comrade Stalin pointed out: 
The political departments of the magazine should 
deal only with the major questions of the work of

THE TASKS OF THE MAGAZINE KRASNAYA MOLODYOZH 5 
the Party and the Soviet Government. There is no need 
to duplicate other magazines. Every organ of the press 
in our Union ought to have its own definite place in the 
general work. The departments: ³Student Life,² ³Literature,² 
and ³Science and Technology,² should be considerably 
enlarged. Those are the departments in which 
the students themselves can take an active part and 
show what they can do. It is also necessary to get the 
students, as well as lecturers and professors, to elaborate 
various problems in the department: ³Reform of 
Higher Education.² 
If the magazine acts in keeping with the slogan 
³closer to the students,² it will be better able to perform 
its function and really become the Soviet studentsı 
own organ. 
The magazine Krasnaya Molodyozh, 
No. 1 (5), January 1925

SPEECH DELIVERED AT A PLENUM 
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
AND THE CENTRAL CONTROL COMMISSION 
OF THE R.C.P.(B.)3 
January 17, 1925 
Comrades, on the instructions of the Secretariat of 
the Central Committee I have to give you certain necessary 
information on matters concerning the discussion 
and on the resolutions connected with the discussion. 
Unfortunately, we shall have to discuss Trotskyıs action 
in his absence because, as we have been informed 
today, he will be unable to attend the plenum owing to 
illness. 
You know, comrades, that the discussion started with 
Trotskyıs action, the publication of his Lessons of October. 
The discussion was started by Trotsky. The discussion 
was forced on the Party. 
The Party replied to Trotskyıs action by making two 
main charges. Firstly, that Trotsky is trying to revise 
Leninism; secondly, that Trotsky is trying to bring about 
a radical change in the Party leadership. 
Trotsky has not said anything in his own defence 
about these charges made by the Party. 
It is hard to say why he has not said anything in his 
own defence. The usual explanation is that he has 
fallen ill and has not been able to say anything in his 
own defence. But that i s not the Partyıs fault, of

SPEECH AT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 7 
course. It is not the Partyıs fault if Trotsky begins to 
get a high temperature after every attack he makes upon 
the Party. 
Now the Central Committee has received a statement 
by Trotsky (statement to the Central Committee dated 
January 15) to the effect that he has refrained from making 
any pronouncement, that he has not said anything in 
his own defence, because he did not want to intensify the 
controversy and to aggravate the issue. Of course, one may 
or may not think that this explanation is convincing. 
I, personally, do not think that it is. Firstly, how long 
has Trotsky been aware that his attacks upon the Party 
aggravate relations? When, precisely, did he become 
aware of this truth? This is not the first attack that 
Trotsky has made upon the Party, and it is not the first 
time that he is surprised, or regrets, that his attack aggravated 
relations. Secondly, if he really wants to prevent 
relations within the Party from deteriorating, why 
did he publish his Lessons of October, which was directed 
against the leading core of the Party, and was intended to 
worsen, to aggravate relations? That is why I think that 
Trotskyıs explanation is quite unconvincing. 
A few words about Trotskyıs statement to the Central 
Committee of January 15, which I have just mentioned, 
and which has been distributed to the members of 
the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. 
The first thing that must be observed and taken 
note of is Trotskyıs statement that he is willing to take 
any post to which the Party appoints him, that he is 
willing to submit to any kind of control as far as future 
actions on his part are concerned, and that he thinks 
it absolutely necessary in the interests of our work that

J. V. S T A L I N 8
he should be removed from the post of Chairman of 
the Revolutionary Military Council as speedily as possible. 
All this must, of course, be taken note of. 
As regards the substance of the matter, two points 
should be noted: concerning ³permanent revolution² and 
change of the Party leadership. Trotsky says that if at 
any time after October he happened on particular occasions 
to revert to the formula ³permanent revolution,² it 
was only as something appertaining to the History of 
the Party Department, appertaining to the past, and not 
with a view to elucidating present political tasks. This 
question is important, for it concerns the fundamentals 
of Leninist ideology. In my opinion, this statement of 
Trotskyıs cannot be taken either as an explanation or 
as a justification. There is not even a hint in it that he admits 
his mistakes. It is an evasion of the question. What 
is the meaning of the statement that the theory of 
³permanent revolution² is something that appertains 
to the History of the Party Department? How is this to 
be understood? The History of the Party Department is 
not only the repository, but also the interpreter of Party 
documents. There are documents there that were valid at 
one time and later lost their validity. There are also 
documents there that were, and still are, of great importance 
for the Partyıs guidance. And there are also 
documents there of a purely negative character, of 
a negative significance, to which the Party cannot 
become reconciled. In which category of documents does 
Trotsky include his theory of ³permanent revolution²? 
In the good or in the bad category? Trotsky said nothing 
about that in his statement. He wriggled out of

SPEECH AT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 9 
the question. He avoided it. Consequently, the charge 
of revising Leninism still holds good. 
Trotsky says further that on the questions settled 
by the Thirteenth Congress he has never, either in the 
Central Committee, or in the Council of Labour and Defence, 
and certainly not to the country at large, made 
any proposals which directly or indirectly raised the questions 
already settled. That is not true. What did Trotsky 
say before the Thirteenth Congress? That the cadres 
were no good, and that a radical change in the Party leadership 
was needed. What does he say now, in his Lessons 
of October? That the main core of the Party is no good 
and must be changed. Such is the conclusion to be drawn 
from The Lessons of October. The Lessons of October was 
published in substantiation of this conclusion. That was 
the purpose of The Lessons of October. Consequently, the 
charge of attempting to bring about a radical change in 
the Party leadership still holds good. 
In view of this, Trotskyıs statement as a whole is 
not an explanation in the true sense of the term, but a 
collection of diplomatic evasions and a renewal of old 
controversies already settled by the Party. 
That is not the kind of document the Party demanded 
from Trotsky. 
Obviously, Trotsky does not understand, and I doubt 
whether he will ever understand, that the Party demands 
from its former and present leaders not diplomatic evasions, 
but an honest admission of mistakes. Trotsky, evidently, 
lacks the courage frankly to admit his mistakes. 
He does not understand that the Partyıs sense of power 
and dignity has grown, that the Party feels that it is 
the master and demands that we should bow our heads

J. V. S T A L I N 10 
to it when circumstances demand. That is what Trotsky 
does not understand. 
How did our Party organisations react to Trotskyıs 
action? You know that a number of local Party organisations 
have passed resolutions on this subject. They 
have been published in Pravda. They can be divided into 
three categories. One category demands Trotskyıs expulsion 
from the Party. Another category demands Trotskyıs 
removal from the Revolutionary Military Council and 
his expulsion from the Political Bureau. The third category, 
which also includes the last draft resolution sent to 
the Central Committee today by the comrades from Moscow, 
Leningrad, the Urals and the Ukraine, demands 
Trotskyıs removal from the Revolutionary Military 
Council and his conditional retention in the Political 
Bureau. 
Such are the three main groups of resolutions on 
Trotskyıs action. 
The Central Committee and the Central Control 
Commission have to choose between these resolutions. 
That is all I had to tell you about matters concerning 
the discussion. 
J. Stalin, Trotskyism, 
Moscow, 1925

SPEECH DELIVERED 
AT THE PLENUM OF THE CENTRAL 
COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 
January 19, 1925 
I have taken the floor in order strongly to support 
Comrade Frunzeıs proposal. I think that we must decide 
here on three things. 
Firstly, we must accept Comrade Frunzeıs proposal 
concerning additional assignments‹5,000,000 rubles; 
a total of 405,000,000 rubles. 
Secondly, we must pass a resolution endorsing Comrade 
Frunzeıs appointment to the post of Chairman of 
the Revolutionary Military Council. 
Thirdly, we must instruct the Party to render the 
new Revolutionary Military Council every assistance in 
the way of providing personnel. 
I must say that lately, owing to some increase in 
the requirements of our economic bodies and to the fact 
that economic and cultural requirements are growing 
beyond our present means, a certain liquidationist mood 
concerning the army has arisen among us. Some of our 
comrades say that little by little, keeping the brakes 
on, we ought to reduce our army to the level of a 
militia. What they have in mind is not the militia 
system, but a peace army, the conversion of the army 
into a simple militia that cannot be prepared for military 
complications.

J. V. S T A L I N 12 
I must declare most emphatically that we must resolutely 
do away with this liquidationist mood. 
Why? Because a radical change in the international 
situation has begun lately. New pre-conditions are maturing, 
which foreshadow new complications for us, and 
we must be ready to meet them. The danger of intervention 
is again becoming real. 
What are those facts? 
Firstly, the growth of the colonial movement, and 
of the liberation movement in general, in the East. India, 
China, Egypt, the Sudan are important bases for 
imperialism. There, the colonial movement is growing 
and will continue to grow. That is bound to turn the ruling 
strata of the Great Powers against us, against the 
Soviets, for they know that the seeds that are falling on 
this fertile soil in the East will mature and germinate. 
They will certainly germinate. 
Second fact: complications are maturing in North Africa, 
in the region of Morocco and Tunisia. That is causing 
a new regrouping of forces, new preparations for new military 
complications between the imperialists. The fact 
that Spain has suffered defeat in Morocco4; that France 
is stretching out her hands to grab Morocco; that Britain 
will not tolerate the strengthening of Franceıs position 
in Morocco; that Italy is trying to take advantage of 
the new situation to lay her hands on Tunisia and that 
the other states will not permit her to do so; the fact 
that Britain and France are vying with each other in 
their strenuous endeavours to secure influence in the 
Balkans, in the new states that were formed as a result 
of the disintegration of Austria-Hungary‹all this is 
reminiscent of the well-known facts in the history of

SPEECH AT PLENUM OF C.C. AND C.C.C. OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 13 
the last war, reminiscent of the facts that preceded the 
last war. The Albanian events are not accidental5; they are 
a manifestation of the struggle between the Great Powers, 
each trying to establish its influence on that small area. All 
this shows that the preparation and regrouping of forces 
is taking place all over Europe in view of the nascent 
complications in the Far East and of the new prospects 
that are opening in North Africa. All this forms the 
pre-conditions for a new war. And a new war is bound 
to affect our country. 
Third fact: the growth of a revolutionary mood among 
the workers in Britain. This is a fact of first-rate importance. 
Britain holds a commanding position in Europe. 
The incipient split between the General Council of the 
Trades Union Congress and the Labour Party, and the 
fissures which have begun to develop within the British 
Labour Party, go to show that something revolutionary, 
something new is developing in Britain. This is alarming 
the ruling strata in Britain. And this is bound to turn 
them against Soviet Russia, for the key-note of the revival 
of the movement in Britain is friendship with Russia. 
Fourth fact: in view of the pre-conditions of which 
I have spoken, in view of the fact that the pre-conditions 
for war are maturing and that war may become inevitable, 
not tomorrow or the day after, of course, but in 
a few yearsı time, and in view of the fact that war is 
bound to intensify the internal, revolutionary crisis both 
in the East and in the West‹in view of this we are bound 
to be faced with the question of being prepared for all 
contingencies. I think that the forces of the revolutionary 
movement in the West are strong, that they are 
growing and will continue to grow, and here or there may

J. V. S T A L I N 14 
succeed in kicking out the bourgeoisie. That is so. But 
it will be very difficult for them to hold out. That is 
clearly shown by the examples of the border countries, 
Estonia and Latvia, for instance. The question of our army, 
of its might and preparedness, will certainly face us as 
a burning question in the event of complications arising 
in the countries around us. 
That does not mean that in such a situation we must 
necessarily undertake active operations against somebody 
or other. That is not so. If anybody shows signs of harbouring 
such a notion‹he is wrong. Our banner is still 
the banner of peace. But if war breaks out we shall not be 
able to sit with folded arms. We shall have to take action, 
but we shall be the last to do so. And we shall do so 
in order to throw the decisive weight in the scales, the 
weight that can turn the scales. 
Hence the conclusion: we must be prepared for all 
contingencies; we must prepare our army, supply it with 
footwear and clothing, train it, improve its technical 
equipment, improve chemical defence and aviation, and 
in general, raise our Red Army to the proper level. The 
international situation makes this imperative for us. 
That is why I think that we must resolutely and irrevocably 
meet the demands of the war department. 
Published for the first time

TO RABOCHAYA GAZETA6 
Remember, love and study Ilyich, our teacher, our 
leader. 
Fight and defeat our enemies, home and foreign‹ 
in the way that Ilyich taught us. 
Build the new society, the new way of life, the new 
culture‹in the way that Ilyich taught us. 
Never refuse to do the little things, for from little 
things are built the big things‹that is one of Ilyichıs 
important behests. 
J. Stalin 
Rabochaya Gazeta, No. 17, 
January 21, 1925

A LETTER TO COMRADE D‹OV 
Comrade D‹ov, 
I am late with my reply, but I had no time to reply 
earlier. 
1) I think that you read the article7 carelessly, otherwise 
you would certainly have found in it the passage 
from Ilyichıs article about ³the victory of socialism in 
one country.² 
2) If you read the article carefully you will probably 
understand that the point at issue is not complete 
victory, but the victory of socialism in general, i.e., 
driving away the landlords and capitalists, taking power, 
repelling the attacks of imperialism and beginning 
to build a socialist economy. In all this, the proletariat 
in one country can be fully successful; but a complete 
guarantee against restoration can be ensured only by 
the ³joint efforts of the proletarians in several countries.² 
It would have been foolish to have begun the October 
Revolution in Russia with the conviction that the victorious 
proletariat of Russia, obviously enjoying the sympathy 
of the proletarians of other countries, but in the 
absence of victory in several countries, ³cannot hold out in 
the face of a conservative Europe.² That is not Marxism, 
but the most ordinary opportunism, Trotskyism, and 
whatever else you please. If Trotskyıs theory were correct, 
Ilyich, who stated that we shall convert NEP Russia into

A LETTER TO COMRADE D‹OV 17 
socialist Russia, and that we have ³all that is necessary 
for building a complete socialist society² (see the article 
³On Co-operation²8), would be wrong. 
3) Evidently, you failed to note that the published 
article is part of a ³Preface.² Had you noted this, I think 
you would have understood that the ³Preface² must 
be taken as a whole. 
4) The most dangerous thing in our political practice 
is the attempt to regard the victorious proletarian country 
as something passive, capable only of marking time until 
the moment when assistance comes from the victorious 
proletarians in other countries. Let us assume 
that the Soviet system will exist in Russia for five or 
ten years without a revolution taking place in the West; 
let us assume that, nevertheless, during that period our 
Republic goes on existing as a Soviet Republic, building 
a socialist economy under the conditions of NEP*‹do 
you think that during those five or ten years our country 
will merely spend the time in collecting water with a 
sieve and not in organising a socialist economy? It is 
enough to ask this question to realise how very dangerous 
is the theory that denies the possibility of the 
victory of socialism in one country. 
But does that mean that this victory will be complete, 
final? No, it does not (see my ³Preface²), for as long as 
capitalist encirclement exists there will always be the 
danger of military intervention. Nevertheless, it is obvious 
to everyone that it is the victory and not the 
* I am fully justified in making the second assumption 
because the strength of our Republic is growing and will continue 
to grow, and the support we are receiving from our Western 
Comrades is increasing and will continue to increase.

J. V. S T A L I N 18 
defeat of socialism. And there can scarcely be any reason 
to doubt that at the same time this victory creates 
the pre-conditions for the victory of the revolution in 
other countries. 
I see that some comrades have not yet abandoned the 
old Social-Democratic theory that the proletarian revolution 
cannot be brought about in countries where capitalism 
is less developed than, say, in Britain or America. 
5) I advise you to read again some of Ilyichıs articles 
in the symposium Against the Stream,9 his pamphlets 
The Proletarian Revolution10 and ³Left-Wing² Communism,
11 and also his article ³On Co-operation.² 
With communist greetings, 
J. Stalin 
January 25, 1925 
Published for the first time

³DYMOVKA² 
Speech Delivered 
at a Meeting of the Organising Bureau 
of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.)12 
January 26, 1925 
First of all the question of Sosnovsky, although it 
is not the central question. He is accused of stating 
somewhere in the press that the entire Soviet apparatus, 
even the system, is rotten. I have not read such statements, 
and nobody has indicated where Sosnovsky wrote 
this. Had he said anywhere that the Soviet system was 
rotten, he would have been a counter-revolutionary. 
Here is his book. It says: ³Not knowing the 
Ukrainian countryside sufficiently, I do not undertake 
to judge how far Dymovka is typical of all the Ukrainian 
villages. Let those who have more expert knowledge 
about the Soviet Ukraine decide this. Nevertheless, I take 
the liberty to assert that Dymovka is by no means an 
exception. From the local press, from conversations 
with responsible workers, from meetings with peasants 
and from certain documents that came into my hands, 
I gathered that elements of a ŒDymovkaı situation are to 
be found in other villages too.² 
This is put very mildly, and it does not say anything 
about decay of the Soviet system or of the Soviet apparatus 
as a whole. Therefore, the accusations against

J. V. S T A L I N 20 
Sosnovsky made by the commission, or by individual 
comrades, are incorrect. Whether they are made by the 
Gubernia Committee, the Okrug Committee, the commission, 
or by individuals makes no difference; the charges 
are unsupported, there are no documents. 
On the contrary, I should like to point out that in this 
matter Sosnovsky has something to his credit. Nobody 
has said anything about that. It is to the credit of Pravda, 
to the credit of Sosnovsky, to the credit of Demyan 
Bedny, that they had the courage to drag into the light 
of day a piece of real life and to reveal it to the whole 
country. That is a service which it is absolutely necessary 
to point out. That is what must be said, and not 
that they overdid things. 
It is said that Sosnovsky overdid things. But in cases 
where there is a general tendency towards officialdom, 
-while there are evils under the surface which are spoiling 
all our work, it is necessary to overdo things. It is certainly 
necessary. It is inevitable. Nothing but good can come of 
it. Of course, somebody will be offended, but our work 
gains by it. We shall not be able to set things right without 
some offence to individuals. 
The main thing in this matter, in my opinion, is not 
that a village correspondent was murdered, or even that 
we have a Dymovka‹all this is very deplorable, but it 
is not the main thing. The main thing is that here and 
there in the countryside, in the volosts, in the districts, 
in the okrugs, our local responsible workers look only 
towards Moscow and refuse to turn towards the peasantry, 
failing to understand that it is not enough to be on good 
terms with Moscow, that it is also necessary to be on 
good terms with the peasantry. That is the principal mis

³DYMOVKA² 21 
take, the principal danger in our work in the countryside. 
Many responsible workers say that it has become the 
fashion at the centre to make new statements about the 
countryside, that this is diplomacy for the outside world, 
that we are not moved by an earnest and determined desire 
to improve our policy in the countryside. That is what 
I regard as the most dangerous thing. If our comrades in 
the localities refuse to believe that we have earnestly 
set to work to teach our responsible workers a new approach 
to the countryside, to the peasantry, if they fail 
to see this, or do not believe it, a very grave danger arises. 
What we must do now is to dispel this mood among 
the local responsible workers, to turn the line abruptly 
in the other direction, so that they look on our policy 
in regard to the countryside as something important, 
something absolutely essential. 
We have three allies: the international proletariat, 
which is tardy in making a revolution; the colonies, 
which are very slow in getting into their stride; and 
the peasantry. I shall not now speak of the fourth ally, 
i.e, the conflicts in the camp of our enemies. It is hard 
to say when the international revolution will get into 
its stride; when it does, it will be the decisive factor. It 
is also hard to say when the colonies will get into their 
stride; that is a very serious and difficult question and 
nothing definite can be said about it. As for the peasantry, 
we are working with it today; it is our third ally, 
and an ally who is giving us direct assistance at this 
very moment; it gives us the men for the army, grain, 
and so forth. With this ally, i.e., the peasantry, we are 
working jointly, together we are building socialism, well

J. V. S T A L I N 22 
or ill, but we are building it, and we must appreciate 
the value of this ally at the present time, particularly 
at the present time. 
That is why we are now putting the question of the 
peasantry into the forefront of our work. 
It must be said that the present course of our policy 
is a new one; it marks a new line in our policy in regard 
to the countryside in the matter of building socialism. 
The comrades do not wish to understand this. If they 
fail to understand this fundamental thing, we shall 
make no progress whatever in our work, and there will 
be no building of socialism in our country. The gravest 
cause of danger, to my mind, is that our comrades forget 
about this main thing and are carried away by what may 
be called their departmental view that Moscow must be 
shown the ³right side of the cloth² and that apparently 
all is well, that they must conceal evils, that they 
must not permit criticism because, they think, it discredits 
the local authorities, the local responsible workers. 
We must put a stop to that, and we must tell the comrades 
that they must not be afraid of dragging bits of 
life into the light of day, however unpleasant they may 
be. We must make our comrades turn round, so that 
they do not look only towards Moscow, but learn to look 
towards the peasantry, whom it is their function to 
serve; so that they shall not conceal evils, but, on the 
contrary, help us to expose our mistakes, to rectify them 
and to conduct our work along the line now laid down 
by the Party. 
One thing or the other (I have already spoken about 
this a number of times): either we, jointly with the 
non-Party peasants, jointly with our local Soviet and

³DYMOVKA² 23 
Party workers, criticise ourselves in order to improve 
our work, or the discontent of the peasants will accumulate 
and burst out in revolts. Bear in mind that under 
the new conditions, under NEP, another Tambov, or 
another Kronstadt,13 is by no means precluded. The 
Transcaucasian, the Georgian revolt14 was a grave warning. 
Such revolts are possible in future if we do not 
learn to expose and eliminate our evils, if we go on making 
it appear outwardly that all is well. 
That is why I think that what we must speak of here 
is not the shortcomings or exaggerations of individual 
writers who expose the defects in our work, but their 
merits in doing so. 
Here I must pass on to the question of our writers, 
our correspondents. I think that we have arrived at the 
period when the worker correspondents and village correspondents 
can become one of the principal instruments 
for correcting our constructive work in the countryside, 
for exposing our defects and, consequently, for correcting 
and improving the work of the Soviets. Perhaps we do 
not all realise this, but it is clear to me that it is precisely 
from this end that the improvement of our work 
must begin. These people, the bulk of whom are impressionable, 
who are fired by the love of truth, who 
desire to expose and correct our shortcomings at 
all costs, people who are not afraid of bullets‹it is these 
people who, in my opinion, should become one of the 
principal instruments for exposing our defects and correcting 
our Party and Soviet constructive work in the 
localities. 
That is why we must heed the voice of these comrades 
and not disparage our press workers. By means of them,

J. V. S T A L I N 24 
as by means of a sort of barometer which directly marks 
defects in our constructive work, there is very much that 
we could expose and correct. 
As regards the Central Control Commission, I think 
that, on the whole, the resolution that it adopted is correct. 
Something, perhaps, should be amended, revised. 
The Dymovka affair should be dealt with in the press 
in such a way as to enable our comrades to understand 
what gave rise to it. The point does not lie in the fact 
that a village correspondent was murdered; still less 
does it lie in not offending the secretary of the Okrug 
Committee or Gubernia Committee. The point is to start 
improving our constructive socialist work in the countryside. 
That is the main thing. That is the point at issue. 
J. Stalin, The Peasant Question, 
Moscow and Leningrad, 1925

CONCERNING 
THE QUESTION OF THE PROLETARIAT 
AND THE PEASANTRY 
Speech Delivered at the Thirteenth Gubernia Conference 
of the Moscow Organisation of the R.C.P.(B.)15 
January 27, 1925 
Comrades, I should like to say a few words about the 
principles underlying the policy which the Party has now 
adopted towards the peasantry. That the question of the 
peasantry is particularly important at the present time 
there can be no doubt. Many comrades have gone to extremes 
and even say that a new era has begun‹the peasant 
era. Others have begun to interpret the slogan ³face 
to the countryside² as meaning that we must turn our 
backs on the towns. Some have even gone to the length 
of talking about a political NEP. That is nonsense, of 
course. All that means going to extremes, of course. If, 
however, we put those extremes aside, one thing remains, 
namely, that at the present time, particularly just 
now, the question of the peasantry acquires exceptional 
importance. 
Why? What is the reason? 
There are two reasons for it. I am speaking of fundamental 
reasons. 
The first reason why the peasant question has assumed 
exceptional importance for us at the present moment is 
that, of the allies of the Soviet power, of all the 
proletariatıs principal allies‹of whom there are four,

J. V. S T A L I N 26 
in my opinion‹the peasantry is the only ally that can 
be of direct assistance to our revolution at this very moment. 
It is a question of direct assistance just now, at 
the present moment. All the other allies, while they 
will be of great importance in the future and while they 
constitute an immense reserve for our revolution, nevertheless, 
unfortunately, cannot render our regime, our 
state, direct assistance now. 
What are these allies? 
The first ally, our principal ally, is the proletariat 
in the developed countries. The advanced proletariat, 
the proletariat in the West, is an immense force, 
and it is the most faithful and most important ally of 
our revolution and our regime. But, unfortunately, the 
situation, the state of the revolutionary movement in the 
developed capitalist countries, is such that the proletariat 
in the West is unable to render us direct and decisive 
assistance at the present moment. We have its indirect, 
moral support, and this is so important that its 
value cannot even be measured, it is inestimable. Nevertheless, 
it does not constitute that direct and immediate 
assistance that we need now. 
The second ally is the colonies, the oppressed peoples 
in the under-developed countries, which are oppressed 
by the more developed countries. Comrades, they 
constitute an immense reserve for our revolution. But 
they are very slow in getting into their stride. They are 
coming directly to our help, but it is evident that they 
will not arrive quickly. For that very reason they are 
unable to render us direct and immediate assistance in 
our work of socialist construction, of strengthening the 
Soviet regime, of building our socialist economy.

THE QUESTION OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY 27 
We have a third ally, intangible, impersonal, but for 
all that an extremely important one, namely, the conflicts 
and contradictions between the capitalist countries; 
they cannot be personified, but they certainly 
render our regime and our revolution very great 
support. That may seem strange, comrades, but it is a 
fact. Had the two chief coalitions of capitalist countries 
not been engaged in mortal combat during the imperialist 
war in 1917, had they not been clutching at each otherıs 
throats, had they not been busy with their own affairs 
and unable to spare time to wage a struggle against the 
Soviet power, it is doubtful whether the Soviet power 
would have survived. The struggle, conflicts and wars 
between our enemies, I repeat, constitute an extremely 
important ally for us. But what is the situation with 
regard to this ally? The situation is that world capital 
after the war, after passing through several crises, has 
begun to recover. That must be admitted. The chief victor 
countries‹Britain and America‹have now acquired 
such strength that they have the material possibility 
not only of putting capitalıs affairs in more or less tolerable 
order at home, but also of infusing new blood into 
France, Germany and other capitalist countries. That is 
one aspect of the matter. And as a result of that aspect 
of the matter, the contradictions between the capitalist 
countries are, for the time being, not developing with 
the same intensity as was the case immediately after 
the war. That is a gain for capital, and a loss for us. 
But this process has also another aspect, a reverse side. 
The reverse side is that, notwithstanding the relative 
stability which capital has been able to create for the 
time being, the contradictions at the other end of the

J. V. S T A L I N 28 
inter-relations, the contradictions between the exploiting 
advanced countries and the exploited backward countries, 
the colonies and dependent countries, are becoming sharper 
and deeper and are threatening to disrupt capitalıs 
³work² from a new and ³unexpected² end. The crisis 
in Egypt and in the Sudan‹you have probably read 
about i t in the newspapers‹also a number of key 
points of contradiction in China, which may set the present 
³allies² at loggerheads and wreck the strength 
of capital, a new series of key points of contradiction 
in North Africa, where Spain is losing Morocco, towards 
which France is stretching out her hands, but which she 
will be unable to take because Britain will not permit 
France to gain control over Gibraltar‹all these are facts 
which are in many ways reminiscent of the pre-war period 
and which are bound to imperil the ³constructive work² 
of international capital. 
Such are the gains and losses in the total balancesheet 
of the development of contradictions. But as, for 
the time being, capitalıs gains in this sphere are bigger 
than its losses and as there are no grounds for expecting 
that armed conflicts between the capitalists will 
break out in the immediate future, it is evident that 
the situation as regards our third ally is still not what 
we would like it to be. 
There remains the fourth ally‹the peasantry. It is 
by our side, we are living together, together we are 
building the new life; well or ill, we are building together. 
As you yourselves are aware, this ally is not a very 
staunch one; the peasantry is not as reliable an ally as 
the proletariat in the developed capitalist countries. 
But, for all that, it is an ally, and of all our existing

THE QUESTION OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY 29 
allies it is the only one that can render us, and is rendering 
us, direct assistance at this very moment, receiving 
our assistance in exchange. 
That is why, particularly at the present moment, 
when the course of development of revolutionary and 
all other crises has slowed down somewhat, the question 
of the peasantry acquires exceptional importance. 
Such is the first reason for the exceptional importance 
of the peasant question. 
The second reason for our making the question of the 
peasantry the corner-stone of our policy at the present moment 
is that our industry, which is the basis of socialism 
and the basis of our regime, rests on the home market, the 
peasant market. I do not know what the situation will be 
when our industry develops to the full, when we are able 
to cope with the home market, and when we are faced 
with the question of winning foreign markets. We shall 
be faced with that question in the future, you can have 
no doubt about that. It is doubtful whether we shall 
be able in the future to count on capturing foreign markets 
in the West from capital, which is more experienced 
than we are. But as regards markets in the East, our relations 
with which cannot be considered bad‹and they 
will improve still further‹here we shall find more favourable 
conditions. There can be no doubt that textile 
goods, means of defence, machinery, and so forth, will 
be the principal commodities with which we shall supply 
the East in competition with the capitalists. But 
that concerns the future of our industry. As for the 
present, when we have not yet fully utilised even a third 
of our peasant market, at the present moment, the chief 
question that faces us is that of the home market, and

J. V. S T A L I N 30 
above all the peasant market. The fact that the peasant 
market is at the present moment the chief basis of our 
industry is precisely the reason why we, as the government, 
and we, as the proletariat, are interested in improving 
to the utmost the condition of peasant economy, in 
improving the material conditions of the peasantry, in 
raising the purchasing power of the peasantry, in improving 
the relations between the proletariat and the peasantry, 
in establishing that bond which Lenin spoke about, 
but which we have not yet established properly. 
That is the second reason why we, as the Party, must 
put the question of the peasantry in the forefront at the 
present moment, why we must devote special attention 
and special care to the peasantry. 
Such are the premises of our Partyıs policy in regard 
to the peasantry. 
The whole trouble, comrades, is that many of our 
comrades do not understand, or do not want to understand, 
how extremely important this question is. 
It is often said: our leaders in Moscow have made 
it the fashion to talk about the peasantry; probably, 
they donıt mean it seriously, it is diplomacy. Moscow 
needs these speeches to be made for the outside world, 
but we can continue the old policy. That is what some 
say. Others say that the talk about the peasantry is just 
talk. If the Moscow people did not stick in their offices, 
but were to visit the countryside, they would see what 
the peasants are, and how the taxes are collected. That 
is the sort of talk one hears. I think, comrades, that 
of all the dangers that face us, this failure of our local 
responsible workers to understand the tasks before us 
is the most serious danger.

THE QUESTION OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY 31 
One thing or the other: 
Either our local comrades will realise how very serious 
the question of the peasantry is, in which case they 
will really set about drawing the peasantry into our constructive 
work, improving peasant economy and strengthening 
the bond; or the comrades will fail to realise it, in 
which case things may end in the collapse of the Soviet 
power. 
Let not the comrades think that I am trying to 
frighten somebody. No, comrades, there would be no 
sense in trying to frighten anybody. The question is too 
serious, and it must be dealt with in a way that befits 
serious people. 
On arriving in Moscow, comrades often try to show 
the ³right side of the cloth,² saying that all is well in 
the countryside where they are. This official optimism 
is sometimes sickening, for it is obvious that all is not 
well, nor can it be. Obviously, there are defects, which 
must be exposed without fear of criticism, and then eliminated 
The issue is as follows: either we, the entire 
Party, allow the non-Party peasants and workers to criticise 
us, or we shall be criticised by means of revolts. 
The revolt in Georgia was criticism. The revolt in Tambov 
was also criticism. The revolt in Kronstadt‹was 
not that criticism? One thing or the other: either we abandon 
this official optimism and official approach to the 
matter, do not fear criticism and allow ourselves to be 
criticised by the non-Party workers and peasants, who, 
after all, are the ones to feel the effects of our mistakes, 
or we do not do this, and discontent will accumulate 
and grow, and we shall have criticism in the form of revolts.

J. V. S T A L I N 32 
The greatest danger now is that many of our comrades 
fail to understand this specific feature of the present 
situation. 
Has this question‹the question of the peasantry‹ 
any connection with the question of Trotskyism, which 
you have discussed here? Undoubtedly it has. 
What is Trotskyism? 
Trotskyism is disbelief in the forces of our revolution, 
disbelief in the alliance between the workers 
and peasants, disbelief in the bond. What is our principal 
task at the present time? In the words of Ilyich, 
it is to convert NEP Russia into socialist Russia. Can 
this task be carried out if the bond is not established? 
No, it cannot. Can the bond, the alliance between the 
workers and peasants, be established if the theory which 
involves disbelief in that alliance, i . e . , the theory 
of Trotskyism, is not smashed? No, it cannot. The conclusion 
is obvious: whoever wants to emerge from 
NEP as the victor must bury Trotskyism as an ideological 
trend. 
Before the revolution in October, Ilyich would often 
say that of all our ideological opponents the most dangerous 
were the Mensheviks, for they were trying to instil 
disbelief in the victory of the October Revolution. 
Therefore, he said, the victory of October could not be 
achieved unless Menshevism was smashed. I think that 
there is some analogy between Menshevism at that time, 
in the period of October, and Trotskyism at the present 
time, in the period of NEP. I think that of all the 
ideological trends in communism today, after the victory 
of October, under the present conditions of NEP, 
Trotskyism must be regarded as the most dangerous,

THE QUESTION OF THE PROLETARIAT AND THE PEASANTRY 33 
for it tries to instil disbelief in the forces of our revolution, 
disbelief in the alliance of the workers and 
peasants, disbelief in the work of converting NEP Russia 
into socialist Russia. Therefore, unless Trotskyism is 
smashed, i t will be impossible to achieve victory 
under the conditions of NEP, i t will be impossible 
to achieve the conversion of present-day Russia into socialist 
Russia. 
Such is the connection between the Partyıs policy 
towards the peasantry and Trotskyism. 
Pravda, No. 24, 
January 30, 1925

THE PROSPECTS 
OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF GERMANY 
AND THE QUESTION OF BOLSHEVISATION 
Interview with Herzog, Member of the G.C.P. 
First Question (Herzog). Do you think that political 
and economic conditions in the democratic-capitalist 
republic of Germany are such that the working class 
will have to wage a struggle for power in the more or 
less immediate future? 
Answer (Stalin). It would be difficult to give a strictly 
definite answer to this question if it were a matter of 
dates and not of trends. That the present situation, as 
regards both international and internal conditions, differs 
substantially from that in 1923 needs no proof. 
That, however, does not preclude the possibility of the 
situation changing abruptly in favour of a revolution in 
the immediate future as a result of possible important 
changes in the external situation. The instability of 
the international situation is a guarantee that this assumption 
may become very probable. 
Second question. Considering the present economic 
situation and the present relation of forces, shall we 
need a longer preparatory period in which to win over 
the majority of the proletariat (the task which Lenin set 
the Communist Parties of all countries as an extremely 
important condition for the conquest of political 
power)?

THE PROSPECTS OF THE C.P.G. AND BOLSHEVISATION 35 
Answer. As regards the economic situation, I am 
able to judge the matter only in the light of the general 
data that I have at my disposal. I think that the Dawes 
Plan16 has already produced some results, which have 
led to a relative stabilisation of the situation. The influx 
of American capital into German industry, the stabilisation 
of the currency, the improvement that has taken 
place in a number of highly important branches of German 
industry‹which by no means signifies a radical 
recovery of Germanyıs economy‹and lastly, some improvement 
in the material conditions of the working 
class‹all this was bound to strengthen the position of 
the bourgeoisie in Germany to some extent. That is, so 
to speak, the ³positive² side of the Dawes Plan. 
But the Dawes Plan also has ³negative² sides, 
which are bound inevitably to make themselves felt at 
some definite period and to demolish the ³positive² results 
of this plan. Undoubtedly, the Dawes Plan imposes 
a double yoke upon the German proletariat, the 
yoke of home and the yoke of foreign capital. The contradiction 
between the expansion of German industry 
and the shrinking of the foreign markets for this industry, 
the discrepancy between the hypertrophied demands of 
the Entente and the maximum ability of German national 
economy to meet these demands‹all this inevitably 
worsens the conditions of the proletariat, the small 
peasants, office employees and the intelligentsia, and is 
bound to lead to an upheaval, to a direct struggle for 
the conquest of power by the proletariat. 
That circumstance must not, however, be regarded as 
the only favourable condition for a German revolution. 
In order that this revolution may be victorious, it is

J. V. S T A L I N 36 
also necessary that the Communist Party should represent 
the majority of the working class, that it should become 
the decisive force in the working class. Social-
Democracy must be exposed and routed, it must 
be reduced to an insignificant minority in the working 
class. Without that, it is useless even to think of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat. If the workers are to achieve 
victory, they must be inspired by a single will, they 
must be led by a single party, which enjoys the indubitable 
confidence of the majority of the working class. 
If there are two competing parties of equal strength within 
the working class, a lasting victory is impossible 
even under favourable external circumstances. Lenin 
was the first to lay special emphasis on this in the period 
before the October Revolution as a most essential 
condition for the victory of the proletariat. 
It could be considered that the situation most favourable 
for a revolution would be one in which an internal 
crisis in Germany and the decisive growth of the 
Communist Partyıs forces coincided with grave complications 
in the camp of Germanyıs external enemies. 
I think that the absence of this latter circumstance 
in the revolutionary period of 1923 was by no means the 
least important unfavourable factor. 
Third question. You said that the C.P.G. must have 
the majority of the workers behind it. Too little attention 
has been paid to this aim hitherto. What, in your 
opinion, must be done to convert the C.P.G. into such 
an energetic party, with a progressively increasing recruiting 
power? 
Answer. Some comrades think that strengthening 
the Party and Bolshevising it mean expelling all dissent

FROM MARX 
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37 
ers from it. That is wrong, of course. Social-Democracy 
can be exposed and reduced to an insignificant minority 
in the working class only in the course of the day-to-day 
struggle for the concrete needs of the working class. 
The Social-Democrats must be pilloried not on the 
basis of planetary questions, but on the basis of the 
day-to-day struggle of the working class for improving 
its material and political conditions; in this, questions 
concerning wages, hours, housing conditions, insurance, 
taxation, unemployment, high cost of living, and so 
forth, must play a most important if not the decisive 
role. To hit the Social-Democrats day after day on the 
basis of these questions, exposing their treachery‹such 
is the task. 
But that task would not be fully carried out if those 
everyday practical questions were not linked up with the 
fundamental questions of Germanyıs international and 
internal situation, and if, in all its work, the Party failed 
to deal with all those everyday questions from the standpoint 
of revolution and the conquest of power by the proletariat. 
But such a policy can be conducted only by a party 
which is headed by cadres of leaders sufficiently experienced 
to be able to take advantage of every single 
blunder of Social-Democracy in order to strengthen the 
Party, and possessing sufficient theoretical training not 
to lose sight of the prospects of revolutionary development 
because of partial successes. 
It is this, chiefly, that explains why the question of 
the leading cadres of the Communist Parties in general, 
including those of the Communist Party of Germany, is 
one of the vital questions of Bolshevisation. 
THE PROSPECTS OF THE C.P.G. AND BOLSHEVISATION

J. V. S T A L I N 38 
To achieve Bolshevisation it is necessary to bring 
about at least certain fundamental conditions, without 
which no Bolshevisation of the Communist Parties will 
be possible. 
1) The Party must regard itself not as an appendage 
of the parliamentary electoral machinery, as the Social- 
Democratic Party in fact does, and not as a gratuitous 
supplement to the trade unions, as certain Anarcho- 
Syndicalist elements sometimes claim it should be, 
but as the highest form of class association of the proletariat, 
the function of which is to lead all the other 
forms of proletarian organisations, from the trade 
unions to the Partyıs group in parliament. 
2) The Party, and especially its leading elements, 
must thoroughly master the revolutionary theory of 
Marxism, which is inseparably connected with revolutionary 
practice. 
3) The Party must draw up slogans and directives 
not on the basis of stock formulas and historical analogies, 
but as the result of a careful analysis of the 
concrete internal and international conditions of the revolutionary 
movement, and it must, without fail, take 
into account the experience of revolutions in all countries. 
4) The Party must test the correctness of these slogans 
and directives in the crucible of the revolutionary 
struggle of the masses. 
5) The entire work of the Party, particularly if Social-
Democratic traditions have not yet been eradicated 
in it, must be reorganised on new, revolutionary lines, 
so that every step, every action, taken by the Party 
should naturally serve to revolutionise the masses, to

THE PROSPECTS OF THE C.P.G. AND BOLSHEVISATION 39 
train and educate the broad masses of the working class 
in the revolutionary spirit. 
6) In its work the Party must be able to combine the 
strictest adherence to principle (not to be confused with 
sectarianism!) with the maximum of ties and contacts 
with the masses (not to be confused with khvostism!); 
without this, the Party will be unable not only to teach 
the masses but also to learn from them, it will be unable 
not only to lead the masses and raise them to its own 
level but also to heed their voice and anticipate their 
urgent needs. 
7) In its work the Party must be able to combine an 
uncompromising revolutionary spirit (not to be confused 
with revolutionary adventurism!) with the maximum 
of flexibility and manoeuvring ability (not to be confused 
with opportunism!); without this, the Party will be 
unable to master all the forms of struggle and organisation, 
will be unable to link the daily interests of the 
proletariat with the fundamental interests of the proletarian 
revolution, and to combine in its work the legal 
with the illegal struggle. 
8) The Party must not cover up its mistakes, it must 
not fear criticism; i t must improve and educate its 
cadres by learning from its own mistakes. 
9) The Party must be able to recruit for its main 
leading group the best elements of the advanced fighters 
who are sufficiently devoted to the cause to be 
genuine spokesmen of the aspirations of the revolutionary 
proletariat, and who are sufficiently experienced 
to become real leaders of the proletarian revolution, 
capable of applying the tactics and strategy of 
Leninism.

J. V. S T A L I N 40 
10) The Party must systematically improve the social 
composition of its organisations and rid itself of 
corrupting opportunist elements with a view to achieving 
the utmost solidarity. 
11) The Party must achieve iron proletarian discipline 
based on ideological solidarity, clarity concerning 
the aims of the movement, unity of practical action and 
an understanding of the Partyıs tasks by the mass of the 
Party membership. 
12) The Party must systematically verify the execution 
of its decisions and directives; without this, these 
decisions and directives are in danger of becoming empty 
promises, which can only rob the Party of the confidence 
of the broad proletarian masses. 
In the absence of these and similar conditions, Bolshevisation 
is just an empty sound. 
Fourth question. You said that, in addition to the negative 
sides of the Dawes Plan, the second condition for 
the conquest of power by the C.P.G. is a situation in 
which the Social-Democratic Party stands fully exposed 
before the masses, and when it is no longer an important 
force in the working class. In view of actual circumstances, 
we are a long way from that. That is obviously 
the effect of the shortcomings and weaknesses of the 
Partyıs present methods of work. How can these be removed? 
What is your opinion of the results of the December 
1924 elections, in which the Social-Democratic 
Party‹an utterly corrupt and rotten party‹far from 
losing votes, actually gained about two million votes? 
Answer. That is not due to shortcomings in the work 
of the Communist Party of Germany. It is primarily 
due to the fact that the American loans and the influx

THE PROSPECTS OF THE C.P.G. AND BOLSHEVISATION 41 
of American capital, plus the stabilisation of the currency, 
which have somewhat improved the situation, 
have created the illusion that the internal and external 
contradictions connected with Germanyıs situation can 
be completely eliminated. It was on this illusion that 
German Social-Democracy rode into the present Reichstag 
as if on a white horse. Wels is now preening himself 
on his election victory; evidently he does not realise that 
he is claiming anotherıs victory as his own. It was not 
the victory of German Social-Democracy, but of the 
Morgan group. Wels has been and remains merely one of 
Morganıs agents. 
Pravda, No. 27, 
February 3, 1925

A LETTER TO COMRADE ME‹RT 
Dear Comrade Me‹rt, 
I have received your letter of February 20. First of 
all, accept my greetings. And now to the matter in hand. 
1) You (and not only you) are making too much of 
my interview with Herzog.* I could not, and will not, 
kick him out, not only because he is a member of the 
Party, but also because he came to me with a letter 
from Comrade Geschke, who begged me to give him an 
interview. I am sending you a copy of that letter. I have 
already sent the German original to the Central Committee 
of the C.P.G. On the basis of the mere fact that, on Comrade 
Geschkeıs written request, I gave Herzog an interview, 
to draw the conclusion that the Central Committee 
of the R.C.P.(B.) is turning, or intends to turn, towards 
Brandler, means making a mountain not even out of a 
molehill, but out of nothing, and being altogether wide of 
the mark. If the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) were 
to learn that you, or other members of the Central Committee 
of the C.P.G., suspect the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) 
of having sympathies towards Brandler-Thalheimer,17 
and of turning from the Lefts to the Rights, they would 
split their sides with laughter. 
* See this volume, pp. 34-41.‹Ed.

A LETTER TO COMRADE ME‹RT 43 
2) You are quite right in saying that the Communist 
Party of Germany has achieved enormous successes. 
There is no doubt that Brandler and Thalheimer belong to 
the category of the old type of leaders who have outlived 
their time and are being pushed into the background 
by leaders of a new type. Here in Russia, too, the process 
of the dying-out of a number of old guiding functionaries 
from the world of letters and old ³leaders² has taken place. 
That process was more rapid in periods of revolutionary 
crises and slower in periods when we were accumulating 
forces, but it went on all the time. The Lunacharskys, 
Pokrovskys, Rozhkovs, Goldenbergs, Bogdanovs, Krassins, 
etc.‹such are the first specimens that come to my mind 
of former Bolshevik leaders who later dropped into secondary 
roles. It is a necessary process of renewal of the leading 
cadres of a live and developing party. Incidentally, 
the difference between the Brandlers and Thalheimers 
and the comrades I have mentioned is that, in addition 
to everything else, the Brandlers and Thalheimers are 
burdened with the old Social-Democratic baggage, whereas 
the above-mentioned Russian comrades were free 
from such a burden. This difference, as you see, speaks 
not in favour of but against Brandler and Thalheimer. 
The fact that the C.P.G. has succeeded in pushing the 
Brandlers and Thalheimers aside, in pushing them off 
the stage, is in itself evidence that the C.P.G. is growing, 
advancing and prospering. That is apart from the 
undoubted successes of the C.P.G. which you quite rightly 
mention in your letter. To think now that there are 
people in the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) who 
are planning to turn back the wheel of the German Communist 
Partyıs development means having a very bad

J. V. S T A L I N 44 
opinion of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). Be 
more careful, Comrade Me‹rt. . . . 
3) You speak about the line of the C.P.G. It is beyond 
doubt that its line‹I mean its political line‹is 
correct. That indeed explains the close, friendly (and 
not merely comradely) relations between the R.C.P.(B.) 
and the C.P.G. that you yourself refer to in your letter. But 
does that mean that we must slur over individual mistakes 
in the political work of the C.P.G. or of the R.C.P.(B.)? 
Of course not. Can it be asserted that the Central Committee 
of the C.P.G., or the Central Committee of the 
R.C.P.(B.), are free from individual mistakes? Can it 
be asserted that criticism of part of the activities of 
the Central Committee of the C.P.G. (inadequate exploitation 
of the Barmat case,18 the well-known voting of 
the Communist group in the Prussian parliament in the 
election of the Speaker of that parliament, the question 
of taxation in connection with the Dawes Plan, etc.) is 
incompatible with complete solidarity with the general 
line of the Central Committee of the C.P.G.? Obviously 
not. What will become of our Parties if, when meeting 
one another, in the Executive Committee of the Comintern, 
say, we shut our eyes to individual mistakes committed 
by our Parties, content ourselves with parading 
our ³complete harmony² and ³well-being,² and become 
yesmen to one another? I think that such parties 
could never become revolutionary. They would not be 
revolutionary parties, but mummies. It seems to me that 
some German comrades are occasionally inclined to 
demand that we should become complete yesmen to the 
Central Committee of the C.P.G. and are ready on their 
part to become complete yesmen to the Central Commit

A LETTER TO COMRADE ME‹RT 45 
tee of the R.C.P.(B.). I am emphatically opposed to 
this mutual yesmenship. Judging by your letter, you 
are also opposed to it. All the better for the C.P.G. 
4) I am emphatically opposed to the policy of kicking 
out all dissenting comrades. I am opposed to such a 
policy not because I am sorry for the dissenters, but 
because such a policy gives rise in the Party to a 
regime of intimidation, a regime of bullying, which 
kills the spirit of self-criticism and initiative. It is not 
good when leaders of the Party are feared but not respected. 
Party leaders can be real leaders only if they are not 
merely feared but respected in the Party, when their 
authority is recognised. It is difficult to produce such 
leaders, it is a long and arduous process, but it is absolutely 
essential, otherwise the Party cannot be called a 
real Bolshevik Party, and the discipline of the Party 
cannot be conscious discipline. I think that the German 
comrades are acting contrary to this self-evident truth. 
To disavow Trotsky and his supporters, we Russian Bolsheviks 
carried out an intense campaign based on an explanation 
of principles in support of the foundations of Bolshevism 
as against the foundations of Trotskyism, although, 
considering the strength and prestige of the Central 
Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), we could have dispensed with 
such a campaign. Was that campaign needed? Certainly 
it was, for by means of it we educated hundreds of thousands 
of new Party members (and also people who are not 
Party members) in the spirit of Bolshevism. It is very sad 
that our German comrades do not feel it necessary that 
repressive measures against the opposition should be preceded 
or supplemented by a wide campaign based on an 
explanation of principles, and are thus hindering the

J. V. S T A L I N 46 
education of the Party members and Party cadres in the 
spirit of Bolshevism. To expel Brandler and Thalheimer is 
an easy matter, but the task of overcoming Brandlerism 
is a difficult and serious one. In this matter, repressive 
measures alone can only cause harm; here the soil must 
be deeply ploughed, minds must be greatly enlightened. 
The R.C.P.(B.) always developed through contradictions, 
i.e., in the struggle against non-communist trends, and 
only in that struggle did it gain strength and forge real 
cadres. The same path of development through contradictions, 
through a real, serious and lengthy struggle against 
non-communist trends, especially against Social-Democratic 
traditions, Brandlerism, etc., lies before the 
C.P.G. But repressive measures alone are not enough in 
such a struggle. That is why I think that the inner- 
Party policy of the Central Committee of the C.P.G. must 
be made more flexible. I have no doubt that the C.P.G. 
will be able to rectify the defects in this sphere. 
5) You are quite right about work in the trade unions. 
The role of the trade unions in Germany is different 
from that of the trade unions in Russia. In Russia, the 
trade unions arose after the Party and, in essence, they 
were the Partyıs auxiliary organs. That is not the case in 
Germany, or in Europe generally. There, the Party arose 
from the trade unions; the latter successfully competed 
with the Party in influencing the masses, and often acted 
as a heavy fetter on the Party. If the broad masses 
in Germany, or in Europe generally, were asked which 
organisation they regarded as nearer to them, the Party 
or the trade unions, they would undoubtedly answer 
that the trade unions were nearer to them than the Party. 
Whether good or bad, it is a fact that the non-Party

A LETTER TO COMRADE ME‹RT 47 
workers in Europe regard the trade unions as their principal 
strongholds, which help them in their struggle 
against the capitalists (wages, hours, insurance, etc.), 
whereas they regard the Party as something auxiliary, secondary, 
although necessary. That explains the fact that 
the broad masses of the workers regard the direct struggle 
waged against the present trade unions from outside by the 
³ultra-Lefts² as a struggle against their principal strongholds, 
which took them decades to build, and which 
the ³Communists² now want to destroy. Failure to take 
this specific feature into account means wrecking the 
entire communist movement in the West. But from this 
two conclusions follow: 
firstly, that in the West the vast working-class 
masses cannot be won over unless the trade unions are 
won over, 
and, secondly, that the trade unions cannot be won 
over unless we work inside them and strengthen our influence 
there. 
That is why special attention must be paid to the 
work of our comrades in the trade unions. 
That is all for the time being. Donıt scold me for 
being straightforward and blunt. 
J. Stalin 
28.II.25 
Published for the first time

INTERNATIONAL WOMENıS DAY 
There has not been in the history of mankind a single 
great movement of the oppressed in which women toilers 
have not participated. Women toilers, the most oppressed 
of all the oppressed, have never kept away from the high 
road of the emancipation movement, and never could have 
done so. As is known, the movement for the emancipation 
of the slaves brought to the front hundreds of thousands 
of great women martyrs and heroines. In the ranks of 
the fighters for the emancipation of the serfs there were 
tens of thousands of women toilers. It is not surprising 
that the revolutionary working-class movement, the 
mightiest of all the emancipation movements of the oppressed 
masses, has rallied millions of women toilers to 
its banner. 
International Womenıs Day is a token of the invincibility 
of the working-class movement for emancipation 
and a harbinger of its great future. 
Women toilers‹working women and peasant women‹ 
are a vast reserve of the working class. This reserve constitutes 
a good half of the population. The side that it 
takes‹for or against the working class‹will determine 
the fate of the proletarian movement, the victory or 
defeat of the proletarian revolution, the victory or defeat

INTERNATIONAL WOMENıS DAY 49 
of the proletarian power. Consequently, the first task of 
the proletariat, and of its advanced detachment‹the 
Communist Party, is to wage a resolute struggle to free 
women, working women and peasant women, from the influence 
of the bourgeoisie, to enlighten them politically 
and to organise them under the banner of the proletariat. 
International Womenıs Day is a means of winning 
the reserve of women toilers to the side of the proletariat. 
But the women toilers are not only a reserve. If 
the working class pursues a correct policy, they can and 
must become a real working-class army, operating against 
the bourgeoisie. To forge from this reserve of women 
toilers an army of working women and peasant women, 
operating side by side with the great army of the proletariat‹
such is the second and decisive task of the working 
class. 
International Womenıs Day must become a means 
of transforming the working women and peasant women 
from a reserve of the working class into an active army of 
the emancipation movement of the proletariat. 
Long live International Womenıs Day! 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 56, 
March 8, 1925

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 
TO THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 
OF THE KUOMINTANG 
The Central Committee of the Russian Communist 
Party joins you in mourning the loss of the leader of the 
Kuomintang19 and organiser of the national-liberation 
struggle of the workers and peasants of China for the 
freedom and independence of the Chinese people, for the 
unity and independence of the Chinese state. 
The Central Committee of the Russian Communist 
Party has no doubt that Sun Yat-senıs great cause will 
not die with Sun Yat-sen, that Sun Yat-senıs cause will 
live in the hearts of the Chinese workers and peasants 
to the terror of the enemies of the Chinese people. 
The Central Committee of the Russian Communist 
Party is confident that the Kuomintang will hold high 
the banner of Sun Yat-sen in the great struggle for liberation 
from imperialism, that the Kuomintang will 
succeed with honour in carrying this banner to complete 
victory over imperialism and its agents in China. 
Sun Yat-sen is dead‹long live the cause of Sun Yatsen! 
May Sun Yat-sen's behests live on and gain in power! 
Secretary of the Central Committee 
of the Russian Communist Party 
J. Stalin 
March 13, 1925 
Pravda, No. 60, 
March 14, 1925

THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION 
AND THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST 
PARTIES 
Of a number of phenomena of decisive significance in 
the international situation, the following basic facts 
should be noted: 
1. Undoubtedly, capital has succeeded in extricating 
itself from the quagmire of the post-war crisis. The 
stabilisation of the currency in a number of capitalist 
countries, the growth of world trade and the expansion 
of production in individual countries, the export and 
investment of capital, especially Anglo-American capital, 
in Europe and Asia‹all this testifies to the successes 
capital has achieved in its ³constructive work.² As is 
known, that ³work² is being conducted under the aegis 
of the Anglo-American bloc. Of the results of this ³work,² 
the so-called ³Dawesation² of Germany, i.e., the transition 
from the method of military intervention to 
the method of financial intervention, to the method 
of financial enslavement of Germany, must be regarded 
as one of the most important. 
2. It is also beyond doubt that in Germany, in the 
centre of Europe, the period of revolutionary upsurge 
has come to an end. The period of the upsurge of revolution, 
when the movement seethes, rises and boils over, 
whereas the Partyıs slogans lag behind the movement, 
when the masses break the bounds of legality, storm

J. V. S T A L I N 52 
the old order and establish their own, new law‹ 
that period has now gone by in Germany. The workingclass 
movement in Germany has passed from the period 
of assault to the period of accumulating forces, to the 
period of forming and training a proletarian army under 
the banner of communism. It scarcely needs proof that 
this circumstance is bound to be of great importance. 
All the more definitely, therefore, must this be said, in 
order to be able quickly to find our bearings in the new 
situation and to start the work of preparing the revolution 
on new lines. 
Such are the facts of positive significance for the bourgeoisie, 
for they testify to the strength and successes of 
capital at the present time. 
But alongside these facts there are a number of 
facts of negative significance for capitalism. 
1. Undoubtedly, side by side with the strengthening 
of capitalism, there is a growth of the contradictions 
between the capitalist groups, a growth of the forces 
which weaken and disintegrate capitalism. The struggle 
between Britain and America for oil, for Canada, for 
markets, etc.; the struggle between the Anglo-American 
bloc and Japan for Eastern markets; the struggle between 
Britain and France for influence in Europe; and, 
lastly, the struggle between enslaved Germany and the 
dominant Entente‹all these are commonly-known facts 
which indicate that the successes that capital has 
achieved are transient, that the process of capitalismıs 
³recovery² contains within itself the germs of its inherent 
weakness and disintegration. 
2. The growth and consolidation of the national-liberation 
movement in India, China, Egypt, Indonesia,

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND TASKS OF COMMUNIST PARTIES 53 
North Africa, etc., which are undermining capitalismıs 
rear. Since, for its ³recovery,² imperialism must enlarge 
its sphere of influence in the colonies and dependent countries, 
whereas the struggle of these countries against 
imperialism is undoubtedly becoming intensified, it is 
obvious that the successes of imperialism in this sphere 
cannot be durable. 
3. The fight for trade-union unity in Europe and the 
crisis in the Amsterdam Federation.20 The fight of the 
British trade unions for trade-union unity, the support 
of this fight by the Soviet trade unions, the transformation 
of the fight for trade-union unity into a fight against 
the counter-revolutionary leaders of the Amsterdam 
Federation (Oudégeest, Sassenbach, Jouhaux, and others), 
who pursue a policy of splitting the trade unions‹are 
all facts which indicate that the Amsterdam Federation 
is in a state of profound crisis. And what does 
the crisis in the Amsterdam Federation mean? It means 
the instability of bourgeois rule, for the Amsterdam 
trade-union bureaucracy is a part and a prop of this 
rule. 
4. The economic growth of the Soviet Union. There 
is no doubt that the stories of the bourgeois hack writers 
about the Soviets being incapable of organising industry 
have been completely refuted. There is no doubt that during 
the past two years, after intervention and the blockade 
ceased, the industry of the Soviet Union has revived 
and gained strength. There is no doubt that the material 
and cultural conditions of the workers have substantially 
improved during this short period. There is no doubt that 
this improvement will continue. All these circumstances 
are now of decisive importance for revolutionising the

J. V. S T A L I N 54 
workers in the capitalist countries. I think that the workers 
of the West have never displayed such interest in 
Russia as they are doing now. Why? Because rumours 
are reaching them about the new way of life of the Soviet 
workers in the workersı state called the Soviet Union, 
and they would like to test the truth of these rumours. 
The fact that scores and hundreds of workers holding diverse 
views come from Europe to Russia and peer into 
every nook and cranny undoubtedly indicates that interest 
in Russia will grow month by month among the 
workers of the West. There is no doubt that this pilgrimage 
to Russia will grow. And when the Western workers 
become convinced that every step in the development of 
industry in Russia also means a step in the improvement 
of the conditions of the workers, and not the deterioration 
of these conditions, as usually happens in the capitalist 
countries, they will realise that it is high time for them, 
the Western workers, to set up workersı states in their 
own countries. That is why the very existence of the Soviet 
state is a deadly menace to imperialism. That is 
why no successes that imperialism achieves can be durable 
as long as the Soviet state exists and develops. 
Such are the facts of negative significance for the 
bourgeoisie, for they testify to the strength and probable 
successes of the revolutionary movement in the near 
future. 
The conflict between these opposite trends, positive 
and negative, constitutes the basis and content of the 
present international situation. 
Amidst this conflict of opposites, so-called pacifism 
arose and wilted before it could bloom, failing to mark 
either an ³era,² an ³epoch² or a ³period.² It failed to

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND TASKS OF COMMUNIST PARTIES 55 
justify either the hopes of the compromisers or the apprehensions 
of the counter-revolutionaries. 
In this conflict the ³renowned² names of Poincaré 
and Hughes, of MacDonald and Herriot, perished. 
Which of these trends will gain the upper hand, the 
positive or the negative? 
There can be no doubt that in time the trends that 
are unfavourable for capitalism and favourable for the 
revolution must triumph, for imperialism is incapable 
of resolving the contradictions that are corroding it, 
for it is capable only of alleviating them for a time with 
the result that they break out again later on and manifest 
themselves with fresh destructive force. It is also 
beyond doubt, however, that at the present time the positive 
trends, that are favourable for capitalism, are gaining 
the upper hand. 
That is the specific feature of the present international 
situation. 
As a result we have a sort of lull in Europe and 
America, ³disturbed² by the national revolutionary movement 
in the colonies and ³marred² by the existence, 
development and growing strength of the Soviet Union. 
For the bourgeoisie it means a respite, increased 
exports of capital, increased wealth, increased oppression 
and exploitation in the colonies, increased pressure 
on the Soviet Union, the concentration of all the 
counter-revolutionary forces around Anglo-American 
capital. 
For the proletariat in the capitalist countries it means 
the opening of a period of accumulating forces, the 
opening of a period of forming and training the proletarian 
armies under the banner of communism in the

J. V. S T A L I N 56 
conditions of a system of repression alternating with a 
system of ³liberties.² 
For the colonies it means an intensification of the 
struggle against national oppression and exploitation, an 
intensification of the struggle for liberation from imperialism.
For the Soviet Union it means the exertion of all efforts 
to develop industry further, to strengthen the 
countryıs defensive capacity, to concentrate the revolutionary 
forces of all countries against imperialism. 
Hence the tasks of the Communist Parties: 
1. To utilise to the utmost all contradictions in the 
camp of the bourgeoisie with the object of disintegrating 
and weakening its forces and of strengthening the positions 
of the proletariat. 
2. To devise concrete forms and methods of drawing 
the working class in the advanced countries closer to 
the national revolutionary movement in the colonies and 
dependent countries with the object of rendering all 
possible support to this movement against the common 
enemy, against imperialism. 
3. To promote the fight for trade-union unity and to 
carry it to a successful conclusion, bearing in mind that 
this is the surest means of winning over the vast workingclass 
masses; for it is impossible to win over the vast 
proletarian masses unless the trade unions are won over; 
and it is impossible to win over the trade unions unless 
work is conducted in them and unless the confidence of 
the masses of the workers is won in the trade unions 
month by month and year by year. Failing this, it is 
out of the question even to think of achieving the 
dictatorship of the proletariat.

INTERNATIONAL SITUATION AND TASKS OF COMMUNIST PARTIES 57 
4. To devise concrete forms and methods of drawing 
the working class closer to the small peasantry, who are 
crushed by the bureaucratic machine of the bourgeois state 
and by the extortionate prices of the all-powerful trusts, 
bearing in mind that the struggle to win over the small 
peasantry is the immediate task of a party that is advancing 
towards the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
5. To support the Soviet regime and to frustrate the 
interventionist machinations of imperialism against the 
Soviet Union, bearing in mind that the Soviet Union is 
the bulwark of the revolutionary movement in all countries, 
and that to preserve and strengthen the Soviet 
Union means to accelerate the victory of the working 
class over the world bourgeoisie. 
Pravda, No. 66, 
March 22, 1925 
Signed: J. Stalin

THE COMMUNIST PARTY 
OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA 
Speech Delivered in the Czechoslovak 
Commission of the E.C.C.I.21 
January 17, 1925 
Comrades, leaving aside certain minor points and 
personal factors which some comrades have dragged into 
the subject, the disagreements in the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia can be reduced to the following nine 
questions: 
1) Is there a crisis in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia? 
2) What is the chief cause of the crisis? 
3) What is the character of the crisis, i.e., from 
where does danger threaten, from the Left or from the 
Right? 
4) Which danger is the more serious, the Left or the 
Right? 
5) Why is the danger from the Right the more real 
danger? 
6) How should the struggle against the Right danger 
be waged so that it results in real Bolshevisation and 
in a real solution of the crisis? 
7) What is the immediate task in connection with 
Bolshevisation in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia?

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA 59 
8) The rights of the Comintern in relation to the 
national sections. 
9) Comrade Kreibich and the threat of a split. 
Is there a crisis in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia? 
Yes, there is. Both sides admit it. On this 
point there is no disagreement between them. Comrade 
Smeral went even further and said that the crisis is deeper 
than some comrades usually represent it. 
What is the chief cause of the crisis? Comrade Smeral 
was quite right when he said that the chief cause of 
the crisis lay in the difficulties entailed by the transition 
from a period of revolutionary upsurge to a period 
of lull. A transition period, which calls for a new orientation, 
usually gives rise to some kind of a crisis in the 
Party. That is the situation in Czechoslovakia, too, at the 
present time. 
What is the character of the crisis, and from where 
does danger threaten, from the Left or from the Right? 
Here, too, Comrade Smeral was right when he said that 
danger threatens from both sides, from the Left and from 
the Right. There is the danger of over-estimating the 
importance of partial demands to the detriment of fundamental 
demands, of over-estimating parliamentary activity 
and work in the trade unions. That is the danger 
from the Right, for it leads to adapting oneself to the bourgeoisie. 
On the other hand, there is the danger of under-estimating 
the importance of partial demands, of parliamentary 
activity, of work in the trade unions, and so forth. 
That is the danger from the Left, for it leads to becoming 
divorced from the masses and to sectarianism. Comrade 
Smeralıs desire to take a middle position in this 
conflict between the two opposite deviations is quite

J. V. S T A L I N 60 
legitimate. The only trouble is that he has failed to keep 
to that position and has followed in the wake of the 
Rights. 
Which is the more serious danger, the Left or the 
Right? I think that Comrade Smeral has not cleared 
up this question for himself. He directs his criticism 
mainly against the Lefts, in the belief that they are the 
chief danger. The facts, however, show that the chief 
danger comes from the Right and not from the Left. 
Comrade Smeral has not realised this, and herein lies 
his first mistake. 
Why is the danger from the Right the more serious 
danger at the present time? For three reasons. 
Firstly. The transition itself from upsurge to lull, 
by its very nature, increases the chances of danger from 
the Right. Whereas an upsurge gives rise to revolutionary 
illusions and causes the Left danger to become the principal 
one, a lull, on the contrary, gives rise to Social- 
Democratic, reformist illusions and causes the Right 
danger to become the principal one. In 1920, when the 
working-class movement was on the upgrade, Lenin wrote 
his pamphlet ³Left-Wing² Communism, an Infantile 
Disorder. Why did Lenin write this particular pamphlet? 
Because at that time the Left danger was the more serious 
danger. I think that if Lenin were alive he would now 
write another pamphlet entitled Right-Wing Communism, 
an Old-Age Disorder, because, at the present time, in 
the period of lull, when illusions about compromise are 
bound to grow, the Right danger is the most serious 
danger. 
Secondly. As Comrade Smeral reported, no less than 
70 per cent of the members of the Communist Party of

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA 61 
Czechoslovakia are former Social-Democrats. It scarcely 
needs proof that Social-Democratic relapses are not only 
possible but inevitable in such a party. Needless to say, 
this circumstance is bound to increase the danger from 
the Right. 
Thirdly. The Czechoslovak state is a state that marks 
the national victory of the Czechs. The Czechs have 
already acquired their national state as a dominant 
nation. The workers there are for the time being fairly 
well off: there is no unemployment, and they are obviously 
intoxicated with the idea of possessing a national state. 
All this is bound to give rise to illusions about national 
peace between the classes in Czechoslovakia. Needless to 
say, this circumstance, in its turn, gives rise to and increases 
the danger from the Right. And it is here that 
we must look for the reason why the divergence between 
the Rights and Lefts took place along national lines, 
why the Slovaks and the Germans (oppressed nations) 
are on the left flank, and the Czechs are on the opposite 
flank Comrade Smeral spoke of the danger of such a 
division. That is true, of course. But it is also true that 
such a division is quite understandable, if we bear in 
mind the above-mentioned specific national features of 
the Czechoslovak state and the dominant position of the 
Czechs. 
Such are the principal reasons why the danger from 
the Right in the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia is 
a particularly serious danger. 
How should the struggle against the Right danger in 
the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia be waged? This 
question brings us to the very core of the disagreements. 
One would think that the struggle against this danger

J. V. S T A L I N 62 
should be waged in the most determined and ruthless manner. 
But with the Czech Communists the opposite has 
happened. Is Comrade Smeral combating the danger from 
the Right? Yes, he is. But he is combating it in such a way 
that, in the final result, the Rights, instead of being eliminated, 
are being cultivated, supported, protected from 
the blows of the Lefts. That is somewhat strange, but it 
is a fact, comrades. That is Comrade Smeralıs second 
and principal mistake. 
Judge for yourselves. 
1. It is a fact that Comrade Kreibich wrote an article 
in favour of Trotskyism. It is a fact that this document 
is known in Party circles and is passing from hand to 
hand. This document should have been dragged into the 
light of day and its author should have been given a good 
drubbing, an ideological drubbing, in full view of the workers, 
in order to give the Party the opportunity to realise 
the danger of Trotskyism and to train the cadres in the 
spirit of Bolshevism; for what is Trotskyism if not the 
Right wing of communism, if not the danger from the 
Right? What did Comrade Smeral do in this case? Instead 
of raising the question of Comrade Kreibichıs 
Trotskyism before the whole Party, he slurred over it, 
suppressed it, took it behind the scenes and ³settled² it 
there in a hole-and-corner way, as if it were an ordinary 
³misunderstanding.² The gainers by this were Trotskyism 
and Comrade Kreibich. The Party was the 
loser. Instead of the Rights being combated, they were 
protected. 
2. It is known that some of the leaders of three trade 
unions‹those of the transport workers, woodworkers 
and building workers‹issued a document demanding the

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA 63 
complete independence of the unions from the Party. It 
is known that this document is evidence of the existence 
of a number of Right elements in the trade unions of 
Czechoslovakia. This document should have been analysed 
in full view of the Party, and the Party should have 
been warned of the danger of the trade unions becoming 
divorced from it. What did Comrade Smeral 
do in this case? He hushed up this question too; he 
withdrew the document from circulation and thereby 
hid i t from the eyes of the Party membership. 
The Rights escaped unscathed and the ³Partyıs prestige² 
was saved. And that is called combating the 
Rights! 
3. It is known that there are Right-wing elements in 
the communist group in parliament. It is known that every 
now and again these elements throw off the leadership 
of the Party and try to set themselves up in opposition 
to the Central Committee of the Party. It is urgently 
necessary to combat these elements, particularly at the 
present time, in the present lull. How did Comrade 
Smeral combat this danger? Instead of exposing the Rightwing 
elements in the communist parliamentary group 
he took them under his protection and saved them by 
means of an elastic resolution on recognising the Party 
leadership, a resolution adopted as the result of an internal 
struggle conducted behind the scenes, in the fourth 
year of the Partyıs existence. Again the Rights gained 
and the Party was the loser. 
4. Lastly, the Bubnik case. I must say, comrades, 
that the l u l l i s not a period of the absence of all 
action. The lull is a period of forming and training 
the proletarian armies, a period of preparing them

J. V. S T A L I N 64 
for revolution. But the proletarian armies can be trained 
only in the course of action. The rise in the cost 
of living that has recently begun in Czechoslovakia is 
one of the favourable conditions for such action. 
As is known, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 
took advantage of this situation and recently organised 
a number of demonstrations in connection 
with the rise in the cost of living. As is known, the 
Right-wing Communist Bubnik, now expelled from the 
Party, also took advantage of the situation and tried 
to disrupt those actions by the workers, thereby striking 
a blow at the Party in the rear. What did Comrade 
Smeral do to safeguard the Party from the blow 
struck in its rear by the Rights? Instead of utilising 
the Bubnik ³case² and by means of it ruthlessly 
exposing the entire Right-wing group in full view of 
the Party, Comrade Smeral reduced the question of 
principle concerning the Rights to the individual 
case of Bubnik, although all the world knows that 
Bubnik does not stand alone, that he has supporters 
in the trade unions, in the communist group in 
parliament, and in the press. At the price of a small 
sacrifice (the expulsion of Bubnik) he saved the Rightwing 
group from defeat, to the detriment of the fundamental 
interests of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. 
And Comrade Smeral calls that the tactics of combating 
the Rights! 
Comrade Smeral calls those tactics ³fine,² ³delicate.² 
Those tactics may indeed be fine, but they have nothing 
in common with the Bolshevik tactics of uncompromising 
struggle against the Rights; there cannot be the 
slightest doubt about that. Comrade Smeral forgets the

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA 65 
Russian saying: ³The finest thread is most likely to 
break.² He forgot that fineness is no guarantee against 
failure. And that is what happened, as is known; for 
those ³fine² tactics towards the Rights broke and failed 
at the very first test, when, encouraged by those tactics, 
the Bubnik group almost succeeded in disrupting the 
recent action by the Czech proletariat. The strengthening 
of the Rights and Bubnikıs treachery‹such are the 
results of Comrade Smeralıs ³fine² tactics. That is why 
I think that Comrade Smeralıs ³fine² tactics are tactics 
that save the Rights, tactics that intensify the crisis, 
tactics threatening to doom the Party. 
Why did the old Social-Democracy perish as a revolutionary 
Party? Among other things, because Kautsky 
and Co. did indeed employ the ³fine² tactics of shielding 
and saving the Rights, the ³delicate² tactics of ³unity 
and peace² with Ed. Bernstein and Co. What was 
the result? The result was that at the crucial moment, 
just before the war, the Right-wing Social-Democrats 
betrayed the workers, the ³orthodox² became the prisoners 
of the Rights, and Social-Democracy as a whole 
proved to be a ³living corpse.² I think that, in time, 
this may happen to the Communist Party in Czechoslovakia 
if you do not quickly and resolutely substitute for 
Comrade Smeralıs ³fine² tactics the Bolshevik tactics 
of ruthless struggle against the Right-wing groups in 
the communist movement. In saying this I am not putting 
Comrade Smeral on a par with the Social-Democrats. 
Not at all. He is undoubtedly a Communist, and, perhaps, 
even a splendid Communist. What I want to say is that if 
he does not renounce his ³fine² tactics he will inevitably 
slide into Social-Democracy.

J. V. S T A L I N 66 
What is the immediate task of the Communist Party 
of Czechoslovakia? 
The immediate task is, while combating ³ultra-Left² 
deviations, resolutely to combat the danger from the 
Right with the aim of altogether isolating and completely 
eliminating the Rights. To unite all the genuine revolutionary 
elements in the Party for the purpose of completely 
eliminating the Right groups‹such is the Partyıs task, 
such is the way out of the crisis. Unless this is done it 
is useless even to think of Bolshevising the Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia. 
That, of course, does not mean that all the Rights 
must necessarily be expelled. Expulsion is not the decisive 
weapon in the struggle against the Rights. The main 
thing is to give the Right groups a drubbing, ideologically 
and morally, in the course of a struggle based on 
principle and to draw the mass of the Party membership 
into this struggle. That is one of the chief and most important 
means of educating the Party in the spirit of Bolshevism. 
Expulsion must come, if it is really necessary, 
as a natural result of the ideological rout of the enemy. 
In this respect, the Lefts in Czechoslovakia committed a 
grave mistake in hastening to expel Bubnik. Instead of 
utilising the Bubnik ³case² to the utmost and linking it 
with the principles underlying the stand taken by the 
Rights on the question of mass action, revealing their 
true countenance, the Lefts hastened with the expulsion, 
and cut off the road to further attack against the 
Rights on this ground. 
As regards the rights of the Comintern and its intervention 
in the affairs of the national parties, I emphatically 
disagree with those comrades who spoke in favour

THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA 67 
of curtailing those rights. They want the Comintern to 
be transformed into an organisation situated beyond the 
stars, gazing dispassionately at what is going on in the 
individual parties and patiently recording events. No, 
comrades, the Comintern cannot become an organisation 
beyond the stars. The Comintern is a militant organisation 
of the proletariat, it is linked with the workingclass 
movement by all the roots of its existence and cannot 
refrain from intervening in the affairs of individual 
parties, supporting the revolutionary elements and combating 
their opponents. Of course, the parties possess 
internal autonomy, the party congresses must be unfettered, 
and the Central Committees must be elected by 
the congresses. But to deduce from this that the Comintern 
must be denied the right of leadership, and hence of 
intervention, means working on behalf of the enemies of 
communism. 
Lastly, about Comrade Kreibich. I think that the 
purpose of his entire speech was to frighten somebody or 
other with the threat of a split. Donıt touch the Rights 
in Brünn, he said. If you do there will be trouble. Donıt 
fight them; if you do there will be a split. Well, we 
shall see. But let not Comrade Kreibich try to frighten 
us, he will not succeed. He surely knows that we are seasoned 
people, and threats of a split cannot frighten our 
kind. And if he thinks of passing from threats to action, 
I assure him that he, and he alone, will suffer. 
To sum up. There is a crisis in the Party. There can 
be no doubt about its causes. The chief danger comes 
from the Right. The task is to wage a determined and uncompromising 
struggle against this danger. The way out 
of the crisis is to unite all the revolutionary elements

J. V. S T A L I N 68 
in the Party for the purpose of completely eliminating 
the Rights. 
Advantage must be taken of the lull to strengthen 
the Party, to Bolshevise i t and make i t ³always 
ready² for all possible ³complications²; for ³ye know 
neither the day nor the hour² wherein ³the bridegroom 
cometh² to open the road for a new revolutionary upsurge. 
Pravda, No. 72, 
March 29, 1925

CONCERNING THE NATIONAL QUESTION 
IN YUGOSLAVIA 
Speech Delivered 
in the Yugoslav Commission of the E.C.C.I., 
March 30, 1925 
Comrades, I think that Semich has not fully understood 
the main essence of the Bolshevik presentation of 
the national question. The Bolsheviks never separated 
the national question from the general question of revolution, 
either before October or after October. The main 
essence of the Bolshevik approach to the national question 
is that the Bolsheviks always examined the national 
question in inseparable connection with the revolutionary 
perspective. 
Semich quoted Lenin, saying that Lenin was in 
favour of embodying the solution of the national question 
in the constitution. By this he, Semich, evidently 
wanted to say that Lenin regarded the national question 
as a constitutional one, that is, not as a question of 
revolution but as a question of reform. That is quite 
wrong. Lenin never had, nor could he have had, constitutional 
illusions. It is enough to consult his works to 
be convinced of that. If Lenin spoke of a constitution, 
he had in mind not the constitutional, but the revolutionary 
way of settling the national question, that is to 
say, he regarded a constitution as something that would 
result from the victory of the revolution. We in the 
U.S.S.R. also have a Constitution, and i t reflects

J. V. S T A L I N 70 
a definite solution of the national question. This 
Constitution, however, came into being not as the result 
of a deal with the bourgeoisie, but as the result of a 
victorious revolution. 
Semich further referred to Stalinıs pamphlet on 
the national question written in 1912,22 and tried to 
find in it at least indirect corroboration of his point 
of view. But this reference was fruitless, because he did 
not and could not find even a remote hint, let alone 
a quotation, that would in the least justify his ³constitutional² 
approach to the national question. In confirmation 
of this, I might remind Semich of the 
passage in Stalinıs pamphlet where a contrast is drawn 
between the Austrian (constitutional) method of settling 
the national question and the Russian Marxistsı 
(revolutionary) method. 
Here it is: 
³The Austrians hope to achieve the Œfreedom of nationalitiesı 
by means of petty reforms, by slow steps. While they propose 
cultural-national autonomy as a practical measure, they do not 
count on any radical change, on a democratic movement for liberation, 
which they do not even contemplate. The Russian Marxists, 
on the other hand, associate the Œfreedom of nationalitiesı with 
a probable radical change, with a democratic movement for liberation, 
having no grounds for counting on reforms. And this essentially 
alters matters in regard to the probable fate of the nations 
of Russia.² 
Clear, one would think. 
And this is not Stalinıs personal view, but the general 
view of the Russian Marxists, who examined, and 
continue to examine, the national question in inseparable 
connection with the general question of revolution. 
It can be said without stretching a point that in the

CONCERNING THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA 71 
history of Russian Marxism there were two stages in the 
presentation of the national question: the f i r s t , or 
pre-October stage; and the second, or October stage. In 
the first stage, the national question was regarded as 
part of the general question of the bourgeois-democratic 
revolution, that is to say, as part of the question of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat and peasantry. In the 
second stage, when the national question assumed wider 
scope and became a question of the colonies, when it 
became transformed from an intra-state question into a 
world question, it came to be regarded as part of the 
general question of the proletarian revolution, as part of 
the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat. In 
both stages, as you see, the approach was strictly revolutionary. 
I think that Semich has not yet fully grasped all 
this. Hence his attempts to reduce the national question 
to a constitutional issue, i.e., to regard it as a question 
of reform. 
That mistake leads him to another, namely, his refusal 
to regard the national question as being, in essence, 
a peasant question. Not an agrarian but a peasant question, 
for these are two different things. It is quite true 
that the national question must not be identified with 
the peasant question, for, in addition to peasant questions, 
the national question includes such questions as 
national culture, national statehood, etc. But it is also 
beyond doubt that, after all, the peasant question is 
the basis, the quintessence, of the national question. 
That explains the fact that the peasantry constitutes 
the main army of the national movement, that there is 
no powerful national movement without the peasant

J. V. S T A L I N 72 
army, nor can there be. That is what is meant when it is 
said that, in essence, the national question is a peasant 
question. I think that Semichıs reluctance to accept 
this formula is due to an under-estimation of the inherent 
strength of the national movement and a failure 
to understand the profoundly popular and profoundly 
revolutionary character of the national movement. 
This lack of understanding and this under-estimation 
constitute a grave danger, for, in practice, they imply 
an under-estimation of the potential might latent, 
for instance, in the movement of the Croats for national 
emancipation. This under-estimation is fraught with 
serious complications for the entire Yugoslav Communist 
Party. 
That is Semichıs second mistake. 
Undoubtedly, Semichıs attempt to treat the national 
question in Yugoslavia in isolation from 
the international situation and the probable prospects 
in Europe must also be regarded as a mistake. 
Proceeding from the fact that there is no serious popular 
movement for independence among the Croats and the 
Slovenes at the present moment, Semich arrives at the 
conclusion that the question of the right of nations to 
secede is an academic question, at any rate, not an urgent 
one. That is wrong, of course. Even if we admit 
that this question is not urgent at the present moment, 
it might definitely become very urgent if war begins, 
or when war begins, if a revolution breaks out in Europe, 
or when it breaks out. That war will inevitably begin, 
and that they, over there, are bound to come to blows 
there can be no doubt, bearing in mind the nature and 
development of imperialism.

CONCERNING THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA 73 
In 1912, when we Russian Marxists were outlining 
the first draft of the national programme, no serious movement 
for independence yet existed in any of the 
border regions of the Russian Empire. Nevertheless, 
we deemed it necessary to include in our programme the 
point on the right of nations to self-determination, i.e., 
the right of every nationality to secede and exist as an 
independent state. Why? Because we based ourselves 
not only on what existed then, but also on what was 
developing and impending in the general system of international 
relations; that is, we took into account not 
only the present, but also the future. We knew that if 
any nationality were to demand secession, the Russian 
Marxists would fight to ensure the right to secede for 
every such nationality. In the course of his speech Semich 
repeatedly referred to Stalinıs pamphlet on the national 
question. But here is what Stalinıs pamphlet says about 
self-determination and independence: 
³The growth of imperialism in Europe i s not fortuitous. 
In Europe, capital is beginning to feel cramped, and it is reaching 
out towards foreign countries in search of new markets, cheap 
labour and new fields of investment But this leads to external 
complications and to war. . . . It is quite possible that a combination 
of internal and external conditions may arise in which one 
or another nationality in Russia may find it necessary to raise 
and settle the question of its independence. And, of course, it is 
not for Marxists to create obstacles in such cases.² 
That was written as far back as 1912. You know that 
subsequently this view was fully confirmed both during 
the war and afterwards, and especially after the victory 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia.

J. V. S T A L I N 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
74 
All the more reason, therefore, why we must reckon 
with such possibilities in Europe in general, and in Yugoslavia 
in particular, especially now, when the national 
revolutionary movement in the oppressed countries has 
become more profound, and after the victory of the revolution 
in Russia. It must also be borne in mind that 
Yugoslavia is not a fully independent country, that she 
is tied up with certain imperialist groups, and that, 
consequently, she cannot escape the great play of forces 
that is going on outside Yugoslavia. If you are drawing 
up a national programme for the Yugoslav Party‹and 
that is precisely what we are dealing with now‹you 
must remember that this programme must proceed not 
only from what exists at present, but also from what is 
developing and what will inevitably occur by virtue of 
international relations. That is why I think that the 
question of the right of nations to self-determination 
must be regarded as an immediate and vital 
question. 
Now about the national programme. The starting 
point of the national programme must be the thesis of 
a Soviet revolution in Yugoslavia, the thesis that the 
national question cannot be solved at all satisfactorily 
unless the bourgeoisie is overthrown and the revolution 
is victorious. Of course, there may be exceptions; there 
was such an exception, for instance, before the war, 
when Norway separated from Sweden‹of which Lenin 
treats in detail in one of his articles.23 But that was before 
the war, and under an exceptional combination of 
favourable circumstances. Since the war, and especially 
since the victory of the Soviet revolution in Russia, 
such cases are hardly possible. At any rate, the chances

CONCERNING THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN YUGOSLAVIA 75 
of their being possible are now so slight that they can be 
put as nil. But if that is so, it is obvious that we cannot 
construct our programme from elements whose significance 
is nil. That is why the thesis of a revolution must 
be the starting point of the national programme. 
Further, it is imperatively necessary to include in 
the national programme a special point on the right of 
nations to self-determination, including the right to 
secede. I have already said why such a point cannot be 
omitted under present internal and international conditions. 
Finally, the programme must also include a special 
point providing for national territorial autonomy for 
those nationalities in Yugoslavia which may not deem it 
necessary to secede from that country. Those who think 
that such a contingency must be excluded are incorrect. 
That is wrong. Under certain circumstances, as a result 
of the victory of a Soviet revolution in Yugoslavia, it 
may well be that some nationalities will not wish 
to secede, just as happened here in Russia. It is clear 
that to meet such a contingency it is necessary to have 
in the programme a point on autonomy, envisaging the 
transformation of the state of Yugoslavia into a federation 
of autonomous national states based on the Soviet 
system. 
Thus, the right to secede must be provided for those 
nationalities that may wish to secede, and the right to 
autonomy must be provided for those nationalities that 
may prefer to remain within the framework of the Yugoslav 
state. 
To avoid misunderstanding, I must say that the right 
to secede must not be understood as an obligation, as a

J. V. S T A L I N 76 
duty to secede. A nation may take advantage of this 
right and secede, but it may also forgo the right, and if 
it does not wish to exercise it, that is its business and we 
cannot but reckon with the fact. Some comrades turn 
this right to secede into an obligation and demand from 
the Croats, for instance, that they secede whatever happens. 
That position is wrong and must be rejected. We must 
not confuse a right with an obligation. 
The magazine Bolshevik, No. 7, 
April 15, 1925

THE ACTIVE 
OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE 
IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 
Speech Delivered at a Meeting of the Organising 
Bureau of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) 
April 6, 1925 
Comrades, the first task is to ensure that the Youth 
League possesses its basic proletarian core, as the core 
which leads the entire League. The reporter did not say 
anything on this question. That is not surprising, since 
we are discussing the work of the Young Communist 
League in the countryside and not its proletarian core. 
But this does not prevent the task of acquiring a proletarian 
core from remaining the Leagueıs principal task. I 
think that the efforts that are being made in the League 
in this direction are more or less successful. It may be 
said without exaggeration that the recruiting of young 
workers for the Young Communist League is proceeding 
successfully, and the time is not far distant when the 
League will embrace no less than nine-tenths of the 
entire working-class youth. 
The second task is properly to distribute the responsible 
workers of the proletarian core in the key points 
and principal districts of the Union in order to ensure 
that this core exercises real leadership of the peasant 
section of the youth. I take as my starting point the 
fact that the peasant section of the youth is numerically 
larger than its proletarian section, and also the 
fact that the proletarian forces among the youth are 
not numerous enough to be distributed evenly among

J. V. S T A L I N 78 
all the uyezds and volosts of the Soviet Union. It is 
therefore necessary to place these forces at points from 
which it will be most easy to ensure leadership of the 
peasant youth. I do not think that the Young Communist 
League is carrying out this task as successfully as 
the first. Nevertheless, there are grounds for supposing 
that the League is devoting all its energy to the accomplishment 
of this task and that the results of these 
efforts will be seen in the very near future. 
The third task is to ensure that the Young Communist 
League has a numerous active of peasant youth in the 
countryside, to educate this active politically, to make 
it the instrument of proletarian policy in the countryside, 
and to transform it into a cement that will bind 
the proletariat with the toiling masses of the peasantry. 
That is a difficult and extremely complicated task, 
and it is quite impossible to carry it out in a short space 
of time. The proletarian core of the Young Communist 
League will have to exert tremendous efforts, and to 
strain every nerve in order to cope with it. But it must 
be carried out at all costs, for if it is not, it will be 
impossible either to strengthen the Young Communist 
League or to maintain the bond between the workers 
and peasants. 
But how can we ensure that the Young Communist 
League has a peasant active, how can we educate this active, 
and how can we ensure that this active will become 
the instrument of proletarian policy in the countryside? 
I t i s said that the secretaries of Y.C.L. village 
units alone number not less than 27,000. It is said 
that in addition to secretaries of units there are 
active Young Communist League workers in the co

THE ACTIVE OF THE Y.C.L. IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 79 
operatives, in the Soviets, in the Peasant Committees, 
cultural institutions, and so forth. It is said that, all 
together, these should constitute a Young Communist 
League rural active amounting to no less than 100,000. 
Whether all this is true, it is difficult to say, but if it 
is, then I must say that, skilfully utilised, this active can 
be a tremendous force, capable of performing miracles. 
This is all the more important because at the present 
time the Partyıs active in the countryside is much smaller. 
And so the problem is: how is this numerous active 
to be educated, how can it be made an instrument of proletarian 
policy in the countryside not only in name, but in fact? 
It is not my intention to give an exhaustive answer 
here. It is quite impossible to do so in a short speech. But 
it is quite possible even in a short speech to indicate some 
of the chief conditions that are necessary for a correct 
approach to this problem. What are these conditions? 
There are at least eight of them. 
Firstly. The youth active in the countryside must 
be supplied with popular pamphlets and handbooks 
explaining the decrees the Soviet Government has issued 
for the benefit of the peasant poor. This active must 
know these decrees inside out, must be able to explain 
them to the peasant poor, and must be able on the basis 
of these decrees to protect the interests of the peasant 
poor from the domination of the kulaks. I think that 
ignorance of these decrees and their systematic violation 
by the ³powers that be² in the countryside is one of the 
chief evils of the existing state of things there. The 
Young Communist League active in the countryside must 
be the guardian of revolutionary law. It must stand up 
staunchly for the poor in the countryside. This task is

J. V. S T A L I N 80 
undoubtedly simple and prosaic. Undoubtedly, it is far 
easier to talk about the world revolution than to carry 
out this simple and everyday task connected with the 
Soviet decrees. There is no doubt, however, that unless 
it is carried out, no bond is possible. 
Secondly. The youth active in the countryside must 
be supplied with popular pamphlets on the elementary 
principles of agricultural science. This active must study 
agriculture, must become familiar with measures for improving 
it, and must be able to give the peasants the 
necessary advice on this subject. Often the peasants do 
not take Young Communist League members seriously 
and ridicule them. That happens because the peasants 
regard them as having nothing to do with farming, 
regard them as ignoramuses and idlers. Hence, the task 
is to bring the Young Communist Leaguers closer to farming, 
to link them with it. The Young Communist League 
activist will be able to win the respect and confidence 
of the peasants only if he becomes directly linked with 
agriculture, if he learns to give useful advice on how to 
advance peasant economy, how to improve and strengthen 
it. That is not an easy matter, of course; it may even 
be dull work. But that does not prevent it from being an 
essential means of winning the confidence of the peasantry. 
Thirdly. The Young Communist League active in 
the countryside must be supplied with popular pamphlets 
on the agricultural tax, on the local budget and on the 
financial state of the country. The tax and the local budget 
are now in the forefront in the countryside. In connection 
with them innumerable abuses are being committed. 
How should the taxes be apportioned so that 
the poor peasant is not wronged or the kulak relieved

THE ACTIVE OF THE Y.C.L. IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 81 
from the burden of taxation? How should the sums assigned 
in the local budgets be spent, and for what needs? 
How can it be ensured that abuses in this connection 
are exposed and eradicated? All these are questions that 
the Young Communist League activist cannot ignore. 
The task is to intervene in all these matters and come to 
the aid of the labouring peasants. That, too, is by no means 
easy or attractive. But if it is not done there cannot be 
any Soviet constructive work in the countryside. 
Fourthly. The Young Communist League active in the 
countryside must be supplied with popular handbooks on 
questions concerning Soviet constructive work, on revitalising 
the Soviets and enlisting the peasants in the work 
of village, volost, district, uyezd, etc., administration. 
The Young Communist League activist must know inside 
out the regulations governing the rights and duties of the 
local Soviets; the rights and duties of the peasants in relation 
to the Soviets, the electoral system, the procedure of 
conducting elections, etc. The task is to explain to the 
peasants the policy of the Party and the Soviet Government 
in the countryside and to see to it that this policy 
is honestly and conscientiously carried out. If that is not 
done it is useless to think of winning confidence among 
the peasants, of enlarging the peasant active, or of 
implanting proletarian democracy in the countryside. 
Fifthly. The Young Communist League active in the 
countryside must be supplied with popular pamphlets 
on agricultural, credit and consumer co-operatives, on 
agricultural artels, and on collective farming generally. 
The Young Communist League activist must be able to 
enlist the peasants in the work of implanting a co-operative 
communal life in the countryside. This is an extremely

J. V. S T A L I N 82 
difficult and complicated task, but it is absolutely necessary 
to carry it out in order to draw the rural population into 
the work of socialist construction. Agricultural and credit 
co-operatives are now a matter of first-rate importance for 
the peasants. The task is to make co-operation something 
near and dear to the peasantry. In this connection attention 
should be paid to the fact that the lack of livestock 
and farm implements among the poor sections of the 
peasantry creates in the countryside a special situation 
favourable to the formation of artels and collective farms, 
provided the state credit institutions render definite 
assistance. The task is to make it possible for the poor 
sections of the peasantry to obtain preferential credits 
for this purpose. The Young Communist League activist 
cannot ignore such vital questions. 
Sixthly. The Young Communist League active in the 
countryside must be supplied with the necessary instructions 
and information concerning cultural development 
in the countryside‹on the organisation of village reading-
rooms, the abolition of illiteracy, etc. The task 
is to make the Young Communist League activist the 
natural assistant of the Soviets, and of the rural cultural 
forces generally, in the work of implanting Soviet culture. 
Seventhly. The Young Communist League active in 
the countryside must receive precise instructions concerning 
the rights and duties of Young Communist Leaguers, 
concerning the relations between the Young Communist 
League and the Party, between the Soviets and the Young 
Communist League. Every Young Communist League activist 
must regard himself as an assistant of the Party and 
the Soviet Government in the countryside. High-handed 
methods in the countryside, disorder during Soviet elec

THE ACTIVE OF THE Y.C.L. IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 83 
tions, attempts to usurp the functions of the Party, cooperative 
and Soviet organisations, and rowdy escapades 
during so-called anti-religious propaganda‹all this must 
be abandoned and stopped forthwith as something that 
tarnishes the banner of the Young Communist League 
and disgraces the name of Young Communist Leaguer. 
The task is to wage a ruthless struggle against such scandals 
and to establish proper relations between the Young 
Communist League and the Soviet and Party bodies. 
Eighthly. The Young Communist League active in 
the countryside must be supplied with popular pamphlets 
on the alliance between the workers and peasants, 
on the meaning and significance of this alliance, on the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, on the principles of communism, 
and lastly, on the history of the October Revolution 
and on how the peasants lived before, under the tsar 
and the landlords, how they are living now, and how 
they will live if the bond is strengthened and socialism 
is implanted. The Y.C.L. activist must in no way pander 
to the peasantsı prejudices. There is a difference between 
reckoning with these prejudices and pandering to them. 
He must be able to speak to the peasants in the language 
of the Communists. He must be able to convince the 
peasants by means of concrete facts that there is no salvation 
for them outside of socialism. 
Such are the conditions that must be fulfilled in order 
to educate politically the Young Communist League 
active in the countryside and to make it the instrument 
of proletarian policy there. 
The task of the Central Committee of the Young 
Communist League is to facilitate and supervise the 
fulfilment of these conditions.

J. V. S T A L I N 84 
There is talk about the danger of the colossal growth 
of the Young Communist League in the countryside. 
There is talk about an influx of peasant youth into the 
Young Communist League. Undoubtedly, there is some 
danger in that. But it is also beyond doubt that the Young 
Communist League will have no reason to fear that danger 
if it succeeds in carrying out with honour the tasks 
mentioned above. A Young Communist League active of 
100,000 in the countryside is a force for whom no influx 
of peasant youth can be dangerous. The whole point is 
to make energetic efforts to educate this active politically. 
The whole point is skilfully to direct the efforts of this 
active towards strengthening the alliance between the 
workers and peasants. The whole point is to utilise this 
active for the purpose of drawing the peasantry into the 
new Soviet constructive work. 
Hence: a) to ensure that the Young Communist 
League has a proletarian core which is the chief leading 
force; b) to distribute the active forces of this core among 
the principal districts of the Soviet Union with a view 
to ensuring this leadership; c) to educate the youth active 
in the countryside in such a way as to ensure the implementation 
of proletarian policy there‹such are the 
immediate tasks of the Young Communist League in 
general and of its Central Committee in particular. 
Having these tasks before it, and carrying them out 
in the course of its daily work, the Young Communist 
League need not fear the dangers that confront it in the 
countryside. 
Pravda, No. 85, 
April 15, 1925

TO THE FIRST ALL-UNION CONFERENCE 
OF PROLETARIAN STUDENTS24 
A Message 
Comrades, your representatives have asked me to 
give my views on the tasks of the Party and of Party 
work among the proletarian students. 
Permit me to say a few words to you on this subject. 
The specific feature of the present situation is that 
the proletariat of our country has succeeded in creating 
the conditions necessary for building socialism. It is not 
true that socialism cannot be built in one country, a 
country that has vanquished and driven out the capitalists 
and landlords. A country which has established the dictatorship 
of the proletariat, which possesses tremendous 
resources and enjoys the backing of the proletarians of 
all countries‹such a country can and must build socialism. 
Lenin was right when he said that our country possesses 
all that is necessary ³for building a complete 
socialist society.² The specific feature of the present 
situation is that we have succeeded in making considerable 
progress in building socialism, that we have transformed 
socialism from an icon into a prosaic object of 
everyday practical work. 
What part should the proletarian students play in 
this work of construction? 
Their part is undoubtedly important, perhaps of 
prime importance. The higher educational institutions,

J. V. S T A L I N 86 
communist universities, workersı faculties and technical 
schools are institutions for training the commanding 
personnel for economic and cultural development. 
Doctors and economists, co-operators and teachers, 
miners and statisticians, technicians and chemists, agriculturists 
and railway engineers, veterinary surgeons and 
forestry experts, electrical and mechanical engineers, 
are all future commanders of the work of building the 
new society, of building socialist economy and socialist 
culture. The new society cannot be built without new commanders, 
just as a new army cannot be built without new 
commanders. The advantage that the new commanders 
possess is that their function is to build not for the purpose 
of exploiting the working people in the interests of a 
handful of rich men, but for the purpose of emancipating 
the working people, in opposition to the handful of exploiters. 
The whole point is that the students at the 
higher educational institutions‹workers and peasants, 
Party and non-Party‹should become conscious of this 
honourable role, and begin to fulfil it not by constraint 
but by conviction. 
Hence: to make the proletarian students conscious 
builders of socialist economy and socialist culture‹ 
such is the Partyıs first task. 
But the new society cannot be built only by the commanders, 
without the direct support of the masses of the 
working people. The knowledge obtained by the new 
commanders is not in itself sufficient for the building of 
socialism. These commanders must also have the confidence 
and support of the masses. The distinguishing feature 
of the old commanders who built under capitalism 
was that they were divorced from the workers and peas

TO ALL-UNION CONFERENCE OF PROLETARIAN STUDENTS 87 
ants, they felt superior to the toiling masses, they attached 
no value either to the confidence or to the support of 
these masses and, as a consequence, enjoyed neither the 
one nor the other. This method is absolutely unsuitable 
for our country. The new commanders of the work of 
building the new economy and the new culture are called 
new precisely because they must abruptly and irrevocably 
break with the old methods of commanding. Not 
divorce from the masses, but the closest connection with 
them; not feeling superior to the masses, but going in 
front of them and leading them; not alienation from the 
masses, but merging with them and winning their confidence 
and support‹such are the new methods of management 
that must be employed by the new commanders. 
Without these methods no kind of socialist construction 
is conceivable. 
Hence: to make the proletarian students regard themselves 
as an inseparable part of the masses of the working 
people, to make the students feel and act in a genuinely 
public spirit‹such is the Partyıs second task. 
Lastly, about the Communist students in particular. 
It is said that the Communist students are making little 
progress in scientific knowledge. It is said that they lag 
very much behind the non-Party students in this respect. 
It is said that the Communist students prefer to engage 
in ³high politics² and that they waste two-thirds of 
their time in endless debates on ³world problems.² Is 
all this true? I think it is. But if it is true, at least two 
conclusions must be drawn. Firstly, that the Communist 
students stand in danger of becoming poor directors 
of the work of building socialism, for it is impossible 
to direct the work of building a socialist society without a

J. V. S T A L I N 88 
mastery of scientific knowledge. Secondly, the work of 
training the new commanders stands in danger of becoming 
the monopoly of the old professors, who need to be 
replaced by new people, for a new professorial staff and 
new scientific workers cannot be obtained from people 
who are unwilling or unable to master science. Needless 
to say, all this cannot but directly jeopardise the entire 
work of building socialism. Can we resign ourselves to 
such a state of affairs? Obviously not. Hence the Communist 
students, and Soviet students generally, must set 
themselves clearly and definitely the immediate task of 
mastering science, and of creating a new professorial 
staff consisting of new Soviet people to take the place of 
the old. I do not mean to say that students should not 
engage in politics. Not in the least. I merely wish to 
say that the Communist students must learn to combine 
political work with the work of mastering science. It is 
said that it is difficult to combine the two. That is true, 
of course. But since when have Communists been daunted 
by difficulties? The difficulties in the path of our work 
of construction are there precisely to be combated and 
overcome. 
Moreover, still another circumstance must be taken 
into consideration. I think that our country, with its 
revolutionary habits and traditions, its struggle against 
conservatism and stagnation of thought, provides the 
most favourable environment for the flourishing of science. 
There can be scarcely any doubt that philistine narrowmindedness 
and routine, which are characteristic of the 
old professors of the capitalist school, are fetters on 
science. There can be scarcely any doubt that only 
new people who are free from these defects are capable

TO ALL-UNION CONFERENCE OF PROLETARIAN STUDENTS 89 
of full and free creative activity in science. In this 
respect, our country has a great future before it as the 
citadel and nursery of free and unfettered science. I 
think that we are already beginning to take this road. But 
it would be deplorable and disgraceful if the Communist 
students kept away from the high road of development of 
science. That is why the slogan about mastering science is 
acquiring special importance. 
Hence: to make the proletarian students, and above 
all the Communist students, realise the necessity of 
mastering science and that they do master it‹such is 
the Party Œs third task. 
Accept my greetings, 
J. Stalin 
15.IV.25 
Pravda, No. 87, 
April 16, 1925

THE RESULTS OF THE WORK 
OF THE FOURTEENTH CONFERENCE 
OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 
Report Delivered at a Meeting of the Active 
of the Moscow Organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) 
May 9, 1925 
Comrades, I do not think there is any point in examining 
here in detail the resolutions adopted at the Fourteenth 
Conference of our Party.25 That would take up 
a great deal of time, and besides, there is no need to do 
so. I think it will be enough to note the main lines that 
stand out in these resolutions. That will enable us to 
emphasise the main conclusions of the resolutions that 
were adopted. And this, in its turn, will facilitate a further 
study of these resolutions. 
If we turn to the resolutions we shall find that the 
diverse questions touched upon in them can be reduced 
to six main groups of questions. The first group consists 
of questions concerning the international situation. The 
second group consists of questions concerning the immediate 
tasks of the Communist Parties in the capitalist 
countries. The third group consists of questions concerning 
the immediate tasks of the communist elements in 
the colonial and dependent countries. The fourth group 
consists of questions concerning the fate of socialism 
in our country in connection with the present international 
situation. The fifth group consists of questions con

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 91 
cerning our Party policy in the countryside and the tasks 
of Party leadership under the new conditions. And, lastly, 
the sixth group consists of questions concerning the vital 
nerve of all our industry, namely, the metal industry. 
I 
THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION 
What is new and specific in the international situation, 
which, in the main, determines the character of 
the present period? 
The new feature that has revealed itself lately, and 
which has laid its impress upon the international situation, 
is that the revolution in Europe has begun to ebb, 
that a certain lull has set in, which we call the temporary 
stabilisation of capitalism, while at the same time the 
economic development and political might of the Soviet 
Union are increasing. 
What is the ebb of the revolution, the lull? Is it the 
beginning of the end of the world revolution, the beginning 
of the liquidation of the world proletarian revolution? 
Lenin said that the victory of the proletariat 
in our country ushered in a new epoch, the epoch of world 
revolution, an epoch replete with conflicts and wars, 
advances and retreats, victories and defeats, an epoch 
leading to the victory of the proletariat in the major 
capitalist countries. Does the fact that the revolution 
in Europe has begun to ebb mean that Leninıs thesis 
concerning a new epoch, the epoch of world revolution, 
no longer holds good? Does it mean that the proletarian 
revolution in the West has been cancelled? 
No, it does not.

J. V. S T A L I N 92 
The epoch of world revolution is a new stage of the 
revolution, a whole strategic period, which will last for 
a number of years, perhaps even a number of decades. 
During this period there can and must be ebbs and flows 
of the revolution. 
Our revolution passed through two stages, two strategic 
periods, in the course of its development, and after 
October it entered a third stage, a third strategic period. 
The first stage (1900-17) lasted over fifteen years. The 
aim then was to overthrow tsarism, to achieve the victory 
of the bourgeois democratic revolution. During that 
period we had a number of ebbs and flows of the revolution. 
The tide of revolution flowed in 1905. That tide 
ended with the temporary defeat of the revolution. After 
that we had an ebb, which lasted a number of years 
(1907-12). Then the tide flowed anew, beginning with the 
Lena events (1912), and later it ebbed again, during the 
war. In 1917 (February) the tide began to flow once 
again and it culminated in the victory of the people over 
tsarism, the victory of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. 
With each ebb the Liquidators asserted that the 
revolution was done for. After ebbing and flowing several 
times, however, the revolution swept on to victory 
in February 1917. 
The second stage of the revolution began in February 
1917. The aim then was to extricate the country from 
the imperialist war, to overthrow the bourgeoisie and to 
achieve the victory of the proletarian dictatorship. 
That stage, or strategic period, lasted only eight months, 
but these were eight months of profound revolutionary 
crisis, during which war and economic ruin spurred on the 
revolution and quickened its pace to the utmost. Pre

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 93 
cisely for that reason, those eight months of revolutionary 
crisis can and should be counted as being equal to at 
least eight years of ordinary constitutional development. 
That strategic period, like the preceding one, was not 
marked by a steady rise of the revolution in a straight 
ascending line, as the philistines of revolution usually 
picture it, but by alternating ebbs and flows. During 
that period we had an immense rise in the tide of the revolutionary 
movement in the days of the July demonstration. 
Then the revolutionary tide ebbed after the 
July defeat of the Bolsheviks. The tide flowed again 
immediately after the Kornilov revolt and it carried us 
to the victory of the October Revolution. The Liquidators 
of that time talked of the complete liquidation of the revolution 
after the July defeat. After passing through a 
number of trials and ebbs, however, the revolution, as 
is known, culminated in the victory of the proletarian 
dictatorship. 
After the October victory we entered the third strategic 
period, the third stage of the revolution, in which 
the aim is to overcome the bourgeoisie on a world scale. 
How long this period will last it is difficult to say. At 
all events, there is no doubt that it will be a long one, 
and there is no doubt also that it will contain ebbs and 
flows. The world revolutionary movement at the present 
time has entered a period of ebb of the revolution, but, 
for a number of reasons, of which I shall speak later, the 
tide must turn again, and it may end in the victory of 
the proletariat. On the other hand, it may not end in 
victory, but be replaced by a new ebb, which in its turn 
is bound to be followed by another rise in the tide of the 
revolution. The present-day Liquidators say that the lull

J. V. S T A L I N 94 
that has now set in marks the end of the world revolution. 
But they are mistaken, just as they were mistaken 
before, in the periods of the first and second stages of 
our revolution, when they regarded every ebb of the 
revolutionary movement as the utter defeat of the revolution. 
Such are the fluctuations within each stage of the revolution, 
within each strategic period. 
What do those fluctuations show? Do they show that 
Leninıs thesis about the new epoch of world revolution 
has lost, or may lose, its significance? Of course not! 
They merely show that, usually, revolution develops not 
in a straight ascending line, not in a continuously 
growing upsurge, but in zigzags, in advances and retreats, 
in flows and ebbs, which in the course of development 
steel the forces of the revolution and prepare for its 
final victory. 
Such is the historical significance of the present ebb 
of the revolution, the historical significance of the lull 
we are now experiencing. 
But the ebb is only one aspect of the matter. The 
other aspect is that simultaneously with the ebb of the 
revolution in Europe we have the impetuous growth of 
the economic development of the Soviet Union and its 
increasing political might. In other words, we have not 
only the stabilisation of capitalism; we also have the stabilisation 
of the Soviet system. Thus, we have two stabilisations: 
the temporary stabilisation of capitalism and 
the stabilisation of the Soviet system. A certain temporary 
equilibrium between these two stabilisations has 
been reached‹such is the characteristic feature of the 
present international situation.

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 95 
But what is stabilisation? Is it not stagnation? And 
if it means stagnation, can that term be applied to the 
Soviet system? No. Stabilisation is not stagnation. Stabilisation 
is the consolidation of a given position and further 
development. World capitalism has not only consolidated 
itself in its present position; it is going on and developing 
further, expanding its sphere of influence and increasing 
its wealth. It is wrong to say that capitalism 
cannot develop, that the theory of the decay of capitalism 
advanced by Lenin in his Imperialism26 precludes 
the development of capitalism. Lenin fully proved in his 
pamphlet Imperialism that the growth of capitalism does 
not cancel, but presupposes and prepares the progressive 
decay of capitalism. 
Thus, we have two stabilisations. At one pole capitalism 
is becoming stabilised, consolidating the position 
i t has achieved and developing further. At the 
other pole the Soviet system is becoming stabilised, 
consolidating the positions it has won and advancing 
further along the road to victory. 
Who will win? That is the essence of the question. 
Why are there two stabilisations, one parallel with 
the other? Why are there two poles? Because there is 
no longer a single, all-embracing capitalism in the world. 
Because the world has split into two camps‹the capitalist 
camp, headed by Anglo-American capital, and the 
socialist camp, headed by the Soviet Union. Because the 
international situation will to an increasing degree be 
determined by the relation of forces between these two 
camps. 
Thus, the characteristic feature of the present situation 
is not only that capitalism and the Soviet system

J. V. S T A L I N 96 
have become stabilised, but also that the forces of these 
two camps have reached a certain temporary equilibrium, 
with a slight advantage for capital, and hence, 
a slight disadvantage for the revolutionary movement; 
for, compared with a revolutionary upsurge, the lull 
that has now set in is undoubtedly a disadvantage for 
socialism, although a temporary one. 
What is the difference between these two stabilisations? 
Where does the one and where does the other 
lead to? 
Stabilisation under capitalism, while temporarily 
strengthening capital, at the same time inevitably leads 
to the aggravation of the contradictions of capitalism: 
a) between the imperialist groups of the various countries; 
b) between the workers and the capitalists in each country; 
c) between imperialism and the peoples of all colonial 
countries. 
Stabilisation under the Soviet system, however, while 
strengthening socialism, at the same time inevitably 
leads to an alleviation of contradictions and to an improvement 
in the relations: a) between the proletariat and 
the peasantry in our country; b) between the proletariat 
and the colonial peoples of the oppressed countries; 
c) between the proletarian dictatorship and the workers 
of all countries. 
The fact of the matter is that capitalism cannot develop 
without intensifying the exploitation of the working 
class, without a semi-starvation existence for the majority 
of the working people, without intensifying the 
oppression of the colonial and dependent countries, 
without conflicts and clashes between the different imperialist 
groups of the world bourgeoisie. On the other

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 97 
hand, the Soviet system and the proletarian dictatorship 
can develop only if there is a continuous rise in the material 
and cultural level of the working class, if there is 
a continuous improvement in the conditions of all the 
working people in the Land of Soviets, if the workers 
of all countries draw closer and closer together and unite, 
if the oppressed peoples of the colonial and dependent 
countries rally around the revolutionary movement of 
the proletariat. 
The path of development of capitalism is the path 
of impoverishment and a semi-starvation existence for 
the vast majority of the working people, while a small 
upper stratum of these working people is bribed and 
pampered. 
The path of development of the proletarian dictatorship, 
on the contrary, is the path of continuous improvement 
in the welfare of the vast majority of the working 
people. 
Precisely for this reason the development of capitalism 
is bound to create conditions which aggravate the 
contradictions of capitalism. Precisely for this reason 
capitalism cannot resolve these contradictions. 
Of course, if there were no law of the uneven development 
of capitalism, leading to conflicts and wars between 
the capitalist countries on account of colonies; if 
capitalism could develop without exporting capital to 
backward countries, countries where raw materials 
and labour are cheap; if the surplus capital accumulated 
in the ³metropolises² were used not for export of capital, 
but for seriously developing agriculture and for improving 
the material conditions of the peasantry; and lastly, if this 
surplus were used for the purpose of raising the standard

J. V. S T A L I N 98 
of living of the entire mass of the working class, there 
would be no intensification of the exploitation of the working 
class, no impoverishment of the peasantry under 
capitalism, no intensification of oppression in colonial 
and dependent countries, and no conflicts and wars between 
capitalists. 
But then, capitalism would not be capitalism. 
The whole point is that capitalism cannot develop 
without aggravating all these contradictions, and without 
thereby developing the conditions which, in the final 
analysis, facilitate the downfall of capitalism. 
The whole point is that the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
on the contrary, cannot develop further without 
creating the conditions which raise the revolutionary 
movement in all countries to a higher stage and prepare 
for the final victory of the proletariat. 
Such is the difference between the two stabilisations. 
That is why the stabilisation of capitalism cannot 
be either lasting or firm. 
Let us now examine the question of the stabilisation 
of capitalism concretely. 
In what way has the stabilisation of capitalism found 
concrete expression? 
Firstly, in the fact that America, Britain and France 
have temporarily succeeded in striking a deal on the methods 
of robbing Germany and on the scale on which she 
is to be robbed. In other words, they have struck a deal 
on what they call the Dawesation of Germany. Can 
that deal be regarded as being at all durable? No, it cannot. 
Because, firstly, it was arrived at without reckoning 
with the host, i.e., the German people; secondly, because 
this deal means imposing a double yoke upon the German

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 99 
people, the yoke of the national bourgeoisie and the yoke 
of the foreign bour geoisie. To think that a cultured nation 
like the German nation and a cultured proletariat like 
the German proletariat will consent to bear this double 
yoke without making repeated serious attempts at a revolutionary 
upheaval means believing in miracles. Even 
such an essentially reactionary fact as the election of 
Hindenburg as President,27 leaves no doubt that the 
Ententeıs temporary deal directed against Germany is 
unstable, ridiculously unstable. 
Secondly, the stabilisation of capitalism has found 
expression in the fact that British, American and Japanese 
capital have temporarily succeeded in striking a 
deal about the division of spheres of influence in China, 
that vast market for international capital, about the 
methods for plundering that country. Can that deal be 
regarded as being at all durable? Again, no! Firstly, 
because the partners to it are fighting, and will fight to 
the death, over the division of the spoils; secondly, 
because that deal was struck behind the back of the Chinese 
people, who have no wish to submit to the laws of the alien 
robbers, and will not do so. Does not the growth of 
the revolutionary movement in China show that the 
machinations of the foreign imperialists are doomed to 
failure? 
Thirdly, the stabilisation of capitalism has found 
expression in the fact that the imperialist groups of the 
advanced countries have temporarily succeeded in striking 
a deal about mutual non-intervention in the plunder 
and oppression of ³their² respective colonies. 
Can that deal, or that attempt at a deal, be regarded as 
being at all durable? No, it cannot. Firstly, because each

J. V. S T A L I N 100 
imperialist group is striving, and will go on striving, to 
snatch a piece of the othersı colonies; secondly, because 
the pressure the imperialist groups exercise in the colonies 
and the policy of oppression they pursue there only 
serve to steel and revolutionise those colonies and thereby 
intensify the revolutionary crisis. The imperialists are 
trying to ³pacify² India, to curb Egypt, to tame Morocco, 
to tie Indo-China and Indonesia hand and foot, 
and are resorting to all sorts of cunning devices and machinations. 
They may succeed in achieving some ³results² 
in this respect, but there can scarcely be any doubt 
that these machinations will not, and cannot, suffice 
for long. 
Fourthly, the stabilisation of capitalism may find 
expression in an attempt on the part of the imperialist 
groups of the advanced countries to strike a deal 
concerning the formation of a united front against the 
Soviet Union. Let us assume that the deal comes off. 
Let us assume that they succeed in establishing something 
in the nature of a united front by resorting to all 
sorts of trickery, including the scoundrelly forgeries 
in connection with the explosion in Sofia,28 etc. Are 
there any grounds for assuming that a deal directed 
against our country, or stabilisation in this sphere, can 
be at all durable, at all successful? I think that there are 
no such grounds. Why? Because, firstly, the threat of 
a capitalist united front and united attack would act 
like a gigantic hoop that would bind the whole country 
around the Soviet Government more tightly than ever 
before and transform it into an even more impregnable 
fortress than it was, for instance, during the invasion 
of the ³fourteen states.² Recall the threat of an invasion

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 101 
by fourteen states uttered by the notorious Churchill. You 
know that the mere utterance of that threat was enough 
to unite the entire country around the Soviet Government 
against the imperialist vultures. Because, secondly, 
a crusade against the Land of Soviets would certainly 
set in motion a number of revolutionary key points in our 
enemiesı rear, which would disintegrate and demoralise 
the ranks of imperialism. There can scarcely be any doubt 
that a host of such key points have developed of late, and 
they bode imperialism no good. Because, thirdly, our 
country no longer stands alone; it has allies in the shape 
of the workers in the West and the oppressed peoples in 
the East. There can scarcely be any doubt that war 
against the Soviet Union will mean for imperialism that 
it will have to wage war against its own workers and colonies. 
Needless to say, if our country is attacked we shall 
not sit with folded arms; we shall take all measures to 
unleash the revolutionary lion in all countries of the 
world. The leaders of the capitalist countries cannot 
but know that we have some experience in this matter. 
Such are the facts and considerations which show 
that the stabilisation of capitalism cannot be durable, 
that this stabilisation signifies the creation of conditions 
that lead to the defeat of capitalism, while the stabilisation 
of the Soviet system, on the contrary, signifies 
the continuous accumulation of conditions that strengthen 
the proletarian dictatorship, raise the revolutionary 
movement in all countries and lead to the victory 
of socialism. 
This fundamental antithesis between the two stabilisations, 
capitalist and Soviet, is an expression of the 
antithesis between the two systems of economy and

J. V. S T A L I N 102 
government, between the capitalist system and the 
socialist system. 
Whoever fails to understand this antithesis will never 
understand the basic character of the present international 
situation. 
Such is the general picture of the international situation 
at the present time. 
II 
THE IMMEDIATE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST 
PARTIES IN THE CAPITALIST COUNTRIES 
I pass to the second group of questions. 
The new and specific feature of the present position 
of the Communist Parties in the capitalist countries 
is that the period of the flow of the revolutionary 
tide has given way to a period of its ebb, a period 
of lull. The task is to take advantage of the period of 
lull that we are passing through to strengthen the 
Communist Parties, to Bolshevise them, to transform 
them into genuine mass parties relying on the trade 
unions, to rally the labouring elements among the nonproletarian 
classes, above all among the peasantry, 
around the proletariat, and lastly, to educate the proletarians 
in the spirit of revolution and proletarian dictatorship. 
I shall not enumerate all the immediate tasks that 
confront the Communist Parties in the West. If you read 
the resolutions on this subject, especially the resolution 
on Bolshevisation passed by the enlarged plenum of 
the Comintern,29 it will not be difficult for you to understand 
what these tasks are concretely.

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 103 
I should like to deal with the main task, with that 
task confronting the Communist Parties in the West, 
the elucidation of which will facilitate the fulfilment of all 
the other immediate tasks. 
What is that task? 
That task is to link the Communist Parties in the West 
with the trade unions. That task is to develop and bring to 
a successful conclusion the campaign for trade-union unity, 
to see that all Communists without fail join the trade 
unions, to work systematically in them for combining 
the workers in a united front against capital, and in this 
way to create the conditions that will enable the Communist 
Parties to have the backing of the trade unions. 
If this task is not carried out it will be impossible to 
transform the Communist Parties into genuine mass 
parties or to create the conditions necessary for the victory 
of the proletariat. 
The trade unions and parties in the West are not 
what the trade unions and the Party are here in Russia. 
The relations between the trade unions and the parties 
in the West are quite different from those that have been 
established here in Russia. In our country the trade 
unions arose after the Party, and around the Party of the 
working class. Trade unions had not yet arisen in our country 
when the Party and its organisations were already 
leading not only the political but also the economic 
struggle of the working class, down to small and very 
small strikes. That, mainly, explains the exceptional 
prestige of our Party among the workers prior to the February 
Revolution, in contrast to the rudimentary trade 
unions which then existed here and there. Real trade 
unions appeared in our country only after February

J. V. S T A L I N 104 
1917. Before October we already had definitely formed 
trade-union organisations, which enjoyed tremendous 
prestige among the workers. Already at that time 
Lenin said that without trade-union support it would be 
impossible either to achieve or to maintain the dictatorship 
of the proletariat. The most powerful development 
of the trade unions in our country was reached 
after the capture of power, particularly under the conditions 
of NEP. There is no doubt that our powerful 
trade unions now constitute one of the chief supports 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat. The most characteristic 
feature of the history of the development of 
our trade unions is that they arose, developed and became 
strong after the Party, around the Party, and in friendship 
with the Party. 
The trade unions in Western Europe developed under 
entirely different circumstances. Firstly, they arose and 
became strong long before working-class parties appeared. 
Secondly, there it was not the trade unions that developed 
around the working-class parties; on the contrary, the working-
class parties themselves emerged from the trade unions. 
Thirdly, since the economic sphere of the struggle, the 
one that is closest to the working class, had already been 
captured, so to speak, by the trade unions, the parties 
were obliged to engage mainly in the parliamentary political 
struggle, and that could not but affect the character 
of their activities and the importance attached to them 
by the working class. And precisely because the parties 
there arose after the trade unions, precisely because 
the trade unions came into being long before the parties, 
and in fact became the proletariatıs principal fortresses 
in i t s struggle against capital‹precisely for that

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 105 
reason, the parties, as independent forces that did not 
have the backing of the trade unions, were pushed into 
the background. 
From this it follows, however, that if the Communist 
Parties want to become a real mass force, capable of pushing 
the revolution forward, they must link up with the 
trade unions and get their backing. 
Failure to take this specific feature of the situation 
in the West into account means leading the cause of 
the communist movement to certain doom. 
Over there, in the West, there are still individual 
³Communists² who refuse to understand this specific 
feature and continue to make play with the anti-proletarian 
and anti revolutionary slogan: ³Leave the trade 
unions!² It must be said that nobody can do more harm 
to the communist movement in the West than these and 
similar ³Communists.² Regarding the trade unions as 
an enemy camp, these people contemplate ³attacking² 
them from without. They fail to understand that if they 
pursue such a policy the workers will indeed regard them 
as enemies. They fail to understand that the trade 
unions, whether good or bad, are regarded by the 
rank-and-file worker as his fortresses, which help him to 
protect his wages, hours, and so forth. They fail to 
understand that such a policy, far from facilitating, 
hinders Communists from penetrating among the vast 
working-class masses. 
The average rank-and-file worker may say to such 
³Communists²: ³You are attacking my fortress. You 
want to wreck the organisations that took me decades to 
build, and are trying to prove to me that communism is 
better than trade-unionism. I donıt know, perhaps your

J. V. S T A L I N 106 
theoretical arguments about communism are right. How 
can I, an ordinary working man, grasp the meaning of 
your theories? But one thing I do know: I have my tradeunion 
fortresses; they have led me into the struggle, they 
have protected me, well or ill, from the attacks of the capitalists, 
and whoever thinks of destroying these fortresses 
wants to destroy my own cause, the workersı cause. 
Stop attacking my fortresses, join the trade unions, 
work in them for five years or so, help to improve and 
strengthen them. In the meantime I shall see what sort 
of fellows you are, and if you turn out to be real good 
fellows, I, of course, will not refuse to support you,² 
and so forth. 
That is the attitude, or approximately the attitude, 
of the average rank-and-file workers in the West today 
towards the anti-trade-unionists. 
Whoever fails to understand this specific feature of 
the mentality of the average worker in Europe will understand 
nothing about the position of our Communist Parties 
at the present time. 
Wherein lies the strength of Social-Democracy in 
the West? 
In the fact that it has the backing of the trade unions. 
Wherein lies the weakness of our Communist Parties 
in the West? 
In the fact that they have not yet linked up with 
the trade unions, and certain elements in these Communist 
Parties do not wish to link up with them. 
Hence, the main task of the Communist Parties in 
the West at the present time is to develop and bring to 
a successful conclusion the campaign for trade-union 
unity, to see that all Communists without exception join

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 107 
the trade unions, to work in them systematically and 
patiently for uniting the working class against capital, 
and in this way to enable the Communist Parties to 
have the backing of the trade unions. 
Such is the meaning of the decisions of the enlarged 
plenum of the Comintern concerning the immediate 
tasks of the Communist Parties in the West at the present 
time. 
III 
THE IMMEDIATE TASKS 
OF THE COMMUNIST ELEMENTS 
IN THE COLONIAL AND DEPENDENT 
COUNTRIES 
I pass to the third group of questions. 
The new features in this sphere are the following: 
a) owing to the increase in the export of capital from 
the advanced to the backward countries, an increase 
encouraged by the stabilisation of capitalism, capitalism 
in the colonial countries is developing and will continue 
to develop at a rapid rate, breaking down the old social 
and political conditions and implanting new ones; 
b) the proletariat in these countries is growing and 
will continue to grow at a rapid rate; 
c) the revolutionary working-class movement and 
the revolutionary crisis in the colonies are growing and 
will continue to grow; 
d) in this connection, there is a growth, which will continue, 
of certain strata of the national bourgeoisie, the 
richest and most powerful strata, which, fearing revolution 
in their countries more than they fear imperialism, 
will prefer a deal with imperialism to the liberation of

J. V. S T A L I N 108 
their countries from imperialism and will thereby betray 
their own native lands (India, Egypt, etc.); 
e) in view of all this, those countries can be liberated 
from imperialism only if a struggle is waged against the 
compromising national bourgeoisie; 
f) but from this it follows that the question of the 
alliance between the workers and peasants and of the 
hegemony of the proletariat in the industrially developed 
and developing colonies is bound to become an 
urgent one, as it did before the first revolution in Russia 
in 1905. 
Until now the situation has been that the East was 
usually spoken of as a homogeneous whole. It is now 
obvious to everybody that there is no longer a single, 
homogeneous East, that there are now capitalistically 
developed and developing colonies and backward and 
lagging colonies, and they cannot all be measured with 
the same yardstick. 
Until now the national-liberation movement has been 
regarded as an unbroken front of all the national forces 
in the colonial and dependent countries, from the most 
reactionary bourgeois to the most revolutionary proletarians. 
Now, after the national bourgeoisie has split 
into a revolutionary and an anti-revolutionary wing, 
the picture of the national movement is assuming a somewhat 
different aspect. Parallel with the revolutionary 
elements of the national movement, compromising and 
reactionary elements which prefer a deal with imperialism 
to the liberation of their countries are emerging 
from the bourgeoisie. 
Hence the task of the communist elements in the colonial 
countries is to link up with the revolutionary ele

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 109 
ments of the bourgeoisie, and above all with the peasantry, 
against the bloc of imperialism and the compromising 
elements of ³their own² bourgeoisie, in order, 
under the leadership of the proletariat, to wage a genuinely 
revolutionary struggle for liberation from imperialism. 
Only one conclusion follows: a number of colonial 
countries are now approaching their 1905. 
The task is to unite the advanced elements of the workers 
in the colonial countries in a single Communist 
Party that will be capable of leading the growing revolution. 
Here is what Lenin said about the growing revolutionary 
movement in the colonial countries as far back 
as 1922: 
³The present Œvictorsı in the first imperialist massacre are 
unable to vanquish even a small, insignificantly small, country 
like Ireland, they are not even able to unravel the tangle they have 
got themselves into in financial and currency questions. And 
India and China are seething. They have a population of over 
seven hundred million. With the surrounding Asiatic countries 
quite like them they account for more than half the population 
of the world. In these countries, 1905 is approaching, irresistibly 
and with ever increasing speed, but with this essential and 
enormous difference: in 1905 the revolution in Russia could still 
(at the outset at any rate) proceed in isolation, that is to say, 
without immediately drawing other countries into the revolution, 
whereas the revolutions that are growing in India and China 
are already being drawn, and have been drawn, into the revolutionary 
struggle, into the revolutionary movement into the international 
revolution² (see Vol. XXVII, p. 293).* 
* References in Roman numerals to Lenin's works here and 
elsewhere are to the third edition of the Works.‹Tr.

J. V. S T A L I N 110 
The colonial countries are on the threshold of their 
1905‹such is the conclusion. 
Such is also the meaning of the resolutions on the 
colonial question adopted by the enlarged plenum of 
the Comintern. 
IV 
THE FATE OF SOCIALISM 
IN THE SOVIET UNION 
I pass to the fourth group of questions. 
So far I have spoken about the resolutions of our Party 
conference on questions directly concerning the Comintern. 
We shall now pass to questions which directly concern 
both the Comintern and the R.C.P.(B.), and thus 
serve as a link between the external and internal 
problems. 
How will the temporary stabilisation of capitalism 
affect the fate of socialism in our country? Does that 
stabilisation mark the end, or the beginning of the end, 
of the building of socialism in our country? 
Is it at all possible to build socialism by our own 
efforts in our technically and economically backward 
country if capitalism continues to exist in the other countries 
for a more or less prolonged period? 
Is it possible to create a complete guarantee against 
the dangers of intervention, and hence, against the 
restoration of the old order of things in our country, 
while we are encircled by capitalism, and, at the present 
moment, by stabilised capitalism at that? 
All these are questions which inevitably confront us 
as a result of the new situation in the sphere of interna

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 111 
tional relations, and which we cannot ignore. They demand 
a precise and definite answer. 
Our country exhibits two groups of contradictions. 
One group consists of the internal contradictions that 
exist between the proletariat and the peasantry. The 
other group consists of the external contradictions that 
exist between our country, as the land of socialism, 
and all the other countries, as lands of capitalism. 
Let us examine these two groups of contradictions 
separately. 
That certain contradictions exist between the proletariat 
and the peasantry cannot, of course, be denied. 
It is sufficient to recall everything that has taken place, 
and is still taking place, in our country in connection with 
the price policy for agricultural produce, in connection 
with the price limits, in connection with the campaign to 
reduce the prices of manufactured goods, and so forth, to 
understand how very real these contradictions are. We 
have two main classes before us: the proletarian class and 
the class of private-property-owners, i.e., the peasantry. 
Hence, contradictions between them are inevitable. The 
whole question is whether we shall be able by our own 
efforts to overcome the contradictions that exist between 
the proletariat and the peasantry. When the question is 
asked: can we build socialism by our own efforts? what 
is meant is: can the contradictions that exist between 
the proletariat and the peasantry in our country be 
overcome or not? 
Leninism answers that question in the affirmative: 
yes, we can build socialism, and we will build it together 
with the peasantry under the leadership of the 
working class.

J. V. S T A L I N 112 
What is the basis, the grounds, for such an answer? 
The grounds are that, besides contradictions between 
the proletariat and the peasantry, there are also common 
interests between them on fundamental problems of 
development, interests which outweigh, or, at all events, 
can outweigh those contradictions, and are the basis, 
the foundation, of the alliance between the workers and 
the peasants. 
What are those common interests? 
The point is that there are two paths along which 
agriculture can develop: the capitalist path and the 
socialist path. The capitalist path means development 
by impoverishing the majority of the peasantry 
for the sake of enriching the upper strata of 
the urban and rural bourgeoisie. The socialist path, on 
the contrary, means development by a continuous 
improvement in the well-being of the majority of the 
peasantry. It is in the interest of both the proletariat 
and the peasantry, particularly of the latter, that 
development should proceed along the second path, the 
socialist path, for that is the peasantryıs only salvation 
from impoverishment and a semi-starvation existence. 
Needless to say, the proletarian dictatorship, 
which holds in its hands the main threads of economic 
life, will take all measures to secure the victory of the 
second path, the socialist path. It goes without saying, 
on the other hand, that the peasantry is vitally interested 
in development proceeding along this second 
path. 
Hence the community of interests of the proletariat 
and the peasantry which outweighs the contradictions 
between them.

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 113 
That is why Leninism says that we can and must build 
a complete socialist society together with the peasantry 
on the basis of the alliance between the workers and the 
peasants. 
That is why Leninism says, basing itself on the common 
interests of the proletarians and the peasants, that 
we can and must by our own efforts overcome the contradictions 
that exist between the proletariat and the peasantry. 
That is how Leninism regards the matter. 
But, evidently, not all comrades agree with Leninism. 
The following, for example, is what Trotsky says about 
the contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry: 
³The contradictions in the position of a workersı government 
in a backward country with an overwhelmingly peasant population 
could be solved only* on an international scale, in the arena of 
the world proletarian revolution² (see preface to Trotskyıs book 
The Year 1905). 
In other words, it is not within our power, we are not 
in a position, by our own efforts to overcome, to eliminate 
the internal contradictions in our country, the 
contradictions between the proletariat and the peasantry, 
because, it appears, only as a result of a world revolution, 
and only on the basis of a world revolution, can 
we eliminate those contradictions and, at last, build 
socialism. 
Needless to say, this proposition has nothing in common 
with Leninism. 
The same Trotsky goes on to say: 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 114 
³Without direct state support from the European proletariat, 
the working class of Russia will not be able to maintain itself 
in power and to transform its temporary rule into a lasting socialist 
dictatorship. This we cannot doubt for an instant² (see Trotskyıs 
Our Revolution, p. 278). 
In other words, we cannot even dream of maintaining 
power for any length of time unless the Western proletariat 
takes power and renders us state support. 
Further: 
³It would be hopeless to think . . . that, for example, a revolutionary 
Russia could hold out in the face of a conservative Europe² 
(see Trotskyıs Works, Vol. III, Part I, p. 90). 
In other words, it appears that not only are we unable 
to build socialism, but we cannot even hold out 
albeit for a brief period ³in the face of a conservative 
Europe,² although the whole world knows that we have 
not only held out, but have repulsed a number of furious 
attacks upon our country by a conservative Europe. 
And lastly: 
³Real progress of a socialist economy in Russia,² says Trotsky, 
³will become possible only after the victory* of the proletariat 
in the major European countries² (ibid., p. 93). 
Clear, one would think. 
I have quoted these passages, comrades, in order to 
contrast them with passages from the works of Lenin, and 
thus to enable you to grasp the quintessence of the question 
of the possibility of building a complete socialist 
society in the land of the proletarian dictatorship, which 
is surrounded by capitalist states. 
* My italics.‹J. St.

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 115 
Let us now turn to passages from the works of 
Lenin. 
Here is what Lenin wrote as far back as 1915, during 
the imperialist war: 
³Uneven economic and political development is an absolute 
law of capitalism. Hence, the victory of socialism is possible, 
first in several or even in one capitalist country taken separately. 
The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the 
capitalists and organised its own socialist production, would 
stand up against the rest of the world, the capitalist world, attracting 
to its cause the oppressed classes of other countries, raising 
revolts in those countries against the capitalists, and in the event 
of necessity, coming out even with armed force against the exploiting 
classes and their states.² . . . Because ³the free union of 
nations in socialism is impossible without a more or less prolonged 
and stubborn struggle of the socialist republics against the backward 
states² (see Vol. XVIII, pp. 232-33). 
In other words, the land of the proletarian dictatorship, 
which is surrounded by capitalists, can, it appears, 
not only by its own efforts eliminate the internal contradictions 
between the proletariat and the peasantry, 
but can and must, in addition, build socialism, organise 
its own socialist economy and establish an armed 
force in order to go to the aid of the proletarians in the 
surrounding countries in their struggle to overthrow 
capital. 
Such is the fundamental thesis of Leninism on the 
victory of socialism in one country. 
Lenin said the same thing, although in a slightly 
different way, in 1920, at the Eighth Congress of Soviets, 
in connection with the question of the electrification 
of our country:

J. V. S T A L I N 116 
³Communism is Soviet power plus the electrification of the 
whole country. Otherwise, the country will remain a small peasant 
country, and we have got to understand that clearly. We are 
weaker than capitalism, not only on a world scale, but also 
within the country. Everybody knows this. We are conscious of 
it, and we shall see to it that our economic base is transformed 
from a small peasant base into a large-scale industrial base. Only 
when the country has been electrified, only when our industry, 
our agriculture, our transport system have been placed upon 
the technical basis of modern large-scale industry, shall we achieve 
final* victory² (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 46-47). 
In other words, Lenin was fully aware of the technical 
difficulties connected with the building of socialism 
in our country, but he did not by any means draw 
from this the absurd conclusion that ³real progress 
of a socialist economy in Russia will become possible 
only after the victory of the proletariat in the major 
European countries²; on the contrary, he was of the 
opinion that we could by our own efforts surmount 
those difficulties and achieve ³final victory,² i . e . , 
build complete socialism. 
And here is what Lenin said a year later, in 1921: 
³Ten or twenty years of correct relations with the peasantry, 
and victory on a world scale* is assured (even if the proletarian 
revolutions, which are growing, are delayed)² (³Outline and 
Synopsis of the Pamphlet The Tax in Kind,² 1921‹see Vol. XXVI, 
p. 313). 
In other words, Lenin was fully aware of the political 
difficulties connected with the building of socialism 
in our country, but he did not by any means draw 
* My italics.‹J. St.

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 117 
from this the false conclusion that ³without direct state 
support from the European proletariat, the working 
class of Russia will not be able to maintain itself in 
power²; on the contrary, he was of the opinion that, 
given a correct policy towards the peasantry, we would 
be quite able to ensure ³victory on a world scale,² meaning 
that we could build complete socialism. 
But what is a correct policy towards the peasantry? 
A correct policy towards the peasantry is something that 
depends wholly and entirely upon us, and upon us alone, 
as the Party which directs the building of socialism in 
our country. 
Lenin said the same thing, but still more definitely, 
in 1922, in his notes on co-operation: 
³As a matter of fact, state power over all large-scale means 
of production, state power in the hands of the proletariat, the 
alliance of this proletariat with the many millions of small and 
very small peasants, the assured leadership of the peasantry by 
the proletariat, etc.‹is not this all that is necessary for building 
a complete socialist society from the co-operatives, from the 
co-operatives alone, which we formerly looked down upon as 
huckstering and which from a certain aspect we have the right 
to look down upon as such now, under the NEP? Is this not all 
that is necessary for building a complete socialist society?* This 
is not yet the building of socialist society, but i t is all that 
is necessary and sufficient* for this building² (see Vol. XXVII, 
p. 392). 
In other words, under the dictatorship of the proletariat 
we possess, it appears, all that is needed to build 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 118 
a complete socialist society, overcoming all internal 
difficulties, for we can and must overcome them by our 
own efforts. 
Clear, one would think. 
As regards the objection that the relative economic 
backwardness of our country precludes the possibility of 
building socialism, Lenin attacked and refuted it as 
something incompatible with socialism: 
³Infinitely hackneyed is the argument,² says Lenin, ³that 
they learned by rote during the development of West-European 
Social-Democracy, namely, that we are not yet ripe for socialism, 
that, as certain Œlearnedı gentlemen among them express it, the 
objective economic prerequisites for socialism do not exist in 
our country² (see Vol. XXVII, p. 399). 
Had it been otherwise, there was no point in taking 
power in October and carrying out the October Revolution. 
For if the possibility and necessity of building 
a complete socialist society is precluded for some reason 
or other, the October Revolution becomes meaningless. 
Anyone who denies the possibility of building socialism 
in one country must necessarily deny that the October 
Revolution was justified; and vice versa, anyone who 
has no faith in the October Revolution cannot admit the 
possibility of the victory of socialism in the conditions 
of capitalist encirclement. The connection between lack 
of faith in October and denial of the socialist potentialities 
in our country is complete and direct. 
³I know,² says Lenin, ³that there are, of course, sages who 
think they are very clever and even call themselves Socialists, 
who assert that power should not have been seized until the revolution 
had broken out in all countries. They do not suspect that

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 119 
by speaking in this way they are deserting the revolution and going 
over to the side of the bourgeoisie. To wait until the toiling classes 
bring about a revolution on an international scale means that 
everybody should stand stock-still in expectation. That is nonsense² 
(see Vol. XXIII, p 9). 
That is how the matter stands with the contradictions 
of the first order, with the internal contradictions, with 
the question of the possibility of building socialism in 
the conditions of capitalist encirclement. 
Let us now pass to the contradictions of the second 
order, to the external contradictions that exist between 
our country, as the country of socialism, and all the 
other countries, as the countries of capitalism. 
What are these contradictions? 
They are that, as long as capitalist encirclement 
exists, there is bound to be the danger of intervention 
by the capitalist countries, and as long as such a danger 
exists, there is bound to be the danger of restoration, 
the danger of the capitalist order being re-established 
in our country. 
Can those contradictions be fully overcome by one 
country? No, they cannot; for the efforts of one country, 
even if that country is the land of the proletarian dictatorship, 
are insufficient for the purpose of fully guaranteeing 
it against the danger of intervention. Therefore, 
a full guarantee against intervention, and hence the 
final victory of socialism, are possible only on an international 
scale, only as a result of the joint efforts of 
the proletarians of a number of countries, or‹still better‹
only as a result of the victory of the proletarians in 
a number of countries. 
What is the final victory of socialism?

J. V. S T A L I N 120 
The final victory of socialism is the full guarantee 
against attempts at intervention, and hence against restoration, 
for any serious attempt at restoration can take 
place only with serious support from outside, only with 
the support of international capital. Therefore, the support 
of our revolution by the workers of all countries, 
and still more the victory of the workers in at least several 
countries, is a necessary condition for fully guaranteeing 
the first victorious country against attempts at intervention 
and restoration, a necessary condition for the 
final victory of socialism. 
³As long as our Soviet Republic,² says Lenin, ³remains an 
isolated borderland of the entire capitalist world, just so long 
will it be quite ludicrously fantastic and utopian to hope . . . for 
the disappearance of all danger. Of course, as long as such fundamental 
opposites remain, dangers will remain too, and we cannot 
escape them² (see Vol. XXVI, p. 29). 
And further: 
³We are living not merely in a state, but in a system of states, 
and the existence of the Soviet Republic side by side with imperialist 
states for a long time is unthinkable. One or the other must 
triumph in the end² (see Vol. XXIV, p. 122). 
That is why Lenin says that: 
³Final victory can be achieved only on a world scale, and 
only by the joint efforts of the workers of all countries² (see 
Vol. XXIII, p. 9). 
That is how the matter stands with the contradictions 
of the second order. 
Anyone who confuses the first group of contradictions, 
which can be overcome entirely by the efforts of one

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 121 
country, with the second group of contradictions, the 
solution of which requires the efforts of the proletarians 
of several countries, commits a gross error against Leninism. 
He is either a muddle-head or an incorrigible 
opportunist. 
An example of such confusion is provided by a 
letter I received from a comrade in January this 
year on the question of the victory of socialism in one 
country. He writes in perplexity: 
³You say that the Leninist theory . . . is that socialism can 
triumph in one country. I regret to say that I have not found in the 
relevant passages of Leninıs works any references to the victory of 
socialism in one country.² 
The trouble, of course, is not that this comrade, whom 
I regard as one of the best of our young student comrades, 
³has not found in the relevant passages of Leninıs works 
any references to the victory of socialism in one country.² 
He will read and, some day, will at last find such references. 
The trouble is that he confused the internal contradictions 
with the external contradictions and got 
entirely muddled up in this confusion. Perhaps it will not 
be superfluous to inform you of the answer I sent to this 
comradeıs letter. Here it is: 
³The point at issue is not complete victory, but the victory 
of socialism in general, i . e . , driving away the landlords and 
capitalists, taking power, repelling the attacks of imperialism 
and beginning to build a socialist economy. In all this, the proletariat 
in one country can be fully successful; but a complete 
guarantee against restoration can be ensured only by the Œjoint 
efforts of the proletarians in several countries.ı 
³It would have been foolish to have begun the October Revolution 
in Russia with the conviction that the victorious proletariat

J. V. S T A L I N 122 
of Russia, obviously enjoying the sympathy of the proletarians 
of other countries, but in the absence of victory in several countries, 
Œcannot hold out in the face of a conservative Europe.ı That 
is not Marxism, but the most ordinary opportunism, Trotskyism, 
and whatever else you please. If Trotskyıs theory were correct, 
Ilyich, who stated that we shall convert NEP Russia into 
socialist Russia, and that we have Œall that is necessary for building 
a complete socialist societyı* (see the article ³On Co-operation²), 
would be wrong. . . . 
³The most dangerous thing in our political practice is the 
attempt to regard the victorious proletarian country as something 
passive, capable only of marking time until the moment when 
assistance comes from the victorious proletarians in other countries. 
Let us assume that the Soviet system will exist in Russia for 
five or ten years without a revolution taking place in the West; 
let us assume that, nevertheless, during that period our Republic 
goes on existing as a Soviet Republic, building a socialist economy 
under the conditions of NEP‹do you think that during 
those five or ten years our country will merely spend the time in 
collecting water with a sieve and not in organising a socialist 
econonny? It is enough to ask this question to realise how very 
dangerous is the theory that denies the possibility of the victory 
of socialism in one country. 
³But does that mean that this victory will be complete, final? 
No, it does not . . . for as long as capitalist encirclement exists 
there will always be the danger of military intervention² (January 
1925). 
That is how the matter stands with the question of 
the fate of socialism in our country from the standpoint 
of the well-known resolution of the Fourteenth Conference 
of our Party. 
* All italics mine.‹J. St.

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 123 
V 
THE PARTYıS POLICY 
IN THE COUNTRYSIDE 
I pass to the fifth group of questions. 
Before passing to the resolutions of the Fourteenth 
Conference dealing with the Partyıs policy in the countryside, 
I should like to say a few words about the hullabaloo 
raised by the bourgeois press in connection with 
the criticism which our Party has made of our own shortcomings 
in the countryside. The bourgeois press leaps 
and dances and assures all and sundry that the open criticism 
of our own shortcomings is a sign of the weakness 
of the Soviet power, a sign of its disintegration and decay. 
Needless to say, all this hullabaloo is thoroughly 
false and mendacious. 
Self-criticism is a sign of our Partyıs strength and 
not of its weakness. Only a strong party, which has its 
roots in life and is marching to victory, can afford the 
ruthless criticism of its own shortcomings that it has 
permitted, and always will permit, in front of 
the whole people. A party which hides the truth from 
the people, which fears the light and fears criticism, 
is not a party, but a clique of impostors, whose doom is 
sealed. Messieurs the bourgeois measure us with their 
own yardstick. They fear the light and assiduously hide 
the truth from the people, covering up their shortcomings 
with ostentatious proclamation of well-being. And so 
they think that we Communists, too, must hide the 
truth from the people. They fear the light, for it would 
be enough for them to permit anything like serious selfcriticism, 
anything like free criticism of their own

J. V. S T A L I N 124 
shortcomings, to cause the downfall of the bourgeois system. 
And so they think that if we Communists permit selfcriticism, 
it is a sign that we are surrounded and that the 
ground is slipping from under our feet. Those honourable 
gentlemen, the bourgeois and Social-Democrats, measure 
us with their own yardsticks. Only parties which are 
departing into the past and whose doom is sealed can fear 
the light and fear criticism. We fear neither the one nor 
the other, we do not fear them because we are a party 
that is in the ascendant, that is marching to victory. 
That is why the self-criticism that has been going on for 
several months already is a sign of our Partyıs immense 
strength, and not of its weakness, it is a means of consolidating 
and not of disintegrating the Party. 
Let us now pass to the question of the Partyıs policy 
in the countryside. 
What new facts are to be noted in the countryside 
in connection with the new internal and international 
situation? 
I think that four chief facts are to be noted: 
1) the change in the international situation and the 
slowing down of the tempo of the revolution, which compel 
us to choose the least painful, although slower, methods 
of drawing the peasantry into socialist construction, 
of building socialism together with the peasantry; 
2) the economic progress in the countryside and the 
process of differentiation among the peasantry, which 
call for the elimination of the survivals of war communism 
in the countryside; 
3) the political activity of the peasantry, which requires 
that the old methods of leadership and administration 
in the countryside be changed;

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 125 
4) the elections to the Soviets, which revealed the 
indubitable fact that in a number of districts in our 
country the middle peasants were found to be on the side 
of the kulaks against the poor peasants. 
In view of these new facts, what is the Partyıs main 
task in the countryside? 
Proceeding from the fact that differentiation is going 
on in the countryside, some comrades draw the conclusion 
that the Partyıs main task is to foment class 
struggle there. That is wrong. That is idle talk. That 
is not our main task now. That is a rehash of the old 
Menshevik songs taken from the old Menshevik encyclopedia. 
To foment class struggle in the countryside is not 
by any means the main task at present. The main task 
at present is to rally the middle peasants around the proletariat, 
to win them over to our side again. The main 
task at present is to link up with the main masses of 
the peasantry, to raise their material and cultural 
level, and to move forward together with those main 
masses along the road to socialism. The main task is 
to build socialism together with the peasantry, without 
fail together with the peasantry, and without fail under 
the leadership of the working class; for the leadership 
of the working class is the basic guarantee that our 
work of construction will proceed along the path to 
socialism. 
That is now the Partyıs main task. 
Perhaps it will not be superfluous to recall Ilyichıs 
words on this subject, the words he uttered at the time 
NEP was introduced, and which remain valid to this 
day:

J. V. S T A L I N 126 
³The whole point now is to advance as an immeasurably wider 
and larger mass, and only together with the peasantry² (see Vol. 
XXVII, p. 272). 
And further: 
³Link up with the peasant masses, with the rank-and-file 
toiling peas ants, and begin to move forward immeasurably, infinitely, 
more slowly than we imagined, but in such a way that the 
entire mass will actually move forward with us. If we do that we 
shall in time get such an acceleration of progress as we cannot 
dream of now² (ibid., pp. 231-32). 
In view of this, two main tasks confront us in the 
countryside. 
1) Firstly, we must see to it that peasant economy 
is included in the general system of Soviet economic 
development. Formerly things proceeded in such a way 
that we had two parallel processes: the town went its 
own way and the country went its way. The capitalist 
strove to include peasant economy in the system of 
capitalist development, but that inclusion took place 
through the impoverishment of the peasant masses and 
the enrichment of the upper stratum of the peasantry. As 
is known, that path was fraught with revolution. After 
the victory of the proletariat the inclusion of peasant 
economy in the general system of Soviet economic development 
must be brought about by creating conditions 
that can promote the progress of our national economy 
on the basis of a gradual but steady improvement of the 
welfare of the majority of the peasants, that is, along 
a road which is the very opposite to the one along which 
the capitalists led the peasantry and proposed that they 
should go prior to the revolution.

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
127 
But how is peasant economy to be included in the 
system of economic construction? Through the co-operatives. 
Through the credit co-operatives, agricultural 
co-operatives, consumersı co-operatives and producersı 
co-operatives. 
Such are the roads and paths by which peasant economy 
must be slowly but thoroughly drawn into the general 
system of socialist construction. 
2) The second task consists in gradually but steadily 
pursuing the line of eliminating the old methods of administration 
and leadership in the countryside, the line 
of revitalising the Soviets, the line of transforming the 
Soviets into genuinely elected bodies, the line of implanting 
the principles of Soviet democracy in the countryside. 
Ilyich said that the proletarian dictatorship is the 
highest type of democracy for the majority of the working 
people. Ilyich said that this highest type of democracy can 
be introduced only after the proletariat has taken power 
and after we have obtained the opportunity of consolidating 
this power. Well, this phase of consolidating the 
Soviet power and of implanting Soviet democracy has 
already begun. We must proceed along this path cautiously 
and unhurriedly, and in the course of our work 
we must create around the Party a numerous active consisting 
of non-Party peasants. 
While the first task, the task of including peasant 
economy in the general system of economic construction, 
makes it possible for us to put the peasantry in joint 
harness with the proletariat on the road of building socialism, 
the second task, the task of implanting Soviet 
democracy and revitalising the Soviets in the countryside, 
should make it possible for us to reconstruct our 
RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.)

J. V. S T A L I N 128 
state apparatus, to link it with the masses of the people, 
to make it sound and honest, simple and inexpensive, 
in order to create the conditions that will facilitate the 
gradual transition from a society with a dictatorship 
of the proletariat to communist society. 
Such are the main lines of the resolutions adopted 
by the Fourteenth Conference of our Party on the question 
of our Partyıs policy in the countryside. 
Hence, the methods of Party leadership in the countryside 
must change accordingly. 
We have people in the Party who assert that since 
we have NEP, and since capitalism is beginning to 
be temporarily stabilised, our task is to pursue a policy 
of the utmost pressure both in the Party and in the state 
apparatus, pressure so strong as to make everything 
creak. I must say that such a policy would be wrong and 
fatal. What we need now is not the utmost pressure, but 
the utmost flexibility in both policy and organisation, 
the utmost flexibility in both political and organisational 
leadership. Unless we have that we shall be unable 
to remain at the helm under the present complicated conditions. 
We need the utmost flexibility in order to keep 
the Party at the helm and to ensure that the Party exercises 
complete leadership. 
Further. The Communists in the countryside must 
refrain from improper forms of administration. We must 
not rely merely on giving orders to the peasants. We must 
learn to explain to the peasants patiently the questions 
they do not understand, we must learn to convince the 
peasants, sparing neither time nor effort for this purpose. 
Of course, it is much easier and simpler to issue an order 
and leave it at that, as some of our Volost Executive

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 129 
Committee Chairmen often do. But not all that is simple 
and easy is good. Not long ago, it appears, when the representative 
of a Gubernia Committee asked the secretary 
of a volost Party unit why there were no newspapers 
in his volost, the answer was given: ³What do we want 
newspapers for? Itıs quieter and better without them. 
If the peasants begin reading newspapers they will 
start asking all sorts of questions and we shall have no 
end of trouble with them.² And this secretary calls himself 
a Communist! It scarcely needs proof that he is not 
a Communist, but a calamity. The point is that nowadays 
it is utterly impossible to lead without ³trouble,² 
let alone without newspapers. This simple truth must be 
understood and assimilated if we want the Party and the 
Soviet power to retain the leadership in the countryside. 
Further. To lead, nowadays, one must be a good 
manager, one must be familiar with and understand 
economic affairs. Merely talking about ³world politics,² 
about Chamberlain and MacDonald, will not carry one 
very far now. We have entered the period of economic 
construction. Hence, the one who can lead i s one 
who understands economic affairs, who is able to give 
the peasant useful advice about economic development, 
who can give the peasant assistance in economic construction. 
To study economic affairs, to be directly linked 
with economic affairs, to go into all the details of economic 
construction‹such is now the task of the Communists 
in the countryside. Unless they do that, it is no use 
even dreaming of leadership. 
It is now impossible to lead in the old way, because 
the peasants are displaying more political activity, and 
it is necessary that this activity should assume a Soviet

J. V. S T A L I N 130 
form, that it should flow through the Soviets and not 
past them. A leader is one who revitalises the Soviets 
and creates a peasant active around the Party in the 
countryside. 
It is impossible to lead in the old way nowadays, 
because the economic activity of the rural population 
has increased, and it is necessary that this activity 
should assume the form of co-operation, that it should 
flow through the co-operatives and not past them. 
A leader is one who implants a co-operative communal 
life in the countryside. 
Such, in general, are the concrete tasks of Party 
leadership in the countryside. 
VI 
THE METAL INDUSTRY 
I pass to the last group of questions dealt with at 
the Fourteenth Conference of our Party. 
What is new and specific in our economic leadership? 
It is that our economic plans have begun to lag behind 
the actual development of our economy, they turn 
out to be inadequate and quite often fail to keep pace 
with the actual growth of our economy. 
A striking expression of this fact is our state budget. 
You know that in the course of half a year we were 
obliged to revise our state budget three times owing to 
rapid increases in the revenue side of our budget not 
foreseen in our estimates. In other words, our estimates 
and our budget plans failed to keep pace with the increase 
in state revenues, as a result of which the state treasury 
found itself with a surplus. That means that the sap of eco

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 131 
nomic life in our country is surging upward with irresistible 
force, upsetting all the scientific plans of our 
financial experts. That means that we are experiencing an 
upsurge of economic and labour activity, at least as 
powerful as that which America, for example, experienced 
after the Civil War. 
The growth of our metal industry can be taken as 
the most striking expression of this new phenomenon in 
our economic life. Last year the output of the metal 
industry amounted to 191,000,000 pre-war rubles. In 
November last year the annual output plan for 1924-25 
was fixed at 273,000,000 pre-war rubles. In January 
this year, in view of the discrepancy between that figure 
and the actual growth of the metal industry, the plan 
was revised and the figure brought up to 317,000,000. 
In April this year, even this enlarged plan proved to be 
unsound and, as a consequence, the figure had to be 
raised again, this time to 350,000,000. Now we are told 
that this plan has also proved to be inadequate, for it 
will have to be enlarged once again and the figure raised 
to 360-370 millions. 
In other words, the output of the metal industry 
this year has almost doubled compared with that of last 
year. That is apart from the colossal growth of our light 
industry, of the growth of our transport system, fuel 
industry, and so forth. 
What does all this show? It shows that as regards 
the organisation of industry, which is the chief basis of 
socialism, we have already entered the broad high road 
of development. As regards the metal industry, the mainspring 
of all industry, the period of stagnation has passed, 
and our metal industry now has every opportunity

J. V. S T A L I N 132 
of going ahead and nourishing. Comrade Dzerzhinsky is 
right in saying that our country can and must become 
a land of metal. 
The enormous importance of this fact both for the 
internal development of our country and for the international 
revolution scarcely needs proof. 
There is no doubt that, from the standpoint of our 
internal development, the development of our metal 
industry and the significance of its growth are colossal, 
for this development means the growth of our entire 
industry and of our economy as a whole, for the metal 
industry is the chief basis of industry as a whole, for 
neither light industry, nor transport, nor the fuel 
industry, nor electrification, nor agriculture can be 
put on their feet unless the metal industry is powerfully 
developed. The growth of the metal industry is 
the basis of the growth of industry as a whole, and of 
our national economy as a whole. 
Here is what Lenin says about ³heavy industry,² 
meaning by that mainly the metal industry: 
³The salvation of Russia lies not only in a good harvest on 
the peasant farms‹that is not enough; and not only in the good 
condition of light industry, which provides the peasantry with 
consumer goods‹that, too, is not enough; we also need heavy 
industry. And to put i t in good condition will require many 
years of work.² 
And further: 
³Unless we save heavy industry, unless we restore it, we shall 
not be able to build up any industry; and without that we shall 
be doomed altogether as an independent country² (see Vol. XXVII, 
p. 349). 
As for the international significance of the development 
of our metal industry, we may say that it is immeas

RESULTS OF WORK OF XIV CONFERENCE OF THE R.C.P.(B.) 133 
urable. For what is the surging growth of the metal 
industry under the proletarian dictatorship if not direct 
proof that the proletariat is capable not only of destroying 
the old, but also of building the new, that it is capable 
of building by its own efforts a new industry, 
and a new society free from the exploitation of man by 
man? To prove this in actual fact and not from books 
means advancing the cause of the international revolution 
surely and finally. The pilgrimages of West- 
European workers to our country are not accidental. 
They are of enormous agitational and practical significance 
for the development of the revolutionary movement 
throughout the world. The fact that workers come here 
and probe every corner at our factories and works 
shows that they do not believe books, but want to convince 
themselves by their own experience that the proletariat 
is capable of building a new industry, of creating 
a new society. And when they convince themselves 
of this, you may be sure that the cause of the international 
revolution will make enormous strides forward. 
³At the present time,² says Lenin, ³we are exercising our 
main influence on the international revolution by our economic 
policy. All eyes are turned on the Soviet Russian Republic, the 
eyes of all toilers in all countries of the world without exception 
and without exaggeration. . . . That is the field to which the 
struggle has been transferred on a world-wide scale. If we solve 
this problem, we shall have won on an international scale surely 
and finally. That is why questions of economic construction assume 
absolutely exceptional significance for us. On this front we must 
win victory by slow, gradual‹it cannot be fast‹but steady progress 
upward and forward²* (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 410-11). 
* All italics mine.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 134 
Such is the international significance of the growth 
of our industry in general, and of our metal industry in 
particular. 
At the present time we have an industrial proletariat 
of about 4,000,000. A small number, of course, but it 
is something to go on with in building socialism and in 
building up the defence of our country to the terror of 
the enemies of the proletariat. But we cannot and must 
not stop there. We need 15-20 million industrial proletarians, 
we need the electrification of the principal 
regions of our country, the organisation of agriculture 
on co-operative lines, and a highly developed metal 
industry. And then we need fear no danger. And then 
we shall triumph on an international scale. 
The historical significance of the Fourteenth Conference 
lies precisely in the fact that it clearly mapped 
the road to that great goal. 
And that road is the right road, for it is Leninıs 
road, and it will lead us to final victory. 
Such, in general, are the results of the work of 
the Fourteenth Conference of our Party. 
Pravda, Nos. 106 and 107, 
May 12 and 13, 1925

THE POLITICAL TASKS OF THE UNIVERSITY 
OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST 
Speech Delivered at a Meeting of Students 
of the Communist University 
of the Toilers of the East 
May 18, 1925 
Comrades, permit me, first of all, to greet you on the 
occasion of the fourth anniversary of the existence of the 
Communist University of the Toilers of the East. Needless 
to say, I wish your University every success on the 
difficult road of training communist cadres for the East. 
And now let us pass to the matter in hand. 
Analysing the composition of the student body of 
the University of the Toilers of the East, one cannot help 
noting a certain duality in it. This University unites 
representatives of not less than fifty nations and national 
groups of the East. All the students at this University 
are sons of the East. But that definition does not 
give any clear or complete picture. The fact is that there 
are two main groups among the students at the University, 
representing two sets of totally different conditions 
of development. The first group consists of people 
who have come here from the Soviet East, from countries 
where the rule of the bourgeoisie no longer exists, 
where imperialist oppression has been overthrown, and 
where the workers are in power. The second group of 
students consists of people who have come here from 
colonial and dependent countries, from countries where 
capitalism still reigns, where imperialist oppression is

J. V. S T A L I N 136 
still in full force, and where independence has still to be 
won by driving out the imperialists. 
Thus, we have two Easts, living different lives, and 
developing under different conditions. 
Needless to say, this duality in the composition of the 
student body cannot but leave its impress upon the work 
of the University of the Toilers of the East. That explains 
the fact that this University stands with one foot on 
Soviet soil and the other on the soil of the colonies and 
dependent countries. 
Hence the two lines of the Universityıs activity: 
one line having the aim of creating cadres capable of 
serving the needs of the Soviet republics of the East, 
and the other line having the aim of creating cadres capable 
of serving the revolutionary requirements of the 
toiling masses in the colonial and dependent countries 
of the East. 
Hence, also, the two kinds of tasks that face the 
University of the Toilers of the East. 
Let us examine these tasks of the Communist University 
of the Toilers of the East separately. 
I 
THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST UNIVERSITY 
OF THE TOILERS OF THE EAST IN RELATION 
TO THE SOVIET REPUBLICS OF THE EAST 
What are the characteristic features of the life and 
development of these countries, of these republics, which 
distinguish them from the colonial and dependent countries?

TASKS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST 137 
Firstly, these republics are free from imperialist 
oppression. 
Secondly, they are developing and becoming consolidated 
as nations not under the aegis of the bourgeois 
order, but under the aegis of Soviet power. That is a fact 
unprecedented in history, but it is a fact for all that. 
Thirdly, inasmuch as they are industrially underdeveloped, 
they can in their development rely wholly 
and entirely on the support of the industrial proletariat 
of the Soviet Union. 
Fourthly, being free from colonial oppression, enjoying 
the protection of the proletarian dictatorship, and 
being members of the Soviet Union, these republics 
can and must be drawn into the work of building socialism 
in our country. 
The main task is to make it easier to draw the workers 
and peasants of these republics into the work of 
building socialism in our country, to create and develop 
the prerequisites, applicable in the specific conditions 
of life in these republics, that can promote and hasten 
this process. 
Hence, the immediate tasks that face the leading 
cadres in the Soviet East are: 
1) To create industrial centres in the Soviet republics 
of the East to serve as bases for rallying the peasants 
around the working class. You know that this work 
has already begun, and it will advance together with the 
economic growth of the Soviet Union. The fact that these 
republics possess all kinds of raw materials is a guarantee 
that in time this work will be completed. 
2) To raise the level of agriculture, above all irrigation. 
You know that this work has also been pushed

J. V. S T A L I N 138 
forward, at any rate in Transcaucasia and in Turkestan. 
3) To start and further promote the organisation of 
co-operatives for the broad masses of the peasants and 
handicraftsmen as the surest way of drawing the Soviet 
republics in the East into the general system of Soviet 
economic construction. 
4) To bring the Soviets closer to the masses, to make 
them national in composition, and in this way implant 
national-Soviet statehood, close to and comprehensible 
to the toiling masses. 
5) To develop national culture, to set up a wide network 
of courses and schools for both general education 
and vocational-technical training, to be conducted in the 
native languages for the purpose of training Soviet, 
Party, technical and business cadres from the local 
people. 
It is precisely the fulfilment of these tasks that 
will facilitate the work of building socialism in the 
Soviet republics of the East. 
There is talk about model republics in the Soviet 
East. But what is a model republic? A model republic 
is one which carries out all these tasks honestly 
and conscientiously, thereby attracting the workers and 
peasants of the neighbouring colonial and dependent 
countries to the liberation movement. 
I have spoken above about bringing the Soviets closer 
to the toiling masses of the different nationalities‹ 
about making the Soviets national in character. But what 
does that mean, and how does it manifest itself in practice? 
I think that the national delimitation recently 
completed in Turkestan30 can serve as a model of the way

TASKS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST 139 
the Soviets should be brought closer to the masses. The 
bourgeois press regards this delimitation as ³Bolshevik 
cunning.² It is obvious, however, that this was a manifestation 
not of ³cunning,² but of the deep-rooted aspiration 
of the masses of the people of Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan to have their own organs of power, close 
to and comprehensible to them. In the pre-revolutionary 
epoch, both these countries were torn to pieces and distributed 
among various khanates and states, thus providing 
a convenient field for the exploiting machinations 
of ³the powers that be.² The time has now come when 
it has become possible for these scattered pieces to be 
reunited in independent states, so that the toiling masses 
of Uzbekistan and of Turkmenistan may be brought 
closer to the organs of power and linked solidly with them. 
The delimitation of Turkestan is, above all, the reunion 
of the scattered parts of these countries in independent 
states. That these states later expressed the wish to 
join the Soviet Union as equal members of it merely 
shows that the Bolsheviks have found the key to the 
deep-rooted aspirations of the masses of the people of 
the East, and that the Soviet Union is a voluntary 
union of the toiling masses of different nationalities, 
the only one in the world. To reunite Poland, the bourgeoisie 
needed a whole series of wars. To reunite 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, however, the Communists 
needed only a few months of explanatory propaganda. 
That is the way to bring the organs of government, 
in this case the Soviets, closer to the broad masses of 
the toilers of different nationalities. 
That is the proof that the Bolshevik national policy 
is the only correct policy.

J. V. S T A L I N 140 
I spoke, further, about raising the level of national 
culture in the Soviet republics of the East. But what 
is national culture? How is it to be reconciled with proletarian 
culture? Did not Lenin say, already before the 
war, that there are two cultures‹bourgeois and socialist; 
that the slogan of national culture is a reactionary 
slogan of the bourgeoisie, who try to poison the minds 
of the working people with the venom of nationalism?31 
How is the building of national culture, the development 
of schools and courses in the native languages, and the 
training of cadres from the local people, to be reconciled 
with the building of socialism, with the building of 
proletarian culture? Is there not an irreconcilable contradiction 
here? Of course not! We are building proletarian 
culture. That is absolutely true. But it is also true that 
proletarian culture, which is socialist in content, assumes 
different forms and modes of expression among 
the different peoples who are drawn into the building 
of socialism, depending upon differences in language, 
manner of life, and so forth. Proletarian in content, 
national in form‹such is the universal culture towards 
which socialism is proceeding. Proletarian culture does 
not abolish national culture, it gives it content. On 
the other hand, national culture does not abolish proletarian 
culture, it gives it form. The slogan of national 
culture was a bourgeois slogan as long as the bourgeoisie 
was in power and the consolidation of nations proceeded 
under the aegis of the bourgeois order. The slogan of 
national culture became a proletarian slogan when the 
proletariat came to power, and when the consolidation of 
nations began to proceed under the aegis of Soviet power. 
Whoever fails to understand the fundamental difference

TASKS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST 141 
between these two situations will never understand 
either Leninism or the essence of the national question. 
Some people (Kautsky, for instance) talk of the 
creation of a single universal language and the dying 
away of all other languages in the period of socialism. 
I have little faith in this theory of a single, all-embracing 
language. Experience, at any rate, speaks against rather 
than for such a theory. Until now what has happened 
has been that the socialist revolution has not diminished 
but rather increased the number of languages; for, by 
stirring up the lowest sections of humanity and pushing 
them on to the political arena, it awakens to new life 
a number of hitherto unknown or little-known nationalities. 
Who could have imagined that the old, tsarist 
Russia consisted of not less than fifty nations and national 
groups? The October Revolution, however, by 
breaking the old chains and bringing a number of forgotten 
peoples and nationalities on to the scene, gave them 
new life and a new development. Today, India is spoken 
of as a single whole. But there can scarcely be any doubt 
that, in the event of a revolutionary upheaval in India, 
scores of hitherto unknown nationalities, having their 
own separate languages and separate cultures, will appear 
on the scene. And as regards implanting proletarian 
culture among the various nationalities, there can 
scarcely be any doubt that this will proceed in forms 
corresponding to the languages and manner of life of 
these nationalities. 
Not long ago I received a letter from some Buryat 
comrades asking me to explain serious and difficult questions 
concerning the relations between universal culture 
and national culture. Here it is:

J. V. S T A L I N 142 
³We earnestly request you to explain the following, for us, 
very serious and difficult questions. The ultimate aim of the Communist 
Party is to achieve a single universal culture. How is one 
to conceive the transition to a single universal culture through 
the national cultures which are developing within the limits of 
our individual autonomous republics? How is the assimilation 
of the specific features of the individual national cultures (language, 
etc.) to take place?.² 
I think that what has just been said might serve as 
an answer to the anxious question put by these Buryat 
comrades. 
The Buryat comrades raise the question of the assimilation 
of the individual nationalities in the course of 
building a universal proletarian culture. Undoubtedly, 
some nationalities may, and perhaps certainly will, undergo 
a process of assimilation. Such processes have 
taken place before. The point is, however, that the process 
of assimilation of some nationalities does not exclude, 
but presupposes the opposite process of the strengthening 
and further development of quite a number 
of existing and developing nations; for the partial process 
of assimilation of individual nationalities is the 
result of the general process of development of nations. 
It is precisely for this reason that the possible assimilation 
of some individual nationalities does not weaken, 
but confirms the entirely correct thesis that proletarian 
universal culture does not exclude, but presupposes 
and fosters the national culture of the peoples, just as 
the national culture of the peoples does not annul, but 
supplements and enriches universal proletarian culture. 
Such, in general, are the immediate tasks that face 
the leading cadres of the Soviet republics of the East. 
Such are the character and content of these tasks.

TASKS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST 143 
Advantage must be taken of the period that has 
begun of intense economic construction and of new concessions 
to the peasantry to promote the fulfilment of 
these tasks, and thereby to make it easier to draw the 
Soviet republics in the East, which are mainly peasant 
countries, into the work of building socialism in the 
Soviet Union. 
It is said that the Partyıs new policy towards the 
peasantry, in making a number of new concessions 
(land on short lease, permission to employ hired labour), 
contains certain elements of retreat. Is that 
true? Yes , i t i s . But those are elements of retreat 
that we permit alongside the retention of an overwhelming 
superiority of forces on the side of the Party 
and the Soviet power. Stable currency, developing industry, 
developing transport, a credit system which is 
growing stronger, and by means of which it is possible, 
through preferential credits, to ruin or to raise to a 
higher level any stratum of the population without 
causing the slightest upheaval‹all these are reserves 
at the command of the proletarian dictatorship by means 
of which certain elements of retreat on one sector of 
the front can only facilitate the preparation of an offensive 
along the whole front. Precisely for this reason, the 
few new concessions that the Party has made to the peasantry 
should, at the present time, make it easier rather 
than more difficult to draw the peasantry into the work 
of building socialism. 
What can this circumstance mean for the Soviet republics 
in the East? It can only mean that it places in 
the hands of the leading cadres in these republics a new 
weapon enabling these countries to be more easily and

J. V. S T A L I N 144 
quickly linked with the general system of Soviet economic 
development. 
Such is the connection between the Partyıs policy in 
the countryside and the immediate national tasks confronting 
the leading cadres in the Soviet East. 
In this connection, the task of the University of 
the Peoples of the East in relation to the Soviet republics 
of the East is to train cadres for these republics 
along lines that will ensure the fulfilment of the immediate 
tasks I have enumerated above. 
The University of the Peoples of the East must not 
isolate itself from life. It is not, nor can it be, an institution 
standing above life. It must be connected 
with actual life through every fibre of its being. Consequently, 
it cannot ignore the immediate tasks confronting 
the Soviet republics in the East. That is why the 
task of the University of the Peoples of the East is to 
take the immediate tasks that face these republics into 
account in training the appropriate cadres for them. 
In this connection, it is necessary to bear in mind 
the existence of two deviations in the practice of the 
leading cadres in the Soviet East, deviations which must 
be combated within the precincts of this University if 
it is to train real cadres and real revolutionaries for the 
Soviet East. 
The first deviation lies in simplification, a simplification 
of the tasks of which I have spoken above, an 
attempt mechanically to transplant models of economic 
construction which are quite comprehensible and applicable 
in the centre of the Soviet Union, but which are 
totally unsuited to the conditions of development in the 
so-called border regions. The comrades who are guilty

TASKS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST 145 
of this deviation fail to understand two things. They fail 
to understand that conditions in the centre and in the 
³border regions² are not alike and are far from being 
identical. Furthermore, they fail to understand that the 
Soviet republics themselves in the East are not alike, 
that some of them, Georgia and Armenia, for example, 
are at a higher stage of national formation, whereas 
others, Chechnya and Kabarda, for example, are at a 
lower stage of national formation, and others again, 
Kirghizia, for example, occupy a middle position between 
these two extremes. These comrades fail to understand 
that if the work is not adapted to local conditions, 
if all the various specific features of each country are 
not carefully taken into account, nothing of importance 
can be built. The result of this deviation is that they become 
divorced from the masses and degenerate into Left 
phrasemongers. The task of the University of the Peoples 
of the East is to train cadres in the spirit of uncompromising 
struggle against this simplification. 
The second deviation, on the other hand, lies in 
the exaggeration of local specific features, forgetfulness 
of the common and main thing that links the Soviet 
republics of the East with the industrial areas of the 
Soviet Union, the hushing up of socialist tasks, adaptation 
to the tasks of a narrow and restricted nationalism. 
The comrades who are guilty of this deviation care 
little about the internal development of their countries 
and prefer to leave that development to the natural 
course of things. For them, the main thing is 
not internal development, but ³external² policy, the expansion 
of the frontiers of their republics, litigation 
with surrounding republics, the desire to snatch an extra

J. V. S T A L I N 146 
piece of territory from their neighbours and thus to get 
into the good graces of the bourgeois nationalists in their 
respective countries. The result of this deviation is that 
they become divorced from socialism and degenerate 
into ordinary bourgeois nationalists. The task of the 
University of the Peoples of the East is to train cadres 
in the spirit of uncompromising struggle against this 
concealed nationalism. 
Such are the tasks of the University of the Peoples 
of the East in relation to the Soviet republics of the 
East. 
II 
THE TASKS OF THE COMMUNIST 
UNIVERSITY OF THE TOILERS OF THE EAST 
IN RELATION TO THE COLONIAL 
AND DEPENDENT COUNTRIES OF THE EAST 
Let us pass to the second question, the question of 
the tasks of the Communist University of the Toilers of 
the East in relation to the colonial and dependent 
countries of the East. 
What are the characteristic features of the life and 
development of these countries, which distinguish them 
from the Soviet republics of the East? 
Firstly, these countries are living and developing 
under the oppression of imperialism. 
Secondly, the existence of a double oppression, internal 
oppression (by the native bourgeoisie) and external 
oppression (by the foreign imperialist bourgeoisie), 
is intensifying and deepening the revolutionary crisis 
in these countries.

TASKS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST 147 
Thirdly, in some of these countries, India for example, 
capitalism is growing at a rapid rate, giving rise 
to and moulding a more or less numerous class of local 
proletarians. 
Fourthly, with the growth of the revolutionary movement, 
the national bourgeoisie in such countries is splitting 
up into two parts, a revolutionary part (the petty 
bourgeoisie) and a compromising part (the big bourgeoisie), 
of which the first is continuing the revolutionary 
struggle, whereas the second is entering into a 
bloc with imperialism. 
Fifthly, parallel with the imperialist bloc, another 
bloc is taking shape in such countries, a bloc between 
the workers and the revolutionary petty bourgeoisie, 
an anti-imperialist bloc, the aim of which is complete 
liberation from imperialism. 
Sixthly, the question of the hegemony of the proletariat 
in such countries, and of freeing the masses of the 
people from the influence of the compromising national 
bourgeoisie, is becoming more and more urgent. 
Seventhly, this circumstance makes it much easier 
to link the national-liberation movement in such countries 
with the proletarian movement in the advanced 
countries of the West. 
From this at least three conclusions follow: 
1) The liberation of the colonial and dependent countries 
from imperialism cannot be achieved without a victorious 
revolution: you will not get independence gratis. 
2) The revolution cannot be advanced and the complete 
independence of the capitalistically developed 
colonies and dependent countries cannot be won unless 
the compromising national bourgeoisie is isolated,

J. V. S T A L I N 148 
unless the petty-bourgeois revolutionary masses are freed 
from the influence of that bourgeoisie, unless the policy 
of the hegemony of the proletariat is put into effect, 
unless the advanced elements of the working class are 
organised in an independent Communist Party. 
3) Lasting victory cannot be achieved in the colonial 
and dependent countries without a real link between 
the liberation movement in those countries and the 
proletarian movement in the advanced countries of the 
West. 
The main task of the Communists in the colonial 
and dependent countries is to base their revolutionary 
activities upon these conclusions. 
What are the immediate tasks of the revolutionary 
movement in the colonies and dependent countries in 
view of these circumstances? 
The distinctive feature of the colonies and dependent 
countries at the present time is that there no longer 
exists a single and all-embracing colonial East. Formerly 
the colonial East was pictured as a homogeneous 
whole. Today, that picture no longer corresponds to 
the truth. We have now at least three categories of colonial 
and dependent countries. Firstly, countries like 
Morocco, which have little or no proletariat, and are 
industrially quite undeveloped. Secondly, countries like 
China and Egypt, which are under-developed industrially, 
and have a relatively small proletariat. Thirdly, 
countries like India, which are capitalistically more 
or less developed and have a more or less numerous national 
proletariat. 
Clearly, all these countries cannot possibly be put 
on a par with one another.

TASKS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST 149 
In countries like Morocco, where the national bourgeoisie 
has, as yet, no grounds for splitting up into a 
revolutionary party and a compromising party, the task 
of the communist elements is to take all measures to 
create a united national front against imperialism. In 
such countries, the communist elements can be grouped 
in a single party only in the course of the struggle 
against imperialism, particularly after a victorious revolutionary 
struggle against imperialism. 
In countries like Egypt and China, where the national 
bourgeoisie has already split up into a revolutionary 
party and a compromising party, but where 
the compromising section of the bourgeoisie is not yet 
able to join up with imperialism, the Communists can 
no longer set themselves the aim of forming a united na 
tional front against imperialism. In such countries the 
Communists must pass from the policy of a united national 
front to the policy of a revolutionary bloc of the 
workers and the petty bourgeoisie. In such countries 
that bloc can assume the form of a single party, a workersı 
and peasantsı party, provided, however, that this 
distinctive party actually represents a bloc of two forces 
‹the Communist Party and the party of the revolutionary 
petty bourgeoisie. The tasks of this bloc are 
to expose the half-heartedness and inconsistency of 
the national bourgeoisie and to wage a determined 
struggle against imperialism. Such a dual party is 
necessary and expedient, provided i t does not bind 
the Communist Party hand and foot, provided it does 
not restrict the freedom of the Communist Party to 
conduct agitation and propaganda work, provided it 
does not hinder the rallying of the proletarians around

J. V. S T A L I N 150 
the Communist Party, and provided it facilitates the 
actual leadership of the revolutionary movement by 
the Communist Party. Such a dual party is unnecessary 
and inexpedient if it does not conform to all these conditions, 
for it can only lead to the communist elements 
becoming dissolved in the ranks of the bourgeoisie, to 
the Communist Party losing the proletarian army. 
The situation is somewhat different in countries 
like India. The fundamental and new feature of the conditions 
of life of colonies like India is not only that 
the national bourgeoisie has split up into a revolutionary 
party and a compromising party, but primarily that 
the compromising section of this bourgeoisie has already 
managed, in the main, to strike a deal with imperialism. 
Fearing revolution more than it fears imperialism, 
and concerned more about its money-bags than 
about the interests of its own country, this section of 
the bourgeoisie, the richest and most influential section, 
is going over entirely to the camp of the irreconcilable 
enemies of the revolution, it is forming a bloc with 
imperialism against the workers and peasants of its own 
country. The victory of the revolution cannot be achieved 
unless this bloc is smashed. But in order to smash this 
bloc, fire must be concentrated on the compromising 
national bourgeoisie, its treachery exposed, the toiling 
masses freed from its influence, and the conditions necessary 
for the hegemony of the proletariat systematically 
prepared. In other words, in colonies like India 
it is a matter of preparing the proletariat for the role 
of leader of the liberation movement, step by step 
dislodging the bourgeoisie and its mouthpieces from 
this honourable post. The task is to create a revolu

TASKS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST 151 
tionary anti-imperialist bloc and to ensure the hegemony 
of the proletariat in this bloc. This bloc can 
assume, although it need not always necessarily do so, 
the form of a single workersı and peasantsı party, formally 
bound by a single platform. In such countries, 
the independence of the Communist Party must be 
the chief slogan of the advanced communist elements, 
for the hegemony of the proletariat can be prepared 
and brought about only by the Communist Party. But 
the Communist Party can and must enter into an open 
bloc with the revolutionary wing of the bourgeoisie 
in order, after isolating the compromising national 
bourgeoisie, to lead the vast masses of the urban and rural 
petty bourgeoisie in the struggle against imperialism. 
Hence, the immediate tasks of the revolutionary 
movement in the capitalistically developed colonies and 
dependent countries are: 
1) To win the best elements of the working class to 
the side of communism and to create independent Communist 
Parties. 
2) To form a national-revolutionary bloc of the workers, 
peasants and revolutionary intelligentsia against 
the bloc of the compromising national bourgeoisie and 
imperialism. 
3) To ensure the hegemony of the proletariat in that 
bloc. 
4) To fight to free the urban and rural petty bourgeoisie 
from the influence of the compromising national 
bourgeoisie. 
5) To ensure that the liberation movement is linked 
with the proletarian movement in the advanced countries. 
Such are the three groups of immediate tasks

J. V. S T A L I N 152 
confronting the leading cadres in the colonial and 
dependent countries of the East. 
These tasks assume a particularly important character 
and particularly great significance when examined 
in the light of the present international situation. The 
characteristic feature of the present international situation 
is that the revolutionary movement has entered a 
period of temporary lull. But what is a lull, what does 
it mean at the present time? It can only mean an intensification 
of the pressure on the workers of the West, 
on the colonies of the East, and primarily on the Soviet 
Union as the standard-bearer of the revolutionary movement 
in all countries. There can scarcely be any doubt 
that preparation for this pressure on the Soviet Union 
has already begun in the ranks of the imperialists. The 
campaign of slander launched in connection with the 
insurrection in Estonia,32 the infamous incitement against 
the Soviet Union in connection with the explosion in 
Sofia, and the general crusade that the bourgeois press 
is conducting against our country, all mark the preparatory 
stage of an offensive. It is the artillery preparation 
of public opinion intended to accustom the general 
public to attacks against the Soviet Union and to create 
the moral prerequisites for intervention. What will 
be the outcome of this campaign of lies and slander, 
whether the imperialists will risk undertaking a serious 
offensive, remains to be seen; but there can scarcely 
be any doubt that those attacks bode no good for 
the colonies. Therefore, the question of preparing a counter-
blow by the united forces of the revolution to the 
blow likely to be delivered by imperialism is an inevitable 
question of the day.

TASKS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF THE PEOPLES OF THE EAST 153 
That is why the unswerving fulfilment of the immediate 
tasks of the revolutionary movement in the colonies 
and dependent countries acquires particular importance 
at the present time. 
What is the mission of the University of the Peoples 
of the East in relation to the colonial and dependent 
countries in view of all these circumstances? Its mission 
is to take into account all the specific features of 
the revolutionary development of these countries and 
to train the cadres coming from them in a way that will 
ensure the fulfilment of the various immediate tasks 
I have enumerated. 
In the University of the Peoples of the East there 
are about ten different groups of students who have come 
here from colonial and dependent countries. We all know 
that these comrades are thirsting for light and knowledge. 
The task of the University of the Peoples of the 
East is to make them into real revolutionaries, armed 
with the theory of Leninism, equipped with practical 
experience of Leninism, and capable of carrying out 
the immediate tasks of the liberation movement in the 
colonies and dependent countries with all their heart 
and soul. 
In this connection it is necessary to bear in mind 
two deviations in the practice of the leading cadres in 
the colonial East, two deviations which must be combated 
if real revolutionary cadres are to be trained. 
The first deviation lies in an under-estimation of 
the revolutionary potentialities of the liberation movement 
and in an over-estimation of the idea of a united, 
all-embracing national front in the colonies and dependent 
countries, irrespective of the state and degree of

J. V. S T A L I N 154 
development of those countries. That is a deviation to 
the Right, and i t is fraught with the danger of the 
revolutionary movement being debased and of the 
voices of the communist elements becoming drowned 
in the general chorus of the bourgeois nationalists. It 
is the direct duty of the University of the Peoples of 
the East to wage a determined struggle against that 
deviation. 
The second deviation lies in an over-estimation of 
the revolutionary potentialities of the liberation movement 
and in an under-estimation of the role of an alliance 
between the working class and the revolutionary 
bourgeoisie against imperialism. It seems to me that 
the Communists in Java, who not long ago mistakenly 
put forward the slogan of Soviet power for their country, 
are suffering from this deviation. That is a deviation to 
the Left, and it is fraught with the danger of the Communist 
Party becoming divorced from the masses and 
converted into a sect. A determined struggle against 
that deviation is an essential condition for the training 
of real revolutionary cadres for the colonies and dependent 
countries of the East. 
Such, in general, are the political tasks of the University 
of the Peoples of the East in relation to the peoples 
of the Soviet East and of the colonial East. 
Let us hope that the University of the Peoples of 
the East will succeed in carrying out these tasks with 
honour. 
Pravda, No. 115, 
May 22, 1925

TO ALL THE MEMBERS OF THE EDITORIAL 
BOARD OF KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA33 
Comrades, in view of the great importance of Komsomolskaya 
Pravda, I should like to share with you my 
first impressions of some of the articles in that newspaper. 
1) We are of the opinion that certain passages in 
Stetskyıs articles ³A New Stage in the New Economic 
Policy² evoke doubts. In those articles, in a mild form 
it is true, countenance is given to the slogan ³enrich 
yourselves.² That is not our slogan, it is incorrect, it 
gives rise to a whole series of doubts and misunderstandings 
and has no place in a leading article in Komsomolskaya 
Pravda. Our slogan is socialist accumulation. 
We are removing the administrative obstacles to an 
improvement of the welfare of the countryside. That 
operation will undoubtedly facilitate all accumulation, 
both private-capitalist and socialist. But the Party has 
never yet said that it makes private accumulation its 
slogan. We are giving NEP full scope and permitting 
private accumulation in order to facilitate the 
implementation of our slogan of socialist accumulation 
within the framework of our national economy. Perhaps 
some of our comrades regard this as a debatable question. 
If so, it should be stated that the slogan ³enrich yourselves² 
is a debatable one, and that articles in favour

J. V. S T A L I N 156 
of such a slogan are printed for discussion. On the other 
hand it is obvious that Komsomolskaya Pravda is not 
an organ for discussion, but primarily a positive organ, 
which presents its readers with the slogans and propositions 
generally accepted by the Party. 
In short, whichever way you look at the question, 
from the formal standpoint, or from the standpoint of 
the substance of the matter, in this respect Stetskyıs article 
must be regarded as unsatisfactory. You must be 
more careful in future. 
2) The point in Stetskyıs articles about non-capitalist 
development in the countryside is also not quite 
acceptable. Formerly it was possible to speak of a noncapitalist 
path of development. Now, however, when an 
actual struggle between the elements of socialist development 
and the elements of capitalist development has 
begun and is expanding to the full, it would be more 
correct to speak of the socialist path of development. 
Otherwise, the impression may be created that besides 
the two paths of development, capitalist and socialist, 
there is a third path, which is wrong, and at any rate 
unconvincing. 
3) It seems to me that the passage in Slepkovıs article 
³Leninıs Legacy,² about the Communists and 
Young Communist Leaguers having to compete with the 
non-Party peasant active in organisational and political 
work, is also wrong. Up to now we have raised the 
question of forming such an active around the Party 
and of training that active, and that was regarded as 
correct. Now Slepkov is raising a new question about 
the Communists and Young Communist Leaguers having 
to compete with a non-Party active which has still

TO THE EDITORIAL BOARD OF KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 157 
to be formed. That is wrong, and it is out of accord with 
the whole of our campaign under the slogan of revitalising 
the Soviets. We must not compete with this active, but 
form and train it. 
4) It would be good to arrange for systematic publication 
of supplements to Komsomolskaya Pravda in the 
shape of popular pamphlets by outstanding exponents of 
Marxist theory, on communism, the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, the October Revolution, and also on various 
branches of economy and administration that are directly 
related to the practical work of the active of the 
Young Communist League in town and country. Such 
supplements, in the shape of small pamphlets, could 
later form a sort of little library for the activists of the 
Young Communist League, which could not fail to be of 
great importance for training the active of the Young 
Communist League. 
5) It would be good to simplify the style of the articles 
in Komsomolskaya Pravda, to make the contributors 
write in a simple way, in short sentences, and, as 
far as possible, without employing foreign terms, as 
Ilyich knew how to write. At least, it should be possible 
to publish, also in the shape of a supplement to 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, a small glossary of foreign words, 
or at any rate to give in the text of the articles explanations 
of foreign words if the latter really cannot be 
avoided. 
J. Stalin 
V. Molotov 
A. Andreyev 
Moscow, June 2, 1925 
Published for the first time

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 
Speech Delivered at the Sverdlov University 
June 9, 1925 
Comrades, I shall answer the questions you have submitted 
in writing. I shall deal with them in the order 
in which they are given in your note. As you know, 
there are ten questions. 
Let us begin with the first question. 
I 
What measures and what conditions would help to 
strengthen the bond between the working class and the peasantry 
under the proletarian dictatorship if the Soviet 
Union is not supported by a social revolution of the Western 
proletariat during the next ten to fifteen years? 
I think that this question embraces all your other 
written questions. Therefore, my answer will be of a 
general, and hence far from exhaustive, character. Otherwise, 
there will be nothing left to say in answer to the 
other questions. 
I think that the decisions of the Fourteenth Party 
Conference give an exhaustive answer to this question. 
These decisions say that the chief guarantee that the 
bond will be strengthened is a correct policy towards 
the peasantry.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 159 
But what is a correct policy towards the peasantry? 
It can consist only of a series of measures‹economic, 
administrative-political and cultural-educational‹ 
that will ensure the strengthening of the bond. 
Let us start with the economic sphere. 
First of all, the survivals of war communism in the 
countryside must be eliminated. Further, a correct policy 
must be pursued in relation to the prices of manufactured 
goods and agricultural produce, a policy that 
will ensure the rapid growth of industry and agriculture 
and the elimination of the ³scissors.² Furthermore, 
the total amount of the agricultural tax must be 
reduced and the tax must be gradually transferred from 
the state budget to the local budgets. The vast masses 
of the peasantry must be organised in co-operatives, 
primarily in agricultural and credit co-operatives, as 
a means of drawing peasant economy into the general 
system of socialist construction. The countryside must 
be supplied with the maximum amount of tractors as 
a means of bringing about a technical revolution in agriculture 
and as the way towards creating cultural 
and technical centres in the countryside. Finally, the 
plan for electrification must be carried out as a means 
of bringing the countryside closer to the towns and of 
abolishing the antithesis between them. 
Such is the path along which the Party must proceed 
if it wants to ensure the bond between town and country 
in the economic sphere. 
I should like to draw your attention to the question 
of transferring the agricultural tax from the state 
budget to the local budgets. It may seem strange to you, 
but it is nevertheless a fact, that the agricultural tax is

J. V. S T A L I N 160 
assuming, and will steadily more and more assume, the 
character of a local tax. You know, for example, that 
formerly, a year or two ago, the agricultural tax was the 
chief, or almost the chief, item of revenue in our state 
budget. But now? Now it is a small item in the state 
budget. Today, the state budget amounts to 2,500 million 
rubles, but the revenue from the agricultural tax 
will amount, may amount, this year to 250-260 million 
rubles at most, that is, 100 million rubles less than 
last year. As you see, it is not very much. And the more 
the state budget grows, the smaller will be the proportion 
represented by this tax. Secondly, 100 million out 
of the 260 million obtained from the agricultural tax 
will go to the local budgets. That is more than a third 
of the total revenue from this tax. What is the explanation 
of this? The fact that of all the existing taxes, the 
agricultural tax is most closely connected with local 
conditions and can be most easily utilised for local needs. 
There can scarcely be any doubt that the local budgets in 
general will grow, but it is also beyond doubt that they will 
grow primarily on account of the agricultural tax, which 
should be adapted to the utmost to local conditions. That 
is all the more probable for the reason that the bulk of 
our state revenues is already coming, and in future 
will in general increasingly come, from other sources, 
from our state enterprises, indirect taxes and so forth. 
That is why the transfer of the agricultural tax from 
the state budget to the local budgets may in time become 
likely and quite expedient from the standpoint of strengthening 
the bond. 
Let us pass to the measures for ensuring the bond 
in the administrative and political sphere.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 161 
Implanting Soviet democracy in town and country 
and revitalising the Soviets with a view to simplifying, 
cheapening, and morally improving the state 
apparatus, with a view to expelling elements of 
bureaucracy and bourgeois corruption from this apparatus, 
with a view to completely linking the state 
apparatus with the vast masses‹such is the path along 
which the Party must proceed if it wants to strengthen 
the bond in the sphere of administrative and political 
development. 
The dictatorship of the proletariat is not an end 
in itself. The dictatorship is a means, a way of achieving 
socialism. But what is socialism? Socialism is the 
transition from a society with the dictatorship of the proletariat 
to a stateless society. To effect this transition, 
however, preparations must be made for altering the state 
apparatus in such a way as to ensure in fact that the 
society with the dictatorship is transformed into communist 
society. That purpose is served by the slogan of 
revitalising the Soviets, the slogan of implanting Soviet 
democracy in town and country, the slogan of drawing the 
best elements of the working class and the peasantry into 
the direct work of governing the country. It will be impossible 
to reform the state apparatus, to alter it thoroughly, 
to expel elements of bureaucracy and corruption 
from it and to make it near and dear to the broad masses 
unless the masses themselves render the state apparatus 
constant and active assistance. But on the other hand, 
active and continuous assistance of the masses is impossible 
unless the best elements of the workers and 
peasants are drawn into the organs of government, unless 
direct and close connection is established between

J. V. S T A L I N 162 
the state apparatus and the ³rank and file² of the toiling 
masses. 
What distinguishes the Soviet state apparatus from 
the apparatus of the bourgeois state? 
Above all, the fact that the bourgeois state apparatus 
stands above the masses and, as a consequence, it is 
separated from the population by an impassable barrier 
and by its very spirit is alien to the masses of the people. 
The Soviet state apparatus, however, merges with 
the masses, for it cannot and must not stand above the 
masses if it wants to remain a Soviet state apparatus, 
for it cannot be alien to these masses if it really wants 
to embrace the millions of working people. That is one 
of the fundamental differences between the Soviet state 
apparatus and the apparatus of the bourgeois state. 
Lenin once said in his pamphlet Can the Bolsheviks 
Retain State Power? that the 240,000 members of the 
Bolshevik Party could undoubtedly govern the country 
in the interests of the poor and against the rich, for they 
were in no way inferior to the 130,000 landlords who 
governed the country in the interests of the rich and 
against the poor. On these grounds, some Communists 
think that the state apparatus can consist merely of 
several hundred thousand Party members, and that this 
is quite enough for the purpose of governing a vast country. 
From this standpoint they are sometimes not averse 
to identifying the Party with the state. That is wrong, 
comrades. It is a distortion of Leninıs idea. When speaking 
of the 240,000 members of the Bolshevik Party, Lenin 
did not in the least mean that this figure indicated, or 
could indicate, the total personnel and general scope of 
the Soviet state apparatus. On the contrary, in addition

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 163 
to the members of the Party, he included in the state 
apparatus the million electors who cast their votes for 
the Bolsheviks at that time, before October, stating that 
we had the means by which at one stroke to enlarge tenfold 
our state apparatus, that is to say, to increase its personnel 
to at least 10,000,000 by drawing the working people 
into the daily work of governing the state. 
³These 240,000,² said Lenin, ³are already backed by not 
less than a million votes of the adult population, for this is precisely 
the proportion between the number of Party members and 
the number of votes cast for it established by the experience of 
Europe and the experience of Russia, as shown, for example, by 
the August elections to the Petrograd Duma. Thus, we already 
have a Œstate apparatusı of one million people who will be devoted 
to the socialist state for the sake of their ideals and not for the 
sake of receiving a fat sum on the 20th of every month. 
³Not only that. We have a Œmagic meansı by which at once, 
at one stroke to enlarge tenfold our state apparatus, a means which no 
capitalist state ever possessed nor could possess. This magic means 
is that of drawing the working people, drawing the poor, into the 
daily work of governing the state² (see Vol. XXI, pp. 264-65). 
How does this ³drawing the working people, drawing 
the poor, into the daily work of governing the state² 
take place? 
It takes place through organisations based on 
mass initiative, all kinds of commissions and committees, 
conferences and delegate meetings, that spring 
up around the Soviets, economic bodies, factory committees, 
cultural institutions, Party organisations, youth 
league organisations, all kinds of co-operative associations, 
and so on and so forth. Our comrades sometimes 
fail to see that around the low units of our

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Party, Soviet, cultural, trade-union, educational, Y.C.L. 
and army organisations, around the departments for work 
among women and all other kinds of organisations, there 
are whole teeming ant-hills‹organisations, commissions 
and conferences which have sprung up of their own accord 
and embrace millions of non-Party workers and peasants‹ 
ant-hills which, by their daily, inconspicuous, painstaking, 
quiet work, provide the basis and the life of the 
Soviets, the source of strength of the Soviet state. If our 
Soviet and Party organs did not have the help of these 
organisations embracing millions, the existence and 
development of Soviet power, the guidance and administration 
of a great country would be absolutely inconceivable. 
The Soviet state apparatus does not consist solely 
of Soviets. The Soviet state apparatus, in the profound 
meaning of the term, consists of the Soviets plus all the 
diverse non-Party and Party organisations, which embrace 
millions, which unite the Soviets with the ³rank and file,² 
which merge the state apparatus with the vast masses 
and, step by step, destroy everything that serves as a 
barrier between the state apparatus and the people. 
That is how we must strive to ³enlarge tenfold² our 
state apparatus, making it near and dear to the vast 
masses of the working people, expelling the survivals 
of bureaucracy from it, merging it with the masses and 
thereby preparing the transition from a society with 
the dictatorship of the proletariat to communist society. 
Such is the meaning and significance of the slogan of 
revitalising the Soviets and implanting Soviet democracy. 
Such are the principal measures for strengthening 
the bond that must be taken in the administrative and 
political sphere of the Partyıs work.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 165 
As regards the measures for ensuring the bond in the 
cultural and educational sphere of work, little need be 
said about them, for they are obvious and commonly 
known, and therefore need no explanation. I should 
only like to indicate the main line of work in this sphere 
for the immediate future. This main line lies in preparing 
the conditions necessary for introducing universal, 
compulsory, primary education throughout the country, 
throughout the Soviet Union. That is a very important 
reform, comrades. Its achievement will be a great 
victory not only on the cultural front, but also on the 
political and economic fronts. That reform must serve 
as the basis of an immense advance of the country. But it 
will cost hundreds of millions of rubles. Suffice it to say 
that to carry it out a whole army of men and women 
school-teachers, almost half a million, will be needed. 
But we must, in spite of everything, carry out this reform 
in the very near future if we really intend to raise 
the country to a higher cultural level. And we shall do 
it, comrades. There can be no doubt about that. 
Such is the answer to your first question. 
Let us now pass to the second question. 
II 
What dangers are there of our Party degenerating 
as a result of the stabilisation of capitalism, if this stabilisation 
lasts a long time? 
Are we faced by such dangers at all? 
Such dangers, as possible and even real dangers, 
undoubtedly exist. They face us quite apart from

J. V. S T A L I N 166 
stabilisation. Stabilisation merely makes them more palpable. 
Of those dangers, taking the most important of 
them, I think there are three: 
a) the danger of losing the socialist perspective in 
our work of building up our country, and the danger of 
liquidationism connected with it; 
b) the danger of losing the international revolutionary 
perspective, and the danger of nationalism connected 
with it; 
c) the danger of a decline of Party leadership and the 
possibility connected with it of the Partyıs conversion 
into an appendage of the state apparatus. 
Let us begin with the first danger. 
The characteristic feature of this danger is lack 
of confidence in the internal forces of our revolution; 
lack of confidence in the alliance between the workers 
and peasants; lack of confidence in the leading role of 
the working class within that alliance; lack of confidence 
in the conversion of ³NEP Russia² into ³socialist 
Russia²; lack of confidence in the victory of socialist 
construction in our country. 
That is the path of liquidationism and degeneration, 
for it leads to the liquidation of the principles and aims 
of the October Revolution, to the degeneration of the 
proletarian state into a bourgeois-democratic state. 
The source of this ³frame of mind,² the soil on which 
it has arisen in the Party, is the growth of bourgeois 
influence on the Party in the conditions of the New Economic 
Policy and of the desperate struggle between the 
capitalist and socialist elements in our national economy. 
The capitalist elements are fighting not only in 
the economic sphere; they are trying to carry the fight

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 167 
into the sphere of proletarian ideology, trying to infect 
the least stable detachments of the Party with lack of 
confidence in the possibility of building socialism, with 
scepticism concerning the socialist prospects of our work 
of construction, and it cannot be said that their efforts 
have been entirely fruitless. 
Some of these infected ³Communists² say: ³How 
can a backward country like ours build a complete socialist 
society? The state of the productive forces of our 
country makes it impossible for us to set ourselves such 
utopian aims. God grant that we hold on somehow. How 
can we dream of building socialism? Let us build in one 
way or another, and we shall see what happens. . . .² 
Others say: ³We have already fulfilled our revolutionary 
mission by making the October Revolution. Now 
everything depends on the international revolution, 
for we cannot build socialism unless the Western proletariat 
first gains victory. Strictly speaking, a revolutionary 
has nothing more to do in Russia.² . . . As you 
know, in 1923, on the eve of the German revolution, some 
of our young students were ready to throw down their 
books and go to Germany. They said: ³A revolutionary 
has nothing to do in Russia. We must throw down our 
books and go to Germany to make a revolution.² 
As you see, both these groups of ³Communists,² the 
first and the second, adopt the standpoint of denying 
the socialist potentialities of our work of construction, 
they adopt a liquidationist standpoint. The difference 
between them is that the first group cover up their liquidationism 
with the ³scientific² ³theory of productive 
forces² (no wonder Milyukov praised them in Posledniye 
Novosti34 the other day, calling them ³serious Marxists²),

J. V. S T A L I N 168 
whereas the second group cover it up with Left and 
³terribly revolutionary² phrases about world revolution. 
Indeed, let us assume that a revolutionary has nothing 
to do in Russia; let us assume that it is inconceivable, 
impossible, to build socialism in our country until 
socialism is victorious in other countries; let us assume 
that the victory of socialism in the advanced countries 
is delayed for another ten or twenty years‹can we 
suppose that under those circumstances the capitalist 
elements in our economy, acting in the conditions of 
capitalist encirclement of our country, will agree to 
cease their mortal struggle against the socialist elements 
in this economy and wait with folded arms for the 
victory of the world revolution? It is enough to put 
this question to realise how utterly absurd that supposition 
is. But if that supposition is excluded, what is 
there left for our ³serious Marxists² and ³terrible revolutionaries² 
to do? Obviously, only one thing is left 
for them: to loaf around, surrender to the elemental 
forces and gradually degenerate into ordinary bourgeois 
democrats. 
One thing or the other: either we regard our country 
as the base of the proletarian revolution, either we have, as 
Lenin said, all that is needed to build a complete socialist 
society‹in which case we can and must build such 
a society in expectation of complete victory over the 
capitalist elements in our national economy; or we do 
not regard our country as the base of the revolution, 
we have not got what is needed to build socialism, and 
we cannot build a socialist society‹in which case, if the 
victory of socialism in other countries is delayed, we 
must resign ourselves to the prospect that the capitalist

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 169 
elements in our national economy will gain the upper 
hand, that the Soviet regime will decay, and the Party 
will degenerate. 
One thing or the other. 
That is why lack of confidence in the socialist potentialities 
of our work of construction leads to liquidationism 
and to degeneration. 
That is why the struggle against the liquidationist 
danger is an immediate task of our Party, particularly 
at the present time, particularly during the temporary 
stabilisation of capitalism. 
Let us pass to the second danger. 
The characteristic feature of that danger is lack of 
confidence in the international proletarian revolution; 
lack of confidence in its victory; a sceptical attitude 
towards the national-liberation movement in the colonies 
and dependent countries; failure to understand that 
without the support of the revolutionary movement in 
other countries our country would not be able to hold 
out against world imperialism; failure to understand 
that the victory of socialism in one country alone cannot 
be final because it has no guarantee against intervention 
until the revolution is victorious in at least a number 
of countries; failure to understand the elementary demand 
of internationalism, by virtue of which the victory 
of socialism in one country is not an end in itself, but 
a means of developing and supporting the revolution 
in other countries. 
That is the path of nationalism and degeneration, 
the path of the complete liquidation of the proletariatıs 
international policy, for people afflicted with this disease 
regard our country not as a part of the whole that

J. V. S T A L I N 170 
is called the world revolutionary movement, but as the 
beginning and the end of that movement, believing that 
the interests of all other countries should be sacrificed 
to the interests of our country. 
Support the liberation movement in China? But 
why? Wouldnıt that be dangerous? Wouldnıt it bring 
us into conflict with other countries? Wouldnıt it be 
better if we established ³spheres of influence² in China 
in conjunction with other ³advanced² powers and snatched 
something from China for our own benefit? That would 
be both useful and safe. . . . Support the liberation 
movement in Germany? Is it worth the risk? Wouldnıt it 
be better to agree with the Entente about the Versailles 
Treaty and bargain for something for ourselves by 
way of compensation?. . . Maintain friendship with 
Persia, Turkey and Afghanistan? Is the game worth 
the candle? Wouldnıt it be better to restore the ³sphere 
of influence² with one or other of the Great Powers? 
And so on and so forth. 
Such is the new type of nationalist ³frame of mind,² 
which is trying to liquidate the foreign policy of the 
October Revolution and is cultivating the elements of 
degeneration. 
Whereas the first danger, the danger of liquidationism, 
springs from the growth of bourgeois influence on 
the Party in the sphere of internal policy, in the sphere 
of the struggle between the capitalist and socialist elements 
in our national economy, the second danger, the 
danger of nationalism, must be regarded as springing 
from the growth of bourgeois influence on the Party 
in the sphere of foreign policy, in the sphere of the struggle 
that the capitalist states are waging against the state

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 171 
of the proletarian dictatorship. There can scarcely be 
any doubt that the pressure of the capitalist states on our 
state is enormous, that the people who are handling our 
foreign policy do not always succeed in resisting this 
pressure, that the danger of complications often gives 
rise to the temptation to take the path of least resistance, 
the path of nationalism. 
On the other hand, it is obvious that the first country 
to be victorious can retain the role of standard-bearer 
of the world revolutionary movement only on the basis 
of consistent internationalism, only on the basis of the 
foreign policy of the October Revolution, and that the 
path of least resistance and of nationalism in foreign 
policy is the path of the isolation and decay of the first 
country to be victorious. 
That is why losing the international revolutionary 
perspective leads to the danger of nationalism and degeneration. 
That is why the struggle against the danger of nationalism 
in foreign policy is an immediate task of the 
Party. 
Finally, about the third danger. 
The characteristic feature of that danger is lack of 
confidence in the Partyıs internal forces; lack of confidence 
in the Partyıs leadership; the efforts of the state 
apparatus to weaken the Partyıs leadership, to free 
itself from it; failure to understand that without the 
Partyıs leadership there can be no proletarian dictatorship. 
This danger arises on three sides. 
Firstly. The classes that have to be led have changed. 
The workers and peasants today are no longer what they

J. V. S T A L I N 172 
were in the period of war communism. Formerly, the 
working class was declassed and scattered, and the peasants 
were in dread of the return of the landlords in 
the event of defeat in the civil war, while in that period 
the Party was the only concentrated force, which directed 
affairs in military fashion. The situation is different 
now. There is no war now. Consequently, there is no war 
danger to rally the toiling masses around the Party. 
The proletariat has recovered and has risen to a higher 
level, both culturally and materially. The peasantry 
has also developed and risen to a higher level. The political 
activity of both classes is growing and will continue 
to grow. It is now no longer possible to lead in 
the military fashion. Firstly, there must be the utmost 
flexibility in leadership. Secondly, there must be extreme 
sensitiveness to the requirements and needs of the workers 
and peasants. Thirdly, there must be the ability 
to draw into the Party the best of the workers and peasants 
who have come to the fore as a result of the development 
of the political activity of these classes. But 
these conditions and qualities are not created at one 
stroke, as we know. Hence the discrepancy between 
what is demanded of the Party and the possibilities at 
the disposal of the Party at the present time. Hence, also, 
the danger of a weakening of the Partyıs leadership, the 
danger of the Party losing the leadership. 
Secondly. During the recent period, during the period 
of economic development, the apparatuses of the 
state and public organisations have considerably grown 
and gained in strength. The trusts and syndicates, the 
trading and credit institutions, the administrativepolitical 
and cultural-educational organisations, and,

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 173 
finally, the co-operatives of all kinds, have grown and 
expanded considerably, having absorbed hundreds of 
thousands of new people, mainly non-Party people. 
But these apparatuses are not only growing in personnel; 
their power and influence are growing too. 
And the more their importance grows the more palpable 
becomes their pressure on the Party, the more 
persistently do they strive to weaken the Partyıs leadership, 
and the stronger becomes their resistance to 
the Party. The forces in those apparatuses must be 
regrouped and the leading people in them must be 
distributed in such a way as to ensure the Partyıs 
leadership in the new situation. But that cannot be 
achieved at one stroke, as we know. Hence the danger 
of the state apparatus becoming divorced from the Party. 
Thirdly. The work itself has become more complicated 
and differentiated. I am speaking of the present work 
of construction. Entire branches and sub-branches of 
work have arisen and developed in both town and country. 
Accordingly, leadership has become more concrete. Formerly, 
it was customary to speak of leadership ³in general.² 
Today, leadership ³in general² is mere talk, for 
there is no leadership in it whatever. Today we must 
have concrete, specific leadership. The past period 
developed a know-all type of Party worker who was 
ready to answer all questions of theory and practice. 
Today, this old, know-all type of Party worker must 
give way to a new type, who strives to become an 
expert in a given branch of work. To give real leadership, 
one must know the work, one must study the work conscientiously, 
patiently and perseveringly. One cannot give 
leadership in the countryside without a knowledge of

J. V. S T A L I N 174 
agriculture, without a knowledge of the co-operatives, 
without being familiar with the price policy, without 
having studied the laws that directly concern the countryside. 
One cannot give leadership in a town without a knowledge 
of industry, without studying the life of the workers, 
without paying heed to the requirements and needs of 
the workers, without a knowledge of co-operative, tradeunion 
and club affairs. But can all this be acquired at 
one stroke? Unfortunately, it cannot. To raise Party 
leadership to the requisite level, it is first of all necessary 
to raise the qualifications of the Party workers. Today 
the quality of the Party worker must be the first 
consideration. But it is not so easy to improve the quality 
of the Party worker at one stroke. The old habit 
of hastily issuing orders, which, unfortunately, served 
as a substitute for knowledge, still persists in Party organisations. 
That explains why it is that so-called Party 
leadership sometimes degenerates into the ridiculous 
piling up of totally useless orders, into empty verbal 
³leadership,² which affects nobody and nothing. Herein 
lies one of the gravest dangers of the weakening and 
decline of the Partyıs leadership. 
Such, in general, are the reasons why the danger of 
the Party losing the leadership leads to the decay and 
degeneration of the Party. 
That i s why a determined struggle against that 
danger is an immediate task of our Party. 
Such is the answer to your second question. 
Let us pass to the third question.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 175 
III 
How can a struggle be waged against the kulaks without 
fomenting class struggle? 
I think that the question is confused and, therefore, 
presented incorrectly. What class struggle is 
meant? If it means class struggle in the countryside in 
general, then the proletariat is waging such a struggle 
not only against the kulaks. What about the contradictions 
between the proletariat and the peasantry as a 
whole‹is that not class struggle, even though it assumes 
a rather unusual form? Is it not true that at the present 
time the proletariat and the peasantry constitute the 
two main classes of our society, that between these 
classes there are contradictions, soluble and in the long 
run surmountable it is true, but contradictions for all 
that, which give rise to a struggle between these two 
classes? 
I think that the class struggle in our country, if 
we have in mind the relations between town and country, 
between the proletariat and the peasantry, has three 
main fronts: 
a) the front of the struggle between the proletariat 
as a whole (in the shape of the state) and the peasantry 
in the matter of establishing maximum prices for manufactures 
and agricultural produce, in the matter of normalising 
taxation, and so forth; 
b) the front of the struggle between the proletariat 
as a whole (in the shape of the state) and the kulaks in 
the matter of liquidating profiteering prices of agricultural 
produce, in the matter of shifting the main burden 
of taxation on to the kulaks, and so forth;

J. V. S T A L I N 176 
c) the front of the struggle between the rural poor, 
above all the agricultural labourers, and the kulaks. 
You see that these fronts cannot be equal either in 
importance or in the character of the struggle that is 
being waged on them. Hence, our attitude towards the 
forms of the class struggle that is being waged on these 
fronts must be differentiated, it cannot be the same 
for all. 
Let us examine this more closely. 
The first front. The proletariat (in the shape of the 
state), taking into consideration the weakness of our 
industry and the impossibility of obtaining loans for 
it, took a series of fundamental measures capable of 
protecting it from the competition of foreign industry 
and of accelerating its development for the benefit of 
our entire national economy, including agriculture. 
Those measures are: the monopoly of foreign trade, the 
agricultural tax, state forms of procurement of agricultural 
produce, the introduction of the planning principle 
in the development of the national economy as a whole. 
All these are based on the nationalisation of the principal 
branches of industry, transport and credit. You 
know that those measures have led to what they were 
intended to lead to: that is to say, they have checked both 
the precipitous fall in the price of manufactured goods 
and also the precipitous rise in the price of agricultural 
produce. On the other hand, it is obvious that the peasantry 
as a whole, as buyers of manufactured goods 
and sellers of agricultural produce, prefer to buy those 
goods at the lowest possible price and to sell their 
produce at the highest possible price. Equally, the 
peasantry would like to have the agricultural tax

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 177 
abolished altogether, or at least to have it reduced to a 
minimum. 
Here, then, is the ground for the struggle between 
the proletariat and the peasantry. 
Can the state abandon the fundamental measures 
enumerated above? No, i t cannot, for the abandonment 
of those measures would lead at the present time to 
the ruin of our industry, to the utter defeat of the 
proletariat as a class, to the conversion of our country 
into an agrarian colony of the industrially developed 
capitalist countries, to the failure of our entire revolution. 
Would it be in the interests of the peasantry as a 
whole to abolish those fundamental measures taken by 
our state? No, it would not, for their abolition at the 
present time would mean the triumph of the capitalist 
path of development, and this path is that of development 
through the impoverishment of the majority of 
the peasants for the sake of the enrichment of a handful 
of rich people, a handful of capitalists. Who would 
dare to assert that the peasantry is interested in its own 
impoverishment, that it is interested in the conversion 
of our country into a colony, that it is not vitally interested 
in the triumph of the socialist path of development 
of our national economy? 
Here, then, is the ground for the alliance between 
the proletariat and the peasantry. 
Does that mean that our industrial bodies, relying 
on their monopoly, can screw up the prices of manufactured 
goods to the detriment of the interests of the 
bulk of the peasantry, and to the detriment of industry 
itself? No, it does not. Such a policy, above all, would

J. V. S T A L I N 178 
injure industry, for i t would make i t impossible to 
transform it from the feeble, hothouse plant that 
it was only yesterday into the strong and mighty 
industry that i t must become tomorrow. Hence our 
campaign to reduce the prices of manufactured goods 
and to raise productivity of labour. You know that this 
campaign is meeting with fairly wide success. 
Furthermore, does i t mean that our procurement 
bodies, relying on their monopoly, can force down 
the prices of agricultural produce and make them ruinous 
for the peasantry, to the detriment of our entire national 
economy? No, it does not. Such a policy, above 
all, would ruin industry, for, firstly, it would make 
it difficult to supply the workers with agricultural produce; 
and, secondly, it would utterly dislocate and disorganise 
the home market for our industry. Hence our 
campaign against the so-called ³scissors.² You know 
that this campaign has already produced favourable 
results. 
Finally, does it mean that our local or central bodies, 
relying on the agricultural tax law and exercising 
their right to collect taxes, can regard that law as 
something unquestionable and go to such lengths in 
actual practice as to demolish the barns and remove the 
roofs from the houses of impoverished taxpayers, as 
happened in some districts of the Tambov Gubernia? 
No, it does not. Such a policy would completely destroy 
the peasantsı confidence in the proletariat, in the state. 
Hence the Partyıs latest measures to reduce the agricultural 
tax, to give that tax a more or less local character, 
to normalise our taxation affairs in general, to 
put a stop to the scandalous practices in the collec

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 179 
tion of taxes that have occurred in some places. You know 
that those measures have already produced the desired 
results. 
Thus, we have, firstly, the community of interests of 
the proletariat and the peasantry on fundamental questions, 
their common interest in the triumph of the socialist 
path of development of our national economy. Hence 
the alliance of the working class and the peasantry. 
We have, secondly, the contradictions between the interests 
of the working class and those of the peasantry 
on current questions. Hence the struggle within this alliance, 
a struggle whose importance is outweighed by that 
of the community of interests, and which should disappear 
in the future, when the workers and the peasants cease to 
be classes‹when they become working people of a classless 
society. We have, thirdly, the ways and means 
of solving these contradictions between the working 
class and the peasantry within the framework of maintaining 
and strengthening the alliance between the 
workers and the peasants in the interest of both allies. 
We not only have those ways and means at our disposal, 
but we are already employing them successfully in the 
complicated conditions of NEP and the temporary 
stabilisation of capitalism. 
Does it follow from this that we must foment class 
struggle on this front? No, it does not. On the contrary! 
What follows from this is merely that we must do everything 
to moderate the struggle on this front, to regulate 
it by means of agreements and mutual concessions, and 
under no circumstances permit it to assume acute forms, 
to reach the point of clashes. And we are doing this, for 
we have every possibility of doing i t ; for here the

J. V. S T A L I N 180 
community of interests is stronger and deeper than 
the contradiction between them. 
As you see, the slogan of fomenting class struggle 
is totally unsuitable for the conditions of the struggle 
on this front. 
The second front. The forces operating here are the 
proletariat (in the shape of the Soviet state) and the 
kulaks. The forms of the class struggle here are as peculiar 
as they are under the conditions of the struggle on the 
first front. 
Wishing to give the agricultural tax very definitely 
the character of an income tax, the state is shifting the 
main burden of this tax on to the kulaks. In retaliation, 
the kulaks are trying, ³by hook or by crook,² to evade 
paying, and are exercising all their power and all their 
influence in the countryside to shift the burden of this 
tax on to the middle and poor peasants. 
Combating the high cost of living, and endeavouring 
to maintain the stability of wages, the state is trying 
to take measures of an economic character for the purpose 
of establishing fair maximum prices for agricultural 
produce which fully meet the interests of peasant 
economy. In retaliation, the kulaks buy up the produce 
of the poor and middle peasants, accumulate large stocks, 
hoard them in their barns, and withhold them from the 
market in order artificially to screw up the price of produce 
to a profiteering level; only then do they release 
those stocks on the market with the object of making 
fabulous speculatory profits. You are no doubt aware that 
this year, in some gubernias of our country, the kulaks 
have succeeded in forcing up the price of grain to the 
utmost limit.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 181 
Hence the class struggle on this front, and its peculiar 
and more or less hidden forms. 
It might seem that the slogan of fomenting class 
struggle is quite suitable for the conditions of the struggle 
on this front. But that is not true, for here, too, it is not 
in our interest to foment class struggle; for here we are 
quite able to avoid, and must avoid, fomenting class 
struggle and the complications resulting from it. 
We can and must revitalise the Soviets, win over the 
middle peasants and organise the poor peasants in the Soviets 
in order to secure relief of taxation for the bulk 
of the peasants and actually to shift the main burden 
of taxation on to the kulaks. You know that measures 
in that direction are being taken and are already producing 
favourable results. 
We can and must hold at the disposal of the state 
sufficiently large food stocks to be able to bring pressure 
to bear on the food market, to intervene, when necessary, 
to maintain prices at a level acceptable to the 
masses of the working people, and in this way to frustrate 
the profiteering machinations of the kulaks. You 
know that this year we have used several tens of millions 
of poods of grain for this purpose. You no doubt 
know that we have achieved quite favourable results 
in this field, for we have not only succeeded in keeping 
the price of grain at a low level in districts like Leningrad, 
Moscow, the Donets Basin, Ivanovo-Voznesensk 
and other places, but have also forced the kulaks to surrender 
in a number of districts, compelling them to put 
on to the market old stocks of grain at moderate prices. 
Of course, things here do not depend upon us alone. 
I t i s quite possible that in some cases the kulaks

J. V. S T A L I N 182 
themselves will begin to foment class struggle, will try 
to bring the struggle to boiling point, will try to give it 
the form of bandit or insurrectionary outbreaks. If that 
happens, however, the slogan of fomenting class struggle 
will not be our slogan, but that of the kulaks, and, therefore, 
a counter-revolutionary one. Moreover, there is 
no doubt that the kulaks themselves will then get a taste 
of all the disadvantages of this slogan against the Soviet 
state. 
As you see, the slogan of fomenting class struggle 
on this front is not our slogan. 
The third front. The forces operating here are two: the 
rural poor, primarily the agricultural labourers, on the 
one hand, and the kulaks, on the other. Formally, the 
state stands aside. As you see, this front is not as wide 
as the preceding fronts. On the other hand, on this front 
the class struggle is quite evident and open, whereas 
it is hidden and more or less masked on the first two 
fronts. 
Here it is a matter of the direct exploitation of wageworkers, 
or semi-wage-workers, by kulak employers. 
That is why the Party cannot here conduct a policy of 
allaying, or moderating the struggle. Here our task is 
to organise the struggle waged by the rural poor and to 
lead this struggle against the kulaks. 
But does that mean that we thereby undertake to 
foment class struggle? No, it does not. Fomenting a 
struggle means something more than organising and 
leading the struggle. It also means artificially stirring 
up and deliberately fanning the class struggle. Is there 
any necessity for these artificial measures now, when 
we have the dictatorship of the proletariat, and when

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 183 
the Party and trade-union organisations are operating 
quite freely in our country? Of course, not. 
Therefore, the slogan of fomenting class struggle is 
also unsuitable for this third front. 
That is how the matter stands with the third question. 
As you see, the question of the class struggle in the 
countryside is not as simple as it might appear to be 
at first sight. 
Let us pass to the fourth question. 
IV 
A workersı and peasantsı government‹is it a fact or 
an agitational slogan? 
It seems to me that the formulation of the question 
is rather absurd. 
What is the meaning of the formulation: a workersı 
and peasantsı government‹is it a fact or an agitational 
slogan? It suggests that the Party can issue slogans that 
are not in accordance with the truth, but merely serve 
the purpose of some cunning manoeuvre, here, for some 
reason, called ³agitation.² It suggests that the Party 
can issue slogans that do not have, and cannot have, 
scientific substantiation. Is that correct? Of course, not. 
Such a party would deserve to vanish like a soap-bubble 
after a brief existence. Our Party would not then be the 
Party of the proletariat pursuing a scientific policy; 
it would be mere froth on the surface of political events. 
Our Government, by its nature, by its programme 
and tactics, i s a workersı, proletarian, communist

J. V. S T A L I N 184 
government. There should be no misconception or doubt 
on this score. Our Government cannot simultaneously 
have two programmes: a proletarian one and some other 
kind. Its programme and practical activities are proletarian, 
communist, and in this sense our Government is 
undoubtedly proletarian, communist. 
Does that mean that our Government is not at the 
same time a workersı and peasantsı government? No, 
it does not. By its programme and activities, our Government 
is proletarian, but at the same time it is a 
workersı and peasantsı government. 
Why? 
Because, under our conditions, the fundamental 
interests of the bulk of the peasant masses wholly and 
entirely coincide with the interests of the proletariat. 
Because, in view of that, the interests of the 
peasantry are fully expressed in the programme of the 
proletariat, in the programme of the Soviet Government. 
Because the Soviet Government rests on the alliance 
of the workers and peasants, which is based on the common 
fundamental interests of these classes. 
Because, finally, in the organs of government, in 
the Soviets, there are not only workers, but also peasants, 
who are fighting the common enemy and building 
the new life jointly with the workers, under the leadership 
of the workers. 
That is why the slogan ³a workersı and peasantsı 
government² is not an empty ³agitational² slogan, but 
the revolutionary slogan of the socialist proletariat, 
scientifically substantiated in the programme of communism.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 185 
That is how the matter stands with the fourth question. 
Let us pass to the fifth question. 
V 
Some comrades interpret our policy towards the peasantry 
as an extension of democracy for the peasantry and 
as a change in the character of the governmental power 
in our country. Is this interpretation correct? 
Are we actually extending democracy in the countryside? 
Yes, we are. 
Is that a concession to the peasantry? 
Certainly, it is. 
Is it a big concession, and does it keep within thebounds 
of the Constitution of our country? 
I think the concession is not very big, and it doesnot 
alter our Constitution one iota. 
In that case, what are we changing, and what is thenature 
of this concession? 
We are changing the way in which work in the countryside 
is carried out, for the old way is totally unsatisfactory 
under the new conditions of development. 
We are changing the established state of affairs in the 
countryside, which is impeding the bond and disorganising 
the work of the Party in rallying the peasantry 
around the proletariat. 
Until now, the situation was that quite a number of 
rural districts were governed by small groups of people 
connected more with the uyezd and gubernia administrations 
than with the rural population. The result of this

J. V. S T A L I N 186 
was that those who governed the rural districts mostly 
looked to the top, to the uyezd, and least of all looked to 
the bottom, to the rural population; they felt responsible 
not to the villages, not to their electors, but to the uyezd 
and gubernia administrations, evidently failing to understand 
that the ³top² and the ³bottom² constitute 
here a single chain, and that if the chain is broken below, 
the whole of it must collapse. The result of this was 
unchecked arbitrariness and tyranny of the rulers, 
on the one hand, and discontent and murmuring in the 
countryside, on the other. We are now putting an end 
to this state of affairs in the countryside, resolutely, 
once and for all. 
Until now the situation was that in quite a number 
of districts elections to the Soviets in the countryside 
were not real elections, but merely a bureaucratic procedure 
of smuggling in ³deputies² by means of all kinds of 
trickery and of pressure exercised by the small groups 
of rulers who were afraid of losing power. The result of 
this was that the Soviets stood in danger of being transformed 
from bodies that are near and dear to the masses 
into bodies alien to the masses; and the leadership of 
the peasants by the workers, that foundation and fortress 
of the proletarian dictatorship, stood in danger 
of becoming a fiction. You know that in view of 
this the Party was obliged to arrange for new elections 
of Soviets, and these elections showed that the old election 
practices in quite a number of districts were a 
survival of war communism, and that they had to be 
abolished as harmful and utterly rotten. We are now 
putting an end to such election practices in the countryside.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 187 
That is the basis of the concession, the basis of 
the extension of democracy in the countryside. 
It is not only the peasantry who need this concession. 
It is needed just as much by the proletariat, for 
it strengthens the proletariat, raises its prestige in the 
countryside and increases the peasantsı confidence in 
the proletariat. As is known, the main purpose of concessions, 
and of compromises generally, is that they 
should, in the long run, reinforce and strengthen the proletariat. 
What are the limits of these concessions at the present 
time? 
The limits of these concessions were laid down by 
the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) and by the 
Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.35 You know 
that they are not very wide; they are restricted to the 
limits I have just spoken about. That, however, does 
not mean that they will remain unalterable forever. 
On the contrary, they will undoubtedly be expanded, 
in proportion to the development of our national economy, 
in proportion to the growth in strength of the economic 
and political might of the proletariat, in proportion to 
the development of the revolutionary movement in the 
West and East, in proportion to the growth in strength 
of the international positions of the Soviet state. In 1918, 
Lenin spoke of the necessity of ³extending the Soviet 
Constitution to the e n t i r e population i n p r op 
o r t i o n a s the resistance of the exploiters ceases² 
(see Vol. XXII, p. 372). As you see, it is a matter of 
extending the Constitution to the entire population, 
including the bourgeoisie. That was said in March 1918. 
From that time until Lenin died more than five years

J. V. S T A L I N 188 
passed; but not once during that period did Lenin even 
hint that it was time to put that proposition into practice. 
Why? Because the time to make that extension 
had not yet come. There can be no doubt, however, that 
it will come some day, when the internal and international 
positions of the Soviet state are finally consolidated. 
That is why, although foreseeing the further extension 
of democracy in the future, we nevertheless consider 
it necessary at the present time to restrict the concessions 
in the sphere of democracy to the limits laid down 
by the Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) and by 
the Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. 
Do these concessions change the character of the 
governmental power in the country? 
No, they do not. 
Do they introduce into the system of the proletarian 
dictatorship any changes that would weaken it? 
Not in the least, not in the slightest degree. 
Far from being weakened, the proletarian dictatorship 
is strengthened by revitalising the Soviets and 
drawing the best elements of the peasantry into the work 
of administration. The leadership of the peasantry by 
the proletariat is not only maintained by the expansion 
of democracy, but it acquires additional strength, creating 
an atmosphere of confidence around the proletariat. And 
surely that is the chief thing in the dictatorship of the 
proletariat, as regards the relations between the proletariat 
and the peasantry in the system of the dictatorship. 
Those comrades who assert that the concept of the 
dictatorship of the proletariat is limited to the concept of

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 189 
violence are wrong. The dictatorship of the proletariat is 
not only violence; it is also leadership of the toiling masses 
of the non-proletarian classes, it is also the building 
of a socialist economy, which is a higher type of economy 
than capitalist economy, with a higher productivity 
of labour than capitalist economy. The dictatorship of 
the proletariat is: 1) violence, unrestricted by law, in 
relation to the capitalists and landlords, 2) leadership 
by the proletariat in relation to the peasantry, 3) the 
building of socialism in relation to the whole of society. 
Not one of these three aspects of the dictatorship can be 
excluded without running the risk of distorting the concept 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat. Only by taking 
all these three aspects together do we get a complete and 
finished concept of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Does the Partyıs new course in the sphere of Soviet 
democracy introduce any deterioration into the system 
of the proletarian dictatorship? 
No, it does not. On the contrary! The new course can 
but improve matters by strengthening the system of 
the proletarian dictatorship. As regards the element of 
violence in the system of the dictatorship, the instrument 
of that violence being the Red Army, it scarcely 
needs proof that the implanting of Soviet democracy 
in the countryside can but improve the state of the 
Red Army by rallying it more closely around the Soviet 
power, for our army consists mainly of peasants. 
As regards the element of leadership in the system of 
the dictatorship, there can be scarcely any doubt that the 
slogan of revitalising the Soviets can but facilitate the 
proletariatıs leadership by strengthening the peasantsı 
confidence in the working class. And as regards the

J. V. S T A L I N 190 
element of building in the system of the dictatorship, it 
scarcely needs proof that the Partyıs new course can but 
facilitate the building of socialism, for it has been put 
into effect for the purpose of strengthening the bond, 
and it is impossible to build socialism without this bond. 
Only one conclusion follows: concessions to the 
peasantry in the present situation strengthen the proletariat 
and consolidate its dictatorship without changing 
the character of the governmental power in the 
country one iota. 
That is how the matter stands with the fifth question. 
Let us pass to the sixth question. 
VI 
Is our Party making any concessions to the Right 
deviation in the Comintern in connection with the stabilisation 
of capitalism, and if so, is such a tactical manoeuvre 
really necessary? 
Evidently, this refers to the Communist Party of 
Czechoslovakia and the agreement concluded with the 
group headed by Comrades Smeral and Zapotocky against 
the Right elements in that Party. 
I do not think our Party has made any concessions 
to the Right deviation in the Comintern. On the contrary, 
the key-note of the entire enlarged plenum of the Executive 
Committee of the Comintern36 was the isolation of 
the Right elements in the Comintern. Read the Cominternıs 
resolution on the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, 
read the resolution on Bolshevisation, and you

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 191 
will easily see that the Cominternıs chief target was the 
Right elements in the communist movement. 
That is why it is impossible to say that our Party 
has made concessions to the Right deviation in the Comintern. 
Strictly speaking, Comrades Smeral and Zapotocky 
are not Rights. They do not accept the platform of the 
Rights, the platform of the Brünnites. The nearest description 
would be that they are vacillators between the 
Leninists and the Rights, with an inclination toward the 
Rights. The specific feature of their behaviour at the enlarged 
plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern 
was that, under the pressure of our criticism, on the 
one hand, and as a result of the dangerous prospect of a 
split created by the Rights, on the other, they, on this 
occasion, swung to our side, the side of the Leninists, 
and pledged themselves to keep in alliance with the 
Leninists against the Rights. That is to their credit. 
But do the comrades think that we should not have offered 
a hand to the vacillators when the latter swung to the 
side of the Leninists, when they made concessions to the 
Leninists against the Rights? It would be strange and 
deplorable if people were to be found among us who are 
incapable of understanding the elementary truths of 
Bolshevik tactics. Has not experience already shown that 
the Cominternıs policy on the question of the Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia is the only correct policy? Are not 
Comrades Smeral and Zapotocky continuing to fight in the 
ranks of the Leninists against the Rights? Are not the 
Brünnites in the Czechoslovak Party already isolated? 
It may be asked: will this be for long? Of course, 
I do not know whether this will be for long; I do not

J. V. S T A L I N 192 
undertake to prophesy. It is obvious, at all events, that 
as long as the Smeralites fight the Rights, the agreement 
with the former will remain in force; but as soon as the 
Smeralites abandon their present position, the agreement 
with them will cease to hold good. But that is not at 
all the point now. The point now is that the present 
agreement against the Rights strengthens the Leninists, 
creates new possibilities for them to carry the vacillators 
with them. That is the main thing now, and not how 
Comrades Smeral and Zapotocky may vacillate again 
in the future. 
Some people think that it is the duty of the Leninists 
to support every Left tub-thumper and neurasthenic, 
that everywhere and in everything the Leninists are the 
inveterate Lefts among the Communists. That is not 
true, comrades. We are Lefts in relation to the noncommunist 
parties of the working class; but we have never 
pledged ourselves to be ³more Left than everybody,² as 
the late Parvus demanded at one time, and for which he 
received a severe telling-off from Lenin. Among Communists 
we are neither Lefts nor Rights, we are simply 
Leninists. Lenin knew what he was doing when he fought 
on two fronts, against both the Left and the Right 
deviations in the communist movement. It is not for nothing 
that one of Leninıs best pamphlets deals with the 
subject: ³Left-Wing² Communism, an Infantile Disorder. 
I think that the comrades would not have asked me 
the sixth question had they paid timely attention to this 
latter circumstance. 
That is how the matter stands with the sixth question. 
Let us pass to the seventh question.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 193 
VII 
Owing to the weakness of the Party organisations in 
the countryside, is there not a danger that, with the adoption 
of the new course, anti-Soviet agitation in the countryside 
will assume a definite ideological form? 
Yes, there is such a danger. There can be scarcely 
any doubt that conducting elections to the Soviets under 
the slogan of revitalising the Soviets means freedom of 
local election propaganda. Needless to say, the anti- 
Soviet elements will not miss such a convenient opportunity 
to squeeze through the loop-hole and once more 
make trouble for the Soviet regime. Hence the danger that 
anti-Soviet agitation in the countryside will increase 
and assume definite form. The elections in the Kuban, 
in Siberia and in the Ukraine provide eloquent proof of 
this. Undoubtedly, the weakness of our rural organisations 
in a number of districts enhances this danger. 
It is beyond doubt, too, that the interventionist 
proclivities of the imperialist powers also enhance this 
danger. 
What fosters this danger, what are its sources? 
There are at least two such sources. 
Firstly, the anti-Soviet elements sense that a certain 
change in favour of the kulaks has taken place recently 
in the countryside, that in a number of districts 
the middle peasants have turned towards the kulaks. 
That might have been guessed before the elections; 
after the elections the guess became a certainty. That 
is the first and chief basis of the danger that anti-Soviet 
agitation in the countryside will assume a definite ideological 
form.

J. V. S T A L I N 194 
Secondly, in quite a number of districts our concessions 
to the peasantry were regarded as a sign of weakness. 
Before the elections there might have been some 
doubt about that; after the elections, there is no room 
for doubt. Hence the cry issued by the whiteguard elements 
in the countryside: ³Press harder!² That is the second, 
although less important, basis of the danger that 
anti-Soviet agitation in the countryside will increase. 
Communists must understand, first of all, that the 
present period in the countryside is a period of struggle 
to win over the middle peasants, that to win the middle 
peasants to the side of the proletariat is the Partyıs paramount 
task in the countryside, that unless this task is 
carried out, the danger that anti-Soviet agitation will 
assume definite form will increase, and the Partyıs new 
course may benefit only the whiteguard elements. 
Communists must understand, secondly, that the 
middle peasants can be won over now only on the basis 
of the Partyıs new policy in the sphere of the Soviets, 
co-operation, credit, the agricultural tax, local budgets, 
and so forth; that measures of administrative 
pressure can only do harm and ruin the work; that 
the middle peasants must be convinced of the correctness 
of our policy by means of measures of an 
economic and political character; that the middle 
peasants can be ³captured² only by means of example, 
by practical proof. 
Communists must understand, furthermore, that 
the new course has been taken not to stimulate the anti- 
Soviet elements, but to revitalise the Soviets and to 
win over the bulk of the peasant masses, that the new 
course does not preclude, but presupposes, a deter

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 195 
mined struggle against the anti-Soviet elements, that 
if the anti-Soviet elements, regarding the concessions 
to the peasantry as a sign of our weakness and utilising 
them for the benefit of counter-revolution, say: ³Pres 
harder,² then we must, without fail, show them that the 
Soviet power is strong, and remind them of the prisons, 
which have long been waiting to receive them. 
I think that the danger that anti-Soviet agitation 
in the countryside will assume a definite ideological 
form and increase will certainly be completely removed 
if these tasks of ours are understood and carried out. 
That is how the matter stands with the seventh 
question. 
Let us pass to the eighth question. 
VIII 
In view of the increased influence of the non-Party 
people, is there not a danger that non-Party groups will 
be formed in the Soviets? 
One can speak of danger in this case only with reservations. 
There is nothing dangerous in the growth of 
the influence of more or less organised non-Party people 
in places where the influence of Communists has not yet 
penetrated. Such is the case, for example, with the 
trade unions in the towns and with non-Party, more or 
less Soviet organisations in the countryside. Danger arises 
the moment non-Party organisations begin to think of 
usurping the place of the Party. 
What is the source of this danger? 
It is characteristic that no sign, or very little sign 
of such danger is to be observed in our working class.

J. V. S T A L I N 196 
How is this to be explained? By the fact that around our 
Party in the working class there is a large active of 
non-Party workers who surround the Party with an 
atmosphere of confidence and link i t with the vast 
masses of the working class. 
It is no less characteristic that such a danger is especially 
acute among the peasantry. Why? Because the 
Party is weak among the peasantry, the Party has not 
yet a large active of non-Party peasants to link it with 
the tens of millions of peasants. And yet nowhere, perhaps, 
is the need of a non-Party active felt as acutely as 
it is among the peasantry. 
Only one conclusion follows: to remove the danger 
of the non-Party peasant masses becoming divorced 
and alienated from the Party we must create around 
the Party a large non-Party peasant active. 
But such an active cannot be created at one stroke, 
or in a couple of months. It can be created and singled 
out from the mass of the peasantry only in the course of 
time, in the course of work, in the course of revitalising 
the Soviets, in the course of implanting a co-operative 
communal life. For this purpose the Communist must 
change his very approach to the non-Party person. For this 
purpose the Communist must treat the non-Party person 
as an equal. For this purpose the Communist must learn 
to treat the non-Party person with confidence, to 
treat him as a brother. The non-Party person cannot 
be expected to display confidence when treated with 
distrust in return. Lenin said that the relations between 
Party and non-Party people must be those of ³mutual 
confidence.² Those words of Leninıs must not be forgotten. 
The creation of an atmosphere of mutual confi

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 197 
dence between Party and non-Party people‹that is 
what is needed first of all in order to prepare the conditions 
for the creation of a large non-Party peasant active 
around the Party. 
But how is this mutual confidence to be created? 
Not at one stroke, of course, and not by order. It can be 
created, as Lenin said, only by means of ³mutual testing² 
of Party and non-Party people, mutual testing in the 
course of the daily practical work. During the first purge 
of the Party, the Party members were tested through the 
medium of non-Party people, and this was beneficial 
for the Party, for it created around it an atmosphere of 
extraordinary confidence. Already at that time Lenin 
said in this connection that the lessons of the first purge 
as regards the mutual testing of Party and non-Party 
people should be extended to all branches of activity. 
I think it is high time to recall this advice of Leninıs 
and to take measures to put it into practice. 
Thus, mutual criticism and mutual testing of Party 
and non-Party people in the course of the daily practical 
work as the means of creating an atmosphere of mutual 
confidence between them‹such is the path along which 
the Party must proceed if it wants to remove the danger 
of the alienation of the millions of non-Party people 
from the Party, if it wants to create a large non-Party 
peasant active around its organisations in the countryside. 
That is how the matter stands with the eighth question. 
Let us pass to the ninth question.

J. V. S T A L I N 198 
IX 
Shall we really be able to carry out the re-equipment 
and considerable enlargement of the fixed capital of largescale 
industry without foreign assistance? 
This question can be interpreted in two ways. 
Either that the questioners have in mind immediate 
assistance to the Soviet state in the shape of credits 
from the existing capitalist states as an essential condition 
for the development of Soviet industry‹in which 
case one answer would have to be given, corresponding 
to that way of presenting the question 
Or that the questioners have in mind assistance 
to the Soviet state on the part of the Western proletariat 
in the future, after it has achieved victory, as an 
essential condition for the building of a socialist economy‹
in which case a different answer would have to 
be given. 
To avoid offending anybody, I shall try to answer 
both possible interpretations of this question. 
Let us start with the first interpretation. 
Is it possible to develop large-scale Soviet industry 
in the conditions of capitalist encirclement without 
credits from abroad? 
Yes, it is possible. It will be accompanied by great 
difficulties, we shall have to go through severe trials, 
nevertheless we can industrialise our country without 
credits from abroad, in spite of all those difficulties. 
History up to now knows three ways of the formation 
and development of powerful industrial states. 
The first way is the seizure and plunder of colonies. 
That was the way Britain, for example, developed.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 199 
After seizing colonies in all parts of the world, she for 
two centuries squeezed ³extra capital² out of them for 
the purpose of strengthening her industry, and eventually 
she became the ³workshop of the world.² You know that 
this path of development is unacceptable for us, for the 
seizure and plunder of colonies are incompatible with 
the nature of the Soviet system. 
The second way is the military defeat of one country 
by another and the imposition of indemnities upon the 
defeated country. Such was the case with Germany, 
for example. After defeating France in the Franco-Prussian 
war, Germany squeezed an indemnity of 5,000 millions 
out of France and poured this money into the channels 
of her own industry. You know that this path of 
development is also incompatible with the nature of 
the Soviet system, for, in essence, it differs in no way 
from the first. 
The third way is for capitalistically backward countries 
to grant concessions to and accept loans from capitalistically 
developed countries on enslaving terms. 
Such was the case with tsarist Russia, for example. She 
granted concessions to and accepted loans from the Western 
powers on such terms and thereby imposed upon 
herself the yoke of a semi-colonial existence, which, 
however, did not preclude the possibility of her eventually 
emerging on to the road of independent industrial 
development, not, of course, without the aid of more or 
less ³successful² wars, and, of course, not without plundering 
neighbouring countries. It scarcely needs proof 
that this path is also unacceptable for the Land of Soviets. 
We did not shed our blood in the three-yearsı war 
against the imperialists of all countries in order to go

J. V. S T A L I N 200 
into voluntary bondage to imperialism the very next 
day after the victorious termination of the civil war. 
It would be wrong to think that in real life each 
of these paths of development is necessarily travelled in 
its pure form, and is absolutely isolated from the others. 
Actually, in the history of individual countries those 
paths often intercrossed and supplemented one another, 
presenting an interwoven pattern. An example of such 
an interweaving of paths is provided by the history of 
the development of the United States of America. That 
is explained by the fact that, notwithstanding all the 
differences between them, those diverse paths of development 
have certain features in common, which bring 
them close to one another and make their interweaving 
possible: firstly, all lead to the formation of capitalist 
industrial states; secondly, all presuppose an influx 
from outside of ³extra capital,² obtained in one way or 
another, as an essential condition for the formation of 
such states. It would be still more wrong, however, on 
these grounds to confuse those paths, to jumble them 
together, failing to understand that, after all, those 
three paths of development imply three different modes 
of formation of industrial capitalist states, that each of 
those paths puts its own special impress upon the complexion 
of those states. 
What, then, is the Soviet state to do if the old paths 
of industrialisation are unacceptable for it, and if an 
influx of new capital on other than enslaving terms is still 
out of the question? 
It can take a new path of development, a path not 
yet fully explored by other countries, the path of developing 
large-scale industry without credits from abroad,

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 201 
the path of industrialising the country without necessarily 
having an influx of foreign capital, the path indicated 
by Lenin in his article ³Better Fewer, but Better.² 
³We must strive,² says Lenin, ³to build up a state in which 
the workers retain their leadership of the peasants, in which 
they retain the confidence of the peasants, and, by exercising the 
greatest economy, remove every trace of extravagance from their 
social relations. 
³We must bring our state apparatus to the utmost degree of 
economy. . . . If we see to it that the working class retains the 
leadership of the peasantry, we shall be able, by exercising the 
greatest possible economy in the economic life of our state, to 
use every kopek we save to develop our large-scale machine industry, 
to develop electrification. . . . Only when we have done 
this,² says Lenin further, ³will we, speaking figuratively, be able to 
change horses, to change from the peasant, muzhik, horse of poverty, 
from the horse of economies adapted to a ruined peasant country, 
to the horse which the proletariat is seeking and cannot but seek 
‹the horse of large-scale machine industry, of electrification, of 
Volkhovstroi, etc.² (see Vol. XXVII, p. 417). 
That is the path our country has already taken, and 
along which it must proceed, in order to develop its 
large-scale industry and in order that it may itself develop 
into a powerful, industrial, proletarian state. 
As I have already said, that path has not been explored 
by the bourgeois states, but that does not mean 
in the least that it cannot be taken by the proletarian 
state. What in this case is impossible, or almost impossible, 
for bourgeois states, is quite possible for the 
proletarian state. The fact of the matter is that, in this 
respect, the proletarian state possesses advantages which 
bourgeois states do not, and, perhaps, cannot possess. 
Nationalised land, nationalised industry, nationalised

J. V. S T A L I N 202 
transport and credit, monopoly of foreign trade and stateregulated 
home trade‹these are all new sources of 
³extra capital,² which can be used for developing our 
countryıs industry, and which hitherto no bourgeois 
state has possessed. You know that the proletarian government 
is already using these and similar new sources 
for developing our industry. You know that along 
this path we have already achieved some successes of no 
little importance. 
That is why the path of development that is impossible 
for bourgeois states is quite possible for the proletarian 
state, in spite of all the difficulties and trials 
involved. 
Furthermore, it must be noted that the absence at 
the present time of an influx of capital from abroad on 
other than enslaving terms cannot be eternal and absolute. 
You know that some influx of capital into our country 
from abroad has already begun. There is scarcely any 
room for doubt that this influx will increase in proportion 
as our national economy grows and becomes consolidated. 
That is how the matter stands with the first interpretation 
of the question. 
Let us pass to the second interpretation of the 
question. 
Is it possible to build a socialist economy in our 
country before socialism is victorious in the major European 
countries, without direct assistance in machinery 
and equipment from the victorious European proletariat? 
Before dealing with this question, which, by the by, 
I have already answered in the beginning of my speech,

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 203 
I should like to dispel a very widespread misconception 
concerning it. The misconception is that some comrades 
are inclined to identify the question of ³the re-equipment 
and enlargement of the fixed capital of large-scale industry² 
with the question of building a socialist economy in 
our country. Can we agree to such an identification? No, 
we cannot. Why? Because the scope of the first question 
is narrower than that of the second. Because the first 
question concerning the enlargement of the fixed capital 
of industry embraces only a part of the national economy, 
namely, industry, whereas the question concerning 
the building of a socialist economy embraces the 
whole national economy, namely, both industry and agriculture. 
Because the problem of building socialism is 
the problem of organising the national economy as a 
whole, the problem of correctly combining industry and 
agriculture, whereas, strictly speaking, the question of 
enlarging the fixed capital of industry does not even 
touch that problem. We can picture to ourselves that the 
fixed capital of industry is already being re-equipped 
and enlarged, but that would not at all mean that the 
problem of building a socialist economy has already been 
solved. Socialist society is a producersı and consumersı 
association of those who work in industry and agriculture. 
If, in this association, industry is not linked up 
with agriculture, which provides raw materials and food 
and absorbs the products of industry, if industry and agriculture 
do not thus constitute a single, national-economic 
whole, there will be no socialism whatever. 
That is why the question of the relations between 
industry and agriculture, the question of the relations 
between the proletariat and the peasantry, is a

J. V. S T A L I N 204 
fundamental question in the problem of building a socialist 
economy. 
That is why the question of the re-equipment and 
enlargement of the fixed capital of large-scale industry 
cannot be identified with the question of building a socialist 
economy. 
And so, is it possible to build a socialist economy in 
our country before socialism is victorious in other countries, 
without direct assistance in machinery and equipment 
from the victorious Western proletariat? 
Yes, it is possible. It is not only possible, but necessary 
and inevitable. For we are already building socialism 
by developing nationalised industry and linking 
i t with agriculture, implanting co-operatives in the 
countryside and drawing peasant economy into the general 
system of Soviet development, revitalising the 
Soviets and merging the state apparatus with the vast 
masses of the people, building a new culture and implanting 
a new social life. Undoubtedly, a multitude of 
difficulties face us on this path, and we shall have to 
go through a number of trials. Undoubtedly, things 
would be vastly easier if the victory of socialism in the 
West came to our aid. But, firstly, the victory of socialism 
in the West is not ³happening² as quickly as we 
would like; and, secondly, those difficulties can be surmounted 
and we are already surmounting them, as you 
know. 
I spoke about all this in the beginning of my speech. 
I spoke about it even before, in my report to the Moscow 
active.* And still earlier I spoke about it in my ³Pref- 
* See this volume, pp. 90-134.‹Ed.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 205 
ace² to the book On the Road to October. I said that denial 
of the possibility of building socialism in our country 
is liquidationism, which leads to the degeneration 
of the Party. It is scarcely worth while repeating now 
what has already been said several times before. Therefore, 
I refer you to the works of Lenin, where you will 
find sufficient material and propositions on this subject. 
I should like, however, to say a few words about the 
history of the question, and about the significance it 
has for the Party at the present time. 
If we leave out of account the discussion that took 
place in 1905-06, we can say that the question of the 
possibility of building socialism in one country was 
first raised in the Party during the imperialist war, in 
1915. As is known, Lenin then for the first time formulated 
his proposition about ³the possibility of the victory 
of socialism² first of all ³in one capitalist country taken 
separately² (see Vol. XVIII, p. 232). That was the period of 
the turn from the bourgeois-democratic revolution to the 
socialist revolution. As is known, Trotsky, already at that 
time, disputed this proposition of Leninıs, declaring that 
³it would be hopeless to think . . . that, for example, 
a revolutionary Russia could hold out in the face of a 
conservative Europe² (see Vol. III of Trotskyıs Works, 
Part I, p. 90). 
In 1921, after the October Revolution and the civil 
war, when questions of construction came to the fore, 
the question of building socialism again rose in the Party. 
That was the period when some comrades regarded the 
turn towards the ³New Economic Policy² as the abandonment 
of socialist aims, as the abandonment of the building 
of socialism. As is known, Lenin, in his pamphlet

J. V. S T A L I N 206 
The Tax in Kind,37 then defined the turn towards the 
³New Economic Policy² as a necessary condition for 
linking industry with peasant economy, as a condition 
for building the foundation of a socialist economy, as the 
path to the successful building of socialism. That was 
in April 1921. As if in answer to this, Trotsky, in January 
1922, in the preface to his book The Year 1905, advanced 
a totally opposite proposition on the question of building 
socialism in our country, declaring that ³the contradictions 
in the position of a workersı government 
in a backward country with an overwhelmingly peasant 
population can be solved only on an international 
scale, in the arena of the world proletarian revolution.² 
A year later (in 1922) we again get two statements 
in opposition to one another: that of Lenin at the plenum 
of the Moscow Soviet, saying ³NEP Russia will become 
socialist Russia,² and that of Trotsky in the postscript 
to his Peace Programme, saying ³real progress 
of a socialist economy in Russia will become possible 
only after the victory of the proletariat in the major 
European countries.² 
Finally, still another year later, shortly before his 
death, Lenin reverted to this question again in his article 
³On Co-operation² (May 1923), stating that here 
in the Soviet Union, we have ³all that is necessary for 
building a complete socialist society.² 
Such is the brief history of the question. 
This reference to history alone is sufficient to show 
that the problem of building socialism in our country 
is one of the major problems of our Partyıs practical 
work. It scarcely needs proof that Lenin would not have

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 207 
reverted to it repeatedly had he not regarded it as a major 
problem of our practical work. 
The subsequent development of our economy, the 
intensification of the struggle between the socialist and 
the capitalist elements within it, and particularly the 
temporary stabilisation of capitalism, only served to 
make the question of the possibility of building socialism 
in our country more acute and to enhance its importance. 
Why is this question so important from the standpoint 
of the Partyıs practical work? 
Because it affects the question of the prospects of 
our work of construction, the question of the aims and 
objects of that work. You cannot build effectively if 
you do not know what you are building for. You cannot 
move a step forward if you do not know in what direction 
to go. The question of prospects is a cardinal question 
for our Party, which is accustomed to have a clear and 
definite goal. Are we building for socialism, in anticipation 
of victory in the building of socialism? Or are 
we building at haphazard, blindly, so as, ³in anticipation 
of a socialist revolution throughout the world² 
to manure the soil for bourgeois democracy? That is a 
fundamental question today. We cannot work and build 
effectively unless we have a clear answer to this no less 
clear question. Hundreds and thousands of Party workers, 
trade-unionists and co-operators, business executives 
and cultural workers, military men and Young 
Communist Leaguers turn to us, asking us, asking our 
Party: What is the aim of our work? What are we building 
for? Woe betide those leaders who are unable, or 
unwilling, to give a clear and definite answer to that

J. V. S T A L I N 208 
question, who begin to shuffle, to send people from 
Pontius to Pilate, and drown the socialist prospects of 
our work of construction in intellectualist scepticism. 
The great significance of Leninism lies, among other 
things, in that it does not recognise building at haphazard, 
blindly, that it cannot conceive of building without 
prospects, that it gives a clear and definite answer to 
the question of the prospects of our work, declaring 
that we have all that is needed to build a socialist economy 
in our country, that we can and must build a complete 
socialist society. 
That is how the matter stands with the question of 
the possibility of building a socialist economy. 
Whether we shall succeed for certain in building a 
socialist economy is another question. That does not depend 
upon us alone. It also depends upon the strength, 
or weakness, of our enemies and of our friends outside 
our country. We shall build it if we are allowed to do 
so, if we succeed in prolonging the period of ³respite,² 
if there is no serious intervention, if intervention is not 
victorious, if the international revolutionary movement 
on the one hand, and our own country on the other, are 
sufficiently strong and mighty to make a serious attempt 
at intervention impossible. And vice versa, we shall not 
build it if we are crushed as the result of successful intervention. 
That is how the matter stands with the ninth 
question. 
Let us pass to the last question.

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 209 
X 
Indicate the greatest forthcoming difficulties in our 
Party and Soviet affairs arising from stabilisation and the 
delay of the world revolution, especially difficulties in the 
sphere of the relations between the Party and the working 
class, and between the working class and the peasantry. 
I have counted five such difficulties, having in mind 
the chief ones. The part played by the stabilisation of 
capitalism is that it somewhat increases these difficulties. 
The first difficulty. This consists of the difficulties 
arising from the danger of foreign armed intervention. 
That does not mean that we are confronted with the immediate 
danger of intervention, that the imperialists are 
already prepared and fully in a position to intervene in 
our country immediately. To be able to do that, imperialism 
would have to be at least as strong as it was, 
for example, before the war, which is not the case, as 
is known. The present war in Morocco38 and intervention 
in China,39 those rehearsals of future wars and intervention, 
clearly demonstrate that the backbone of imperialism 
has weakened. Therefore, it is not a matter of immediate 
intervention; the point is that, as long as capitalist 
encirclement exists, there will always be the danger 
of intervention in general, and as long as the danger 
of intervention exists we shall have to maintain, for 
the purpose of defence, an army and navy, which cost 
us hundreds of millions of rubles every year. What does 
the annual expenditure of hundreds of millions of rubles 
on the army and navy mean? It means a corresponding 
reduction of expenditure on cultural and economic

J. V. S T A L I N 210 
development. Needless to say, if there were no danger of 
intervention we could use these sums, or at least the 
greater part of them, to strengthen industry, to improve 
agriculture, to introduce, for example, a reform like 
universal compulsory primary education, and so forth. 
Hence the difficulties in the sphere of constructive work 
which arise from the danger of intervention. 
The characteristic feature of this difficulty, which 
distinguishes it from all the others, is that to overcome 
it does not depend upon us alone, that it can be removed 
only by the joint efforts of our country and of the revolutionary 
movement in all other countries. 
The second difficulty. This consists of the difficulties 
arising from the contradictions between the proletariat 
and the peasantry. I spoke about those contradictions 
when dealing with the question of the class struggle 
in the countryside. There is no need whatever to repeat 
what has already been said. Those contradictions manifest 
themselves in the sphere of the policy relating to prices 
of agricultural produce and manufactured goods, in the 
sphere of the agricultural tax, rural administration, and so 
forth. The danger here is that the bond may be disrupted 
and that the idea of the proletariat leading the peasantry 
may be discredited. Hence the difficulty arising from this 
danger. 
The characteristic feature of this difficulty, which 
distinguishes it from the preceding one, is that it can 
be overcome by our own internal forces. The new course 
in the countryside‹such is the path that must be taken 
to overcome this difficulty. 
The third difficulty. This consists of the difficulties 
arising from the national contradictions within our

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Union, from the contradictions between the ³centre² and 
the ³border regions.² Those contradictions develop as a 
result of the dissimilarity between the economic and cultural 
conditions of development at the ³centre² and those in 
the ³border regions,² as a result of the fact that the latter 
lag behind the former. Whereas the political contradictions 
in this sphere may be regarded as already overcome, 
the cultural, and more especially, the economic 
contradictions, are only just arising and taking shape; 
consequently, they still have to be overcome. The danger 
here is twofold: on the one hand, the danger of dominant-
nation arrogance and bureaucratic arbitrariness on 
the part of those central institutions in the Union which 
are unable, or unwilling, to display the necessary sensitiveness 
to the requirements of the national republics, 
and, on the other hand, the danger of the republics and 
regions becoming imbued with national distrust and national 
insularity in relation to the ³centre.² To combat 
those dangers, especially the first‹such is the path 
that must be taken to overcome the difficulties in the 
sphere of the national question. 
The characteristic feature of this difficulty is that, 
like the second one, it can be overcome by the internal 
forces of the Union. 
The fourth difficulty. This consists of the difficulties 
arising from the danger that the state apparatus may 
become divorced from the Party, the danger that the 
Partyıs leadership of the state apparatus may be weakened. 
I spoke about that danger when dealing with the 
dangers of the Partyıs degeneration. It is hardly necessary 
to repeat what has already been said. That danger 
is fostered by the presence of bourgeois-bureaucratic 
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

J. V. S T A L I N 212 
elements in the state apparatus. It is intensified and 
aggravated by the growth of the state apparatus and 
its increased importance. The task is to reduce the state 
apparatus as much as possible, systematically to expel 
the elements of bureaucracy and bourgeois decay from 
it, to place leading Party forces in the key positions of 
the state apparatus and thus ensure the Partyıs leadership 
of it. 
The characteristic feature of this difficulty is that, 
like the third one, i t can be overcome by our own 
forces. 
The fifth difficulty. This consists of the danger of a 
partial divorce of the Party organisations and trade 
unions from the broad working-class masses, from the 
needs and requirements of these masses. That danger 
arises and develops as a result of the domination of 
bureaucratic elements in quite a number of Party and 
trade-union bodies, not excluding Party units and factory 
committees. That danger has increased lately 
owing to the slogan ³face to the countryside,² which has 
shifted the attention of our organisations from the town 
to the country, from the proletariat to the peasantry. 
Many comrades have failed to understand that when 
turning to face the countryside they must not turn their 
backs on the proletariat, that the slogan ³face to the 
countryside² can be implemented only through the medium 
of the proletariat and with the forces of the proletariat, 
that inattention to the requirements of the working 
class can only increase the danger of the Party and 
trade-union organisations becoming divorced from the 
masses of the workers. 
What are the signs of this danger?

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 213 
Firstly, loss of sensitiveness and inadequate attention 
of our Party and trade-union organisations to the requirements 
and needs of the broad working-class masses; 
secondly, failure to understand that the workers now have 
a higher sense of dignity and a sense of being the ruling 
class, that they will not understand or tolerate a bureaucratic 
attitude on the part of Party and trade-union 
organisations; thirdly, failure to understand that one 
should not thrust oneself on the workers with ill-considered 
orders, that attention must now be focussed not on 
such ³measures,² but on winning for the Party the confidence 
of the whole working class; fourthly, failure to 
understand that no measures at all extensive affecting 
the masses of the workers (for example, going over to 
the three-loom system in the textile area) should be 
carried out without first conducting a campaign among 
the workers, without first holding broad production 
conferences. 
All this results in a number of Party and trade-union 
organisations becoming divorced from the broad working-
class masses and in conflicts in the factories. As is 
known, the conflicts which flared up in the textile 
area recently revealed the existence of all these evils 
in a number of our Party and trade-union organisations. 
Such are the characteristic features of the fifth difficulty 
on our path of development. 
To overcome these difficulties it is necessary above 
all to rid our Party and trade-union organisations of the 
manifestly bureaucratic elements, to set about renewing 
the composition of the factory committees, to revive 
without fail the production conferences, to centre Party

J. V. S T A L I N 214 
work on the large Party units in industrial enterprises 
and to assign the best Party workers to them. 
More attention and thought to the requirements and 
needs of the working class, less bureaucratic formalism 
in the practical work of our Party and trade-union organisations, 
more sensitiveness and responsiveness to the 
sense of class dignity of the working class‹such is now 
the task. 
That is how the matter stands with the tenth 
question. 
Pravda, Nos. 139, 141, 
142 and 145, June 21, 
24, 25 and 28, 1925

TO THE SVERDLOV UNIVERSITY 
On the Occasion of the Second Graduation of Students 
of Basic and Trade-Union Courses 
The Sverdlov University is one of the most powerful 
instruments in training the Partyıs commanding personnel 
for leading the masses. 
During the years it has been in existence the Sverdlov 
University has already given the Party whole detachments 
of active workers who are now operating on all the 
fronts of socialist construction. 
The University is now handing over for Party work 
another detachment of 214 students, the majority of 
whom are workers. 
In order that the forthcoming work of this detachment 
may be fruitful in view of the complex tasks of 
construction that confront the Party, this detachment 
must bear in mind certain new circumstances in our situation 
which are of decisive importance at the present 
time. 
What are these circumstances? 
Firstly, the fact that the basic classes in our country, 
the proletariat and the peasantry, have lately undergone 
a substantial change. They have become more active 
both in the political and in the economic field, and this 
requires that the Party should adopt a new approach

J. V. S T A L I N 216 
to them. We no longer have a declassed working class; 
that class is now a fully-formed and full-blooded proletarian 
class, culturally and politically developed. This 
requires that the Partyıs leadership should become more 
flexible and thought-out. The same can be said about 
the peasantry. It is no longer the old peasantry, under 
the scourge of the old scorpions, dreading the loss 
of the land that formerly belonged to the landlords 
and cowed by the rigours of the surplus appropriation 
system. It is now a new peasantry, which has culturally 
developed, which has already forgotten about the landlords 
and the surplus appropriation system, which is 
demanding cheap goods and high prices for grain and 
is able to exploit to the full the Partyıs slogan of 
revitalising the Soviets. The utmost flexibility in 
relation to the present-day peasantry‹that is what is 
demanded of the Party now. To win the peasantry anew 
to the side of the proletariat‹that is now the Partyıs 
task. 
Secondly, the circumstance that in a number of districts 
the middle peasants have been found to be in a bloc 
with the kulaks. That is a fundamental fact that must 
not be forgotten for a single moment. From the standpoint 
of the alliance between the workers and the peasants, 
the dictatorship of the proletariat is leadership 
of the peasantry by the proletariat. But what does leading 
the peasantry mean? It means fully restoring the 
confidence of the bulk of the peasantry in the working 
class and its Party. If there is no such confidence 
there is no proletarian leadership, and if there is no 
such leadership there is no proletarian dictatorship. 
Hence, to work in the direction of fully restoring the

TO THE SVERDLOV UNIVERSITY 217 
confidence of the bulk of the peasantry in the working 
class‹that is the task of the Party and of the Party 
workers. 
Thirdly, the circumstance that, because of the slogan 
³face to the countryside,² our Party workers have 
of late gradually begun to forget the workers, they have 
lost sight of the fact that in facing the countryside we 
must not turn our backs on the towns, especially on the 
proletariat. That, too, is a new fact which must not be 
forgotten for a single moment. It must be borne in mind 
that of late a sense of its power and dignity has especially 
developed and grown strong in the working class. It 
is the sense of being the master which has developed 
in the class which in our country is the ruling class. 
That, comrades, is an immense achievement in all our 
work, for a working class that feels that it is not only 
the class that works, but also the class that governs‹ 
such a class can perform miracles. But from this it follows 
that a Communist who in his work fails to reckon with 
this sense of being the master felt by the proletarian 
class, fails to understand anything about the new situation; 
strictly speaking, he is not a Communist, he is 
certainly riding for a fall. Therefore, when speaking 
about the slogan ³face to the countryside² we must at 
the same time remember that the main class which is 
called upon to implement this slogan is the working class, 
that this slogan can be put into practice only to the 
degree that the working class really becomes the leading 
force in the country. That is why the Partyıs immediate 
task is to make our local Party workers understand, 
at l a s t , the absolute necessity of adopting a most 
attentive and thoughtful attitude to absolutely all

J. V. S T A L I N 218 
the requirements of the working class, whether material 
or cultural. 
The task of your detachment of graduates is to take 
all these circumstances into account in your work in the 
localities. 
I have no doubt that you will be able to carry out 
this task. 
Permit me to wish you complete success in your forthcoming 
work. 
With communist greetings, 
J. Stalin 
Pravda, No. 132, 
June 13, 1925

THE NATIONAL QUESTION ONCE AGAIN 
Concerning the Article by Semich 
One can only welcome the fact that now, after the 
discussion that took place in the Yugoslav Commission, 
Semich, in his article, wholly and entirely associates 
himself with the stand taken by the R.C.P.(B.) delegation 
in the Comintern. It would be wrong, however, to 
think on these grounds that there were no disagreements 
between the R.C.P.(B.) delegation and Semich before 
or during the discussion in the Yugoslav Commission. 
Evidently, that is exactly what Semich is inclined to 
think about the disagreements on the national question, 
in trying to reduce them just to misunderstandings. Unfortunately, 
he is profoundly mistaken. He asserts in his 
article that the dispute with him is based on a ³series of 
misunderstandings² caused by ³one, not fully translated,² 
speech he delivered in the Yugoslav Commission. In other 
words, it follows that we must make a scapegoat of the 
person who, for some reason, did not translate Semichıs 
speech in full. In the interests of the truth I must declare 
that this assertion of Semichıs is quite contrary to the 
facts It would have been better, of course, had Semich 
supported his assertion with passages from the speech 
he delivered in the Yugoslav Commission, the report of

J. V. S T A L I N 220 
which is kept in the Comintern files. But for some reason 
he did not do this. Consequently, I am compelled to go 
through this not very pleasant, but very necessary, procedure 
for him. 
This is all the more necessary since even now, after 
Semich has wholly associated himself with the stand 
taken by the R.C.P.(B.) delegation, there is still much 
that is unclear in his present position. 
In my speech in the Yugoslav Commission (see Bolshevik,
40 No. 7)* I spoke of disagreements on three questions: 
1) the question of the ways of solving the national 
question, 2) the question of the internal social content 
of the national movement in the present historical epoch, 
and 3) the question of the role of the international factor 
in the national question. 
On the first question I said that Semich had ³not 
fully understood the main essence of the Bolshevik 
presentation of the national question,² that he separated 
the national question from the general question 
of the revolution, and that, consequently, he was inclined 
to reduce the national question to a constitutional 
issue. 
Is all that true? 
Read the following passage from Semichıs speech 
in the Yugoslav Commission (March 30, 1925) and judge 
for yourselves: 
³Can the national question be reduced to a constitutional issue? 
First of all, let us make a theoretical supposition. Let us 
suppose that in state X there are three nations A, B, and C. These 
three nations express the wish to live in one state. What is the 
* See this volume, pp. 69-76.‹Ed.

THE NATIONAL QUESTION ONCE AGAIN 221 
issue in this case? It is, of course, the regulation of the internal 
relationships within this state. Hence, it is a constitutional issue. 
In this theoretical case the national question amounts to 
a constitutional issue. . . . If, in this theoretical case, we 
reduce the national question to a constitutional issue, it must 
be said‹as I have always emphasised‹that the self-determination 
of nations, including secession, is a condition for the solution 
of the constitutional issue. And it is solely on this plane 
that I put the constitutional issue.² 
I think that this passage from Semichıs speech 
needs no further comment. Clearly, whoever regards the 
national question as a component part of the general 
question of the proletarian revolution cannot reduce it 
to a constitutional issue. And vice versa, only one 
who separates the national question from the general 
question of the proletarian revolution can reduce it to 
a constitutional issue. 
Semichıs speech contains a statement to the effect 
that the right to national self-determination cannot be 
won without a revolutionary struggle. Semich says: 
³Of course, such rights can be won only by means of a 
revolutionary struggle. They cannot be won by parliamentary 
means; they can result only from mass revolutionary 
actions.² But what do ³revolutionary struggle² 
and ³revolutionary actions² mean? Can ³revolutionary 
struggle² and ³revolutionary actions² be identified with 
the overthrow of the ruling class, with the seizure of 
power, with the victory of the revolution as a condition 
for the solution of the national question? Of course not. 
To speak of the victory of the revolution as the fundamental 
condition for the solution of the national question 
is one thing; but it is quite another thing to put

J. V. S T A L I N 222 
³revolutionary actions² and ³revolutionary struggle² as 
the condition for the solution of the national question. It 
must be observed that the path of reforms, the constitutional 
path, by no means excludes ³revolutionary actions² 
and ³revolutionary struggle.² Decisive in determining 
whether a given party is revolutionary or reformist 
are not ³revolutionary actions² in themselves, but 
the political aims and objects for the sake of which the 
party undertakes and employs these actions. As is known, 
in 1906, after the first Duma was dispersed, the Russian 
Mensheviks proposed the organisation of a ³general 
strike² and even of an ³armed uprising.² But that 
did not in the least prevent them from remaining Mensheviks, 
for why did they propose all this at that time? 
Not, of course, to smash tsarism and to organise the complete 
victory of the revolution, but in order to ³exert 
pressure² on the tsarist government with the object of 
winning reforms, with the object of widening the ³constitution,² 
with the object of securing the convocation 
of an ³improved² Duma. ³Revolutionary actions² for 
the purpose of reforming the old order, while power 
remains in the hands of the ruling class is one thing‹ 
that is the constitutional path. ³Revolutionary actions² 
for the purpose of breaking up the old order, for overthrowing 
the ruling class, is another thing‹that is the 
revolutionary path, the path of the complete victory 
of the revolution. There is a fundamental difference 
here. 
That is why I think that Semichıs reference to ³revolutionary 
struggle² while reducing the national question 
to a constitutional issue does not refute, but, 
on the contrary, only confirms my statement that Semich

THE NATIONAL QUESTION ONCE AGAIN 223 
had ³not fully understood the main essence of the Bolshevik 
presentation of the national question,² for he 
failed to understand that the national question must 
be regarded not in isolation from, but in inseparable 
connection with, the question of the victory of the 
revolution, as part of the general question of the revolution. 
While insisting on this, I do not in the least mean 
to imply that I have said anything new about Semichıs 
mistake on this question. Not at all. This mistake of 
Semichıs was already mentioned by Comrade Manuilsky 
at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern41 when he 
said: 
³In his pamphlet The National Question in the Light of Marxism, 
and in a number of articles published in Radnik, the organ of 
the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, Semich advocates a 
struggle for the revision of the Constitution as a practical slogan 
for the Communist Party, that is, he in fact reduces the whole 
question of self-determination of nations exclusively to a constitutional 
issue² (see Stenographic Report of the Fifth Congress, 
pp. 596-97). 
Zinoviev, too, spoke about this same mistake in the 
Yugoslav Commission, when he said: 
³In the prospect drawn by Semich it appears that only one 
little thing is lacking, namely, revolution,² that the national 
question is a ³revolutionary and not a constitutional² problem 
(see Pravda, No. 83). 
These remarks by representatives of the R.C.P.(B.) 
in the Comintern concerning Semichıs mistake could 
not have been accidental, groundless. There is no smoke 
without fire.

J. V. S T A L I N 224 
That is how matters stand with Semichıs first and 
fundamental mistake. 
His other mistakes arise directly from this fundamental 
mistake. 
Concerning the second question, I said in my speech 
(see Bolshevik, No. 7) that Semich ³refuses to regard 
the national question as being, in essence, a peasant 
question.²* 
Is that true? 
Read the following passage from Semichıs speech 
in the Yugoslav Commission and judge for yourselves: 
³What is the social significance of the national movement 
in Yugoslavia?² asks Semich, and he answers there: ³Its social 
content is the competitive struggle between Serb capital on 
the one hand and Croat and Slovene capital on the other² (see 
Semichıs speech in the Yugoslav Commission). 
There can be no doubt, of course, that the competitive 
struggle between the Slovene and Croat bourgeoisie 
and the Serb bourgeoisie is bound to play a certain role 
here. But it is equally beyond doubt that a man who 
thinks that the social significance of the national movement 
lies in the competitive struggle between the bourgeoisies 
of the different nationalities cannot regard the 
national question as being, in essence, a peasant question. 
What is the essence of the national question today, when 
this question has been transformed from a local, intrastate 
question into a world question, a question of the 
struggle waged by the colonies and dependent nationalities 
against imperialism? The essence of the national 
* See this volume, p. 71.‹Ed.

THE NATIONAL QUESTION ONCE AGAIN 225 
question today lies in the struggle that the masses of 
the people of the colonies and dependent nationalities 
are waging against financial exploitation, against the 
political enslavement and cultural effacement of those 
colonies and nationalities by the imperialist bourgeoisie 
of the ruling nationality. What significance can the competitive 
struggle between the bourgeoisies of different 
nationalities have when the national question is presented 
in that way? Certainly not decisive significance, and, 
in certain cases, not even important significance. It 
is quite evident that the main point here is not that 
the bourgeoisie of one nationality is beating, or may 
beat, the bourgeoisie of another nationality in the 
competitive struggle, but that the imperialist group 
of the ruling nationality is exploiting and oppressing 
the bulk of the masses, above all the peasant masses, of 
the colonies and dependent nationalities and that, by oppressing 
and exploiting them, it is drawing them into 
the struggle against imperialism, converting them into 
allies of the proletarian revolution. The national question 
cannot be regarded as being, in essence, a peasant question 
if the social significance of the national movement is 
reduced to the competitive struggle between the bourgeoisies 
of different nationalities. And vice versa, the competitive 
struggle between the bourgeoisies of different nationalities 
cannot be regarded as constituting the social 
significance of the national movement if the national 
question is regarded as being, in essence, a peasant 
question. These two formulas cannot possibly be taken 
as equivalent. 
Semich refers to a passage in Stalinıs pamphlet 
Marxism and the National Question, written at the end

J. V. S T A L I N 226 
of 1912. There it says that ³the national struggle under 
the conditions of rising capitalism is a struggle of the bourgeois 
classes among themselves.² Evidently, by this 
Semich is trying to suggest that his formula defining 
the social significance of the national movement under 
the present historical conditions is correct. But Stalinıs 
pamphlet was written before the imperialist war, when 
the national question was not yet regarded by Marxists 
as a question of world significance, when the Marxistsı 
fundamental demand for the right to self-determination 
was regarded not as part of the proletarian revolution, 
but as part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. It 
would be ridiculous not to see that since then the international 
situation has radically changed, that the war, 
on the one hand, and the October Revolution in Russia, 
on the other, transformed the national question from a 
part of the bourgeois-democratic revolution into a part 
of the proletarian-socialist revolution. As far back 
as October 1916, in his article, ³The Discussion on 
Self-Determination Summed Up,²42 Lenin said that 
the main point of the national question, the right to 
self-determination, had ceased to be a part of the general 
democratic movement, that it had already become a 
component part of the general proletarian, socialist revolution. 
I do not even mention subsequent works on the 
national question by Lenin and by other representatives 
of Russian communism. After all this, what significance 
can Semichıs reference to the passage in Stalinıs 
pamphlet, written in the period of the bourgeois-democratic 
revolution in Russia, have at the present time, when, 
as a consequence of the new historical situation, we have 
entered a new epoch, the epoch of proletarian revolution?

THE NATIONAL QUESTION ONCE AGAIN 227 
It can only signify that Semich quotes outside of space 
and time, without reference to the living historical situation, 
and thereby violates the most elementary requirements 
of dialectics, and ignores the fact that what 
is right for one historical situation may prove to be 
wrong in another historical situation. In my speech in 
the Yugoslav Commission I said that two stages must 
be distinguished in the presentation of the national question 
by the Russian Bolsheviks: the pre-October stage, 
when the bourgeois-democratic revolution was the issue 
and the national question was regarded as a part of 
the general democratic movement; and the October 
stage, when the proletarian revolution was already the 
issue and the national question had become a component 
part of the proletarian revolution. It scarcely needs 
proof that this distinction is of decisive significance. 
I am afraid that Semich still fails to understand the 
meaning and significance of this difference between 
the two stages in the presentation of the national question. 
That is why I think Semichıs attempt to regard the 
national movement as not being, in essence, a peasant 
question, but as a question of the competition between the 
bourgeoisies of different nationalities ³is due to an under-
estimation of the inherent strength of the national 
movement and a failure to understand the profoundly 
popular and profoundly revolutionary character of the 
national movement² (see Bolshevik, No. 7).* 
That is how the matter stands with Semichıs second 
mistake. 
* See this volume, p. 72.‹Ed.

J. V. S T A L I N 228 
It is characteristic that the same thing about this 
mistake of Semichıs was said by Zinoviev in his speech 
in the Yugoslav Commission: 
³Semich is wrong when he says that the peasant movement 
in Yugoslavia is headed by the bourgeoisie and is therefore not 
revolutionary² (see Pravda, No. 83). 
Is this coincidence accidental? Of course, not! 
Once again: there is no smoke without fire. 
Finally, on the third question I stated that Semich 
makes an ³attempt to treat the national question in Yugoslavia 
in isolation from the international situation 
and the probable prospects in Europe.²* 
Is that true? 
Yes, it is, for in his speech Semich did not even 
remotely hint at the fact that the international situation 
under present conditions, especially in relation to Yugoslavia, 
is a major factor in the solution of the national 
question. The fact that the Yugoslav state itself was 
formed as a result of the clash between the two major 
imperialist coalitions, that Yugoslavia cannot escape 
from the big play of forces that is now going on in the 
surrounding imperialist states‹all this remained outside 
of Semichıs field of vision. Semichıs statement 
that he can fully conceive of certain changes taking 
place in the international situation which may cause the 
question of self-determination to become an urgent and 
practical one, must now, in the present international 
situation, be regarded as inadequate. Now it is by no 
means a matter of admitting that the question of the 
* Ibid.‹Ed.

THE NATIONAL QUESTION ONCE AGAIN 229 
right of nations to self-determination may become urgent, 
given certain changes in the international situation, 
in a possible and distant future; this could, if need be, 
now be admitted as a prospect even by bourgeois democrats. 
That is not the point now. The point now is 
to avoid making the present frontiers of the Yugoslav 
state, which came into being as a result of war and violence, 
the starting point and legal basis for the solution of 
the national question. One thing or the other: either the 
question of national self-determination, i.e., the question 
of radically altering the frontiers of Yugoslavia, is an 
appendage to the national programme, dimly looming 
in the distant future, or it is the basis of the national 
programme. At all events it is clear that the point about 
the right to self-determination cannot be at one and the 
same time both an appendage to and the basis of the 
national programme of the Yugoslav Communist Party. 
I am afraid that Semich still continues to regard the 
right to self-determination as an appendage concerning 
prospects added to the national programme. 
That is why I think that Semich divorces the national 
question from the question of the general international 
situation and, as a consequence, for him the question 
of self-determination, i.e., the question of altering 
the frontiers of Yugoslavia, is, in essence, not an urgent 
question, but an academic one. 
That is how the matter stands with Semichıs third 
mistake. 
It is characteristic that the same thing about this 
mistake of Semichıs was said by Comrade Manuilsky 
in his report to the Fifth Congress of the Comintern:

J. V. S T A L I N 230 
³The fundamental premise of Semichıs whole presentation 
of the national question is the idea that the proletariat must accept 
the bourgeois state within those frontiers which have been set up by 
a series of wars and acts of violence²* (see Stenographic Report of 
the Fifth Congress of the Comintern, p. 597). 
Can this coincidence be regarded as accidental? Of 
course, not! 
Once again: there is no smoke without fire. 
The magazine Bolshevik, No. 11-12, 
June 30, 1925 
Signed: J. Stalin 
* My italics.‹J. St.

THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT 
IN THE EAST 
Interview Given to Mr. Fuse, 
Japanese Correspondent of Nichi-Nichi 
MR. FUSEıS QUESTIONS 
AND J. V. STALINıS ANSWERS 
First question. The Japanese people, being the most 
advanced of the peoples of the East, are most of all interested 
in the successes of the liberation movement of 
the peoples of the East. They would willingly become 
the ally of the U.S.S.R. in this great cause, the cause 
of liberating the enslaved peoples of the East from the 
imperialist yoke of the Western powers. Being, however, 
at the same time a capitalist state, Japan is sometimes 
obliged to go against this movement, joining in the 
same front as the Western powers. (For example: the 
Anglo-Japanese alliance, by virtue of which Japan had 
to help Britain in her struggle against the insurgents in 
India, and Japanıs joint action with Britain, America 
and France against the Chinese workers during the recent 
events in Shanghai.) 
What, in your opinion, could be the way out of 
this embarrassing situation created by the contradiction 
between the national strivings of the Japanese people, on 
the one hand, and the political and social structure of 
the Japanese state, on the other?

J. V. S T A L I N 232 
Answer. It is true that the Japanese people are the 
most advanced of the peoples of the East and that they 
are interested in the successes of the liberation movement 
of the oppressed peoples. An alliance between the Japanese 
people and the peoples of the Soviet Union would 
be a decisive step towards the liberation of the peoples 
of the East. Such an alliance would mark the beginning 
of the end of the big colonial empires, the beginning of 
the end of world imperialism. That alliance would be 
invincible. 
But it is also true that the political and social structure 
of Japan impels the Japanese people along the 
path of imperialism and makes them an instrument of 
the enslavement and not of the liberation of the peoples 
of the East. 
You ask: What is the way out of this contradiction 
between the interests of the Japanese people and the political 
and social structure of Japan? 
There is only one way out: change the political and 
social structure of Japan to make it fit the fundamental 
interests of the Japanese people. 
Russia, at one time, was the terror of the peoples 
of the East, the gendarme against every liberation movement. 
What is the explanation of the fact that Russia, 
formerly the gendarme against the liberation movement, 
has become its friend and standard-bearer? The only explanation 
is that Russiaıs political and social structure has 
been changed. 
Second question. The Eastern nationalities who inhabit 
the U.S.S.R. are many centuries behind the times 
as a result of the despotic tsarist regime, and they 
acquired the right to an independent development of

THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN THE EAST 233 
industry, agriculture, culture, etc., only after the revolution. 
Approximately how many years, in your opinion, 
will it take the Eastern nationalities in the U.S.S.R. to 
reach the cultural level of the other nationalities of the 
U.S.S.R.? 
Answer. You ask: Approximately how many years 
will it take the Eastern peoples of the Soviet Union to 
reach the cultural level of the other peoples of the Soviet 
Union? 
It is hard to say. The tempo of cultural development 
of these peoples will depend upon numerous internal 
and external conditions. In general, I must say that 
forecasts about the tempo of development have never 
been very accurate, especially as regards number of 
years. The main thing that facilitates the cultural development 
of these countries is that the chief obstacles to 
development, such as tsarism, Russian imperialism, the 
regime of exploitation of the border regions by the centre, 
have already been removed from the path. This circumstance 
gives a tremendous impulse to the cultural development 
of the Eastern peoples of the Soviet Union. But how 
fully this main facilitating circumstance will be taken advantage 
of depends upon the Eastern peoples themselves, 
and primarily, upon the stage of cultural development 
in which they were at the time of the Soviet revolution. 
At any rate, one thing can be said without hesitation: 
under present conditions of development, the Eastern 
peoples of the Soviet Union have far more chances of 
a rapid and all-round development of their national culture 
than they could have under the most ³free² and 
most ³cultured² capitalist regime.

J. V. S T A L I N 234 
Third question. You say that the link between the 
national-liberation movement of the enslaved peoples of 
the East and the proletarian movement in the advanced 
Western countries will ensure the victory of the world 
revolution. We, the Japanese people, have the slogan: 
³Asia for the Asiatics.² Do you not think that there 
is something in common between our strivings and your 
revolutionary tactics in regard to the colonial countries 
of the East? 
Answer. You ask: Is there not something in common 
between the slogan ³Asia for the Asiatics² and the 
Bolsheviksı revolutionary tactics in regard to the colonial 
countries of the East? 
To the extent that the slogan ³Asia for the Asiatics² 
is a call for a revolutionary war against Western imperialism‹
but only to that extent‹there is, undoubtedly, 
something in common between them. 
But the slogan ³Asia for the Asiatics² embraces not 
only that aspect of the matter. It contains two other 
component elements that are totally incompatible with 
the Bolsheviksı tactics. Firstly, it evades the question 
of Eastern imperialism, as if suggesting that Eastern imperialism 
is better than Western, and that there is no 
need to fight Eastern imperialism. Secondly, that slogan 
imbues the workers of Asia with a feeling of distrust 
towards the European workers, alienates the former from 
the latter, breaks the international ties between them 
and thereby saps the very foundations of the liberation 
movement. 
The revolutionary tactics of the Bolsheviks are directed 
not only against Western imperialism, but against 
imperialism in general, including Eastern imperialism.

THE REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN THE EAST 235 
These tactics are directed not towards weakening the international 
ties between the workers of Asia and the workers 
of the European and American countries, but towards 
expanding and strengthening them. 
Hence, as you see, in addition to something in common, 
there are points of fundamental difference between 
the slogan ³Asia for the Asiatics² and the Bolshevik 
tactics in the East. 
Fourth question. In answer to my question: ³Where 
has communism the greater chances of success, in the West 
or in the East?² Vladimir Ilyich, in my interview with 
him in 1920, said: ³For the time being real communism 
can achieve success only in the West. The West, however, 
lives at the expense of the East. The European capitalist 
powers amass their wealth mainly by exploiting the Eastern 
colonies; but at the same time they are arming their 
colonies and teaching them how to fight, and thereby 
the West is digging its own grave in the East.² Do you 
not think that the events that are occurring more and 
more often in China, India, Persia, Egypt and other 
Eastern countries are a sign that the time is drawing 
near when the Western powers will have to bury themselves 
in the grave they have dug for themselves in the 
East? 
Answer. You ask: Do I not think that the growth of 
the revolutionary movement in China, India, Persia, 
Egypt and other Eastern countries is a sign that the time 
is drawing near when the Western powers will bury themselves 
in the grave they have dug for themselves in the 
East? 
Yes, I do. The colonial countries constitute the principal 
rear of imperialism. The revolutionisation of this

J. V. S T A L I N 236 
rear is bound to undermine imperialism not only in the 
sense that imperialism will be deprived of its rear, but 
also in the sense that the revolutionisation of the East 
is bound to give a powerful impulse to the intensification 
of the revolutionary crisis in the West. Attacked 
on two sides‹in the rear as well as in front‹imperialism 
will be forced to admit that it is doomed. 
Pravda, No. 150, 
July 4, 1925

A LETTER TO COMRADE YERMAKOVSKY 
Comrade Yermakovsky, 
Many apologies for this late reply. I have been on 
holiday these last two months, returned to Moscow 
yesterday and was able to read your note only today. 
However, better late than never. 
Engelsıs negative answer to the question: ³Can this 
revolution take place in one country alone?² wholly reflects 
the epoch of pre-monopolist capitalism, the preimperialist 
epoch, when the conditions did not yet exist 
for the uneven, spasmodic development of the capitalist 
countries, when, consequently, the premises did not yet 
exist for the victory of the proletarian revolution in one 
country (as is known, the possibility of the victory of 
such a revolution in one country follows from the law 
of uneven development of capitalist countries under imperialism). 
The law of uneven development of capitalist 
countries, and the concomitant thesis that the victory 
of the proletarian revolution is possible in one country, 
were, and could be, advanced by Lenin only in the period 
of imperialism. That, incidentally, explains why Leninism 
is Marxism of the epoch of imperialism, why it is

J. V. S T A L I N 238 
a further development of Marxism, which arose in the 
pre-imperialist epoch. Genius though he was, Engels 
could not see what did not yet exist in the pre-monopolist 
period of capitalism, in the forties of the last century, 
when he wrote his Principles of Communism,43 
and which arose only later, in the monopolist period of 
capitalism. On the other hand, Lenin, being a Marxist 
of genius, could not fail to see what had already 
arisen after Engelsıs death, in the period of imperialism. 
The difference between Lenin and Engels is the difference 
between the two historical periods that separate 
them. 
The idea that ³Trotskyıs theory is identical with 
Engelsıs doctrine² is quite out of the question. Engels 
had grounds for giving a negative reply to Question 19 
(see his Principles of Communism) in the pre-monopolist 
period of capitalism, in the forties of the last century, 
when there could be no question of the law of uneven development 
of capitalist countries. Trotsky, on the contrary, 
has no grounds whatever for repeating in the twentieth 
century Engelsıs old answer, taken from an epoch that has 
already passed away, and applying it mechanically to 
the new, imperialist epoch, when the law of uneven 
development is a widely known fact. Engels based his 
answer on an analysis of the pre-monopolist capitalism 
of his time. Trotsky, however, does not analyse, but ignores 
the present epoch, forgets that he is not living in 
the forties of the last century, but in the twentieth 
century, in the epoch of imperialism, and slyly adds the 
nose of Ivan Ivanovich of the forties of the nineteenth 
century to the chin of Ivan Nikiforovich of the beginning 
of the twentieth century, evidently in the belief

A LETTER TO COMRADE YERMAKOVSKY 239 
that it is possible in that way to outwit history. I do 
not think that these two diametrically opposite methods 
can give grounds for saying that ³Trotskyıs theory is 
identical with Engelsıs doctrine.² 
With communist greetings, 
J. Stalin 
15.IX.25 
Published for the first time

INTERVIEW WITH THE PARTICIPANTS 
IN THE CONFERENCE OF AGITATION 
AND PROPAGANDA DEPARTMENTS 
October 14, 1925 
Question. Have any changes taken place in the stabilisation 
of capitalism since the last congress of the Comintern? 
Answer. In our Party circles we usually speak of 
two stabilisations: the stabilisation of capitalism and 
the stabilisation of the Soviet system. The stabilisation 
of capitalism signifies a certain temporary relaxation 
of the crisis of capitalism accompanied by a growth 
within capitalism of irreconcilable contradictions, the 
development of which must lead to the next, fresh 
crisis of capitalism. No matter what changes take place 
in this sphere, a new crisis cannot be averted. As regards 
the stabilisation of the Soviet system, it is developing 
with increasing tempo, consolidating the forces of socialism 
in our country and uprooting the capitalist elements. 
There can be no doubt that the complete victory of 
the socialist elements in our country over the capitalist 
elements is a matter of the next few years. 
Question. Will not the growing Left-wing movement 
in the Western trade unions lead to some part of the 
proletariat becoming divorced from the Communist Parties?

INTERVIEW WITH THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE 241 
Answer. No, i t should not. On the contrary, the 
swing of the trade unions to the Left should strengthen 
the influence of the Communist Parties in the workingclass 
movement. The social-reformists are strong in the 
working-class movement not only, and even not so much, 
because they have Social-Democratic parties at their 
command, but mainly because they have the backing of 
the workersı trade unions. It will be enough to deprive 
them of this backing for them to be left hanging in midair. 
The swing of the trade unions to the Left means that a 
considerable section of the organised workers is beginning 
to desert the old, reformist leaders and is seeking new, 
Left leaders. The mistake that the Communist Parties 
make is that they fail to understand this beneficent 
process, and instead of offering a hand to the Social-Democratic 
workers who are moving to the Left and helping 
them to extricate themselves from the mire, they begin 
to abuse them as traitors and repel them. 
It must be borne in mind that the situation as regards 
the trade unions in the West is different from what it is 
here, in our country. Here, the trade unions arose after the 
Party had appeared, after the Party had already become 
strong and had gained great prestige among the workers. 
Here, the trade unions were implanted and organised 
by the efforts of the Party, under the leadership of the 
Party, with the assistance of the Party. It is this, incidentally, 
that explains the fact that, here, the Partyıs 
prestige among the workers is much higher than that 
of the trade unions. We see an entirely different picture 
in the West. There, the trade unions arose much earlier 
than the working-class political parties. There were no 
parties yet in the West when the trade unions were leading

J. V. S T A L I N 242 
the workers in strikes, organising them and helping 
them to defend their interests in the struggle against 
the capitalists. More than that. There, the parties arose 
out of the trade unions. It is this, incidentally, that explains 
the fact that the trade unions in the West enjoy 
much more prestige among the masses than the parties. 
Whether the trade unions and their leaders there are good 
or bad, one thing is clear, namely, that the workers regard 
the trade unions as their bastions against the capitalists. 
All these specific features must be taken into account 
when exposing the reformist trade-union leaders. 
Hurling abuse and violent epithets at the reformist leaders 
will not help. On the contrary, abuse and violent epithets 
can only create the impression among the workers that 
the aim is not to secure the removal of bad leaders, 
but to wreck the trade unions. 
Question. What is the position of the German Communist 
Party after the removal of the ³ultra-Lefts²? 
Answer. Undoubtedly, the removal of the ³ultra- 
Lefts² has improved the position of the German Communist 
Party. The ³ultra-Lefts² are people alien to the working 
class. What can Ruth Fischer and Maslow44 have 
in common with the working class of Germany? The 
result of the removal of the ³ultra-Lefts² has been that 
new leaders of the Communist Party have come to the 
fore from the workers. That is a great gain for the 
German working-class movement. 
Question. Is a new orientation of the U.S.S.R. contemplated 
in connection with the pact with Germany? 
Answer. No. We have always had and always will have 
but one orientation: our orientation is on the U.S.S.R.

INTERVIEW WITH THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE 243 
and its success both at home and abroad. We need no 
other orientation. Whatever pacts are concluded, they 
cannot change anything in this respect. 
Question. What is our chief method of Party work 
among the broad masses? 
Answer. The elimination of the survivals of war 
communism in Party work and transition to the method 
of persuasion. In relation to the exploiting elements 
in our country, we have the old, tried method‹ 
the method of coercion. In relation to the working 
people of our country, the workers, peasants, and so 
forth, we must employ the method of persuasion. The 
point is not that the Partyıs instructions and directives 
are correct. That, of course, is a good thing, 
but i t is not enough. The point now is to convince 
the broad masses of the working people that these 
directives and instructions are correct. The point is 
that the masses themselves should by their own experience 
become convinced that the Partyıs directives and 
instructions are correct. That calls for extensive, intricate, 
flexible and patient Party work; but that is the 
only correct method of work under present conditions, 
when the activity of the masses of the working people is 
growing. 
Question. What questions should the agitation and 
propaganda departments pay attention to in view of the 
forthcoming Party Congress? 
Answer. Firstly, the question of the industrialisation 
of our country; and secondly, the peasant question. 
On the first question, the point must be stressed that 
industrialisation is the principal means by which we can 
preserve the economic independence of our country, that

J. V. S T A L I N 244 
if we do not industrialise our country it will run the 
risk of becoming an appendage of the world capitalist 
system. On the second question, more efforts must be devoted 
to the problem of strengthening the bond between 
the working class and the peasantry, between industry 
and peasant economy, for without this bond it will be 
impossible to build socialism in our country. 
Question. What problems arise out of the Partyıs 
growth and the necessity of regulating its membership? 
Answer. The growth of the Party membership has 
been proceeding rapidly of late. That, of course, is good, 
for the Partyıs rapid growth is an indication of the 
growing confidence of the working class in our Party. 
But it also has serious drawbacks. The drawbacks are 
that the Partyıs rapid growth leads to a certain lowering 
of the level of political understanding of the Party membership, 
to some deterioration of the Partyıs quality. 
But quality should be of no less, if not more, importance 
to us than quantity. To remove those drawbacks we must 
put an end to the excessive passion of some of our 
comrades for a quantitative growth of the Party; we 
must stop the wholesale influx into the Party and make 
it a rule in future to accept new members with great 
discrimination. That is the first thing. Secondly, we 
must organise intensive political education of the new 
Party members in order to raise their political understanding 
to the requisite level. 
Question. What can now best ensure contact with the 
non-Party peasant masses‹drawing the peasants into 
the Party, or the creation of a non-Party active around 
the Party?

INTERVIEW WITH THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE CONFERENCE 245 
Answer. We need both. It will be very difficult to 
create a broad, non-Party, peasant active around our 
Party unless we have in the countryside a certain minimum 
of peasants organised in the Party. It will be still 
more difficult to create effective Party organisations in 
the countryside unless we have a broad, non-Party, 
peasant active, for Party organisations are usually created 
out of such an active. Nevertheless, the creation of a 
broad, non-Party, peasant active is the more important 
task. 
What makes the Party strong from the standpoint 
of its connections with the masses? The fact that it has 
around itself a broad, non-Party active of sympathisers. 
The Party could not have led the vast working-class 
masses into the struggle if it had not had this broad active 
of sympathisers around itself. Without the aid of 
such an active the Party cannot exercise leadership of 
the vast masses of the people. That is one of the fundamental 
laws of leadership. 
Do you remember the Lenin Enrolment, when, in the 
course of a few days, 200,000 new members, the finest 
sons of the working class, joined the Party? Where did 
those 200,000 come from? They came from the ranks of 
the broad, non-Party active of workers in sympathy 
with our Party. 
Hence, the non-Party active is the medium that 
provides the sap on which the Party lives and 
develops. That is true not only in relation to the 
working class. It is also true in relation to the labouring 
peasantry. 
Question. What concrete results for the expansion 
of industry are expected from concessions?

J. V. S T A L I N 246 
Answer. Lenin in his day already said that nothing 
had come of concessions in our country. We are now in 
possession of new data which confirm Leninıs words. We 
can now quite confidently say that there are no prospects 
for concessions in our country. It is a fact that the proportion 
of the output of concession industry to our total 
industrial output is insignificant, and that proportion 
is tending to drop to zero. 
Published for the first time

THE TASKS OF THE YOUNG 
COMMUNIST LEAGUE 
Answer to Questions Submitted by the Editorial 
Board of Komsomolskaya Pravda 
I 
What, in the main, are the duties of the Young Communist 
League resulting from the Soviet Unionıs present 
international and internal position? 
The formulation of the question is too general; hence, 
the answer can be couched only in general terms. 
In the main, the Soviet Unionıs present international 
and internal position imposes upon the Young Communist 
League the duty of supporting by word and deed 
the revolutionary movement of the oppressed classes in 
all countries and the struggle of the proletariat of the 
Soviet Union to build socialism, and for the freedom 
and independence of the proletarian state. It follows 
from this, however, that the Young Communist League 
will be able to perform this general duty only if it is 
guided in all its work by the directives issued by the 
Communist International and the Russian Communist 
Party. 
II 
What tasks confront the Young Communist League in 
connection with the dangers of l i q u i d a t i o n i s m 
(loss of perspective in the building of socialism), of

J. V. S T A L I N 248 
n a t i o n a l i s m (loss of the international revolutionary 
perspective) and of the b e l i t t l i n g of the Party leadership, 
i.e., in connection with the dangers mentioned in 
the pamphlet Questions and Answers? 
Briefly, the task of the Young Communist League in 
this sphere is to educate our young workers and peasants 
in the spirit of Leninism. But what does educating the 
youth in the spirit of Leninism mean? It means, firstly, 
imbuing them with the consciousness that victory in the 
building of socialism in our country is fully possible and 
necessary. It means, secondly, strengthening their conviction 
that our workersı state is the offspring of the international 
proletariat, that it is the base for developing 
the revolution in all countries, that the final victory 
of our revolution is the cause of the international proletariat. 
It means, thirdly, educating the young people 
in a spirit of confidence in the leadership of the Russian 
Communist Party. It is necessary to create in the 
Young Communist League such cadres and such an active 
as will be able to educate the youth precisely along 
those lines. 
Young Communist Leaguers are active in all spheres 
of construction: industry, agriculture, the co-operatives, 
the Soviets, cultural and educational organisations, 
and so forth. Every member of the Young 
Communist League active must link his daily work in 
all spheres of construction with the prospect of building 
socialist society. He must be able to conduct his 
daily work in the spirit and direction of realising this 
prospect. 
Young Communist Leaguers conduct work among the 
workers and peasants of the most diverse nationalities.

THE TASKS OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE 249 
The Young Communist League itself is something in the 
nature of an International. A role is played here not 
only by the national composition of the Young Communist 
League, but also by the fact that the latter is directly 
linked with the R.C.P.(B.), one of the most important 
detachments of the world proletarian International. Internationalism 
is the fundamental idea that permeates the 
work of the Young Communist League. That is what 
makes it strong. That is what makes it mighty. The 
spirit of internationalism must always hover over the 
Young Communist League. The successes and setbacks 
in the struggle that the proletariat of our country is 
waging must be linked in the minds of Young Communist 
Leaguers with the successes and setbacks of the international 
revolutionary movement. Young Communist 
Leaguers must learn to regard our revolution not as 
an end in itself, but as a means and an aid towards 
the victory of the proletarian revolution in all countries. 
Formally, the Young Communist League is a non- 
Party organisation. But it is at the same time a communist 
organisation. This means that, while being formally 
a non-Party organisation of workers and peasants, 
the Young Communist League must, nevertheless, 
work under the leadership of our Party. The task 
is to ensure that the youth has confidence in our Party, 
to ensure our Partyıs leadership in the Young Communist 
League. The Young Communist Leaguer must remember 
that ensuring the Partyıs leadership is the chief and 
most important thing in the entire work of the Young 
Communist League. The Young Communist Leaguer must 
remember that without that leadership the Young

J. V. S T A L I N 250 
Communist League will be unable to fulfil its main task 
namely, that of educating the young workers and peasants 
in the spirit of the proletarian dictatorship and of communism. 
III 
How should the question of the growth of the Young 
Communist League be presented at the present time: should 
it continue, in the main, the policy of drawing all the 
young workers, agricultural labourers and poor peasants 
and the best of the young middle peasants into its ranks, 
or should it concentrate attention mainly on holding and 
educating the mass of the youth already in the League? 
It is wrong to say: either‹or. Both must be done. 
As far as possible, all the young workers and the best 
elements of the young poor and middle peasants must 
be drawn into the League. At the same time, attention 
must be concentrated on the education of the new members 
by the Young Communist League active. The most 
important immediate task of the Young Communist 
League is to strengthen its proletarian core. The carrying 
out of this task will be a guarantee that the Young 
Communist League will proceed along the right road. But 
the Young Communist League is not only a young workers 
organisation. It is a young workersı and peasantsı 
organisation. Therefore, in addition to strengthening its 
proletarian core, it must work to recruit the best elements 
of the peasant youth, it must work to ensure a firm 
alliance between the proletarian core and the peasant 
section of the League. If that is not done, leadership 
of the young peasants in the League by the proletarian 
core will be impossible.

THE TASKS OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE 251 
IV 
Some Gubernia Committees of the Russian Leninist 
Young Communist League, taking as their example the womenıs 
delegate meetings, have begun to organise delegate 
meetings of young non-Party peasants, attended by permanent 
delegates. The function of those meetings is to form 
a young peasant, mainly middle peasant, active, under the 
leadership of the Young Communist League. Is that standpoint 
correct? Does not this harbour the danger of those delegate 
meetings degenerating into a sort of non-Party peasant-
youth leagues, which may set themselves up against 
our Young Communist League? 
In my opinion that standpoint is incorrect. Why? 
For the following reasons. 
Firstly, there is concealed here a fear of the middle 
peasant, a desire to keep the young middle peasants at 
a distance, an attempt to wash oneıs hands of them. Is 
that a proper desire? Of course not. We must not keep 
the young middle peasants at a distance; on the contrary, 
we must draw them closer to us, draw them closer 
to the Young Communist League. Only in this way will 
it be possible to imbue the young middle peasants with 
confidence in the workers, with confidence in the proletarian 
core of the Young Communist League, with confidence 
in our Party. 
Secondly, there is no doubt that, under present circumstances, 
when all sections of the peasantry are becoming 
more active, special delegate meetings of young 
middle peasants convened by the Young Communist 
League will inevitably be transformed into a separate 
middle-peasant youth league. This separate league will by 
force of necessity be compelled to set itself up against

J. V. S T A L I N 252 
the existing youth league and its leader, the R.C.P.(B.); 
it will draw towards itself the peasant section of the 
Young Communist League and thereby create the danger 
of the League splitting into two leagues‹a young workersı 
league and a young peasantsı league. Can we ignore 
such a danger? Of course not. Do we want such a split, 
especially under present circumstances, especially under 
the present conditions of our development? Of course 
not. On the contrary, what is necessary now is not to 
keep the young peasants at a distance, but to draw them 
closer to the proletarian core of the Young Communist 
League, not discord, but a firm alliance between them. 
Thirdly, the organisation of delegate meetings of 
young middle peasants cannot be justified on the plea 
of the existence of delegate meetings of working women 
and peasant women. The young workers and peasants, 
who have their own separate organisation in the shape of 
the Young Communist League, cannot be put on a par 
with the working women and peasant women, who have 
no separate organisation of their own, just as the young 
middle peasants must not be confused with working 
women, who are a part of the working class. The existence 
of delegate meetings of young middle peasants gives rise 
to a danger for the Young Communist League, whereas the 
existence of delegate meetings of working women and 
peasant women creates no danger to anybody, for at 
the present time the working women and peasant women 
have no separate permanent organisation of their own 
like the Young Communist League. 
That is why I think that the organisation of special 
delegate meetings of young middle peasants by the Young 
Communist League is superfluous.

THE TASKS OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE 253 
I think that the Sixth Congress of the Young Communist 
League45 acted rightly in confining itself to the proposal 
to form around the Young Communist League in 
the countryside auxiliary organisations, such as self-education 
circles, groups for the study of agriculture, and 
so forth. 
V 
Is it possible, under our conditions, for the active of the 
Young Communist League to combine practical work with a 
thorough study of Marxism and Leninism; and what must 
the Young Communist League organisations and the individual 
Young Communist Leaguers do in this direction? 
First of all, a brief remark about Marxism and Leninism. 
Such a formulation of the question might lead 
one to think that Marxism is one thing and Leninism 
another, that one can be a Leninist without being a 
Marxist. Such an idea cannot be regarded as correct. 
Leninism is not Leninıs teaching minus Marxism. Leninism 
is Marxism of the epoch of imperialism and proletarian 
revolutions. In other words, Leninism includes all 
that was taught by Marx plus Leninıs new contribution 
to the treasury of Marxism, and what necessarily 
follows from all that was taught by Marx (teaching on 
the dictatorship of the proletariat, the peasant question, 
the national question, the Party, the question of the 
social roots of reformism, the question of the principal 
deviations in communism, and so forth). It would 
be better, therefore, to formulate the question in such 
a way as to speak of Marxism or of Leninism (which 
fundamentally are the same) and not of Marxism and 
Leninism.

J. V. S T A L I N 254 
Secondly, there cannot be the slightest doubt that 
unless the practical work of the active of the Young 
Communist League is combined with theoretical training 
(³the study of Leninism²), no kind of intelligent communist 
work in the Young Communist League will 
be possible. Leninism is the generalisation of the experience 
of the revolutionary movement of the workers 
of all countries. That experience is the guiding star 
which lights up the path of the practical workers in their 
daily work and gives them direction. The practical workers 
cannot have confidence in their work or know whether 
i t is correct without having mastered that experience, 
at least to some degree. To grope, to work in the 
dark‹such is the lot of practical workers if they do not 
study Leninism, if they do not strive to master Leninism, 
if they refuse to combine their practical work with 
the necessary theoretical training. Therefore, the study 
of Leninism, Leninist education, is an essential condition 
for converting the present active of the Young 
Communist League into a genuine Leninist active, 
capable of educating the many millions of Young 
Communist Leaguers in the spirit of the dictatorship 
of the proletariat and of communism. 
But is such a combination of theory and practice 
possible under present conditions, when the active of the 
Young Communist League is so overworked? Yes, it 
is. It is difficult, that goes without saying; but it is 
quite possible, since it is so necessary, since a genuine 
Leninist active in the Young Communist League 
cannot be created without i t . We must not behave 
like weaklings who run away from difficulties and 
look for easy work. Difficulties exist to be combated

THE TASKS OF THE YOUNG COMMUNIST LEAGUE 255 
and overcome. The Bolsheviks would certainly have 
perished in their struggle against capitalism had they not 
learned to overcome difficulties. The Young Communist 
League would not be a Young Communist League if 
it were daunted by difficulties. The active of the Young 
Communist League has undertaken a great task. Therefore, 
it must find the strength to overcome all difficulties 
in the path to the goal. 
The patient and persevering study of Leninism‹such 
is the path the active of the Young Communist League 
must travel if it really wants to educate the millions 
of young people in the spirit of the proletarian 
revolution. 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, No. 133, 
October 29, 1925 
Signed: J. Stalin

SPEECH AT THE FUNERAL 
OF M. V. FRUNZE 
November 3, 1925 
Comrades, I cannot make a long speech. In my present 
state of mind I am not in the mood for that. I shall 
say, merely, that in Comrade Frunze we have lost one 
of the purest, most honest and most fearless revolutionaries 
of our time. 
In Comrade Frunze, the Party has lost one of its 
most faithful and most disciplined leaders. 
In Comrade Frunze, the Soviet Government has lost 
one of the boldest and wisest builders of our country and 
of our state. 
In Comrade Frunze, the Army has lost one of its most 
beloved and respected leaders and creators. 
That is why the Party so deeply mourns the loss of 
Comrade Frunze. 
Comrades, this year has been an affliction to us. It 
has torn a number of leading comrades from our midst. 
But it appears that this was not enough; still another 
sacrifice was needed. Perhaps it is indeed necessary that 
our old comrades should so easily and simply go down 
to their graves. Unfortunately, our young comrades do 
not so easily and by no means so simply come to the 
fore to take the place of the old ones.

SPEECH AT THE FUNERAL OF M. V. FRUNZE 257 
Let us believe and hope that the Party and the working 
class will take all measures to facilitate the forging 
of new cadres to take the place of the old. 
The Central Committee of the Russian Communist 
Party has instructed me to express the grief of the whole 
Party at the loss of Comrade Frunze. 
Let my short speech be the expression of that grief, 
which is boundless, and does not need long speeches. 
Pravda, No. 253, 
November 5, 1925

OCTOBER, LENIN, AND THE PROSPECTS 
OF OUR DEVELOPMENT 
I think that the period of preparation for October, 
eight years ago, and the present period, eight years after 
October, have a certain common feature notwithstanding 
the enormous difference between them. This common 
feature is that both periods mark turning points in the 
development of our revolution. Then, in 1917, the task 
was to make the transition from the power of the bourgeoisie 
to the power of the proletariat. Now, in 1925, the 
task is to make the transition from the present economy, 
which cannot, as a whole, be called socialist, to socialist 
economy, to the economy that must serve as the material 
basis of a socialist society. 
What was the situation in the period of October, 
when, on October 10, 1917, the Central Committee of 
our Party, under Leninıs leadership, took the decision 
to organise the armed uprising? 
Firstly, the war between the two European coalitions, 
the growth of the elements of a socialist revolution 
all over Europe, and the threat of a separate peace with 
Germany with the object of strangling the revolution in 
Russia. That was the external situation. Secondly, the 
fact that our Party had won a majority in the Soviets, 
peasant revolts throughout the country, the upsurge of

OCTOBER, LENIN, AND THE PROSPECTS OF OUR DEVELOPMENT 259 
the revolutionary movement at the front, the isolation 
of the bourgeois Kerensky Government and the threat 
of another Kornilov revolt. That was the internal situation. 
That was mainly a front of political struggle. 
At that time the turning point resulted in the victorious 
uprising of the workers and peasants and the establishment 
of the dictatorship of the proletariat. 
What is the situation now, eight years after the 
overthrow of bourgeois rule? 
Firstly, there are two camps in the world: the camp 
of capitalism, which is temporarily undergoing stabilisation, 
along with an obvious growth of the revolutionary 
movement in the colonial and dependent countries 
(China, Morocco, Syria, etc.); and the camp of 
socialism, the Soviet Union, the economic development 
of which is increasing and which is rallying around itself 
both the workers of the advanced countries and the 
oppressed peoples of the colonial and dependent countries‹
a circumstance which makes it possible to convert 
the brief ³respite² into a whole period of ³respite.² 
That is the external situation. Secondly, the increasing 
industrial and co-operative development of our country, 
the improvement in the material conditions of the workers 
and peasants, the undoubted improvement in the 
relations between the proletariat and the peasantry, and 
the enhanced prestige of the Party among the workers 
and peasants‹a circumstance which makes it possible to 
go ahead with the building of socialism in conjunction 
with the peasantry and under the leadership of the proletariat 
and its Party. That is the internal situation. 
That is mainly a front of economic construction.

J. V. S T A L I N 260 
Whether the present turning-point period will end 
with the victory of the proletariat depends primarily 
upon the successes we achieve in our work of construction, 
upon the successes achieved by the revolutionary 
movement in the West and East, upon the development 
of the contradictions that are corroding the capitalist 
world. 
Eight years ago, the task was to link the proletariat 
with the poorest strata of the peasantry, to neutralise 
the middle strata of the peasantry, to take advantage 
of the mortal struggle between the two imperialist 
coalitions and to overthrow the bourgeois government in 
Russia in order to organise the dictatorship of the proletariat, 
to get out of the imperialist war, to strengthen 
the ties with the proletarians of all countries and to 
promote the cause of the proletarian revolution in all 
countries. 
Now, eight years later, the task is, on the one hand, 
to link the proletariat and poor peasants with the middle 
peasants on the basis of a firm alliance between them, 
to ensure the leadership of the proletariat within that 
alliance, to accelerate the development and re-equipment 
of our industry, to draw the vast masses of the peasantry 
into the co-operatives and thereby ensure the victory 
of the socialist core of our economy over the capitalist 
elements; on the other hand, the task is to establish 
an alliance both with the proletarians of all countries 
and with the colonial peoples of the oppressed countries 
in order to help the revolutionary proletariat in its 
struggle for victory over capitalism. 
The neutralisation of the middle peasants is not 
enough now. The task now is to establish a firm alliance

OCTOBER, LENIN, AND THE PROSPECTS OF OUR DEVELOPMENT 261 
with the middle peasants in order to establish correct 
relations between the proletariat and the peasantry; for 
if Leninıs thesis that ³ten or twenty years of correct relations 
with the peasantry, and victory on a world scale 
is assured²46* is true, then Leninıs words ³. . . to advance 
now as an immeasurably wider and larger mass, and only 
together with the peasantry²47* are equally true. 
The simple development of state industry is not 
enough now. Still less is the pre-war level of industry 
enough. The task now is to push forward the re-equipment 
of our state industry and to expand it further 
on a new technical basis; for our state industry is 
a socialist type of industry, it is the principal base of 
the proletarian dictatorship in our country. Without 
such a base it is impossible to talk of transforming our 
country into an industrial country, of converting NEP 
Russia into socialist Russia. 
The simple development of the co-operatives in the 
countryside is not enough now. The task now is to draw 
the vast masses of the peasantry into the co-operatives and 
to implant a co-operative communal life in the countryside; 
for under the dictatorship of the proletariat, and with 
the existence of a socialist type of industry, co-operation 
is the principal means by which the peasantry can be 
drawn into the work of building socialism. 
Such, in general, are the necessary conditions for 
victory in building socialism in our country. 
Eight years ago, the Party achieved victory over 
bourgeois rule because it was able to display Leninist 
firmness in carrying out the tasks of the proletariat in 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 262 
spite of incredible difficulties, in spite of the wavering 
of some of its detachments. 
Today, eight years later, the Party has every possibility 
of ensuring victory over the capitalist elements 
in our national economy, provided it is able to display 
the old, Leninist firmness in carrying out its tasks in 
spite of the host of difficulties that confront it, in spite 
of the possible wavering of some of its detachments. 
Leninist firmness in carrying out the immediate 
tasks of the proletariat is also one of the essential conditions 
for victory in building socialism. 
Pravda, No. 255, 
November 7, 1925 
Signed: J. Stalin

A LETTER TO THE PRESIDIUM 
OF THE TWENTY-SECOND LENINGRAD 
GUBERNIA PARTY CONFERENCE48 
Dear comrades, 
Information has reached the Secretariat of the Central 
Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) to the effect that certain 
members of your conference are of the opinion that 
the resolution adopted by the Fourteenth Moscow Party 
Conference on the Central Committeeıs report49 is directed 
against the Leningrad organisation, and that those 
comrades are calling for an open fight by the Leningrad 
delegation at the Party congress. If that information is 
correct, I consider it my duty to declare to you the following. 
At the Moscow conference a resolution based on principle 
was adopted on questions of principle. The stenographic 
reports of the speeches delivered at the Moscow 
conference and at the district conferences, as well as the 
above-mentioned resolution, can easily convince one that 
nobody in Moscow thought either of discrediting the 
Leningrad organisation or of calling for a fight against 
it. In view of this, it seems to me that the speeches delivered 
by Sarkis, Safarov and others at the district conferences 
and repeated at your gubernia conference give 
cause for alarm. Particularly alarming, it seems to me, 
are the speeches made during the last few days by

J. V. S T A L I N 264 
certain comrades at your conference calling for an open 
fight at the Party congress. Under present conditions, 
unity among the Leninists, even if there is some disagreement 
between them on certain questions, is more necessary 
than ever before. Unity among the Leninists can be 
not only maintained, but also strengthened if you firmly 
wish it. The Leningrad organisation is and must remain 
one of our Partyıs most important supports. 
I consider it my duty to inform you of all this as a 
member of the presidium of your conference. 
Member of the Presidium of 
the conference of the Leningrad 
organisation 
J. Stalin 
December 8, 1925 
The magazine Krasnaya Letopis, 
No. 1 (58), 1934

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS 
OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)50 
December 18-31, 1925 
Pravda, Nos. 291, 292 and 296, 
December 20, 22, and 29, 1925


POLITICAL REPORT 
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
December 18 
Comrades, during the past two weeks you have had 
an opportunity of hearing reports on the activities of 
the C.C. between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Congresses 
from a number of members of the C.C. and 
members of the Political Bureau; extensive reports 
which, fundamentally, were certainly correct. I believe 
that there would hardly be any point in repeating those 
reports. I think that this circumstance eases my task at 
the present moment, and in view of this I consider it expedient 
to confine myself to presenting a number of problems 
connected with the activities of the C.C. of our 
Party between the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Congresses. 
Usually, the report of the C.C. begins with the external 
situation. I am not going to violate that custom. I, 
too, will begin with the external situation. 
I 
THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION 
The basic and new feature, the decisive feature that 
has affected all the events in the sphere of foreign relations 
during this period, is the fact that a certain temporary 
equilibrium of forces has been established between 
our country, which is building socialism, and the

J. V. S T A L I N 268 
countries of the capitalist world, an equilibrium which 
has determined the present period of ³peaceful co-existence² 
between the Land of Soviets and the capitalist countries. 
What we at one time regarded as a brief respite after 
the war has become a whole period of respite. Hence a certain 
equilibrium of forces and a certain period of ³peaceful 
co-existence² between the bourgeois world and the 
proletarian world. 
At the bottom of all this lies an internal weakness, 
the weakness and infirmity of world capitalism, on the 
one hand, and the growth of the workersı revolutionary 
movement in general, and particularly the growth of 
strength in our country, the Land of Soviets, on the other. 
What lies at the bottom of this weakness of the capitalist 
world? 
At the bottom of this weakness lie the contradictions 
which capitalism cannot overcome, and within the 
framework of which the entire international situation is 
taking shape‹contradictions which the capitalist countries 
cannot overcome, and which can be overcome only 
in the course of development of the proletarian revolution 
in the West. 
What are these contradictions? They can be reduced 
to five groups. 
The first group of contradictions are those between 
the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in the capitalist 
countries. 
The second group of contradictions are those between 
imperialism and the liberation movement in the colonies 
and dependent countries. 
The third group of contradictions are those that are 
developing, and cannot but develop, between the

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 269 
countries that were victorious in the imperialist war 
and those that were defeated. 
The fourth group of contradictions are those that are 
developing, and cannot but develop, among the victor 
countries themselves. 
And the fifth group of contradictions are those 
that are developing between the Land of Soviets and the 
countries of capitalism as a whole. 
Such are the five principal groups of contradictions, 
within the framework of which the development of our 
international position is proceeding. 
Comrades, unless we briefly examine the nature and 
the growth of these contradictions, we shall not be able 
to understand the present international position of our 
country. Therefore, a brief review of these contradictions 
must necessarily form part of my report. 
1. The Stabilisation of Capitalism 
And so, let us begin with the first series of contradictions, 
those between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie in 
the capitalist countries. In this sphere, the basic facts 
may be reduced to the following. 
Firstly. Capitalism i s emerging, or has already 
emerged, from the chaos in production, trade and in the 
sphere of finance which set in, and in which it found itself, 
after the war. The Party called this the partial, 
or temporary, stabilisation of capitalism. What does 
that mean? It means that the production and trade of the 
capitalist countries, which had become terribly low at 
one time in the period of the post-war crisis (I have in 
mind the years 1919-20), have begun to make progress,

J. V. S T A L I N 270 
and the political power of the bourgeoisie has begun 
to become more or less consolidated. It means that 
capitalism has temporarily extricated itself from the 
chaos in which it found itself after the war. 
Here are the figures, if we take Europe. 
Production in all the advanced countries of Europe 
is either making progress compared with 1919, is growing, 
reaching in some places 80-90 per cent of the pre-war 
level, or is keeping on one level. Only in Britain are 
there some branches of production which have not yet 
straightened themselves out. In the main, if we take 
Europe as a whole, production and trade are making 
progress, although they have not yet reached the prewar 
level. If we take the production of grain, we find 
that Britain has reached 80-85 per cent of the pre-war 
level, France 83 per cent, and Germany 68 per cent. In 
Germany, the production of grain is rising very slowly. 
In France it is not rising, and in Britain it is sinking. All 
this is compensated for by imports of grain from America. 
Coal output in Britain in 1925 amounts to 90 per 
cent of the pre-war level, in France to 107 per cent of 
the pre-war level, in Germany to 93 per cent. Steel production 
in Britain amounts to 98 per cent of the pre-war 
level, in France to 102 per cent, in Germany to 78 per 
cent. Consumption of raw cotton in Britain is equal to 
82 per cent of the pre-war level, in France to 83 per cent, 
in Germany to 81 per cent. Britainıs foreign trade shows 
an unfavourable balance and amounts to 94 per cent of 
pre-war; that of Germany is slightly higher than in 1919 
and also shows an unfavourable balance; that of France 
is now higher than the pre-war level‹102 per cent. The 
level of European trade as a whole, taking 1921, was

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 271 
63 per cent of the pre-war level, but now, in 1925, it has 
reached 82 per cent of that level. The budgets of these 
countries balance in one way or another, but the balance 
is obtained by imposing a frightful burden of taxation 
upon the population. There is a fluctuation in the currency 
in some countries, but, in general, the former chaos 
is not observed. 
The general picture is that the post-war economic 
crisis in Europe is passing away, production and trade 
are approaching the pre-war level. One of the European 
countries, France, has already surpassed the pre-war 
level in the sphere of trade and production, while another 
European country‹I refer to Britain‹still remains at 
one and the same, or almost one and the same, level 
without reaching the pre-war level. 
Secondly. Instead of the period of flow of the revolutionary 
tide that we observed in Europe in the years 
of the post-war crisis, we now see a period of ebb. This 
means that the question of taking power, of the proletariat 
capturing power any day, is not now on the order 
of the day in Europe. The period of rising revolutionary 
tide, when the movement pushes forward and upward 
and the Partyıs slogans cannot keep pace with the movement, 
as was the case in our country, for example, in 
1905 or in 1917‹that period of rising tide still lies 
ahead. At present, however, it does not exist; instead, 
there is a period of temporary ebb, a period in which 
the proletariat is accumulating forces, a period which is 
giving big results as regards indicating new forms of the 
movement, as regards the existence and growth of a mass 
movement under the banner of the struggle for tradeunion 
unity, as regards establishing and strengthening

J. V. S T A L I N 272 
ties between the working-class movement in the West 
and the working-class movement in the Soviet Union, 
as regards a swing to the Left‹the British workingclass 
movement for example‹as regards the disintegration 
of Amsterdam, the deep fissure in it, etc., etc. I 
repeat, we are in a period of accumulation of forces, 
which is of great importance for future revolutionary 
actions. It is the period in which the conquest of 
the mass organisations of the proletariat (the trade unions, 
etc.) and the ³removal from their posts² of the 
Social-Democratic leaders becomes the slogan of the 
communist movement, as was the case in our country 
in 1911-12. 
Thirdly. The centre of financial power in the capitalist 
world, the centre of the financial exploitation of 
the whole world, has shifted from Europe to America. 
Formerly, France, Germany and Britain usually formed 
the centre of the financial exploitation of the world. 
That cannot be said now without special reservations. 
Now, the centre of the financial exploitation of the world 
is mainly the United States of America. That country is 
growing in every respect: as regards production, as regards 
trade, and as regards accumulation. I shall quote 
some figures. The production of grain in North America 
has risen above the pre-war level; it is now 104 per cent 
of that level. Coal output has reached 90 per cent of the 
pre-war level, but the deficit is compensated for by an 
enormous increase in the output of oil. And it must be 
pointed out that the oil output of America amounts to 
70 per cent of world output. Steel production has risen 
to 147 per cent‹47 per cent above the pre-war level. 
The national income amounts to 130 per cent of pre-war‹

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 273 
exceeding the pre-war level by 30 per cent. Foreign trade 
has reached 143 per cent of the pre-war level and 
has an enormous favourable balance in relation to the European 
countries. Of the total world gold reserve amounting 
to 9,000 millions, about 5,000 millions are in America. 
United States currency is the most stable of all currencies. 
As regards export of capital, America, at the present 
time, is almost the only country that is exporting 
capital in ever-growing proportions. The amount exported 
by France and Germany is terribly small; Britain has 
also considerably reduced her export of capital. 
Fourthly. The temporary stabilisation of European 
capitalism to which I referred above has been achieved 
mainly with the aid of American capital, and at the 
price of the financial subordination of Western Europe 
to America. To prove this, it is sufficient to quote the 
figure of Europeıs state indebtedness to America. That 
figure amounts to no less than 26,000 million rubles. 
This is apart from private debts to America, i.e., American 
investments in European enterprises, amounting for 
Europe to the sum of several thousand millions. What 
does that show? It shows that Europe has begun to get 
on its feet, more or less, as a result of the influx of capital 
from America (and partly from Britain). At what 
price? At the price of Europeıs financial subordination 
to America. 
Fifthly. In view of this, in order to be able to pay 
interest and principal, Europe is forced to increase the 
burden of taxation on the population, to worsen the conditions 
of the workers. That is precisely what is happening 
now in the European countries. Already, before the 
payment of principal and interest has properly started,

J. V. S T A L I N 274 
in Britain, for example, the burden of taxation as a percentage 
of the total national income has increased from 
11 per cent (in 1913) to 23 per cent in 1924; in France 
it has increased from 13 per cent of the national income 
to 21 per cent, and in Italy‹from 13 per cent to 19 per 
cent. Needless to say, in the very near future the burden 
of taxation will grow still heavier. In view of this, the 
material conditions of the working people in Europe, 
and primarily those of the working class, will certainly 
deteriorate and the working class will inevitably become 
revolutionised. Symptoms of this revolutionisation are 
already to be observed in Britain and in other European 
countries. I have in mind the definite swing to the Left 
of the working class in Europe. 
Such are the principal facts which show that the 
temporary stabilisation of capitalism which Europe has 
achieved is a putrid stabilisation that has grown up on 
putrid soil. 
It is very likely‹I do not exclude the possibility‹ 
that production and trade in Europe will reach the prewar 
level. But that does not mean that capitalism will 
thereby reach the degree of stability it possessed before 
the war. That degree of stability it will never reach again. 
Why? Because, firstly, Europe has purchased her temporary 
stability at the price of financial subordination to 
America, which is leading to a colossal increase in the 
burden of taxation, to the inevitable deterioration of 
the conditions of the workers, and to the revolutionisation 
of the European countries; secondly, because of a 
number of other reasons‹about which I will speak later‹
that make the present stabilisation undurable, unstable.

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 275 
The general conclusion, if we sum up all that I have 
just said about the analysis of the first series of contradictions‹
the general conclusion is that the circle of major 
states exploiting the world has shrunk to an extreme 
degree compared with the period before the war. Formerly, 
the chief exploiters were Britain, France, Germany, 
and partly America; that circle has now shrunk 
to an extreme degree. Today, the major financial exploiters 
of the world, and hence its major creditors, are North 
America and to some extent her assistant‹Britain. 
That does not mean that Europe has sunk to the position 
of a colony. The European countries, while continuing 
to exploit their colonies, have themselves now fallen 
into a state of financial subordination to America 
and, as a consequence, are in their turn being exploited, 
and will continue to be exploited by America. In that 
sense, the circle of major states which exploit the world 
financially has shrunk to a minimum, whereas the 
circle of exploited countries has expanded. 
That is one of the reasons for the instability andinternal 
weakness of the present stabilisation of capitalism. 
2. Imperialism, the Colonies 
and Semi-Colonies 
Let us pass to the second series of contradictions, 
those between the imperialist countries and the colonial 
countries. 
The basic facts in this sphere are: the development 
and growth of industry and of the proletariat in the 
colonies, especially during and after the war; the growth

J. V. S T A L I N 276 
of culture in general, and of the national intelligentsia 
in particular, in these countries; the growth of the national-
revolutionary movement in the colonies and the crisis 
in the world domination of imperialism in general; 
the struggle for liberation waged by India and Egypt 
against British imperialism; the war for liberation waged 
by Syria and Morocco against French imperialism; 
Chinaıs struggle for liberation against Anglo-Japanese- 
American imperialism, etc.; the growth of the workingclass 
movement in India and China and the increasingly 
important role of the working class in these countries in 
the national-revolutionary movement. 
From this it follows that the Great Powers are faced 
with the danger of losing their chief rear, i.e., the 
colonies. Here, the stabilisation of capitalism is in a 
bad way; for the revolutionary movement in the oppressed 
countries, growing step by step, is beginning in 
some places to assume the form of open war against imperialism 
(Morocco, Syria, China), while imperialism is 
obviously unable to cope with the task of curbing ³its² 
colonies. 
It is said‹especially by bourgeois writers‹that the 
Bolsheviks are to blame for the growing crisis in the 
colonies. I must say that they do us too much honour by 
blaming us for that. Unfortunately, we are not yet strong 
enough to render a l l the colonial countries direct 
assistance in securing their liberation. It is necessary 
to delve deeper to find the cause. The cause is, 
apart from everything else, that the European states, 
being obliged to pay interest on debts to America, are 
compelled to intensify oppression and exploitation in 
the colonies and dependent countries, and this cannot

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 277 
but lead to an intensification of the crisis and of the revolutionary 
movement in these countries. 
All this goes to show that, in this sphere, the affairs 
of world imperialism are more than in a bad way. Whereas, 
in the sphere of the first series of contradictions, 
European capitalism has become partly stabilised and 
the question of the proletariat seizing power any day 
does not arise for the time being, in the colonies the 
crisis has reached a climax and the question of expelling 
the imperialists from a number of colonies is on the order 
of the day.
3. Victors and Vanquished 
I pass to the third series of contradictions, those 
between the victor countries and the defeated countries. 
The basic facts in this sphere are the following. 
Firstly, after the Versailles Peace, Europe found herself 
split up into two camps‹the camp of the vanquished 
(Germany, Austria and other countries) and the camp of 
the victors (the Entente plus America). Secondly, the 
circumstance must be noted that the victors, who had 
previously tried to strangle the defeated countries by 
means of occupation (I remind you of the Ruhr), 
have abandoned this line and have adopted a different 
method, the method of financial exploitation‹of Germany 
in the first place, and of Austria in the second 
place. This new method finds expression in the Dawes 
Plan, the unfavourable results of which are only now 
making themselves felt. Thirdly, the Locarno Conference,
51 which was supposed to have eliminated all the

J. V. S T A L I N 278 
contradictions between the victors and the vanquished, 
but which, actually, in spite of all the hullabaloo around 
this question, did not eliminate any of the contradictions 
but only aggravated them. 
The intention of the Dawes Plan is that Germany must 
pay the Entente no less than some 130,000 million gold 
marks in several instalments. The results of the Dawes 
Plan are already making themselves felt in the deterioration 
of Germanyıs economic position, in the bankruptcy 
of a whole group of enterprises, in growing unemployment, 
etc. The Dawes Plan, which was drawn up in America, 
is as follows: Europe is to pay her debts to America 
at the expense of Germany, who is obliged to pay Europe 
reparations; but as Germany is unable to pump this sum 
out of a vacuum, she must be given a number of free 
markets, not yet occupied by other capitalist countries, 
from which she could gain fresh strength and fresh blood 
for the reparation payments. In addition to a number of 
unimportant markets, America has in view our Russian 
markets. According to the Dawes Plan, they are to be 
placed at Germanyıs disposal in order that she may be 
able to squeeze something out of them and have the 
wherewithal to make reparation payments to Europe, 
which, in its turn, must make payments to America 
on account of state debts. The whole plan i s well 
constructed, but i t reckons without the host, for i t 
means for the German people a double yoke‹the 
yoke of the German bourgeoisie on the German proletariat, 
and the yoke of foreign capital on the whole 
German people. To say that this double yoke will 
have no effect upon the German people would be a mistake. 
That is why I think that in this respect the Dawes

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 279 
Plan is fraught with an inevitable revolution in Germany. 
It was created for the pacification of Germany,- 
but it, the Dawes Plan, must inevitably lead to a revolution 
in Germany. The second part of this plan, which 
says that Germany must squeeze money out of the Russian 
markets for the benefit of Europe, is also a decision 
that reckons without the host. Why? Because, we 
have not the least desire to be converted into an 
agrarian country for the benefit of any other country 
whatsoever, including Germany. We ourselves will manufacture 
machinery and other means of production. Therefore, 
to reckon that we shall agree to convert our Motherland 
into an agrarian country for the benefit of Germany, 
means reckoning without the host. In this respect, 
the Dawes Plan stands on feet of clay. 
As for Locarno, it is merely a continuation of Versailles, 
and the only object it can have is to preserve the 
³status quo,² as they say in the language of diplomacy, 
i.e., to preserve the existing order of things, under which 
Germany is the defeated country and the Entente 
the victor. The Locarno Conference gives this order of 
things juridical sanction in the sense that Germanyıs 
new frontiers are preserved to the advantage of Poland, 
are preserved to the advantage of France; that Germany 
loses her colonies, and at the same time, pinioned and 
forced into a Procrustean bed, must take all measures 
to pump out 130,000 million gold marks. To believe 
that Germany, which is growing and pushing forward, 
will resign herself to this situation means counting on 
a miracle. If, in the past, after the Franco-Prussian War, 
the question of Alsace-Lorraine, one of the key points 
of the contradictions of that time, served as one of the

J. V. S T A L I N 280 
gravest causes of the imperialist war, what guarantee is 
there that the Versailles Peace and its continuation, 
Locarno, which legalise and give juridical sanction to 
Germanyıs loss of Silesia, the Danzig Corridor and Danzig; 
the Ukraineıs loss of Galicia and Western Volhynia; 
Byelorussiaıs loss of her western territory; Lithuaniaıs 
loss of Vilna, etc.‹what guarantee is there that this 
treaty, which has carved up a number of states and has 
created a number of key points of contradiction, will not 
share the fate of the old Franco-Prussian Treaty which, 
after the Franco-Prussian War, tore Alsace-Lorraine 
from France? 
There is no such guarantee, nor can there be. 
If the Dawes Plan is fraught with a revolution in 
Germany, Locarno is fraught with a new war in Europe. 
The British Conservatives think that they can both 
maintain the ³status quo² against Germany and use 
Germany against the Soviet Union. Are they not wanting 
too much? 
There is talk about pacifism, there is talk about peace 
among the states of Europe. Briand and Chamberlain 
embrace, Stresemann lavishes compliments on Britain. 
That is all nonsense. We know from the history of 
Europe that every time treaties were concluded about 
the disposition of forces for a new war, those treaties 
were called peace treaties. Treaties were concluded 
that determined the elements of the subsequent war, 
and the conclusion of such treaties was always accompanied 
by a hullabaloo and clamour about peace. False 
bards of peace were always found on those occasions. I 
recall facts from the history of the period after the Franco- 
Prussian War, when Germany was the victor, when France

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 281 
was the vanquished, when Bismarck did everything to 
maintain the ³status quo,² i.e., the order of things that 
was created after Germanyıs victorious war against France. 
At that time Bismarck stood for peace, because that 
peace gave him a whole series of privileges over France. 
France, too, stood for peace, at all events at the beginning, 
until she had recovered from the unsuccessful war. Well, 
in that period, when everybody was talking about peace 
and the false bards were lauding Bismarckıs peaceful 
intentions, Germany and Austria concluded an agreement, 
an absolutely peaceful and absolutely pacifist 
agreement, which later served as one of the bases of the 
subsequent imperialist war. I am speaking of the agreement 
between Austria and Germany in 1879. Against 
whom was that agreement directed? Against Russia and 
France. What did that agreement say? Listen: 
³Whereas close collaboration between Germany and 
Austria threatens nobody and is calculated to consolidate 
peace in Europe on the principles laid down in the 
Berlin Treaty, their Majesties, i.e., the two Sovereigns, 
have resolved to conclude a peace alliance and a mutual 
agreement.² 
Do you hear: close collaboration between Germany 
and Austria for the sake of peace in Europe. That agreement 
was treated as a ³peace alliance,² nevertheless all 
historians agree that the agreement served as a direct 
preparation for the imperialist war of 1914. A consequence 
of that agreement for peace in Europe, but actually 
for war in Europe, was another agreement, the agreement 
between Russia and France of 1891-93‹also for 
peace‹for nothing else! What did that agreement say? 
It said:

J. V. S T A L I N 282 
³France and Russia, animated by an equal desire 
to maintain peace, have reached the following agreement.² 
What agreement‹was not openly stated at that time. 
But the secret text of the agreement said: in the event 
of war, Russia must put up against Germany 700,000 
troops and France (I think) 1,300,000. 
Both these agreements were officially called agreements 
for peace, friendship and tranquillity throughout 
Europe. 
To crown all this, six years later, in 1899, the Hague 
Peace Conference assembled and the question of reduction 
of armaments was brought up there. That was at the 
time when, on the basis of the agreement between France 
and Russia, French General Staff officers came to Russia 
to draw up plans for troop movements in the event 
of war, and Russian General Staff officers went to France 
to draw up plans in conjunction with the French generals 
for future military operations against Germany. That 
was at the time when the General Staffs of Germany 
and Austria were drawing up a plan and drafting the 
terms on which Austria and Germany were jointly to 
attack their neighbours in the West and in the East. 
At that very time (all this, of course, was done on the 
quiet, behind the scenes) the Hague Conference of 1899 
assembled, and there peace was proclaimed and a lot 
of hypocritical noise was raised about reducing armaments. 
There you have an example of the matchless hypocrisy 
of bourgeois diplomacy, when by shouting and singing 
about peace they try to cover up preparations for a 
new war.

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 283 
Have we any grounds, after this, for believing the 
songs about the League of Nations and Locarno? Of 
course not. That is why we can believe neither Chamberlain 
and Briand when they embrace, nor Stresemann 
when he is lavish with his compliments. That is why we 
think that Locarno is a plan for the disposition of forces 
for a new war and not for peace. 
Interesting is the role played by the Second International 
in this question. It is the leaders of the Second 
International who most of all are leaping and dancing, 
assuring the workers that Locarno is an instrument of 
peace and the League of Nations an ark of peace, that the 
Bolsheviks refuse to join the League of Nations because 
they are opposed to peace, etc. What does all this noise 
made by the Second International amount to, taking 
into account what has been said above and, in particular, 
the historical information that I cited about the conclusion 
after the Franco-Prussian War of a whole series 
of agreements that were called peace agreements, but 
which actually proved to be war agreements? What does 
the present position of the Second International in relation 
to Locarno show? That the Second International is 
not only an organisation for the bourgeois corruption of 
the working class, but also an organisation for the moral 
justification of all the injustices of the Versailles Peace; 
that the Second International is a subsidiary of the Entente, 
an organisation whose function is, by its activities 
and its clamour in support of Locarno and the 
League of Nations, to give moral justification to all the 
injustices and all the oppression that have been created 
by the Versailles-Locarno regime.

J. V. S T A L I N 284 
4. The Contradictions between the Victor 
Countries 
I pass to the fourth series of contradictions, to those 
between the victor countries. The basic facts here are 
that, in spite of the existence of a sort of bloc between 
America and Britain, a bloc founded on an agreement 
between America and Britain against the annulment 
of Allied debts, in spite of this bloc, I say, the conflict 
of interests between Britain and America is not 
being allayed, on the contrary, it is becoming more intense. 
One of the principal problems now facing the world 
powers is the problem of oil. If, for example, we take 
America, we find that she produces about 70 per cent of 
the world output of oil and accounts for over 60 per cent 
of total world consumption. Well, it is just in this sphere, 
which is the principal nerve of the entire economic and 
military activities of the world powers, that America 
everywhere and always encounters opposition from Britain. 
If we take the two world oil companies‹Standard 
Oil and Royal Dutch-Shell, the former representing America 
and the latter Britain‹we find that the struggle 
between those companies is going on in all parts of the 
world, wherever oil is obtainable. It is a struggle between 
America and Britain. For the problem of oil is a vital 
one; because who will command in the next war depends 
on who will have most oil. Who will command world industry 
and trade depends on who will have most oil. Now 
that the fleets of the advanced countries are passing over 
to oil propulsion, oil is the vital nerve of the struggle 
among the world states for supremacy both in peace 
and in war. It is precisely in this sphere that the struggle

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 285 
between the British oil companies and the American oil 
companies is a mortal one, not always coming into 
the open, it is true, but always going on and smouldering, 
as is evident from the history of the negotiations and 
from the history of the clashes between Britain and America 
on this ground. It is sufficient to recall the series of 
Notes of Hughes, when he was United States Secretary 
of State, directed against Britain on the oil question. 
The struggle is going on in South America, in Persia, in 
Europe, in those districts of Rumania and Galicia where 
oil is to be found, in all parts of the world, sometimes in 
a concealed and sometimes in an open form. That is apart 
from such a fact of no little importance as the conflict of 
interests between Britain and America in China. You no 
doubt know that the struggle there is a concealed one, 
and that very often America, operating in a more flexible 
manner and refraining from the crude colonial methods 
which the British lords have not yet abandoned, succeeds 
in putting a spoke in Britainıs wheel in China in order 
to oust Britain and pave the way for herself in China. Obviously, 
Britain cannot look upon this with indifference. 
I shall not dwell at length on the opposition of interests 
between France and Britain arising from the struggle 
for supremacy on the European continent. That is a 
generally known fact. It is also clear that the conflict 
of interests between Britain and France takes place not 
only over the question of hegemony on the continent, 
but also in the colonies. Information has got into the press 
that the war in Syria and Morocco against French imperialism 
was organised not without Britainıs participation. 
I have no documents, but I think that this information 
is not altogether groundless.

J. V. S T A L I N 286 
Nor shall I dwell on the opposition of interests between 
America and Japan‹that, too, is common knowledge. 
It is enough to recall the recent American naval 
manoeuvres in the Pacific and the Japanese naval 
manoeuvres to understand why they took place. 
Lastly, I must mention a fact which must surprise 
everybody, namely, the colossal growth of armaments 
in the victor countries. I am speaking about the victors, 
about the contradictions among the victor states. These 
victors are called allies. True, America does not belong 
to the Entente, but she fought in alliance with it 
against Germany. Well, those allies are now arming themselves 
to the utmost. Against whom are they arming? In 
the past, when the Entente countries piled up armaments, 
they usually referred to Germany, saying that she was 
armed to the teeth and constituted a danger to world 
peace, owing to which it was necessary to arm for defence. 
But what about now? Germany as an armed force no longer 
exists; she has been disarmed. Nevertheless, the growth 
of armaments in the victor countries is proceeding as 
never before. How, for example, is the monstrous growth 
of the air force in France to be explained? How is the 
monstrous growth of armaments, and especially of the 
navy, in Britain to be explained? How is the monstrous 
growth of the navies of America and Japan to be explained? 
What and whom are Messieurs the ³Allies,² who 
jointly defeated Germany and disarmed her, afraid 
of? What are they afraid of, and why are they arming? 
And where is the pacifism of the Second International, 
which shouts about peace and does not see‹pretends 
that it does not see‹that the ³Allies,² who have officially 
called each other friends, are feverishly arming against

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 287 
a ³non-existent² enemy? What have the League of 
Nations and the Second International done to put a 
stop to this furious growth of armaments? Donıt they 
know that with the growth of armaments ³the guns begin 
to go off of their own accord²? Donıt expect a reply from 
the League of Nations and the Second International. 
The point here is that the conflict of interests among the 
victor countries is growing and becoming more intense, 
that a collision among them is becoming inevitable, and, 
in anticipation of a new war, they are arming with might 
and main. I shall not be exaggerating if I say that in 
this case we have not a friendly peace among the victor 
countries, but an armed peace, a state of armed peace 
that is fraught with war. What is now going on in the 
victor countries reminds us very much of the situation 
that prevailed before the war of 1914‹a state of armed 
peace. 
The rulers of Europe are now trying to cover up 
this fact with clamour about pacifism. But I have already 
said what this pacifism is worth and what value 
should be attached to it. The Bolsheviks have been demanding 
disarmament ever since the time of Genoa.52 Why 
do not the Second International and all the others who 
are chattering about pacifism support our proposal? 
This circumstance shows once again that the stabilisation, 
the temporary, partial stabilisation, that Europe 
has achieved at the price of its own enslavement, is not 
lasting, for the contradictions between the victor countries 
are growing and becoming more intense, not to speak 
of the contradictions between the victor countries and 
the defeated countries.

J. V. S T A L I N 288 
5. The Capitalist World 
and the Soviet Union 
I pass to the fifth series of contradictions, those 
between the Soviet Union and the capitalist world. 
The basic fact in this sphere is that an all-embracing 
world capitalism no longer exists. After the Land of 
Soviets came into being, after the old Russia was transformed 
into the Soviet Union, an all-embracing world 
capitalism ceased to exist. The world split up into two 
camps: the camp of imperialism and the camp of the 
struggle against imperialism. That is the first point that 
must be noted. 
The second point that must be noted in this sphere is 
that two major countries‹Britain and America, as an 
Anglo-American alliance‹are coming to stand at the 
head of the capitalist countries. Our country‹the Soviet 
Union‹is coming to stand at the head of those discontented 
with imperialism and who are engaged in 
mortal struggle against it. 
The third point is that two major, but opposite, 
centres of attraction are being created and, in conformity 
with this, two lines of attraction towards those centres 
all over the world: Britain and America‹for the bourgeois 
governments, and the Soviet Union‹for the workers of the 
West and for the revolutionaries of the East. The power 
of attraction of Britain and America lies in their wealth; 
credits can be obtained there. The power of attraction of the 
Soviet Union lies in its revolutionary experience, its experience 
in the struggle for the emancipation of the workers 
from capitalism and of the oppressed peoples from im

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 289 
perialism. I am speaking of the attraction of the workers 
of Europe and of the revolutionaries of the East towards 
our country. You know what a visit to our country means 
to a European worker or to a revolutionary from an oppressed 
country, how they make pilgrimages to our country, 
and what an attraction our country has for all that 
is honest and revolutionary all over the world. 
Two camps, two centres of attraction. 
The fourth point is that in the other camp, the camp 
of capitalism, there is no unity of interests and no solidarity; 
that what reigns there is a conflict of interests, disintegration, 
a struggle between victors and vanquished, a 
struggle among the victors themselves, a struggle among 
all the imperialist countries for colonies, for profits; and 
that, because of all this, stabilisation in that camp cannot 
be lasting. On the other hand, in our country there is a 
healthy process of stabilisation, which is gaining strength, 
our economy is growing, our socialist construction is 
growing, and in the whole of our camp all the discontented 
elements and strata of both the West and the 
East are gradually and steadily rallying around the 
proletariat of our country, rallying around the Soviet 
Union. 
Over there, in the camp of capitalism, there is discord 
and disintegration. Over here, in the camp of socialism, 
there is solidarity and an ever-increasing unity of 
interests against the common enemy‹against imperialism. 
Such are the basic facts which I wanted to point out 
in the sphere of the fifth series of contradictions‹the 
contradictions between the capitalist world and the Soviet 
world.

J. V. S T A L I N 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
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290 
I should like to dwell particularly on the fact which 
I have called the attraction of the revolutionary and 
socialist elements of the whole world towards the proletariat 
of our country. I have in mind the workersı delegations 
which come to our country, delegations which 
carefully probe every detail of our work of construction 
in order to convince themselves that we are able not 
only to destroy, but also to build the new. What is the 
significance of these workersı delegations‹this pilgrimage 
of workers to our country‹delegations which today 
reflect an entire stage in the development of the workingclass 
movement in the West? You have heard how leaders 
of the Soviet state met a British workersı delegation, 
and a German workersı delegation. Have you noticed 
that our comrades, directors of various spheres of administration, 
not only provided the representatives of the 
workersı delegations with information, but actually rendered 
account to them? I was not in Moscow at the time, I 
was away, but I read the newspapers, and I read that 
Comrade Dzerzhinsky, head of the Supreme Council of 
National Economy, not merely gave the German workersı 
delegation information, but rendered account to them. 
That is something new and special in our life, and special 
attention should be paid to it. I have read that the directors 
of our oil industry‹Kosior in Grozny and Serebrovsky 
in Baku‹not merely gave the workersı delegates 
information as is done to tourists, but rendered account to 
these workersı delegations as if to a higher supervising 
authority. I have read that all our higher institutions, the 
Council of Peopleıs Commissars and the Central Executive 
Committee of Soviets, right down to the local Executive 
Committees of Soviets, were prepared to render

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 291 
account to the workersı delegations, whose visits to us 
they regarded as the friendly, fraternal supervision by 
the working class of the West of our work of construction, 
of our workersı state. 
What do all those facts show? They show two things. 
Firstly, that the working class of Europe, at all events 
the revolutionary part of the working class of Europe, 
regards our state as its own child, that the working class 
sends its delegations to our country not out of curiosity, 
but in order to see how things are here, and what is being 
done; for, evidently, they regard themselves as being 
morally responsible for everything that we are building 
here. Secondly, that the revolutionary part of the proletariat 
of Europe, having adopted our state, and regarding 
it as its child, is ready to defend it and to fight 
for it if need be. Name another state, even the most democratic, 
that would dare to submit to fraternal supervision 
by workersı delegations from other countries! You cannot 
name such a state, because there is no such state in 
the world. Only our state, the workersı and peasantsı 
state, is capable of taking such a step. But, in placing 
the utmost confidence in the workersı delegations, our 
country thereby wins the utmost confidence of the working 
class of Europe. And that confidence is more valuable 
to us than any loans, because the workersı confidence 
in our state is the fundamental antidote to imperialism 
and its interventionist machinations. 
That is what lies at the bottom of the change in the 
mutual relations between our state and the proletariat 
of the West that has taken place, or is taking place, on 
the basis of the workersı pilgrimages to our country. 
That is the new factor, which many have failed to

J. V. S T A L I N 292 
discern, but which is decisive at the present time. For if 
we are regarded as a part, as the child, of the working 
class of Europe, if on those grounds the working class of 
Europe assumes moral responsibility, undertakes the 
task of defending our state in case, say, of intervention 
by capitalism, the task of defending our interests 
against imperialism, what does that show? It shows that 
our forces are growing and will continue to grow very 
rapidly. It shows that the weakness of capitalism will 
increase very rapidly. For without the workers it is impossible 
to wage war nowadays. If the workers refuse to 
fight against our Republic, if they regard our Republic 
as their child in whose fate they are closely concerned, 
then war against our country becomes impossible. That is 
the secret, that is the root, that is the significance of the 
pilgrimages to our country that we have had, which we 
shall have more of, and which it is our duty to encourage to 
the utmost as a pledge of solidarity and a pledge that the 
ties of friendship between the workers of our country and 
the workers of the Western countries will be strengthened. 
Perhaps it will not be superfluous to say a word or 
two about the number of the delegations that have visited 
our country. I heard recently that at the Moscow 
Conference a comrade asked Rykov: ³Are not those delegations 
costing us too much?² Comrades, we must not 
say such things. We must never talk in that strain about 
the workersı delegations that visit us. It is disgraceful 
to talk like that. We cannot and must not shrink from 
any expense, or any sacrifice, to help the working class 
in the West to send their delegates to us, to help them to 
convince themselves that the working class, after capturing 
power, is capable not only of destroying capitalism,

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 293 
but also of building socialism. They, the workers of the 
West, many of them at any rate, are still convinced that 
the working class cannot do without the bourgeoisie. 
That prejudice is the chief disease of the working class 
in the West, injected into it by the Social-Democrats. 
We shall not shrink from any sacrifice to give the working 
class in the West the opportunity, through their delegates, 
to convince themselves that the working class, 
after capturing power, is capable not only of destroying 
the old order, but also of building socialism. We shall 
not shrink from any sacrifice to give the working class in 
the West the opportunity to convince themselves that 
our country is the only state in the world that is a workersı 
state, which they in the West ought to fight for, and which 
is worth defending against their own capitalism. (Applause.) 
Three kinds of delegations have visited us: delegations 
of intellectuals‹teachers and so forth; delegations 
of adult workers, I think there have been, roughly, 
about ten of them; and delegations of young workers. In 
all, 550 delegates and tourists have visited our country. 
Another sixteen delegations, registered with the All- 
Union Central Council of Trade Unions, are expected. 
We shall continue to promote these visits in the future 
in order to strengthen the ties between the working class 
of our country and the working class in the West, and 
thereby erect a barrier against any possibility of intervention. 
Such are the characteristic features of the basic contradictions 
that are corroding capitalism. 
What follows from all these contradictions? Whatdo 
they show? They show that the capitalist world is

J. V. S T A L I N 294 
being corroded by a whole series of internal contradictions 
which are enfeebling capitalism; that, on the other 
hand, our world, the world of socialism, is becoming more 
and more closely welded, more united; that because 
of this, on precisely this basis, there arose that temporary 
equilibrium of forces that put an end to war 
against us, that ushered in the period of ³peaceful 
co-existence² between the Soviet state and the capitalist 
states. 
I must mention two other facts which also helped to 
bring it about that instead of a period of war we have a 
period of ³peaceful co-existence.² 
The first fact is that at the present moment America 
does not want war in Europe. It is as though she were saying 
to Europe: I have loaned you thousands of millions; 
sit still and behave yourself if you want to get more money 
in future, if you donıt want your currency to get into 
a mess; get down to work, earn money and pay the interest 
on your debts. It scarcely needs proof that this 
advice of Americaıs, even if it is not decisive for Europe, 
is bound to have some effect. 
The second fact is that since the victory of the proletarian 
revolution in our country, a whole vast country 
with tremendous markets and tremendous sources of 
raw materials has dropped out of the world capitalist system, 
and this, of course, was bound to affect the economic 
situation in Europe. The loss of one-sixth of the globe, 
the loss of the markets and sources of raw materials of 
our country, means for capitalist Europe that its production 
is reduced and experiences a severe shaking. And 
so, in order to put a stop to this alienation of European 
capital from our country, from our markets and sources

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 295 
of raw materials, it was found necessary to agree to a 
certain period of ³peaceful co-existence² with us, in order 
to be able to find a way to our markets and sources of 
raw materials‹without this, it appears, it is impossible 
to achieve any economic stability in Europe. 
6. The External Position 
of the U.S.S.R. 
Such are all those factors that have led to a certain 
equilibrium of forces between the camp of socialism 
and the camp of capitalism all over the world; that have 
caused the period of war to be replaced by a period of 
respite; that have converted the brief respite into a whole 
period of respite, and have enabled us to carry out a sort 
of ³collaboration,² as Ilyich called it, with the capitalist 
world. 
Hence the series of ³recognitions² of the Soviet 
Union which has commenced, and which is bound to 
continue. 
I shall not enumerate the countries that have ³recognised² 
us. I think that America is the only one of 
the big countries that has not done so. Nor shall I dilate 
on the fact that after these ³recognitions² we concluded 
trade agreements, with Germany and Italy, for example. 
I shall not deal at length with the fact that our foreign 
trade has grown considerably, that America, a country 
which exports cotton to us, and Britain and Germany, 
countries which import our grain and agricultural produce, 
are particularly interested in this trade. There 
is one thing I must gay, namely, that this year is the 
first year since the advent of the period of ³co-existence²

J. V. S T A L I N 296 
with the capitalist states in which we are entering into 
rich and wide commercial relations with the capitalist 
world on a more or less large scale. 
That, of course, does not mean that we have already 
done away with all those, so to speak, reservations, and 
all those claims and counter-claims, as they might 
be called, that have existed and still exist between our 
state and the states of the West. We know that payment 
of debts is being demanded of us. Europe has not yet 
forgotten this, and probably will not forget it, at any 
rate, not so soon. We are told that our pre-war debts to 
Europe amount to 6,000 millions, that the war debts 
are estimated at over 7,000 million rubles, hence, a total 
of 13,000 millions. Allowing for depreciation of currency, 
and subtracting from this sum the share of the 
border countries, it works out that we owe the West- 
European states not less than 7,000 millions. It is known 
that our counter-claims in connection with the intervention 
of Britain, France and America during the civil 
war amount, I think, to the figure (if we take Larinıs 
calculations) of 50,000 million rubles. Consequently, 
they owe us five-times more than we owe them. (Larin, 
from his seat: ³We shall get it.²) Comrade Larin says 
that in good time we shall get all of it. (Laughter.) If, 
however, we make a more conservative calculation, as 
the Peopleıs Commissariat of Finance does, it will amount 
to no less than 20,000 million. Even then we stand to 
gain. (Laughter.) But the capitalist countries refuse to 
reconcile themselves to this, and we still figure in their 
lists as debtors. 
It is on this ground that snags and stumbling-blocks 
arise during our negotiations with the capitalists. That

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 297 
was the case with Britain, and it will probably be the 
case with France as well. 
What is the position of the Central Committee of 
our Party on this question? 
It is still what it was when the agreement was being 
concluded with MacDonald.53 
We cannot repeal the well-known law of our country, 
promulgated in 1918, annulling the tsarist debts.54 We 
stand by that law. We cannot repeal the decrees which 
were proclaimed, and which gave legal sanction to the 
expropriation of the expropriators in our country. We 
stand by those laws and will continue to do so. But we 
are not averse to making certain exceptions in the course 
of practical negotiations, in the case of both Britain and 
France, concerning the former tsarist debts, on the understanding 
that we pay a small part and get something 
for it. We are not averse to satisfying the former private 
owners by granting them concessions, but again on the 
understanding that the terms of those concessions are 
not enslaving. On that basis we were able to reach agreement 
with MacDonald. The underlying basis of those 
negotiations was the idea of virtually annulling the war 
debts. It was precisely for this reason that this agreement 
was frustrated. By whom? Undoubtedly, by America. 
Although America did not take part in the negotiations 
between Rakovsky and MacDonald, although MacDonald 
and Rakovsky arrived at a draft agreement, and 
although that draft agreement provided a way out 
for both parties and more or less satisfied the interests 
of both parties, nevertheless, since that draft was based 
on the idea of annulling the war debts, and America did 
not want to create such a precedent, for she would then

J. V. S T A L I N 298 
have stood to lose the thousands of millions that Europe 
owed her, she, i.e., America, ³advised,² and the agreement 
did not come about. 
Nevertheless, we still take our stand on the basis of 
the above-mentioned draft. 
Of the questions concerning our foreign policy, of 
the questions that arose in the period under review, 
questions that are exceptionally delicate and urgent, 
that concern the relations between our government and 
the governments of the West-European countries, I should 
like to mention two: firstly, the question that the British 
Conservatives have raised more than once and will 
raise again‹that of propaganda; and, secondly, the 
question of the Communist International. 
We are accused of conducting special propaganda 
against imperialism both in Europe and in the colonies 
and dependent countries. The British Conservatives 
assert that the Russian Communists are people whose 
mission it is to destroy the might of the British Empire. 
I should like to state here that all this is utter nonsense. 
We do not need any special propaganda, either in the 
West or in the East, now that workersı delegations 
visit our country, see for themselves the state of things 
here and carry their information about the state of things 
here to all the Western countries. We do not need any 
other propaganda. That is the best, the most potent and 
most effective propaganda for the Soviet system and 
against the capitalist system. (Applause.) 
We are told that we are conducting propaganda in 
the East. I assert that this, too, is utter nonsense. We do 
not need any special propaganda in the East, now that, 
as we know, the whole of our state system rests on the

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 299 
basis of the co-existence and fraternal co-operation of 
the extremely diverse nationalities in our country. Any 
Chinese, any Egyptian, any Indian, who comes to our 
country and stays here six months, has an opportunity 
of convincing himself that our country is the only country 
that understands the spirit of the oppressed peoples and 
is able to arrange co-operation between the proletarians 
of the formerly dominant nationality and the proletarians 
of the formerly oppressed nationalities. We need 
no other propaganda, no other agitation, in the East 
except that the delegations that come here from China, 
India and Egypt, after working here and looking about 
them, should carry their information about our state 
of things all over the world. That is the best propaganda, 
and i t is the most effective of all forms and types 
of propaganda. 
But there is a force that can and certainly will destroy 
the British Empire. That force is the British Conservatives. 
That is the force that will certainly, inevitably, 
lead the British Empire to its doom. It is sufficient to 
recall the Conservativesı policy when they came to 
power.55 What did they begin with? They began by 
putting the curb on Egypt, by increasing the pressure 
on India, by intervening in China, and so forth. That 
is the policy of the Conservatives. Who is to blame, 
who is to be accused, if the British lords are incapable of 
any other policy? Is it difficult to understand that by proceeding 
on these lines the Conservatives must, inevitably, 
as surely as twice two are four, lead the British 
Empire to its doom? 
A few words about the Comintern. Hirelings of the 
imperialists and authors of forged letters are spreading

J. V. S T A L I N 300 
rumours in the West to the effect that the Comintern 
is an organisation of conspirators and terrorists, that 
Communists are touring the Western countries for the 
purpose of hatching plots against the European rulers. 
Among other things, the Sofia explosion in Bulgaria 
is being linked with Communists. I must declare what 
every cultured person must know, if he is not an utter 
ignoramus, and if he has not been bribed‹I must declare 
that Communists never had, do not have, and cannot 
have, anything in common with the theory and practice 
of individual terrorism; that Communists never had, 
do not have, and cannot have, anything in common 
with the theory of conspiracies against individual persons. 
The theory and practice of the Comintern consists 
in organising the mass revolutionary movement against 
capitalism. That is true. That is the task of the Communists. 
Only ignoramuses and idiots can confuse plots and 
individual terrorism with the Cominternıs policy in the 
mass revolutionary movement. 
Two words about Japan. Some of our enemies in the 
West are rubbing their hands with glee, as much as to 
say: See, a revolutionary movement has begun in China. 
It is, of course, the Bolsheviks who have bribed the Chinese 
people‹who else could bribe a people numbering 
400 millions?‹and this will lead to the ³Russians² 
fighting the Japanese. All that is nonsense, comrades. 
The forces of the revolutionary movement in China are 
unbelievably vast. They have not yet made themselves 
felt as they should. They will make themselves felt in the 
future. The rulers in the East and West who do not see 
those forces and do not reckon with them to the degree 
that they deserve will suffer for this. We, as a state,

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 301 
cannot but reckon with this force. We consider that 
China is faced with the same problem that faced North 
America when she was uniting in a single state, that 
faced Germany when she was taking shape as a state 
and was uniting, and that faced Italy when she was uniting 
and freeing herself from external enemies. Here, 
truth and justice are wholly on the side of the Chinese 
revolution. That is why we sympathise and will continue 
to sympathise with the Chinese revolution in its struggle 
to liberate the Chinese people from the yoke of the imperialists 
and to unite China in a single state. Whoever 
does not and will not reckon with this force will certainly 
lose. I think that Japan will understand that she, 
too, must reckon with this growing force of the national 
movement in China, a force that is pushing forward and 
sweeping everything from its path. It is precisely because 
he has not understood this that Chang Tso-lin is going 
under. But he is going under also because he based his 
whole policy on conflicts between the U.S.S.R. and 
Japan, on a deterioration of relations between them. 
Every general, every ruler of Manchuria, who bases 
his policy on conflicts between us and Japan, on a deterioration 
of our relations with Japan, is certain to go under. 
Only the one who bases his policy on an improvement 
of our relations with Japan, on a rapprochement between 
us and Japan, will remain on his feet; only such a general, 
and such a ruler, can sit firmly in Manchuria, because 
we have no interests that lead to our relations with 
Japan becoming strained. Our interests lie in the direction 
of rapprochement between our country and Japan.

J. V. S T A L I N 302 
7. The Partyıs Tasks 
I pass to the question of our Partyıs tasks in connection 
with the external situation. 
I think that here our Partyıs tasks, in the sense of 
its work, should be outlined in two spheres: the sphere 
of the international revolutionary movement, and then 
in the sphere of the Soviet Unionıs foreign policy. 
What are the tasks in the sphere of the international 
revolutionary movement? 
The tasks are, firstly, to work in the direction of 
strengthening the Communist Parties in the West, of 
their winning a majority among the masses of the workers. 
Secondly, to work in the direction of intensifying the 
struggle of the workers in the West for trade-union unity, 
for strengthening the friendship between the proletariat 
in our Union and the proletariat in the capitalist countries. 
This includes the pilgrimages of which I have 
spoken and the significance of which I described above. 
Thirdly, to work in the direction of strengthening the 
link between the proletariat in our country and the 
movement for liberation in the oppressed countries, for 
they are our allies in the struggle against imperialism. 
And fourthly, to work in the direction of strengthening 
the socialist elements in our country, in the direction 
of the victory of these elements over the capitalist elements, 
a victory that will be of decisive significance for 
revolutionising the workers of all countries. Usually, 
when speaking about our Partyıs tasks in the sphere 
of the international revolutionary movement, our comrades 
confine themselves to the first three tasks and forget 
about the fourth task, namely, that our struggle in our

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 303 
country, the struggle for the victory of the socialist 
elements in our country over the capitalist elements, 
our struggle in the work of construction, is also of international 
significance, for our country is the base of the 
international revolution, for our country is the principal 
lever for expanding the international revolutionary 
movement; and if our work of construction here, in our 
country, proceeds at the proper tempo, it means that 
we are performing our work in all the other channels 
of the international revolutionary movement precisely 
in the way the Party demands that we should perform 
it. 
Such are the Partyıs tasks in the sphere of the international 
revolutionary movement. 
Now about the Partyıs tasks in the sphere of our 
Unionıs foreign policy. 
Firstly, to work in the direction of fighting against 
new wars, in the direction of maintaining peace and 
ensuring so-called normal relations with the capitalist 
countries. The basis of our governmentıs policy, of its 
foreign policy, is the idea of peace. The struggle for 
peace, the struggle against new wars, the exposure of 
all the steps that are being taken to prepare a new war, the 
exposure of those steps that cover up actual preparation 
of war with the flag of pacifism‹such is the task. It is 
precisely for this reason that we refuse to join the League 
of Nations, for the League of Nations is an organisation 
for covering up the preparations for war; for, to join the 
League of Nations, we must choose, as Comrade Litvinov 
has rightly expressed it, between the hammer and the 
anvil. Well, we do not wish to be either a hammer for 
the weak nations or an anvil for the strong ones. We want

J. V. S T A L I N 304 
neither the one nor the other; we stand for peace, we 
stand for the exposure of all those steps that lead to war, 
no matter by what pacifist bunting they may be concealed. 
Whether the League of Nations or Locarno, it 
makes no difference‹they canıt fool us with a flag, nor 
frighten us with noise. 
Secondly, to work in the direction of expanding our 
trade with the outside world on the basis of the monopoly 
of foreign trade. 
Thirdly, to work in the direction of rapprochement 
with the countries that were defeated in the imperialist 
war, with those capitalist countries which were 
most humiliated and came off worst, and which, owing to 
this, are in opposition to the ruling alliance of Great 
Powers. 
Fourthly, to work in the direction of strengthening 
our link with the dependent and colonial countries. 
Such are the tasks that face the Party at the present 
time in the sphere of international relations and the international 
working-class movement. 
II 
THE INTERNAL SITUATION 
IN THE SOVIET UNION 
I pass to the second part of the Central Committeeıs 
report. This part deals with the internal situation in 
our state and with the Central Committeeıs policy on 
questions concerning the internal situation. I should 
like to quote some figures. Although quite a number 
of figures have been published in the press recently, we 
cannot, unfortunately, avoid quoting some here.

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 305 
1. The National Economy as a Whole 
But, before passing to the figures, permit me to set 
out several general propositions which define our work 
in the building of a socialist economy (I intend to start 
with our economy). 
The first proposition. We are working and building in 
the circumstances of capitalist encirclement. That means 
that our economy and work of construction will develop 
in the contradiction, in conflicts, between our system 
of economy and the capitalist system of economy. We 
cannot possibly avoid this contradiction. It is the framework 
within which the struggle between the two systems, 
the socialist and the capitalist systems, must 
proceed. It means, furthermore, that our economy must be 
built not only amidst its opposition to the capitalist economy 
outside our country, but also amidst the opposition 
between the different elements within it, the opposition 
between the socialist elements and the capitalist elements. 
Hence the conclusion: we must build our economy 
in such a way as to prevent our country from becoming 
an appendage of the world capitalist system, to prevent 
it from being drawn into the general system of capitalist 
development as a subsidiary enterprise of this system, 
so that our economy develops not as a subsidiary enterprise 
of world capitalism, but as an independent 
economic unit, based mainly on the home market, based 
on the bond between our industry and peasant economy 
in our country. 
There are two general lines: one takes as its starting 
point that our country must for a long time yet remain

J. V. S T A L I N 306 
an agrarian country, must export agricultural produce 
and import equipment, that we must adopt this standpoint 
and develop along this line in the future. In essence, 
this line demands that we should wind up our 
industry. It found expression recently in Shaninıs theses 
(perhaps some of you have read them in Ekonomicheskaya 
Zhizn56). To follow this line would mean that our country 
would never be able, or almost never be able, to become 
really industrialised; that instead of being an economically 
independent unit based on the home market, our 
country would, objectively, have to become an appendage 
of the general capitalist system. That line means 
the abandonment of our construction tasks. 
That is not our line. 
There is another general line, which takes as its 
starting point that we must exert all efforts to make 
our country an economically self-reliant, independent 
country based on the home market; a country that will 
serve as a centre of attraction for all other countries that 
little by little drop out of capitalism and enter the channel 
of socialist economy. That line demands the utmost 
expansion of our industry, but proportionate to and in 
conformity with the resources at our command. It emphatically 
rejects the policy of converting our country into an 
appendage of the world capitalist system. That is our line 
of construction, the line followed by the Party and which 
it will continue to follow in the future. That line is 
imperative as long as the capitalist encirclement exists. 
Things will be different when the revolution is 
victorious in Germany or France, or in both countries 
together, when the building of socialism begins there 
on a higher technical basis. We shall then pass from the

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 307 
policy of transforming our country into an independent 
economic unit to the policy of drawing our country into 
the general channel of socialist development. But until 
that happens, it will be absolutely essential for us to 
have that minimum of independence for our national 
economy without which it will be impossible to safeguard 
our country from economic subordination to the 
world capitalist system. 
That is the first proposition. 
The second proposition, by which we must be guided 
in our work of construction as much as by the first, is that 
we must on each occasion take into account the specific 
features of our management of the national economy distinguishing 
it from such management in capitalist countries 
There, in the capitalist countries, private capital 
reigns; there, the mistakes committed by individual capitalist 
trusts, syndicates, or one or other group of capitalists, 
are corrected by the elemental forces of the market 
If too much is produced‹a crisis ensues; but later, 
after the crisis, the economy resumes its normal course. 
If they indulge too much in imports and an unfavourable 
balance of trade results‹the rate of exchange will 
be shaken, inflation will ensue, imports will drop and 
exports will rise. All this in the form of crises. No mistake 
of any magnitude, no overproduction of any magnitude, 
or serious discrepancy between production and total 
demand takes place in capitalist countries without the 
blunders, mistakes and discrepancies being corrected 
by some crisis or other. That is how they live in capitalist 
countries. But we cannot live like that. There 
we see economic, commercial and financial crises, 
which affect individual groups of capitalists. Here, in

J. V. S T A L I N 308 
our country, things are different. Every serious hitch 
in trade, in production, every serious miscalculation in 
our economy, results not in some individual crisis 
or other, but hits the whole of our national economy. 
In our country, every crisis, whether commercial, financial 
or industrial, may develop into a general crisis that 
will hit the whole state. That is why special circumspection 
and foresight in construction are demanded of us. 
That is why we here must manage our economy in a 
planned way so that there are fewer miscalculations, 
so that our management of economy i s conducted 
with supreme foresight, circumspection and accuracy. 
But since, comrades, we, unfortunately, do not possess 
exceptional foresight, exceptional circumspection, 
or an exceptional ability to manage our economy without 
error, since we are only just learning to build, we make 
mistakes, and will continue to do so in the future. That 
is why, in building, we must have reserves; we must have 
reserves with which to correct our blunders. Our entire 
work during the past two years has shown that we are 
not guaranteed either against fortuities or against errors. 
In the sphere of agriculture, very much depends in our 
country not only on the way we manage, but also on the 
forces of nature (crop failures, etc.). In the sphere of 
industry, very much depends not only on the way we 
manage, but also on the home market, which we have 
not yet mastered. In the sphere of foreign trade, very 
much depends not only on us, but also on the behaviour 
of the West-European capitalists; and the more our exports 
and imports grow, the more dependent we become 
upon the capitalist West, the more vulnerable we become 
to the blows of our enemies. To guarantee our

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 309 
selves against all these fortuities and inevitable mistakes, 
we need to accept the idea that we must accumulate 
reserves. 
We are not guaranteed against crop failures in agriculture. 
Hence we need reserves. We are not guaranteed 
against the fortuities of the home market in the sphere 
of the development of our industry. That is apart from 
the fact that, living on the funds that we ourselves 
accumulate, we must be exceptionally frugal and restrained 
in spending accumulated funds; we must try to 
invest every kopek wisely, i.e., in such undertakings 
as it is absolutely essential to develop at the given 
moment. Hence the need for reserves for industry. We are 
not guaranteed against fortuities in the sphere of foreign 
trade (covert boycott, covert blockade, etc.). Hence 
the need for reserves. 
We could double the sum allocated for agricultural 
credits; but then the necessary reserve for financing 
industry would not be left, the development of industry 
would lag far behind agriculture, the output of manufactured 
goods would shrink, resulting in inflated prices 
of manufactured goods and all the consequences following 
from that. 
We could double the assignments for the expansion 
of industry; but that would mean a rapid rate of industrial 
development which we would not be able to maintain 
owing to the great shortage of free capital, and it 
would certainly lead to a breakdown, not to speak of 
the fact that the reserve from which to provide credits 
for agriculture would be lacking. 
We could push forward the growth of our imports, 
chiefly import of equipment, to twice the amount

J. V. S T A L I N 310 
we import now, in order to promote the rapid development 
of industry; but that might cause an excess of 
imports over exports, which would result in an unfavourable 
balance of trade and in the depreciation of our 
currency, i.e., the only basis on which it is possible to 
plan and develop industry would be undermined. 
We could recklessly develop exports to the utmost, 
ignoring the state of the home market; but that would 
certainly cause great complications in the towns in the 
form of a rapid rise in the prices of agricultural produce 
and, consequently, in the form of the undermining of 
wages and a certain degree of artificially organised 
famine with all the consequences resulting from that. 
We could raise wages of the workers to the utmost, 
not merely to the pre-war level, but higher; but that 
would reduce the tempo of development of our industry, 
because under our conditions, in the absence of loans 
from abroad, in the absence of credits, etc., the expansion 
of industry is possible only on the basis of the accumulation 
of a certain amount of profit necessary for 
financing and promoting industry, which, however, would 
be excluded, i.e., accumulations of any serious magnitude 
would be excluded if the tempo of raising wages 
was excessively accelerated. 
And so on, and so forth. 
Such are the two fundamental guiding propositions 
that must serve as the torch, the beacon, in our work 
of construction in our country. 
Permit me now to pass to the figures. 
But just one more digression. Our system of economy 
exhibits a certain diversity, it contains no less than 
five forms. There is one form of economy that is almost

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 311 
on the level of natural economy: the peasant farms that 
produce very little for the market. There is a second form 
of economy, the commodity production form‹the peasant 
farms which produce chiefly for the market. There 
is a third form of economy‹private capitalism, which 
is not dead, which has revived and will continue to revive, 
within certain limits, as long as we have NEP. The 
fourth form of economy is state capitalism, i.e., the capitalism 
that we have permitted and are able to control 
and restrict in the way the proletarian state wishes. 
Lastly, there is the fifth form‹socialist industry, i.e., 
our state industry, in which production does not involve 
two antagonistic classes‹the proletariat and the bourgeoisie‹
but only one class‹the proletariat. 
I should like to say a word or two about these five 
forms of economy, because otherwise it will be difficult 
to understand the group of figures I intend to quote and 
the trend that is observed in the development of our 
industry; the more so that Lenin already dealt in considerable 
detail with these five forms of economy in our 
social system57 and taught us to take the struggle among 
these forms into account in our work of construction. 
I should like to say a word or two about state capitalism 
and about state industry, the latter being of 
a socialist type, in order to clear up the misunderstandings 
and confusion that have arisen in the Party around 
this question. 
Would it be right to call our state industry, 
state-capitalist industry? No. Why? Because under the 
dictatorship of the proletariat, state capitalism is 
a form of organisation of production involving two 
classes: an exploiting class which owns the means of

J. V. S T A L I N 312 
production, and an exploited class which does not own 
the means of production. No matter what special form 
state capitalism may assume, i t must nevertheless 
remain capitalist in its nature. When Ilyich analysed 
state capitalism, he had in mind primarily concessions. 
Let us take concessions and see whether two classes are 
involved in them. Yes, they are. The class of capitalists, 
i.e., the concessionaires, who exploit and temporarily 
own the means of production, and the class of proletarians, 
whom the concessionaire exploits. That we have 
no elements of socialism here is evident if only from 
the fact that nobody would dare turn up at a concession 
enterprise to start a campaign to increase productivity 
of labour; for everybody knows that a concession enterprise 
is not a socialist enterprise, but one alien to 
socialism. 
Let us take another type of enterprise‹state enterprises. 
Are they state-capitalist enterprises? No, they are 
not. Why? Because they involve not two classes, but 
one class, the working class, which through its state 
owns the instruments and means of production and 
which is not exploited; for the maximum amount of what 
is produced in these enterprises over and above wages 
is used for the further expansion of industry, i.e., for 
the improvement of the conditions of the working class 
as a whole. 
It may be said that, after all, this is not complete 
socialism, bearing in mind the survivals of bureaucracy 
persisting in the managing bodies of our enterprises. 
That is true, but it does not contradict the fact that 
state industry belongs to the socialist type of production. 
There are two types of production: the capitalist,

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 313 
including the state-capitalist, type, where there are two 
classes, where production is carried on for the profit of the 
capitalist; and there is the other type, the socialist type 
of production, where there is no exploitation, where 
the means of production belong to the working class, 
and where the enterprises are run not for the profit of 
an alien class, but for the expansion of industry in the 
interests of the workers as a whole. That is just what 
Lenin said, that our state enterprises are enterprises 
of a consistently socialist type. 
Here an analogy with our state could be drawn. 
Our state, too, is not called a bourgeois state, for, according 
to Lenin, it is a new type of state, the proletarian 
type of state. Why? Because our state apparatus does 
not function for the purpose of oppressing the working 
class, as is the case with all bourgeois states without 
exception, but for the purpose of emancipating the working 
class from the oppression of the bourgeoisie. That 
is why our state is a proletarian type of state, although 
any amount of trash and survivals of the past 
can be found in the state apparatus. Lenin, who proclaimed 
our Soviet system a proletarian type of state, 
castigated it for its bureaucratic survivals more strongly 
than anybody else. Nevertheless, he asserted all the time 
that our state is a new proletarian type of state. A distinction 
must be drawn between the type of state and the 
heritage and survivals still persisting in the system and 
apparatus of the state. It is equally imperative to draw 
a distinction between the bureaucratic survivals in 
state enterprises and the type of structure of industry 
that we call the socialist type. It is wrong to say that 
because our economic bodies, or our trusts, suffer

J. V. S T A L I N 314 
from mistakes, bureaucracy, and so forth, our state 
industry is not socialist. It is wrong to say that. If that 
were true, our state, which is of the proletarian type, 
would also not be proletarian. I can name quite a number 
of bourgeois apparatuses that function better and 
more economically than our proletarian state apparatus; 
but that does not mean that our state apparatus is not 
proletarian, that our type of state apparatus is not 
superior to the bourgeois type. Why? Because, although 
that bourgeois apparatus functions better, it functions 
for the capitalist, whereas our proletarian state apparatus, 
even if it does fumble sometimes, after all functions 
for the proletariat and against the bourgeoisie. 
That fundamental difference must not be forgotten. 
The same must be said about state industry. We 
must not, because of the defects and survivals of bureaucracy 
that are to be found in the managing bodies of our 
state enterprises, and which will exist for some time 
yet, we must not, because of those survivals and defects, 
forget that, in their nature, our enterprises are socialist 
enterprises. At the Ford plants, for example, which function 
efficiently, there may be less thieving, nevertheless 
they function for the benefit of Ford, a capitalist, whereas 
our enterprises, where thieving takes place sometimes, 
and things do not always run smoothly, nevertheless 
function for the benefit of the proletariat. 
That fundamental difference must not be forgotten. 
Let us now pass to the figures concerning our national 
economy as a whole. 
Agriculture. Its gross output in 1924-25, comparing 
its level with the pre-war level, that of 1913, reached 
71 per cent. In other words, the output in 1913 amounted

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 315 
to something over 12,000 million rubles at pre-war prices, 
and in 1924-25, the output amounted to something 
over 9,000 million rubles. In the coming year, 
1925-26, we anticipate, on the basis of data of our 
planning bodies, a further rise that will bring the output 
up to 11,000 million rubles, i.e., up to 91 per cent of 
the pre-war level. Agriculture is growing‹such is the 
natural conclusion to be drawn. 
Industry. Taking all industry‹state, concession and 
private‹its gross output in 1913 amounted to 7,000 million 
rubles; in 1924-25, the gross output amounted to 
5,000 million. That is 71 per cent of the pre-war level. 
Our planning bodies anticipate that next year output 
will reach 6,500 million, i.e., it will amount to about 
93 per cent of the pre-war level. Industry is rising. 
This year it rose faster than agriculture. 
Special reference must be made to the question of 
electrification. The GOELRO plan in 1921 provided for 
the erection in the course of 10-15 years of thirty electric 
power stations of a total capacity of 1,500,000 kw. at 
a cost of 800,000,000 gold rubles. Before the October 
Revolution, the total capacity of electric power stations 
amounted to 402,000 kw. Up to the present we have 
built stations with a total capacity of 152,350 kw. and 
it is planned to put into operation in 1926 a total capacity 
of 326,000 kw. If development continues at that 
rate, the plan for the electrification of the U.S.S.R. 
will be fulfilled in ten years, i.e., approximately by 
1932 (the earliest date planned for). Parallel with the 
growth in electric power construction runs the growth 
of the electrical engineering industry, the 1925-26 programme 
of which provides for bringing output up to

J. V. S T A L I N 316 
165-170 per cent of the pre-war level. It must be observed, 
however, that the erection of big hydro-electric power 
stations leads to a large over-expenditure of funds compared 
with what had been planned. For example, the 
original estimate for the Volkhov project amounted to 
24,300,000 ³conventional² rubles, but by September 1925 
it had risen to 95,200,000 chervonets rubles, which is 59 
per cent of the funds spent on the erection of the first priority 
stations, although the capacity of the Volkhov project 
amounts to 30 per cent of the capacity of those stations. 
The original estimate for the Zemo-Avchaly station 
amounted to 2,600,000 gold rubles, but the latest request 
amounts to about 16,000,000 chervonets rubles, of which 
about 12,000,000 have already been spent. 
If we compare the output of state and co-operative 
industry, associated in one way or another, with 
the output of private industry, we get the following: 
in 1923-24, the output of state and co-operative industry 
amounted to 76.3 per cent of the total industrial output 
for the year, while that of private industry amounted 
to 23.7 per cent; in 1924-25, however, the output of 
state and co-operative industry amounted to 79.3 per 
cent of the total, and that of private industry was no 
longer 23.7 per cent, but 20.7 per cent. 
The relative importance of private industry declined 
in this period. It is anticipated that next year the share 
of state and co-operative industry will amount to about 
80 per cent, while that of private industry will sink to 
20 percent. In absolute figures, private industry is growing, 
but as state and co-operative industry is growing 
faster, the relative importance of private industry is 
progressively declining.

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 317 
That is a fact that must be reckoned with, and which 
shows that the preponderance of socialist industry over 
private industry is an indisputable fact. 
If we take property concentrated in the hands of the 
state and property in the hands of private business 
people, we find that in this sphere too‹I have the State 
Planning Commissionıs control figures in mind‹preponderance 
is on the side of the proletarian state, for the 
state possesses capital funds amounting to not less than 
11,700 millions (chervonets rubles), whereas private 
owners, mainly peasant farms, possess funds amounting 
to not more than 7,500 millions. 
This fact shows that socialised funds constitute 
a very large share of the total, and this share is growing 
compared with the share of property in the non-socialised 
sector. 
For all that, our system as a whole cannot yet be 
called either capitalist or socialist. Our system as a 
whole is transitional from capitalism to socialism‹ 
a system in which privately-owned peasant production 
still preponderates as regards volume of output, but 
in which the share of socialist industry is steadily 
growing. The share of socialist industry is growing in 
such a way that, taking advantage of its concentration 
and organisation, taking advantage of the fact that we 
have the dictatorship of the proletariat, that transport 
is in the hands of the state, that the credit system and 
the banks are ours‹taking advantage of all this, our 
socialist industry, the share of which in the total volume 
of national production is growing step by step, this 
industry is advancing and is beginning to gain the 
upper hand over private industry and to adapt to itself

J. V. S T A L I N 318 
and take the lead over all the other forms of economy. 
Such is the fate of the countryside‹it must follow the 
lead of the towns, of large-scale industry. 
That is the fundamental conclusion that follows if 
we raise the question of the character of our system, of 
the share of socialist industry in this system, of the 
share of private capitalist industry in it and, lastly, of the 
share of small commodity‹chiefly peasant‹production 
in the total national economy. 
A word or two about the state budget. You no doubt 
know that it has grown to 4,000 million rubles. Counting 
in pre-war rubles, our state budget amounts to not 
less than 71 per cent of the state budget of the pre-war 
period. Further, if to the amount of the general state 
budget we add the amounts of the local budgets, as far 
as they can be calculated, our total state budget will 
amount to not less than 74.6 per cent of the 1913 budget. 
A characteristic feature is that in our state budget the 
proportion of non-tax revenues is much higher than 
that of revenues from taxes. All this also shows that 
our economy is growing and making progress. 
The question of the profits that we obtained from 
our state and co-operative enterprises last year is of 
very great importance, because ours is a country poor 
in capital, a country that does not obtain big loans from 
abroad. We must closely scrutinise our industrial and 
trading enterprises, our banks and co-operatives, in order 
to ascertain what we can have at our disposal for the 
purpose of further expanding our industry. In 1923-24, 
state industry of Union importance and industry under 
the Chief Metal Board yielded a profit of, I think, about 
142,000,000 chervonets rubles. Of this sum, 71,000,000

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 319 
were assigned as state revenue. In 1924-25 we already 
have 315,000,000. Of this sum, it is planned to assign 
173,000,000 as state revenue. 
State trade of Union importance yielded in 1923-24 
about 37,000,000, of which 14,000,000 went as state 
revenue. In 1925, the amount is smaller‹22,000,000, 
as a result of the policy of reducing prices. Of this sum 
about 10,000,000 will go as state revenue. 
From our foreign trade in 1923-24 we obtained a 
profit of something over 26,000,000 rubles, of which about 
17,000,000 went as state revenue. In 1925, foreign trade 
will yield or, rather, has already yielded, 44,000,000. 
Of this sum 29,000,000 will go as state revenue. 
According to the calculations of the Peopleıs Commissariat 
of Finance, in 1923-24 the banks yielded a profit 
of 46,000,000, of which 18,000,000 went as state revenue; 
in 1924-25 the profit amounted to over 97,000,000, 
of which 51,000,000 have gone as state revenue. 
The consumer co-operatives in 1923-24 yielded 
a profit of 57,000,000 and the agricultural co-operatives‹ 
4,000,000. 
The figures I have just quoted are more or less understated. 
You know why. You know how our economic 
bodies calculate with a view to keeping as much 
as possible for the expansion of their enterprises. If 
these figures seem small to you, as indeed they are, 
then bear in mind that they are slightly understated. 
A few words about our foreign trade turn-over. 
If we take our trade turn-over for 1913 as 100, we 
shall find that our foreign trade in 1923-24 reached 21 per 
cent of the pre-war level, and in 1924-25‹26 per cent 
of the pre-war level. Exports in 1923-24 amounted to

J. V. S T A L I N 320 
522,000,000 rubles; imports‹439,000,000; total turnover‹
961,000,000; favourable balance‹83,000,000. 
In 1923-24 we had a favourable balance of trade. In 
1924-25 exports amounted to 564,000,000; imports‹ 
708,000,000; total turn-over‹1,272 million; balance‹ 
minus 144,000,000. This year we ended our foreign trade 
with an unfavourable balance of 144,000,000. 
Permit me to dwell on this somewhat. 
People here are often inclined to attribute this unfavourable 
balance of trade in the past economic year 
to the fact that we imported a large quantity of grain 
this year owing to the crop failure. But we imported 
grain amounting to 83,000,000, whereas the trade deficit 
amounts to 144,000,000. What does that deficit lead to? 
To this: by buying more than we sell, by importing more 
than we export, we put in jeopardy our balance of payments 
and therefore our currency as well. We received a 
directive from the Thirteenth Party Congress that the 
Party should at all costs secure a favourable balance of 
trade.58 I must admit that all of us, both the Soviet bodies 
and the Central Committee, committed a gross error here 
in failing to carry out the directive given us. It was 
difficult to carry it out; nevertheless we could have obtained 
at least a small favourable balance if we had 
made a real effort. We committed this gross error and the 
congress must rectify it. Incidentally, the Central Committee 
itself attempted to rectify it in November this 
year at a special meeting at which it examined the figures 
of our imports and exports and adopted a decision that 
next year‹at that meeting we outlined the chief elements 
of our foreign trade for the coming year‹that next year 
our foreign trade should end with a favourable balance

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 321 
of at least 100,000,000. That is essential. That is absolutely 
essential for a country like ours, where we have 
little capital, where import of capital from abroad does 
not take place, or only to a minimal degree, and where 
the balance of payments, its equilibrium, must be maintained 
by the balance of trade in order to prevent our 
chervonets currency from being shaken and in order, by 
maintaining our currency, to preserve the possibility of 
further expanding our industry and agriculture. You have 
all experienced what an unstable currency means. We 
must not fall into such an unfortunate position again; 
we must take all measures to eradicate all factors that 
could later on result in conditions capable of shaking 
our currency. 
Such are the figures and considerations concerning 
our national economy as a whole, concerning industry 
and agriculture in particular, concerning the relative 
importance of socialist industry in relation to the other 
forms of economy, and concerning those leading ideas 
in the building of socialism of which I have spoken, 
and which the Central Committee of our Party takes as 
the basis for its stand. 
2. Industry and Agriculture 
If, further, we take the questions that directly concern 
the interrelations of industry and agriculture now 
and in the immediate future, they can be reduced to 
the following points. 
Firstly. We are still an agrarian country: agricultural 
output predominated over industrial output. 
As regards industry, the main thing i s that i t has

J. V. S T A L I N 322 
already approached the limit of the pre-war level, that 
further steps in industry mean developing it on a new 
technical basis, with the utilisation of new equipment 
and the building of new plants. That is a very difficult 
matter. To step across this threshold, to pass 
from the policy of utilising to the utmost all that we 
have had in industry to the policy of building up a new 
industry on a new technical basis, on the basis of building 
new plants, to cross this threshold calls for large 
amounts of capital. As, however, we suffer from a considerable 
shortage of capital, the further development 
of our industry will, in all probability, proceed at a less 
rapid tempo than it has done up to now. 
That is not the case in agriculture. It cannot be 
said that all the potentialities latent in agriculture on 
its present technical basis are already exhausted. Unlike 
industry, agriculture can make rapid progress for a certain 
time even on its present technical basis. Even simply 
raising the culture of the peasant, literacy, even a simple 
thing like cleaning seed, could increase the gross 
output of agriculture 10-15 per cent. Just reckon up 
what that means for the entire country. Such are the 
potentialities still latent in agriculture. That is why the 
further development of agriculture does not, for the time 
being, encounter the technical difficulties that our industry 
does. That is why the discrepancy between the balance 
of output of industry and the balance of output of agriculture 
will continue to grow during the next few years, 
because agriculture possesses a number of inherent 
potentialities which are far from being utilised yet, and 
which are due to be utilised during the next few years. 
What are our tasks in view of this circumstance?

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 323 
First of all, to raise our large-scale state industry 
at all costs, overcoming the difficulties that confront 
us. Next, to raise the local type of Soviet industry. 
Comrades, we cannot concentrate only on the development 
of Union industry, because Union industry, our 
centralised trusts and syndicates, cannot satisfy all the 
diverse tastes and requirements of a 140,000,000-population. 
To be able to satisfy these requirements, we 
must see to it that life, industrial life, is pulsating in 
every district, in every okrug, in every gubernia, region 
and national republic. Unless we unleash the forces 
latent in the localities for the purpose of economic construction, 
unless we lend local industry every support, 
beginning with the districts and okrugs, unless we unleash 
all these forces, we shall not be able to achieve 
that general upswing of economic construction in our 
country that Lenin spoke about. Unless we do this, 
unless we link the interests and benefits of the centre 
with the interests and benefits of the localities, we shall 
not solve the problem of stimulating initiative in the 
work of construction, the problem of a general economic 
upswing in the country, the problem of securing the 
speediest industrialisation of the country. 
Secondly. Formerly, the problem in relation to fuel 
was that of over-production. Now we are approaching the 
problem of a fuel crisis, because our industry is growing 
faster than the fuel supply. We are approaching the 
level on which our country stood under the bourgeois 
system, when there was a shortage of fuel and we were 
obliged to import it. In other words, the position is that 
there is a discrepancy between the balance of fuel output 
and the balance of output of industry, the requirements

J. V. S T A L I N 324 
of industry. Hence the task of accelerating the development 
of our fuel industry, of improving its technical 
equipment, so that its development should overtake, 
should be able to overtake, the development of industry. 
Thirdly. There is some discrepancy between the balance 
of output of metals and the balance of the national 
economy as a whole. If we calculate the minimum metal 
requirements and the maximum possibility of producing 
metals, we shall find that we have a shortage running into 
tens of millions. Under these conditions, our economy, 
and our industry in particular, cannot make further 
progress. That is why this circumstance must receive 
special attention. Metal is the foundation of foundations 
of our industry, and its balance of output must be made 
to correspond to the balance of industry and transport. 
Fourthly. The discrepancy between the balance of our 
skilled labour power and the balance of our industry. 
A number of figures have been published in the press 
and I will not quote them; I will merely say that the 
additional skilled labour power required for the whole 
of industry in 1925-26 amounts to 433,000 people, and 
we can supply only a fourth of the number required. 
Fifthly. I should like to mention one other defect 
and discrepancy, namely, that the standards for using 
railway rolling stock exceed all limits. The demand for 
rolling stock is so great that next year we shall be 
obliged to use locomotives and freight wagons, not to 100 
per cent of their capacity, but to 120-130 per cent. Thus, 
the fixed capital of the Peopleıs Commissariat of Transport 
will be subjected to excessive wear and tear, and 
we may be faced with disaster in the near future if we 
do not take resolute measures.

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 325 
Such are all the defects and discrepancies which exist 
in our national economy in general, and in our industry 
in particular, and which must be overcome. 
3. Questions Concerning Trade 
Permit me now to pass to questions concerning 
trade. The figures show that in this sphere, as in the 
industrial sphere, the relative importance of state-based 
trade is increasing as compared with trade on a private 
capitalist basis. If we take the total internal trade turnover 
before the war as being equal to 20,000 million 
commodity rubles, we find that the turn-over for 1923-24 
amounted to 10,000 million, i.e., 50 per cent of pre-war, 
while that for 1924-25 equals 14,000 million, i.e., 70 per 
cent. The general growth of the internal turn-over is 
beyond doubt. Speaking of the stateıs share in that turnover, 
we find that in 1923-24, the stateıs share amounted 
to 45 per cent of the total internal trade turn-over; the 
share of the co-operatives was 19 per cent, and the share 
of private capital 35 per cent. In the following year, 
i.e., in 1924-25, the stateıs share amounted to 50 per 
cent; the share of the co-operatives, instead of 19 per 
cent, was 24.7 per cent, and the share of private capital, 
instead of 35 per cent, was 24.9 per cent. The share of 
private capital in the total turn-over is falling; the 
shares of the state and of the co-operatives are rising. 
If we divide the turn-over into two parts, wholesale and 
retail, we shall see the same trend. The stateıs share of 
wholesale trade in 1923-24 amounted to something over 
62 per cent of the total turn-over; in 1924-25 it amounted 
to 68.9 per cent. An obvious increase. The share of

J. V. S T A L I N 326 
the co-operatives shows an increase from 15 to 19 per 
cent. The share of private trade was 21 per cent; now 
it is 11 per cent. In retail trade, the stateıs share in 
1923-24 amounted to 16 per cent; in 1924-25 it was almost 
23 per cent. The co-operativesı share of retail 
trade last year was 25.9 per cent, and in 1924-25 it was 
32.9 per cent. The growth is beyond doubt. Private 
capitalıs share of the retail trade in 1923-24 amounted 
to 57 per cent; now it is 44.3 per cent. We have obviously 
crossed the threshold in the sphere of retail trade. Last 
year, private capital predominated in retail trade; this 
year, the state and the co-operatives predominate. 
The growth of the importance of the state and the 
co-operatives in the procurement of raw materials and 
grain is shown by the following figures: oil seeds in 
1924-25‹65 per cent; flax‹94 per cent; raw cotton‹ 
almost 100 per cent; grain in 1923-24‹75 per cent and 
in 1924-25‹70 per cent. Here we have a slight drop. 
On the whole, the growth of the state and co-operative 
bases in the sphere of internal trade is beyond doubt, 
both as regards wholesale and retail trade. 
Although the stateıs share of grain procurement is 
preponderant, nevertheless, it is not growing as much 
as it did last year, and that points to mistakes committed 
in the procurement of grain. The fact of the matter is 
that the miscalculation in regard to procurement was 
a miscalculation not only on the part of the Soviet 
bodies, but also of the Central Committee, for it is 
the latterıs duty to supervise the Soviet bodies, and it 
is responsible for everything they do. The miscalculation 
consists in the fact that when planning we failed 
to take into account that this year the state of the mar

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 327 
ket, the conditions for grain procurement, presented something 
new, something special, compared with last year 
and the year before. This is the first year in which we 
have come into the grain market without resorting to coercive 
administrative measures, in which we have reduced 
the burden of taxation, the tax pressure, to a minimum, 
and in which the peasants and the governmentıs agents 
come face to face in the market as equals. These were 
the circumstances that were left out of account by our 
planning bodies, which intended by January 1, 1926, to 
procure 70 per cent of the total grain procurement for the 
year. We failed to take into account the fact that the 
peasant is also able to manoeuvre, that he puts his currency 
commodity‹wheat‹into store for the future 
in anticipation of a further rise in prices, and prefers, 
for the time being, to come into the market with other, 
less valuable grain. That is what we failed to take into 
account. In view of this, the plan for grain procurement 
has been revised, and the plan for grain exports has 
been reduced, just as the plan for imports is also being 
correspondingly reduced. The exports and imports plan 
is being revised; it has to show a favourable balance 
of trade of not less than a hundred million rubles, but 
it has not yet been finally drawn up. 
4. Classes, Their Activity, 
Their Correlation 
The development of the national economy in the 
country has led to an improvement in the material conditions 
primarily of the working class. The declassing 
of the working class has become a thing of the remote

J. V. S T A L I N 328 
past. The restoration and growth of the working class 
are proceeding at a rapid rate. Here are the figures according 
to data of the Peopleıs Commissariat of Labour: 
on April 1,1924, counting all workers, in all forms of industry, 
including small-scale industry, including seasonal 
workers and agricultural labourers, we had 5,500,000 
workers, of whom 1,000,000 were agricultural labourers 
and 760,000 unemployed. On October 1, 1925, we already 
had over 7,000,000 workers, of whom 1,200,000 were 
agricultural labourers and 715,000 unemployed. The 
growth of the working class is beyond doubt. 
The average monthly wage per worker in industry as 
a whole, in chervonets rubles, amounted in April 1925 
to 35 rubles, or 62 per cent of the pre-war average. In 
September 1925 it was 50 rubles, or 88.5 per cent of the 
pre-war average. Some branches have exceeded the prewar 
level. The average daily real wage per worker in 
commodity rubles amounted in April 1925 to 0.88 ruble 
and in September 1925 to 1 ruble 21 kopeks. The average 
output per man-day worked in industry as a whole 
amounted, in pre-war rubles, to 4.18 in April 1924, but 
in 1925 it amounted to 6.14, i.e., 85 per cent of the prewar 
average. If we take the relation between wages and 
productivity of labour month by month we shall find 
that they run in parallel lines: when wages rise, productivity 
of labour rises. But in June and July wages 
rose; productivity of labour, however, rose less than 
wages. That was due to holidays and to the influx of 
new strata of workers‹semi-peasants‹into the mills 
and factories. 
Now as regards wage funds. According to data 
of the Peopleıs Commissariat of Labour, wage funds

FROM MARX 
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NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
329 
(I have in mind industry, leaving out other branches) 
amounted in 1923-24 to 808,000,000; in 1924-25 they 
amounted to over 1,200 million; the estimate for 1925-26 
is 1,700 million rubles. 
I shall not, comrades, speak of the needs for which 
the social insurance funds are used, everybody knows 
that. Permit me to mention one general figure to enable 
you to judge how much the proletarian state spends on 
workersı insurance. The total number of insured workers 
in 1924-25 was 6,700,000; the estimate for 1925-26 is 
7,000,000. The average assignment calculated on the 
wage budget amounted in 1924-25 to 14.6 per cent; the 
estimate for 1925-26 is 13.84 per cent. Expressing this 
in gross figures, the amount expended on this in 1924-25 
was 422,000,000 rubles; the estimate for 1925-26 is 
588,000,000. Perhaps it will not be superfluous to inform 
you that from the fund that was allocated last 
year a certain sum was left in the social insurance coffers, 
amounting to 71,000,000 rubles. 
As regards the peasants, the increase in the output 
of agriculture was naturally bound to be reflected in an 
improvement in the material conditions of the peasant 
population. According to data of our planning 
bodies, the personal consumption of the peasant population, 
the percentage increase in this consumption, is 
higher than the percentage increase in the consumption 
of the urban population. The peasant has begun to feed 
better, and he retains a far larger share of his production 
for himself, for his personal consumption, than was 
the case last year. 
What assistance did the proletarian state render 
the households of the poor peasants, those who had 
THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.)

J. V. S T A L I N 330 
suffered from the crop failure? The Peopleıs Commissariat 
of Finance calculates that financial assistance to poor 
peasants in 1924-25 amounted, in preliminary figures, 
not quite exact, to 100-105 million rubles, of which tax 
and insurance exemptions constituted about 60,000,000 
rubles; furthermore, disbursements from the fund for 
combating the consequences of the crop failure amounted 
to 24,000,000 rubles, and credits to 12,000,000 rubles. 
Assistance to victims of the crop failure in 1924 covered 
an area with a population of over 7,000,000. The 
total spent for this purpose amounted to 108-110 million 
rubles, of which 71,000,000 came from the state budget 
and 38,000,000 from the funds of public organisations 
and banking institutions. In addition to this, a 
fund of 77,000,000 was set up for combating drought. 
Such was the assistance that the proletarian state 
rendered the poor strata of the peasantry, inadequate 
assistance, of course, but such as deserves a word or two 
of comment. 
Improvement of the material conditions of the working 
class and of the peasantry is a fundamental premise 
of all progress in the sphere of our construction work. 
We see that this premise already exists. 
A few words about the increase in the activity of the 
masses. The chief thing in our internal situation, that 
which strikes the eye and which one cannot possibly 
get away from, is that as a consequence of the improvement 
in the material conditions of the workers and 
peasants there has been an increase in their political 
activity, they have become more critical in their attitude 
towards our shortcomings, they are speaking more loudly 
about the defects in our practical work. We have entered

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 331 
a period of greater activity of all classes and all 
social groupings. The working class has become more 
active, the peasantry, with all its groupings, has become 
more active, as also the new bourgeoisie, its agents 
in the countryside (the kulaks) and its representatives 
among the intelligentsia. This fact served as the basis for 
the turn in our policy which is expressed in the decisions 
of the Fourteenth Party Conference. The policy of revitalising 
the Soviets, the policy of revitalising the cooperatives 
and the trade unions, the concessions to 
the peasantry as regards precise regulation of questions 
of renting and leasing land and hiring labour, the material 
assistance for the poor peasants, the policy of a stable alliance 
with the middle peasants, the elimination of the 
remnants of war communism‹it is these, chiefly, that 
express the Partyıs new course in the countryside. You are 
well aware what the situation was in the countryside at 
the end of last year and in the beginning of this year. 
General discontent among the peasantry was growing, 
and here and there even attempts at revolt occurred. 
Those were the circumstances which determined the Partyıs 
new course in the countryside. 
Such are the foundations of the Partyıs policy towards 
the peasantry in the period of the rise in the activity 
and organisation of the masses; a policy calculated 
to regulate relationships in the countryside, to raise 
there the prestige of the proletariat and its Party, and 
to ensure a stable alliance of the proletariat and poor 
peasants with the middle peasantry. 
You know that this policy has fully justified 
itself.

J. V. S T A L I N 332 
5. Leninıs Three Slogans 
on the Peasant Question 
Did we act rightly in steering a course towards the 
middle peasantry? How does the matter stand with the 
new course from the aspect of principle? Have we any 
directives from Lenin on this score? 
It is said that the Second Congress of the Comintern 
adopted a resolution on the peasant question stating 
that only the poor peasants can be the ally of the proletariat 
in the epoch of the struggle for power, that the 
middle peasants can only be neutralised. Is that true? 
It is true. In writing that resolution,59 Lenin had in mind 
parties advancing towards power. We, however, are 
a party that has already come to power. That is where 
the difference lies. On the question of the peasantry, 
on the question of the alliance between the workers and 
the peasantry, or individual strata of the peasantry, 
Leninism has three basic slogans, corresponding to the 
three periods of the revolution. The whole point is correctly 
to discern the transition from one slogan to the 
next, and from that to the third. 
Formerly, when we were advancing towards the 
bourgeois revolution, when we Bolsheviks first outlined 
our tactics in relation to the peasantry, Lenin said: 
alliance with the whole of the peasantry against the tsar 
and the landlords, at the same time neutralising the 
Cadet bourgeoisie. With that slogan we, at that time, 
advanced towards the bourgeois revolution and we 
achieved victory. That was the first stage of our revolution. 
Later, when we had reached the second stage, October, 
Lenin issued a new slogan, corresponding to the new

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 333 
situation: alliance of the proletariat with the poor peasantry 
against all the bourgeois, at the same time neutralising 
the middle peasantry. That is a slogan essential 
for Communist Parties which are advancing towards 
power. And even when they have won power, but have 
not yet consolidated it, they cannot count on an alliance 
with the middle peasant. The middle peasant is a cautious 
man. He looks round to see who is going to come 
out on top, he waits, and only when you have gained the 
upper hand, when you have expelled the landlords and 
the bourgeois, does he enter into alliance with you. 
That is the nature of the middle peasant. Hence, at the 
second stage of the revolution we no longer advanced 
the slogan of alliance of the workers with the whole of 
the peasantry, but the slogan of alliance of the proletariat 
with the poor peasantry. 
And after that? After that, when we had sufficiently 
consolidated our power, when we had repulsed the attacks 
of the imperialists and had entered the period of 
extensive socialist construction, Lenin advanced a third 
slogan‹a stable alliance of the proletariat and poor peasantry 
with the middle peasantry. That is the only correct 
slogan corresponding to the new period of our revolution, 
the period of extensive construction. It is correct 
not only because we can now count on an alliance, 
but also because, in building socialism, we have to operate 
not only with millions, but tens of millions of 
people of the countryside. It is impossible to build socialism 
otherwise. Socialism does not embrace only the 
towns. Socialism is that organisation of economy which 
unites industry and agriculture on the basis of the socialisation 
of the means and instruments of production.

J. V. S T A L I N 334 
If those two branches of economy are not united, socialism 
is impossible. 
That is how the matter stands with the slogans 
of Leninism on alliance with the peasantry. 
What Lenin said at the Second Congress of the Comintern 
was absolutely correct, for when you are advancing 
towards power, or have not yet managed to consolidate 
power after capturing it, you can count only on an alliance 
with the poor peasantry and on neutralising the 
middle peasantry. But when you have consolidated your 
position, after you have captured power, have begun to 
build, and when you already have to operate with tens 
of millions of people, alliance of the proletariat and 
poor peasants with the middle peasants is the only correct 
slogan. 
This transition from the old slogan ³alliance of the 
proletariat with the poor peasantry,² from the old slogan 
of neutralising the middle peasantry to the slogan of a 
stable alliance with the middle peasantry, took place 
as far back as the Eighth Congress of our Party. Permit 
me to quote a passage from Ilyichıs speech in opening 
the congress. Here it is: 
³The best representatives of socialism of the old days‹ 
when they still believed in revolution and served it theoretically 
and ideologically‹spoke of neutralising the peasantry, i.e., of 
turning the middle peasantry into a social stratum which, if it 
did not actively aid the revolution of the proletariat, at least 
would not hinder it, would be neutral and not take the side of 
our enemies. This abstract, theoretical presentation of the problem 
is perfectly clear to us. But it is not enough. We have entered a 
phase of socialist construction in which we must draw up concrete 
and detailed basic rules and instructions which have been tested 
by the experience of our work in the countryside, and by which

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 335 
we must be guided in order to achieve a stable alliance with the middle 
peasantry.²*60 
Such is the theoretical basis of the Partyıs policy, 
calculated to achieve in the present historical period 
a stable alliance with the middle peasantry. 
Whoever thinks of using the resolution of the Second 
Congress of the Comintern, which Lenin wrote, to refute 
these words of Leninıs, let him say so frankly. 
That is how the question stands in theory. We do 
not take a separate part of Leninıs teaching, we take 
the whole. Lenin had three slogans in relation to the 
peasantry: one‹during the bourgeois revolution, another 
‹during the October Revolution, and a third‹after 
the consolidation of the power of the Soviets. Whoever 
thinks of substituting some single general slogan for 
these three, commits a very gross error. 
That is how the question stands in theory. In practice, 
it stands as follows: after carrying through the 
October Revolution, after expelling the landlords and 
distributing the land among the peasants, it is clear 
that we have made Russia into a more or less middlepeasant 
country, as Lenin expressed i t , and today 
the middle peasants constitute the majority in the 
countryside, notwithstanding the process of differentiation. 
Differentiation is, of course, proceeding. Under 
NEP at the present stage, it cannot be otherwise. But 
it is proceeding at a slow pace. Recently, I read a handbook, 
issued, I think, by the Agitation and Propaganda 
* All italics mine.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 336 
Department of the Central Committee, and another 
handbook, issued, if I am not mistaken, by the Agitation 
and Propaganda Department of the Leningrad 
organisation. If we are to believe these handbooks, it 
appears that under the tsar the poor peasants in this 
country constituted somewhere about 60 per cent, but 
now they constitute 75 per cent; that under the tsar the 
kulaks constituted 5 per cent, but now‹8 or 12 per cent; 
under the tsar there were so many middle peasants, but 
now there are fewer. I donıt want to indulge in strong 
language, but it must be said that these figures are worse 
than counter-revolution. How can a man who thinks in 
a Marxist way invent a thing like that, and print it, too, 
and in a handbook at that? As a member of the Central 
Committee, I, too, of course, am answerable for this 
incredible blunder. If, under the tsar, a policy of creating 
kulaks was practised, private property in land 
existed and land could be bought and sold (which exceptionally 
aggravates differentiation), if the government 
was such that it forced differentiation to the utmost, 
and, for all that, the poor peasants constituted no more 
than 60 per cent, how could it happen that under our 
government, under the Soviet Government, when private 
property in land does not exist, i.e., the land is 
withdrawn from circulation and, consequently, this 
obstacle to differentiation exists, after we have been 
busy with dekulakisation for a couple of years and to 
this day have not abandoned all methods of dekulakisation, 
when we are conducting a special credit and cooperative 
policy which is unfavourable to differentiation 
‹how could it happen that with these obstacles it turns 
out, allegedly, that there is much more differentiation

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 337 
today than under the tsar, many more kulaks and poor 
peasants than in the past? How can people who call 
themselves Marxists talk such absurd nonsense? It is 
at once comic and tragic. (Laughter.) 
The same must be said about the ill-starred grain 
and fodder balance sheet issued by the Central Statistical 
Board in June, according to which the well-to-do peasants 
held 61 per cent of the surplus market grain, the 
poor peasants none, while the middle peasants held the 
rest. The funny thing about this is that a few months 
later the C.S.B. came out with a different figure: not 
61 per cent, but 52 per cent. And recently, the C.S.B. has 
given a figure, not 52 per cent this time, but 42 per cent. 
Is that the way to calculate? We believe that the C.S.B. 
is a citadel of science. We are of the opinion that without 
the C.S.B.ıs figures not a single administrative body could 
calculate or plan. We consider that the C.S.B. should provide 
objective statistics free from all pre-conceived opinions, 
for the attempt to fit statistics to any pre-conceived 
opinion is a crime. But, after this, how can we 
believe the C.S.B.ıs figures if it has ceased to believe 
them itself? 
More briefly. Since we have made the countryside 
middle-peasant in character as a result of the agrarian revolution, 
since the middle peasants constitute the majority 
in the countryside, in spite of the process of differentiation, 
and since our work of construction and Leninıs cooperative 
plan call for the enlistment of the bulk of the 
peasant masses in this work, then the policy of alliance 
with the middle peasants is, under NEP conditions, the 
only correct policy. 
Such is the practical aspect of the question.

J. V. S T A L I N 338 
See how Lenin formulated our tasks when he gave 
the grounds for the New Economic Policy. Before me 
lies the draft of the pamphlet The Tax in Kind, written 
by Lenin, in which he clearly and distinctly gives the 
fundamental guiding lines: 
³Now, increasing the output of produce is becoming (has 
become) the pivot, the touchstone. . . . Consequently: Œstakeı on 
the middle peasants in agriculture. 
³The diligent peasant as the Œcentral figureı of our economic 
upsurge² (see Vol. XXVI, pp. 312-13). 
Thus, stake on the middle peasant in agriculture, 
the diligent peasant as the central figure of our economic 
upsurge. That is what Comrade Lenin wrote 
in 1921. 
It was this idea, comrades, that served as the basis 
of the decisions and of the concessions to the peasantry 
adopted at the Fourteenth, April, Conference of our 
Party. 
In what relation do the resolutions of the Fourteenth, 
April, Party Conference stand to the resolution on work 
among the poor peasants that the Central Committee 
unanimously adopted in October, 61 just as it unanimously 
adopted the resolutions of the Fourteenth Conference? 
The main task that confronted us at the October 
Plenum of the Central Committee was to prevent the 
disruption of the policy we had worked out at the April 
Conference, the policy of a stable alliance with the middle 
peasants; to prevent the disruption of this policy, for 
sentiments were observed in the Party expressing the 
view that the policy of a stable alliance with the middle 
peasants was wrong or unsuitable. Sentiments were also

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 339 
observed expressing the view that the policy of a stable 
alliance with the middle peasants implied forgetting 
the poor peasants, that somebody was trying to bring 
about a stable alliance with the middle peasants over 
the heads of the poor peasants. That is silly, comrades, 
but it is a fact, for such sentiments did exist. Was the 
question of the poor peasants something new for us when 
we gathered at the October Plenum? Of course not. 
As long as there are poor peasants, we must be in alliance 
with them. We learned that as far back as 1903, when 
Leninıs pamphlet To the Village Poor62 first appeared. 
Precisely because we are Marxists, because we are Communists, 
we must lean on the poor peasants in the countryside. 
Upon whom else can we lean? This question is 
not a new one; there was nothing new in it for us, whether 
in April or in October, whether at the conference or at 
the plenum of the Central Committee, nor could there 
be anything new in it. If the question of the poor peasants 
did come up after all, it did so in connection with the 
experience we had gained during the elections to the 
Soviets. What did we find? We had revitalised the Soviets. 
We had begun to implant Soviet democracy. 
But what for? After all, Soviet democracy means leadership 
by the working class. No Soviet democracy can be 
called genuinely Soviet and genuinely proletarian democracy 
if there is no leadership there by the proletariat 
and by its Party. But what does Soviet democracy 
with the leadership of the proletariat mean? It means 
that the proletariat must have its agents in the countryside. 
Who must those agents be? Representatives of 
the poor peasants. But in what condition did the poor 
peasants find themselves when we revitalised the Soviets?

J. V. S T A L I N 340 
In the most scattered and dispersed condition. It seemed, 
not only to certain elements among the poor peasants, 
but also to certain Communists, that abandoning dekulakisation 
and administrative pressure meant abandoning 
the poor peasants, forgetting their interests. And 
instead of conducting an organised struggle against the 
kulaks, they began to whine in the most disgraceful 
manner. 
What had to be done to overcome those sentiments? 
Firstly, it was necessary to carry out the task that the 
Fourteenth Party Conference had set the Party, i.e., 
to define the conditions, methods and measures for providing 
material assistance for the poor peasants. Secondly, 
it was necessary to issue the slogan of organising special 
groups of poor peasants for conducting an open political 
struggle to win over the middle peasants and to 
isolate the kulaks during the elections to the Soviets, 
elections in the co-operatives, etc. 
That is exactly what Comrade Molotov did in the 
theses on work among the poor peasants, as a result of 
his three monthsı work on the Rural Commission of the 
Central Committee, theses that were unanimously approved 
by the October Plenum of the Central Committee. 
As you see, the resolution of the October Plenum 
of the Central Committee is the direct continuation of 
the decisions of the Fourteenth Conference. 
It was necessary, firstly, to present the question of 
material assistance concretely, so as to improve the 
material conditions of the poor peasants; and, secondly, 
it was necessary to issue the slogan of organising the 
poor peasants. That is the new feature, the credit for

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 341 
which belongs wholly to Comrade Molotov; the slogan 
of organising groups of poor peasants was his idea. 
Why was the slogan of organising groups of poor 
peasants needed? It was needed in order to put an end 
to the dispersion of the poor peasants and to give them 
an opportunity of organising, with the aid of the Communists, 
into an independent political force capable 
of serving as an organised bulwark of the proletariat 
in the countryside in the struggle against the kulaks, 
in the struggle to win over the middle peasants. The 
poor peasants are still imbued with a dependent mentality; 
they put their hopes in the GPU, in officials, 
in whatever you like, except in themselves, in their 
own strength. It is from this passivity and dependent 
mentality that the minds of the poor peasants must be 
freed. We must issue the slogan for the poor peasants 
that they must, at last, stand on their own feet, that 
they must, with the aid of the Communist Party and 
with the aid of the state, organise themselves into groups; 
that in the arena of the Soviets, in the arena of the cooperatives, 
in the arena of the Peasant Committees, in 
all the arenas of rural public life, they must learn to 
fight the kulaks, to fight, however, not by appealing 
to the GPU, but by a political struggle, by an organised 
struggle. Only in that way can the poor peasants become 
steeled, only in that way can the poor peasants be organised, 
only in that way can the poor peasants be transformed 
from a dependent group into a bulwark of the 
proletariat in the countryside. 
That is why the question of the poor peasants was 
brought forward in October.

J. V. S T A L I N 342 
6. Two Dangers and Two Deviations 
in Regard to the Peasant Question 
In connection with the peasant question, two deviations 
are observed in our Party. A deviation in the direction 
of belittling the kulak danger, and a deviation in 
the direction of exaggerating it, in the direction of belittling 
and under-estimating the role of the middle peasants. 
I will not say that there is anything fatal for us 
in these deviations. A deviation is a deviation; a deviation 
is something that has not yet taken definite shape. 
A deviation is the beginning of an error. Either we 
allow this error to develop‹and then things will 
become serious; or we nip it in the bud‹and then the 
danger will be removed. A deviation is something erroneous 
that will produce its results later if not checked in 
time. 
A word or two about under-estimating the kulak 
danger. There is talk about a kulak deviation. That is 
foolish, of course. There cannot be a kulak deviation in 
the Party. The point at issue is not a kulak deviation, 
but a deviation in the direction of under-estimating the 
kulak danger. Even if nobody had fallen victim to this 
deviation, even if nobody had adopted the standpoint 
of this deviation, some people would have done so eventually, 
because development in our country is proceeding 
in the direction of some revival of capitalism, and the 
revival of capitalism is bound to create confusion 
around our Party. On the other hand, socialist industry 
is developing in our country, and a struggle is going on 
between it and private capital. Which will outstrip the 
other? At present, preponderance is on the side of the

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 343 
socialist elements. We shall get both the kulaks and the 
urban private capitalists under our control. So far, however, 
the fact remains that the kulaks are growing, and we 
have not beaten them economically by a long way yet. The 
kulaks are mustering their forces, that is indisputable; 
and whoever fails to see this, whoever says that this is 
of no importance, that the kulak is a bogey, puts the 
Party in danger of losing its vigilance and of finding 
itself disarmed in the struggle against the kulaks, in 
the struggle against capitalism, for the kulak is the agent 
of capitalism in the countryside. 
There is talk about Bogushevsky. Of course, his is 
not a kulak deviation. His deviation is in the direction 
of under-estimating the kulak danger. If his were a kulak 
deviation, he would have to be expelled from the Party. 
Up to now, however, as far as I know, nobody has demanded 
his expulsion from the Party. This deviation is in 
the direction of under-estimating the kulak danger in 
the countryside, a deviation which hinders us from 
keeping the Party in a constant state of readiness for the 
struggle, and which disarms the Party in its struggle 
against the capitalist elements; as is known, this deviation 
was condemned by the decision of the Central Committee 
of the Party. 
But there is another deviation‹in the direction of 
over-estimating the kulak danger, in the direction of 
consternation in face of the kulak danger, in the direction 
of panic: ³The kulak is coming, help!² A strange 
thing! People introduced NEP, knowing that NEP 
is a revival of capitalism, a revival of the kulaks, 
that the kulaks would inevitably raise their heads. 
But it was enough for the kulaks to appear for people

J. V. S T A L I N 344 
to start shouting ³help!² and to lose their heads. And 
their consternation reached such a point that they forgot 
about the middle peasants. And yet, the basic task in 
the countryside at the present time lies in the fight to 
win over the middle peasants, the fight to wrest the middle 
peasants from the kulaks, the fight to isolate the kulaks 
by establishing a stable alliance with the middle peasants. 
That is forgotten by those comrades who have 
become panic-stricken in the face of the kulak danger. 
I think that if we delved down to the roots of these 
two deviations it would be possible to trace them to the 
following starting points. 
The first deviation consists in belittling the role of 
the kulaks, and of the capitalist elements generally, in 
the countryside, in slurring over the kulak danger. It 
starts out from the wrong assumption that the development 
of NEP does not lead to the revival of the capitalist 
elements in the countryside, that in our country 
the kulaks, and the capitalist elements generally, are 
passing, or have already passed, into the sphere of history, 
that differentiation is not taking place in the countryside, 
that the kulaks are an echo of the past, a bogey, 
and nothing more. 
What does that deviation lead to? 
In practice, that deviation leads to the denial of 
the class struggle in the countryside. 
The second deviation consists in exaggerating the 
role of the kulaks, and of the capitalist elements generally, 
in the countryside, in becoming panic-stricken in 
the face of those elements, in denying that an alliance of 
the proletariat and poor peasants with the middle peasants 
is possible and expedient.

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 345 
That deviation starts from the belief that what is 
taking place in the countryside is a simple restoration 
of capitalism, that this process of the restoration of capitalism 
is an all-absorbing process that also embraces the 
whole, or the overwhelming part, of our co-operatives, 
that the result of such a development must be a continuous 
and large-scale growth of differentiation among the 
peasantry, that the extreme groups, i.e., the kulaks and 
the poor peasants, must grow in strength and numbers 
year by year, while year by year, too, the middle groups, 
i.e., the middle peasants, grow weaker and melt away. 
In practice, that deviation leads to fomenting class 
struggle in the countryside, to a reversion to the dekulakisation 
policy of the Poor Peasantsı Committees, 
consequently, to proclaiming civil war in our country, 
and thus to the disruption of all our work of construction, 
and thereby to the repudiation of Leninıs 
co-operative plan for drawing the millions of peasant 
farms into the system of socialist construction. 
You will ask: which deviation is worse? It is wrong 
to put the question that way. One is as bad as the other. 
And if those deviations are allowed to develop they may 
disintegrate and destroy the Party. Fortunately there 
are forces in our Party capable of ridding it of both deviations. 
(Applause.) Although one deviation is as bad 
as the other, and it is foolish to ask which of them is 
more dangerous, nevertheless, there is another point of 
view from which these two deviations must be approached. 
Against which deviation is the Party best prepared 
to fight‹the first or the second? That is how, in practice, 
the question should be put. Both deviations are dangerous, 
one is as bad as the other; it is wrong to ask which of

J. V. S T A L I N 346 
them is more dangerous; but it is possible and necessary 
to ask: against which deviation is the Party best prepared 
to fight? If we were to ask Communists what the Party 
is better prepared for‹to strip the kulaks, or not to do 
that but to go in for an alliance with the middle peasants‹
I think that 99 Communists out of 100 would say 
that the Party is best prepared for the slogan: strike at 
the kulaks. Just let them‹they would strip the kulaks 
in a moment. As for refraining from dekulakisation 
and pursuing the more complex policy of isolating 
the kulaks by entering into an alliance with the middle 
peasants‹that is something not so easily assimilated. 
That is why I think that in its struggle against both deviations, 
the Party must, after all, concentrate its fire on 
the second deviation. (Applause.) No talk of Marxism, 
no talk of Leninism can cover up the thesis that the kulaks 
are dangerous. The kulaks are kulaks, they are dangerous, 
no matter how much Bogushevsky may talk about bogeys. 
No quotations can obliterate this from the mind of a 
Communist. But the thesis that a stable alliance with 
the middle peasants is necessary‹although Ilyich, in 
the resolution of the Second Congress, wrote about neutralising 
the middle peasants‹this thesis can always 
be slurred over, obscured with phrases about Leninism, 
about Marxism. Here there is a rich field for quotations, 
here there is a rich field for everyone who wants to confuse 
the Party, who wants to conceal the truth from the 
Party, the truth that in relation to the peasantry Lenin 
had not one, but three slogans. Here, all sorts of manipulations 
can be performed in regard to Marxism. And 
precisely for that reason, fire must be concentrated on 
the second deviation.

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 347 
That is how the matter stands with the question of 
the internal situation in the Union, its economy, its industry 
and agriculture, the classes, the activity of the 
classes, the revitalisation of the Soviets, the peasantry, 
and so forth. 
I shall not stop to deal with certain questions concerning 
the state apparatus, which is growing and is 
striving to escape from leadership by the Party, in 
which, of course, it will not succeed. 
Nor shall I speak about the bureaucracy of our state 
apparatus; I shall not do so because my report has already 
taken too long. I shall not deal with that question 
because it is in no way a new one for the Party. 
7. The Partyıs Tasks 
I pass to the Partyıs tasks in the sphere of internal 
policy. 
In the sphere of developing the national economy as 
a whole we must conduct work: 
a) in the direction of further increasing the output 
of the national economy; 
b) in the direction of transforming our country from 
an agrarian into an industrial country; 
c) in the direction of ensuring within the national 
economy a decisive preponderance of the socialist elements 
over the capitalist elements; 
d) in the direction of ensuring for the national economy 
of the Soviet Union the necessary independence in 
the circumstances of capitalist encirclement; 
e) in the direction of increasing the proportion of 
non-tax revenue in the total state budget.

J. V. S T A L I N 348 
In the sphere of industry and agriculture we must 
conduct work: 
a) in the direction of expanding our socialist industry 
on a higher technical level, of increasing the productivity 
of labour, reducing the cost of production and accelerating 
the turn-over of capital; 
b) in the direction of bringing the balance of output 
of fuel and metals, and also the fixed capital of railway 
transport, into conformity with the countryıs growing 
requirements; 
c) in the direction of accelerating the development 
of Soviet local industry; 
d) in the direction of increasing the fertility of the 
soil, raising the technical level of agriculture, developing 
the cultivation of industrial crops, industrialising 
agriculture; 
e) in the direction of drawing the scattered peasant 
farms into socialist construction by organising co-operatives 
on a mass scale and by raising the cultural level 
of the peasantry. 
In the sphere of trade we must conduct work: 
a) in the direction of expanding further and improving 
the quality of the network of trading channels (cooperatives 
of all kinds, state trade); 
b) in the direction of accelerating trade turn-over to 
the utmost; 
c) in the direction of reducing retail prices and further 
increasing the preponderance of Soviet and co-operative 
trade over private trade; 
d) in the direction of establishing a united front and 
strict discipline in procurement among all the procurement 
bodies;

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 349 
e) in the direction of increasing the trade turn-over 
with the outside world, while ensuring a favourable 
balance of trade, and hence, a favourable balance of 
payments, which is an indispensable condition for maintaining 
the stability of our currency and a necessary guarantee 
against inflation. 
In the sphere of planning, we must conduct work 
in the direction of absolutely ensuring the necessary reserves. 
A word or two, by the way, about one of the sourcesof 
reserves‹vodka. There are people who think that it 
is possible to build socialism in white gloves. That is 
a very gross mistake, comrades. Since we are not receiving 
loans, since we are poor in capital, and since, 
furthermore, we cannot go into bondage to the West- 
European capitalists, not being able to accept the enslaving 
terms that they offer us and which we have rejected, 
only one alternative remains‹to seek sources in other 
spheres. After all, that is better than bondage. Here we 
have to choose between bondage and vodka, and those 
people who think that it is possible to build socialism 
in white gloves are grievously mistaken. 
In the sphere of the correlation of classes we must conduct 
work: 
a) in the direction of ensuring an alliance of the proletariat 
and the poor peasants with the middle peasants; 
b) in the direction of ensuring the leadership of the 
proletariat in this alliance; 
c) in the direction of politically isolating and economically 
ousting the kulaks and the urban capitalists. 
In the sphere of Soviet affairs we must work in the 
direction of a resolute struggle against bureaucracy, in

J. V. S T A L I N 350 
the direction of enlisting the broad masses of the working 
class in this struggle. 
I should like to say a word or two about the new bourgeoisie 
and its ideologists‹the Smena-Vekhites. Smena- 
Vekhism is the ideology of the new bourgeoisie, which 
is growing and little by little linking up with the kulaks 
and the intelligentsia in the government service. The 
new bourgeoisie has put forward its own ideology, the 
Smena-Vekh ideology, which consists in the view that 
the Communist Party is bound to degenerate and the 
new bourgeoisie to consolidate itself, while it appears 
that, without ourselves noticing it, we Bolsheviks are 
bound to reach the threshold of the democratic republic, 
then to cross that threshold and, with the assistance 
of some ³Caesar,² who will come forward, perhaps from 
the ranks of the military, or perhaps from the government 
service officials, to find ourselves in the position 
of an ordinary bourgeois republic. 
Such is the new ideology with which attempts are 
being made to fool our government service intelligentsia, 
and not only them, but also certain circles that stand close 
to us. I shall not refute the thesis that our Party is degenerating. 
It is not worth while refuting nonsense. Our 
Party is not degenerating, and will not do so. It is not 
made of such stuff, and it was not forged by such a man, 
that it should degenerate. (Applause.) Our cadres, young 
and old, are growing ideologically. It is a fortunate thing 
for us that we have managed to publish several editions 
of Leninıs Works. People are now reading, learning and 
beginning to understand. Not only the leaders, but also 
the average Party members are beginning to understand, 
and they cannot be fooled. Shouting about degeneration

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 351 
will not frighten anybody now. People will be able to see 
clearly for themselves. Those others can shout as much as 
they please, they may try to frighten us with quotations 
as much as they please, but the average Party member 
will listen and see clearly, because he now has the works 
of Lenin in his hands. (Applause.) That fact is one of 
the fundamental guarantees that our Party will not 
depart from the path of Leninism. (Loud applause.) 
If I have mentioned the Smena-Vekhites after all, 
it is only in order to answer in a few words all those who 
are counting on the degeneration of our Party and our 
Central Committee. Ustryalov is the author of this ideology. 
He is in the transport service. It is said that he 
is serving well. I think that if he is serving well, let 
him go on dreaming about the degeneration of our Party. 
Dreaming is not prohibited in our country. Let him dream 
to his heartıs content. But let him know that while dreaming 
about our degeneration, he must, at the same time, 
bring grist to our Bolshevik mill. Otherwise, it will go 
badly with him. (Applause.)
III 
THE PARTY 
I pass to the question of the Party. I do not put the 
Party at the end of my report because it is the last in 
importance of all the factors of our development. No, 
not because of that, but because, with us, the Party crowns 
the whole edifice. 
I have spoken about the successes that the proletarian 
dictatorship has achieved in the sphere of foreign and internal 
policy, in the sphere of manoeuvring abroad, in

J. V. S T A L I N 352 
the circumstances of the capitalist encirclement, and in 
the sphere of socialist construction within the country. 
But these successes would not have been possible had our 
Party not been equal to its tasks, had it not grown and 
gained strength. The Partyıs importance in this respect, 
as the guiding force, is immeasurable. The dictatorship 
of the proletariat is not exercised automatically; it is 
exercised primarily by the Partyıs forces, under its leadership. 
Without the Partyıs leadership, in the present 
conditions of capitalist encirclement, the dictatorship 
of the proletariat would be impossible. It would 
be enough to shake the Party, to weaken it, for the dictatorship 
of the proletariat to be shaken and weakened in 
an instant. It is precisely for this reason that all the bourgeois 
in all countries talk with such fury about our Party. 
By that I do not at all mean to say that our Party 
is identical with the state. Not in the least. The Party 
is the guiding force in our state. It would be foolish to 
say on these grounds, as some comrades do, that the Political 
Bureau is the supreme organ in the state. That is 
not true. It is a confusion that brings grist to the mill 
of our enemies. The Political Bureau is the supreme organ 
not of the state, but of the Party, while the Party is 
the supreme guiding force in the state. The Central Committee 
and the Political Bureau are organs of the Party. 
I do not want to identify the state institutions with the 
Party. All I want to say is that in all the fundamental 
questions of our internal and foreign policy, the Party 
has played the leading role. And it was solely due to 
this that we achieved successes in our internal and foreign 
policy. That is why the question of the Partyıs composition, 
of its ideological level, of the Partyıs cadres, of

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 353 
its ability to guide in the presentation of questions 
concerning economic construction and Soviet affairs, 
of its weight in the working class and among the peasantry, 
and, lastly, of its internal condition generally‹is a 
fundamental question of our policy. 
First of all, about the Partyıs composition. The total 
numerical strength of the Party by April 1, 1924, 
not including the Lenin Enrolment, amounted to 446,000 
Party members and candidates. Of these, workers numbered 
196,000, i.e., 44 per cent; peasants, 128,000, i.e., 
28.8 per cent; office employees and others, 121,000, 
i.e., 27.2 per cent. By July 1, 1925, we had in the Party 
not 446,000, but 911,000 members and candidates; of 
these, workers‹534,000, i.e., 58.6 per cent; peasants‹ 
216,000, i.e., 23.8 per cent; office employees and others‹ 
160,000, i.e., 17.6 per cent. On November 1, 1925, we 
had 1,025,000 Communists. 
What percentage of the working class (if we take the 
whole working class) is organised in our Party? At the 
Thirteenth Congress I said in my report on organisation 
that the total number of workers in our country was 
4,100,000 (including agricultural workers). I did not then 
include the workers employed in small industry who could 
not be counted, as social insurance had not yet been extended 
to them and statistics did not deal with them. At 
that time I gave the figures for January 1924. Later, 
when it became possible to take into account the workers 
employed in small industry, it was found that by July 1, 
1924, the total number of workers was 5,500,000, 
including agricultural workers. Of these, 390,000 
workers, i.e., 7 per cent of the entire working class, 
were in the Party. By July 1, 1925, the workers

J. V. S T A L I N 354 
numbered 6,500,000; of these, 534,000, i.e., 8 per cent 
of the entire working class, were in the Party. By 
October 1, 1925, we had 7,000,000 workers, agricultural 
and industrial, of small, medium and large-scale 
industry without distinction. Of these, 570,000, i.e., 
8 per cent, were in the Party. 
I am saying all this in order to show how unreasonable 
it is to talk about getting 90 per cent of the entire 
working class in the country organised in the Party in 
one or two years. 
Now let us see in what proportion the working class 
section of the R.C.P.(B.) stands to the number of workers 
employed in statistically registered industry. The number 
of permanent workers, not seasonal, in large-scale 
statistically registered industry, state and non-state, 
including also the war industry, the chief railway 
workshops and main depots‹the number of workers 
in all these branches, by January 1, 1924, was 1,605,000. 
At that time we had 196,000 workers in the Party. 
That amounts to 12 per cent of the total number of 
workers employed in large-scale industry. If, however, 
we take the number of workers at the bench who are 
Party members and see what percentage of the total 
number of workers employed in large-scale industry 
they represent, we shall find that by January 1 we had 
in the Party 83,000 workers at the bench, and that they 
constituted 5 per cent of the total number of workers 
employed in large-scale industry. All this was by January 
1, 1924. By June 1, 1924, 1,780,000 workers were 
employed in large-scale industry; in the Party at that 
time there were 389,000 workers, i.e., 21.8 per cent of 
the total number of workers employed in large-scale

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 355 
industry. Of workers at the bench, there were 267,000 
in the Party, i.e., 15 per cent of the total number of workers 
employed in large-scale industry. By January 1, 1925, 
1,845,000 workers were employed in large-scale statistically 
registered industry; the total number of workers in 
the Party, those at the bench and those not at the 
bench, was 429,000, i.e., 23.2 per cent of the total number 
of workers employed in large-scale industry; of workers at 
the bench, we had in the Party 302,000, i.e., 16.3 per 
cent of the total number of workers employed in largescale 
industry. By July 1, 1925, 2,094,000 workers were 
employed in large-scale industry; the number of workers 
in the Party was 534,000, i.e., 25.5 per cent; the number of 
workers at the bench was 383,000, i.e., 18.2 percent of the 
total number of workers employed in large-scale industry. 
You see that, whereas in relation to the entire working 
class the growth of the proportion of workers organised 
in the Party to the total working class is slower than 
the growth of the working class itself, in large-scale 
industry we have the opposite: the growth of the percentage 
of workers in the Party is faster than the growth of 
the working class in large-scale industry. That must 
be noted in order to have in mind what our Partyıs 
complexion is like when we speak of its working-class 
core; it consists mainly of workers employed in largescale 
industry. 
Can we now, looking at all this, speak of bringing 
the number of workers at the bench in the Party up to 
90 per cent in the course of one year? No, we cannot, 
because we do not want to indulge in fantasy. Because, 
since we have 380,000 workers at the bench in the Party, 
then, to get all the rest‹that is about 700,000 not at the

J. V. S T A L I N 356 
bench‹to constitute 10 per cent, we would have to raise 
the Party membership in the course of one year to 
7,000,000. The comrades have simply failed to count, and 
have put their foot in it with their figure of 90 per cent. 
Is the Partyıs weight in the working class growing? 
This self-evident truth scarcely needs proof. You know 
that our Party is, in essence, a party elected by the working 
class. In this respect we have achieved what no other 
party in the world has achieved. This fact alone shows 
that our Partyıs weight in the ranks of the working 
class is immeasurable, and that our Party enjoys a monopoly 
in the working class. 
As regards our Partyıs weight in the countryside, 
the situation is rather displeasing. At the time of the 
Thirteenth Congress, the rural population from the age 
of 18 to 60 in our country amounted to 53,000,000; at 
the time of the Fourteenth Congress it is over 54,000,000. 
But the Communists in village units of the Party at the 
time of the Thirteenth Congress numbered 136,000, i.e., 
0.26 per cent of the total adult rural population; at the 
time of the Fourteenth Congress we have 202,000 peasants 
in the Party, i.e., 0.37 per cent. Our Partyıs growth in 
the countryside is terribly slow. I do not mean to say 
that it ought to grow by leaps and bounds, but the percentage 
of the peasantry that we have in the Party is, 
after all, very insignificant. Our Party is a workersı 
party. Workers will always preponderate in it. That is 
an expression of the fact that we have the dictatorship 
of the proletariat. But it is also clear that without 
an alliance with the peasantry the dictatorship of the 
proletariat is impossible, that the Party must have a 
certain percentage of the best people among the peas

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 357 
antry in its ranks as an essential foothold in the 
countryside. From this aspect, matters are still far 
from well. 
Further, I must note a general rise in our Partyıs 
ideological level. As regards the organisational side, 
Comrade Molotov will report to you and, therefore, I shall 
not dwell on it; but I cannot refrain from saying one 
thing, namely, that all the evidence shows that the ideological 
level of our leading cadres, young and old, has 
risen considerably. One could take as an example the discussion 
we had with Trotskyism last year. As you know, 
the point at issue was the revision of Leninism, changing 
the leadership of the Party while on the march, so to 
speak. How solidly the Party encountered that anti-Party 
wave, you all know. What does that show? It shows that 
the Party has grown up. Its cadres have become strong; 
it is not afraid of discussion. Today, unfortunately, we 
have entered the period of a new discussion. I am sure 
that the Party will quickly get over this discussion too 
and nothing exceptional can happen. (Voices: ³Quite 
right!² Applause.) In order not to anticipate events 
and not to irritate people, I shall not at the present 
moment touch upon the essence of the Leningrad comradesı 
behaviour at their conference and upon the way the 
Moscow comrades reacted to it. I think that the members 
of this congress will speak about that themselves, and I 
shall sum up in my reply to the discussion. 
I am coming to the end of my report. 
I have spoken about our foreign policy, about the 
contradictions that are corroding the capitalist world. 
I said that those contradictions can be overcome only by 
a workersı revolution in the West.

J. V. S T A L I N 358 
Furthermore, I have spoken about the contradictions 
within the framework of which our interrelations, the 
interrelations between the Soviet Union and the capitalist 
states, develop. I said that those states will strive 
to convert our country into an appendage of the capitalist 
system, that they will try intervention against us, but 
that we shall repel them; that in this we count on the 
utmost support of the working class in the West, particularly 
after the workers of the West have begun to visit 
us frequently and to fraternise with us. Moreover, we 
are of the opinion that for the capitalists this fraternisation 
will not be without its cost. We are overcoming 
those contradictions too. But in the last analysis, we 
cannot overcome the contradictions outside our country 
between the capitalist world and the socialist world solely 
by our own efforts; for that we need the assistance of a 
victorious proletarian revolution in a number of countries. 
Furthermore, I have spoken about the contradictions 
within our country, between the capitalist elements and 
the socialist elements. I said that we can overcome these 
contradictions by our own efforts. Whoever does not believe 
that this is possible is a liquidator, does not believe 
that we can build socialism. We shall overcome these contradictions; 
we are already doing so. Of course, the 
sooner assistance comes from the West the better, the 
sooner shall we overcome these contradictions in order 
to deliver the finishing stroke to private capital and to 
achieve the complete victory of socialism in our country, 
the building of a complete socialist society. But even if we 
do not receive outside assistance we shall not become despondent, 
we shall not cry out for help, we shall not abandon 
our work (applause) and we shall not be daunted

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 359 
by difficulties. Whoever is weary, whoever is scared 
by difficulties, whoever is losing his head, let him make 
way for those who have retained their courage and staunchness. 
(Applause.) We are not the kind of people to 
be scared by difficulties. We are Bolsheviks, we have been 
steeled by Lenin, and we do not run away from difficulties, 
but face them and overcome them. (Voices: ³Quite 
right!² Applause.) 
Furthermore, comrades, I have spoken about our 
Partyıs successes and mistakes. Of mistakes there 
have been not a few. In the field of foreign trade, in 
the field of procurement, and in several other of our 
fields of work there have been not a few mistakes. Ilyich 
taught us not to become conceited. We shall not become 
conceited. There have been not a few mistakes. But there 
are also successes. Whatever the case may be, we have 
achieved one thing that cannot possibly be taken from 
us, namely, that by our extensive constructive work, by 
our Bolshevik assault on the economic front, by the successes 
we have gained in this field, we have shown the 
whole world that the workers, after capturing power, 
are able not only to beat capitalism, not only to destroy, 
but also to build the new society, to build socialism. 
That achievement, the fact that we have made this truth 
obvious, nobody can take from us. That is the biggest and 
most difficult of all our achievements up to now. For we 
have shown the working class of the West and the oppressed 
peoples of the East that the workers, who throughout 
history were able only to work for masters, while 
the masters governed, that these workers, after capturing 
power, have proved capable of governing a great country, 
of building socialism under the most difficult conditions.

J. V. S T A L I N 360 
What is needed to enable the proletarians of the West 
to win? First of all, confidence in their own strength, 
the consciousness that the working class can do without 
the bourgeoisie, that the working class is capable not 
only of destroying the old, but also of building the new, 
of building socialism. The entire work of Social-Democracy 
consists in imbuing the workers with scepticism, with 
distrust in their own strength, with disbelief in the possibility 
of achieving victory over the bourgeoisie by force. 
The significance of all our work, of all our construction, 
lies in that this work and this construction convince 
the working class in the capitalist countries that 
it can do without the bourgeoisie and can build the new 
society by its own efforts. 
The workersı pilgrimages to our country, the fact 
that the workersı delegations that come to our country 
probe every detail of our work of construction and try 
to get the feel of our successes in construction, all 
this shows that, in spite of the Social-Democrats, the 
working class in the capitalist countries is beginning 
to acquire confidence in its own strength and in the ability 
of the working class to build the new society on the 
ruins of the old. 
I do not say that we have achieved much during the 
year under review, but, after all, one thing must be admitted, 
namely, that by our successes in socialist construction 
we have demonstrated and proved that the working 
class, after overthrowing the bourgeoisie and taking 
power into its own hands, is capable of rebuilding 
capitalist society on a socialist basis. This we have 
achieved, and nobody can take this from us, whatever 
happens. This success is inestimable. For what does its

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 361 
achievement mean? It means giving the workers in the 
capitalist countries confidence in their own strength, confidence 
in their victory. It means placing into their hands 
a new weapon against the bourgeoisie. That they are 
taking up this weapon and are prepared to use it is evident 
if only from the fact that workersı pilgrimages to 
our country are not ceasing, but are becoming more numerous. 
And when the workers in the capitalist countries 
become imbued with confidence in their own strength, 
you may be sure that this will be the beginning of the 
end of capitalism and a sure sign of the victory of the 
proletarian revolution. 
That is why I think that we are not working in vain 
in building socialism. That is why I think that in this 
work we are bound to achieve victory on an international 
scale. (Loud and prolonged applause. An ovation from 
the entire congress.)

REPLY TO THE DISCUSSION 
ON THE POLITICAL REPORT 
OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE 
December 23 
Comrades, I shall not answer separately the notes on 
particular questions, because the whole of my speech in 
reply to the discussion will in substance be an answer to 
these notes. 
Nor do I intend to answer personal attacks or any 
verbal thrusts of a purely personal character, for I think 
that the congress is in possession of sufficient material 
with which to verify the motives of those attacks and 
what is behind them. 
Nor shall I deal with the ³cave men,² the people who 
gathered somewhere near Kislovodsk and devised all 
sorts of schemes in regard to the organs of the Central 
Committee. Well, let them make schemes, that is their 
business. I should only like to emphasise that Lashevich, 
who spoke here with aplomb against politics of 
scheming, was himself found to be one of the schemers 
and, it turns out, at the ³cave menıs² conference near 
Kislovodsk he played a role that was far from unimportant. 
Well, so much for him. (Laughter.) 
I pass to the matter in hand.

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 363 
1. SOKOLNIKOV AND THE DAWESATION 
OF OUR COUNTRY 
First of all, a few rejoinders. First rejoinder‹to 
Sokolnikov. He said in his speech: ³When Stalin indicated 
two general lines, two lines in the building of our 
economy, he misled us, because he should have formulated 
these two lines differently, he should have talked 
not about importing equipment, but about importing 
finished goods.² I assert that this statement of Sokolnikovıs 
utterly exposes him as a supporter of Shaninıs 
theses. I want to say that here Sokolnikov in point of 
fact speaks as an advocate of the Dawesation of our country. 
What did I speak about in my report? Did I speak 
about the exports and imports plan? Of course not. Everybody 
knows that we are obliged at present to import equipment. 
But Sokolnikov converts this necessity into a principle, 
a theory, a prospect of development. That is 
where Sokolnikovıs mistake lies. In my report I spoke 
about two fundamental, guiding, general lines in building 
our national economy. I spoke about that in order 
to clear up the question of the ways of ensuring for our 
country independent economic development in the 
conditions of capitalist encirclement. In my report 
I spoke about our general line, about our prospects as 
regards transforming our country from an agrarian into 
an industrial country. What is an agrarian country? 
An agrarian country is one that exports agricultural produce 
and imports equipment, but does not itself manufacture, 
or manufactures very little, equipment (machinery, 
etc.) by its own efforts. If we get stranded at the 
stage of development at which we have to import equip

J. V. S T A L I N 364 
ment and machinery and not produce them by our own 
efforts, we can have no guarantee against the conversion 
of our country into an appendage of the capitalist system. 
That is precisely why we must steer a course towards the 
development of the production of the means of production 
in our country. Can it be that Sokolnikov fails to understand 
such an elementary thing? Yet it was only about 
this that I spoke in my report. 
What does the Dawes Plan demand? It demands that 
Germany should pump out money for the payment of 
reparations from markets, chiefly from our Soviet markets. 
What follows from this? From this it follows that 
Germany will supply us with equipment, we shall import 
it and export agricultural produce. We, i.e., our industry, 
will thus find itself tethered to Europe. That is precisely 
the basis of the Dawes Plan. Concerning that, I said in 
my report, in so far as it affects our country, the Dawes 
Plan is built on sand. Why? ³Because,² I said, ³we have 
not the least desire to be converted into an agrarian 
country for the benefit of any other country whatsoever, 
including Germany,² because, ³we ourselves will manufacture 
machinery and other means of production.² The 
conversion of our country from an agrarian into an industrial 
country able to produce the equipment it needs 
by its own efforts‹that is the essence, the basis of our 
general line. We must so arrange things that the thoughts 
and strivings of our business executives are directed precisely 
towards this aspect, the aspect of transforming our 
country from one that imports equipment into one that 
manufactures this equipment. For that is the chief guarantee 
of the economic independence of our country. 
For that is the guarantee that our country will not be

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 365 
converted into an appendage of the capitalist countries. 
Sokolnikov refuses to understand this simple and 
obvious thing. They, the authors of the Dawes Plan, 
would like to restrict us to the manufacture of, say, 
calico; but that is not enough for us, for we want to 
manufacture not only calico, but also the machinery 
needed for manufacturing calico. They would like us to 
restrict ourselves to the manufacture of, say, automobiles; 
but that is not enough for us, for we want to manufacture 
not only automobiles, but also the machinery for 
making automobiles. They want to restrict us to the 
manufacture of, say, shoes; but that is not enough for 
us, for we want to manufacture not only shoes, but also 
the machinery for making shoes. And so on, and so forth. 
That is the difference between the two general lines; 
and that is what Sokolnikov refuses to understand. 
To abandon our line means abandoning the tasks of 
socialist construction, means adopting the standpoint of 
the Dawesation of our country. 
2. KAMENEV AND OUR CONCESSIONS 
TO THE PEASANTRY 
Second rejoinder‹to Kamenev. He said that by 
adopting at the Fourteenth Party Conference the wellknown 
decisions on economic development, on revitalising 
the Soviets, on eliminating the survivals of war 
communism, on precise regulation of the question of 
renting and leasing land and hiring labour, we had made 
concessions to the kulaks and not to the peasants, that 
these are concessions not to the peasantry, but to the 
capitalist elements. Is that true? I assert that it is not

J. V. S T A L I N 366 
true; that it is a slander against the Party. I assert that 
a Marxist cannot approach the question in that way; that 
only a Liberal can approach the question in that way. 
What are the concessions that we made at the Fourteenth 
Party Conference? Do those concessions fit into 
the framework of NEP, or not? Undoubtedly they do. 
Perhaps we expanded NEP at the April Conference? 
Let the opposition answer: Did we expand NEP in 
April, or not? If we expanded it, why did they vote for 
the decisions of the Fourteenth Conference? And is it 
not well known that we are all opposed to an expansion 
of NEP? What is the point, then? The point is that 
Kamenev has got himself mixed up; for NEP includes 
permission of trade, capitalism, hired labour; and the 
decisions of the Fourteenth Conference are an expression 
of NEP, which was introduced when Lenin was with 
us. Did Lenin know that in the first stages, NEP 
would be taken advantage of primarily by the capitalists, 
the merchants, the kulaks? Of course he knew. 
But did Lenin say that in introducing NEP we were 
making concessions to the profiteers and capitalist elements 
and not to the peasantry? No, he did not and 
could not say that. On the contrary, he always said that, 
in permitting trade and capitalism, and in changing 
our policy in the direction of NEP, we were making 
concessions to the peasantry for the sake of maintaining 
and strengthening our bond with it; since under the given 
conditions, the peasantry could not exist without trade, 
without some revival of capitalism being permitted; 
since at the given time we could not establish the bond in 
any way except through trade; since only in that way 
could we strengthen the bond and build the foundations of

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 367 
a socialist economy. That is how Lenin approached the 
question of concessions. That is how the question of the 
concessions made in April 1925 should be approached. 
Allow me to read to you Leninıs opinion on this 
subject. This is how he substantiated the Partyıs transition 
to the new policy, to the policy of NEP, in his 
address on ³The Tax in Kind² at the conference of 
secretaries of Party units of the Moscow Gubernia: 
³I want to dwell on the question how this policy can be 
reconciled with the point of view of communism, and how it 
comes about that the communist Soviet state is facilitating the development 
of free trade. Is this good from the point of view of 
communism? In order to answer this question we must carefully 
examine the changes that have taken place in peasant economy. 
At first the position was that we saw the whole of the peasantry 
fighting against the rule of the landlords. The landlords were 
equally opposed by the poor peasants and the kulaks, although, 
of course, with different intentions: the kulaks fought with 
the aim of taking the land from the landlords and developing 
their own farming on i t . It was then that i t became revealed 
that the kulaks and the poor peasants had different interests 
and different aims. In the Ukraine, even today, we see this difference 
of interests much more clearly than here. The poor peasants 
could obtain very little direct advantage from the transfer of the 
land from the landlords because they had neither the materials nor 
the implements for that. And we saw the poor peasants organising 
to prevent the kulaks from seizing the land that had been taken 
from the landlords. The Soviet Government assisted the Poor 
Peasantsı Committees that sprang up in Russia and in the Ukraine. 
What was the result? The result was that the middle peasants became 
the predominant element in the countryside. . . . The extremes of 
kulaks and poor peasants have diminished; the majority of the 
population has come nearer to the position of the middle peasant. 
If we want to raise the productivity of our peasant economy we must 
first of all reckon with the middle peasant. It was in accordance 
with this circumstance that the Communist Party had to mould its

J. V. S T A L I N 368 
policy. . . . Thus, the change in the policy towards the peasantry 
is to be explained by the change in the position of the peasantry 
itself. The countryside has become more middle-peasant, and in order 
to increase the productive forces we must reckon with this²* (see 
Vol. XXVI, pp. 304-05). 
And in the same volume, on page 247, Lenin draws 
the general conclusion: 
³We must build our state economy in relation to the economy 
of the middle peasants,** which we have been unable to transform 
in three years, and will not be able to transform in ten years.² 
In other words, we introduced freedom of trade, we 
permitted a revival of capitalism, we introduced NEP, 
in order to accelerate the growth of productive forces, 
to increase the quantity of products in the country, to 
strengthen the bond with the peasantry. The bond, the 
interests of the bond with the peasantry as the basis 
of our concessions along the line of NEP‹such was 
Leninıs approach to the subject. 
Did Lenin know at that time that the profiteers, the 
capitalists, the kulaks would take advantage of NEP, 
of the concessions to the peasantry? Of course he did. 
Does that mean that these concessions were in point of 
fact concessions to the profiteers and kulaks? No, it does 
not. For NEP in general, and trade in particular, is 
being taken advantage of not only by the capitalists 
and kulaks, but also by the state and co-operative 
bodies; for it is not only the capitalists and kulaks 
who trade, but also the state bodies and co-operatives; 
and when our state bodies and co-operatives learn 
* All italics mine.‹J. St. 
** My italics.‹J. St.

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 369 
how to trade, they will gain (they are already gaining!) 
the upper hand over the private traders, linking our industry 
with peasant economy. 
What follows from this? It follows from this that our 
concessions proceed basically in the direction of strengthening 
our bond, and for the sake of our bond, with 
the peasantry. 
Whoever fails to understand that, approaches the 
subject not as a Leninist, but as a Liberal. 
3. WHOSE MISCALCULATIONS? 
Third rejoinder‹to Sokolnikov. He says: ³The considerable 
losses that we have sustained on the economic 
front since the autumn are due precisely to an over-estimation 
of our forces, to an over-estimation of our socialist 
maturity, an over-estimation of our ability, the ability 
of our state economy, to guide the whole of the national 
economy already at the present time.² 
It turns out, then, that the miscalculations in regard 
to procurement and foreign trade‹I have in mind the unfavourable 
balance of trade in 1924-25‹that those miscalculations 
were due not to the error of our regulating 
bodies, but to an over-estimation of the socialist maturity 
of our economy. And it appears that the blame for this 
rests upon Bukharin, whose ³school² deliberately cultivates 
exaggerated ideas about the socialist maturity of 
our economy. 
Of course, in making speeches one ³can² play all 
sorts of tricks, as Sokolnikov often does. But, after all, 
one should know how far one can go. How can one talk 
such utter nonsense and downright untruth at a congress?

J. V. S T A L I N 370 
Does not Sokolnikov know about the special meeting of 
the Political Bureau held in the beginning of November, 
at which procurement and foreign trade were discussed, 
at which the errors of the regulating bodies were rectified 
by the Central Committee, by the majority of the 
Central Committee, which is alleged to have over-estimated 
our socialist potentialities? How can one talk such 
nonsense at a congress? And what has Bukharinıs 
³school,² or Bukharin himself, to do with it? What a way 
of behaving‹to blame others for oneıs own sins! Does 
not Sokolnikov know that the stenographic report of the 
speeches delivered at the meeting of the Central Committee 
on the question of miscalculations was sent to all the 
Gubernia Party Committees? How can one fly in the 
face of obvious facts? One ³can² play tricks when making 
speeches, but one should know how far one can go. 
4. HOW SOKOLNIKOV PROTECTS 
THE POOR PEASANTS 
Fourth rejoinder‹also to Sokolnikov. He said here 
that he, as Peopleıs Commissar of Finance, donıt you 
see, strives in every way to ensure that our agricultural 
tax is collected in proportion to income, but he is hindered 
in this, he is hindered because he is not allowed to 
protect the poor peasants and to curb the kulaks. That 
is not true, comrades. It is a slander against the Party. 
The question of officially revising the agricultural tax 
on the basis of income‹I say officially, because actually 
it is an income tax‹this question was raised at the plenum 
of the Central Committee in October this year, but 
nobody except Sokolnikov supported the proposal that

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 371 
it be raised at the congress, because it was not yet ready 
for presentation at the congress. At that time Sokolnikov 
did not insist on his proposal. But now it turns out 
that Sokolnikov is not averse to using this against the 
Central Committee, not in the interests of the poor peasants, 
of course, but in the interests of the opposition. 
Well, since Sokolnikov talks here about the poor peasants, 
permit me to tell you a fact which exposes the actual stand 
taken by Sokolnikov, this alleged thorough-going protector 
of the poor peasants. Not so long ago, Comrade Milyutin, 
Peopleıs Commissar of Finance of the R.S.F.S.R., 
took a decision to exempt poor peasant farms from taxation 
in cases where the tax amounts to less than a ruble. 
From Comrade Milyutinıs memorandum to the Central 
Committee it is evident that the total revenue from taxation 
of less than a ruble, taxation which irritates the 
peasantry, amounts to about 300-400 thousand rubles 
for the whole of the R.S.F.S.R., and that the cost alone 
of collecting this tax is only a little less than the revenue 
from it. What did Sokolnikov, this protector of the poor 
peasants, do? He annulled Comrade Milyutinıs decision. 
The Central Committee received protests about this from 
fifteen Gubernia Party Committees. Sokolnikov would not 
give way. The Central Committee had to exercise pressure 
to compel Sokolnikov to rescind his veto on the absolutely 
correct decision of the Peopleıs Commissar of Finance 
of the R.S.F.S.R. not to collect taxes of less than 
a ruble. That is what Sokolnikov calls ³protecting² the 
interests of the poor peasants. And people like that, with 
such a weight on their conscience, have the‹whatıs the 
mildest way of putting it?‹the audacity to speak against 
the Central Committee. It is strange, comrades, strange.

J. V. S T A L I N 372 
5. IDEOLOGICAL STRUGGLE OR SLANDER? 
Lastly, one more rejoinder. I have in mind a rejoinder 
to the authors of A Collection of Materials on Controversial 
Questions. Yesterday, A Collection of Materials 
on Controversial Questions, only just issued, was secretly 
distributed here, for members of the congress only. In 
this collection it is stated, among other things, that in 
April this year I received a delegation of village correspondents 
and expressed sympathy with the idea of 
restoring private property in land. It appears that analogous 
³impressions² of one of the village correspondents 
were published in Bednota63; I did not know about these 
³impressions,² I did not see them. I learned about them 
in October this year. Earlier than that, in April, the 
Riga news agency, which is distinguished from all other 
news agencies by the fact that it fabricates all the false 
rumours about us, had circulated a similar report to the 
foreign press, about which we were informed by our people 
in Paris, who telegraphed to the Peopleıs Commissariat 
of Foreign Affairs demanding that it be refuted. 
At the time I answered Comrade Chicherin, through 
my assistant, saying: ³If Comrade Chicherin thinks it 
necessary to refute all kinds of nonsense and slander, 
let him refute it² (see archives of the Central Committee). 
Are the authors of this sacramental ³Collection² aware 
of all that? Of course they are. Why, then, do they continue 
to circulate all kinds of nonsense and fable? How 
can they, how can the opposition, resort to the methods 
of the Riga news agency? Have they really sunk so low 
as that? (A voice: ³Shame!²)

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 373 
Further, knowing the habits of the ³cave men,² 
knowing that they are capable of repeating the methods 
of the Riga news agency, I sent a refutation to the editorial 
board of Bednota. It is ridiculous to refute such 
nonsense, but knowing with whom I have to deal, I, for 
all that, sent a refutation. Here it is: 
³To the Editorial Board of Bednota. 
³Comrade editor, recently I learned from some comrades 
that in a sketch, published in Bednota of 5/IV, 1925, of a village 
correspondentıs impressions of an interview with me by a delegation 
of village correspondents, which I had not the opportunity to 
read at the time, it is reported that I expressed sympathy with 
the idea of guaranteeing ownership of land for 40 years or more, 
with the idea of private property in land, etc. Although this fantastic 
report needs no refutation because of its obvious absurdity, 
nevertheless, perhaps it will not be superfluous to ask your permission 
to state in Bednota that this report is a gross mistake 
and must be attributed entirely to the authorıs imagination. 
³J. Stalin.² 
Are the authors of the ³Collection² aware of this letter? 
Undoubtedly they are. Why, then, do they continue to 
circulate tittle-tattle, fables? What method of fighting is 
this? They say that this is an ideological struggle. But 
no, comrades, it is not an ideological struggle. In our 
Russian language it is called simply slander. 
Permit me now to pass to the fundamental questions 
of principle. 
6. CONCERNING NEP 
The question of NEP. I have in mind Comrade 
Krupskaya and the speech she delivered on NEP. 
She says: ³In essence, NEP is capitalism permitted

J. V. S T A L I N 374 
under certain conditions, capitalism that the proletarian 
state keeps on a chain. . . .² Is that true? Yes, and no. 
That we are keeping capitalism on a chain, and will 
keep it so as long as it exists, is a fact, that is true. 
But to say that NEP is capitalism‹that is nonsense, 
utter nonsense. NEP is a special policy of the proletarian 
state aimed at permitting capitalism while the 
commanding positions are held by the proletarian state, 
aimed at a struggle between the capitalist and socialist 
elements, aimed at increasing the role of the socialist 
elements to the detriment of the capitalist elements, 
aimed at the victory of the socialist elements over the 
capitalist elements, aimed at the abolition of classes 
and the building of the foundations of a socialist economy. 
Whoever fails to understand this transitional, 
dual nature of NEP departs from Leninism. If NEP 
were capitalism, then NEP Russia that Lenin spoke 
about would be capitalist Russia. But is presentday 
Russia a capitalist country and not a country 
that i s in transition from capitalism to socialism? 
Why then, did Lenin not say simply: ³Capitalist 
Russia will be socialist Russia,² but preferred a different 
formula: ³NEP Russia will become socialist Russia²? 
Does the opposition agree with Comrade Krupskaya 
that NEP is capitalism, or does it not? I think that 
not a single member of this congress will be found 
who would agree with Comrade Krupskayaıs formula. 
Comrade Krupskaya (may she forgive me for saying so) 
talked utter nonsense about NEP. One cannot come out 
here in defence of Lenin against Bukharin with nonsense 
like that.

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 375 
7. CONCERNING STATE CAPITALISM 
Connected with this question is Bukharinıs mistake. 
What was his mistake? On what questions did Lenin dispute 
with Bukharin? Lenin maintained that the category 
of state capitalism is compatible with the system of the 
proletarian dictatorship. Bukharin denied this. He was 
of the opinion, and with him the ³Left² Communists, 
too, including Safarov, were of the opinion that the category 
of state capitalism is incompatible with the system 
of the proletarian dictatorship. Lenin was right, of course. 
Bukharin was wrong. He admitted this mistake of his. 
Such was Bukharinıs mistake. But that was in the 
past. If now, in 1925, in May, he repeats that he disagrees 
with Lenin on the question of state capitalism, I 
suppose i t is simply a misunderstanding. Either he 
ought frankly to withdraw that statement, or it is a 
misunderstanding; for the line he is now defending on 
the question of the nature of state industry is Leninıs 
line. Lenin did not come to Bukharin; on the contrary, 
Bukharin came to Lenin. And precisely for that reason 
we back Bukharin. (Applause.) 
The chief mistake of Kamenev and Zinoviev is that 
they regard the question of state capitalism scholastically, 
undialectically, divorced from the historical situation. 
Such an approach to the question is abhorrent to 
the whole spirit of Leninism. How did Lenin present the 
question? In 1921, Lenin, knowing that our industry 
was under-developed and that the peasantry needed goods, 
knowing that it (industry) could not be raised at one 
stroke, that the workers, because of certain circumstances, 
were engaged not so much in industry as in making

J. V. S T A L I N 
FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
376 
cigarette lighters‹in that situation Lenin was of the 
opinion that the best of all possibilities was to invite 
foreign capital, to set industry on its feet with its aid, 
to introduce state capitalism in this way and through it 
to establish a bond between Soviet power and the countryside. 
That line was absolutely correct at that time, because 
we had no other means then of satisfying the peasantry; 
for our industry was in a bad way, transport was 
at a standstill, or almost at a standstill, there was a lack, 
a shortage, of fuel. Did Lenin at that time consider state 
capitalism permissible and desirable as the predominant 
form in our economy? Yes, he did. But that was then, in 
1921. What about now? Can we now say that we have no 
industry, that transport is at a standstill, that there is 
no fuel, etc.? No, we cannot. Can it be denied that our 
industry and trade are already establishing a bond between 
industry (our industry) and peasant economy directly, 
by their own efforts? No, it cannot. Can it be denied 
that in the sphere of industry ³state capitalism² 
and ³socialism² have already exchanged roles, for socialist 
industry has become predominant and the relative 
importance of concessions and leases (the former have 
50,000 workers and the latter 35,000) is minute? No, it 
cannot. Already in 1922 Lenin said that nothing had 
come of concessions and leases in our country. 
What follows from this? From this it follows that 
since 1921, the situation in our country has undergone a 
substantial change, that in this period our socialist industry 
and Soviet and co-operative trade have already 
succeeded in becoming the predominant force, that we 
have already learned to establish a bond between town 
and country by our own efforts, that the most striking

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 377 
forms of state capitalism‹concessions and leases‹have 
not developed to any extent during this period, that to 
speak now, in 1925, of state capitalism as the predominant 
form in our economy, means distorting the socialist 
nature of our state industry, means failing to understand 
the whole difference between the past and the present 
situation, means approaching the question of state 
capitalism not dialectically, but scholastically, metaphysically. 
Would you care to hear Sokolnikov? In his speech he 
said: 
³Our foreign trade is being conducted as a state-capitalist 
enterprise. . . . Our internal trading companies are also state-capitalist 
enterprises. And I must say, comrades, that the State Bank 
is just as much a state-capitalist enterprise. What about our monetary 
system? Our monetary system is based on the fact that in 
Soviet economy, under the conditions in which socialism is being 
built, there has been adopted a monetary system which is permeated 
with the principles of capitalist economy.² 
That is what Sokolnikov says. 
Soon he will go to the length of declaring that the 
Peopleıs Commissariat of Finance is also state capitalism. 
Up to now I thought, and we all thought, that the State 
Bank is part of the state apparatus. Up to now I thought, 
and we all thought, that our Peopleıs Commissariat of 
Foreign Trade, not counting the state-capitalist institutions 
that encompass it, is part of the state apparatus, 
that our state apparatus is the apparatus of a proletarian 
type of state. We all thought so up to now, for the proletarian 
state is the sole master of these institutions. But 
now, according to Sokolnikov, it turns out that these institutions, 
which are part of our state apparatus, are

J. V. S T A L I N 378 
state-capitalist institutions. Perhaps our Soviet apparatus 
is also state capitalism and not a proletarian type 
of state, as Lenin declared it to be? Why not? Does 
not our Soviet apparatus utilise a ³monetary system 
which is permeated with the principles of capitalist 
economy?² Such is the nonsense a man can talk himself 
into. 
Permit me first of all to quote Leninıs opinion on 
the nature and significance of the State Bank. I should 
like, comrades, to refer to a passage from a book written 
by Lenin in 1917. I have in mind the pamphlet: Can the 
Bolsheviks Retain State Power? in which Lenin still held 
the viewpoint of control of industry (and not nationalisation) 
and, notwithstanding that, regarded the State 
Bank in the hands of the proletarian state as being ninetenths 
a socialist apparatus. This is what he wrote about 
the State Bank: 
³The big banks are the Œstate apparatusı we need for bringing 
about socialism, and which we take ready-made from capitalism; 
our task here is merely to lop off what capitalistically distorts 
this excellent apparatus, to make it still bigger, still more democratic, 
still more all-embracing. Quantity will be transformed into 
quality. A single State Bank, the biggest of the biggest, with 
branches in every volost, in every factory, will already be ninetenths 
of the socialist apparatus. That will be nation-wide bookkeeping, 
nation-wide accounting of the production and distribution 
of goods, that will be, so to speak, something in the nature of the 
skeleton of socialist society² (see Vol. XXI, p. 260). 
Compare these words of Leninıs with Sokolnikovıs 
speech and you will understand what Sokolnikov is slipping 
into. I shall not be surprised if he declares the People 
s Commissariat of Finance to be state capitalism.

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 379 
What is the point here? Why does Sokolnikov fall 
into such errors? 
The point is that Sokolnikov fails to understand the 
dual nature of NEP, the dual nature of trade under 
the present conditions of the struggle between the socialist 
elements and the capitalist elements; he fails to understand 
the dialectics of development in the conditions 
of the proletarian dictatorship, in the conditions of 
the transition period, in which the methods and weapons 
of the bourgeoisie are utilised by the socialist elements 
for the purpose of overcoming and eliminating the capitalist 
elements. The point is not at all that trade and the 
monetary system are methods of ³capitalist economy.² 
The point is that in fighting the capitalist elements, the 
socialist elements of our economy master these methods 
and weapons of the bourgeoisie for the purpose of overcoming 
the capitalist elements, that they successfully use 
them against capitalism, successfully use them for the purpose 
of building the socialist foundation of our economy. 
Hence, the point is that, thanks to the dialectics of our 
development, the functions and purpose of those instruments 
of the bourgeoisie change in principle, fundamentally; 
they change in favour of socialism to the detriment 
of capitalism. Sokolnikovıs mistake lies in his failure to 
understand all the complexity and contradictory nature 
of the processes that are taking place in our economy. 
Permit me now to refer to Lenin on the question of 
the historical character of state capitalism, to quote a 
passage on the question as to when and why he proposed 
state capitalism as the chief form, as to what induced 
him to do that, and as to precisely under what concrete 
conditions he proposed it. (A voice: ³Please do!²)

J. V. S T A L I N 380 
³We cannot under any circumstances forget what we very 
often observe, namely, the socialist attitude of the workers in factories 
belonging to the state, where they themselves collect fuel 
raw materials and produce, or when the workers try properly to distribute 
the products of industry among the peasantry and to deliver 
them by means of the transport system. That is socialism. But side 
by side with it there is small economy, which very often exists independently 
of it. Why can it exist independently of it? Because 
large-scale industry has not been restored, because the socialist 
factories can receive only one-tenth, perhaps, of what they should 
receive; and in so far as they do not receive what they should, 
small economy remains independent of the socialist factories. The 
incredible state of ruin of the country, and the shortage of fuel, raw 
materials and transport facilities, lead to small production existing 
separately from socialism. And I say: Under these circumstances, 
what is state capitalism? It will mean the amalgamation of small 
production. Capital amalgamates small production, capital grows 
out of small production. It is no use closing our eyes to this fact. Of 
course, freedom of trade means the growth of capitalism; one cannot get 
away from it. And whoever thinks of getting away from it and 
brushing it aside is only consoling himself with words. If small 
economy exists, if there is freedom of exchange, capitalism will 
appear. But has this capitalism any terrors for us if we hold the 
factories, works, transport and foreign trade in our hands? And so I 
said then, and will say now, and I think it is incontrovertible, that 
this capitalism has no terrors for us. Concessions are capitalism 
of that kind²* (see Vol. XXVI, p. 306). 
That is how Lenin approached the question of state 
capitalism. 
In 1921, when we had scarcely any industry of our 
own, when there was a shortage of raw materials, and 
transport was at a standstill, Lenin proposed state capitalism 
as a means by which he thought of linking peasant 
economy with industry. And that was correct. But does 
* All italics mine.‹J. St.

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 381 
that mean that Lenin regarded this line as desirable under 
all circumstances? Of course not. He was willing to 
establish the bond through the medium of state capitalism 
because we had no developed socialist industry. 
But now? Can it be said that we have no developed state 
industry now? Of course not. Development proceeded 
along a different channel, concessions scarcely took root, 
state industry grew, state trade grew, the co-operatives 
grew, and the bond between town and country began to 
be established through socialist industry. We found ourselves 
in a better position than we had expected. How 
can one, after this, say that state capitalism is the chief 
form of managing our economy? 
The trouble with the opposition is that it refuses to 
understand these simple things. 
8. ZINOVIEV AND THE PEASANTRY 
The question of the peasantry. I said in my report, 
and speakers here have asserted, that Zinoviev is deviating 
in the direction of under-estimating the middle peasants; 
that only recently he definitely held the viewpoint 
of neutralising the middle peasants, and is only now, 
after the struggle in the Party, trying to go over to, to 
establish himself on, the other viewpoint, the viewpoint 
of a stable alliance with the middle peasants. Is all that 
true? Permit me to quote some documents. 
In an article on ³Bolshevisation,² Zinoviev wrote 
this year: 
³There are a number of tasks which are absolutely common to 
all the Parties of the Comintern. Such, for example, are . . . the proper 
approach to the peasantry. There are three strata among the agri

J. V. S T A L I N 382 
cultural population of the whole world, which can and must be won 
over by us and become the allies of the proletariat (the agricultural 
proletariat, the semi-proletarians‹the small-holder peasants 
and the small peasantry who do not hire labour). There is another 
stratum of the peasantry (the middle peasants), which must be at 
least neutralised by us²* (Pravda, January 18, 1925). 
That is what Zinoviev writes about the middle peasantry 
six years after the Eighth Party Congress, at 
which Lenin rejected the slogan of neutralising the 
middle peasants and substituted for it the slogan of a 
stable alliance with the middle peasants. Bakayev 
asks, what is there terrible about that? But I will ask 
you to compare Zinovievıs article with Leninıs thesis 
on staking on the middle peasants and to answer the 
question: has Zinoviev departed from Leninıs thesis 
or not. . . ? (A voice from the hall: ³It refers to countries 
other than Russia.² Commotion.) It is not so, comrade, 
because in Zinovievıs article i t says: ³tasks 
which are absolutely common to all the Parties of the 
Comintern.² Will you really deny that our Party is also 
a part of the Comintern? Here it is directly stated: 
³to all the Parties.² (A voice from the benches of the 
Leningrad delegation: ³At definite moments.² General 
laughter.) 
Compare this passage from Zinovievıs article about 
neutralisation with the passage from Leninıs speech at 
the Eighth Party Congress in which he said that we must 
have a stable alliance with the middle peasants, and 
you will realise that there is nothing in common between 
them. 
* All italics mine.‹J. St.

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 383 
It is characteristic that after reading these lines 
in Zinovievıs article, Comrade Larin, that advocate of 
³a second revolution² in the countryside, hastened to 
associate himself with them. I think that although 
Comrade Larin spoke in opposition to Kamenev and 
Zinoviev the other day, and spoke rather well, this does 
not exclude the fact that there are points on which we 
disagree with him and that we must here dissociate 
ourselves from him. Here is the opinion Comrade Larin 
expressed about this article of Zinovievıs: 
³ŒThe proper approach to the peasantryı from the point of 
view of the common tasks of all* the Parties of the Comintern was 
quite correctly formulated by its Chairman, Zinoviev² (Larin, 
The Soviet Countryside, p. 80). 
I see that Comrade Larin protests, saying that he 
makes a reservation in his book about his disagreeing 
with Zinoviev in so far as Zinoviev extends the slogan 
of neutralising the middle peasants to Russia as well. 
It is true that in his book he makes this reservation and 
says that neutralisation is not enough for us, that we 
must take ³a step farther² in the direction of ³agreement 
with the middle peasants against the kulaks.² But here, 
unfortunately, Comrade Larin drags in his scheme 
of ³a second revolution² against kulak domination, 
with which we disagree, which brings him near to Zinoviev 
and compels me to dissociate myself from him to 
some extent. 
As you see, in the document I have quoted, Zinoviev 
speaks openly and definitely in favour of the slogan 
* My italics.‹J. St.

J. V. S T A L I N 384 
of neutralising the middle peasants, in spite of Lenin, 
who proclaimed that neutralisation was not enough, 
and that a stable alliance with the middle peasants was 
necessary. 
The next document. In his book Leninism, Zinoviev, 
quoting from Lenin the following passage dating from 
1918: ³With the peasantry to the end of the bourgeoisdemocratic 
revolution; with the poor, the proletarian 
and the semi-proletarian section of the peasantry, forward 
to the socialist revolution!², draws the following 
conclusion: 
³The fundamental . . . problem that is engaging our minds 
at the present moment . . . is elucidated fully and to the end in 
the above-quoted theses of Leninıs. To this nothing can be added, 
not a single word can be subtracted.* Here everything is said with 
Ilyichıs terseness and explicitness, concisely and clearly, so that 
it simply asks to be put into a textbook² (Leninism, p. 60). 
Such, according to Zinoviev, is the exhaustive characterisation 
of the peasant question given by Leninism. 
With the peasantry as a whole against the tsar and the 
landlords‹that is the bourgeois revolution. With the 
poor peasants against the bourgeoisie‹that is the October 
Revolution. That is all very well. It gives two of 
Leninıs slogans. But what about Leninıs third slogan 
‹with the middle peasants against the kulaks for 
building socialism? What has become of Leninıs third 
slogan? It is not in Zinovievıs book. It has disappeared. 
Although Zinoviev asserts that ³to this nothing can 
be added,² nevertheless, if we do not add here Leninıs 
third slogan about a stable alliance of the proletariat 
* My italics.‹J. St.

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 385 
and poor peasants with the middle peasants, we run the 
risk of distorting Lenin, as Zinoviev distorts him. Can 
we regard it as an accident that Leninıs third slogan, 
which is our most urgent slogan today, has disappeared, 
that Zinoviev has lost it? No, it cannot be regarded as an 
accident, because he holds the viewpoint of neutralising 
the middle peasants. The only difference between the 
first and second document is that in the first he opposed 
the slogan of a stable alliance with the middle peasants, 
while in the second he kept silent about this slogan. 
The third document is Zinovievıs article ³The Philosophy 
of the Epoch.² I am speaking of the original 
version of that article, which does not contain the changes 
and additions that were made later by members of 
the Central Committee. The characteristic feature of 
that article is that, like the second document, it is completely 
silent about the question of the middle peasants 
and, evading this most urgent question, talks about some 
kind of indefinite, Narodnik equality, without pointing 
to the class background of equality. You will find in it the 
rural poor, the kulaks, the capitalists, attacks on Bukharin, 
Socialist-Revolutionary equality, and Ustryalov; 
but you will not find the middle peasants or Leninıs 
co-operative plan, although the article is entitled ³The 
Philosophy of the Epoch.² When Comrade Molotov sent 
me that article (I was away at the time), I sent back a 
blunt and sharp criticism. Yes, comrades, I am straightforward 
and blunt; thatıs true, I donıt deny it. (Laughter.) 
I sent back a blunt criticism, because it is intolerable 
that Zinoviev should for a whole year systematically 
ignore or distort the most characteristic features 
of Leninism in regard to the peasant question, our Partyıs

J. V. S T A L I N 386 
present-day slogan of alliance with the bulk of the 
peasantry. Here is the answer that I sent then to Comrade 
Molotov: 
³Zinovievıs article ŒThe Philosophy of the Epochı is a distor 
tion of the Party line in the Larin spirit. It treats of the Fourteenth 
Conference, but the main theme of this conference‹the 
middle peasants and the co-operatives‹is evaded. The middle 
peasants and Leninıs co-operative plan have vanished. That is no 
accident. To talk, after this, about a Œstruggle around the interpretationı 
of the decisions of the Fourteenth Conference‹means 
pursuing a line towards the violation of those decisions. To mix 
up Bukharin with Stolypin, as Zinoviev does‹means slandering 
Bukharin. On such lines it would be possible to mix up with Stolypin 
even Lenin, who said: Œtrade, and learn to trade.ı At the 
present time the slogan about equality is Socialist-Revolutionary 
demagogy. There can be no equality so long as classes exist, and so 
long as skilled and unskilled labour exist (see Leninıs State and 
Revolution). We must speak not about an indefinite equality, but 
about abolishing classes, about socialism. To say that our revolution 
is Œnot classicalı means slipping into Menshevism. In my opinion, 
the article must be thoroughly revised in such a way that it should 
not bear the character of a platform for the Fourteenth Congress. 
³September 12, 1925 ³J. Stalin.² 
I am ready to defend the whole of this today. Every 
word, every sentence. 
One must not speak about equality in a principal 
leading article without strictly defining what kind of 
equality is meant‹equality between the peasantry 
and the working class, equality among the peasantry, 
equality within the working class, between skilled and 
unskilled workers, or equality in the sense of abolishing 
classes. One must not in a leading article keep silent 
about the Partyıs immediate slogans on work in the 
in countryside. One must not play with phrases about equal

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 387 
ity, because that means playing with fire, just as one 
must not play with phrases about Leninism while keeping 
silent about the immediate slogan of Leninism on 
the question of the peasantry. 
Such are the three documents: Zinovievıs article 
(January 1925) in favour of neutralising the middle 
peasants, Zinovievıs book Leninism (September 1925), 
which kept silent about Leninıs third slogan about the 
middle peasants, and Zinovievıs new article ³The Philosophy 
of the Epoch² (September 1925), which kept silent 
about the middle peasants and Leninıs co-operative 
plan. 
Is this constant wobbling of Zinovievıs on the peasant 
question accidental? 
You see that it is not accidental. 
Recently, in a speech delivered by Zinoviev in Leningrad 
on the report of the Central Committee, he at last 
made up his mind to speak in favour of the slogan of 
a stable alliance with the middle peasants. That was 
after the struggle, after the friction, after the conflicts 
in the Central Committee. That is all very well. But I am 
not sure that he will not repudiate it later on. For, as 
facts show, Zinoviev has never displayed the firmness of 
line on the peasant question that we need. (Applause.) 
Here are a few facts illustrating Zinovievıs vacillations 
on theı peasant question. In 1924, at a plenum 
of the Central Committee, Zinoviev insisted on a ³peasant² 
policy of organising non-Party peasant groups, at 
the centre and in the localities, with a weekly newspaper. 
That proposal was rejected because of the objections 
raised in the Central Committee. Shortly before 
that, Zinoviev had even boasted that he had a ³peasant

J. V. S T A L I N 388 
deviation.² Here is what he said, for example, at the 
Twelfth Congress of the Party: ³When I am told: You 
have a Œdeviation,ı you are deviating towards the peasantry‹
I answer: Yes, we should not only Œdeviateı 
towards the peasantry and its economic requirements, 
but bow down and, if need be, kneel down before the 
economic requirements of the peasant who follows our 
proletariat.² Do you hear: ³deviate,² ³bow down,² 
³kneel down.² (Laughter, applause.) Later, when things 
improved with the peasantry, when our position in the 
countryside improved, Zinoviev made a ³turn² from 
his infatuation, cast suspicion upon the middle peasants 
and proclaimed the slogan of neutralisation. A little 
later he made a new ³turn² and demanded what was in 
point of fact a revision of the decisions of the Fourteenth 
Conference (³The Philosophy of the Epoch²) and, accusing 
almost the whole of the Central Committee of 
a peasant deviation, began to ³deviate² more emphatically 
against the middle peasants. Finally, just before 
the Fourteenth Congress of the Party he once more made 
a ³turn,² this time in favour of alliance with the middle 
peasants and, perhaps, he will yet begin to boast that 
he is again ready to ³adore² the peasantry. 
What guarantee i s there that Zinoviev will not 
vacillate once again? 
But, comrades, this is wobbling, not politics. (Laughter, 
applause.) This is hysterics, not politics. (Voices: 
³Quite right!²) 
We are told that there is no need to pay special attention 
to the struggle against the second deviation. That 
is wrong. Since there are two deviations among us‹ 
ogushevskyıs deviation and Zinovievıs deviation‹

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 389 
you must understand that Bogushevsky is not to be 
compared with Zinoviev. Bogushevsky is done for. (Laughter.) 
Bogushevsky does not have an organ of the press. 
But the deviation towards neutralising the middle peasants, 
the deviation against a stable alliance with the 
middle peasants, the Zinoviev deviation, has its organ 
of the press and continues to fight against the Central 
Committee to this day. That organ is called Leningradskaya 
Pravda.64 For what is the term ³middle-peasant 
Bolshevism² recently concocted in Leningrad, and 
about which Leningradskaya Pravda foams at the mouth, 
if not an indication that that newspaper has departed 
from Leninism on the peasant question? Is it not clear, 
if only from this circumstance alone, that the struggle 
against the second deviation is more difficult than the 
struggle against the first, against Bogushevskyıs deviation? 
That is why, being confronted by such a representative 
of the second deviation, or such a defender 
and protector of the second deviation, as Leningradskaya 
Pravda, we must adopt all measures to make the Party 
specially prepared to fight that deviation, which is 
strong, which is complex, and against which we must 
concentrate our fire. That is why this second deviation 
must be the object of our Partyıs special attention. 
(Voices: ³Quite right!² Applause.) 
9. CONCERNING THE HISTORY 
OF THE DISAGREEMENTS 
Permit me now to pass to the history of our internal 
struggle within the majority of the Central Committee. 
What did our disaccord start from? It started from 
the question: ³What is to be done with Trotsky?² That

J. V. S T A L I N 390 
was at the end of 1924. The group of Leningrad comrades at 
first proposed that Trotsky be expelled from the Party. 
Here I have in mind the period of the discussion in 1924. 
The Leningrad Gubernia Party Committee passed a resolution 
that Trotsky be expelled from the Party. We, 
i.e., the majority on the Central Committee, did not 
agree with this (voices: ³Quite right!²), we had some 
struggle with the Leningrad comrades and persuaded 
them to delete the point about expulsion from their 
resolution. Shortly after this, when the plenum of the 
Central Committee met and the Leningrad comrades, 
together with Kamenev, demanded Trotskyıs immediate 
expulsion from the Political Bureau, we also disagreed 
with this proposal of the opposition, we obtained a 
majority on the Central Committee and restricted ourselves 
to removing Trotsky from the post of Peopleıs 
Commissar of Military and Naval Affairs. We disagreed 
with Zinoviev and Kamenev because we knew that 
the policy of amputation was fraught with great dangers 
for the Party, that the method of amputation, 
the method of blood-letting‹and they demanded 
blood‹was dangerous, infectious: today you amputate 
one limb, tomorrow another, the day after tomorrow 
a third‹what will we have left in the Party? (Applause.) 
This first clash within the majority on the Central 
Committee was the expression of the fundamental difference 
between us on questions of organisational policy 
in the Party. 
The second question that caused disagreements among 
us was that connected with Sarkisıs speech against 
Bukharin. That was at the Twenty-First Leningrad

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 391 
Conference in January 1925. Sarkis at that time accused 
Bukharin of syndicalism. Here is what he said: 
³We have read in the Moscow Pravda Bukharinıs article on 
worker and village correspondents. The views that Bukharin develops 
have no supporters in our organisation. But one might say 
that such views, which in their way are syndicalist, un-Bolshevik, 
anti-Party, are held even by a number of responsible comrades (I 
repeat, not in the Leningrad organisation, but in others). Those 
views treat of the independence and extra-territoriality of various 
mass public organisations of workers and peasants in relation to 
the Communist Party² (Stenographic Report of the Twenty-First 
Leningrad Conference). 
That speech was, firstly, a fundamental mistake 
on Sarkisıs part, for Bukharin was absolutely right 
on the question of the worker and village correspondent 
movement; secondly, it was, not without the 
encouragement of the leaders of the Leningrad organisation, 
a gross violation of the elementary rules 
of comradely discussion of a question. Needless to 
say, this circumstance was bound to worsen relations 
within the Central Committee. The matter ended 
with Sarkisıs open admission of his mistake in the 
press. 
This incident showed that open admission of a mistake 
is the best way of avoiding an open discussion and 
of eliminating disagreements privately. 
The third question was that of the Leningrad Young 
Communist League. There are members of Gubernia Party 
Committees here, and they probably remember that 
the Political Bureau adopted a decision relating to the 
Leningrad Gubernia Committee of the Young Communist 
League, which had tried to convene in Leningrad

J. V. S T A L I N 392 
almost an all-Russian conference of the Young Communist 
League without the knowledge and consent of 
the Central Committee of the youth league. With the 
decision of the C.C. of the R.C.P.(B.) you are familiar. 
We could not permit the existence, parallel with the 
Central Committee of the Young Communist League, 
of another centre, competing with and opposing the 
first. We, as Bolsheviks, could not permit the existence 
of two centres. That is why the Central Committee 
considered i t necessary to take measures to infuse 
fresh blood into the Central Committee of the youth 
league, which had tolerated this separatism, and to 
remove Safarov from the post of leader of the Leningrad 
Gubernia Committee of the Young Communist 
League. 
This incident showed that the Leningrad comrades 
have a tendency to convert their Leningrad organisation 
into a centre of struggle against the Central Committee. 
The fourth question was the question, raised by 
Zinoviev, of organising in Leningrad a special magazine 
to be called Bolshevik, the editorial board of which was 
to consist of Zinoviev, Safarov, Vardin, Sarkis and 
Tarkhanov. We did not agree with this and said that 
such a magazine, running parallel with the Moscow 
Bolshevik, would inevitably become the organ of a group, 
a factional organ of the opposition; that such a step was 
dangerous and would undermine the unity of the Party. 
In other words, we prohibited the publication of that 
magazine. Now, attempts are being made to frighten us 
with the word ³prohibition.² But that is nonsense, 
comrades. We are not Liberals. For us, the interests of

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 393 
the Party stand above formal democracy. Yes, we prohibited 
the publication of a factional organ, and we shall 
prohibit things of that kind in future. (Voices: ³Quite 
right! Of course!² Loud applause.) 
This incident showed that the Leningrad leadership 
wants to segregate itself in a separate group. 
Next, the question of Bukharin. I have in mind the 
slogan ³enrich yourselves.² I have in mind the speech 
Bukharin delivered in April, when he let slip the phrase 
³enrich yourselves.² Two days later the April Conference 
of our Party opened. It was I who, in the Conference Presidium, 
in the presence of Sokolnikov, Zinoviev, Kamenev 
and Kalinin, stated that the slogan ³enrich yourselves² 
was not our slogan. I do not remember Bukharin 
making any rejoinder to that protest. When Comrade 
Larin asked for the floor at the conference, to speak against 
Bukharin, I think, it was Zinoviev who then demanded 
that no speeches be permitted against Bukharin. However, 
after that, Comrade Krupskaya sent in an article 
against Bukharin, demanding that it be published. Bukharin, 
of course, gave tit for tat, and, in his turn, wrote 
an article against Comrade Krupskaya. The majority on 
the Central Committee decided not to publish any discussion 
articles, not to open a discussion, and to call on 
Bukharin to state in the press that the slogan ³enrich 
yourselves² was a mistake; Bukharin agreed to that and 
later did so, on his return from holiday, in an article 
against Ustryalov. Now, Kamenev and Zinoviev think 
they can frighten somebody with the ³prohibition² bogey, 
expressing indignation like Liberals at our having 
prohibited the publication of Comrade Krupskayaıs article. 
You will not frighten anybody with that. Firstly,

J. V. S T A L I N 394 
we refrained from publishing not only Comrade Krupskayaıs 
article, but also Bukharinıs. Secondly, why not 
prohibit the publication of Comrade Krupskayaıs article 
if the interests of Party unity demand that of us? In what 
way is Comrade Krupskaya different from every other responsible 
comrade? Perhaps you think that the interests of 
individual comrades should be placed above the interests 
of the Party and its unity? Are not the comrades 
of the opposition aware that for us, for Bolsheviks, formal 
democracy is an empty shell, but the real interests 
of the Party are everything? (Applause.) 
Let the comrades point to a single article in the 
Partyıs Central Organ, in Pravda, that directly or indirectly 
approves of the slogan ³enrich yourselves.² They 
cannot do so, because no such articles exist. There was 
one case, the only one, when Komsomolskaya Pravda published 
an article by Stetsky, in which he tried to justify 
the ³enrich yourselves² slogan in a mild and barely perceptible 
way. But what happened? The very next day 
the Secretariat of the Central Committee called the editorial 
board of that newspaper to order in a special 
letter signed by Molotov, Andreyev and Stalin. That 
was on June 2, 1925. Several days later, the Organising 
Bureau of the Central Committee, with the full consent 
of Bukharin, adopted a resolution to the effect that the 
editor of that newspaper be removed. Here is an excerpt 
from that letter: 
³Moscow, June 2, 1925. To all the members of the editorial 
board of Komsomolskaya Pravda. 
³We are of the opinion that certain passages in Stetskyıs 
articles ŒA New Stage in the New Economic Policyı evoke doubts. 
In those articles, in a mild form it is true, countenance is given to

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 395 
the slogan Œenrich yourselves.ı That is not our slogan, it is incorrect, 
it gives rise to a whole series of doubts and misunderstandings 
and has no place in a leading article in Komsomolskaya Pravda. 
Our slogan is socialist accumulation. We are removing the 
administrative obstacles to an improvement of the welfare of the 
countryside. That operation will undoubtedly facilitate all accumulation, 
both private-capitalist and socialist. But the Party has 
never yet said that it makes private accumulation its slogan.² . . . 
Is the opposition aware of all these facts? Of course 
it is. In that case, why donıt they stop baiting Bukharin? 
How much longer are they going to shout about Bukharinıs 
mistake? 
I know of mistakes made by some comrades, in October 
1917, for example, compared with which Bukharinıs 
mistake is not even worth noticing. Those comrades were 
not only mistaken then, but they had the ³audacity,² 
on two occasions, to violate a vital decision of the Central 
Committee adopted under the direction and in the 
presence of Lenin. Nevertheless, the Party forgot about 
those mistakes as soon as those comrades admitted them. 
But compared with those comrades, Bukharin committed 
an insignificant error. And he did not violate a single 
Central Committee decision. How is it to be explained 
that, in spite of this, the unrestrained baiting of 
Bukharin still continues? What do they really want of 
Bukharin? 
That is how the matter stands with Bukharinıs mistake. 
Next came the question of Zinovievıs article ³The 
Philosophy of the Epoch² and Kamenevıs report at the 
meeting of the Moscow Plenum in the autumn of this 
year, at the end of the summer‹a question which also 
strained our internal Party relations. I spoke about

J. V. S T A L I N 396 
this in my speech and I shall not repeat myself. The issue 
then was ³The Philosophy of the Epoch,² the mistakes 
in that article, how we rectified those mistakes, Kamenevıs 
mistakes in connection with the Central Statistical 
Boardıs balance of output of grain and fodder, how 
Kamenev credulously accepted the C.S.B.ıs figure of 
61 per cent as being the proportion of the market 
grain in the hands of the upper groups of the peasantry, 
and how, later, under pressure of our comrades, he was 
obliged to rectify his mistake in a special statement he 
made in the Council of Labour and Defence, and which 
was published in the newspapers, to the effect that more 
than half of the market grain was in the hands of the 
middle peasants. All this undoubtedly strained our 
relations. 
Then came questions connected with the October 
Plenum‹new complications, where the opposition demanded 
an open discussion, where the question of Zalutskyıs 
so-called ³Thermidor² came up, and at the end 
of all this the Leningrad Conference, which on the very 
first day opened fire on the Central Committee. I have 
in mind the speeches delivered by Safarov, Sarkis, Shelavin 
and others. I have in mind Zinovievıs speech, one 
of his last speeches at the close of the conference, in 
which he called upon the conference to wage war against 
the Moscow comrades and proposed that a delegation be 
elected consisting of people who were willing to fight the 
Central Committee. That is how it was. And that is precisely 
why the Bolshevik workers Komarov and Lobov 
were not included in the Leningrad delegation (they refused 
to accept the platform of struggle against the Central 
Committee). Their places in the delegation were filled by

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 397 
Gordon and Tarkhanov. Put Gordon and Tarkhanov in 
one scale and Komarov and Lobov in the other, and any 
unbiassed person will say that the former are not to be 
compared with the latter. (Applause.) What were Lobov 
and Komarov guilty of? All they were guilty of was 
that they refused to go against the Central Committee. 
That was their entire guilt. But only a month before 
that, the Leningrad comrades nominated Komarov as 
first secretary of their organisation. That is how it was. 
Was it so or not? (Voices from the Leningrad delegation: ³It 
was! It was!²) What could have happened to Komarov in a 
month? (Bukharin: ³He degenerated in a month.²) What 
could have happened in a month to bring it about that 
a member of the Central Committee, Komarov, whom 
you yourselves nominated as first secretary of your 
organisation, was kicked out of the Secretariat of the 
Leningrad Committee, and that it was not considered 
possible to elect him as a delegate to the congress? (A 
voice from the Leningrad benches: ³He insulted the conference.² 
A voice: ³Thatıs a lie, Naumov!² Commotion.) 
10. THE OPPOSITIONıS PLATFORM 
Let us now pass to the platform advanced by Zinoviev 
and Kamenev, Sokolnikov and Lashevich. It is 
time to say something about the oppositionıs platform. 
It is rather an original one. Many speeches of different 
kinds have been delivered here by the opposition. Kamenev 
said one thing, he pulled in one direction; Zinoviev 
said another thing, he pulled in another direction; 
Lashevich a third, Sokolnikov a fourth. But in spite 
of the diversity, all were agreed on one thing. On what

J. V. S T A L I N 398 
were they agreed? What indeed is their platform? Their 
platform is‹reform of the Secretariat of the Central 
Committee. The only thing they have in common 
and that completely unites them is the question of the 
Secretariat. That is strange and ridiculous, but it is 
a fact. 
This question has a history. In 1923, after the Twelfth 
Congress, the people who gathered in the ³cave² (laughter) 
drew up a platform for the abolition of the Political 
Bureau and for politicising the Secretariat, i.e., for 
transforming the Secretariat into a political and organisational 
directing body to consist of Zinoviev, Trotsky 
and Stalin. What was the idea behind that platform? 
What did it mean? It meant leading the Party without 
Kalinin, without Molotov. Nothing came of that platform, 
not only because it was unprincipled at that time, 
but also because, without the comrades I have mentioned, 
it is impossible to lead the Party at the present 
time. To a question sent to me in writing from the depths 
of Kislovodsk I answered ln the negative, stating that, if 
the comrades were to insist, I was willing to clear out 
without a fuss, without a discussion, open or concealed, 
and without demanding guarantees for the rights of the 
minority. (Laughter.) 
That was, so to speak, the first stage. 
And now, it appears, the second stage has been ushered 
in, opposite to the first. Now they are demanding not 
the politicisation, but the technicalisation of the Secretariat; 
not the abolition of the Political Bureau, but 
full powers for it. 
Well, if the transformation of the Secretariat into 
a simple technical apparatus is really convenient for

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 399 
Kamenev, perhaps we ought to agree to it. I am afraid, 
however, that the Party will not agree to it. (A voice: 
³Quite right!²) Whether a technical Secretariat would 
prepare, whether it would be capable of preparing, the 
questions it would have to prepare both for the Organising 
Bureau and for the Political Bureau, I have my 
doubts. 
But when they talk about a Political Bureau with 
full powers, such a platform deserves to be made into 
a laughing-stock. Hasnıt the Political Bureau full powers? 
Are not the Secretariat and the Organising Bureau 
subordinate to the Political Bureau? And what about 
the plenum of the Central Committee? Why does not 
our opposition speak about the plenum of the Central 
Committee? Is it thinking of giving the Political Bureau 
fuller powers than those possessed by the Plenum? 
No, the opposition is positively unlucky with its 
platform, or platforms, concerning the Secretariat. 
11. THEIR ³DESIRE FOR PEACE² 
What is to be done now, you will ask; what must we 
do to extricate ourselves from the situation that has been 
created? This question has engaged our minds all the 
time, during the congress as well as before it. We need 
unity of the Party ranks‹that is the question now. The 
opposition is fond of talking about difficulties. But 
there is one difficulty that is more dangerous than all 
others, and which the opposition has created for us‹the 
danger of confusion and disorganisation in the Party. 
(Applause.) We must above all overcome that difficulty. 
We had this in mind when, two days before the congress,

J. V. S T A L I N 400 
we offered the opposition terms of a compromise agreement 
aimed at a possible reconciliation. Here is the text 
of our offer: 
³The undersigned members of the Central Committee believe 
that the preparation for the Party congress by a number of leading 
comrades of the Leningrad organisation was conducted contrary to 
the line of the Central Committee of the Party and in opposition 
to the supporters of this line in Leningrad. The undersigned 
members of the Central Committee regard the resolution of 
the Moscow Conference as being absolutely correct both in 
substance and in form, and believe that it is the Central Committeeıs 
duty to rebuff all tendencies that run counter to the 
Party line and disorganise the Party. 
³However, for the sake of maintaining the unity of the Party, 
peace within the Party, of averting the possible danger of alienating 
the Leningrad organisation, one of the best organisations in 
the R.C.P., from the Partyıs Central Committee‹the undersigned 
consider it possible, if the congress endorses the Central Committeeıs 
distinct and clear political line, to make a number of concessions. 
With this in view we make the following proposals: 
³1. In drafting the resolution on the Central Committeeıs 
report, to take the resolution of the Moscow Conference as a basis 
but to tone down some of its formulations. 
³2. The publication in the newspapers, or in bulletins, of the 
letter of the Leningrad Conference and of the Moscow Committeeıs 
reply to that letter to be regarded as inexpedient in the interests of 
unity. 
³3. Members of the Political Bureau . . . are not to speak 
against each other at the congress. 
³4. In speeches at the congress, to dissociate ourselves from Sarkis 
(on regulating the composition of the Party) and from Safarov 
(on state capitalism). 
³5. The mistake in connection with Komarov, Lobov and 
Moskvin to be rectified by organisational measures. 
³6. The Central Committeeıs decision to include a Leningrad 
comrade in the Secretariat of the Central Committee to be put 
into effect immediately after the congress.

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 401 
³7. With the view to strengthening connection with the Central 
Organ, one Party worker from Leningrad to be included in the 
editorial board of the Central Organ. 
³8. In view of the incompetence of the editor of Leningradskaya 
Pravda (Gladnev), to recognise the need to replace him by a more 
competent comrade by agreement with the Central Committee. 
³Kalinin, Stalin, Molotov, Dzerzhinsky, and others. 
³15. XII. 1925² 
That is the compromise we offered, comrades. 
But the opposition was unwilling to come to an agreement. 
Instead of peace, it preferred an open and fierce 
struggle at the congress. Such is the oppositionıs ³desire 
for peace.²
12. THE PARTY WILL ACHIEVE UNITY 
In the main, we still adhere to the viewpoint of that 
document. In our draft resolution, as you know, we have 
already toned down some of the formulations in the interests 
of peace in the Party. 
We are against amputation. We are against the 
policy of amputation. That does not mean that leaders 
will be permitted with impunity to give themselves airs 
and ride roughshod over the Party. No, excuse us from 
that. There will be no obeisances to leaders. (Voices: ³Quite 
right!² Applause.) We stand for unity, we are against 
amputation. The policy of amputation is abhorrent 
to us. The Party wants unity, and it will achieve it 
with Kamenev and Zinoviev, if they are willing, without 
them if they are unwilling. (Voices: ³Quite right!² Applause.)

J. V. S T A L I N 402 
What is needed for unity? That the minority should 
submit to the majority. Without that there is no unity 
of the Party, nor can there be. 
We are opposed to the publication of a special discussion 
sheet. Bolshevik has a discussion section. That 
will be quite enough. We must not allow ourselves to 
be carried away by discussions. We are a Party that is 
governing a country‹do not forget that. Do not forget 
that every disaccord at the top finds an echo in the 
country that is harmful to us, not to speak of the effect 
it has abroad. 
The organs of the Central Committee will probably 
remain in their present shape. The Party is hardly likely 
to agree to break them up. (Voices: ³Quite right!² Applause.) 
The Political Bureau has full powers as it is, 
it is superior to all the organs of the Central Committee 
except the plenum. But the supreme organ is the plenum‹
that is sometimes forgotten. Our plenum decides 
everything, and it calls its leaders to order when they 
begin to lose their balance. (Voices: ³Quite right!² 
Laughter. Applause.) 
There must be unity among us, and there will be if 
the Party, if the congress displays firmness of character 
and does not allow itself to be scared. (Voices: ³We 
wonıt . We are seasoned people.²) I f any of us go 
too far, we shall be called to order‹that is essential, 
that is necessary. To lead the Party otherwise than 
collectively is impossible. Now that Ilyich is not with 
us it is silly to dream of such a thing (applause), it 
is silly to talk about it. 
Collective work, collective leadership, unity in the 
Party, unity in the organs of the Central Committee,

THE FOURTEENTH CONGRESS OF THE C.P.S.U.(B.) 403 
with the minority submitting to the majority‹that is 
what we need now. 
As regards the Leningrad communist workers, I have 
no doubt that they will always be in the front ranks of 
our Party. With them we built the Party, with them we 
reared it, with them we raised the banner of the uprising 
in October 1917, with them we defeated the bourgeoisie, 
with them we combated, and will combat, the difficulties 
in the path of our work of construction. I am sure that 
the Leningrad communist workers will not lag behind 
their friends in the other industrial centres in the struggle 
for iron, Leninist unity in the Party. (Stormy applause. 
The ³Internationale² is sung.)

N O T E S 
1 The All-Union Teachersı Congress took place in Moscow, January 
12-17, 1925. The congress was attended by 1,660 delegates 
representing 49 nationalities of the Soviet Union. Three-fourths 
of the delegates were village school-teachers. The congress heard 
and discussed reports on: the immediate tasks in the sphere of 
Soviet affairs; the teachers and the proletarian revolution; the 
tasks of education in the system of Soviet affairs; the Soviet 
school; the national question and the schools; teachers and the 
Young Communist League; the international position of the 
U.S.S.R., etc. The congress adopted a declaration stating that 
the teachers did not separate their tasks from those of the Communist 
Party, from its struggle to build socialism. p. 3 
2 Krasnaya Molodyozh (Red Youth)‹a monthly studentsı magazine 
published by the Central Bureau and Moscow Bureau of 
Proletarian Students from May 1924 to November 1925. V. M. Molotov 
was the editor-in-chief. In November 1925 the name of 
the magazine was changed to Krasnoye Studenchestvo (Red Students). 
p. 4 
3 From January 17 to 20, 1925, a plenum of the Central Committee 
of the R.C.P.(B.) took place. On January 17, a joint meeting 
of the plenums of the Central Committee and of the Central 
Control Commission of the R.C.P.(B.) was held. At this joint 
meeting, after hearing a statement by J. V. Stalin on the resolutions 
passed by local organisations on Trotskyıs action, 
the plenums passed a resolution qualifying Trotskyıs action 
as a revision of Bolshevism, as an attempt to substitute Trots

NOTES 405 
kyism for Leninism. On January 19, at the plenum of the Central 
Committee of the R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin delivered a speech 
on M. V. Frunzeıs report on ³Budget Assignments for the 
Peopleıs Commissariat of Military and Naval Affairs of the 
U.S.S.R.² (see this volume, pp. 11-14). p. 6 
4 This refers to the defeat in the autumn of 1924 of the Spanish 
army, 150,000 strong, sent by Primo de Rivera, the fascist dictator 
of Spain, to suppress the national-liberation movement 
in the Riff, the Spanish zone of Morocco. As a result of the victory 
gained by the Moroccans, two-thirds of the territory 
occupied by the Spanish forces was liberated. p. 12 
5 In the summer of 1924, as a result of the revolutionary-progressive 
movement in Albania, the reactionary government of Ahmet 
Zogu was overthrown. The Government of Fan-Noli, which came 
into power, opened negotiations with the Soviet Government for 
the establishment of diplomatic and friendly relations between 
the U.S.S.R. and Albania. The two countries exchanged diplomatic 
representatives. The Governments of Great Britain, 
Italy and Yugoslavia demanded that the Albanian Government 
should break off diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. In December 
1924, armed gangs organised by Ahmet Zogu and supported 
by the armed forces of the fascist government of Yugoslavia 
invaded Albania and overthrew the Government of Fan- 
Noli. The rule of Ahmet Zogu was restored in Albania. p. 13 
6 Rabochaya Gazeta (Workersı Newspaper), a daily newspaper 
of a mass character, organ of the Central Committee of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.), published in Moscow from March 1922 to January 
1932. It first appeared under the title of Rabochy (Worker), 
but in July 1922 it was renamed Rabochaya Gazeta. p. 15 
7 This refers to J. V. Stalinıs article ³October and Trotskyıs 
Theory of ŒPermanentı Revolution² published in Pravda, No. 
290, December 20, 1924. The article was part of the preface 
to the book On the Road to October. The preface was written by 
J. V. Stalin in December 1924 and was published in full only

NOTES 406 
in that book. The greater part of the preface, under the title 
of ³The October Revolution and the Tactics of the Russian Communists,² 
was published in various collections of articles, in 
separate pamphlets and in all the editions of J. V. Stalinıs 
book Problems of Leninism, and is included in Vol. 6 of the 
Works of J. V. Stalin, pp. 374-420. p. 16 
8 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 427-35. 
p. 17 
9 The symposium Against the Stream was published in Petrograd 
in 1918. It contained the following articles by V. I. Lenin, 
written in the period 1914-17: ³The United States of Europe 
Slogan,² ³On Juniusıs Pamphlet,² ³The National Pride of 
the Great Russians,² ³The Two Lines of the Revolution,² 
³The Collapse of the Second International,² and others, which 
later were included in Volumes XVIII and XIX of the 3rd edition 
of the Works of V. I. Lenin (see Vols. 21 and 22 of the 
4th Russ. ed. of the Works). p. 18 
10 V. I. Lenin, The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky 
(see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 28, pp. 207-302). p. 18 
11 V. I. Lenin, ³Left-Wing² Communism, An Infantile Disorder 
(see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 1-97). p. 18 
12 J. V. Stalin spoke at the meeting of the Organising Bureau of 
the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) during the discussion 
of the events that took place in the village of Dymovka (Nikolayev 
Okrug, Odessa Gubernia). In Dymovka, on March 28,1924, 
a gang of criminals, instigated by the kulaks, killed a village 
correspondent named Grigory Malinovsky. The resolution passed 
by the Central Committee and Central Control Commission 
of the R.C.P.(B.) on the events in Dymovka in connection 
with the murder of the village correspondent Malinovsky was 
published in Pravda, No. 30, February 6, 1925. p. 19 
13 This refers to the kulak revolt in the Tambov Gubernia in 
1919-21, and to the counter-revolutionary Kronstadt mutiny

NOTES 407 
in March 1921, which were organised by whiteguards, Socialist- 
Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and agents of foreign states. p. 23 
14 This refers to the counter-revolutionary revolt in Georgia on 
August 28, 1924, organised by the remnants of the defeated 
bourgeois-nationalist parties and by the émigré Menshevik 
³government² headed by Jordania on the instructions and 
with the financial support of the imperialist states and leaders 
of the Second International. On August 29 the revolt was put 
an end to with the active support of the Georgian workers and 
toiling peasants. p. 23 
15 The Thirteenth Gubernia Conference of the Moscow Organisation 
of the R.C.P.(B.) took place from January 24 to 28, 1925. 
There were present 1,150 delegates representing 64,078 members 
and 30,770 candidate members of the Party. The conference 
discussed the report of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.); 
the report of the Moscow Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) and 
the co-report of the Moscow Committee of the Russian Leninist 
Young Communist League; a report on the work of the 
Moscow Control Commission; the budget and the economic 
situation of the Moscow Gubernia; the question of work in the 
countryside. It also elected the leading bodies. J. V. Stalin 
spoke a t the conference on the question of work in the 
countryside. p. 25 
16 The Dawes Plan was the name given to the scheme for the payment 
of reparations by Germany drawn up by an international 
committee of experts under the chairmanship of the American 
financier, General Dawes, and endorsed at the London Conference 
of Allied States on August 16, 1924 (concerning the 
Dawes Plan see this volume, pp. 277-79). p. 35 
17 Brandler and Thalheimer‹leaders of the Right-opportunist 
group, who in 1922-23 stood at the head of the Communist 
Party of Germany. The treacherous policy pursued by Brandler 
and Thalheimer led to the defeat of the working class of Germany

NOTES 408 
during the revolutionary events in 1923. In April 1924, at the 
Frankfurt Congress of the Communist Party of Germany, Brandler 
and Thalheimer were removed from the Party leadership. 
The Fifth Congress of the Comintern (1924) condemned the defeatist 
line of the Brandler-Thalheimer group. In 1929, Brandler 
and Thalheimer were expelled from the Communist Party 
on account of factional, anti-Party activity. p. 42 
18 This refers to the trial of the ³Barmat Brothers Concern² at 
the beginning of 1925. During that trial it was revealed that 
prominent leaders of the Social-Democratic Party of Germany, 
headed by Weis, had received heavy bribes from this 
concern, and also that they had used funds obtained from 
this concern and banks connected with it to fight the Communist 
Party of Germany during the Reichstag elections in 
December 1924. p. 44 
19 Kuomintang‹the political party in China founded by Sun 
Yat-sen in 1912 for the purpose of fighting for a republic and 
for the national independence of the country. Sun Yat-sen died 
on March 12, 1925. In his testament he enjoined the Kuomintang 
to maintain the alliance with the Communist Party of 
China, to maintain friendship with the Soviet Union and to 
expand the national-liberation movement of the workers and 
peasants of China. In the period of the development of the revolution 
in China in 1925-27, the Right wing of the Kuomintang, 
headed by Chiang Kai-shek, violated the behests of Sun Yatsen. 
In alliance with imperialists of foreign states, it waged a 
struggle against the democratic forces of China led by the Communist 
Party. p. 50 
20 The Amsterdam International Federation of Trade Unions 
was formed in July 1919 at an international congress held 
in Amsterdam. It consisted of the reformist trade unions of a 
number of countries of Western Europe and the U.S.A. In 1919 
its affiliated membership reached 24,000,000, but by the end of 
1923 it had dropped to 16,000,000. In subsequent years the influence 
and membership of the Amsterdam Federation steadily

FROM MARX 
TO MAO 

 
NOT FOR 
COMMERCIAL 
DISTRIBUTION 
409 
declined. During the Second World War it practically ceased 
to function. It was dissolved in December 1945 owing to the formation 
of the World Federation of Trade Unions. p. 53 
21 The Czechoslovak Commission was set up by the Fifth Enlarged 
Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International 
held in Moscow from March 21 to April 6, 1925. The plenum 
discussed the following questions: the international prospects 
and the Bolshevisation of the Communist Parties; the 
struggle for world trade-union unity; the peasant question; 
the discussion in the R.C.P.(B.); questions concerning individual 
sections of the Comintern; etc. The plenum set up a number of 
commissions: political, Czechoslovak, and Yugoslav, among 
others. J. V. Stalin was elected a member of the political and 
Czechoslovak commissions. On March 30, J. V. Stalin spoke 
in the Yugoslav Commission on the national question in Yugoslavia 
(see this volume, pp. 69-76). p. 58 
22 See J. V. Stalin, Marxism and the National Question (Works, 
Vol. 2, pp. 300-81). p. 70 
23 See V. I. Lenin, The Right of Nations to Self-Determination 
(Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 20, pp. 365-424). p. 71 
24 The First All-Union Conference of Proletarian Students was 
held in Moscow from April 13 to 17, 1925. There were present 
about 300 delegates representing 250,000 students at higher 
educational institutions, technical schools and workersı faculties. 
The conference discussed the following questions: the 
international position of the U.S.S.R. and its internal situation; 
trade unions and the students; a report on the work of 
the Central Bureau of Proletarian Students; a report on the 
work of the Chief Vocational Education Boards of the R.S.F.S.R. 
and the Ukrainian S.S.R.; the connection between higher educational 
institutions and industry. On April 13, J. V. Stalin had 
an interview with a delegation from the conference, and on 
April 15 he sent to the conference the address published in the 
present volume. p. 85 
NOTES

NOTES 410 
25 The Fourteenth Conference of the R.C.P.(B.) took place in 
Moscow, April 27-29, 1925. The conference discussed the following 
questions: Party affairs; the co-operatives; the single 
agricultural tax; the metal industry; revolutionary law; the 
tasks of the Comintern and of the R.C.P.(B.) in connection with 
the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. (For the decisions of the 
conference see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) 
Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II 
1941, pp. 4-31.) p. 90 
26 V. I. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism (see 
Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, pp. 173-290). p. 95 
27 Field Marshal Hindenburg, a furious monarchist and an 
instrument of German imperialism and militarism, was elected 
President of Germany on April 26, 1925. p. 99 
28 On April 16, 1925, an explosion occurred at the ³Sveta Nedelya² 
Cathedral in Sofia when the members of the fascist government 
of Bulgaria, headed by Tsankoff, were attending a service 
Tsankoff sent to the United States a slanderous statement accusing 
the Soviet Government of instigating the explosion. The 
reactionary foreign press launched a campaign against the 
U.S.S.R., calling upon the governments of their respective countries 
to revise their relations with the Soviet Union. The Third 
Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R., held in May 1925, issued an 
appeal to the working people of the whole world concerning the 
brutal treatment of the best representatives of the Bulgarian 
people by the Tsankoff Government and in this statement repudiated 
the slanderous attacks upon the Soviet Union. p. 100 
29 This refers to the theses on the Bolshevisation of the parties 
affiliated to the Communist International adopted by the Fifth 
Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Comintern 
held in Moscow, March 21-April 6, 1925. p. 102 
30 This refers to the national-state delimitation of the Soviet republics 
in Central Asia (the Turkestan, Bukhara and Khoresm

NOTES 411 
republics) carried through in 1924. As a result of this national 
delimitation there were formed: the Turkmenian Soviet Socialist 
Republic, the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, the Tajik 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as part of the Uzbek 
S.S.R., the Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous Region of the R.S.F.S.R. 
(subsequently it became the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic), 
and the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Region of the Kirghiz 
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (later of the Kazakh 
Soviet Socialist Republic). The Third Congress of Soviets of 
the U.S.S.R. held in May 1925 accepted the Uzbek and Turkmenian 
Soviet Socialist Republics into the U.S.S.R. and 
amended the Constitution of the U.S.S.R. accordingly. The 
national-state delimitation of the Soviet republics in Central 
Asia was carried through under the immediate direction of 
J. V. Stalin. p. 138 
31 See V. I. Leninıs article, ³Critical Remarks on the National 
Question² (Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 20, pp. 1-34). p. 110 
32 This refers to the armed uprising of the workers in Revel (Tallinn) 
on December 1, 1924, provoked by the sentence passed by 
an Estonian court at the end of November 1924 on 149 political 
offenders accused of conducting communist propaganda. The 
majority of the accused were sentenced to long terms of penal 
servitude, thirty-nine were sentenced to penal servitude for 
life, and Tomp, the leader of the Estonian workers, was shot. 
The uprising was cruelly suppressed by the reactionary Estonian 
government. p. 152 
33 Komsomolskaya Pravda (Y.C.L. Truth), a daily newspaper, 
organ of the Central Committee and Moscow Committee of the 
All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, began publication 
in May 1925 in conformity with the decisions of the Thirteenth 
Congress of the R.C.P.(B.) and the Sixth Congress of the 
Russian Leninist Young Communist League. p. 155 
34 Posledniye Novosti (Latest News), a daily newspaper of Cadet 
white émigrés; began publication in Paris in April 1920; was 
edited by the Cadet leader P. N. Milyukov. p. 167

NOTES 412 
35 The Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. was held in Moscow, 
May 13-20, 1925. The congress discussed the following 
questions: the acceptance of the Turkmenian and Uzbek Soviet 
Socialist Republics into the U.S.S.R.; report of the Government 
of the U.S.S.R.; the state of industry in the U.S.S.R. 
questions concerning Soviet affairs; measures for improving 
and strengthening peasant economy; the Red Army etc. The 
report on questions concerning Soviet affairs was delivered by 
M. I. Kalinin. p. 187 
36 This refers to the Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the Executive 
Committee of the Comintern held in Moscow, March 21-April 
6, 1925 (for the speech delivered by J. V. Stalin on the Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia in the Czechoslovak Commission 
of the plenum see this volume, pp. 58-68). p. 190 
37 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, pp. 308-43. 
p. 206 
38 This refers to the war for national liberation launched by the 
Riffs in Morocco against French imperialism in the spring of 
1925. After the defeat of the Spanish army of occupation in Morocco 
in the autumn of 1924, France resolved to seize the Riff, 
the Spanish zone of Morocco, and provoked a war. In the spring 
and summer of 1925 the Riffs inflicted a series of heavy defeats 
upon the French. The Riffs were defeated in May 1926 only 
after the conclusion of a military alliance between France and 
Spain. p. 209 
39 This refers to the intervention of Anglo-American and Japanese 
imperialism in the internal affairs of China in the second half 
of 1924. In South China, British naval forces supported the 
revolt of the counter-revolutionary Canton merchants against 
the revolutionary Canton Government headed by Sun Yat-sen. 
In the North, the Anglo-American and Japanese imperialists 
instigated war between their respective protégés, the Chinese 
generals Wu Pei-fu and Chang Tso-lin, for the partition of

NOTES 413 
China. This intervention gave a powerful impetus to the struggle 
for national liberation in China, which led to the revolution 
of 1925-27. p. 209 
40 Bolshevik, a fortnightly theoretical and political magazine, organ 
of the Central Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.); began publication 
in April 1924. p. 220 
41 The Fifth Congress of the Comintern was held in Moscow, 
June 17-July 8, 1924. On June 30, D. Z. Manuilsky delivered 
a report on the national question. p. 223 
42 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 22, pp. 306-44. 
p. 226 
43 See Marx-Engels, Gesamtausgabe, Abt. I, B. 6, S. 503-22. 
p. 238 
44 Ruth Fischer and Maslow‹leaders of the Trotskyite group in 
the Communist Party of Germany. In April 1924, at the Frankfurt 
Congress of the Communist Party of Germany, after the 
removal of the bankrupt Right-opportunist Brandler-Thalheimer 
group from the Party leadership, the Ruth Fischer-Maslow 
group seized the leadership in the newly-elected Central Committee 
of the C.P.G. In the autumn of 1925, Ruth Fischer and 
Maslow and their supporters were removed from the leading 
posts in the Communist Party of Germany and in 1926 they 
were expelled from the Party as agents of the class enemy. After 
that the leadership of the Communist Party of Germany was 
headed by E. Thälmann. p. 242 
45 The Sixth Congress of the Russian Leninist Young Communist 
League was held in Moscow, July 12-18, 1924. The congress 
discussed the following questions: the change of name from the 
Russian Young Communist League to the Russian Leninist Young 
Communist League; the political situation and the tasks of the 
youth the report of the Russian Leninist Y.C.L. delegation on 
the Executive Committee of the Young Communist International;

NOTES 414 
the report of the Central Committee of the Russian Leninist 
Y.C.L.; the prospects of youth labour and the tasks of the economic 
activities of the R.L.Y.C.L.; the work of the R.L.Y.C.L. 
in the countryside; the work of the R.L.Y.C.L. in the Red Army 
and Navy, etc. The Sixth Congress of the R.L.Y.C.L. associated 
itself with the decisions of the Thirteenth Congress of 
the R.C.P.(B.) and condemned the opportunist theory that the 
Y.C.L. should be neutral in the struggle against anti-Party deviations. 
(For the decisions adopted by the Sixth Congress of 
the R.L.Y.C.L. see Resolutions and Decisions of the Sixth All- 
Union Congress of the R.L.Y.C.L., Moscow, 1924.) p. 253 
46 V. I. Lenin, ³Outline of the Pamphlet The Tax in Kind² (see 
Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, p. 302). p. 261 
47 V. I. Lenin, speech in closing the Eleventh Congress of the 
R.C.P.(B.), April 2, 1922 (see Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol 33) 
p. 291). p. 261 
48 The Twenty-Second Gubernia Conference of the Leningrad 
organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) was held on December 1-10 
1925, just before the Fourteenth Party Congress. This letter 
from J. V. Stalin was read at a private session of the conference 
held on December 8, 1925. p. 263 
49 The Fourteenth Moscow Gubernia Party Conference was held 
on December 5-13, 1925, just before the Fourteenth Party 
Congress. In i t s resolution on the report of the Central 
Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) the conference approved the political 
and organisational work of the Central Committee of 
the R.C.P.(B.). p. 263 
50 The Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) took place in 
Moscow, December 18-31, 1925. The congress discussed the 
political and organisational reports of the Central Committee 
the reports of the Auditing Commission, of the Central Control

NOTES 415 
Commission and of the representatives of the R.C.P.(B.) on 
the Executive Committee of the Comintern; and also reports 
on: the work of the trade unions; the work of the Young Communist 
League; revision of the Party Rules, etc. The congress fully 
approved the political and organisational line of the Central 
Committee, indicated the further path of struggle for the victory 
of socialism, endorsed the Partyıs general line for the 
socialist industrialisation of the country, rejected the defeatist 
plans of the oppositionists and instructed the Central Committee 
resolutely to combat all attempts to undermine the unity of 
the Party. The Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) has 
taken its place in the history of the Party as the Industrialisation 
Congress. The key-note of this congress was the 
struggle against the ³new opposition,² which denied the 
possibility of building socialism in the U.S.S.R. By decision 
of the Fourteenth Congress, the Party adopted the 
name of Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks) 
‹C.P.S.U.(B.). (Concerning the Fourteenth Congress of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) see History of the Communist Party of the Soviet 
Union (Bolsheviks), Short Course, Moscow 1952, pp. 423-28.) 
p. 265 
51 This refers to the conference held in Locarno (Switzerland), 
October 5-16, 1925, at which Great Britain, France, Italy, 
Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Germany were represented. 
(Concerning the Locarno Conference see pp. 279-80 in this 
volume.) p. 277 
52 In Genoa (Italy), April 10-May 19, 1922, an international economic 
conference was held in which Great Britain, France, 
Italy, Belgium Japan and other capitalist states, on the one 
hand, and Soviet Russia, on the other, took part. The Genoa 
Conference was called for the purpose of determining the relations 
between the capitalist world and Soviet Russia. At the 
opening of the conference the Soviet delegation submitted an 
extensive programme for the rehabilitation of Europe and also 
a scheme for universal disarmament. The conference did not 
accept the Soviet delegationıs proposals.

NOTES 416 
On December 2, 1922, the Soviet Government convened 
in Moscow a conference of representatives of the neighbouring 
Western states (Estonia, Finland, Latvia, Poland and Lithuania), 
at which it submitted for discussion a plan for proportional 
reduction of armaments. On December 27, 1922, the Tenth All- 
Russian Congress of Soviets, in an appeal ³To All the Peoples 
of the World,² reaffirmed the Soviet Governmentıs peace policy 
and called upon the working people all over the world to support 
this policy. In February 1924, at the Naval Conference held 
in Rome, the Soviet representative submitted concrete proposals 
for reducing naval armaments. p. 287 
53 This refers to the general and commercial treaties between 
Great Britain and the U.S.S.R. signed in London on August 
8, 1924, by representatives of the Soviet Government and of 
the MacDonald Labour Government. The British Conservative 
Government, which came into office in Britain in November 
1924, refused to ratify those treaties. p. 297 
54 The decree of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee 
of Soviets of Workersı, Soldiersı and Peasantsı Deputies annulling 
the state debts of the tsarist government was adopted on 
January 21, 1918. p. 297 
55 This refers to the Conservative Baldwin-Austen Chamberlain 
Government that came into power in November 1924 in place 
of the MacDonald Labour Government. p. 299 
56 Ekonomicheskaya Zhizn (Economic Life), a daily newspaper 
organ of the economic and financial Peopleıs Commissariats 
and institutions of the R.S.F.S.R. and U.S.S.R. (Supreme Council 
of National Economy, Council of Labour and Defence, the 
State Planning Commission, the State Bank, the Peopleıs 
Commissariat of Finance, and others); published from November 
1918 to November 1937. p. 306 
57 This refers to V. I. Leninıs works: ³Left-Wing² Childishness and 
Petty-Bourgeois Mentality (Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 27, pp.

NOTES 417 
291-319), Report on the Tax in Kind Delivered at a Meeting 
of Secretaries and Responsible Representatives of R.C.P.(B.) 
Units of the City of Moscow and of the Moscow Gubernia on April 
9, 1921, and The Tax in Kind (Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 32, 
pp. 262-76, 308-43), and Five Years of the Russian Revolution 
and the Prospects of the World Revolution (Report delivered at 
the Fourth Congress of the Comintern on November 13, 1922) 
(Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 33, pp. 380-94). p. 311 
58 See Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) Congresses, 
Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part I, 1941, p. 566. 
p . 320 
59 See V. I. Leninıs ³Preliminary Draft of Theses on the Agrarian 
Question (For the Second Congress of the Communist International)² 
(Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 31, pp. 129-41). p. 332 
60 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 29, pp. 124-25. 
p. 336 
61 This refers to the resolution adopted by the plenum of the Central 
Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) (October 3-10, 1925) on 
V. M. Molotovıs report on ³The Partyıs Work among the 
Rural Poor² (see Resolutions and Decisions of C.P.S.U.(B.) 
Congresses, Conferences and Central Committee Plenums, Part II, 
1941, pp. 38-41). p. 338 
62 See V. I. Lenin, Works, 4th Russ. ed., Vol. 6, pp. 325-92. 
p. 339 
63 Bednota (The Poor), a daily newspaper, organ of the Central 
Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.), published from March 1918 
to January 1931. p. 372 
64 Leningradskaya Pravda (Leningrad Truth), a daily newspaper, 
organ of the Leningrad Regional and City Committees of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.) and Leningrad Regional and City Soviets of Work

NOTES 418 
ing Peopleıs Deputies; started publication in 1918 under the title 
of Petrogradskaya Pravda. In 1924 it was renamed Leningradskaya 
Pravda. At the end of 1925, Leningradskaya Pravda, the organ of 
the North-Western Regional Bureau of the Central Committee 
of the R.C.P.(B.), the Leningrad Gubernia Party Committee, 
the Leningrad Gubernia Council of Trade Unions, and the Regional 
Economic Conference, was utilised by the ³new opposition² 
for its factional anti-Party aims. p. 389

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 
1 9 2 5 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with the members 
of the editorial board of Krasnaya Molodyozh 
on the tasks of that magazine. A report of the 
interview was published in Krasnaya Molodyozh, 
No. 1 (5), January 1925. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with students of 
the Stalino (Yuzovka) Party School who had 
come on an excursion to Moscow. 
J. V. Stalin writes the appeal ³Working Women 
and Peasant Women, Remember and Carry Out 
Ilyichıs Behests!² The appeal was published 
in the magazine Rabotnitsa (Working Woman), 
No. 1, January 1925. 
J . V. Stalin writes a letter to the All-Union 
Teachersı Congress. The letter was published 
in Uchitelskaya Gazeta (Teacherıs Newspaper), 
No. 2, January 10, 1925. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with a group of 
Communists assigned for work in the countryside. 
J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the leaders of the 
All-Union Association of Proletarian Writers 
Beginning of 
January 
January 5 
January 6 
January 9 
January 10

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 420 
January 17-20 
January 17 
January 19 
January 21 
January 25 
January 26 
January 27 
January 28 
concerning the convocation of a conference of 
proletarian writers. 
J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the plenum 
of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). 
At a joint session of the plenums of the Central 
Committee and the Central Control Commission 
of the R.C.P.(B.), J. V. Stalin reports on the 
resolutions passed by local organisations on 
Trotskyıs action. 
J. V. Stalin speaks at the plenum of the Central 
Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) on M. V. Frunzeıs 
report on ³Budget Assignments for the Peopleıs 
Commissariat of Military and Naval Affairs 
of the U.S.S.R.² 
. V. Stalinıs letter to Rabochaya Gazeta on the 
first anniversary of the death of V. I. Lenin is 
published in Rabochaya Gazeta, No. 17. 
J. V. Stalin writes an answer to Comrade D‹ovıs 
letter concerning the question of the victory of 
socialism in one country. 
J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Organising 
Bureau of the Central Committee of the 
R.C.P.(B.) on ³Dymovka.² 
J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the Thirteenth 
Gubernia Conference of the Moscow organisation 
of the R.C.P.(B.) ³Concerning the Question of 
the Proletariat and the Peasantry.² 
J. V. Stalin takes part in the meetings of the 
Executive Committee of the Communist International 
(E.C.C.I.) and of its Presidium.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 421 
January 30 
January 31 
February 2 
February 3 
February 6 
February 7 
February 9 
In greetings telegraphed to the first congresses 
of the Communist Parties of Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan, J . V. Stalin defines the tasks 
of the Communist Parties in those republics 
after the national delimitation that had been 
carried out in Central Asia. The telegrams 
were published in the newspapers Pravda Vostoka 
(Truth of the East), No. 29, February 6, 1925, 
and Turkmenskaya Iskra (Turkmenian Spark), 
No. 34, February 14, 1925. 
The Twenty-First Gubernia Party Conference 
of the Leningrad organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) 
elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Leningrad 
Gubernia Party Committee. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation 
from the All-Union Association of Proletarian 
Writers on questions concerning proletarian 
literature. 
J. V. Stalinıs interview with Herzog on ³The 
Prospects of the Communist Party of Germany 
and Bolshevisation² is published in Pravda, 
No. 27. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with leading 
functionaries of the Central Committee and 
Moscow Committee of the Russian Leninist 
Young Communist League on questions concerning 
the work of the League. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation 
from the plenum of the ³Proletkult² organisation 
on questions concerning the further work 
of this organisation. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with leading functionaries 
of the Central Committee of the

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422 BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 
February 15 
February 18 
February 20 
February 26 
February 28 
March 6 
March 8 
March 9 
March 10 
R.L.Y.C.L. on questions concerning the work 
of the League. 
J . V. Stalin sends greetings to the Seventh 
Tsaritsyn Gubernia Congress of Soviets. 
J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the 
Presidium of the E.C.C.I. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with representatives 
of Party and Soviet bodies in the 
Tul a Gubernia on questions concerning the 
work of the co-operatives and on housing. 
J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the 
Presidium of the E.C.C.I. 
J. V. Stalin writes a letter to Comrade Me‹rt 
concerning the situation in the Communist 
Party of Germany. 
J . V. Stalin sends greetings to the working 
people of Tajikistan on the occasion of the formation 
of the Tajik Autonomous Soviet Sociali 
s t Republic. The greetings were published 
in Pravda Vostoka, No. 58, March 12, 1925. 
J. V. Stalinıs article ³International Womenıs 
Day² is published in Pravda, No. 56. 
J. V. Stalin signs the notice ³To all organisations 
of the R.C.P.(B.)² announcing the convocation 
of an All-Union Party Conference and 
agenda of this conference. 
J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the cadets and 
to the commanding, political and teaching 
staff of the Stalin Infantry School in Nizhni 
Novgorod in connection with his election as 
an honorary cadet of the school. The letter

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 423 
March 13 
March 14 and 16 
March 15 
March 17 
March 21 ‹ 
April 6 
March 21 
was published in Nizhegorodskaya Kommuna 
(Nizhni-Novgorod Commune), No. 45, February 
23, 1930 
J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the Tsaritsyn 
Gubernia congress of agricultural co-operative 
delegates, wishing them success in drawing 
the toiling peasantry into the work of building 
socialism. 
J. V. Stalin writes the message of the Central 
Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) sent to the Central 
Executive Committee of the Kuomintang 
in connection with the death of Sun Yat-sen. 
The message was published in Pravda, No. 60, 
March 14, 1925. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation 
from the First All-Union Congress of Village 
Correspondents. 
J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the First Party 
Conference of the Kara-Kirghiz Autonomous 
Region in which he defines the tasks confronting 
the Communists of Kara-Kirghizia. The 
greetings were published in Pravda Vostoka, 
No. 67, March 26, 1925. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with the delegation 
from the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia 
which had arrived for the Fifth Enlarged 
Plenum of the E.C.C.I. 
J. V. Stalin takes part in the work of the Fifth 
Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. 
J. V. Stalin is elected a member of the political 
and Czechoslovak commissions set up by the 
Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 424 
March 22 
March 25 
March 27 
March 28 
March 30 
J . V. Stalinıs article ³The International Situation 
and the Tasks of the Communist Parties² 
is published in Pravda, No. 66. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with the delegations 
from the workers at the Vladimir Ilyich 
and Dynamo factories who had come to 
invite him to attend their meetings for the 
election of deputies to the Moscow and District 
Soviets of Workersı, Peasantsı and Red Army 
Deputies. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation 
from the crew of the torpedo-boat ³Stalin² of 
the Red Baltic Fleet. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with leading 
members of the staff of the Lenin Institute on 
questions concerning the work of the Institute. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with the delegation 
from the Communist Party of France which had 
arrived for the Fifth Enlarged Plenum of the 
E.C.C.I. 
J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Czechoslovak 
Commission of the Enlarged Plenum 
of the E.C.C.I. on ³The Communist Party 
of Czechoslovakia.² 
At a meeting of the workers of Section No. 1 of 
the Locomotive Service of the Northern Railway, 
J. V. Stalin is elected a deputy to the Moscow 
Soviet of Workersı, Peasantsı and Red Army 
Menıs Deputies. 
J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Czechoslovak 
subcommission of the Fifth Enlarged

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 425 
April 1 
April 3 
April 6 
April 7 
Plenum of the E.C.C.I. on the situation in the 
Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. 
J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Yugoslav 
Commission of the Enlarged Plenum of 
the E.C.C.I. on ³Concerning the National 
Question in Yugoslavia.² 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation 
from the Kirghiz Republic on the situation in 
Kirghizia. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with representatives 
of the editorial board of the newspaper 
Bednota on questions concerning the work of 
the peasant department of that newspaper. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation 
of workers from Section No. 1 of the Locomotive 
Service of the Northern Railway who had come 
to hand him his credentials as a deputy to the 
Moscow Soviet. 
In a telegram to S. M. Kirov, Secretary of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party 
of Azerbaijan, J . V. Stalin greets the Communist 
Party of Azerbaijan on the occasion 
of its fifth anniversary. The telegram was published 
in Bakinsky Rabochy (Baku Worker) , 
No. 75, April 5, 1925. 
J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Organising 
Bureau of the Central Committee of the 
R.C.P.(B.) on ³The Active of the Young Communist 
League in the Countryside.² 
J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the 
E.C.C.I.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 426 
April 13 
April 15 
April 23-30 
April 27-29 
May 1 
May 2 
May 5 
May 6 
May 7-11, 16 
May 9 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation 
from the First All-Union Conference of Proletarian 
Students. 
J . V. Stalin writes an address ³To the First 
All-Union Conference of Proletarian Students.² 
The address was published in Pravda, No. 87, 
April 16, 1925. 
J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the plenum 
of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the Fourteenth 
Conference of the R.C.P.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin is present at the May Day military 
parade and a demonstration of the working 
people in the Red Square, Moscow. 
J . V. Stalin sends greetings to the editorial 
board of Pravda Vostoka (Tashkent) on the 
occasion of Press Day. The greetings were 
published in a special issue of Pravda Vostoka, 
May 6, 1925. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with a delegation 
of workers from the October Railway. 
J. V. Stalin writes a message of greetings to the 
newspaper Pod Znamenem Ilyicha (Under Ilyichıs 
Banner), organ of the Communist University of 
the Toilers of the East, in which he defines 
the tasks confronting that newspaper. 
J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of 
the Twelfth All-Russian Congress of Soviets. 
J. V. Stalin delivers a report on ³The Results 
of the Work of the Fourteenth Conference of

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 427 
May 11 
May 13-20 
May 18 
May 20 
May 21 
May 22 
May 23 
May 25 
the R.C.P.(B.)² at a meeting of the active 
of the Moscow organisation of the R.C.P.(B.). 
The Twelfth All-Russian Congress of Soviets 
elects J. V. Stalin a member of the All-Russian 
Central Executive Committee. 
The first session of the All-Russian C.E.C., 
Twelfth Convocation, elects J. V. Stalin a member 
of the Presidium of the All-Russian C.E.C. 
J. V. Stalin takes part in the proceedings of 
the Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. 
J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of students at 
the Communist University of the Toilers of 
the East on ³The Political Tasks of the University 
of the Peoples of the East.² 
The Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. 
elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Union Soviet 
of the Central Executive Committee of 
the U.S.S.R. 
The first session of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R. 
elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Presidium 
of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R. 
J . V. Stalin has an interview with delegates 
from the Turkmenian and Uzbek republics at 
the Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with leading workers 
of Party and Soviet bodies in the South- 
Ossetian and North-Ossetian Autonomous Regions. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with delegates at 
the Third Congress of Soviets of the U.S.S.R.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 428 
May 29 
June 1 
June 2 
June 3 
June 5 
June 9 
June 13 
June 27 
from the Turkmenian S.S.R. and the Tajik 
and Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republics 
on the situation in these republics. 
J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the 
Presidium of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with leading 
officials of the Uzbek S.S.R. and of the 
Daghestan and Tajik Autonomous Soviet Socialist 
Republics. 
J. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and A. A. Andreyev 
send a letter to the members of the editorial 
board of Komsomolskaya Pravda. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with students of 
the courses organised by the Central Committee 
of the R.C.P.(B.) for uyezd Party workers. 
J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of the Presidium 
of the C.E.C. of the U.S.S.R. 
J. V. Stalin speaks at the Sverdlov Communist 
University, answering questions put to him 
by students of the University. 
J. V. Stalinıs greetings ³To the Sverdlov University 
(On the Occasion of the Second Graduation 
of Students of Basic and Trade-Union 
Courses)² are published in Pravda, No. 132. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with the chairmen 
of the Tambov, Orel, Voronezh and Kursk 
Gubernia Executive Committees of Soviets on the 
measures to be taken to rehabilitate the national 
economy in the black-earth belt.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 429 
June 30 
July 3 
July 4 
July 29 
August 18 
September 12 
September 15 
September 19 
J. V. Stalinıs article ³The National Question 
Once Again (Concerning the Article by Semich)² 
is published in the magazine Bolshevik, 
No. 11-12. 
At a meeting of the Presidium of the E.C.C.I., 
J. V. Stalin is elected to the commission on 
the Polish question. 
J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Polish 
Commission of the E.C.C.I. on the situation 
in the Communist Party of Poland. 
J. V. Stalinıs interview with Mr. Fuse, Japanese 
correspondent of the newspaper Nichi- 
Nichi, on ³The Revolutionary Movement in 
the East² is published in Pravda, No. 150. 
The Presidium of the E.C.C.I. elects J. V. 
Stalin to the commission on the German question. 
J. V. Stalin sends a letter to the Cossacks of 
Goryachevodskaya Stanitsa acknowledging the 
receipt of the certificate of his election as an 
Honorary Cossack of that stanitsa on the occasion 
of its centenary. The letter was published 
in the newspaper Terek, No. 189, August 22, 
1925. 
J. V. Stalin writes a letter to V. M. Molotov 
concerning the anti-Bolshevik character of 
Zinovievıs article ³The Philosophy of the 
Epoch.² 
J. V. Stalin writes an answer to a note by 
Comrade Yermakovsky. 
J. V. Stalinıs greetings to the patients at the 
Uch-Dere Sanatorium are published in the newspaper 
Sovietsky Yug (Soviet South), No. 215.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 430 
September 24 
September 28 
October 3-10 
October 10 
October 12 
October 14 
October 15 
October 19 
The Political Bureau of the Central Committee 
of the R.C.P.(B.) elects J. V. Stalin to the 
commission set up to examine the proposals 
of the Central Asian Bureau of the C.C. of the 
R.C.P.(B.) for land and irrigation reform in 
Central Asia. 
J. V. Stalin discusses with representatives of 
the Kazakh Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic 
the national and state structure of that 
republic. 
J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the plenum 
of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). 
J . V. Stalin wr i t e s a l e t t e r to Klara Zetkin 
concerning the state of affairs in the Communist 
Party of Germany. 
J . V. Stalin has an interview with members 
of the staffs of the Agitation and Propaganda 
Departments of the Tiflis and Nizhni-Novgorod 
Party Committees, participants in the 
conference of heads of Agitation and Propaganda 
Departments convened by the Central 
Committee of the R.C.P.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with participants 
in the conference of Agitation and Propaganda 
Departments convened by the Central Committee 
of the R.C.P.(B.). 
The announcement, signed by J. V. Stalin, of 
the convocation of the Fourteenth Congress of 
the R.C.P.(B.) is published in Pravda, No. 236. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with representatives 
of the South-Ossetian and North-Osse

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 431 
October 23 
October 29 
October 31 
November 2 
tian Autonomous Regions on the question of 
uniting the two regions. 
J. V. Stalin speaks at a meeting of the Organising 
Bureau of the Central Committee of the 
R.C.P.(B.) on the work of the Tatar Party 
organisation. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with the Chairman 
of the Kursk Gubernia Executive Committee of 
Soviets and the Secretary of the Kursk Gubernia 
Party Committee on questions concerning work 
in the countryside. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with the manager 
of the Tula Small Arms Factory on questions 
concerning the work of the factory. 
J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the workers at 
the Baltic Shipbuilding Yard on the occasion 
of the launching of the first Soviet-built timbercarrier, 
the ³Comrade Stalin.² The greetings 
were published in Izvestia, No. 246, October 27, 
1925. 
Komsomolskaya Pravda, No. 133, publishes 
J. V. Stalinıs answers to questions put to him 
by the editorial board concerning the tasks 
of the Young Communist League. 
J . V. Stalin vi s i t s M. V. Frunze, then lying 
ill in the Botkin (Soldatenkov) Hospital. 
J. V. Stalin visits the Botkin Hospital where 
the body of M. V. Frunze was lying in state. 
J. V. Stalin attends the Frunze memorial meeting 
in the Bolshoi Theatre.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 432 
November 3 
November 7 
November 9 
Before November 
15 
November 16 
November 18 
November 29 
December 1 
J. V. Stalin delivers a speech at the funeral 
of M. V. Frunze in the Red Square. 
J. V. Stalinıs article ³October, Lenin, and 
the Prospects of Our Development² i s published 
in Pravda, No. 255. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with leading 
functionaries of the Central Committee and 
Moscow Committee of the R.L.Y.C.L. on 
questions concerning the work of the League. 
A Party meeting of the workers at the Stalin 
Workshops of the October Railway elects 
J. V. Stalin a delegate to the Fifth Party 
Conference of the Sokolniki District of Moscow. 
J. V. Stalin has an interview with the leaders 
of the Azerbaijan sections of the Metalworkersı 
and Minersı Unions on the conditions of the 
workers. 
J. V. Stalin takes part in a meeting of 
the Presidium of the C.E.G. of the U.S.S.R. 
J. V. Stalin sends greetings to the Fifth Party 
Conference of the Sokolniki District of Moscow. 
The greetings were published in the newspaper 
Gudok (Siren), No. 265, November 20, 1925. 
J. V. Stalin sends a telegram to Comrade Yaroslavsky 
in Leningrad concerning the preparations 
for the Twenty-Second Gubernia Conference 
of the Leningrad organisation of the 
R.C.P.(B.). 
The Twenty-Second Gubernia Conference of 
the Leningrad organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) 
elects J. V. Stalin an honorary member of 
the presidium of the conference.

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 433 
December 5 
December 8 
December 9 
December 13 
December 15 
The Fourteenth Gubernia Conference of the 
Moscow organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) elects 
J. V. Stalin an honorary member of the presidium 
of the conference. 
J. V. Stalinıs letter to the editorial board of Bednota 
is published in No. 2,278 of that newspaper. 
J. V. Stalin writes a letter to the presidium of 
the Twenty-Second Gubernia Conference of 
the Leningrad organisation of the R.C.P.(B.). 
The letter was published in the magazine 
Krasnaya Letopis (Red Annals), No. 1 (58), 
1934. 
The Twenty-Second Gubernia Conference of 
the Leningrad organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) 
elects J. V. Stalin a member of the Leningrad 
Gubernia Party Committee. 
The Fourteenth Gubernia Conference of the 
Moscow organisation of the R.C.P.(B.) elects 
J. V. Stalin a delegate to the Fourteenth Congress 
of the R.C.P.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin signs the appeal by members 
of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) 
to the ³new opposition² concerning the maintenance 
of Party unity. 
J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the plenum 
of the Central Committee of the R.C.P.(B.) 
and delivers a speech on the subject of changing 
the name of the R.C.P.(B.) to Communist 
Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks)‹ 
C.P.S.U.(B.).

BIOGRAPHICAL CHRONICLE 434 
December 18-31 
December 18 
December 20 
December 28 
December 31 
J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the 
Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J. V. Stalin delivers the political report of the 
Central Committee to the Fourteenth Congress 
of the C.P.S.U.(B.). 
J . V. Stalin replies to the discussion of the 
Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) on 
the political report of the Central Committee. 
J. V. Stalin makes a statement concerning the 
draft resolution on the Central Committeeıs 
report to the Fourteenth Congress of the 
C.P.S.U.(B.). The statement was published 
in Pravda, No. 298, December 31, 1925. 
J. V. Stalin directs the proceedings of the 
emergency plenum of the Central Committee 
of the Party and delivers a speech on the newspaper 
Leningradskaya Pravda owing to the 
³new opposition² utilising that newspaper 
for their factional anti-Party aims. 
The Fourteenth Congress of the C.P.S.U.(B.) 
elects J . V. Stalin a member of the Central 
Committee of the C.P.S.U.(B.).

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